T3 B8 Hurley Sources For Final Report Sec 9-2 2 of 3 FDR - Entire Contents - Notes - Memos - Withdrawal Notices - Government and Media Reports - 1st Pgs Scanned For Reference - Fair Use 981

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— Operation Enduring Freedom - Order of Battle Page 1 of3
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Home » Military » Operations » Attack on America » Enduring Freedom » Orbat »
Operation Enduring Freedom - Order of Battle

Coalition Forces
II Equipment Personnel LOG
Coalition Air elements
|U/I unit Australian Air Force ||? - C-130
|u/I unit Australian Air Force J[l - KC-135 Mar
|u/I unit Australian Air Force ? - F/A-18D Pie;
|U/I unit British RAF ? Tanker
|U/I unit British RAF ? Nimrod
[U/I unit British RAF ? C-130
\27 Squadron British Marines 3 CH-47
JU/I unit Australian Air Force ? - KC-135 Mar
|u/I unit Bahrain Air Force ? - fighter Bah
\ Wing Trenton, Canadian Air Force 1 - CC-150 40
|14 Wing Greenwood, NS, Canadian Air Force 111 - CP-140 ||< 200
[19 WincLComox, BC, Canadian Air Force ||l - CP-140 |< 200 |
|8 Wing Trenton, Ont, Canadian Air Force 3 - CC-130 fl50
|U/I unit Danish Air Force ||l - C-130 75
[u/I unit Danish Air Force 4 - F-16
|u/I unit French Air Force ? - C-160 DUE
[u/I unit French Air Force ||? - C-130 || Dus
|u/I unit French Air Force 2 - KC-135 |Mar
|u/I unit French Air Force 6 - Mirage 2000 |Mar
|u/I unit French Air Force [Under National Control] ? - Atlantique JDjit
|u/I unit Dutch Air Force 1 - C-130 || Mar
|u/I unit New Zealand Air Force ? - C-130 |[
|U/I unit Norwegian Air Force j|? - C-130 ||
|U/I unit UAE Air Force ? - C-130 || ||
|Coalition Ground Elements

|u/I element, Australian Special Forces
U/I element, Danish Special Forces 100
|u/I element, German Special Forces 100
|u/I element, New Zealand Special Air Service 100
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-03.htm 6/7/2004
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Background: Not just a Saudi financier...
(Approx. mid-1995 - mid 1997)
• The threat: AQ terrorist network—and clearly UBL is more than just a money man
(also involved in planning terrorist acts); credible reporting on possible WMD
threat by late 1996.
• Strategy of disruption: Planning against AQ/UBL physical and financial
infrastructure.
" Key factors: Issues station established 1996; worldwide disruptions of AQ network.
Phase I: Targeting UBL

Mid-1997 - August 1998
• The threat: UBL in Afghanistan—a state-sponsored terrorist.
• Arrest & detention strategy: Planning against UBL himself (though disruptions
continue).
• Key points: capture operation, aborted May 1998; discussion of Taliban
cooperating in arrest & detention.
Phase II: Capture.. .but capture not feasible

August 1998 - Spring 1999
• The threat: UBL--America's #1 Most Wanted
• Strategy of offensive operations: Lethal action authorized against UBL &
associates (ideally, to deliver them to law enforcement). Efforts to augment
operational capabilities through use of (unreliable) proxies.
• Key factors: Aug, 1998, Dec. 1998 & Feb. 1999 special authorities; aborted
ambush & capture attempts; missile strike option considered 3 times.
Phase III: Actionable intelligence

Spring 1999-Fall 2000
• The threat: Increasing, imminent threat from UBL/AQ—includes build up to the
Millennium, and continuous warnings thereafter.
» Strategy—'The Plan': comprehensive efforts to provide actionable intelligence to
the military, by providing more "eyes-on" intelligence.
• Key factors: July 1999 & Dec. 1999 special authorities; NALT teams sent to
Afghanistan; UAV flights.
Phase IV: From anti-AQ to anti-Taliban

Fall 2000-9/11
• The threat: Increasing, imminent threat from UBL/AQ—from the attack on the
Cole, through summer 2001.
• Strategy: sponsoring direct action to eliminate the terrorist safehaven.
• Key factors: March and July 2001 draft special authorities.
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Alexis Albion [aalbion@9-11commission.gov]

Sent: Monday, November 17, 2003 9:16 AM
To: mhurley@9-11commission.gov
Subject: FW: Agency story
Original Message
From: Alexis Albion [mailto:aalbion@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Friday, November 14, 2003 8:43 PM
To: 'pzelikow@9-llcommission.gov1
Subject: Agency story
Philip:
Attached please find a one-page outline laying out the phases of my part of the CT story, as I presently see them.
-Alexis
11/17/2003
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p
(°
I do not believe before September llth that the American
people or the international community would have supported
an invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which already,
since 9/11, has gone on for two-and-a-half years in the
absence before 9/11.
I do not believe that this country was ready to invade
Afghanistan before September llth, notwithstanding the fact
we had a president who, in 1996, said this is the challenge
of our generation, this is the threat of our generation.
MR. KERREY t I don' t - - I mean - - you persuaded the

