For Statcon 08.14.13

STATCON GROUP DIGEST
Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo
Literal Interpretation CASE NO: 26 CASE TITLE: Bello v Court of Appeals DECISION DATE: March 29, 1974 PONENTE: Teehankee, J. VOTATION: 10 concur, 1 dissenting
I. II.
PETITIONER: JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, as Judge of Pasay City Court, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PARTIES IN THE CASE: Bellos (spouses), City Court of Pasay, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, Atty. Prudencio de Guzman FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: Bellos were charged of estafa before the City Court of Pasay because they allegedly misappropriated the ladys ring they got from a certain Atty. Prudencio de Guzman with the agreement that they would sale it on a commission basis. After the trial and prosecution, they were found to be guilty and were sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,000.00 with costs of suit. The petitioners filed for a notice of appeal at the Court of First Instance but the prosecutors moved that the appeal be dismissed because the petitioners should have filed it directly at the Court of Appeals instead as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended. Petitioners invoked Rule 50 Sec 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor and prayed that the Court of Instance that they send the appeal to the Court of Appeals so they can seek relief Court of First Instance did not send the appeal to the CA and dismissed it without informing the petitioners. Petitioners then filed motion to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals at the City Court of Pasay and asked the records be elevated to the CA. The City Court, as with the Court of Instance, dismissed the petition without sending the appeal to the CA. Petitioners filed for prohibition and mandamus against the People (note that this is originally a criminal case so the People is a party) to prohibit the City Court of execution of its judgment and to compel it to elevate the appeal the CA. The CA, in its decision, admitting that the "CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to this Court of Appeals" but it however, dismissed the appeal because the CFI was not a principal respondent in the
III.
IV.

V.
case filed by the Petitioners and therefore they cannot seek any relief. Subsequent motion for reconsideration was also dismissed for lack of merit. Petition for review was at last, filed at the Supreme Court.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Rule 50, Section 3 of the Rules of Court (I think they have changed/amended this because I can no longer find the provision in the present RC) when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor.
VI.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO The CFI should have certified and endorsed the appeal to the CA instead of remanding the records to the City Court for execution of judgement since the petitioners timely sought to correct the their mistake of filing at the CFI instead at the CA. Even if the Rule cited was for the Court of Appeals, the Court cannot see any reason why this should not apply to the Court of First Instance. The lack of expressed rule for wrong appeals filed at CFI should not be a reason why the petitioners should be deprived of the right to appeal. SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) (Copied and pasted for emphasis since this is the heart of the case ) This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against "narrowly" interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose of the legislator" " and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity)" and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results". In the construction of its own Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy
W/N the CFI Yes. should have sent the appeal to the Court of Appeals

and inconsistency by holding as it does now that courts of first instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate court. (issue/s not really related to StatCon) W/N Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the case on the ground that the petitioners did not place the CFI as principal party respondent
VII.
Yes. Decision of CA is set aside.
The court (or the judge) is merely a nominal party and therefore such can be overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication.
OVERALL DECISION Petition to prohibit City Court for executing judgment GRANTED City Court to elevate appeal to CA No costs DISSENTING OPINIONS (IF ANY):
A. Esguerra, J.
VIII.
SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) W/N the provision is Rule 50, Sec 3 Only the Supreme Literal application of applicable to the CFI should not be Court and the Court the law (?) applicable to the CFI of Appeals are required to follow the provision. Neither the Congress nor the Rules of Court has provided for instances when appeals are erroneously brought
ISSUE/S
HELD
RATIO

to the Court of First Instance. The Court cannot fulfil this deficiency without formally promulgating a rule regarding such circumstances.
CASE NO: 27 CASE TITLE: Salaria v Buenviaje DECISION DATE: February 28, 1978 PONENTE: Guerrero VOTATION: UNANIMOUS; All concur (Makasiar, Munoz Palma, Fernandez, Teehankee*Chair) FIRST DIVISION
I.
PETITIONER: a. Ramon Salaria- lessee of a piece of land situated in San Roque, Iriga City, Camarines Sur and owned by Eliodoro Cailao RESPONDENTS: a. Judge Carlos Buenviaje- Executive Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, Iriga City; Judge who denied Salarias motion to dismiss and set the case for hearing in the City Court b. Antonio Mendiola- husband of Ceferina Flores who subsequently bought the land owned by Cailao and leased by Salaria; bought the land for P300.00 PARTIES IN THE CASE: a. Petitioner Salaria and Respondents Judge Buenviaje and Mendiola b. Ceferina Flores- wife of Antonio Mendiola who warned Salaria to vacate the premises to avoid a suit that would be filed against the latter if he did not do such FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: a. Salaria had been staying in the land of Cailao as a LESSEE since Sep. 18, 1930, when he bought the house of Rufino Llagas which was constructed there b. Salaria and Cailao agreed that Salaria would pay a MONTHLY rental of P6.00 (later increased to P10.00), but they had NO AGREEMENT REGARDING ITS DURATION c. December 1972: Cailao advised Salaria not to pay rent anymore and to vacate the land because he was selling it to Ceferina Flores d. 1973: The land was sold to Flores and Mendiola (married) for P300.00.
II.
III.
IV.

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo e. No rentals were collected anymore either by Cailao or Mendiola; Petitioner-Salaria
f. g.
h.
i. j.
k.
V.
did not leave the premises and deposited P200.00 with the clerk of court for the payment of such rental May 16, 1974: Ceferina Flores wrote a letter to Salaria asking him to vacate the premises until July 1974; otherwise, a suit would be filed against him August 23, 1974: Antonio Mendiola filed a complaint for UNLAWFUL DETAINER (act of maintaining possession without a legal right) against Salaria in Branch II of the City Court of Iriga Salaria filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, as Presidential Decree No. 20 suspends the provision of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code and that the need of Mendiola of the premises for his own use does not fall within the exception provided by the said decree Judge Buenviaje dismissed Salarias motion; the case was brought before the City Court Salaria in the trial: i. The lease was without a fixed period ii. Lease was not on a monthly basis but on a yearly basis iii. Admitted to receiving Flores letter but denied all other allegations iv. Cause of action is suspended by P.D. 20 v. City Court has no jurisdiction over the matter, there being no law to support it vi. Mendiola knew that his filing of the action had no basis in law; therefore, Salaria was exposed to actual and moral damages which Mendiola should be liable for The City Court rendered a decision in favor of Mendiola: i. Ordered Salaria to vacate within 3 months from receipt of decision ii. Salaria is excused from paying backrentals from January 1973 (selling of land to Mendiola by Cailao) up to the time he vacates; P200.00 deposit to the clerk of court is to be returned as consignation by him iii. No award for damages to Mendiola; counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit; Salaria ordered to pay the costs of the suit Appeal to Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur: Decision of City Court was AFFIRMED with modification: P200.00 may be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court of the City Court by Mendiola Case brought before the Supreme Court
PROVISIONS BEING CONTESTED: A) Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 states that Sec. 4. Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of

Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall apply. B) Article 1673 (and Article 1687) of the Civil Code provides as follows: Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes: (1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has expired; (2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated; (3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract; (4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any used or service not stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof-, or if he does not observe the requirements in No. 2 of Article 1657, as regards the use thereof. It appearing that no fixed period has been agreed upon for the duration of the lease between the original owner of the subject lot and the petitioner, the case comes under the provision of Article 1687 of the Civil Code, which states Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annually; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. C) Memorandum Circular No. 970 issued by the Office of the President on March 15, 1977, clarifying Presidential Decree No. 20, which states: WHEREAS, there have been many reports that many owners or lessors of residential lands and buildings covered by Presidential Decree No. 20 have been ejecting, with the help of certain lower courts, their tenants on the ground that the former or their families will use the leased property; WHEREAS, in a long time of opinions rendered by this Office in the construction and interpretation of Presidential Decree No. 20, personal use by the owners or lessors or their families of covered dwelling units occupied by bona fide tenants is not a recognized cause for judicial ejectment of the latter , and WHEREAS, to allow eviction of lessees for the reason alone that the premises are needed by the owners or lessors or their families will open the floodgates for abuse and circumvention of Presidential Decree No. 20 thereby setting to naught the intent and purpose of the President to protect and assist the low-income families comprising the bulk of rented dwelling place occupants; WHEREFORE, it is hereby made clear for the benefit of all concerned that, except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees enumerated in Article 1673 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6359, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 20, bona fide covenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the only cause of action thereof is personal use of the property by the owners or their families. By Authority of the President:

VI.
(Sgd.) RONALDO B. ZAMORA Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs D) Previous Laws Designed to Protect the Low-Income Members of Society Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6126 states that The provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code insofar as they refer to dwelling units or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended for the period of one year from the effectivity of this Act; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shall apply. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6359 reads Except when the lease is for definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended for two years from the effectivity of this Act; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shall apply. Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6359 was later amended by Presidential Decree No. 20 which changed the phrase "shall be suspended for two years from the effectivity of this Act" to should be suspended until otherwise provided." DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) 1. It is CLEAR AND Focus on Ratio 1: EXPLICIT that LITERAL P.D. No. 20 INTERPRETATION of suspends PD No. 20 paragraph (1) of Article 1673 2. Personal use of the property by the owners or lessors is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment under Article 1673 3. The construction under RATIO
W/N under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20, Mendiola can eject Salaria on the ground that he needs the lot for his own use?
No. Mendiola cannot eject Salaria because of P.D. No. 20 which suspends paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code The decision appealed from is REVERSED (but Mendiola is still authorized to withdraw the P200.00 from the Clerk of Court of the City Court)

Salaria is ordered to pay back rentals for the period on his stay on the land at the rate of P10.00 a month, which is not covered by the deposit
Memorandum Circular No. 970 must be given controlling weight as it comes from the branch of the government called upon to implement the law 4. Even before P.D. No. 20, there have been previous laws designed to protect the lowincome members of Society (RA 6126; RA 6359)
Valid in part, void in part CASE NO: 28 CASE TITLE: Barrameda v Moir DECISION DATE: August 8, 1913 PONENTE: TRENT, J. VOTATION: UNANIMOUS, ALL CONCUR. (Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ.)
I. II. III. IV. V.
PETITIONER: Juan Barrameda RESPONDENTS: Percy M. Moir- Judge of First Instance PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioner Barrameda and Respondent Judge Percy M. Moir FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: Original application for a writ of mandamus Petitioner was a defendant in a previous suit which was dismissed and prays that respondent judge be ordered to proceed with the case on appeal. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED and RELATED STATCON PRINCIPLES Act No. 2041, section 3

Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance. Act No. 2131, section 1, the above provision was amended by substituting "exclusive original jurisdiction" for "exclusive jurisdiction." Acts No. 2041 and 2131 confer original jurisdiction upon justices of peace to try title to real estate and provide that it shall be exclusive in case where the value of the property not exceed 200 exclusive- gives Court of First Instance original jurisdiction to try title to real estate , which means that it cannot permitted for another court to entertain jurisdiction of such cases -applies whether exclusive or exclusive original jurisdiction is used Act No. 136, sec. 56, par. 2. The original jurisdiction of those courts extends to " all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest therein," except in forcible entry and detainer cases. all-The Court of First Instance is authorized to hear and determine cases without restriction ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: Fill up only if the reading provides these. Eg. In Chinabank vs. Ortega: ISSUE/S PETITIONERS DEFENDANTS ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS W/N Respondent Judge was Barrameda: YES. Moir: NO. correct in dismissing the case Petitioner relates that Judge demurred to the of Barrameda? he was a defendant in complaint on ground a suit brought before a that it did not state justice of peace to try facts sufficient to title to a parcel of land constitute a cause of action. It was decided adversely against him Grounds used: He then appealed to Acts Nos. 2041 the Court of First and 2131Instance but upon conferring original motion of the appellee, jurisdiction upon the judge of that court justices of the dismissed the appeal peace to try title to with direction to the real state, are Justice of Peace to inconsistent with enforce judgment. and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of
VI.

