Truth,PoliticsandtheWill

Truth,PoliticsandtheWill

byJamesF.Bohman

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Source: PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:2/1987,pages:199204,onwww.ceeol.com.

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REVIEW

TRUTH, POLITICS, AND THE WILL*

James Bohman In the eyes of some, critical theory has reached a turning point. The older solutions to the problem of the foundations of critique have long been put into question, and now the newer solutions have been around long enough to have been subjected to thorough criticism. Various responses to this situation make up the landscape of current literature on critical theory. But one clear trend is toward the conclusion that the new idea of a linguistic turn seems to many to be as questionable as Marxs old idea of a turn to economics. Recent attempts, by Jrgen Habermas in particular, to ground criticism in concepts of language or communication seem all the less plausible as every kind of transcendental argument is subjected to antifoundationalist criticism in ethics and epistemology. So it is in this situation that Rolf Zimmermanns book brings together many different strands of the debate about the future of critical theory. While his arguments are inspired especially by analytic philosophy, he thinks that a new turn to politics is the only way out for an emancipatory social philosophy. For Zimmermann, not only are the old arguments mistaken, but the old utopias of rationality, transparency and consensus, from which critical theory drew its ideals and standards, are also exhausted. What is this new critical perspective? Zimmermanns new turn to emancipatory politics is defined negatively, precisely by a new separation of politics from truth, whether truth be interpreted as objective truth in Marxs historical materialism or as consensus in Habermass theory of communicative action. In its place, the concepts of the will and autonomous self-determination are supposed to do the job that reason and truth failed to do in defining the Utopian ideal of a critical theory. But the question is: can they do this work without giving up emancipation itself? Can critical theory do without what Marcuse and Horkheimer called the emphatic claim to truth and justice without thereby slipping back into pure Hobbesianism, the original political philosophy of the will? According to Zimmermann, a critical theory brings together three basic elements into a coherent unity: a structural analysis of society, a normative criticism of that structure, and an alternative, rational Utopia (11). He tries to show that the source of the unity of these three elements in Marx is a common political concern. Marx wants his social theory to give support to the idea of a society structured by personal sociation (personelle Vergesellschaftung), that is, a society structured so as to allow the optimal constitutive effects for social
* The issues discussed in this review are raised by Rolf Zimmermann, Utopie-Rationalitt-Politik. Zu Kritik, Rekonstruktion und Systematik einer emanzipatorischen Gesellschaftstheorie bei Marx und Habermas. Freiburg/ Mnchen: Alber Verlag, 1985. Praxis International 7:2 July 1987 0260-8448

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interaction. Such a society in which social structure is the result of social interaction fits what Zimmermann calls the optimal interactive model. Capitalism favors a form of social relations mediated by things, not by persons, in acts of exchange of commodities in a market instead of by social interaction. The problem is that Marx couches his criticism of capitalism in the objective, scientific terms of a theory of value. Given its intractable problems, which Zimmermann presents with great clarity, it can hardly provide the basis for critique in general. That is not all: there are real political problems with the optimal model itself; it leads to a non-political, perhaps even anti-political utopia, one that holds out the possibility of some complete immediacy and technical transparency in the organization of relations between persons. The clear consequence of this utopian vision is the rejection of the basic political achievements of modernity, as Lefort and Castoriadis point out as well. Most objectionable to Zimmermann is Marxs lack of appreciation for parliamentary forms of government, which, he argues, best embody the radical democratic ideals of freedom and equality. Indeed, even according to the criteria of personal sociation, Marxs utopia is a basic obstacle to a sensible political theory, since it does not permit him to show how the rationality of social interaction could be so mediated in the society as a whole (134). Zimmermann argues that such a mediation could only be achieved by political institutions. From this well-founded perception of a lack of a concept of politics and of institutions in Marx, however, he goes on to make the repeated demand that these political institutions therefore be able to mediate interaction in the whole of society. This requirement unnecessarily restricts the range of possibilities for political institutions to one, namely the form of the centralized state, hardly a necessary political institution or a condition of emancipation. Because Zimmermann never clearly distinguishes various possible political institutions and forms of political association, he often confuses Marxs criticism of the state with a criticism of politics as such. In any case, given the lacuna of Marxs critical theory, it would seem that Habermass theory of communication could fill the breach; it is, after all, a theory of social interaction. Yet, it is clear that, for Zimmermann, Habermas fails as much as Marx in grounding critical theory. In particular, his basic quarrel is with the strong, transcendental claims for grounding criticism in a theory of truth, in particular in a pragmatic theory of truth as consensus; in its transcendental version, one deduces norms governing all possible speech from the criteria disclosed in the theory of truth. I think that if there were such a grounding of critical theory in a theory of truth it would be as dubious as Zimmermann thinks it is; the problem is that this is a misleading characterization of what Habermas is doing, at least in his better moments and at least since 1976 and the inauguration of the reconstructive phase of his writings. But even if Zimmermanns arguments against Habermass Knowledge and Human Interests and his 1973 essay Theories of Truth are accurate, they do not lend any support at all to his ultimate political purpose. His rejection of Habermas leads him to suggest, implausibly, that there is no relation between the norm of consensus and radical democratic politics.