American people that military effort was necessary in
Bosnia. You didn't have the House of Representatives with
you. You barely had a majority in the Senate. You persuaded
the American people that war was necessary to get Slobodan
Milosevic to stop his terror in Kosovo.
MR. BERGERt Yeah, and we also had 19 democracies in

NATO, and both of those cases that were standing with us
together.
MR. KERREY t The point is only that -- the arguments that

I find to be most unpersuasive is, say, we couldn't have
gotten it done because nobody had been with us, because
there are several examples during the Clinton administration
where you all wanted to do something, you believed it was
important, and you came to the American people over and over
and over, I thought, heroically and correctly, to get public
opinion on your side. That's what it's all about. If you'd
come to Congress and said, "We're at war. Somebody just
declared war on us," and I could understand not doing it
until the 7th of August. But after the 7th of August, it
seems to me that should have been the U.S. declaration, and
every policy option we had should have followed that, and
all diplomacy should have been abandoned.
MR. BERGER; I think we were at war after the 7th of

August using military, covert instruments, rolling back al
Qaeda cells, trying to put as much economic and other
pressure on the Taliban. What we did not do is invade
Afghanistan, and we'll just have to disagree on this,
Senator. I do not believe that was conceivable before 9/11.
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On May 7 1999, NATO bombs struck the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade killing 3 and
wounding 20 Chinese nationals. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, who some U.S.
officials believed before the Chinese Embassy incident had been close to capitulating,
used the tragedy and the international outrage it provoked in his effort to split the
NATO alliance. Thus, the incident may have prolonged NATO's campaign against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. DCI Tenet, in a statement to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in open hearing on July 22, 1999 testified
that the bombing was the result of a CIA mistake. A number of CIA officers were
later disciplined for the intelligence failure. The May 1999 intelligence on UBL's
location in Kandahar came as criticism of CIA's Belgrade mistake was at its peak.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | General vows to catch Bin Laden Page 1 of 2
nim NEWS
General vows to catch Bin Laden
By Andrew North
BBC correspondent in Kabul
The American commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan says he expects to bring
Osama Bin Laden to justice by the end of this year.
Lieutenant-General David Barno said dealing with Bin Laden and ex-Taleban leader Mullah Omar
was a top priority.
"The sands in the hourglass of all of the al-Qaeda senior leadership is running out," said General
Barno.
He was speaking as Afghan interim President Hamid Karzai signed the country's new constitution
into law.
'World threat'
General Barno commands about 11,000 mostly American troops in Afghanistan whose focus is
combating al-Qaeda and members of the Taleban still operating in the south and east of the
country.
In an exclusive interview with the BBC, he said the problem of Bin Laden and Mullah Mohammad
Omar would be resolved this year.
"You can be assured that we're putting a renewed emphasis on closing this out and bringing
these two individuals to justice, as well as the other senior leadership of that organisation.
"They represent a threat to the entire world and they need to be destroyed."
At least 500 people are estimated to have been killed in the past six months or so of fighting in
Afghanistan.
There are continuing fears this insecurity will disrupt this summer's planned elections - polls that
are supposed to follow today's adoption of the new constitution.
General Barno said he could provide the necessary security but criticised the United Nations for
its planning of the elections.
He also signalled a more aggressive approach by US and coalition forces in tackling the drugs
trade, which many now regard as one of the most significant threats to Afghanistan's transition
to democracy.
Mr Karzai signed the country's new constitution in a ceremony on Monday at the foreign ministry
in Kabul.
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/343057... 1/26/2004
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass
Sent: Monday, January 26, 2004 5:36 PM
To: Alexis Albion; Mike Hurley
Subject: Tenet on UBL, Feb. 2001
50 of 61 DOCUMENTS
Copyright 2001 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
February 8, 2001 Thursday

Final Edition
SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A16
LENGTH: 753 words
HEADLINE: Bin Laden Called Top Terrorist Threat;