July 1, 1902.
VII.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED When part of a statute is void, while other part is valid, the valid portion if separable may stand and be enforced. The valid portion must be so far independent from invalid portion that it is fair to presume that Legislature would have enacted it by itself and they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact other Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute. Void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the act
W/N Respondent Judge was correct in dismissing the case of Barrameda?
Yes, the Court held that the judge was correct in his decision since the provisions of Act 2041 and 2131 relating to a change of jurisdiction when amount involved is more than P200 and less than P600 are considered to merely supplemental
The Court of First instance is considered to have exclusive jurisdiction The difference in the amount (200CFI; 200<n<600jusitice of peace) is to be considered supplemental. To confer exclusive original jurisdiction upon courts of justice of peace to try cases involving not >P200 are declared void

Disposition: Writ of Mandamus is DENIED CASE NO: 29 CASE TITLE: Tatad v Secretary of the Department of Energy DECISION DATE: November 5, 1997 PONENTE: VOTATION: Justice Reynato Puno Divided court (8 concur Puno, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Vitug, Menodza, Panganiban 2 dissent Melo, Francisco 1 separate Kapunan 1 on leave Narvasa) Senator Francisco Tatad
IX.
VIII.
PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS: Secretary of Energy (the agency tasked with the implementation of the oil deregulation law)
X. XI.
PARTIES IN THE CASE: (see above) FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

This is a very intricate case on whether or not the Downward Oil Deregulation Law (RA 8180) is constitutional or not. It tackles provisions in Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony). The law RA 8180 grants unto certain oil companies (The Big 3 Shell, Caltex, and Petron) specific benefits (i.e. significantly lower tax requirements when compared to other players).
XII.
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS ISSUE/S Whether the issue is justiciable HELD & RATIO (SC) Respondents (Department of Energy) submit that the said law should be given the presumption of constitutionality and that the policy of Congress is to impose the certain tariff rates on oil products. Petitioners, however, argue, that the Court has jurisidiction over this case since the contention is the constitutionality of a certain law.

The Supreme Court finally ruled that it has the power to review statutes only on the basis of whether or not the Legislature has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or if they pass a law that is repugnant to the Constitution. The Supreme Court not only possesses the right but also the duty to settle issues of constitutionality of a law. Respondents cannot hide beyond the veil of the doctrine of political question since the issue at hand is to assure the supremacy and faithfulness of all laws passed by Congress to the supreme law of the land. Once the interpretation of the law on a constitutional provision is raised before the court, it Whether the petitioners have legal becomes a judicial question with the scope of the Supreme Courts expanded power of review. standing When the issue at hand is of transcendental is significance to the people, the court may brush aside hypertechnical requirements of locus standi
Whether or not RA constitutional or not
8180
On the question of undue delegation of power, it CANNOT BE SAID that the law is unconstitutional since the law has provided for very specific standards and policies, with which to guide the implementing agency. The agency bestowed with the power to implement the law was given very specific indicators that will cause the President to initiate a series of actions to implement the said law. This power is what is said to be contingent legislation. HOWEVER, the law is still unconstitutional for it violates Article XII, Section 19 that prohibits monopolies. Since this law is partial to the olipoly of the Big 3, the law was struck down.

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo XIII.
LESSON FOR CONSTI In the case of Anak Mindanao vs Executive Secretary, locus standi (legal standing) was defined as a party raising the issues must possess substantive or personal interest in the issue. o he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; o the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and o the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The court may waive the requirement of a locus standi if the issue of transcendental public importance.
CASE NO: 30 CASE TITLE: Dumlao v Comelec DECISION DATE: January 22, 1980 PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera SC Division: En Banc VOTATION: 9 CONCUR, 1 DISSENT, 1 ABSTAIN
I.
PETITIONER: Patricio Dumlao former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya who filed his certificate of candidacy for Reelection (January 30, 1980) Romeo B. Igot taxpayer, a qualified voter and member of the Bar Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. taxpayer, a qualified voter, a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo RESPONDENTS: COMELEC PARTIES IN THE CASE: PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents
II. III.
IV.
FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: Petitioner Dumalo questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 for it perceives to be discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process granted by the Constitution o Said provision is allegedly directed insidiously against him and that that the classification are based on pure arbitrary grounds and therefor, class legislation Petitioner Igot and Salapantan, Jr questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pamba nsa Blg. 51 Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo V.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED Batas Pambansa Blg 52 Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) Batas Pambansa Blg 51 Sec. 4. ... Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
VI.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable)
W/N BP 52, sec 4 is No unconstitutional because it is violative of the equal protection
The claim that sec 4 of BP Blg. 42 is discrimintaory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challeged provision have laready been filed with the

COMELEC. Hence, there is no intentional or purposeful discrimination to overthrow Dumlao The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification If groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations The classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class The Solicitor General said that a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. There was no clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution Clear beyond reasonable doubt must be established to

W/N BP 51, sec 1 is Partly unconstitutional because it is violative of the presumption of innocence
declare a law unconstitutional Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutional defection except in a clear case Second paragraph of Valid in part, void in section 4 (which states part that filing of charges of the crime stipulated are primary facie evidence of such fact) is violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused Explicit is the constitutional privision that the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved An accusation is not synonymous with guilt Disqualifying a canddiate for the ground that charges have been filed contravenes presumption of innocence
VII.
CONCURRING / SEPARATE OPINIONS (IF ANY):

A. Chief Justice Fernando
ISSUE/S W/N BP 52 is constitutional (equal
HELD
RATIO Age and receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative

protection)
determination impose.
of
what
qualifications
to
Laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. Equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical, are analogous. W/N BP 51 constitutional (presumption innocence) is of The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis of being annuled. Such constitutional right, is not a mer formality that may be dispensed at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern. It is constitutional safegaurd of the highest order. It is a response to mans innate sense of justice.
B. (SO) Justice Teehankee
ISSUE/S
HELD
RATIO
SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable)
W/N BP 52 is No constitutional (equal protection)
Sec. 4 imposes special disqualification. To specifically and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously reitred elective local official from running for the same elective office previously held by him and from which he

W/N BP 51 constitutional (presumption innocence)
is Yes of
has retired is arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable Persons similarly situated are not similiarly treated (because the disqualification is for the retiree to run for same office but if not reelection may still run even if not 65) The classification is not rational nor reasonable They are disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits which they are entitled under the law Young or new blood does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65-year old. (same as majority) Such judgment conviction must be final and unappealable (before disqualification from office may be a ground not just mere

charges
Addendum

January 21 - There appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and pronouncements January 23 - However, such majority have been dissipated that the action to nullify such second paragraph (Sec 4 of BP 51) is premature and has not properly submitted for adjudication under the strict procedural requirements
Ambiguity, construed against party who caused it CASE NO: 31 CASE TITLE: Reyes v dela Cruz DECISION DATE: March 30, 1959 PONENTE: J. Montemayor VOTATION: Judgment of lower court affirmed 6 concur, 1 concurs in the result
I.
PETITIONER: Atty. Arsenio R. Reyes: Lawyer of the respondents whom was hired to expedite the partition of properties the respondents were to inherit from the deceased Ansemlo S. Hilario RESPONDENTS: Marcial, Asuncion, Eugenio, Lucia and Alfonso dela Cruz: heirs of the deceased Arnsemlo S. Hilario PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioner and respondents FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: Spetember 26, 1950: Respondents hired plaintiff under a contract of services o Probate court had already odered partition at this time but it was taking long so they hired Atty. Reyes (the plaintiff) to expedite the said partition No date: Properties were partitioned and adjudicated to each of the five heirs No date: Plaintiff filed action to recover his fees; 5% market value of all said proprties, PHP 10,000 consequential damages, PHP 10,000 attorneys fees No date: Lower court denied damages and attorneys fees and ruled that the 5% refers to the assessed value not the market value Reyes appeals that he be awarded 5% of market value, not assessed value PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Directly lift / quote the provision/s in question. Do not forget the Number of the provision and its title, e.g. in Chinabank vs. Ortega:
II.
III.
IV.
V.

