Deterrence Disadvantage Samford

Deterrence DA Grayson/Lewis/Bell-Ard
SUDI 10 1 Deterrence DA
1NC Deterrence (1/2)................................................................................ 3 1NC Deterrence (2/2)................................................................................ 4 *****Uniqueness*****..................................................................................5 UQ Deterrence......................................................................................... 5 UQ - Deterrence......................................................................................... 6 UQ Germany............................................................................................ 7 UQ Umbrella strong now...........................................................................8 UQ Troop deployment in ME high..............................................................9 UQ Troop deployment in ME high.............................................................10 *****Links*****.......................................................................................... 11 2NC Link - Deterrence ........................................................................... 11 2NC Link - Deterrence ............................................................................. 12 .............................................................................................................. 12 2NC - Link Asian relations.......................................................................13 2NC - Link Chinese Expansion..................................................................14 2NC - Link Forward deployed troops........................................................15 2NC - Link Deployment in Europe............................................................16 2NC - Link Power projection....................................................................17 2NC - Link troop presence.......................................................................18 .............................................................................................................. 18 2NC - Link Troop Withdrawal HEG I/L.....................................................19 2NC I/L Extended Deterrence German Prolif.........................................20 2NC - I/L regional stability....................................................................... 21 2NC - I/L Extended deterrence key to Europe prolif...................................22 2NC I/L - Alliance key to Asian stability....................................................23 2NC - I/L Heg collapse causes Chinese modernization...............................24 .............................................................................................................. 24 2NC I/L Extended Deterrence key to solve Terrorism..............................25 2NC I/L - Alliance key to power projection................................................26 2NC I/L SoKo Econ................................................................................. 27 2NC I/L Extended Deterrence solves Japn rearm.....................................28 2NC I/L NoKo prolif............................................................................... 29 2NC I/L - Alliance key to terror, pandemics, warming................................30
Deterrence DA SUDI 10 Grayson/Lewis/Bell-Ard 2 *****2NC Impacts*****............................................................................. 31 2NC Impact Noko Prolif......................................................................... 31 .............................................................................................................. 31 2NC Impact Chinese expansion.............................................................32 2NC Impact China modernization..........................................................33 2NC Impacts - Terrormism....................................................................... 34 2nc Impacts - Disease............................................................................. 35 2NC Impact - Warming............................................................................ 36 .............................................................................................................. 36 2NC Impacts Prolif...............................................................................36 2NC Impacts - Prolif................................................................................ 38 2NC Impacts SoKo Econ........................................................................39 2NC Impacts Japan rearm causes Asia Prolif and War.............................40 2NC Impact Japan Rearm Prolif............................................................41 2NC Impacts - HEG.................................................................................42 2NC Impact - HEG................................................................................... 46 *****2NC Answers To*****........................................................................ 50 2NC - A2 Alliance is resilient ..................................................................50 2NC A2 nuke deterrence Key.................................................................52 .............................................................................................................. 53 2NC A2 Nuke weaps deterr...................................................................54 2NC - A2 Nukes solve deterrence............................................................57 2NC - Conventional Deterrence Key...........................................................58 2NC A2 Nukes key..................................................................................59 2NC Conventional deterrent key..............................................................60 *****AFF ANSWERS*****............................................................................61 Aff NUQ Deterrent not credible now......................................................61 Aff - Impact turn....................................................................................... 62 Aff a2 Heg G/ Impact............................................................................63 .............................................................................................................. 63 .............................................................................................................. 63 Aff Link/Turn.......................................................................................... 64
SUDI 10 3
1NC Deterrence (1/2)

(_/_) A Uniqueness - Despite concerns regarding US leadership, the commitment to extended deterrence is perceived as strong by allies
Frhling.June16,2010.[StephanTheOddAlly:USExtendedDeterrenceandAustralianStrategicPolicy.Nautilus Institute.http://www.nautilus.org/projects/akfconnections/researchworkshop/research papers/Fruehling.pdf DrStephanFrhlingisaLecturerinSDSC'sGraduateStudiesinStrategy&DefenceProgramand
managingeditorofthejournalSecurityChallenges.HereceivedaPhDinStrategicStudiesfromtheANU,workingondefence planningconcepts.HealsoreceivedaMasterofScienceinDefense&StrategicStudiesfromMissouriStateUniversity,andstudied EconomicsattheSorbonneinParisandChristianAlbrechtsUniversittinKiel. However, despite the confidence expressed in these judgments, the White Paper is more equivocal on the conditions that ultimately underpin the US position in Asia. On the one hand, it states that the United States will
remain the most powerful and influential strategic actor over the period to 2030politically, economically and militarily,45 and that Within the timeframe of this White Paper, the United States will continue to rely on its nuclear deterrence capability to underpin US strategic power, deter attack or coercion by other nuclear powers, and sustain allied confidence in US security commitments by way of extended deterrence.46 On the other
hand, the White Paper also remarks that [a]s other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change,47 and it makes a number of comments that highlight the conditionality of Australian strategic planning on the assumption of US primacy, or state that of particular concern would be any diminution in the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a stabilising force.48 The
consequences of these concerns for the reliability of US extended deterrence, however, are not spelled out. (_/_)B Link - Troop presence is crucial to assuring allies and flexible response to escalating crises
Frhling.June16,2010.[StephanTheOddAlly:USExtendedDeterrenceandAustralianStrategicPolicy.Nautilus Institute.http://www.nautilus.org/projects/akfconnections/researchworkshop/research papers/Fruehling.pdf.DrStephanFrhlingisaLecturerinSDSC'sGraduateStudiesinStrategy&DefenceProgramand
managingeditorofthejournalSecurityChallenges.HereceivedaPhDinStrategicStudiesfromtheANU,workingondefence planningconcepts.HealsoreceivedaMasterofScienceinDefense&StrategicStudiesfromMissouriStateUniversity,andstudied EconomicsattheSorbonneinParisandChristianAlbrechtsUniversittinKiel.
As earlier documents had done, the 2009 White Paper also highlights the importance of US engagement for stability in Asia, and the importance of reassurance through US forward deployed forces: While the United States will maintain the capability to project force globally from its own territory, it will likely continue to judge that its forward deployed forces, including in the Western Pacific, provide reassurance to allies ... as well as providing operational flexibility in crises.43 Were Japan, for example, unable to rely on the US alliance, its strategic outlook would be dramatically different, and it would be compelled to reexamine its strategic posture and capabilities.44
SUDI 10 4
1NC Deterrence (2/2)

