WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Series: Team 5 Files

Folder: Cadman, Dan

Date: 10/7/2003

Pages: 46

Description: Notes and summary of Dan Cadman interview

Reason for withdrawal: Classification review pending

Box 1

Withdrawn by: kw, 12/23/2008

Janice Kephart-Roberts
From: Susan Ginsburg
Sent: Monday, March 15, 2004 8:06 AM
To: 'Cadman, Dan'
Cc: Janice Kephart-Roberts; Walter Hempel
Subject: RE: staffing agencies

Thanks so much Dan. That gives us a picture of the world of illegal documents as well.
Had you ever seen similar organizations to the one in the article I sent in your work in
the US? Extending back to countries other than in Eastern Europe? I gather the Walmart
case was also eastern Europe. Susan

Original Message
From: Cadman, Dan [mailto:Dan.Cadman@dhs.gov]
Sent: Monday, March 15, 2004 11:54 AM
To: Susan Ginsburg
Cc: Janice Kephart-Roberts; Walter Hempel
Subject: Re:staffing agencies

Yes, thanks, I'm safe and sound as are the others in our small office.

Interesting article you sent. The anecdotal information on which I base my answer, for
Spain only, is no. Labor contractors don't appear to be a prevalent form of hiring /
providing labor here - - a t least in the non-agricultural arena. There is some evidence of
brokers providing migrant labor for the fields, often Maghrebis (Arabic North Africans
usually from the poorer parts of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, etc.), and also sub-Saharan
Africans. But, to my knowledge, there is no direct nexus with terrorist cells.

On the other hand, take a look at the attached article about the recent arrest of two Al
Qaeda cell members by the Guardia Civil in Murcia. (It's in Spanish;
sorry.) The last paragraph of that article says, roughly, "In the zone [where the arrests
took place] live hundreds of Maghrebis that at the first hour of morning get up to work in
the field as agricultural workers, and that went to this "locutorio" to speak with their
families, and send them money, so this detention caused them surprise, as related by one
of them, who asserted that they were 'good persons.1 [Note that a 'locutorio' is a small
shop serving the needs of migrants through providing long-distance phone services; check
cashing; selling phone cards; and money-changing/wiring, etc. The locutorio was in fact
owned and run by one of the detained Qaeda members, as indicated earlier in the article.
An excellent place to launder money and gain/provide access to phone services, no? Some
of the more modern locutorios also have internet services, though I don't know about this
one. ]

To extrapolate from this particular circumstance, it would appear that the barrio in which
these hundreds of Algerians and others were living/working within the city of Murcia
created both an ambient subculture in which to operate without arousing suspicion, and
also a very direct way in which this guy could make and clean money to be funneled into
nefarious purposes.

I can speculate as to a few reasons why sleazy labor contracting isn't prevalent in other
sectors: (1) Spain's labor unions are very strong, and would not allow themselves to be
undercut. (2) Workers' rights here are also strong, based on the many years the Socialists
were in power immediately after the dissolution of the Franquist state; translated into
practice, businesses wouldn't get away with subcontracting out labor as a way of trying to
sidestep paying workers' benefits. (3) Until fairly recently, Spain's economy was at the
bottom of Western Europe's, and thus there was no lucrative market to try and undercut
natives' wages.

Having said all that, it isn't that there is no illegal labor other than in agriculture --
there clearly is. Usually things like waiters or deliverymen; there also seem to be
undocumented aliens in segments of the construction industry, usually doing the physically
hardest, and generally unskilled, things that need done. And, it's important to note that
things are in rapid flux here. Immigration to Spain, both legal and illegal, is at record
levels, and Spain's economy has rocketed during the past few years under the Popular
1
 rty. I'm also curious to see what will play out vis-a-vis the newest members of the EU.
suspect many will float to Spain, with its relatively liberal immigration laws, low
birthrates, and nascent Eastern European communities (Romanians, Bulgarians, Czechs, etc.)
It may be that such contract labor will be the thing of the future.