VI. VII.
We are hiring your services to represent us in Special Proceeding No. 7501, Court of First Instance Manila, in such a way that we will be given all due share arising out of the will and of the law. You will exercise duties of an attorney to preserve and defend our rights until the project of partition is approved by the court. For and in consderation of the services which you are going to render to us in the said case, we will pay you 5 per cent of the amount adjudicated to us. You will not be paid in cash by us for the time being that the case is pending in court. We have no money to pau. You will only be paid of your servcie when the case is terminated and our respective shares are delivered to us by order of the court. ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: Not explicitly provided in the case. DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) For (2): If there is ambiguity or obscurity in the interepretation and meaning of a contract, the same shall not favor the paert who cause such ambiguity or obscurity.
W/N market value or Use MARKET value Two reasons are assessed value not assessed value provided: should be used in the 1. There is a compuation of the 5% tendency for of properties real estate value to rise over time. This may tempt the lawyer to work for the delay of the case. 2. Lawyerplaintiff prepared the contract. He knew the meaning and value of every word or phrase used in the said contract. He could have avoided ambiguity and uncertainty. CASE NO: 32 CASE TITLE: ILDEFONSO v. SIBAL

DECISION DATE: September 30, 1959 PONENTE: Gutierrez David VOTATION: Unanimous (En Banc)
I.
PETITIONER: Lucio Ildefonso- Appellant; party who, through his counsel, constructed the Compromise Agreement; party tasked to be the exclusive agent of Sibal in the purchase and sale of real property for 2 years with liability to pay Php 2,000 in case of breach. RESPONDENTS: Ernesto Sibal- Appellee; party who was looking to purchase real estate within Manila for the expansion of his business of selling books and school supplies
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II.
III.
PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioner-Appellant: Lucio Ildefonso Respondent-Appellee: Ernesto Sibal
IV.
FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: During the pendency of a civil case under the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ildefonso (plaintiff and appellant) and Sibal (defendant and appellee) reached a compromise agreement and thereafter filed a joint motion to dismiss the case. Ildefonso was the one who crafted the agreement. - The court granted the motion and dismissed the case. - The compromise agreement, which was later reduced to writing but was not presented to the court for approval, reads: COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
-
For and consideration of the mutual covenants herein set forth, the parties hereinabove named agree: 1. That the plaintiff agrees to dismiss the above-entitled case on the ground of amicable settlement, this Compromise Agreement, on the consideration of the promise and covenant of the defendant, to wit: 2. That the defendant promises and covenants that: a. That the defendant shall pay the plaintiff this date the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; b. That the defendant promises THAT WITHIN TWO (2) YEARS FROM THE DATE HEREOF, HE SHALL COURSE THROUGH THE PLAINTIFF AS REALTOR THE FORMERS REAL ESTATE PURCHASE OR TRANSACTION AND SHOULD HE (DEFENDANT) FAIL THEREOF, THAT IS, TO MAKE SUCH REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND TO COURSE THE SAME TO THE PLAINTIFF AS SAID REALTOR, THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FURTHER TO

PAY THE PLAINTIFF AN ADDITIONAL SUM OF
TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS. c. That the defendant further agrees to dismiss his Counterclaim in the aboveentitled case on the ground of his amicable settlement. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands this 15th day of October, 1953, at the City of Manila. (Sgd.) ERNESTO Y. SIBAL (Sgd.) LUCIO R. ILDEFONSO
-
V.
Pursuant to the agreement, Sibal commissioned Ildefonso to sell some of his real properties in Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City within the 2 year period After the lapse of the 2-year period , Sibal sold the same properties himself at a higher price than that quoted to Ildefonso During the same 2-year period, in line with Sibals intention to buy property worth Php 400,000 within the commercial district of Manila for the expansion of his business of selling books and school supplies, Ildefonso offered to sell 3 properties (The Great Eastern Hotel for Php 1,300,000, the Borja Building for Php 1,500,000) and a 157 square-meter lot along Rizal Ave. for Php 190,000). Sibal rejected the offers claiming that the 2 buildings (The Great Eastern Hotel and Borja Bldg.) were not only beyond his means but also inappropriate and inadequate to his business and that the lot in Rizal Ave. was too small for his expansion plans Ildefonso filed a case against Sibal to recover the penalty of Php 2,000 (plus legal interest and attorneys fees and costs) provided in the compromise agreement because Sibal failed and neglected to make the purchase of real estate within the 2-year period as provided in the same agreement Sibal admitted the execution of the agreement but denied liability, alleging that liability upon him would arise only if he buys or sells real estate without coursing the same through the plaintiff and NOT because of his failure to buy and sell real estate during the period, which he claims was entirely due to Ildefonsos inability to sell the lands (Sta. Mesa, QC) he offered for sale and to obtain real properties which would be profitable for him to purchase and suitable to his business The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgement in favor of Sibal; ordered Ildefonso to pay attorneys fees (Php 500) Case brought to the Supreme Court PROVISION BEING CONTESTED:
Compromise Agreement (#2) 2. That the defendant promises and covenants that:

a. That the defendant shall pay the plaintiff this date the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; b. That the defendant promises THAT WITHIN TWO (2) YEARS FROM THE DATE HEREOF, HE SHALL COURSE THROUGH THE PLAINTIFF AS REALTOR THE FORMERS REAL ESTATE PURCHASE OR TRANSACTION AND SHOULD HE (DEFENDANT) FAIL THEREOF, THAT IS, TO MAKE SUCH REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND TO COURSE THE SAME TO THE PLAINTIFF AS SAID REALTOR, THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FURTHER TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF AN ADDITIONAL SUM OF TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS. c. That the defendant further agrees to dismiss his Counterclaim in the aboveentitled case on the ground of his amicable settlement.
VI.
ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: ISSUE Whether or not Sibal has violated the compromise agreement by not purchasing the 3 properties offered by Ildefonso within the 2-year period? PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS Under par. 2 (b) of the agreement, Sibal was under the obligation to make a real estate purchase through Ildefonso within the 2-year period DEFENDANTS ARGUMENTS Sibal was only obligated to make Ildefonso his exclusive agent in the purchase and sale of property within the 2year period through the agreement, with liability to pay the Php 2,000 penalty in case of breach
VII.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable)

Whether or not Sibal No. Sibal is not liable 1) There is nothing in has violated the for the Php 2,000 the disputed paragraph compromise penalty that can be construed agreement by not to mean that Sibal purchasing the 3 bound himself to properties offered by actually purchase real Ildefonso within the 2property from Ildefonso year period? and to pay the penalty in case he failed to do so 2) The paragraph only provides that Sibal promises that within 2 years from the agreement date, he shall make Ildefonso his exclusive agent in the buying and selling of real property 3) It is hard to believe that a man of Sibals business acument and stature would give his consent to an agreement wherein he is under compulsion to buy real estate which may be inadequate for his business and beyond his means 4) There is ambiguity in par. 2 (b) of the agreement as a result of the clause (that is, to make such real estate purchase and to course the same to the plaint off as Realtor) inserted after the
Focus on Ratio 4): Ambiguity is construed against the party who caused it

phrase should he fail thereof which follows the statement of appellees obligation. Following the rule that ambiguities or obscure clauses in contracts cannot favor the one who has caused them (article 1377, new Civil Code), and it appearing that the compromise agreement was drawn by appellant through his counsel, with the paragraph in dispute creating an obligation in his favor, the ambiguity found therein must be construed in favor of herein appellee, Sibal.
CASE NO: 33 CASE TITLE: Qua Chee Gan V. Law Union And Rock Insurance Co., Ltd. DECISION DATE: December 17, 1955 PONENTE: REYES, J. B. L., J. VOTATION: Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
I. II. III.
PETITIONER: Qua Chee Gan RESPONDENTS: Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd. PARTIES IN THE CASE:

Qua Chee Gan merchant in Albay Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd Insurance Company
IV.
FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

V.
Petitioner Qua Chee Gan was a merchant from Albay. He had four (4) warehouses (referred to in the case as bodegas), stocked with copra and of hemp, baled and loose. He had these bodegas insured, as well as their contents, with the Respondent. In 1940, a fire broke out, its reason and origin undetermined, that lasted for a week, and completely destroyed bodegas 1, 2, and 4. The stocks inside these bodegas were destroyed as well. Petitioner informed the Respondent of the fire via telegram. The next day, Respondent had the place examined and the incident thoroughly investigated. Petitioner was claiming a total of P398,562.81 (but reduced to the full amount of the insurance, P370,000). Insurance company refused to pay the Petitioner, alleging violation of conditions and warranties and claimed that the fire was intentionally caused by Petitioner to be able to claim the insurance. Petitioner, with his brother and other employees, were tried for arson but the Trial Court acquitted them. Petitioner filed a case in the Court of First Instance against the Insurance Company and the court granted their claim to the insurance money. Respondent appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: (Not really a provision but parts of the contract between the Petitioner and Respondent)
Memo. of Warranty. - The undernoted Appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the premises insured hereby, and it being declared and understood that there is an ample and constant water supply with sufficient pressure available at all seasons for the same, it is hereby warranted that the said appliances shall be maintained in efficient working order during the currency of this policy, by reason whereof a discount of 2 1/2 per cent is allowed on the premium chargeable under this policy. Hydrants in the compound, not less in number than one for each 150 feet of external wall measurement of building, protected, with not less than 100 feet of hose piping and nozzles for every two hydrants kept under cover in convenient places, the hydrants being supplied with water pressure by a pumping engine, or from some other source, capable of discharging at the rate of not less than 200 gallons of water per minute into the upper story of the highest building protected, and a trained brigade of not less than 20 men to work the same.'
VI.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S W/N violated Petitioner the HELD
1. No 2. No
SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) The Respondent, (Copied and pasted for upon issuing the emphasis since this is
RATIO

contract warranty.
1. The
and
petitioner only had 2 fire hydrants and not 11, as stipulated in the memo 2. Petitioner violated "Hemp Warranty" provisions of Policy No. 2637165 because on the day of the fire, gasoline was stored in Bodega No. 2
contract and warranty, already knew that the petitioner only had 2 fire hydrants installed and the knowledge did not stop the issuance of said contract. Such assertion will make the assumption that the contract and warranty will make any future claims of the petitioner invalid. And even though the company already had knowledge of the existing facts, they still collected from the Petitioner payments for the insurance. It must be noted that gasoline was not among the articles listed in the Hemp Warranty. The term invoked by the Respondent is oil. Oil does not necessarily equal to gasoline. The Court cannot find a reason why the term gasoline shouldnt be used if it the prohibition in the warranty wants gasoline to be included in the
the heart of the case ) Taking into account the well known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them, the "memo of warranty" invoked by appellant bars the latter from questioning the existence of the appliances called for in the insured premises, since its initial expression, "the undernoted appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the premises insured hereby, . . . it is hereby warranted . . .", admits of interpretation as an admission of the existence of such appliances which appellant cannot now contradict, should the parol evidence rule

