T1 B22 Doug McEachin Working Papers 2 of 5 Fdr- Entire Contents- 9 Withdrawal Notices- Aug 6 PDB- Part 1 Joint Inquiry Unclassified Final Report- FBI 8-31-98 Interview Mohamed Sadiq Odeh- 1st Pgs

WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Box: 00008 Folder: 0003 Document: 13
Series: Team 1 Files
Copies: 1 Pages: 9
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Document Date:
Document Type: Transcript
From:
To:
Subject: document translations
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND: 281
Withdrawn: 04-16-2008 by:
RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 13

WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Copies: 1 Pages: 37
ACCESS RESTRICTED

Document Date:
Document Type: Intelligence Telegram
From:
To:
Subject: CIA cables re: al Qaeda. Documents dated from 1998
for examination.
NND: 281
RETRIEVAL*: 281 00008 0003 14
(U<^AS1
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Copies: 1 Pages: 29
ACCESS RESTRICTED

Document Date:
Document Type: Report
From:
To:
Subject: FBI report on al Qaeda
for examination.
NND:281
RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 15

04/JfiPB. 10.2004-7: 5= 11PM NO.824 -
PlPR 10 '04 05=04PM
Declassified and Approved

for Release, 10 April 2004
Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US
Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin

since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin
implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1993 lhal his followers would
Follow the example o( World Trade Center bomber Ramzl Yousef and "bring
(he fighling lo America." ' . .
— After US missile sirfttes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin

told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to
— An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an^Kp service

at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning lo expfolUhe operative's
access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.
The millennium plotting In Canada In 1998 may have been part of

Bin Ladln's first serious attempt to Implement a terrorist strike In. the
US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he cotTcaived the
idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himselff
Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him .and he%BQ
.operation. Resaam also said that In 1996 Abu Zubaydarv'was
own US attack. .
—. Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.
% • t
Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US
embassies In Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares
operations years In advance and Is not deterred by setbacks, Bin Ladin
associates surveyed our Embassies In Nairobi end par ee Salaam as early
as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were
arrested and deported In 1997. .
i
AhQa'ida members—Including some who are US citizens—have resided
In or traveled to the US tor years, and the group apparently maintains a
support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa'Ida members found guilty
In the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a
senior EIJ member lived In California in the mld-1990s.
— A clandestine source said In 19,98 that a Sin Lad'm cell In New York
was recruiting'Muslim-American youth for attacks.
i '
We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational

threat reporting, such as that from a •••••••• service in
1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hlfack a US aircraft to gain the
release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahmen and other US'hetd
extremists. ' .
cpntinueit.., '
For the President Only Declassified and Approved
6 August 2001 for Release, 10 April 2004
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Copies: 1 Pages: 2
ACCESS RESTRICTED

Document Date: 05-16-2001
Document Type: Intelligence Report
From:
To:
Subject: ITOS Threat Update -- Daily UBL/Radical Fundamenta
list Threat Update
for examination.
NND:281
Withdrawn: 04-16-2008 by: \: 281 00008 0003 16
DEC. 11.2002 12:45PM JOINT INTEL INQUIRY STAF.F NO. 159 P. 18
FINAL REPORT
PARTI
December 10,2002
THE JOINT INQUIRY
THE CONTEXT
PARTI
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Factual Bindings
1. Finding; While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable
intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it
identified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks mat were planned for
September 11,2001. Nonetheless, the Community did have information mat was
clearly relevant to the September llattacfcs, particularly when considered for its
collective significance.
2. Finding: During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community
experienced a significant increase in information indicating mat Bin Ladin and al-
Qa'ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near future.
3. Finding: Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the
Intelligence Community received a modest, but relatively steady, stream of
intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the
United States. Nonetheless, testimony and interviews confirm that it was the general
view of the Intelligence Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the
threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur against U.S. interests
overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to attack in the domestic United
States.
4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer o.f 2001, the
Intelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were
contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This
information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or
collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat
PARTICULARLY
D-302(R«*. W-6-SS) SENSITIVE
GOVERNMENT
- 1- EXHIBIT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MOKAMED SADIQ ODEH was interviewed at Nairobi, Kenya,