C Internal Link - (_/_) US-Korea security alliance key to regional stability
Snyder2009.(Scott,director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the AsiaFoundationandseniorassociateat PacificForumCSIS.PursuingaComprehensiveVisionfortheU.S.SouthKoreaAlliance There is a need to ensure in practical terms that the alliance is making a direct contribution to regional stability. This can be done by ensuring that the bilateral security alliance is complementary with two emerging forms of broader security cooperation . On the one hand, the U.S.- ROK security alliance should be actively integrated with U.S. security arrangements in the region, including the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-Australia alliance. These alliances have also begun to play broader roles in promoting global stability, and this common mission provides, to the possible, a basis for expanded cooperation and integration on a regional basis as well.
D-Impact - War in Asia escalates to global nuclear war and destroys the world economy
JonathanS.Landay, national securityandintelligencecorrespondent,March10,2000,KnightRidder/Tribune NewsService,TopadministrationofficialswarnstakesforU.S.arehighinAsianconflicts,p.Lexis
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile, said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the
regions tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asias capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher.
There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.
SUDI 10 5
*****Uniqueness***** UQ Deterrence
In the face of NoKo aggression, Obama is reassuring allies over the nuclear umbrella
GODEMENT,2009.(FRANOIS,AsianSurvey,Vol.50,Number1,pp.824.TheUnitedStatesand Asiain2009. PublicDiplomacyandStrategicContinuity
Obamas stated long-term goal of aiming for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and an early decision to stop the deployment of ground-based anti-missile radars in Eastern and Southern Europe, will be hotly debated in Asia for their potential impact. At his second meeting with Lee Myung-bak in Washington, Obama
pledged the continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella to defend South Korea.18 Meant to be reassuring after North Koreas second nuclear test in May and several missile launches, the presidents statement also gives solace to Japans defense establishment, which has been fretting about
the increasing risks of decoupling American and Japanese security. Yet, it may also be read as an acknowledgement that North Koreas accession to nuclear weapons cannot be undone in the foreseeable future. At the same time, retreat on the issue of anti-missile defense in Europe is seen in the same quarters as heralding a similar policy elsewhere.
Deterrence is on the brink. Reassurance is key.
Schoff 9 (James, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence, March, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf, p. ix) Extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance is under pressure because it is more complicated than before (thanks largely to missile proliferation, Chinas expansion of air and sea power, and nuclear modernization in the region), and this challenge comes at a time when Americas and Japans security priorities are diverging . For decades, extended deterrence was thought of in simple terms, characterized by robust U.S. security commitments to its allies overseas and underwritten predominately by the provision of a nuclear umbrella to deter war with the Soviet bloc. The U.S. commitment to counter the
Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little. Today, deterrence is still a primary concern for defense planners, but
there is less consensus regarding exactly who is to be deterred and how. U.S. deterrence doctrine has become muddled, as some emphasize the role of defenses, some push for bigger and better conventional options or seek more assertive alliance partners, and others talk about deterrence tailored to fit different situations. It is time to bring clarity to this important subject, not by simplifying the policy but by realigning priorities and deepening Japans understanding
of the policy. U.S. verbal assurances to Japan will continue to be useful, but increasingly a more concrete and common understanding about how
. The United States is deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in supporting extended deterrence, which is acceptable provided Washington works proactively with Tokyo to shore up the multiple other components of deterrence (strong political and economic relations, conventional air and sea power, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and scenario-based planning involving military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation). Deterrence has always been about more than just the nuclear umbrella, but this fact is often overlooked, given the power and symbolism of those
deterrence functions in East Asia will also be necessary weapons. Deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons is a welcome development, but it should be accompanied by an intense period of political, diplomatic, and strategic consultations covering non-proliferation policies, regional diplomatic and security initiatives, and bilateral security cooperation.
SUDI 10 6
UQ - Deterrence
Extended deterrence now. US conventional troops key.
Tomohiko 9 (Satake, PhD Candidate in IR Australian National U., Nautilus Institute Austral Peace and Security Network, Japans Nuclear Policy: Between Non-Nuclear Identity and US Extended Deterrence, 5-21, http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/policy-forum/2009/japansnuclear-policy/) On the other hand, Japan has still preferred to be under the US nuclear umbrella, rather than become an independent power. An internal report of the Japan Defence Agency (JDA), which secretly studied the possibility of Japans nuclear armament in 1995, suggested that Japan should not go nuclear
because of the enormous political and economic costs that would be caused by the opposition of other countries including the United States. It
concluded that the best way is to rely on the US nuclear deterrence capabilities. [9] In April 1996, Tokyo reconfirmed the US-Japan alliance by concluding the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security. The Joint Declaration clearly defined Japans greater alliance
roles on both regional and global fields, by stressing that the US-Japan alliance is not only for the security of Japan and the Far East,
Because of this, many observers pointed out that the Joint Declaration redefined the alliance, by expanding the alliance scope from a narrow focus on Japan and the Far East to the broader Asia-Pacific. Yet Japanese policymakers denied this
but also for Asia-Pacific security in general. kind of view, by stressing that the Joint Declaration did not redefine the alliance, but simply reconfirmed it. For them, the most important achievement of the Joint Declaration was not that the alliance expanded its scope, but that
the US promised to keep providing extended deterrence to the region even in the post-Cold War era. Yet US extended deterrence cannot be gained without certain costs. These costs not only mean traditional defence burden-sharing such as a significant amount of host nation support to US troops stationing in Japan. In exchange for the continuous US military commitment in the region, Japan became increasingly involved in US regional and global security objectives. After
September 11, Japan contributed to US-led wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, by dispatching the SDF for the first time during wartime operations. While Tokyo clearly recognised the importance of terrorism and WMD issues, the central concern of Japanese policy elites were not those global problems, but how to keep the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan perceives a growing threat from North Korea and China. In fact, Japans military contributions to both the war in Afghanistan and the reconstruction effort in Iraq were never significant compared to other allies. Likewise, Japan has joined the US Missile Defence (MD) program and contributed to its Research & Development (R&D). Although Japan joined the MD system primarily for its own defence, Tokyo also recognised that Japans entry to the MD system would supplement the US global defence posture against the attack of terrorist or rogue states. By providing moderate but symbolic contributions to US global operations ,
Japan attempted to maintain a US credible nuclear extended deterrence in the Asia Pacific region, which is indispensable for Japanese security.
SUDI 10 7
UQ Germany
Germany currently wants disarmament
DDP News 9(Germany'sforeignministerhailsObama'snuclearnonproliferationmoveDDPNews,April7,

2009.Vial/nAD:7/30/09)DCR
US President Obama's promise of a "nuclear weapons free world" has raised great hopes, also in Germany. Foreign Minister FrankWalter Steinmeier (SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]) said in Berlin on Monday [6 April] that the window of history "has once again been opened up." The Greens and The Left, too, welcomed Obama's initiative and, first, called for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. The United States and Russia play a key role in disarmament. Steinmeier stressed that a first important signal on the way towards a nuclear weapons free world was a new bilateral treaty between the two "most important possessors of nuclear weapons." He hoped that the negotiations would be finalized by the end of the year. The Greens called on the Federal Government to present its own proposals for nuclear disarmament as quickly as possible. The summit meetings of last week [30 March -3 April] had strengthened the impression that the German Federal Government, but also the European Union had "decided to hibernate," said Greens Chairman Cem Ozdemir. They should "accept Obama's extended hand and not leave him out in the cold." A first step would be the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Rhineland-Palatinate. "We want a world free of any kind of nuclear weapons," the Greens chief stressed.
Germany is pursing disarmament and fast international non-proliferation treaties.
Indo-Asian News Service 7/9(India,GermanydiscussnucleardisarmamentNewDelhi.July9,2009.LexisAD

7/29/09)DCR India and Germany Thursday held talks on non-proliferation issues and underlined their commitment to nuclear disarmament, officials said here. Germany's Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control Peter Gottwald met Vivek Katju, Special Secretary (Political and International Organisations) in the external affairs ministry, and held talks on a range of nuclear issues. The talks took place against the backdrop of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010 and multilateral efforts, involving Germany, EU and its NATO partners, to speed up the conclusion of an international arms control treaty. Besides issues relating to arms control, the Iranian nuclear issue and enforcement of
the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea also figured prominently in the discussions. Katju reiterated India's position on the need for universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament, but reiterated New Delhi's opposition to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India believes that the NPT is discriminatory and tends to divide the world into the nuclear haves and have-nots. Gottwald, the first high-ranking German official to visit India during the second tenure of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, held talks with Deputy National Security Adviser Shekhar Dutt Wednesday. Gottwald arrived here on a two-day visit Wednesday. Germany backed global consensus for India in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) last year enabled the resumption of international nuclear trade with New Delhi. "Germany pursues a balanced approach aimed at both enhancing and developing the three pillars of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) - non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy,' the German embassy said here.
SUDI 10 8
UQ Umbrella strong now

US reasserting the nuclear umbrella in the squo
P.S.SURYANARAYANA.June52010.TheHindu.U.S.,China differonnuclearposture. http://beta.thehindu.com/news/international/article447545.ece
The United States on Saturday pledged to keep its nuclear umbrellas for its allies in good shape, while China vowed against a nuclear arms race. With the nuclear arms issue figuring in two different plenary sessions of the ongoing Asia Security Summit here, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said allies and partners would continue to be covered under the doctrine of extended deterrence. Through conventional and nuclear capabilities, we will extend [into the future] an umbrella of protection over our allies. The US is increasing its nuclear umbrella over Japan now
Reuters 7/16/2009 (US wants to boost Japans Nuclear Umrbella: Paper) http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE56G0RX20090717 The United States plans discuss with Japan how to boost the nuclear deterrent it provides for its Asian ally , a senior U.S. official was quoted as saying on Friday amid regional tensions over North Korea's nuclear and missile tests. Kurt Campbell, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said Washington and Tokyo planned to hold regular talks on boosting what is dubbed the "nuclear umbrella," starting on Saturday, the Nikkei newspaper said. His comments come two months after Japan's unpredictable neighbor North Korea raised tensions in the region by carrying out its second nuclear test . But talk of stepping up defenses in Japan could raise hackles in other parts of Asia, where many suffered under Japanese militarism before and during World War Two.
US just re-affirmed its nuclear umbrella over Japan