list.
VII.
OVERALL DECISION Decision reaffirmed Costs against appellant

CASE NO: 34 CASE TITLE: Villacorta v Insurance Commission

CASE FACTS
PERTINENT LAWS / JURISPRUDENCE
ISSUES and RULINGS
RELEVANCE TO STATCON
VILLACORTA v . INSURANCE COMMISSION
A couple left their 1976 model Colt Lancer for a check-up at the Sunday Machine Works, Inc. auto repair shop. Without their knowledge or consent, six employees took the car for a joy ride in Montalban.
1) Authorized Driver clause in the Empire Insurance Company car insurance policy:
1) Whether or not the damage on the Lancer incurs insurance coverage from Own Party damage
Ambiguity is construed against the party who caused it.
October 28, 1980
The Lancer figured into an accident, leaving two dead (including the driver Benito Mabasa) and four injured. The car was also extensively damaged.
AUTHORIZED DRIVER: Any of the following: (a) The insured (b) Any person driving on the Insureds Order, or with his permission; Provided, that the person driving is permitted, in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations, to drive the Scheduled Vehicle, or has been permitted and is not disqualified by order of a Court of Law or by reason or any enactment or regulation in that behalf. [Villacorta vs. Insurance Commission, 100 SCRA 467(1980)]
YES, the Lancer is covered by Own Party insurance. The shop owner of an
established car service and repair shop and his employees are presumed to be authorized drivers. When the car owner entrusts his car and keys to them, he basically gives them permission and authorization to use or drive the car for repair/maintenance purposes.
PETITIONER: Jewel Villacorta Luckily, the cars insurance policy covered Own Party damage (i.e. kapag natanga yung driver), Theft and Third Party Liability (i.e. kapag nadali ka ng ibang motorist), so the couple filed a claim for total loss with their insurance company under the first two grounds.
- Liability lies with the insurer, because their own rules caused the ambiguity
RESPONDENT: Insurance Commission (Respondent agency) and Empire Insurance Company (Respondent company) When the company denied their claim, the couple filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission. The respondent agency dismissed their petition, upholding respondent insurance companys defense that:
The purpose of the Authorized Driver clause is that a person who drives the car on the insureds order (such as his regular driver), or with his permission (such as a friend or member of the family or the employees of a car service or repair shop) must be duly licensed drivers and have no disqualification to drive a motor vehicle.
PONENTE: (Acting) Chief Justice Teehankee
1) The accident did not fall under Own Party coverage since there was no compliance with the Authorized Driver provision (full text in the next column) of the insurance policy
GIST:
Unwitting car owners leave their Lancer with an auto repair shop for a check-up, not knowing that two days later, six employees would take it for an ill-fated joy ride.
This provision provides that an insurance claim will only be honored under two conditions: First, that the driver is the insured policy holder himself/herself, or second, that the driver was driving on the insureds order or with his/her permission.
Thus, the Authorized Driver clause is not violated, so long as the employee who drove is qualified to drive, even if he did use it for an illicit purpose. The recovery for loss or damage of car is not barred by the illegal use of the car by the repair shop employees.
Insurance contracts, being contracts of adhesion where the only participation of the other party is the signing of his signature or his adhesion thereto, obviously call for greater strictness and vigilance on the part of courts of justice with a view of protecting the weaker party from abuse and imposition, and prevent their becoming traps for the unwary.
2) Article 308 of the RPC, defining theft
The situation is compared to a regular or family driver, who instead of carrying out the owners order to fetch the children from school takes out his girl friend instead for a joy ride and

The respondent agency affirmed the defense of respondent insurance company, reasoning that if the person driving is other than the insured, he must have been duly authorized by the insured to drive the vehicle to make the insurance company liable for the drivers negligence. instead wrecks the car. There is no question of his being an authorized driver which allows recovery of the insurance money although his trip was for a personal or illicit purpose without the owners authorization.
The car rammed into a parked truck, causing great damage and two deaths and leaving four riders injured.
Petitioners filed a claim for total loss with their insurance company but was denied, so they filed a case with the Insurance Commission.
Since Mabasa drove without the order or permission of Villacorta, the Insurance Commission ruled that he cannot be considered an authorized driver. Therefore, the condition in the insurance policy was violated and the benefit (i.e., the insurance claim) could not be honored.
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.
2) Whether or not the damage on the Lancer incurs insurance coverage from Theft
The respondent agency dismissed the petition because the Authorized Driver provision of the insurance policy was not complied with (more details in the next column).
2) The accident did not fall under the coverage for Theft
YES, the Lancer is covered by Theft insurance. The Lancer entrusted to the
repair shop was unlawfully and wrongfully taken without the owners consent or knowledge this is enough to constitute theft, and is enough to affirm petitioners claim for total loss dues.
In this case, the SC overturned the decision of the Insurance Commission.
(T)he element of taking in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code means that the act of depriving another of the possession and dominion of a movable thing is coupled with the intention, at the time of the taking, of withholding it with the character of permanency.
In other words, there must have been shown a felonious intent upon the part of the taker of the car, and the intent must be to permanently deprive the insured of his car.
Further, the Court held that in cases of theft, there need be no intent to permanently deprive the insured of his car. Intent to gain is enough. Intent to gain is evident when the thief derives utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure from the stolen object.
Such was not the case in this instance. The fact that the car was taken by one of the residents of the Sunday Machine Works, and the withholding of the same, for a joy ride should not be construed to mean taking under Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If at all there was a taking, the same was merely temporary in nature. A temporary taking is held not a taking insured against.

CASE NO: 35 CASE TITLE: Baylon vs. Court of Appeals DECISION DATE: August 17, 1999 PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES, J. VOTATION: 4 CONCUR
I. II.
PETITIONER: PACIONARIA C. BAYLON RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division) LEONILA TOMACRUZ-co-manager of petitioners husband at PLDT PARTIES IN THE CASE: ROSITA B. LUANZON-engaged in business as a contractor for twenty years FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: Petition by way of certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of RTC. Petitioner introduced private respondent to Luanzon and invited her to lend Luanzon money at a monthly interest rate of five percent (5%), to be used as capital for the latter's business. Private respondent was assured by petitioner that Luanzon's business was stable and by the high interest rate, agreed to lend Luanzon money in the amount of P150,000. On June 22, 1987, Luanzon issued a postdated check and signed a promissory note acknowledging receipt of the P150,000 from private respondent and obliging herself to pay the said amount on or before August 22, 1987. Petitioner affixing her signature in the promissory note under the word "guarantor." Respondent made written demand for payment but Luanzon did not heed and filed a case against her and the petitioner but summons were never serve upon Luanzon. The trial court ruled against petitioners and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: ART. 2058 of the Civil Code, which provides that The guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor, and has resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: ISSUE/S
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
W/N there was a loan and not an BAYLON: NO. Claimed that she it was not a loan investment? but rather an investment citing the testimony of the respondent of using the words investments, dividends

and commission
W/N the Petitioner is liable to pay for the BAYLON: NO. She is not liable as a guarantor obligations of Luanzon? because the respondent has not exhausted property of the principal debtor before his own can be levied upon (ART. 2058 Civil Code).
VII.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. STATCON PRINCIPLE Ambuiguity, construed against party who caused it -When the stipulations of the contract are clear, the party claiming ambiguity against it will be prejudiced because there can be no doubt as to the literal meaning which should be applied.
W/N there was a YES. loan and not an investment?
Both parties do not deny the due execution and authenticity of the June 22, 1987 promissory note. All of petitioner's arguments are directed at uncovering the real intention of the parties in executing the promissory note The clear terms of the promissory note establish a creditor-debtor relationship between Luanzon and private respondent. The liability of the guarantor is only subsidiary. The creditor may hold the guarantor liable only after judgment has been obtained against the principal debtor is unable to pay It is premature to hold petitioner liable because there was no judgment obtained against the principal debtor Rosita B. Luanzon because no summons where served upon her, therefore the courts have no jurisdiction against her.
W/N the Petitioner is NO. liable to pay for the obligations of Luanzon?

Law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish CASE NO: 36 CASE TITLE: Robles v Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et al. CASE NO: 37 CASE TITLE: Colgate-Palmolive Philippine, Inc. vs. Gimenez DECISION DATE: January 28, 1961 PONENTE: J. Guttierez David Theme: Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish VOTATION: En Banc
I.
PETITIONER: Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. manufacturer of toilet preparations and houseold remedies RESPONDENT: Hon. Pedro Gimenez Auditor General Ismael Mathay Auditor of the Central Bank of the Philippines FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:
II.
III.
Colgate-Palmolive imports from abroad materials such as irish moss extract, sodium
benzoate, sodium saccharinate, etc. for stablizers and flavoring for their dental cream. o For every importation, it paid 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost pursuant to RA 601 Exchange Tax Law March 14, 1956 Colgate filed for 3 applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it paid to the Central Bank for a total of P113,343.99. Based on: Sec. 2, RA 601 o foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines ofstabilizer and flavors shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof. o After their applications were processed by the Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, the official advised them that P23, 958.13 is the amount to be refunded. Mathay, the Auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass its claim for refund because he said that toothpaste stablizers and flavors were not exempt under Sec. 2 of the Exchange tax law. December 4, 1958 Auditor General (Gimenez) affirmed the ruling of Mathay that it was not under those exempted because Sec. 2 only refers to those in preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Petitioner brought the petition to the SC.

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo Note: What is excise tax? o Tax imposed on goods manufactured for domestic sale or consumption or any other IV.
disposition. Also imposed on things that are imported. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED:
SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."
ISSUE: ISSUE/ S PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS WON Sec. 2, RA 601 the imports of Colgate which they claim to be subject to refund is under the 17% special excise tax imposed under
V.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS NO.
SC (HELD and RATIO)
YES. Decision is reversed. Colgate-Palmolive are to Stabilizer and flavors in Sec. 2 be refunded for the amount refers to those used in the of P23,958.13 preparation or manufacture of food and food products, not Though the argument of manufacturing of toothpaste. the Respondents is based on the General Terms rule Based on: General Terms rule in in Statcon, SC said that StatCon. this rule is only applicable to cases where all the General terms may be restricted items in an enumeration by specific words, with the result belong to or fall under one that the general language will be specific class. limited by the specific language which indicates the statutes The terms fertilizer and object and purpose. poultry also do not belong (Statutody Construction by to the same category of Crawford) food products and yet it is

Sec. 2 of RA 601?
included in the exemption. In the same way, RA 814 which amends Sec. 2 of RA 601, it added industrial starch which also does not refer to food for human consumption. StatCon Principle: Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos = where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish. (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue)
STATCON PRINCIPLES USED: Where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish - We must construe them in their general sense since it did not distinguish between stablizer and flavors for food and those for manufacturing - Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws by Black: The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction. Case no: 38 Case Title: Guevara v Inocentes Decision date: March 15, 1966 Ponente: Angelo Bautista, J Petitioner: Onofre Guevara Rrespondents: Raoul Inocentes, Office of the Solicitor General Facts : Nov 18, 1965- The petitioner, Onofre Guevara, was extended as ad interim appointee Undersecretary of labor by the outgoing President. Nov 25, 1965 He took his oath of office. Jan 23, 1966 The incumbent President issued Memorandum Circular No 8 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former Pres lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of the Congress at the midnight of Jan 22, 1966. On the same day, the respondent, Raoul

Inocentes was appointed ad interim Undersecretary of Labor by the incumbent President. Guevara then filed a petition seeking to be declared the person legally entitled to the said Office of the Undersecretary. Provision Being Contested: Article VII, Sec10 of the Constitution The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval of the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress Issue Petitioners argument 1. WON, the Petitioners ad petitioners interim appointment contention was valid and shall regarding the only become next ineffective upon CA adjournment disapproval or of the adjournment of Congress regular session specifically provide for regular session only Respondents argument Petitioners ad interim appointment lapsed when congress adjourned its last special session. Held No. It is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution to make recess appointments effective only until (a) the disapproval of the CA or (b) until the next adjournment of the Congress, and never a day longer regardless of the nature of the session adjourned. Statcon: UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT BEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS (when the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish) Until the next adjournment of Congress does not make any reference to any specific session of the congress---regular or special. It Is safe to conclude that what the framers of the 1935 Constitution used the word