'Global Network1 Active, Tenet Says
BYLINE: Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writers
BODY:
CIA Director George J. Tenet yesterday described Saudi exile Osama bin Laden 's
"global network" as the "most immediate and serious" terrorist threat to the United
States.
Tenet also reported that Russia, China and North Korea have continued in the past year
to sell missile technology to Iran, Pakistan and other countries.
Delivering the CIA's annual assessment of worldwide threats, Tenet told the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence that state-sponsored terrorism appears to be declining.
But "transnational" terrorist groups -- such as bin Laden's network of Arabs who fought to
drive Soviet troops out of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and have since turned against the
United States and pro-Western Arab governments — are "becoming more operationally adept
and more technically sophisticated," he said.
Bin Laden, who is believed to be living in Afghanistan under the protection of the
ruling Taliban, has been indicted in New York for conspiring to attack U.S. troops in
Somalia in 1993 and to bomb two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998. Four alleged members of
his organization, known as al Qaeda or "the Base," went on trial this week in Manhattan
for the embassy bombings, which killed 224 people, including 12 Americans. U.S. and Yemeni
officials also have said they believe that bin Laden was behind the Oct. 12 bombing of the
Navy destroyer USS Cole, which killed 17 U.S. sailors in the Yemeni port of Aden.
Bin Laden's organization, Tenet said, "is continuing to place emphasis on developing
surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection, blame and retaliation."
Thomas Fingar, acting head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, emphasized the elusive nature of al Qaeda. He told the Senate committee that bin
Laden was like the chief operating officer of a multinational corporation that provides
"guidance, funding and logistical support" to henchmen who, "like regional directors or
affiliates, have broad latitude and sometimes pursue their own agendas."
In discussing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, Tenet said Russian defense
firms last year supplied ballistic missile technology to Iran, India, China and Libya,
although he did not name the companies or specify what they sold. He also said Russia
1
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass
To: Team 3
Subject: Cole investigation, circa Jan. 2001
FYI--might be of particular interest to Len, Bonnie, and other Cole folks.
It sure doesn't sound like FBI has this thing nailed, though they clearly have a lead
suspect.
Copyright 2001 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
January 27, 2001 Saturday

Final Edition
SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A14
LENGTH: 822 words
HEADLINE: FBI Widens Cole Probe As Yemen Cooperates
BYLINE: David A. Viseand Dan Eggen, Washington Post Staff Writers

BODY:
At the FBI's request, the government of Yemen has postponed a planned trial of
suspects in the deadly bombing of the USS Cole to give U.S. agents more time to conduct
interrogations on Yemeni soil, Bush administration officials said yesterday.
In a sign of heightened cooperation, FBI agents are being allowed to question

witnesses and suspects directly, even though a formal, written agreement between the
Yemenis and the FBI called for agents to submit questions to Yemeni officials, who would
ask them.
The FBI's greater latitude has yielded important new leads in the Oct. 12 attack,
which left 17 sailors dead and 39 injured, sources said. Chief among these is evidence
that the FBI believes confirms its operating theory that the attack involved al Qaeda, the
terrorist group headed by Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden, Bush administration officials
said.
"People that are in custody now in Yemen claim to have ties to al Qaeda. We know they
are in al Qaeda from what they have said about their dealings with other things," a U.S.
law enforcement official said. "We have a far better idea that this runs through
Afghanistan."
In addition, fresh information about the whereabouts of possible suspects, witnesses

and evidence in the case has led to a widening of the probe to Saudi Arabia, where U.S.
and Saudi officials are jointly investigating the bombing, the officials said.
"The U.S. is working with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on elements of the
investigation," a Bush administration official said. "There is no question that al Qaeda
was involved in this attack. . . . The question is who gave the order."
The Cole was attacked as it refueled in the Yemeni port of Aden by suicide bombers who
pulled up alongside the destroyer in a small boat and detonated military-style explosives.
In the aftermath of the blast, Yemeni government officials were apprehensive about
allowing the FBI to operate freely and insisted on negotiating an agreement that laid out
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass
To: Team 3; Team 1
Subject: Tom Friedman on UBL, June 2001
Just FYI--here's America's leading foreign policy columnist trying to think like UBL
during the "summer of threat" in 2001. Warren
16 of 61 DOCUMENTS
Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company

The New York Times
June 26, 2001, Tuesday, Late Edition - Final
SECTION: Section A; Page 19; Column 5; Editorial Desk
LENGTH: 725 words
HEADLINE: Foreign Affairs;

A Memo From Osama
BYLINE: By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
BODY:
Memo From: Osama bin Laden
To: all field operatives
My men: This is a great day! Did you see what we accomplished last week? We drove the
U.S. armed forces out of three Arab countries by just threatening to hit them. I had some
of our boys discuss an attack against the U.S. over cell phones, the C.I.A. picked it up,
and look what happened: The F.B.I, team in Yemen, which was investigating our destruction
of the U.S.S. Cole in Aden harbor, just packed up and left -- even though the State
Department was begging them to stay. See ya. Then, after we made a few more phone calls,
hundreds of U.S. marines -- marines! -- who were conducting a joint exercise with the
Jordanian Army cut short their operation, got back on their amphibious vessels and fled
Jordan on Saturday. See ya. Then all the U.S. warships in Bahrain, which is the
headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, were so scared of being hit by us they evacuated
Bahrain's harbor and sailed out into the Persian Gulf. Boys, there is a military term for
all this; it's called a "retreat." Allahu Akbar! God is Great!
This is a superpower? The Americans turned tail as soon as they picked up a few
threats from us. The U.S. press barely reported it; the White House press didn't even ask
the president about it. But trust me, everyone out here noticed it. It told them many
things: The Americans are afraid of sustaining even one casualty to their soldiers, they
don't trust their own intelligence or weak Arab allies to protect them, and they have no
military answer for our threat.
I love America. The Bush people want to spend $100 billion on a missile defense shield
to deal with a threat that doesn't yet exist, and they run away from the threat that
already exists. They think we rogues are going to attack them with an intercontinental
ballistic missile with a return address on it. Are they kidding? Am I wearing a sign that
says STUPID on it? We'll hit them the way the Iranians blew up the U.S. base at Khobar, in
Saudi Arabia. We'll use layers of local operatives, who can't be traced to any country.
Look at the indictment the U.S. courts just passed down for the Khobar bombing. They named
14 people, and they hinted that Iranian agents had coordinated them all, but they had no
proof, so they could never pin it on Iran, so they could never retaliate against Iran.
The people who had the proof were the Saudis, but they refused to turn it over to the
1
-••-•*••• ; . UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET NODIS \.^ •