Kato 7/23/09 (Yoichi, US Warm to Proposal to Reaffirm Security Pact) http://www.asahi.com/english/Heraldasahi/TKY200907230065.html U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told The Asahi Shimbun in a recent interview that Washington embraces a proposal by Tokyo to reaffirm the significance of the bilateral security alliance to mark its 50th anniversary next year. The proposed reaffirmation is being contemplated to keep the alliance solid at a time of an expected major political realignment and possible instability following the Lower House election to be held Aug. 30. Campbell, who made his first regional tour after assuming his post in June, also discussed a wide range of bilateral security issues, including the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and the controversial plan to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan to Henoko in Nago, in Okinawa Prefecture.
SUDI 10 9
UQ Troop deployment in ME high

Troop numbers in the ME high now
TimKane.May24,2006.GlobalU.S.TroopDeployment,19502005.TheHeritageFoundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/05/GlobalUSTroopDeployment19502005
Heavy deployments of American troops to the Middle East are an essential part of the global war on terrorism. However, the duration of troop deployments has been a source of controversy within the United States. There is controversy about whether there are too many or too few soldiers in Iraq, controversy about the nature of America's geopolitical ambitions, and controversy about the impact on the families of soldiers. Much of the debate is carried on in a fact-free vacuum, lacking the context of American troops' traditional footprint around the globe for the past half-century.
US occupation in the ME at an all-time high

For decades, the Middle East saw relatively few U.S. troops. Even the Gulf War of the early 1990s barely registers much of a change in troop numbers, simply because the hostilities were over quickly and U.S. forces went home rapidly after Iraqi forces were pushed out of Kuwait. However, since 2003, the number of troops deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom has been high-roughly 200,000 per year (split among Iraq, Kuwait, and nearby allies).Turkey is categorized here as a Middle Eastern country, but it has equally as much of a European heritage. Turkey's close friendship with the U.S. during the Cold War included the basing of 5,000 to 10,000 American troops from 1957 to 1992, when a slow drawdown began . Roughly 5,000 American troops were in Libya per year during the 1950s and 1960s. The only other major deployments to the Middle East were in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia beginning in 1990. In recent years, the U.S. has deployed troops to new bases in Qatar and Bahrain.Even though the numbers were relatively low, it would be a mistake to think that American forces have not been widely deployed in the Middle East. Thousands have been based in Iran, Pakistan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia over the decades. Hundreds more have been based consistently in Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, and India.
SUDI 10 10
UQ Troop deployment in ME high

Troop numbers in the ME key to military transformation
Twice as many U.S. troops were deployed in the Middle East as in other regions in 2005. During the second half of the 20th century, the number of U.S. troops in Europe and Asia dwarfed the number stationed in the other three regions: Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas (excluding the United States). Fifty-two percent of deployed troops were in Europe, and 41 percent were in Asia. More than one-third of troop deployments during 1950-2000 were to Germany alone, which hosted over 10,000,000 U.S. military personnel. Since 2003, however, the number of U.S. troops in the Middle East has increased dramatically, while troop levels in East Asia and Europe have continued their steady decline. Five Decades of Extensive Foreign DeploymentsThose who follow U.S. defense posture closely know that President George W. Bush's August 2004 announcement of a proposed global redeployment of U.S. troops was predated by many years of preparation and planning. "The world has changed a great deal and our posture must change with it," President Bush said. The plan will withdraw 70,000 troops from Europe and Asia, continuing the departure from the Cold War stance of 1950-1990.
SUDI 10 11
*****Links***** 2NC Link - Deterrence

(_/_) US Troop presence key to regional security Snyder 2009. (Scott, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior
associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.South Korea Alliance.
Safeguard regional stability, economic prosperity, and energy security 1. An early and enduring goal of the alliance is the objective of safeguarding stability in Northeast Asia by mitigating regional rivalries that could lead to conflict. The alliance is an investment in stability that has enabled decades of economic growth and prosperity in the region, and it also safeguards that growth by reducing costs that would otherwise accrue from higher costs that would have to be covered by other means. In particular, the U.S.-led alliance framework has reinforced maritime security necessary to enable safe and secure trade including supplies of oil and other energy resources to Asia and South Korea from other regions of the world. Deter regional aggression through mutual defense commitment 2. U.S. led alliance arrangements in Northeast Asia continue to prevent the likelihood of aggression or conflict in Northeast Asia by providing deterrence against any possible hostile force that might seek to take advantage of perceived weakness on the part of American alliance partners. The defense commitment provides for common security and mitigates the likelihood that costly inter- state conflict will break out in Northeast Asia.
SUDI 10 12
2NC Link - Deterrence
(_/_) US Troop presence key to regional security Snyder 2009. (Scott, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior
In recent years, deep disagreements over how to approach North Korea threatened to unravel the foundations of alliance cooperation, obscuring a broad range of mutual interests that underscore the relevance and mutual strategic benefits that alliance cooperation continues to bring to both countries. The respective United States and South Korean strategic interests in continuing the alliance are overlapping but not identical. Both countries benefit from the stabilizing role of the alliance, and the U.S. presence on the peninsula that it codified, in ensuring economic prosperity, including safeguarding sea-lanes critical to energy security. The mutual defense commitments of the alliance deter aggression against both countries. For the United States, the alliance also supports continuing U.S. engagement in Northeast Asia, provides a hedge against the possibility that a rising China might one day threaten regional and global stability , and is a means through which the United States can pursue and protect its regional and global interests. For South Korea, the alliance is likely to have enduring strategic value as a means by which to enhance its own security without tilting toward one or the other of South Koreas larger next-door neighbors, and the alliance is a platform for South Korea to project its international image more effectively. The respective objectives outlined as follows constitute enduring strategic interests and mutual needs that the alliance will be able to serve if it is properly structured and maintained.
SUDI 10 13
2NC - Link Asian relations

Troop presence key to asian relations and security alliances Snyder 2009. (Scott, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior
The U.S.-ROK alliance continues to be an instrument through which the United States is able to demonstrate its commitment to Northeast Asia, reassuring allies that the United States will continue to play a constructive role in the region. Without the alliance framework, the United States might be likely to pursue a more inward-looking policy, and its constructive and stabilizing influence in the region would be reduced. Other states with ambitions for leadership in the region would be more likely to extract higher or more onerous political costs than the United States as it pursues and attempts to maintain regional dominance. The
alliance serves to reinforce a balance of power among states in Northeast Asia, preventing any single Northeast Asian state from playing the role of regional hegemon.
SUDI 10 14
2NC - Link Chinese Expansion

Troop presence key to hege against Chinese expansionism Snyder 2009. (Scott, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior
For U.S. security planners, the U.S.-ROK alliance, as an important part of the U.S.-led alliance network in Asia, represents an important instrument by which it is possible to hedge against any potential destabilizing aspects of Chinas rise. The alliance serves as a visible constraint against Chinese military expansion and as an instrument by which to channel Chinese strategic choices and deter China from consideration of expansionist aims that might threaten security of American allies. The alliance is a tangible means by which to discourage China from attempting to become a rule-breaker rather than abiding by currently established international norms of state behavior.
SUDI 10 15
2NC - Link Forward deployed troops

Forward deployed bases are key to US power projection
Posen2003.(BarryR.CommandoftheCommons:TheMilitaryFoundationofU.S.HegemonyVol.28,No.1
(Summer,2003),pp.546
Command of the commons and the enduring contested zones mean that allies remain useful, more useful than current U.S. strategic discourse would suggest. The allies provide the formal and informal bases that are the crucial stepping stones for U.S. power to transit the globe. The military power of these allies contributes modestly to maintenance and exploitation of command of the commons, but can contribute significantly to the close fights and their aftermath. The NATO allies, for example, have great expertise in sea mine clear- ance and possess many mine hunters; Britain and France together have nearly half again as many mine-hunting vessels as the U.S. Navy.'33 Several of the allies have good ground forces, and perhaps most critically, good infantry that seem able to tolerate at least moderate casualties. The British Army and Royal Marines have 43 infantry battalions-all professionals-nearly half as many as the United States; France has another 20.134 Given the relative scarcity of U.S. infantry, allied ground forces are also particularly useful in the postconflict peace-enforcement missions necessary to secure the fruits of any battlefield victory.
SUDI 10 16
2NC - Link Deployment in Europe