2. WON
There has been no Ad interim Congress is adjournment of the appointment ceases still in Congress because to be valid after continuous the aforesaid each term of session special session was congress, so suspended by the petitioners House on Jan 22, appointment must 1966 (Saturday)to have lapsed already be resumed on Monday; while the adjournment approved by the Senate is not adjournment contemplated in Art VII sec 10(a). Therefore, the session at the Congress was continuous without any interuption
adjournment had in mind either regular or special sessions No. the fact that Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of Jan 22, 1966, the adjournment of one of its houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole.
Separate Opinions: 1. Concepcion, J - concurring Petitioner maintains there has been no adjournment of the Congress because the aforementioned special session had commenced on January 17, 1966 and although the Senate had adjourned, the House of Representatives merely suspended its session. Petitioner concludes therefore that the Congress has been in continuous session without any interruption. This pretense is clearly devoid of merit for: a. Senate has admittedly adjourned at about midnight of Jan 22-23,1966. In as much as the House of Rep is only part of our Congress, and not Congress itself, it follows necessarily that Congress cannot be said to have been in session. b. Not even the House of Rep was in session on Jan 23-24, 1966. It was next contended by the petitioner that the clause next adjournment of the Congress refers to adjournment assembled in regular session. This is unacceptable because: a. To do so would entail a judicial legislation by the insertion of the word regular in said provision. b. Neither can we adopt the petitioners theory without amending the Constitution.
CASE NO: 39 CASE TITLE: Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court; Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc. and Dominador Cacpal, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Manila

DECISION DATE: May 29, 1987 PONENTE: Gancayco, J. VOTATION: Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., concur; Feliciano, J., is on leave.
I.
PETITIONER: Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. surety of Varian Industrial Corporation
II.
RESPONDENTS: Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court; Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc. and Dominador Cacpal, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Manila
III.
FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court granting Sycwin Coating and Wires (private respondent) motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment by the petitioner. The pertinent facts of the case that resulted to this matter are:
Herein private respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation (VIC). During the pendency of the suit, respondent was able to attach some of the properties VIC upon posting a supersedeas bond. VIC, through the its surety, herein petitioner (Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.), posted a counterbond amounting to P1.4M to release the attached properties. On December 28, 1984, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a decision in favour of Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., ordering the petitioner to pay the principal amount of P1.4M plus interest, damages and other costs. Such decision was appealed by the petitioner to the Intermediate Appellate Court (public respondent). Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal, which on July 5, 1985 was granted. The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand.
IV.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide: SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. The officer executing the order shall without delay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the party against whom the order is issued in the province, not

exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any judgement which he may recover in the action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of the applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found within the province. SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At any time after an order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counterbond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counterbond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment. SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counterbond, and bound to pay to the judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.)
V.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED

(if applicable) Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the counterbond. Yes, the rule is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final executor judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal.
Under Sections 5
and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counterbond." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged against such a counterbond.
It is well
recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and

without regard to consequences.
CASE NO: 40 CASE TITLE: BAYAN v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora DECISION DATE: Oct. 10, 2000 PONENTE: Buena, J. VOTATION: 10 Concur; 3 Dissent; 1 In the Result, 1 No Part
I.
PETITIONERS: Note: This is a consolidation of FIVE (5) petitions. Petitioners are various anti Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) parties; to name a few: o Bayan first case; o Phil. Constitutional Assoc. second case; o Teofisto Guingona, Raul Roco and Sergio Osmea (senators) third case; o IBP fourth case; o Jovito R. Salonga fifth case. RESPONDENTS: Note: This is a consolidation of FIVE (5) petitions. Primary Respondents: o Ronaldo Zamora Exec. Secretary; o Domingo Siazon DFA Secretary; o Orlando Mercado DND Secretary. Other Respondents: o Marcelo Fernan Senate President; o Various other senators; and o All other persons acting their control, supervision, direction and instruction in relation to the VFA PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioners and respondents only. FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: March 14, 1947: RP and US forged a Military Bases Agreement. which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. August 30, 1951: To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, RP and US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, RP and US negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. September 16, 1991: Phil. Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases
II.
III.
IV.

Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. July 18, 1997, the US, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by DFA Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the VFA. Feb. 10, 1998: President FVR approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by DFA Sec. Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. October 5, 1998: President Estrada, through respondent DFA Sec., ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998: President Estrada, acting through respondent Exec. Sec. Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Sen. Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Sen. Rodolfo G. Biazon. May 3, 1999: The two Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. May 27, 1999: Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 became Senate Resolution No. 18. June 1, 1999: VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent DFA Sec. Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.
V.
PROVISIONS BEING CONTESTED:
It is being contested whether VFA falls within the scope of Sec. 21, Art. VII or of Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. Respondents: Sec. 21, Art. VII applies to VFA; Petitioners: Sec. 25, Art. XVIII applies to VFA
Sec. 21, Art. VII No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25, Art. XVIII After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and,

when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
VI.
ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: ISSUE/S PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS Which applies to VFA: Sec. BAYAN, et. Al.: Sec. 25, Art. 21, Art. VII or of Sec. 25, Art. VIII applies should apply, XVIII of the 1987 considering that the VFA has Constitution. for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Phils.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS Exec. Sec., et. al: Sec. 21, Art. VII applies, since VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
VII.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) Focus on Ratio No. 2; The stat con principles are the ratio decidendi themselves.
Which applies to Sec. 25, Art. XVIII 1. Lex specialis VFA: Sec. 21, Art. VII applies. derogat generali. or of Sec. 25, Art. Thus, where there XVIII of the 1987 is in the same Constitution. statute a particular enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.

2. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. When no distinction is made by law, the Court should not distinguish. It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent.
VIII.
DISSENTING OPINION: Puno, J.

According to Puno, whether the stay of the troops are temporary or permanent is relevant. Thus, regardless of whether Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution contemplates permanent presence of foreign military troops alone, or temporary presence as well, the VFA comes within its purview as it allows the permanent presence of U.S. troops on Philippine soil. Contrary to respondents allegation, the determination of the permanent nature of visits of U.S. troops under the VFA is an issue ripe for adjudication since Sec. 25 of Art. XVIII speaks of the manner by which U.S. troops may be allowed to enter Philippine territory. We need not wait and see, therefore, whether the U.S. troops will actually conduct military exercises on Philippine soil on a permanent basis before adjudicating this issue. What is at issue is whether the VFA allows such permanent presence of U.S. troops in Philippine territory. Because the VFA will allow US troops to permanently settle in the Phils., a stricter application of the requisites of Sec. 25, Art. XVIII must be applied. Justice Puno argues that the third requisite of the Section is not complied with:

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo 1. Their presence should be allowed by a treaty duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate COMPLIED;
2. When Congress so requires, such treaty should be ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the Filipino people in a national referendum held for that purpose COMPLIED; 3. Such treaty should be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting party NOT COMPLIED; Puno argues that the US Senate must concur with the VFA; the signature of the US Ambassador should not suffice.
Mandatory/ Directory/ Prohibiture CASE NO: CASE TITLE: SUBJECT: Prohibitive) DECISION DATE: PONENTE: VOTATION: Santiago]
I.
**41 Pimentel Jr vs Aguirre (Statutory Construction: Canons of Interpretation: Mandatory, Directory, 19 July 2000 Justice Artemio Panganiban 12 Concur, 3 Dissent [Kapunan, joined in by Purisima and Ynares-
PETITIONER: Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr RESPONDENTS: Executive Secretary Alexander Aguirre PARTIES IN THE CASE: Indirectly parties in this case, as petitioners in intervention, are the local government units, who are bound to be affected by the imposition of a certain administrative order.
II.
III.
IV.

Estrada, through Executive Secretary Aguirre, issues AO 372 requiring LGUs to identify and implement measures that will reduce by 25% their spending. In the said AO, it was further worded that pending evaluation of the DBM, 10% of the internal revenue allotment of LGUs will be withheld. NOTE: Remember the case of Drilon vs Lim where the powers of control and supervision were delineated. o The difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. (Cabinet and alter egos only)

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo o
On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act . They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. (LGUs and autonomous government units i.e. State Universities)
V.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Lifted only the important parts and parts in contention ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998 WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country's growth momentum; WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with available resources; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct: SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas: X X X SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld. Kenneth: WHEN CAN THE PRESIDENT INTERVENE IN THE FISCAL POLICIES OF AN LGU? So what is being contested here is whether or not the President has the power to mandate the LGUs to reduce spending by 25%. In general, the President does not have that said power as every LGU is autonomous. As long as they act within the bounds of law and the Constitution, they can do whatever they want with their money. Think of him as a little president in his own town he has the political prerogative over whatever he wants, provided he follows statutes. However, the Local Government Code (quoted below) provides scenarios when the President can control the budget of an LGU. Take note that what is controlled is the total budget (the sum of money) and not how the budget will be spent (the items of the budget or the particulars).

The Local Government Code provides:[27] "x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
VI.
ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: Fill up only if the reading provides these. Eg. In Chinabank vs. Ortega: ISSUE/S PETITIONERS DEFENDANTS ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS Whether or not The President, in issuing AO 372, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction, with respect to two parts Yes the President acted in No the President, in issuing (1) The President was excess of his power. He the AO 372, was only exercising power of wrongfully exercised power exercising his power of control in Section 1 of of control over the local supervision in advising local AO 372 government units, a power, government units. It is not that he did not have. The said mandatory as it does not AO has the nature of a provide a sanction for nonmandatory/prohibitive compliance. It is not a character that encroaches mandatory imposition, thus, it upon the fiscal autonomy of is only within the ambits of LGUs. the power of supervision (2) The President, in the directive to prevent the Yes, it violates the No arguments were provided release of 10% of the Constitution that grants the aside from the fact that the IRA as provided for in LGUs fiscal autonomy. The whole AO 372 was only in Section 4 of AO 372, constitution mandates that advisory capacity. However, violates Article X of the the IRA of local government the wording of Section 4 is Constitution providing units be automatically prohibitive in nature in as for the automatic released every year. much as it authorizes the release of the IRAs budget department to every year to the withhold the release of the LGUs IRA to each LGU.