DECL: 7/16/n . RELEASED IN 'FULL
U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin Laden,
DECAPTIONED
Since the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, the United
States has consistently discussed with them peace,
humanitarian assistance, drugs and human rights. However,
we have made clear that Usama bin Laden (UBL) and terrorism
is the preeminent issue between the U.S. and the Taliban.
• These concerns over bin Ladin preceded the 1998 bombings.
• For instance, Secretary Christopher wrote to the Taliban
Foreign Minister in 1996 that.uwe wish to work with you
to expel all terrorists and those who support terrorism..."
In our talks we have stressed that UBL has murdered
Americans and continues to plan attacks against Americans
and others and that we cannot ignore this threat.
• Have also emphasized that the international community
f shares this concern. In 1999 and in 2000, the UN
Security Council passed resolutions demanding that UBL be
expelled to a country where he can be brought to justice.
• Have told the Taliban that the terrorist problem is not
confined to bin Laden and that the Taliban must take
steps to shut down all terrorist activities.
• Have told them that the resolution of the bin Laden issue
and steps to close the terrorist apparatus would enable
us to discuss other issues in an improved atmosphere.
• Conversely, have stressed that if this terrorism issue is
not addressed, there can be no improvement in relations.
These talks have been fruitless. The Taliban usually said
that they want a solution but cannot comply with UNSCRs.
Often the Taliban asked the U.S. to suggest a solution.
• In October 1999 < the Taliban suggested several
"solutions" including a UBL trial by a panel of Islamic
scholars or monitoring of UBL Afghanistan by QIC or UN.
• Taliban consistently maintained that UBL's activities are
restricted, despite all evidence to the contrary.
SECRET NODIS
Classified by: Christina B. Rocca, A/S for South Asia
UNITED STATESDEPARTMEBHflflErS:TATJ:.0. 12958; 1.5 <b) and (d)
REVIEW AUTHORITY: SHARON E AHMAD
DATE/CASE ID: 08 SEP 2003 200103969
The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: The Uncertainty Factor Page 1 of 2
ie $&ti Jerk euncs M.NT««KM»I» F<«M«

f y t r I r. 1- >"/ " sp««seftEa BY
AprU 13,2004
OP-ED COLUMNIST
The Uncertainty Factor

By DAVID BROOKS
T wenty years ago, Secretary of State George Shultz went to the Park Avenue Synagogue in New
York to give a speech about terrorism. Fighting a war on terrorism, he emphasized, means coping
with uncertainty.
Terrorists operate outside the normal rules, Shultz observed. Because an attack is so hard to anticipate,
he said, "our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, pre-
emption and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts."
We can't wait for the sort of conclusive evidence that would stand up in a court of law. "We cannot
allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to
respond." We have to take the battle to the terrorists so we can at least control the time and place of the
confrontation.
And we have to plan these counteroffensives aware of how little we know for sure.
Facing such great uncertainties, Shultz continued, the president has to take extra care to prepare the
electorate: "The public must understand before the fact that some will seek to cast any pre-emptive or
retaliatory action by us in the worst light and will attempt to make our military and our policy makers
— rather than the terrorists — appear to be the culprits. The public must understand before the fact that
occasions will come when their government must act before each and every fact is known."
The Shultz speech opened a rift within the Reagan administration. Shultz's argument was that
uncertainty forces us to be aggressive. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, on the other hand,
argued that uncertainty should make us cautious. As one Weinberger aide told The Times, "The
Pentagon is more aware of the downside of military operations and therefore is cautious about
undertaking operations where the results are as unpredictable as in pre-emptive strikes against
terrorists."
Shultz and Weinberger were clear and mature. Both understood there is no perfect answer to terror and
both understood the downsides of their respective positions.
Two decades and a national tragedy later, it is hard to find anybody that consistent.
If you follow the 9/11 commission, you find yourself in a crowd of Shultzians. The critics savage the
Clinton and Bush administrations for not moving aggressively enough against terror. Al Qaeda facilities
should have been dismantled before 9/11, the critics say.
http://www.nytimes.eom/2004/04/l 3/opinion/l 3BROO.html?pagewanted=print&position= 4/13/2004

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Articles
Radio Rumsfeld: All right. What's up? When they told me what this was about I
Television sat down last night and made some notes.
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Reports Q: Oh, my goodness. Thank you.
Search Rumsfeld: I'm not into this detail stuff, I'm more concepty.
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Rumsfeld: Terrific speech .

svashingtonpost.com: Time to Deal With Iran Page 1 of3
washingtonpost.com
Time to Deal With Iran