Forward deployed troops in Europe are critical to extending the US conventional deterrent
Mazarri2000.(Dr.Shereen.Concept&NatureofConventional&NuclearDeterrence. http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/concept.htm
Of course, conventional deterrence is not based on mutual vulnerabilities that are deliberately sustained. Whether conventional or nuclear, one of the basic prerequisites of effective deterrence is clear communication to convey the threat. Therefore, a basic level of a common strategic language is needed. Also, where communication is not direct, then tacit communication through unambiguous actions has to be in place. Because deterrence seeks to prevent certain types of contingencies from arising, communication becomes central to the notion - and a policy of deterrence also needs specific forecast inputs especially in relation to costs and risks that will be run by the party to be deterred, if certain actions are taken; and about advantages that would be gained if these actions are avoided. Of course, capability that is, military capability becomes very critical to deterrence. Without the appropriate capability, the threat cannot be credible and deterrence is premised upon the credibility of the threat which means that costs and risks must be considered very clearly before a certain strategy is formulated. There is no space for may act; it has to be a case of will act which must be conveyed in no uncertain terms. Often, in such a case, it helps to illustrate that the final decision to act is not totally in the threateners control. For instance, the stationing of American troops in Europe sent the signal that whether the US wanted to or not, once war in Europe broke out America would be involved.
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2NC - Link Power projection

Troop presence key US power projection in Asia Snyder 2009. (Scott, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior
Provide means by which to pursue U.S. regional and global interests 5. The U.S.-ROK alliance, as part of a U.S.-led network of global security relationships designed to secure stability and prosperity, is an important instrument by which the United States is able to pursue the objective of promoting global stability. The alliance, especially if considered as part of a broader global network, provides the means by which to mobilize support for efforts to promote stability and security on terms beneficial to the United States and its allies around the world. Enhance U.S. ability to protect regional and global interests 6. The U.S.-ROK alliance, in combination with the U.S.-Japan alliance, allows the U.S. military to maintain a forwarddeployed presence in Northeast Asia. The existence of parallel presence in both Japan and South Korea reduces political pressure on Japan that might develop if Japan were the only host of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia. The existence of parallel alliances also provides a justification for better political relations between Japan and South Korea, both by reassuring South Korea regarding Japans intentions and by providing a framework through which to promote ROK-Japan security cooperation. Moreover, political cooperation between the United States and South Korea gives the United States a valuable point of entry for promoting regional stability in East Asia. Resting on common values, the U.S.-led alliance framework may provide a valuable benchmark for broadened multilateral approaches to collective security.
SUDI 10 18
2NC - Link troop presence

US troop presence key to Asian stability
Hoge2004.AGlobalPowerShiftintheMaking.By:Hoge,JamesF.,ForeignAffairs,00157120,Jul/Aug2004,Vol.83, Issue4
For more than half a century, the United States has provided stability in the Pacific through its military presence there, its alliances with Japan and South Korea, and its commitment to fostering economic progress. Indeed, in its early days, the Bush administration stressed its intention to strengthen those traditional ties and to treat China more as a strategic competitor than as a prospective partner. Recent events, however---including the attacks of September 11, 2001--have changed the emphasis of U.S. policy. Today, far less is expected of South Korea than in the past, thanks in part to Seoul's new leaders, who represent a younger generation of Koreans enamored of China, disaffected with the United States, and unafraid of the North.
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2NC - Link Troop Withdrawal HEG I/L

(_/_) US forward troop deployments key to hegemony and power projection
In land warfare, U.S. military capabilities are particularly lethal when defending against adversaries who have to move large amounts of heavy military equipment and supplies forward over long distances. Command of space, and command of the air, permit the United States to exact an immense toll on advancing ground forces and the air forces that support them. This means that the United States should have a good chance of deterring regional aggressors , and successfully defending against them in the event that deterrence fails, if it has some forces in the theater and is permitted to mobilize more forces in a timely fashion. Command of the sea helps the U.S. keep forces forward deployed, even in politically sensitive areas, and reinforce those forces quickly. Rapid response still, however, depends on good political relations with the threatened party. On the whole, states worry more about proximate threats than they do about distant ones. But the tremendous power projection capability of the United States can appear to be a proximate threat if U.S. policy seems domineering. So command of the commons will provide more influence, and prove more militarily lethal, if others can be convinced that the United States is more interested in constraining regional aggressors than achieving regional dominance.
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2NC I/L Extended Deterrence German Prolif

Erosion of US extended deterrence would cause Germany to proliferate
Liberman1(Peter,associateprofessorofpoliticalscienceatCityUniversityofNewYork,TiesthatBlind:Will GermanyandJapanRelyTooMuchontheUS?SecurityStudies,Winter2000/2001,Vol.10,No2,p.98)JK
The erosion of the U.S. commitment would be dangerous if Germany and Japan placed too much faith in U.S. protection. Over-reliance increases the likelihood of deterrence failure, should potential regional adversaries take a more cynical view of the U.S. commitment. Over-reliance also increases the danger of crisis escalation once U.S. unreliability is suddenly exposed. Faced with the prospect of war or coercion without U.S. support, Japan or Germany would abandon their civilian power policies and engage in crash military including nuclearbuild-ups . Power shifts, however, are more dangerous in foul weather than in fair. Windows of military opportunity for their rivals would swing open with clear evidence of U.S. disengagement, and begin to close again as the abandoned ally starts to rearm. The build-ups and instability that alliance advocates worry would follow alliance dissolution in periods of international calm would be far more dangerous if an alliance crack-up coincided with a regional crisis .
Germany is an integral part of US nuclear deterrence- if we win germany, we win deterrence-
Suzuki, 9(EisukewriterforBusinessRecorder.USJapanTalksonNuclearDeterrence.July15,2009ONLINE.DA:
730.Lexis)[mjc]
Now that the rabbit is out of the hat, and since all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Japan since 1992, the public debate of the three non-nuclear principles should not be difficult to hold and it cannot be avoided as long as we remain under the US nuclear umbrella. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States is the only nuclear-weapons state today that
continues to deploy nuclear weapons outside its own territory. About 480 nuclear bombs are placed in Europe for use in accordance with Nato nuclear strike plans, and these bombs are earmarked for delivery by Nato members which are nonnuclear weapons states such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey for delivery by their respective air forces. They join with the US Air Force in practicing nuclear strikes and their aircraft are maintained for the nuclear weapons delivery as part of the nuclear war planning exercise. Their participation in the US nuclear deterrence regime is not insignificant even though they are all parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
SUDI 10 21
2NC - I/L regional stability

(_/_) US-Korea security alliance key to regional stability
Snyder2009.(Scott,director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the AsiaFoundationandseniorassociateat PacificForumCSIS.PursuingaComprehensiveVisionfortheU.S.SouthKoreaAlliance
There is a need to ensure in practical terms that the alliance is making a direct contribution to regional stability. This can be done by ensuring that the bilateral security alliance is complementary with two emerging forms of broader security cooperation. On the one hand, the U.S.- ROK security alliance should be actively integrated with U.S. security arrangements in the region, including the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-Australia alliance. These alliances have also begun to play broader roles in promoting global stability, and this common mission provides, to the possible, a basis for expanded cooperation and integration on a regional basis as well.
SUDI 10 22
2NC - I/L Extended deterrence key to Europe prolif

(_/_) Extended deterrence key to entire European nuclear deterrent
Frhling2010.(Stephan,TheOddAlly:USExtendedDeterrenceandAustralianStrategicPolicy. http://www.nautilus.org/projects/akfconnections/researchworkshop/researchpapers/Fruehling.pdf
Extended deterrence is a central element of all Alliance relationships, as any potential aggressor must face the prospect of resistance not only by the immediate victim, but also by its ally. Most of todays analysis of how this fundamental condition can be operationalized, demonstrated, supported and communicated is based on NATOs history of relying on US extended deterrence in general, and on nuclear extended deterrence in particular, in keeping Western Europe free from Soviet encroachment during the Cold War. In this context, the Healy Theorem, which states that it takes five percent credibility of US guarantees to deter the Soviets, but ninety-five percent to reassure the Europeans, highlights an important duality in the concept of extended nuclear deterrence, which consists of two, related but distinct relationships between deterrer and deterree, and deterrer and ally. 1
SUDI 10 23
2NC I/L - Alliance key to Asian stability

