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FELICITAS M. MACHADO vs. RICARDO L. GATDULA, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS G.R. No. 156287 February 16, 2010 Facts: On February 2, 1999, Gatdula wrote a letter to the COSLAP requesting assistance because the Machados allegedly blocked the right of way to his private property by constructing a two-door apartment on their property The Machados contested these reports in their position paper dated August 26, 1999. They alleged that Gatdula had no right of action since they did not violate Gatdulas rights.5 They further assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP, stating that the proper forum for the present case was the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna. The COSLAP Ruling On October 25, 1999, the COSLAP issued a resolution directing the Machados to reopen the right of way in favor of Gatdula. In so ruling, the COSLAP relied on the verification survey made by Engr. Arellano, which established that the Machados had encroached on the existing alley in Gatdulas proper ty. The COSLAP declared the Machados estopped from questioning its jurisdiction to decide the case, since they actively participated in the mediation conferences and the verification surveys without raising any jurisdictional objection. It ruled that its jurisdiction does not depend on the convenience of the Machados. Issue: WON COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case? Held: NO. The COSLAPs forerunner, the PACLAP, was created on July 31, 1970 pursuant to Executive Order No. 251. As originally conceived, the committee was tasked to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other solutions. The PACLAP was abolished by EO 561 effective on September 21, 1979, and was replaced by the COSLAP. Unlike the former laws, EO 561 specifically enumerated the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions: Section 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: xxxx 2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action: (a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; (b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
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(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants; (d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and (e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution.21 In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants. Undisputably, the properties involved in the present dispute are private lands owned by private parties, none of whom is a squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any cultural minority. Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly be classified as critical or explosive in nature that would generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the present case primarily involve the application of the Civil Code provisions on Property and the Easement of Right of Way.

UST v Sanchez
G.R. No. 165569 July 29, 2010 Facts: A Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondents Transcript of Records (ToR). Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused to release respondents ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. After the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21, 2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant case was premature. Issue: WON Rule on Primary Jurisdiction applies in this case

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Held: NO. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to him the corresponding certificate of title.

HLC CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND HENRY LOPEZ CHUA, petitioners, vs. EMILY HOMES SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (EHSHA) [G.R. No. 139360. September 23, 2003] Facts: Respondents Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association (EHSHA) and the 150 individual members thereof filed on October 21, 1998 a civil action for breach of contract, damages and attorneys fees with the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, Branch 19, against petitioners, the developers of low-cost housing units like Emily Homes Subdivision. Respondents alleged that petitioners used substandard materials in the construction of their houses, like coco lumber and termiteinfested door jambs. Petitioners furthermore allegedly did not adhere to the house plan specifications because the ceiling lines were sagging and there were deviations from the plumb line of the mullions, door jams (sic) and concrete columns.[3] Respondents asked petitioners to repair their defective housing units but petitioners failed to do so. Respondents had to repair their defective housing units using their own funds. Hence, they prayed for actual and moral damages arising from petitioners breach of the contract plus exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On December 11, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the trial court which had jurisdiction over the case. Issue: WON HLURB has jurisdiction Held: YES. In this case, respondents complaint was for the reimbursement of expenses incurred in repairing their defective housing units constructed by petitioners. Clearly, the HLURB had jurisdiction to hear it. In the case of Arranza vs. B.F Homes, Inc. this Court ruled that: xxx the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in. The fact that the subject matter of the complaint involved defective housing units did not remove the complaint from the HLURBs jurisdiction. The delivery of habitable houses was petitioners responsibility under their contract with respondents. The trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners so that the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the HLURB. SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA, v. HON. JACINTO G. ANG G.R. No. 156164 Facts: On February 11, 1999, the petitioners (as buyers) and FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as developers) executed a Contract To Sel a condominium unit. Despite the lapse of three

C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADA G.R. No. 80916 November 9, 1990 Facts: The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Issue: WON HLURB acquires jurisdiction Held: YES. P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. Under E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, the regulatory functions conferred on the National Housing Authority under P.D. Nos. 957,1344 and other related laws were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which was renamed Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board by E.O. No. 90 dated December 17, 1986. It is clear from Section 1(c) of the above quoted PD No. 1344 that the complaint for specific performance with damages filed by Diongon with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental

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(3) years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted condominium unit to the petitioners. As a result, the petitioners filed a Complaint-Affidavitbefore the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the private respondents of violating P.D. No. 957, specifically its Sections 17 and 20, in relation with Section 39. The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of Deeds. Of the seven (7) private respondents, only private respondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc filed a Counter-Affidavit. She countered that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case since it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). On November 4, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana and Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (public respondents), respectively issued and approved the Resolution dismissing the complaint for being premature. The Resolution held that it is the HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices. Issue: WON HLURB has authority to impose criminal penalties Held: NO HLURBs jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations of parties under subdivision and condominium contracts comes out very clearly. But hand in hand with this definition and grant of authority is the provision on criminal penalties for violations of the Decree, provided under the Decrees Section 39, heretofore quoted. Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39 criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB to impose administrative fines under Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree. This Section of the Decree provides: Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. The Authority may prescribe and impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of the provisions of this Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable through writs of execution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. The Implementing Rules clarify that The implementation and payment of administrative fines shall not preclude criminal prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of the Decree. Thus, the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two separate remedies with differing consequences may be sought under the Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy and criminal prosecution. Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (and in this case no such provision applies), the determination of the criminal liability lies within the realm of criminal procedure as embodied in the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 112 of these Rules provide that the prerogative to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause lies with the persons duly authorized by law.