By James Dobbins
Thursday, May 6, 2004; Page A35
Iranian diplomats have shown up in Baghdad, reportedly at British

government urging. London hopes that Iranian intervention can prove helpful
in tamping down Shiite resistance to the U.S.-led coalition and in building
support for an emerging Iraqi interim government. This must sound odd to
American ears, accustomed to hearing the Iranian regime described as a
member of the "axis of evil." But this would not be the first time Tehran has
come to Washington's aid in the war on terror.
Before there was Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was Operation Enduring
Freedom. Americans tend to think of that earlier campaign for the liberation of
Afghanistan as a similarly U.S.-initiated and dominated effort. But in fact the
war to displace the Taliban had been underway long before the United States
became involved. It was being fought by a coalition consisting of Iran, Russia,
India and the Northern Alliance. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, the United
States joined this coalition and, with the essential addition of U.S. air power,
Northern Alliance forces were able to take Kabul and drive the Taliban from
power.
Two weeks after the fall of Kabul, all the major elements of the Afghan
opposition came together at a U.N.-sponsored conference in Bonn. The
objective was to create a broadly based successor government to the Taliban.
As the U.S. representative at that gathering, I worked both with the Afghan
delegations and with the other national representatives who had the greatest
influence among them, which is to say the Iranian, Russian and Indian envoys.
All these delegations proved helpful. None was more so than the Iranians. On
two occasions Iranian representatives made particularly memorable
contributions. The original version of the Bonn agreement, drafted by the
United Nations and amended by the Afghans who were present, neglected to mention either democracy
or the war on terrorism. It was the Iranian representative who spotted these omissions and successfully
urged that the newly emerging Afghan government be required to commit to both.
The second was even more decisive. The conference was in its final hours. The German chancellor was
due to arrive momentarily for the closing ceremony. Yet we still lacked agreement on the central issue:
composition of an interim Afghan government. The Northern Alliance was insisting on 18 of 25
ministerial portfolios, which would have marginalized other opposition groups. From 2 a.m. to 5 a.m.
the four key envoys ~ those from Washington, Tehran, Moscow and New Delhi — worked along with
the U.N. representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, and our German host to persuade the recalcitrant Northern
Alliance delegate to make the necessary compromises.
Two weeks later President Hamid Karzai and his new cabinet were inaugurated in Kabul. The most
senior foreign delegation was headed by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who had stopped in
Herat on his way in to pick up the one warlord, Ismail Khan, whose attendance and support for the new
government was most in doubt. At the Tokyo donors' conference the following month, Iran pledged
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5838-2004May5?language=printer 5/6/2004
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BBC News | SOUTH ASIA | Karzai takes power in Kabul Page 1 of4
CATEGORIES TV RADIO COMMUNICATE WHERE I LIVE INDEX SEARCH
You are in: World: South Asia

Front Page Saturday, 22 December, 2001, 10:20 GMT WATCH/LISTEN
world Karzai takes power in Kabul ON THIS STORY
** The BBC's Caroline Wyatt
"They have just six months
to make it work"
l* The BBC's Richard Miron
"Its main task is to ensure
Africa stability"
Americas
*R United Nations envoy,
Asia-Pacific Lakhdar Brahimi
Europe "Each and every Afghan
Middle East has grown tired of war"
South Asia 411 Baqer Moin of the BBC's
Persian and Pashto Service
From Our Own "Hamid Karzai wants to
Correspondent push Afghanistan towards
Power is transferred with a handshake the modern era"
Letter From America Hamid Karzai has been sworn in as
UK
UK Politics
Afghanistan's new leader at an emotionally- AFTER THE
charged ceremony in Kabul.
Business TALEBAN
Sci/Tech
Health In the first peaceful transfer of power in The loya jirga
Education Afghanistan for decades, Mr Karzai embraced Political healing
Entertainment former president Burhanuddin Rabbani and What is a loya jirga?
Talking Point called on Afghans to "forget the painful past".
In Depth Profiles
AudioVideo
In a speech punctuated Hamid Karzai
by applause and shouts Zahir Shah
This agreement,
mma SPORT of support, Mr Karzai although far from Unfinished conflict
HHd Weather called for international perfect, has been Guarding Gardez
help in re-building his warmly welcomed by
the people of Violence halts refugees
SERVICES war-ravaged country
Afghanistan and by 'Bounty' threat
Daily E-mail and promised to work
all the countries of Last stand or long war?
News Ticker hard for unity and
the world Warlords re-emerge
Mobiles/PDAs peace.
Rebuilding the
Feedback Tne new government is UN envoy Lakhdar country
He|P to run Afghanistan for
Brahimi Spending the billions
LOW Graphics tne next six rnonths - the first stage in a Children's bravery
process which should culminate in elections DJFACT FILES
within two and a half years. Afghan powerbrokers
War: Where next?
Mr Karzai, 44, said his administration would QAUDIO VIDEO
respect all Islamic rules, the freedom of TV and Radio reports
speech and the rights of women. He also CTTALKING POINT
stressed the need to rebuild Afghanistan's You asked Hamid
education system, severely damaged under Karzai
the country's former Taleban rulers.
See also:
"We should put our hands together to forget 05 Dec 01 | South Asia
Guide to Afghan deal
the painful past. As brothers and sisters, we
21 Dec 01 I South Asia
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/l 724641 .stm 5/2/2004