Alliance is key to Asian stability.
Twining,SeniorFellowforAsiaattheGermanMarshallFund,2009 (Daniel,AcribsheetforPresidentObama's upcomingAsiansummitry,11102009,ForeignPolicy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/10/a_crib_sheet_for_president_obamas_upcoming_asian_sum mitry,ldg)
Asians are like spectators in a movie theater. They are all looking at the screen, which is America, rather than at each other." So says one of Japan's smartest strategic thinkers, and he is right. Despite the hype surrounding the rise of China, it is the United States that provides the public goods for order, security, and prosperity in East Asia; China in many respects free-rides on these public goods to sustain its focus on internal development. And it is the quality of relations with the United States that helps determine the nature of Asian states' relations with each other. Imagine, for instance, how different Japan-China relations would be in the absence of the U.S.-Japan alliance; look at how India's relationship with China has changed in the wake of the U.S.-India strategic rapprochement. American friends (and competitors) across the region will be watching President Obama closely for the signals he sends on his forthcoming Asia trip . Most Asian nations prefer American preeminence to the alternatives -- and want to know that President Obama has a strategic vision for sustaining American leadership in a region that craves it. Here is what they will want to see: 1. A continuing commitment to American alliance leadership and forward presence. The American alliance system, and the security guarantees and forward deployment of military forces that underpin it, remain an important stabilizing force in a region experiencing the kind of dynamic shifts in relative power that so often lead to arms racing, regional polarization, and conflict. In this context, U.S. leadership provides a stabilizing reassurance to Asian states that might otherwise need to pursue destabilizing "self-help" policies in the face of security dilemmas American security guarantees help mitigate. American alliance commitments to Japan, South Korea, and other nations promote what political scientists call "underbalancing" -- regional states enjoying U.S. protection are able to invest more of their national resources in the pursuits of peace rather than preparations for war, which in turn helps reassure their neighbors. Asians are particularly watching to see how President Obama handles conflict with Japan, Washington's most important regional ally, over troop basing rights and other issues. Many Asian states fear that a Japan unshackled from its close alliance with the U.S. would be a destabilizing force in the region -- which is why so many Asian countries applauded the deft alliance management shown by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. The inexperience of the new Japanese government makes this a real challenge for President Obama, who may have to speak past Japan's uncertain leadership and directly to the Japanese public, which overwhelmingly supports a strong U.S. alliance, to rally public support for a stronger and more capable U.S.-Japan security partnership for the 21st century.
SUDI 10 24
2NC - I/L Heg collapse causes Chinese modernization

Collapse of US Heg causes Chinese modernization
Bandow2009.(Doug,aseniorfellowattheCatoInstitute.China's Military RiseMeansEnd ofUSHegemony? http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php? pub_id=10175&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Opeds)
U.S. military spending continues to increase even though conventional threats against the United States are de minimis. China is the leading contender for Enemy Number 1. But if Beijing poses a threat, it is to U.S. domination of East Asia, not the country itself. Only the latter is worth fighting for. Commonly expressed is fear of growing Chinese military outlays. The Pentagon highlighted its concern with the latest annual report on the Chinese defense budget. Yet Beijing's armed forces remain dwarfed by America's military, which starts at a vastly higher base and spends several times as much. The Pentagon report states that the United States "encourages China to participate responsibly in the international system." True enough, but how does Washington define "responsibly"? The Chinese military buildup so far has been significant but measured. One suspects it means accepting American military hegemony in East Asia something with which Beijing isn't likely to agree. The Chinese military buildup so far has been significant but measured. "The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its periphery against high-tech adversaries," explains the Pentagon.
SUDI 10 25
2NC I/L Extended Deterrence key to solve Terrorism

Conventional deterrent key to deter terrorists and non state actors
Bolkcom,Kan,Wool2006.U.S.ConventionalForcesandNuclearDeterrence:AChina CaseStudyChristopher Bolkcom,ShirleyA.Kan,andAmyF.Wool.ForeignAffairs,Defense,andTradeDivision
Some DOD leaders say that todays conventional and nuclear forces are well suited to deter state-on-state conflict, and that the primary challenges are deterring non-state actors.4 This may be true. However, DOD currently faces a much more complicated state-on-state security environment than it did during the Cold War, when a possible war with the Soviet Union dominated planning and procurement activities. Many potential military challenges exist (e.g. North Korea) or could emerge (e.g. Iran, or a revanchist Russia), but a possible conflict with China is often mentioned as the military scenario of great concern to military planners. Conventional forces crucial to flexibility of response which is crucial to check terrorism
Conducting a review of military strategy and force structure today is likely to be dominated by two overarching themes. The first theme is uncertainty. Relative to the past, contemporary defense planners must now consider a broad and diverse menu of national security challenges when examining the relationship between conventional forces and nuclear deterrence, and assessing the most effective mix of forces. During the Cold War, the threats confronting the United States were reasonably well understood and comparatively predictable. If the United States had the military capabilities to deter or defeat its most stressing threat (e.g. the Soviet Union), then these military capabilities were deemed adequate to address lesser included cases such as nation states with more modest military capabilities or even non-state actors, such as insurgents and terrorists. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 graphically illustrated that todays non-state actors can exploit relatively inexpensive and commercially available technology to conduct very destructive attacks over great distances. Few observers today consider nontraditional threats to be lesser included cases. Increasingly it is recognized that in many cases, combating non-state threats presents a different and in many cases greater set of challenges than combating a conventional military foe.
SUDI 10 26
2NC I/L - Alliance key to power projection

Japan is key to US hegemony-power projection, credibility and political influence.
Rapp,BrigadierGeneralUSarmy,2004(William,PATHSDIVERGING?THENEXTDECADEINTHEU.S. JAPANSECURITYALLIANCE,January2004,http://www.scribd.com/doc/1575556/USAirForcerapp,ldg)
Currently in Northeast Asia there is considerable uncertainty about the future for all countries involved in the region. The nuclear ambitions of an increasingly desperate North Korea have led to serious ruptures in the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance and greatly enhanced security fears in Japan. The global war on terrorism and widely perceived unilateralism on the part of the United States has, ironically, enhanced the confidence of China to portray itself as a multidimensional leader in Asia. The gorwing streght of the Kuomintang in Taiwanese politics and its agenda to build a closer relationship or even confederation with mainland China after the presidential elections of March 2004 may upend security assumptions in the region.1 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM has reinforced the concepts of transformation and power projection from a more limited number of forward bases advocated so strongly by Secretary of Defense Donal Rumsfeld, while at the same time highlighting Americas need for allies in the war on terrorism. It is a region awash in uncertainly, but one in which the United States must remain firmly engaged to protect its vital interestsIn the breadth of its reach and influence, the United States is often described by others as hegemonic and the worlds sole superpower. This is a very clumsy caricature, however. Colin Powell recently quipped We are so multilateral it keeps me up 24 hours a day checking on everybody.2 The extent of that reach and the means necessary for achieving American interests around the world depend greatly on cooperative efforts with other like-minded nations, if only in coalitions of the willing built by the United States for ad hoc purposes. In Northeast Asia, the United States has two vital alliances with Japan and South Korea already in place. Although the American relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK_ is undeniably critical to security on this strategically important peninsula, the relationship is very narrow in its scope, and its future in some doubt. The relationship with japan, however, offers greater potential to achieve American interests in the long run in Asia, beyond simply the defense of Japan. Being off the shores of mainland Asia and comining the two biggest economies in the world, this alliance offers significant longterm opportunities to more actively promote peace, prosperity, and liberal values in the region. Japan and the United States share many important long-term interests, and the convergence of these interests highlights the continued need for their relationship. Concern about the growth and character of Chinese power, fears about the future of North Korea, prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), maintenance of secure sea lines of communication, concern about the absene of alternative security institutions in East Asia, and a shared desire for democracy, human rights, and increased trade all strongly reinforce the need for the alliance.
SUDI 10 27
2NC I/L SoKo Econ

US-Korean alliance is critical to the South Korean economy
GooandKim2007.YoungWanGooFacultyofEconomics,KoreaNationalDefenseUniversity,Seoul,SouthKorea SeungNyeonKim. FacultyofEconomics,HankukUniversityofForeignStudies,Yonginsi,SouthKorea. A studyonthemilitaryallianceofSouthKoreaUnited StateswiththeexistenceofthreatfromNorthKorea: a publicgooddemandapproach. http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer? vid=2&hid=104&sid=90f30a448eec4b7795bf1888baa16750%40sessionmgr112
Second, South Korea needs to strengthen the military alliance with the USA, in order to alleviate the military burden, and to respond effectively to the North Korean threat in the future. Recently, the USA has announced plans for the gradual withdrawal of their troops in South Korea. With the increasing trend of spill-in elasticity in South Korea, any reduction in the military presence of the USA would require the South Korean people to bear a heavy burden of national defense in order to confront the North Korean army. South Korea may retain its reserved strength by increasing GDP to overcome the burden, but recent slow GDP growth suggests that, without the military alliance, South Korea may suffer a heavy burden in the future.
SUDI 10 28
2NC I/L Extended Deterrence solves Japn rearm