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The basic thrust of Zimmermanns criticism goes to the heart of the pragmatic turn of Habermass critical theory, since he argues forcefully that emancipation has nothing to do with general norms of all possible speech; on the methodological level, this implies that formal or universal pragmatics should not be made into a foundational discipline for critical theory. Here is the first difficulty: Even if this is true, in what sense is Habermas turn to communication dependent on a particular theory of truth? Zimmermann seems to be using truth in Habermass more general sense of validity, although he increases the potential for confusion In his argument by running the two together. For Habermas, there are validity claims other than truth., these are indeed truth-like, in the sense of having cognitive value, but they are not reducible to truth. This is no small matter. This ambiguity leads Zimmermann to several interpretive dead-ends in his book, if not to his final ambiguous political stance. First of all, to say that Habermas wants to ground critical theory in a theory of truth Is to contradict Habermass explicit meta-philosophical claims about the status of his pragmatic concepts. It is no longer the case that consensus or the ideal speech situation is to be seen as always already contained in the first act of speech. Rather than having a transcendental status, Habermas now wants to give his pragmatics the status of all critical social science: empirical and fallibilistic in character, and yet normative and universal in ambition. Now that the theory of communicative action is to be considered a reconstructive science, it clearly can no longer serve the transcendental role Zimmermann ascribes to it; we deduce no critical social and political claims from it in the way that we might from the Categorical Imperative, any more than a scientist might deduce particular true propositions from his/her operating theory of truth. At the same time, I think that Zimmermann does point out basic deficiencies in Habermass account of language, even if he does not present sufficient reasons to reject it entirely. His most telling criticisms come in two different areas: first, regarding the concept of a theoretical truth claim in the sciences, and, second, regarding the relation of pragmatics and semantics in the theory of meaning. While accurate and well-made, none of these criticisms lead to the political conclusions which Zimmermann wants to make in rejecting a politics of consensus. Even granting that practical truth is not merely consensus (although here Zimmermanns arguments are not completely convincing). It still does not follow that the democratic principle of legitimacy is not consensual. Zimmermann summarizes his entire criticism of Habermass theory of truth in this way: theoretical truth is not essentially discursive; practical truth is not essentially consensual (349), The first point is established in the way typical of recent debates about realism, viz., by using the open question style of argument that Hilary Putnam puts to the realist in Reason, Truth and History in order to make the opposite point, namely that there are pragmatic dimensions to any adequate concept of truth. For Zimmermann, Habermass concept of truth as a claim to be redeemed discursively in arguments is inadequate, since it does not say anything about the nature of truth but only

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about the way truth is discovered. But the pragmatist may respond in this way: to what degree can truth and its discovery be separated? An analogous question emerges in semantics, and the answer, to it as well, forms the dividing line between pragmatists and realists: can speakers meaning be separated from meaning as such? Like all pragmatic interpretations of normative concepts, Habermass theory of truth is an epistemic one: it denies that truth need be independent in some metaphysical sense; rather truth is only counterfactual relative to our particular, restricted judgments at any time. Zimmermann insists that discursive validation is not strong enough; truth in his sense of a verificationist semantics must go all the way to justification. Here again it is not clear how this distinction makes any real difference, since Habermas is not saying that merely giving some argument is what makes an utterance true. Zimmermanns account makes Habermass idea of truth weaker than it need be since it misses entirely the Peircean character of truth as a validity claim, that is, as essentially normative and counterfactual; truth is what would be discursively redeemed in an ideal community by the best argument. If justification is stronger than truth in this pragmatic sense, and if truth is not essentially discursive in this normative and counterfactual sense, then the verificationist has a real problem: it is not essentially knowable, nor is it in any way a norm for guiding our endeavors to know the world. What is behind this criticism of Habermas is the belief that the concept of truth must be worked out at the semantic level; although in this work Zimmermann never makes clear what this semantics would be like, he alludes to Tugendhat, Dummett and his own essays. Zimmermann is perfectly correct in pointing out that Habermas too quickly denies the possibility of semantics. In Habermass defense, however, I think that it could be shown that Dummetts version of verificationist semantics would only lend support to Habermass pragmatic view of truth, since Dummett shows that even on the semantic level meaning and truth cannot be separated from either speakers knowledge or the basic communicative function of language use. Here, too, what is required is a firm distinction between semantics and pragmatics, but not their abstract separation. Such a distinction certainly does not prima facie show that truth is not discursive, nor that pragmatic rules must be merely conventional (325). Nor does Quines thesis of radical translation lend any support to these arguments against Habermas pragmatic theory of truth as Zimmermann thinks it does; radical translation does not imply for Quine that semantic structure is not subject to discursive examination and revision, or that the categorical apparatus is like an unbreakable chain (329). On the contrary, Quine believes that the semantic structure of our language can be subjected to constant examination through first order predicate logic; translation into such a regulated language as he puts it in Word and Object makes clear our ontological commitments. In general, no arguments about the philosophy of language can say enough about the semantics of true or just to be informative about science or politics; indeed, as Quine says, any semantic interpretation is itself an empirical theory like any other, hardly a limit to inquiry or reflection.