- Bush: 'Justice will be done' - September 20, 2001 Page 1 of4
.com./ U.S.
SEARCH Bush: 'Justice will be done1
MAIN PAGE
WORLD September 20, 2001 Posted: 10:34 p.m. EOT (0234 GMT)
U.S.
WEATHER
BUSINESS
(CNN) -Vowing "justice will be
SPORTS done" against those responsible for
POLITICS last week's terrorist attacks, President
LAW Bush Thursday night denounced
SCI-TECH Afghanistan for training and
SPACE
harboring terrorists.
HEALTH
ENTERTAINMENT
TRAVEL "We condemn the Taliban regime,"
EDUCATION Bush said in a speech to both houses of
IN-DEPTH Congress and a national audience,
describing the military rulers of
AMERICAN Bush warned that the Taliban would share Afghanistan as repressive and blaming
bin Laden's fate if he wasn't turned over to them for allowing terrorists to be trained
MORNING the U.S.
WITH in the country.
SOLEDAD O'BRIEN
VIDEO
LOCAL
> SAVE THIS <5 El EMAIL THIS The president also demanded the
CNN NEWSWATCH i€S PRINT THIS MOST POPULAR
Taliban turn over all members of al
E-MAIL SERVICES Qaeda, the terrorist organization run by
CNNtoGO __„____„.,,,,___ Osama bin Laden, who Bush has labeled
ABOUT US/HELP the prime suspect in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon last
week.
CNN TV
what's on
show transcripts "They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate," Bush said of
CNN Headline News the Taliban.
CNN International
askCNN
"Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our
EDITIONS enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done," Bush
CNN.com Asia vowed to thunderous applause.
CNN.com Europe
CNNenEspanoi.com Bush said countries around the world would have to chose, "Either you are with
CNNArabic.com
set your edition
us, or you are with the terrorists."
Languages
He said nations who harbored terrorists would be considered a hostile regime.
Time, Inc.
(Full story)
Earlier, the White House rejected a recommendation from Afghanistan's Grand

Islamic Council that the country's ruling Taliban ask bin Laden to leave
Afghanistan. (Full story)
Meeting in Kabul, Afghanistan, the council members rejected the U.S. demand,
delivered by Pakistan, that bin Laden be handed over to stand trial for the
September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. (Statement)
They also warned the United States that if it attacks, the Taliban would declare a
jihad, or holy war, against the United States.
http://www.cnn.com/2001 /US/09/20/gen.america.under.attack/ 5/2/2004

CNN.com - Taliban strict on Christian arrests - August 7, 2001 Page 1 of3
com WORLD
MAINPAGE
EUROPE
WORLD Taliban strict on Christian arrests
WEATHER
BUSINESS
SCI-TECH August 7, 2001 Posted: 10:40 AM EOT (1440 GMT)
ENTERTAINMENT
IN-DEPTH By staff and wires
NEWS BRIEF
SPORT
KABUL, Afghanistan -
EDITIONS: Afghanistan's Taliban rulers have
CNN.com U.S.: not been swayed by international
Sections
moves to seek the release of 24 aid
agency workers who face the death
CNN.com Asia
set default edition
penalty for promoting
Christianity.
MULTIMEDIA:
video Authorities said on Tuesday they had
Afghanistan is in the midst of a strong evidence to back up the
humanitarian crisis. charge that detained Western aid
E-MAIL: , agency workers were involved in
Subscribe to one of converting Afghan Muslims to
our news e-mail lists SAVE THIS EMAIL THIS
Enter your address: Christianity.
fBi PRINT THIS MOST POPULAR
— —————-—:—_____—__ The United States, Australia and
SERVICES: Germany all said they were
concerned for four Germans, two Australians and two Americans, and were
seeking access to them through diplomatic missions in neighboring Pakistan.
CNN on AvantGo
desktop news ticker
more services Mohammad Salim Haqqani, Taliban Deputy Minister for the Promotion of
CNN WEB SITES:
Virtue and Prevention of Vice, told Reuters: "We have our concerns too.
" . . . these people strongly insulted our religion and traditions. The concern
local languages: shown by foreigners is not justified."
German
Italian
Danish Religious police in Kabul on Sunday arrested eight foreign staff and 16
Spanish
Portuguese Afghan workers with Christian relief agency Shelter Now International.
Korean Headlines
Arabic Promoting Christianity is punishable by death Q MORE STORIES
under the strict interpretation of Islamic Sharia A profi|e of the Taliban and
DISCUSSION:
law imposed by the Taliban. their battle with the y N
message boards
Officials from the German Embassy in FJECNN com Asia