With specific regard to areas of business or labor with a nexus to terrorist cells --
well, you've read one in the paragraph above. And, it makes sense, doesn't it? I'm
personally fascinated by this locutorio, because of the detention and questioning of the
suspects in the recent bombings. You'll recall that what led to them was the detection of
the unexploded bomb in a backpack, which also included a pay-as-you-go cellphone and a
prepaid phone card. I'll be interested to see what comes to light in that regard.

In other areas where terrorist suspects were engaged in business in Spain, see the second
article I've attached (this one in English). I find the print shop particularly
interesting. Spain has a huge -- I mean, huge -- and thriving underground business in
counterfeit and altered documents, money, and transportation tickets. I can't say with
any certainty at all that this fellow engaged in such activities; I honestly don't know.
But I wouldn't be surprised, and when you ponder the things these fellows were proprietors
of, most every one smacks of infrastructure support, doesn't it? Realty--safe houses.
Used and rental cars--transportation. Locutorio--as discussed earlier.
Printshop--documents. I admit, I don't see how audio, pottery or carpentry fit this
notion, but the others have at least a reasonable possibility of having been targeted to
achieve specific aims.

Well, this was considerably longer than I intended. Sorry.

Reply Separator
Subject: staffing agencies
Author: "Susan Ginsburg" <SMTP:sginsburg@9-llcommission.gov>
Date: 3/14/2004 1:02 PM

Hi Dan,

I'm sure you are incredibly busy over there right now - and I trust, safe.

Re: the article below. Do you know of any terrorist ties to illegal labor
networks? I understand from open sources that there was a front for muj.
in
Germany that operated this way. What is your view of the prevalence of
such
organizations? Do you foresee more?

Thanks.
Susan

BM Toc66874900USA TODAY: Overseas workers often in U.S. illegally By Paige St. John,
FLORIDA TODAY March 10, 2004

Teresa Brown adores the Eastern Europeans who wash her dishes and wait on the tourists at
her upscale restaurants on Florida's Atlantic Coast. She declares the foreign workers more
honest and industrious than Americans.

But these workers are not her employees. They are leased from a staffing agency, like many
others who now supply workers to hotels, grocery stores and cruise ships. And not all of
them should be here.

In Biloxi, Miss., Orlando, and Atlanta, it is the same, operators of illegal labor
2
 3£ Q&00

JOINT INQUIRY - Committee Sensitto •3

Prepared By: Rahul Gupta Reviewed By:
(U) INTERVIEWEE: Immigration & Naturalization Service
(U) Interview Method: Group Interview, briefing
(U) Place: INS offices
(U) Date: 6.27.2002
(FOUO) Participants: JIS: Jordan, Gupta, Barton
INS:
Dan Cadmon INS - Chief Counter-Terrorism Office National Security
Unit (NSU) Tim Haugh INS/Office of Congressional Relations
(U) RECORD OF INTERVIEW
Dan Cadman provided the following information:
In 1997, INS decided to create a CT coordination position a He was not given any control over
the "unit" and only given a handful of
people. He was not given control of the LOOKOUT unit which he thought
he should have. INS had a number of units already involved in CT but they were in
different parts of INS—the new CT coordination position was not linked
to the existing INS units. There were INS reps in DCI/CTC and FBI/ITOS. He was able to get
indirect control of the INS folks in FBI/ITOS (4 staff). He did not get
control over the INS/NAILS and INS/TIPOFF reps. He got indirect control of the INS detailees to
the JTTFs.
110 agents/2 supervisors/46 of 47 JTTFs Before 9/11 INS/NSU had 14 intel analysts and 42
people total.
The key issue for him and the INS working with the FBI was the Alien Terrorism Removal Court
Provision of the AEDPA. The INS was asked to tie up loose ends on hearings to deport
individuals suspected of terrorist linkages but the actual information used was from the FBI. The
INS sometimes was not aware of the information because of FISAs and the involvement of the
OIPR from Justice.
9/27/2002 2:15PM
AG Reno did not like to use the ATRC or the AEDPA. The judges knew that and would frown on
this process. AG Reno was not persuaded of efficacy and propriety of the law. The INS tried to
get some relief on the access to data by signing a letterhead memo with CIA and FBI.
The INS did not have any problems with credibility of the information provided by CTC and FBI
during the detention and deportation hearings.
/* The INS tried to convince the CIA that some of the information should be declassified so that it
/ could be used in the hearings to lock up people but was not well received. If it weren't for the
X^ JTTFs the INS would not have access to some of the key intelligence data.
He stated that the FBI ground rules for working on the JTTFs is that all detailees must use Form
302s to write-up investigations. These rules sometime bog down the process. He said that at the
time that the INS sent people to the JTTFs the INS had no MOD with the FBI to share
information. Now they have a MOU but it took some time before it was agreed to.
As to the INS and State linkage it is through a different office than his. He does not always see
what comes through the National Security Unit. TIPOFF connects to the INS command center
that report to INS HQ Intel and not NSU. Similarly, CIA's excuse for not connecting to NSU is that
their SLUG already copies INS/HQ/INT. He questioned the reasoning by the CIA. They should
copy all.
The INS did not know about the Ken Williams memo and it was not shared with them even
though there were issues with immigration. The INS folks present did not know if the INS agent in
Phoenix who has been part of the JTTF for 3 years was aware of the Williams memo. We were
told that in some JTTFs INS is the co-equal and in others it is subservient.
9/27/2002 2:15PM 2
 Questions for Dan Cadman
October 7, 2003