Reducing dependence on nuclear weapons weakens US extended deterrence efforts causing Japan to rearm.
Foster and Payne 2007 (John, Chairman of the Board of GKN Aerospace Transparency Systems. Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Keith, Head of the Missouri State Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, President and Co-Found of the National Institute for Public Policy, What Are Nuclear Weapons For? The American Phsyical Society, October 2007, Vol. 36, No 4)
We could decide that we would prefer to withdraw the nuclear umbrella and provide non-nuclear extended deterrence. But, with the nuclear proliferation of North Korea and the apparent Iranian aspirations for nuclear weapons, and the rapid growth of Chinas nuclear arsenal, the response of key allies to the U.S. withdrawal of its nuclear extended deterrent coverage would create new and potentially severe problems, i.e., nuclear proliferation by U.S. friends and allies who would likely feel too vulnerable in the absence of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Japanese leaders have been explicit about the extreme security value they attach to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and they have suggested that Japan would be forced to reconsider its non-nuclear status in the absence of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Thus, ironically, nuclear non-proliferation is tied closely to the U.S. preservation of its extended nuclear deterrent. This point is contrary to the typical contention that U.S. movement toward nuclear disarmament promotes nuclear non-proliferation. Precisely the reverse linkage may be more the reality: U.S. movement toward nuclear disarmament will unleash what some have called a cascade of nuclear proliferation among those countries which otherwise have felt themselves secure under the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent and therefore have chosen to remain non-nuclear. We should be extremely careful before moving in a direction that carries the risk of unleashing this cascade, such as deciding that U.S. nuclear weapons are unnecessary for assurance and moving toward a nonnuclear force structure.
Any perception of a retreat from extended deterrence will cause Japan to nuclearize
Satoh 3/5/2009 (Yukio, Former President of the Japan Institute for International Affairs and a Permanent Representative of Japan to the United States from 1998 to 2002 Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear Disarmament Nautilus Institute)
For obvious reasons, the Japanese are second to none in wishing for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, given Japan's vulnerability to North Korea's progressing nuclear and missile programs and China's growing military power , ensuring American
commitment to deterring threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a matter of prior strategic importance for Tokyo. Japan has long been committed to the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their entry into the country. A prevalent and strong sentiment against nuclear weapons among the Japanese people lies behind the policy to deny themselves the possession of nuclear weapons in spite of the country's capabilities to do otherwise. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain vivid national memories. Yet, strategically,
Japan's adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends largely, if not solely, upon the credibility of theJapan-US Security Treaty, or more specifically, that of the United States' commitment to defend Japan from any offensive action, including nuclear threats. In response, the US government has been
steadfastly assuring the Japanese in an increasingly clear manner of American commitment to provide deterrence for Japanby all means, including nuclear. Against this backdrop, the argument made by the aforementioned four eminent strategists in the tone-setting joint article published in The Wall Street Journal of January 4, 2007, that "the end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual SovietAmericandeterrence obsolete", was received with mixed reactions inJapan: welcome for the sake of nuclear disarmament and caution from the perspectives of security and defense. As depending upon the US' extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan's only strategic
option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats, the Japanese are sensitive to any sign of increased uncertainties with regard to extended deterrence.
SUDI 10 29
2NC I/L NoKo prolif

( ) North Koreas nuclear threats could spark an arms race in Asia leading to other countries to seek their own deterrence The Associated Press 7/9/2009, (Foster Klug, Associated Press writer) http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iaM6nu3v2qdZL9xv_5vNZD9ZwR RwD99B2GJG0 President Barack Obama's choice to lead U.S. forces in the Pacific warned Thursday that North Korea's missile and nuclear threats could spark an arms race in Asia. Admiral Robert Willard also told senators at his confirmation hearing that China's huge military buildup remains a serious worry for the U.S. military. North Korea's recent missile and nuclear tests and belligerent rhetoric aimed at the United States, Japan and South Korea have had northeast Asia on edge for months. Willard said North Korean actions pose a significant threat to the United States and its allies and "could spur a limited arms race as neighbors seek to enhance their own deterrent and defense capabilities." The North carried out its second nuclear test in May. On Saturday it test-fired a barrage of ballistic missiles into waters off its east coast, its biggest display of missile firepower in three years. The North deploys hundreds of missiles that have all of South Korea and Japan within their striking range.
SUDI 10 30
2NC I/L - Alliance key to terror, pandemics, warming

And, the Alliance is key to check terrorism, pandemics and warming.
Nye,KennedyschoolofgovernmentatHarvard,2009(Joseph,WillUSJapanAllianceSurvive?,TheKoreaTimes, 7142009,http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/07/137_48423.html,ldg)
Third, the U.S.-Japan alliance will have to face a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests, such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states. Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by global warming, with China having surpassed the U.S. as the leading producer of carbon-dioxide emissions (though not in per capita terms).Fortunately, this is an area that plays to Japan's strengths. Although some Japanese complain about the unequal nature of the alliance's security components, owing to the limits that Japan has accepted on the use of force, in these new areas, Japan is a stronger partner. Japan's overseas development assistance in places ranging from Africa to Afghanistan, its participation in global health projects, its support of the United Nations, its naval participation in anti-piracy operations, and its research and development on energy efficiency place it at the forefront in dealing with the new transnational challenges.Given today's agenda, there is enormous potential for an equal partnership, working with others, in the provision of global public goods that will benefit the U.S., Japan, and the rest of the world. That is why I remain optimistic about the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
SUDI 10 31
*****2NC Impacts***** 2NC Impact Noko Prolif

Korean war risks nuclear war & extinction:
AfricaNews,10/25/1999;Lexis
Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military
tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war.
A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war.
War in Korea leads to global nuclear war
Blair,PresidentCDI,03(TheFollyofNuclearWarGamingforKoreaandSouthAsiaDr.BruceG.Blair,CDI President, bblair@cdi.org April30,2003 http://www.cdi.org/blair/nuclearfolly.cfm ,accesses9/16/04)
"So what, in the end, can we confidently say about nuclear war in these regions? Practically, only that the arsenals could cause a holocaust a single 15-kiloton plutonium bomb exploded by North Korea about one-quarter mile above Seoul would almost certainly kill 150,000, severely injure another 80,000, and inflict significant injuries to another 200,000 city-dwellers. If North Korea has one or two assembled weapons, it's a threat of apocalyptic proportions to South Korea, or for that matter any country that found itself on the
receiving end. If North Korea harvests another six or eight plutonium bombs during the next six months, it could soon put a million or so South Korean and Japanese inhabitants in peril. South Korea's three million civil defense personnel would be overwhelmed. Regarding Pakistan and India, each estimated to possess many scores of nuclear weapons, the death toll could be much higher. These arsenals have put 10 million or so South Asian inhabitants in peril. The United States and Russia, of course, eclipse this specter of a second Holocaust by imperiling many hundreds of millions of people and civilization itself. Prudence dictates that we should assume that any use of nuclear
weapons in anger would run a high risk of escalating to full-scale war that inflicts the maximum possible casualties in each of the theaters a million in Korea, 10 million in South Asia, and hundreds of millions in a U.S.-Russia exchange. These sobering statistics imply that prevention is the only way to limit the adverse consequences of a nuclear conflict."
SUDI 10 32
2NC Impact Chinese expansion

Chinese expansionism leads to conflict over Taiwan James Woolsey, CIA Ex Director, FDCH, February 12, 1998
The one issue which might cause a major rupture between China and the United States is Taiwan. After we demonstrated weakness and vacillation for several years, I believe that the Chinese were genuinely surprised nearly two years ago when they launched ballistic missiles into the waters near Taiwan and the United States responded by sending two aircraft carriers. It is dangerous to give China reason to doubt our resolve, as we had done before that incident. Wars can result, and have resulted, from such miscalculations. Beijing must be quite clear that we insist that there be only a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. Taiwan's healthy democracy is, in a sense, an affront to the dictators in Beijing, and the affront will be doubly galling to Beijing if China begins to have severe economic problems and Taiwan continues to prosper. Taiwan could thus easily become the focus for the nationalistic fervor which Chinese leaders may be tempted to stir up in order to distract the Chinese people from political oppression and economic disruption. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan itself is not militarily feasible for many years, but the seizure of one or more of the offshore islands, such as Quemoy, or a ballistic missile attack against key targets on Taiwan using conventional warheads with high accuracy (e.g. by using GPS guidance) could bring us into a serious military confrontation with China.
Taiwan conflict causes nuclear holocaust Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 5/14/2001, The Nation, Pg. 20
Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forwarddeployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.
SUDI 10 33
2NC Impact China modernization