SITE INFO:
Islamabad, Pakistan, will travel to the Afghan Mpre news from our
search
ad info capital, Kabul, the ministry said in a statement. Asia edition
jobs It didn't elaborate. g
CNN NETWORKS:
The ministry said German officials in Islamabad met Tuesday with their
Australian and U.S. counterparts to coordinate efforts to obtain the
CNN Radio "immediate release" of the aid workers.
CNN anchors
transcripts
Turner distribution The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan also has said it will send a representative to
http://edition.cnn.com/2001 /WORLD/asiapcf7south/08/07/afghan.unmoved/ 4/29/2004

^NN.corn - Taliban strict on Christian arrests - August 7, 2001 Page 1 of 3
(i^PRJNTTHIS
WlyF^JI I I*. Powered by
Taliban strict on Christian arrests

By staff and wires
KABUL, Afghanistan ~ Afghanistan's Taliban rulers have not been swayed by international moves to
seek the release of 24 aid agency workers who face the death penalty for promoting Christianity.
Authorities said on Tuesday they had strong evidence to back up the charge that detained Western aid agency
workers were involved in converting Afghan Muslims to Christianity.
The United States, Australia and Germany all said they were concerned for four Germans, two Australians and
two Americans, and were seeking access to them through diplomatic missions in neighboring Pakistan.
Mohammad Salim Haqqani, Taliban Deputy Minister for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, told
Reuters: "We have our concerns too.
" . . . these people strongly insulted our religion and traditions. The concern shown by foreigners is not
justified."
Religious police hi Kabul on Sunday arrested eight foreign staff and 16 Afghan workers with Christian relief
agency Shelter Now International.
Promoting Christianity is punishable by death under the strict interpretation of Islamic Sharia law imposed by
the Taliban.
Officials from the German Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, will travel to the Afghan capital, Kabul, the
ministry said in a statement. It didn't elaborate.
The ministry said German officials in Islamabad met Tuesday with their Australian and U.S. counterparts to
coordinate efforts to obtain the "immediate release" of the aid workers.
The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan also has said it will send a representative to Kabul, the Associated Press
reported.
The diplomats were trying to make contact with the prisoners through the Red Cross and United Nations
missions in Afghanistan, the ministry said.
Germany's Embassy in Pakistan maintains "close working contacts" with the Taliban on the provision of
humanitarian aid, the ministry said. Germany closed its embassy in Kabul in 1989.
http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=CNN.com+-+Tali... 4/29/2004
DCI Statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy Bombing to a House Permanent Select... Page 1 of 5
Central Intelligence Agency

Director of Central Intelligence
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SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY
DCI Statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy Bombing

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Open Hearing
22 July 1999
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Dr. Hamre and I are here today to explain how a series of errors led to the unintended bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7th.
We will try to describe to the best of our ability - in this open, public session - the causes of what can only be
described as a tragic mistake. It was a major error. I cannot minimize the significance of this. The ultimate
responsibility for the role of intelligence in this tragedy is mine. I've told my own people that we will not hide behind
excuses such as stretched resources or time pressures. It is precisely when the pressure is intense-life or death
decisions are being made-thai the President and the American public expect us to provide the best intelligence in
the world. Clearly, in this case we failed to do that.
But before we tell how this happened, I think it is important to provide some perspective. Dr. Hamre will tell you
that the United States and our allies flew thousands of sorties and struck many hundreds of targets over 78 days
with very few errors. America's success, in this as in previous conflicts, owes much to the extraordinary work of our
intelligence services. The specifics of our contributions cannot be made public Mr. Chairman, but as this committee
knows, we provided our forces detailed knowledge of the enemy, his intentions, his dispositions, and his weapons.
Mr. Chairman, the nature of warfare has changed. When cities were struck in past wars, none doubted that
civilians, embassies, hospitals, and schools would be in harm's way. Today, our ability to strike precisely has
created the impression that sensitive sites can be safe in the middle of a war zone. Our desire to protect innocents
in the line of fire has added an enormous burden on all of us that we accept. It is our job to do our best to ensure
that only appropriate targets be struck.
I think it is useful to note that this episode is unusual because the CIA does not normally assemble, on its own,
target nomination packages containing the coordinates of specific installations or buildings. The targeting support
typically provided by CIA is usually at the strategic and planning level, such as analytical judgments on the kinds of
targets that are the most important, commentary or specific information concerning targets selected by the military
or others, and information that assists the military in identifying future targets.
In addition to describing how this mistake happened, I will also outline the corrective actions that we are taking
within the government to ensure that - as far as humanly possible - that there is no repeat of this type of incident.
The attack was a mistake. Let me emphasize, our investigation has determined that no one - I repeat no one --
knowingly targeted the Chinese Embassy. Speculation to the contrary is simply unfounded. No one, at any stage in
the process, realized that our bombs were aimed at the Chinese Embassy.
There were three basic failures. First, the technique used to locate the intended target - the headquarters of the
Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP) - was severely flawed. Second, none of the
military or intelligence databases used to validate targets contained the correct location of the Chinese Embassy.
Third, nowhere in the target review process was either of the first two mistakes detected.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/1999/dci_speech_072299.html 4/27/2004
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0 o ^AcxU /7£
(L,
^J
C7//«
CMH--PZ Comments for my sections of the Final Report
9.2
Documentary evidence
Hank Crumpton CIA Studies piece
Libby Interview
Tommy Franks Interview
Iraq question—Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz
Rice interview
Hadley interview
Transcripts of when the president started to look at these problems
Andrew Card interview
Cite to secondary sources - compare with Clarke book, Woodward book, Bush at War,
etc.
Powell interview. We asked whether the Woodward treatment of Camp David was
accurate.
Transcripts of interviews of the President, and of VP and of Card
Write it the way you'd write it if we weren't in Iraq