Background.

1. the creation, mission and resources of the NSU

2. leadership support to the NSU and internal enforcement pre 9/11

3. Congressional interest/support of NSU and CT pre 9/11

4. TIPOFF and your relationship with State and the Lookout Unit pre
9/11

5. special interest cases

6. the ATRC

7. the CSG working group

8. the nineteen, and individual records associated with them

9. 9/11 itself, what happened at the borders and what directives went
to the field

10. if we have time this round, the Office of Visa Enforcement

Janice Kephart-Roberts
From: Janice Kephart-Roberts [jkephart-roberts@9-11commission.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 06, 2003 8:01 AM
To: 'Cadman, Dan'
Cc: 'team5@9-11commission.gov'
Subject: RE: 10/7 interview

Dan,

That sounds great. I've got a couple of binders with documents that we may be interested
in having you take a look at; many of the documents have your name on them. I'll have
them available for you to look at, but if you have some documents you'd like to bring with
you, that would be fine too. Here are some areas of interest I'd like to talk to you
about:

1. the creation, mission and resources of the NSU

2. leadership support to the NSU and internal enforcement pre 9/11 3. Congressional
interest/support of NSU and CT pre 9/11 4. TIPOFF and your relationship with State and
the Lookout Unit pre 9/11 5. special interest cases 6. the ATRC 7. the CSG working
group 8. the nineteen, and individual records associated with them 9. 9/11 itself, what
happened at the borders and what directives went to the field 10. if we have time this
round, the Office of Visa Enforcement

Thanks so much and look forward to seeing you too.

Janice

Original Message
From: Cadman, Dan [mailto:Dan.Cadman@dhs.gov]
Sent: Friday, October 03, 2003 11:02 AM
To: jkephart-roberts@9-llcommission.gov
Subject: Re:10/7 interview

Yes, that's fine per date, time and place. I'll plan on being there for as long as you
wish/need. No, a secret level should do for meeting space. Look forward to seeing you
then! !

Reply Separator
Subject: 10/7 interview
Author: "Janice Kephart-Roberts" <jkephart-roberts@9-llcommission.gov>
Date: 10/2/2003 4:22 PM

Dan,

Is 10/7 at 11 am okay here at GSA Rm. 5125? Will we need a greater than secret scif?
That's what we got here. You can come in thru the 7th st employee entrance (7th and D
SW), since you've got a DHS id, I think.

We've got a lot to talk about!