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For all that, my strongest objections concern Zimmermanns argument that practical truth is not essentially consensual. Zimmermanns criticism of practical truth as consensus could easily be made from a game-theoretical perspective; what is hard to see is how it could be made, as Zimmermann asserts, from the perspective of radical democracy. Here the counterfactual nature of practical consensus as a norm must also be made clear. Zimmermann goes so far as to assert that the supposition of a radical democratic model does not imply the acceptance of a consensual practical norm (343). How could this assertion be substantiated? Is it really possible to imagine a single instance of a radical democratic Institution which did not fit or even directly apply in its procedures such a norm of consensual legitimacy? Perhaps Zimmermann is correct in that not all democratic processes Issue in an ideally consensual norm, as in the cases of compromise; however, if they are democratic at all, then the procedure by which this compromise was reached must pass the test of consensual legitimacy. It is doubtful that Zimmermann could produce a single counter-example, since such a procedural norm is a necessary condition of democracy. Here, too, Zimmermann fails to distinguish between procedural and substantive democratic norms. Zimmermanns difficulty can best be put on the level of political theory. It is an old objection to Rousseau and Kant, who, along with Habermas, equate ratio and voluntas. Against the interest in truth, Zimmermann defines democracy in terms of the interest in freedom, in autonomous selfdetermination. But what does this really gain? Why does this shift from reason to freedom sound so familiar? It Is because it approximates the thought of the earliest contractarian, Thomas Hobbes. The same can be said of Castoriadis, from whom Zimmermann takes the idea (344), whose notion of the imaginary institution of society bears striking resemblance to Hobbess original contract, particularly in its implications about the relation of the will and reason. The problem of replacing reason and consensus with the will and freedom is that all the problems of pure self-determination and the tyranny of the will and the majority return to democratic theory with a vengeance. Rousseau and Kant introduced the idea of the rational will precisely to solve these problems; without the ratio of counterfactual consensus governing procedures and decisions, it is hard to see why a democratic order would really be free or worthy of allegiance and obligation. At one point, Zimmermann speaks of finding the ratio in voluntas, rather than restricting the will to reason (332). Whatever it is we find, it will claim normative status; perhaps justice is a more proper term for it than truth. But whatever normative term is used, it can only be called democratic if it passes the test of minimal procedural conditions. Certainly, justice is not separate from consensus; nor can it really be separate from truth, a cognitive claim to its correctness. These separations would undermine the very possibility of normative criticism In democratic politics. Since criticism has a role in both the institution and the on-going practice of democratic decision-making, its principle of legitimacy must make some cognitive claim. Perhaps the most novel contribution of this book is the way Zimmermann puts the discussion of democratic theory within the framework of the problem

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of reification in the tradition of critical theory. The basic question of a modern political order, he asserts, is the proper proportionality between system and social integration, between market mechanisms and political processes of collective decision making. Here his own arguments undermine any possibility of resolving the issue, and he ends the book by hoping for new Utopias. Whatever makes the proportion proper will involve some cognitive and normative claim; no simple description will do the critical task. If the question is to be answered, neither critical theory nor democratic politics should completely separate truth and politics. Surely, the grotesqueness of Hobbess or Nietzsches political vision has taught us that the autonomous will alone can never generate a standard of justice. Emancipatory politics requires some such standard, because it must always be able to pass self-critical, reflective tests of its own justification, both on the level of particular decisions and on the level of institutional procedures as a whole. It is hard to see how Zimmermann has brought critical theory any closer to fulfilling this task; the alternative of some essentially non-consensual vision of democracy is hardly desirable and probably contradictory. A critical, normative political theory must begin by arguing that democracy is essentially consensual in this strong normative, cognitivist sense, both in its procedures and in its substantive decisions. It speaks in favor of Habermass communicative account of legitimacy as a normative ideal that it is thoroughly and consistently democratic in all of its political consequences. Indeed, he is perhaps the first critical theorist to endorse completely the normative ideals of the public sphere formulated in the French Revolution: freedom, equality, and solidarity. It is no accident that Zimmermann never mentions the latter ideal when he tries, inconsistently, to argue that democratic politics need not be based in the norm of consensus. Without such a norm, we have a conception of democracy in which both justice and criticism are impossible.

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