Who was the administration deciding to go to war against
Who—what were the phases of our strategy?
Write it straight
Factual
DoD side is excessive. Does it focus on readiness to deal with Afghanistan or an

excessive preoccupation with
General Peter Schoomaker
February 19, 2004
February (U) Schoomaker again noted that before 9/11, not many people in the
government acted as if the U.S. was at war, even though they say today that they were.
He stated, "folks are not calling it like it really was." There were people working hard to
address terrorism, but there was not much support for these individuals. Schoomaker said
that no one anticipated an airplane would ram into a building. However, for a long time,
at least as far back as 25 years, the U.S. was sending out the same message, which was if
the terrorists "picked" at the U.S. below a certain level, the U.S. would not act. Above
that level, the U.S. would pull its troops out. Until 9/11, the U.S. was not willing to
seriously take the fight to the enemy.
' , 1 1 V
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It's Afghanistan, but I want plans about Iraq if they do something or if we find out about
Iraqi involvement in 9/11. (U)
On Iraq, Rice said they felt they were doing a daily tit-for-tat exercise in the no-fly zones.
Cheney woodward interview: But there was, really, from the very beginning, an interest
as well in other elements, if you will of the global terrorist network: the fact that al
Qaeda had cells in a lot of countries around the world was something we came to grips
with in the very beginning. Cheney p. 7
Cheney: I would say that before we got to Camp David the first priority had already been
established. It's clearly al Qaeda, bin Laden, Afghanistan. What additional steps we
would take, or might be taken, I think were some of the things we talked about then, sort
of the sequencing we talked about at Camp David. Cheney. P. 12.
Hadley "The campaign was global in the get-go in terms of diplomacy, financial pieces,
making it clear to countries that they would have to choose, and the intelligence piece.
It's all global." Balz interview p. 534. The military piece is beginning to roll out initially
in Afghanistan. But the strategy and the campaign is global from the get-go." P. 534
Camp David Saturday, he told Condi about it, that he was concerned that people like
Cheney and Powell, from their decade-ago experience with Iraq, were bringing a little
something to the table. And he wanted to make sure that that didn't figure in his
decision." Hadley Balz interview p. 535
President Bush to Woodward: Well, Iraq wasn't in the second round. There wasn't a lot
of talk about Iraq in the second round. The second round of discussion was focused only
on Afghanistan; let me put it to you this way. P. 307
"The decision not to send military troops into Iraq, yes, that was pretty much made I
think in that [morning session].
Rummie to Woodward: Rummie has no recollection of Wolfowitz remarks at Camp

David, "when I'm in these meetings he doesn't talk much.
Shelton, February 5: Shelton recalls the meetings. He said, however, that he did
not recall the administration being obsessed with Iraq. In his opinion, the
administration was focused on all challenges. The administration reviewed all of
the plans and challenged certain assumptions underlying the plans, as any
prudent new organization leader should do.
Cite statements in Woodward's book, and Clarke's book.
Then cite what Tommy Franks has to say about this. He was pushing this. And it did not
take away troops earmarked for Afghanistan.

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Home » Military » Operations » Attack on America » Enduring Freedom » Orbat »

Operation Enduring Freedom - Order of Battle

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Phase I: Targeting UBL

Phase II: Capture.. .but capture not feasible

Phase III: Actionable intelligence

Phase IV: From anti-AQ to anti-Taliban

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MR. KERREY t I don' t - - I mean - - you persuaded the

MR. BERGERt Yeah, and we also had 19 democracies in

MR. KERREY t The point is only that -- the arguments that

MR. BERGER; I think we were at war after the 7th of

Copyright 2001 The Washington Post

The Washington Post

February 8, 2001 Thursday

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A16

LENGTH: 753 words

HEADLINE: Bin Laden Called Top Terrorist Threat;

FYI--might be of particular interest to Len, Bonnie, and other Cole folks.

Copyright 2001 The Washington Post

The Washington Post

January 27, 2001 Saturday

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A14

LENGTH: 822 words

HEADLINE: FBI Widens Cole Probe As Yemen Cooperates

BYLINE: David A. Viseand Dan Eggen, Washington Post Staff Writers

In a sign of heightened cooperation, FBI agents are being allowed to question

In addition, fresh information about the whereabouts of possible suspects, witnesses

Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company

June 26, 2001, Tuesday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 19; Column 5; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 725 words

HEADLINE: Foreign Affairs;