Janice Kephart-Roberts

National Commission on Terrorist

Attacks Upon the United States

 U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

HQOPS50/5.11-P

Office of the Executive Associate Commissioner 4251Street NW

Office of the General Counsel Washington, DC 20536

FEB 1 8 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER

xA*
FROM: ichael Pearson
Executive Associate Commissioner,
Field Operations

Paul Virtue
General Counsel

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding -

Department of State Automated TIPOFF System

Attached, for your information and review, you will find a copy of a proposed memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between the Department of State (DOS), the U.S. Customs Service (USCS),
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). We recommend approval.

This MOU relates to DOS's automated TIPOFF system. That system is the intragovernmental
repository for terrorist information that feeds the DOS consular lookout system, CLASS; the USCS
lookout system, TECS II; and the INS lookout system, NAILS.

The MOU revises the language of a previous version to incorporate updated practices and
procedures. More importantly, it expands the TIPOFF system beyond terrorism, and authorizes the
entry of data relating to organized crime suspects, initially from territories of the former Soviet
Union, and internationally thereafter.

The language is the result of negotiations and discussions among the signatory agencies, along
with the intelligence agencies of the Federal Government that provide the predicating data to the
Department of State. The Offices of Field Operations and General Counsel represented INS at the
discussions.

The Department of State is proposing a signing ceremony in the Treaty Room of their
headquarters, to be held at 10:00 a.m., March 12, 1999. The signatories would be you, Customs
Commissioner Kelly, and Assistant Secretary of State Phyllis Oakley. We request your
participation in the ceremony.

Attachment
CC: Official file copy
HQCOU/ENF (All staff)
HQOPS/ENF/NSU (All staff)
HQOPS/ENF/SCO (All staff)
HQOPS/INP (Attn: Carrier Affairs/Lookout Unit)
HQPGM/INP
HQPGM/INV
TIPOFF W/F

INS:HQOPS/NSU:WDCadman:02/02/99
C.-TIP-FNLDOC
 HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED BY

JOINT INQUIRY - CHECK FILE IN SAFE

Thomas 11. Kean
CHAIR
DHS INTERVIEW REQUEST NO. 3
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR

Richard Bcn-Veniste
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(the "Commission") requests interviews with the following Department
Max Cleland of Homeland Security personnel during the weeks of September 29 and
Fred F. Fielding
October 6, 2003. Please provide a proposed date, time, and location for
each interview no later than September 24, 2003. The anticipated length
Jamie S. Gorelick of each of these interviews is three hours.
Slade Gorton
l.DanCadman(ICE)
John Lehman

Timothy J. Roemer 2. Tim Goyer (CBP)

James R. Thompson
3. Gary Bradford (BCIS)
Philip D. Zelikow
E X E C U T I V E DIRECTOR 4. Maurice Berez (BCIS)

We anticipate that these interviews will involve the discussion of

classified information. The Commission reserves the right to re-
interview these individuals based on the results of the requested
interviews and the needs of the Commission.

August 29, 2003 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel

TKL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-1 lcommission.gov
tO 99 b ' /A?

s/?