Chinese modernization leads to adventurism and miscalculation in Asia
Krawitz3(Howard,researchfellowintheInstituteforNationalStrategicStudies,Dec,ModernizingChinas
Military:AHighStakesGamble?,StrategicForum,No.204,Acc.Jul29,2009)
Conversely, a
powerful military might encourage Beijing to challenge with confidence perceived competitors in the region, elevating China to the status of hegemon in Asia. While Beijing-as-superpower might lend its efforts to guaranteeing peace and stability in the region, it might opt to do so regardless of its neighbors wishes, enforcing a pax sinica of its own choosing. It also might overestimate its own capabilities, leading to adventurism and possible miscalculation in deciding how far it could safely go in testing limits or trying to further controversial foreign affairs policies .
The impact is global nuclear war
Landay2k[JonathanS.,nationalsecurityandintelligencecorrespondent,March10,2k,Knight
Ridder/TribuneNewsService,Lexis]
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile , said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential
disaster. In an effort to cool the regions tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asias capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using
nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of
American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.
SUDI 10 34
2NC Impacts - Terrormism

Terrorists will use nuclear weapons triggering global nuclear war and extinction
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, 2004 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm, 26 August - 1 September 2004) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
The impact is extinction.
Yonah Alexander, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director and Professor, WASHINGTON TIMES, August 28, 2003, p. A20.
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security
concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda
Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
and psychological warfare.
SUDI 10 35
2nc Impacts - Disease

So does disease
SouthChinaMorningPost1996(KavitaDaswani,LeadingthewaytoacureforAIDS,January4,1996,lexis,ldg)
Despite the importance of the discovery of the facilitating cell, it is not what Dr Ben-Abraham wants to talk about. There is a much more pressing medical crisis at hand one he believes the world must be alerted to: the possibility of a virus deadlier than HIV. If this makes Dr Ben-Abraham sound like a prophet of doom, then he makes no apology for it. AIDS, the Ebola outbreak which killed more than 100 people in Africa last year, the flu epidemic that has now affected 200,000 in the former Soviet Union they are all, according to Dr Ben-Abraham, the tip of the iceberg. Two decades of intensive study and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural and man-made disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus, deadlier than HIV. An airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism, he said. It can come from a rare animal or from anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain reaction and it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen. That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a Hollywood film, but Dr Ben-Abraham said history has already proven his theory. Fifteen years ago, few could have predicted the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years and the only way the deadly virus which turns internal organs into liquid could be contained was because it was killed before it had a chance to spread. Imagine, he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London, New York or Hong Kong. It could happen anytime in the next 20 years theoretically, it could happen tomorrow. The shock of the AIDS epidemic has prompted virus experts to admit that something new is indeed happening and that the threat of a deadly viral outbreak is imminent, said Joshua Lederberg of the Rockefeller University in New York, at a recent conference. He added that the problem was very serious and is getting worse. Dr Ben-Abraham said: Nature isnt benign. The survival of the human species is not a preordained evolutionary programme. Abundant sources of genetic variation exist for viruses to learn how to mutate and evade the immune system. He cites the 1968 Hong Kong flu outbreak as an example of how viruses have outsmarted human intelligence. And as new mega-cities are being developed in the Third World and rainforests are destroyed, disease-carrying animals and insects are forced into areas of human habitation. This raises the very real possibility that lethal, mysterious viruses would, for the first time, infect humanity at a large scale and imperil the survival of the human race, he said.
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2NC Impact - Warming

Warming does too
Tickell,Climateresearcher2008(Oliver,ClimateResearcher,TheGaurdian,Onaplanet4Chotter,allwecan prepareforisextinction,811,http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)atw
We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean , in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.
2NC Impacts Prolif

Proliferation causes extinction
Taylor'02(StuartJr.,SeniorWriterwiththeNationalJournalandcontributingeditoratNewsweek,LegaiTimes, September16,L/N)
< The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation another five or ten potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more
Deterrence DA SUDI 10 Grayson/Lewis/Bell-Ard 37 bombs will be set off on our soil by terrorists or terrorist governments. Even an airtight missile defense will be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat. Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclearweapons states where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where " the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations," So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Nuclear proliferation creates nuclear arms races which risk nuclear war.
ChristopherFord,2007(UnitedStatesSpecialRepresentativeforNuclearNonproliferation,April24,2007.Online. Internet.Accessed,May11,2007.http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0704/S00411.htm)
First and most obviously, such failure directly undermines the most important benefit the NPT brings: assurance against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thus also against the emergence or resurgence of nuclear arms races which raise the specter of nuclear warfare. By undercutting these core nonproliferation assurances, nonproliferation noncompliance imperils the peace and security of all nations. Perhaps quickly, perhaps more slowly, failure to deal with noncompliance could lead to a loss of faith in the Treaty as a means of constraining proliferation. Would-be violators would feel more free to embark upon nuclear weapons programs, and even peaceful and law-abiding states might come to feel it necessary -- in light of this -- to hedge their bets, perhaps themselves ultimately going down such a path. The world faced enormous danger and uncertainty during the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. A radically-proliferated world would be much more dangerous still, with each new participant and each new regional arms competition introducing vastly greater risks of miscalculation, mistake, or reckless over-reaching.
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2NC Impacts - Prolif

PROLIF RISKS NUCLEAR WAR VIA ACCIDENTS:
TheHindu,March8,2003(Lexis)
The professor, whose main research interests include nuclear security in South Asia and ethical norms concerning the use of force, said that during the Cold War, the superpowers were much closer to a real war than we knew at that time.'' India and Pakistan had a lot to learn from the mistakes that the U.S. and the erstwhile USSR had made in handling and deploying nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are controlled by normal imperfect organisations; by normal imperfect people,'' Dr. Sagan said. Speaking on The perils of nuclear proliferation: military mistakes, accidents and terrorism,'' at the Madras University, he cited many instances of the 1950s and the 1960s when the U.S. and the Soviet Union came close to an unintended nuclear conflagration. The lecture was organised by the U. S. Consulate in south India and the School of International Studies, Madras University. Dismissing the security model as a reason for States achieving weapon status as "misleading," he said that the only way to ensure peace was to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Prolif risks nuclear war:
Ross, secretary New Zealand Nuclear Free Peacemaking Assn, 5/12/2004; (The Christchurch Press; Lexis) The risk of nuclear war has never been greater, because new US doctrines allow the use of nuclear weapons against both nuclear and non-nuclear states in pre-emptive wars. It is also developing new, smaller nuclear weapons for battlefield use, and increasing the budget for nuclear weapons' production. These policies encourage nuclear proliferation, and thus increase risk of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, terrorism or intent.
Unchecked proliferation will destroy the world.
Henry A. Kissinger Fall 2002 (Former Secretary of State and Deep Throat Suspect, New Perspectives Quarterly, HYPERLINK "http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_fall/kissinger.html" http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_fall/kissinger.html weapons of mass destruction the most important long-term problem faced by the international community is the problem of proliferation of these weapons, especially in states with no internal checks on their rulers' decisions and even more so when these weapons have been used against the country's own people and its neighbors. If the world is not to turn into a doomsday machine, a way must be found to prevent that proliferation.
It is at this point that the general terrorist threat merges with the challenge posed by in IraqPerhaps
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2NC Impacts SoKo Econ

East Asia is a bigger internal link to the economy
Xinhu2009[April18th,EastAsiaplayingbiggerroleinglobaleconomy,Bushsays,online]
BOAO, Hainan, April 18 (Xinhua) -- Former U.S. President George. W. Bush said Saturday that East Asia is playing a bigger role in global economy, and the world economic center has moved from Atlantic to Asia Pacific. The Asia Pacific takes up 55 percent of the global economy, and it is of vital interest to stay "heavily engaged" with the countries in the region, he said at a banquet speech held during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) annual conference 2009. Economic collapse leads to rabid militarism and nuke war:
Nissani, 92 (Lives in the Balance: the Cold War and American Politics, 1945-1991, available online at HYPERLINK "http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html" http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html; accessed 8/22/04) Nuclear war could be started deliberately. For instance, Chinese officials may decide to do away with both Russia and the United States by firing submarine missiles at Russian cities from American territorial waters. Terrorists may one day be able to carry out a similarly deceptive exercise with a couple of suitcase bombs. Nuclear proliferation raises the chances that nuclear weapons will eventually fall into irresponsible hands. What might happen when a Saddam Hussein acquires a bomb? Would he not be tempted to use it in the event of imminent removal from power? Even worse, one can well imagine a collapse of the international economic system and the rise of rabid militarism in one or another major industrial power.
Economic Decline Causes Nuke War:
Walter Mead, NPQ's Board of Advisors, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 1992, p.30 What if the global economy stagnates-or even shrinks? In the case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor, Russia, China, India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the '30s.
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2NC Impacts Japan rearm causes Asia Prolif and War