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo VII.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO
SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable)
Whether or not The President, in issuing AO 372, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction, with respect to two No, the parts President was only (1) The exercising President his power was of exercising supervisio power of n control in Section 1 of AO 372
(2) The
President, in the directive to prevent the release of 10% of the
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the Solicitor General's assurance that the directive to "ide ntify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern. Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in Yes The this light that we sustain the solicitor President general's contention in regard to in effecting Section 1. Section 10 exercised A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy power of is the automatic release of the shares control of LGUs in the national internal over the revenue. This is mandated by no
Mandatory vs Directory We see here that the Court conceded to the defendantExecutive Secretary that Section 1 is merely directory and not mandatory. Directory is only advisory in nature and is not a requirement. Although the use of the word will was authoritative, the statute was regarded as a whole. The fact that it did not provide for sanctions, the Court considered it only as only directory. It is not a command. (Will = directory)
Mandatory & Prohibitive We see here that the AO used the word shall. It is mandatory in

IRA as provided for in Section 4 of AO 372, violates Article X of the Constitution providing for the automatic release of the IRAs every year to the LGUs
LGUs, a less than the Constitution.[28] power he The Local Government [29] does not Code specifies further that the have release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for [30] whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.[31] Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily."[32] Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
nature and is a requirement. The use of negative, prohibitory or exclusive terms or words in a statute is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. A statute or provision which contains words of positive prohibition, such as shall not, cannot, or ought not, or which is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated is mandatory. Prohi bitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command, thou shall not, and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act.
VIII.
CONCURRING / SEPARATE OPINIONS (IF ANY): None DISSENTING OPINIONS (IF ANY): ISSUE HELD Whether or not the issue is No it is not yet justiticiable justiciable
IX.
RATIO It has not yet been implemented, thus no actual case or controversy has

Whether or not the President Yes has the power to control fiscal measures of LGUs
arisen He is the chief financial officer of the country and is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory mandates. Rebuttal of the majority: This power has been controlled by the Local Government Code that has provided for requisites that need be present so that the President can intervene in a LGUs fiscal policy (see above).
CASE NO: 42 CASE TITLE: Marcelino v Cruz DECISION DATE: March 18, 1983 PONENTE: ESCOLIN, J SC Division: Second Division VOTATION: 4 concur
I. II.
PETITIONER: Bernardino Marcelino RESPONDENTS: The Hon. Fernando Cruz, Jr., as Presiding Judge of Branch XII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, People of the Philippines Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail of Rizal PARTIES IN THE CASE: BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner vs. THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch XII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF THE PROVINCIAL JAIL OF RIZAL, respondents FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: o Petition for Prohibition and Writ of Habeas Corpus to enjoing Judge Fernando Cruz from promulgating his decision in PP v Bernardino Marcelino
III.
IV.

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo o
Release from detention of petitioner (accused in the case) for lack of jurisdiction of respondent (Cruz) over the case for failure to decide within 90 days from submission thereof
Petitioner was charged with rape in Branch 12 (Court of First Instance of Rizal) o Trial was concluded when the accused rested his case on August 4, 1975 Same date, attorneys for both parties moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda Trial court granted the motion and are given 30 days to submit their respective memoranda Petitioner submitted in due time Respondent (people) did not o November 28, 1975 judge filed his decision in said case for promulgation. Decision was dated the same January 26, 1975 Postmaster executed that the letters to the complaining witness and counsel for the accused were posted on December 4, 1975. (which were received on December 8 and 9, 1975) o On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for postponment, raising for the first the the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision The respondent judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976 at 8:30 AM o January 19, 1976 counsel for petitioner moved for the resetting of the promulgation of decision. Petition granted and was rescheduled to January 26, 1976 January 12, 1976 counsel for the accused filed this petition o January 16, 1976 Court issued an Order temporarily restraining respondent judge from promulgating the decision in the Criminal Case
V.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Section 11[1], Article X of the (1973) Constitution: SEC. 11[1] Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months for the Supreme court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior colelgiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.
VI.
ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: Fill up only if the reading provides these. Eg. In Chinabank vs. Ortega: ISSUE/S PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS W/N Sec 11[1], Article X of Yes. the 1973 Constitution applies Three-month period prescribed by Section 11[1] of Article X of to respondent the 1973 Constitution, is mandatory in character and that non-obeserance theof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.

VII.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED
W/N Sec 11[1], No Article X of the 1973 Constitution applies to respondent
To date, no authoritative Mandatory/ interpretation has been Directory/ rendered by this Court. Prohibiture The established rules is that constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest Directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on theory that if the statute had intent such result would clearly In Trapp v McCormick it was have indicated it held that the statutory provisions which may be thus Which equally departed from with impunity, applies to the without affecting the validity constitutional of statutory proceedings, are provision usually those which relate to questioned the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legilsature or some incident of the essential act. o In said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory By the phrase unless reduced by the Supreme Court period prescribed therein is subject to modification of Supreme Court in accordance with its prerogative (Sec 5[5] of Article X of 1973 Constitution) Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v Morris declares constitutional provisions are

directory, where they refer to matters merely procedural Mr. Henry Campbell Black (Construction and Interpretation of the Laws) constitutional provision in question be held as merely directory. Thus where the contrary construction would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences, iit should not be follwoed Courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for failure to decide a case within 90 days period. Failure to observe rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. A certificate to this certificate is required before judges are allowed to draw their salaries. Restraining Order dated January 1976 is lifted. Since Judge Cruz is already deceased, his successor is hereby order to decide Criminal Case on the basis of the record from the time the case is raffled to him.
VIII.
CONCURRING
C. Justice Abad Santos
Add the following observations Petitioner wishes to be release for failure to The main opinion states that the 90-day decide case within 90 days from submission period was not exceeded in this case Exceeded or not, a decision rendered by an inferior court outside 90-day period is not void for loss of jurisdiction o A decision rendered beyond 90 days is valid and the only consequence is to subject the erring judge to administrative action Judge who wrote the questioned decision has It is well-settled that, to be binding, a died. It cannot be now promulgated. judgment must be dully signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears tehreon o For this reason, petitioners case has to be rendered by another judge

For recits Statcon topic is Mandatory/ Directory/ Prohibiture Directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on theory that if the statute had intent such result would clearly have indicated it (which also applies to Constitutional provision questioned) CASE NO: 43 CASE TITLE: In the Matter of Adoption of Elizabeth Mira, Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm v. Republic of the Philippines DECISION DATE: September 30, 1963 PONENTE: Paredes, J. VOTATION: Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur; Labrador and Reyes, J.B.L., took no part.
I.
PETITIONER: Gilbert R. Brehm American citizen serving the US Navy Ester Mira Brehm mother of Elizabeth Mira
II.
RESPONDENTS: Republic of the Philippines
III.

Gilbert Brehm, a US citizen temporarily assigned in Subic Bay serving with the US Navy, married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen. Ester Mira had a daughter by another man, also an American Navy, whom they havent heard from since 1952. The spouses filed a joint petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth to promote her best interest and to give her a legitimate status. They also prayed that the child be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father, and be, for all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all the rights pertinent thereto. The Republic of the Philippines opposed to the petition saying that Brehm is disqualified from making an adoption for being a non-resident alien based on Art 335 [4] of the New Civil Code. Brehm replied to the opposition using Art 338 of the New Civil Code which expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a step-father. And he manifested that he intends to reside in the Philippines permanently, after his tour of duty with the US Naval Force. The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court rendered judgment and granted the petition for adoption. The Solicitor General took exception from the judgment claiming that it was an error for the court to grant the adoption.

IV.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Provides that The following cannot adopt xxx xxx xxx (4) Non-resident aliens; xxx xxx xxx Par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code, which states The following may be adopted: (1) The natural child by the natural father (2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother (3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.
V.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) Mandatory words impose a duty Permissive words grant discretion
Whether or not petitioner, a nonresident alien, may adopt his step-child.
For the reason that Brehm is a nonresident alien, attested by his own testimony, he is not qualified to adopt minor Elizabeth. The decision appealed from, in so far as it affects the petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm, is hereby reversed, and his Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied.
Article
335 is too clear to require interpretation. We should construe Article 338 in connection with article 335. Art. 335 is a mandatory provision, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated. On the other hand, Art. 338, which used the words may be is merely directory, and which can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the

mandatory provisions of Art. 335. Moreover, as heretofore been shown, it is article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case, and before Article; 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established

CASE NO.: 44 CASE TITLE: Don Tino Realty and Development Corp. v. Florentino
CASE
FACTS
PERTINENT LAWS / JURISPRUDENCE
ISSUES and RULINGS
RELEVANCE TO STATCON
Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation (DTRDC) vs. Florentino
6 Feb. 1997 Don Tino filed an ejectment suit against Florentino over a parcel of land in Bulacan.
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Whether or not the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be liberally interpreted to allow the admission of an answer filed 1 day late
Mandatory/Directory/ Prohibitory
Through force, strategy and stealth, Florentino occupied the land and built his house there.
Section 3. Verification.(b) All pleadings shall be verified. NO, the view of the Court of Appeals that such provisions should be liberally interpreted is misplaced.
SHALL means SHALL! The use of the word shall in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character.
October 28, 1980
13 Feb. 1997 Pursuant to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (RRSP), summons were served upon Florentino, requiring him to Answer within 10 days from receipt of the summons.
PETITIONER: Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation
RESPONDENT: Julian Florentino
24 Feb. (1 day past the due date) Florentino filed his Answer through Roel Alvear (NOT A LAWYER), president of the Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng RMB in San Juan, Balagtas, Bulacan, a duly recognized association organized to protect the rights of its members to possession of the property in contention was located. However, the Answer was not verified, in violation of Section 3b of the RRSP.
Sec. 5. Answer.Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof to the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the Answer shall be considered barred. The Answer to counterclaims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the Answer in which they are pleaded.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
PONENTE: Justice Puno
The trial court set the case for preliminary conference on 13 April.
GIST: The Supreme Court sets aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
21 March Don Tino filed a motion to cancel the preliminary conference because the Answer of Florentino was filed out of time.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or upon motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
Cases on forcible entry and unlawful detainers are summary proceedings (i.e. they are NOT FULL-BLOWN TRIALS), designed to provide a speedy means of protecting property rights.
The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
In the case of Gachon vs. Devera, Jr., the Court ruled that the use of the word shall in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character.

which allowed to admission of a late and defective Answer in an ejectment case.
26 March Trial court granted Don Tinos motions, declaring that Florentino failed to comply with Section 3b and Section 5 of the RRSP. It also noted that Alvear had no authority to represent Florentino, since there was no special power of attorney executed in his favor.
therein. To admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers the very mischief the Rule seeks to redress.
Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, promulgating the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Thus, the preliminary conference was cancelled and the case was submitted for decision
EJECTMENT - a lawsuit brought to remove a party that is occupying and has made a wrongful claim of title to the property, as in the ejectment of a squatter
8 April The Municipal Trial Court rendered its decision, ordering Florentino to vacate the premises and turn over possession to Don Tino. Florentino was also ordered to remove the improvements he made on the land and to pay a rental fee of P2,000 from 26 March until he vacates it.
11 April Florentino filed a Motion to Lift Order, contending that he was deprived of due process when the MTC disregarded his tardy Answer. He explained that his Answer was filed late and filed by a non-lawyer because he was too poor to hire a lawyer. He asked the trial court to reconsider this as an honest mistake and excusable negligence, even if a decision was already rendered.
SEC. 36. Summary procedures in special cases. The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedure may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods of filing pleadings shall be non-extendible. [Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation vs. Florentino, 314 SCRA 197(1999)]
In the case at bar, no satisfactory explanation was offered by respondent why he was not able to file his answer on time.
- this is different from eviction, which is the removal of a party that is wrongfully occupying the premises but is not making a claim of title to the land
The trial court approved the motion, but by 8 August, the Malolos RTC affirmed the ruling of the MTC.
After this, the Court of Appeals reversed the MTC and RTC decision, ruling that Don Tino loses nothing anyway if the Answer will be admitted by the courts. They added that suits should be decided on their merits and not on technicalities, and that a liberal construction of the rules was necessary to achieve substantial justice for Florentino.