+*

^
JI03000191 Committee Sensitive
INS Group. 6/02
Dan Cadman, Chief, Counter-terrorism office, National Security Unit, Tim Haugh
INS Cong Rel
In 1997, INS decided to create a CT coordination position. He was not given any control
over the unit, and only a handful of people. Not given control over the LOOKOUT unit,
which he thought he should have. INS already had a number of units involved in CT but
spread out in INS. The new CT coordination unit not linked to any of them.
INS rep in DCI/CTC. Had indirect control over 4 rep to FBI/TTOS and detailees to
JTTFs, but not control over iNS/NAILS and INS/TIPOFF reps. 110 agents/2
supervisors/46 of 47 JTTFs. Before 9/11, INS/NSU had 14 intel analysts and 42 people
total.
Key issue for him in INS-FBI relations was the Alien Terrorist Removal Court provision
of AEDPA. INS asked to tie up loose ends on hearings to deport individuals suspected of
terrorist linkages but the actual information used was from the FBI. The INS sometimes
was not aware of the info b/c of FIS As and the involvement of IOPR from DOJ.
AG Reno did not like to use ATRC or AEDPA. Judges know that and would frown on
the process. AG Reno was not persuaded of efficacy and propriety of the law. INS tried
to get some relief on the access to data by signing a letterhead memo with CIA and FBI.
INS did not have any problems with the credibility of the information provided by CTC
and FBI during detention and deportation hearings.
INS tried to convince CIA to declassify some info to be used in hearings to lock up
people but was not well received. If not for JTTFs, INS would not have access to some of
the key intel data. FBI req'd details to use Form 302 to write up investigations. These
rules sometimes bog down the process. At the time INS sent people to JTTFs there was
no MOU with the FBI to share information, now they have one, took some time to get.
INS-State linkage not thru his office. Does not always see what somes thru the NSU.
TJPOFF connects to INS command center that report to INS HQ intel not NSU.
Similarly CIA excuse for not connecting to NSU is that their SLUG already copies
INS/HQ/INT, thinks they should copy all.
INS did not know about Ken Williams memo and it was not shared with them even
though there were issues about immigration. INS folks did not know if the INS agent in
Phoenix on the JTTF 3 yrs was aware of Williams memo.
In some JTTFs INS subservient in others co-equal.
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

I Janice Kephart-Roberts
From: Cadman, Dan {Dan.Cadman@dhs.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 2:04 PM
To: .. jkephart-roberts@9-11comrnission.gov
Subject: Re:nice to talk to you!

What a pleasure it\was for me too. Sorry for a relatively late response to your e-mail.
Today's been absolutely crazy. So, here are a few names —

Mark LaMonte, NSU supervisor at ICE. Mark worked for me prior to, and after 9/11. He
really helped keep things..rolling during that time.

Laura Baxter, counsel to the -.Deputy AG. (You may recall Laura; she worked at INS, then
moved to the House Subcommittee., then came back briefly to INS as chief of the national
security law div, then onward to-.DOJ. You may already have planned to chat w/her anyway.)

James Castello, Assoc Deputy AG during the Reno years at DOJ (of course, gone by 9/11, but
a fountain of knowledge acoul KtillU'S dim viewi. LUWaTd Immigration national security cases
(so-called "secret evidence" case) .. .sho.uld he choose to open up to you. However, he will
likely put quite the spin on their efforts, given everything that's happened since.

Sarah Kendall, present chief of the nationals-security law division at what is now ICE.

Veronica Gates, who worked for me at NSU, right from the very beginning through when I
left to go to Madrid. She's now at DHS in their 24-hour watch center.

I 1 who is now an Asst_SA£L-At—XHELin Arlington. VA fhg was the former INS

Washington District ADD for iWprTor to the breakup) . j fyTorked for me at FBIHQ, and
was in the heart of the UBL unit at Int'l Terrorism Ops Section for a few months prior to,
and several months after, 9/11.

How about Dan Benjamin, who worked for Richard Clarke at NSC during the Clinton
administration? (He later went on to write the book, "Sacred Age of Terror" which
includes a discussion of the frustrations and ultimate lack of success in getting CIPRIS
moved along. He mentions me as a 'senior INS counterterrorism official' which amuses me
greatly...never been more than middle management and have no illusions about that.)

Maurie Berez, who was the brains behind CIPRIS. Maurie |

Jcertainly had the right idea where

CIPRIS was concerned.It was a more robust,better system than SEVIS, its pale successor,
ever will be.

Anyway, as I think of more names, I'll relay them along. Look forward to getting-back
stateside. Just can't stand too big a slice of this little piece of earthly paradise
here, y'know?

Later!

_Reply Separator
Subject: nice to talk to you!
Author: "Janice Kephart-Roberts" <jkephart-roberts@9-llcommission'.gov>
Date: 9/15/2003 5:30 PM

Let me know who those CT policy people are!

Great to talk; we've got a lot to cover.