from August 15, 1998, through August 28, 1998. Also present
during these interviews were investigators of the Kenyan Criminal
Investigation Division (CIO) and, at times,
ODEH was advised of the
identities of the interviewing agents and was advised that he had
certain rights. ODEH was asked if he understood English enough
to comprehend his rights and to answer questions if he chose to.
ODEH responded that he was comfortable speaking English and would
ask questions if he did not understand his rights or anything
investigators should say.
ODEH was then informed that the FBI agents were
representatives of the United etatea Government and that tinder
United States law, he (ODEH) had certain rights. It was
explained that the FBI agents wanted ODEH to be sure that he
understood those rights. ODEH was told that he did not have to
speak to the FBI or answer any questions, even if he had
previously spoken to the Pakistani authorities. ODEH was advised
that if he chose to speak, anything he said oould be used against
him in a U«s. court or elsewhere. ODEH was further advised that
in the united States, he would have the right to talk to a
lawyer, to gat advice before questioning and that he oould have a
lawyer present during any guestioning and that in the U.S. if he
could not afford a lawyer, one would be provided to him, should
he desire, before any questioning. ODEH was advised that should
he decide to speak with the FBI without a lawyer present, he
could stop answering questions at any time and that refusal to
speak could never be used as evidence against hi» in a u"*S«
eourt.
ODEH then asked whether a Kenyan lawyer was available.
ODEH was told that under Kenyan law, the authorities were under
no obligation to provide him an attorney and that he could be
questioned by Kenyan authorities but did not have to answer.
ODEH was advised that three possibilities existed regarding
guestioning. ODEH was advised that he could talk to both U,S.
and Kenyan authorities together, the Kenyans only, or to no one.
ODEH was also advised that no lawyer was available and should he
want a lawyer present during guestioning, the U.S.
on 8/15-28/98 tt Nairobi, Kenya
SA JOHN M. ANTICEV ffpw D.K il 8/31/98

GA 1 H-IOTHY O'NEILL/ JM^ : p;;"'^//)
'•lit. U in the pref-a'y >>;' » : ITS: i ' u . -i to your tzc.n?f.
SNYQ15-0001
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Copies: 1 Pages: 14
ACCESS RESTRICTED

Document Type: Intelligence Report
From:
To:
Subject: CIA repofr on UBL
for examination.
NND:281
RETRIEVALS: 281 00008 0003 17
/ .. Jj
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Copies: 1 Pages: 11
ACCESS RESTRICTED

Document Date:
Document Type: Intelligence Telegram
From:
To:
Subject: CIA cables dated 2002-2004
for examination.
NND:281
Withdrawn: 04-16-2008 by: /•*-'
RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 18

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Copies: 1 Pages: 10
ACCESS RESTRICTED

Document Type: Draft
From:
To:
Subject: E-mail draft of al Qaeda in Afghanistan section of

Commission report
for examination.
NND: 281
RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 19
o
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Copies: 1 Pages: 16
ACCESS RESTRICTED

Document Date:
Document Type: Draft
From:
To:
Subject: Draft of al Qaeda and Iraq section of Commission r

eport
for examination.
NND:281
RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 20
# /
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Copies: 1 Pages: 28
ACCESS RESTRICTED

Document Type: FBI 302
From:
To:
Subject: FBI 302s re: Pakistani travel agency
for examination.
NND: 281
RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 21
(4S&> ( -

T1 B22 Doug McEachin Working Papers 2 of 5 Fdr- Entire Contents- 9 Withdrawal Notices- Aug 6 PDB- Part 1 Joint Inquiry Unclassified Final Report- FBI 8-31-98 Interview Mohamed Sadiq Odeh- 1st Pgs

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

T1 B22 Doug McEachin Working Papers 2 of 5 Fdr- Entire Contents- 9 Withdrawal Notices- Aug 6 PDB- Part 1 Joint Inquiry Unclassified Final Report- FBI 8-31-98 Interview Mohamed Sadiq Odeh- 1st Pgs

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: document translations

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 13

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: CIA cables re: al Qaeda. Documents dated from 1998

RETRIEVAL*: 281 00008 0003 14

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: FBI report on al Qaeda

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 15

Declassified and Approved

Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin

— After US missile sirfttes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin

— An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an^Kp service

The millennium plotting In Canada In 1998 may have been part of

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: ITOS Threat Update -- Daily UBL/Radical Fundamenta

list Threat Update

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

MOKAMED SADIQ ODEH was interviewed at Nairobi, Kenya,

on 8/15-28/98 tt Nairobi, Kenya

SA JOHN M. ANTICEV ffpw D.K il 8/31/98

'•lit. U in the pref-a'y >>;' » : ITS: i ' u . -i to your tzc.n?f.

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: CIA repofr on UBL

RETRIEVALS: 281 00008 0003 17

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: CIA cables dated 2002-2004

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 18

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: E-mail draft of al Qaeda in Afghanistan section of

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 19

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: Draft of al Qaeda and Iraq section of Commission r

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 20

Folder Title: Douglas MacEachin's Working Papers [2 of 5]

Subject: FBI 302s re: Pakistani travel agency

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0003 21

Вам также может понравиться