CASE NO: 45 CASE TITLE: Bensabhl v Avila CASE NO: 46 CASE TITLE: Lokin, Jr. v Commission on Election Expressio unius est exclusio alterius CASE NO: 47 CASE TITLE: City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v Reyes CASE NO: 48 CASE TITLE: People v Macarandang CASE NO: 49 CASE TITLE: People v mapa CASE NO: CASE TITLE: SUBJECT: exclusio alterius) DECISION DATE: PONENTE: VOTATION:
I.
50 People vs Santayana (Statutory Construction: Canons of Interpretation: Expressio unius est 15 November 1976 Justice Roberto Concepcion Unanimous Second Division with Barredo inhibiting
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines, criminal case involving illegal possession of fire arms RESPONDENTS: Jesus Santayana, convict PARTIES IN THE CASE: (see above) FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:
II.
III. IV.
Santayana was issued a gun by Colonel Maristela, the Chief of the CIS as s Special Agent. He was told that he no longer had to apply for a license to carry because o 1. It was government property, therefore, the gun cannot be named after a person o 2. As a Special Agent, he was already a peace officer that was exempt from obtaining a license, as enunciated in the case of Macarandang. Santayana was detained for illegal possession of firearms in Plaza Miranda. Information was filed in the Municipal Trial Court. Santayana was filed guilty. Hence this appeal.

V.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Whether or not the municipal trial court has jurisdiction of the illegal firearms possession case, given that the penalty imposed by the law punishing illegal possession of firearms is imprisonment of not less than one year and one day nor more than five years , or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, Section 44 of RA 296 Judiciary Reform Act of 1948 Section 44. Original jurisdiction. - Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: XXX (f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos ; XXX Section 87 RA 296 Judiciary Reform Act of 1948 as amended by RA 2916 "Sec. 87. Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases. Justice of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over: XXX "(b) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to: XXX (9) Illegal possession of firearms. X X X ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: Fill up only if the reading provides these. Eg. In Chinabank vs. Ortega: ISSUE/S PETITIONERS DEFENDANTS ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS Whether or not the municipal No the law has provided for Ths Solicitor General sides trial court has jurisdiction the exclusion of criminal with the petitioner. over the criminal case cases that imposes a penalty of more than 6 months or fine of more than 200 pesos from the municipal trial court. Whether or not Santayana No the prevailing case of Ths Solicitor General sides was required to obtain a Macarandang at the time of with the petitioner. license to carry the firearm the crime provided that he incurred no liability and was exempt from the requirement
VI.

of a license to carry since he was acting in discharge of his duties as a deputized special agent.
VII.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO
Whether or not the No municipal trial court has jurisdiction over the criminal case
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court.
SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) Expressio unius est exclusio alterius We see here that the law provides the general scope of jurisdiction of the MTC, which includes criminal cases and illegal possession of firearms cases. However, it was also expressed that the MTC only has jurisdiction over cases with penalties of imprisonment less than 6 months or a fine of less than PhP 200.00.
No Whether or not Santayana was required to obtain a license to carry the firearm
Since it is expressly provided that the MTC only has jurisdiction over cases to which the law attaches a penalty lighter than imprisonment of 6 months or 200 pesos, it excludes all other cases to which the law The Court of First Instance has attaches a greater concurrent jurisdiction over the penalty. It is therefore same. restrictive The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive They At the time of appellant's interpretation. apprehension, the doctrine then are based on the rules

prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
VIII.
of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
CONCURRING / SEPARATE OPINIONS (IF ANY): None DISSENTING OPINIONS (IF ANY): None CASE NO: 51 CASE TITLE: Malinias v Comelec
IX.
CASE NO: 52 CASE TITLE: Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City DECISION DATE: June 29, 2004 PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J. VOTATION: 11 CONCUR, 3 ON LEAVE
I. II.
III.
PETITIONER: Lung Center of The Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit RESPONDENTS: Same as above Quezon City Constantino P. Rosas-City Assessor of Quezon City PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioner and Respondents Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center private enterprise, a leasee of LCP for commercial purposes.

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo IV.
V.
FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: PD 1823 established the Lung Center of the Philippines on January 16, 1981 and it is a registered owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon Avenue corner Elliptical Road, Central District, Quezon City. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics. One half of entire left area is idle while the right side, at corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. Petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government. On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City. PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: PD 1823 Whereas, the more common lung diseases are, to a great extent, preventable, and curable with early and adequate medical care, immunization and through prompt and intensive prevention and health education programs; Whereas, there is an urgent need to consolidate and reinforce existing programs, strategies and efforts at preventing, treating and rehabilitating people affected by lung diseases, and to undertake research and training on the cure and prevention of lung diseases, through a Lung Center which will house and nurture the above and related activities and provide tertiary-level care for more difficult and problematical cases; Whereas, to achieve this purpose, the Government intends to provide material and financial support towards the establishment and maintenance of a Lung Center for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people.[15] The purposes for which the petitioner was created are spelled out in its Articles of Incorporation, thus: SECOND: That the purposes for which such corporation is formed are as follows:
1. To construct, establish, equip, maintain, administer and conduct an integrated medical institution which shall specialize in the treatment, care, rehabilitation and/or relief of lung and allied diseases in line with the concern of the government to assist and provide material and financial support in the establishment and maintenance of a lung center primarily to benefit the people of the Philippines and in pursuance of the policy of the State to secure the well-being of the people by providing them specialized health and medical services and by minimizing the incidence of lung diseases in the country and elsewhere. 2. To promote the noble undertaking of scientific research related to the prevention of lung or pulmonary ailments and the care of lung patients, including the holding of a series of relevant congresses, conventions, seminars and conferences;

3. To stimulate and, whenever possible, underwrite scientific researches on the biological, demographic, social, economic, eugenic and physiological aspects of lung or pulmonary diseases and their control; and to collect and publish the findings of such research for public consumption; 4. To facilitate the dissemination of ideas and public acceptance of information on lung consciousness or awareness, and the development of fact-finding, information and reporting facilities for and in aid of the general purposes or objects aforesaid, especially in human lung requirements, general health and physical fitness, and other relevant or related fields; 5. To encourage the training of physicians, nurses, health officers, social workers and medical and technical personnel in the practical and scientific implementation of services to lung patients; 6. To assist universities and research institutions in their studies about lung diseases, to encourage advanced training in matters of the lung and related fields and to support educational programs of value to general health; 7. To encourage the formation of other organizations on the national, provincial and/or city and local levels; and to coordinate their various efforts and activities for the purpose of achieving a more effective programmatic approach on the common problems relative to the objectives enumerated herein; 8. To seek and obtain assistance in any form from both international and local foundations and organizations; and to administer grants and funds that may be given to the organization; 9. To extend, whenever possible and expedient, medical services to the public and, in general, to promote and protect the health of the masses of our people, which has long been recognized as an economic asset and a social blessing; 10. To help prevent, relieve and alleviate the lung or pulmonary afflictions and maladies of the people in any and all walks of life, including those who are poor and needy, all without regard to or discrimination, because of race, creed, color or political belief of the persons helped; and to enable them to obtain treatment when such disorders occur; 11. To participate, as circumstances may warrant, in any activity designed and carried on to promote the general health of the community; 12. To acquire and/or borrow funds and to own all funds or equipment, educational materials and supplies by purchase, donation, or otherwise and to dispose of and distribute the same in such manner, and, on such basis as the Center shall, from time to time, deem proper and best, under the particular circumstances, to serve its general and non-profit purposes and objectives; 13. To buy, purchase, acquire, own, lease, hold, sell, exchange, transfer and dispose of properties, whether real or personal, for purposes herein mentioned; and

14. To do everything necessary, proper, advisable or convenient for the accomplishment of any of the powers herein set forth and to do every other act and thing incidental thereto or connected therewith.[16] Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. After all, any person, the rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be injured or wounded and become a subject of charity.[17] As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether outpatient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.[18] In Congregational Sunday School, etc. v. Board of Review,[19] the State Supreme Court of Illinois held, thus: [A]n institution does not lose its charitable character, and consequent exemption from taxation, by reason of the fact that those recipients of its benefits who are able to pay are required to do so, where no profit is made by the institution and the amounts so received are applied in furthering its charitable purposes, and those benefits are refused to none on account of inability to pay therefor. The fundamental ground upon which all exemptions in favor of charitable institutions are based is the benefit conferred upon the public by them, and a consequent relief, to some extent, of the burden upon the state to care for and advance the interests of its citizens ART. VI, Sec. 28 (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. Being a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines, all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines, Inc., for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center, shall be exempt from income and gift taxes, the same further deductible in full for the purpose of determining the maximum deductible amount under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases made by, or for the Lung Center. Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) as follows:

SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax: ... (b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
VI.
ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: ISSUE/S PETITIONERS DEFENDANTS ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS W/N Petitioner is a charitable LUNG CENTER: YES. Quezon City: NO. charitable institution Failed to prove as institution within the context (ART. VI Sec. 28 (3) of charitable under PD of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution). 1823 or Constitution. 1987 Constitution and Sec Character is not Failed to prove that 234(b) of RA 7160? altered by fact that it 100% of out-patients, admits paying patients 60% or 170 beds have and renders medical been reserved for services. indigent patients. From 1995-1999, 100% of out-patients, 60% or 170 beds have been allotted to charity patients. The exclusivity required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean solely. W/N the real properties of the YES. NO. Portion leased out to Not exempt under PD petitioner are exempt from private individuals 1823 or under our real property taxes? from whom it derives Consti Failed to show that income does not mean property is actually, it loses character as directly, and charitable institution exclusively used for and exempted from charitable purposes. tax.
VII.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES:

