Mike Mackus

Matthew Benton
Philosophy 220
October 3, 2008

Nobody Wins in an Argument with a Skeptic

Moore’s “Proof of an External World” offers a common sense solution to the problem of

skepticism. However, in using common sense Moore is already relying on what the skeptics have

been arguing against. We are then forced with a difficult decision of whether to allow such

common sense to be able to dictate truths about the world or accept the far-reaching negative

implications of the skeptical argument. Neither leaves a sweet taste in the mouth but, as we shall

see, there seems to be no way to escape this problematic choice.

Moore outlines three check points that all proper, successful proofs must have: firstly, the

premises must differ from the conclusion; secondly, the premises are known to be true; and

finally, that the conclusion follows from the premises. Any logician would agree that these are

the essential means of a valid and sound proof; this much cannot be argued with. Moore’s actual

proof, though, seems to be so straight forward as to not even need a brief introduction:

1) There is a hand.
2) If there is a hand then there exists an external world.
3) Thus there must exist an external world.

The logic appears to be valid in Moore’s proof. He uses a simple inference that we all resort to in

everyday reasoning, modes ponens: if we know it to be the case that P and we also know it to be

the case that P -> Q, then it is valid to conclude that it is the case that Q. Therefore, we can

safely conclude that Moore’s argument is of a valid logical form. However, in light of what many

skeptics have written it seems as though Moore is attempting to circumvent the central premise

of skepticism.
 In comparing Moore’s proof with Stroud’s work on “The Problem of the External

World,” it becomes evident that Moore fails to deal with the problems raised by a skeptic. Stroud

lays out in detail the case for skepticism, specifically focusing in on Descartes’ “dream”

argument. It purports that if one does not whether he is dreaming or not then there is no way for

one to gain any knowledge of an external world. That is not to say that what occurs within one’s

own cognition is not occurring, that much is granted by both Stroud and Descartes. Rather, the

problem arises in the connection between our sensory perception of the world and the actual

objective world that may (or may not) exist. The relationship between perception and reality is

problematic for the reason that what one is currently experiencing, has experienced in the past, or

is to experience in the future, may only be dream. In that case, what we perceive has no direct

relationship to an external world. Thus, for both Stroud and Descartes, if one cannot know for

certain that one is not dreaming, then there is no means by which to make any claim about the

world. The directly preceding statement becomes the fundamental conditional that forms the

skeptical argument:

1) One does not know that it is not the case that he is dreaming.
2) If one does not know that he is not dreaming, then one cannot know any ordinary
claim about the world.
3) Thus one cannot know any ordinary claim about the world.

Once again we see a simple inference by means of modes ponens. And once again we see a proof

that looks perfectly valid. But the proofs of Moore and Stroud are in an obvious opposition. If we

are to grant that both these proofs are valid then it is not the steps of inference which we have a

concern with.

Therefore, we are forced to return back to what Moore has outlined for us as a good

proof. Moore’s third requirement needs no further attention for we have already agreed that if it

is the case that P, and if it is the case that P -> Q, then it is valid to conclude that it is the case
that Q; that is, both Moore’s and Stroud’s proofs have a conclusion that follows directly from the

premises simply because of the shape of the argument. Thus, instead of looking at the step that

takes us from premises to conclusion we must begin to question the premises themselves.

Moore’s first requirement of a proof demands that the conclusion be different from the premises

used to deduce it. On the surface level this seems to be the case for Moore’s proof of an external

world, but at a closer look doubts can be raised about his first premise, There is a hand. The

linguistic form, the conventional shape, that the first step and the final conclusion take are

apparently different. However, one must wonder what is actually expressed in the proposition,

There is a hand; specifically, one may ask what is being stated by the verb is (a form of to be)

and also what is further implied by the relationship of the verb to the expletive subject and the

direct object. The verb is, in conjunction with the expletive subject there, works in such a fashion

to make the claim for the existence of a hand. Furthermore, such a statement, it is the case that a

hand exists, presupposes the existence of an external world for that hand to exist in. Thus, a

premise such as There is a hand equates to stating the proposition aimed at in the conclusion,

that there exists an external world. Therefore, without even questioning the truth or falsity of

Moore’s premises (which would be the most obvious grounds for critique by a skeptic) we see

that his proof is circular.

However, by showing Moore’s proof to be insufficient in regards to dismissing skeptical

claims we still have not proved anything ourselves. Further, we cannot assume the skeptical

argument to be infallible just on the basis of disproving Moore’s argument for an external world.

On the contrary, Moore forces us reexamine the proof that Stroud lays out in support of

skepticism. Thus, here again is the skeptical argument in a somewhat more concise logical form:

1) ~Know(~H)
2) ~Know(~H) -> ~Know(O)
 3) ~Know(O)

Where the predicate Know means one having knowledge of, H represents any skeptical argument

such as one is dreaming or being deceived by an evil demon and O stands for any ordinary claim

about the external world, such as there is a hand. We have agreed that the use of modus ponens

here is a valid step of inference but in allowing such an inference we also grant the use of modus

tollens. Thus, Moore, in his paper “Certainty,” shifts the skeptical argument to produce a proof

against skepticism:

1) Know(O)
2) ~Know(~H) -> ~Know(O)
3) Know(~H)

Moore negates the consequent of the conditional in order to conclude the negation of the

antecedent, leaving him with the conclusion that one can know that a given skeptical argument is

not the case. Once again we are left with two proofs in opposition with one another. The

contradiction arises specifically between premise (1) in the former proof and the conclusion in

step (3) in the latter. We arrive at a fundamental inconsistency of P & ~P. There is no doubt that

this inconsistency displays the falsity of at least one of the proofs. Of course, the skeptics will

argue you that Moore is merely beginning with a false assumption, thus leading him easily to his

desired conclusion. Yet Moore can argue that he is using the material conditional already agreed

upon by skeptics, not to mention claiming that the skeptical argument itself also starts with an

assumption.

It then seems that no one comes out of this debate a winner. I would like to propose that

one possibility for this is that there seems to be something rather sketchy in the logical shape of

the skeptic’s first premise, ~Know(~H). Just trying to state exactly what is intended by this can

be tricky: can it be that it is not the case that one knows that H is not the case? I believe our
language and semantics might be getting the best of us. Stroud concludes his “Problem of the

External World” with an almost somber note that we have not been able to escape this problem

yet. Stroud writes, “But perhaps by now we have come far enough to feel that the whole idea is

simply absurd, that ultimately it is not even intelligible, and that there can be no question of

‘accepting’ Descartes’s conclusion at all” (23). Stroud continues to argue that we must identify

the absurdity or unintelligibility in order to learn from Descartes and the problem of skepticism

in general. In order to get around this problem we must redefine conventions. Our categorical

means of understanding must be reevaluated and readjusted to allow for a new approach to

investigating knowledge and the way we come to it.