9/11 Personal Privacy

 PRIORITY
INS Staff Routing Sheet

TO: THRU: SUSPENSE DATE:

Kenneth J. Elwood Louis Nardi None
SUBJECT:
Security alert to all INS offices 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

1 . Purpose. To advise all offices and employees of the indictment of Usama bin Laden, international
terrorist, and direct hei ghtened security measures.

2. Discussion. The indict ment may result in the targeting of U.S. government facilities and
employees for terrorist acts of the kind that resulted in bombing of U.S. embassies abroad. It
requires heightened aw/areness, and the taking of specific steps at ports of entry and with regard to
apprehensions of speci fie nationalities.

Recommendation. Approv e and sign the heightened alert for dissemination by the INS Command
Center, and via message e itry into TECS II. This dissemination -will not take place until after the
formal announcement oft}te indictment by DOJ at 4PM on November 4, 1998.

CONCURRENCES
NAME OFFICE SIGNAjmE DATE COMMENTS
W.D. Cadman OPS/NSU /v/z/#~~ x) /°^A^
fcr 1^ ^Vr L-- V / l__, f^ f* "/«/?&
L.F. Nardi OPS/ENF ci— 3-.^ /—v_i 1 1-1-12
K.J. Elwood D/EAC OPS J&v~~e#fJ (£&*V+^ ii- v-77 •^

ACTION OFFICER/OFFICE/EXTENSION: WDCadman 5-173 1 DATE: 1 1/4/98

C:\antiterr\usama-alert.rte
 HEIGHTENED SECURITY ALERT

(For immediate distribution via the HQ Command Center to all INS regions, districts, sectors,
suboffices, stations and ports of entry, including overseas. Also for entry into TECS II via the
Office of Carrier Affairs.)

On the afternoon of November 4, 1998, the Justice Department announced the indictment of
international terrorist Usama bin Laden on criminal charges stemming from the bombing attacks
on U.S. Embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. There is no specific threat information to be
provided at this time.

However, as a result of this action, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is issuing a
heightened security alert, applicable to all INS employees and offices throughout the world.

All INS personnel are directed to exercise a high level of caution with regard to their physical
surroundings while on duty. This extends particularly to the presence of unauthorized
individuals or unattended items in and around INS installations. Suspicious incidents observed
by employees are to be immediately reported to management for response and handling
according to established security procedures in place for each site where INS conducts
operations.

The following measures are also to be taken:

• Any individuals taken into custody born or residing in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Bosnia, Albania, Serbia/Montenegro (former Yugoslavia),
Macedonia, Tanzania, or Kenya should be handled as "Special Interest Cases" as outlined in
the HQOPS policy directive dated July 10, 1997.

• Adverse actions at U.S. land, sea, and air ports of entry involving aliens born or residing in ^
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Bosnia, Albania,
Serbia/Montenegro (former Yugoslavia), Macedonia, Tanzania, Kenya encompassing the
following sections of the Immigration & Nationality Act
~212(a)(3), and
-212(a)(6)(C),or(D)
are also to be handled and reported to INS Headquarters pursuant to the same policy directive.

• Commercial air and sea traffic arriving from transit or final embarkation points of Paraguay,
Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq,
Sudan, Libya, Bosnia, Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, Tanzania, Kenya, Lebanon, Cyprus,
Greece, Jordan, Turkey, Oman, United Arab Emirates should be closely scrutinized for
admissibility.

/Kenneth J. Elwood
Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
CC: Official file HQOPS 50/11.18-C
HQCOS (Attn: VCerda)
HQCOU
HQICC
HQINT (Attn: TDurand)
HQOPS/ENF (NSU)
HQOPS/INP/OCA (Attn:RNeighbors)
HQSEC

C:\antiterr\usama-alert.doc
 .uthor: Mark X McGraw at HQ-ICC-001
Date: 11/4/98 4:32 PM
Priority: Urgent
TO: Dan Cadman at HQ-EXM-001, Thomas H Durand
bject: Alert
jan-

Lou asked me to ask you to make sure we have the security alert passed through
Winona Varnon in HQSEC as well.
/
Let me know when you have a signed copy and I will walk it through.