ISSUE/S
HELD
RATIO
STAT CON PRINCIPLE
W/N Petitioner is a YES. charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and Sec 234(b) of RA 7160?
W/N the properties of petitioner exempt from property taxes?
real YES, the Partially. are real
Charity may be fully defined as a gift and is not restricted to relief of the poor or the sick. Under PD 1823, it is a nonprofit and non-stock corporation. The medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. The rich and poor may become a subject of charity. Not lose character because income is derived from paying patients or receives subsidies from government and the money does not inure to private benefit of persons managing or operating the institution. Not lose character by receiving gifts or donations. Portions of real property leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
Exempt from the payment of taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government (PD 1823,
The granting of exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. - Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. And exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. - what is expressed puts an end to that

sec. 2) The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only. (Art. 6, Sec. 28 (3)). Failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. The used does not refer to the use of income derived but rather the direct, actual application of for charitable purposes. Portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes.
which is implied. -proceed from premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. - a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
VIII.
DISPOSITION Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The respondent Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after due hearing, the precise portions of the land and the area thereof which are leased to private persons, and to compute the real property taxes due thereon as provided for by law.
CASE NO: 53 CASE TITLE: GOMEZ v. VENTURA DECISION DATE: March 29, 1930 PONENTE: Romualdez VOTATION: Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.; Villamor, J., reserves his vote (EN BANC)
I.
PETITIONER: Dominador Gomez- A doctor whose license to practice medicine and surgery was revoked by the Board of Medical Examiners because of his prescription of opium for a patient whose physical condition did not require the use of such drug II. RESPONDENTS: Honorio Ventura- Secretary of the Interior of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands

Astorga, Britanico, Cajigal, Cruz, Dimaano, Porta, Ramos, Rapal, Rosit, Sea, Velasco, Zerrudo III.
PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioner- Dominador Gomez Respondents- Honorio Ventura and the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: - Gomez filed a case with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, praying that the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners, forever revoking his license to practice medicine and surgery, be annulled and set aside; that he be restored to his status before the investigation and revocation of his license (with a new license granted to him); and that he be granted the proper legal remedies - The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with costs against Gomez - Gomez brought the case before the Supreme Court, and held that the CFI erred: o In not holding that Act No. 2381 (The Opium Law) has been repealed in such a way as that it limits the definition of unprofessional conduct to the 5 situations mentioned in Act No. 3111 o (Minor issue with no StatCon principle) In holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila was authorized to appear and institute administrative proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines o (Minor issue with no StatCon principle) In holding that The Opium Law is valid (did not comply with the one-subject, one-bill principle) o (Minor issue with no StatCon principle) In rendering the judgment appealed from and in denying the motion for avoidance, and for a new trial, filed by appellant
-
IV.
Act No. 310 (As amended by Act No. 2493 and Section 780 of the Administrative Code) states that the Board of Examiners could revoke licenses for unprofessional conduct (without defining what unprofessional conduct is.) The Opium Law, in its section 9, repeated the provision as to doctors and dentists. Act No. 3111 provides 5 situations which contemplate unprofessional conduct. MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the definition of unprofessional conduct is limited to the 5 situations mentioned in Act No. 3111 (which amends Act No. 2493)
V.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Act No. 3111, which amends Act No. 2493 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), by an addition after the words "unprofessional conduct" of the following: "The words "unprofessional conduct, immoral, or dishonorable conduct" as used in this chapter shall be construed to include the following acts: (1) Procuring, aiding or abeting a criminal abortion; (2) advertising, either in his own name or in the name of any other person, firm, association, or corporation, in any written or printed paper, or document, of medical business in which untruthful or improbable promises are made, or being employed by, or in the service of any person, firm, association or corporation so advertising, or

advertising in any obscene manner derogatory to good morals; (3) habitual intemperance or addition to the use of morphine, opium, cocaine or other drugs having a similar effect; (4) conviction of a crime or misdemeanor involving dishonorable conduct; and (5) willfully betraying a professional secret." (For the first minor issue regarding Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix) According to section 780 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, the procedure to be observed in revoking a certificate of registration is the following: Proceedings for revocation of a certificate of registration shall be begun by filing a written charge or charges against the accused. These charges may be preferred by any person or persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of Medical Examiners itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said charges. Said charges shall be filed with the executive officer of the Board of Medical Examiners and a copy thereof, together with written notice of the time and place when they will be heared and determined, shall be served upon the accused or his counsel, at least two weeks before the date actually fixed for said hearing.
VI.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: JUDGEMENT OF BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS AFFIRMED ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable) The maxim expressio unius est exclussio alterius (the express mention of one thing excludes others) should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature.
Whether or not Act NO No. 3111 repeals The Opium Law in such a way that unprofessional conduct is limited to the 5 situations provided?
MINOR ISSUE: YES Whether or not that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila was authorized to appear and institute administrative
The grounds for unprofessional conduct of a physician are not limited to these 5 grounds. If there exists unprofessional conduct not specified in laws, with more reason does the criminal use of opium remain a specific cause for revocation of license The law does not N/A require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by any specified person. From the wording of the law we infer that any person,

proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines (MINOR ISSUE) NO Whether or not section 9 (stating that the license of a doctor or dentist may be revoked on the ground of unprofessional conduct) of Act No. 2381 is null and void on the ground since said section is foreign to the subject of said Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law prohibiting the enactment of any bill embracing more than one subject and providing that the subject be expressed in the title of the bill? (MINOR ISSUE) YES Whether or not the judgment appealed from was correctly rendered, and the motion of avoidance and new trial properly denied?
including a public officer, may prefer the charges referred to in the above-quoted provision.
Section 9 is not N/A foreign to the end pursued in the Opium Law (regulation of the use of opium.) The provisions contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 relative to the physicians and dentist are simply details and means conducive to the ultimate purpose of said Act, which details and means need not be stated in the title of the Act for the very reason that properly speaking, they are not foreign matter. The actions of the N/A Board of Medical Examiners partake of a quasi-judicial character, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this reason, the exercise thereof cannot be reviewed by mandamus, which is the nature of this cause on its merits.

Ejusdem Generis CASE NO: 54 CASE TITLE: Go Tiaco v Union Ins. Society of Canton CASE NO: 55 CASE TITLE: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission DECISION DATE: January 20, 1961 PONENTE: GUTIERREZ DAVID, J SC Division: EN BANC VOTATION: 6 concur, 3 concur in the result, Bengoz, J reserves his vote
I. II.
PETITIONER: Roman Catholic Archbiship of Manila RESPONDENTS: Social Security Commission PARTIES IN THE CASE: IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant, v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS: o September 1, 1958 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) filed with Social Security Commission (SSC) a request that Catholic Charties, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the RCAM be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA No. 1161 (Social Security Law of 1954) o Based on claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and acitivites organized for profit o SSC in its Resoultion No. 572 (series of 1958), denied the request o RCAM reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution o The request was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767 (series of 1958) o This appeal taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended
III.
IV.
V.
PROVISION BEING CONTESTED: Republic Act No. 1161 AN ACT TO CREATE A SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM PROVIDING SICKNESS, UNEMPLOYMENT, RETIREMENT, DISABILITY AND DEATH BENEFITS FOR EMPLOYEES

(Social Security Law)

SECTION 9. Compulsory coverage. (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon all employees not over sixty years of age and their employers: Provided, That any benefit already earned by employees under private benefit plans existing at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be discontinued, reduced or otherwise impaired: Provided, further, That private plans which are existing and in force at the time of compulsory coverage shall be integrated with the plan of the SSS in such a way where the employer's contribution to his private plan is more that that required of him in this Act he shall pay to the SSS only the contribution required of him and he shall continue his contribution to such private plan less his contribution to the SSS so that the employer's total contribution to his private benefit plan and to the Social Security System shall be the same as his contribution to his private benefit plan before the compulsory coverage: Provided, further, That any changes, adjustments, modifications, eliminations or improvements in the benefits to be available under the remaining private plan, which may be necessary to adopt by reason of the reduced contribution thereto as a result of the integration, shall be subject to agreements between the employers and employees concerned: Provided, further, That the private benefit plan which the employer shall continue for his employees shall remain under the employer's management and control unless there is an existing agreement to the contrary: Provided, finally, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as a limitation on the right of employers and employees to agree on and adopt benefits which are over and above those provided under this Act.
SECTION 8 paragraph c (c) Employer Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government: Provided, That a self-employed professional shall be both employee and employer at the same time.
o VI.
DECISION OF THE COURT (HELD), RATIO, STAT CON PRINCIPLES: ISSUE/S HELD RATIO SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED Ejusdem Generis Latin of the same kind or class A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.
W/N that the term No "employer" as defined in the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade,
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. The term employer was sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. o it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included

business, industry, undertaking."
had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it. o RA No. 1161 - services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded which has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. o This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law. Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. o The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .
o
W/N RA 1161 unconstitutional
is No
Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall

be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." o Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. o It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people." o Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture. There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. o The funds contributed are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members

W/N RA 1161 impairs No. right to disseminate religious information
At any rate, their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment. Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all the people.
For recits Statcon topic is Ejusdem Generis A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed. RA 1161 (c) Employer Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government : o had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.

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Yes. Decision of CA is set aside.

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W/N Respondent Judge was correct in dismissing the case of Barrameda?

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PARTIES IN THE CASE: (see above) FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

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Whether or not RA constitutional or not

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W/N BP 52, sec 4 is No unconstitutional because it is violative of the equal protection

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CONCURRING / SEPARATE OPINIONS (IF ANY):

ISSUE/S W/N BP 52 is constitutional (equal

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SUPPORTING STAT CON PRINCIPLES USED (if applicable)

W/N BP 52 is No constitutional (equal protection)

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W/N BP 51 constitutional (presumption innocence)

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PARTIES IN THE CASE: Petitioner-Appellant: Lucio Ildefonso Respondent-Appellee: Ernesto Sibal

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TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)

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FACTS / TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

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OVERALL DECISION Decision reaffirmed Costs against appellant

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CASE NO: 34 CASE TITLE: Villacorta v Insurance Commission

ISSUES and RULINGS

VILLACORTA v . INSURANCE COMMISSION

Ambiguity is construed against the party who caused it.

October 28, 1980

PONENTE: (Acting) Chief Justice Teehankee

2) Article 308 of the RPC, defining theft

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In this case, the SC overturned the decision of the Insurance Commission.

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ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES: ISSUE/S

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W/N there was a YES. loan and not an investment?

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RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS NO.

SC (HELD and RATIO)

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