Japanese rearmament causes an Asian arms race
Zhou 2005 (Peter, Military Mayhem: The Delcine in Japanese Pacifism, Harvard International Review Vol 27, Issue 2, 2005) In addition to domestic opposition, the remilitarization of Japan will likely bring about international disapproval and regional instability. China, North Korea, and South Korea still remember being victimized by the Japanese military during World War II. The possibility of a nuclear armedJapan, presently outlawed by Japan's "peace constitution," has reentered the public spotlight with support from top Japanese officials.Japan's nuclear ambitions would add a new dimension to East Asia's present fears. A belligerent North Korea and a threatened China would acquire more weapons and resources--leading to a potential Asian arms race that could destabilize the region. Although the rallying forces of nationalism have raised the spirits of the Japanese people, the militaristic actions of the government will only divide public opinion. Reasserting Japan's presence in the international arena may require strengthening its role as a peaceful negotiator, but breaking away from pacifism harms the credibility of Japan in the eyes of its people and its neighbors.
Japanese rearmament would result in Nuclear Korean nuclerization, collapse of the NPT, and Asian proliferation
Halloran 5/27/2009 (Richard, Freelance writer, Taipei Times, Doubts Grow in Japan Over US Nuclear Umbrella) http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/05/27/2003444613 That anxiety has reinvigorated a debate about whether Japan should acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own and reduce its reliance on the US. Japan has the technology, finances, industrial capacity and skilled personnel to build a nuclear force, although it would be costly and take many years. The consequences of that decision would be earthshaking. It would likely cause opponents to riot in the streets and could bring down a government. South Korea, having sought at least once to acquire nuclear weapons, would almost certainly do so. Any hope of dissuading North Korea from building a nuclear force would disappear. China would redouble its nuclear programs. And for the only nation ever to experience atomic bombing to acquire nuclear arms would surely shatter the already fragile international nuclear non-proliferation regime .
Deterrence DA Silber/Lewis/Bell-Ard
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2NC Impact Japan Rearm Prolif

Japan armament would eliminate the ability for the US to enforce the NPT-leads to prolif
Chanlett-Avery 2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests Congressional Research Service, February 19th 2009) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf Japans development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty . If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more generally.
Prolif risks regional instability, nuclear conflict, economic disruption, and terrorism
Lewis A. Dunn, Summer 2007, Deterrence Today Roles, Challenges and Responses, In collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/Deterrence_Today_Dunn_2007.pdf This line of argument should not be accepted at face value. To the contrary, in two different ways, the stakes for the United States (and other outsiders) in a crisis or confrontation with a regional nuclear adversary would be extremely high. To start, what is at stake is the likelihood of cas- cades of proliferation in Asia and the Middle East. Such proliferation cas- cades almost certainly would bring greater regional instability, global political and economic disruption, a heightened risk of nuclear conflict, and a jump in the risk of terrorist access to nuclear weapons. Equally important, nuclear blackmail let alone nuclear use against U.S. and other outsiders forces, those of U.S. regional allies and friends, or any of their homelands would greatly heighten the stakes for the United States and other outsiders. Perceptions of American resolve and credibility around the globe, the likelihood that an initial nuclear use would be followed by a virtual collapse of a six-decades plus nuclear taboo, and the danger of runaway proliferation all would be at issue. So viewed, how the United States and others respond is likely to have a far-reaching impact on their own security as well as longer- term global security and stability.
deterrent |ditrnt| noun a thing that discourages or is intended to discourage someone from doing something. a nuclear weapon or weapons system regarded as deterring an enemy from attack.
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2NC Impacts - HEG

Global Nuclear War
Kagan07SeniorassociateattheCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace[RobertKagan(Seniortransatlantic fellowattheGermanMarshallFund),EndofDreams,ReturnofHistory,PolicyReview,August& September2007,pg.http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html]
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The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan.
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War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene even if it remained the worlds most powerful nation could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe if it adopted what some call a strategy of offshore balancing this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, offshore role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more even-handed policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to
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normal or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
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2NC Impact - HEG

Maintenance of U.S. global leadership is vital to preventing numerous scenarios for nuclear conflict
Thayer,06(Bradley,"InDefenseofPrimacy,"TheNationalInterest,November/December2006,p.lexis)
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THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. (3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria,
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Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy. (4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United
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States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills
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*****2NC Answers To***** 2NC - A2 Alliance is resilient

And the Alliance is no longer resilient
Time Magazine 9-21-09(RethinkinganAlliance,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1921488,00.html,ldg)
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After Japan's momentous election on Aug. 30, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) hammered the long-serving Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), both American and Japanese commentators picked up on a remark by
Prime Minister in-waiting Yukio Hatoyama that there needed to be more "balance" in the U.S.-Japan relationship, read an article in which Hatoyama criticized the U.S. and wondered about the solidity of the alliance between Tokyo and Washington. Then Hatoyama called U.S.
President Barack Obama and told him that of course of course! the alliance was the bedrock of Japanese foreign policy, and everyone relaxed. But this happy conclusion is way too nea t. There are genuine issues with the
U.S.-Japan alliance, and they need to be taken seriously. In the first place, the DPJ's interest in
finding a new balance is not just a matter of Hatoyama's speeches. Ichiro Ozawa, the veteran politician who is now the party's general secretary, has argued for decades that Japan should be a "normal" country, with its own foreign- and domestic-policy priorities, set in relation to its own interests. Ozawa is not anti-American; when I spoke to him earlier this year, he stressed that the U.S.-Japan alliance is "the most important relationship for Japan." But at the same time, Ozawa insisted that in "global disputes," Japan should take a "U.N. approach ." "When it comes to an exercise
of power by the U.S. alone," Ozawa said, "then Japan is not able to go along. " He really could not have been clearer that a DPJ government would mean a new line on foreign policy. Second, the article by Hatoyama that caused so much fuss does not read like an Op-Ed dashed off by
a summer intern. It is a thoughtful and quite radical analysis of how globalization and the financial crisis have changed the landscape in which Japan and the U.S. find themselves. Hatoyama said that Japan had been "buffeted by the
winds of market fundamentalism in a U.S.-led movement that is usually called globalization," and criticized a "way of thinking based on the idea that American-style free-market economics represents a universal and ideal economic order." "The influence of the U.S. is declining," Hatoyama wrote, in a "new era of multipolarity," and he went so far as to propose something like a European Union with a single currency, no less
in East Asia. It is enough to make one wonder how well founded the U.S.-Japan relationship really is, and how resilient to a changing global environment it is likely to be. The U.S.-Japan alliance, remember, did not come into being because the two countries decided they loved each other. It did so because one defeated the other in war, occupied it, then wrote and imposed a new constitutional settlement upon it. Japan's acceptance of the post-1945 settlement had much to do with a naked assessment by Japanese leaders of their interests, rather than a sudden passion for all things American. In truth, it is hard to think of any industrial society that in its essentials is less like the U.S. than Japan. Yes, Japan plays baseball. But Japan is a nation with very deep cultural roots and habits in everything from food, art and style to religion and the expected roles of women and children few of which have any point of contact with modern American mores. Since the bursting of Japan's financial bubble 20 years ago, moreover, many observers have noted that Japanese society has become more "Japanese," cherishing tradition and homegrown values. Now look at things from the U.S. perspective. For many years, there has been a layer of academics, policymakers and politicians in the U.S. who have devoted their professional lives to the relationship with Japan. And Americans enjoy Japanese cars and consumer electronics. At the same time, anyone who remembers the depth of anti-Japanese feeling over trade issues in the 1980s knows that familiarity with Japanese goods does not translate into popular support for Japanese interests . The U.S. is
going to have to display very sophisticated diplomacy in Asia over the next 20 years, as it eases China's rise while helping to ensure that democratic allies like Japan do not feel threatened by it. To show how important the alliance with Japan used to be considered, the U.S. for many years appointed seasoned politicians to the U.S. embassy in Japan. That pattern has been broken recently, and this year Obama appointed John Roos, a Democratic fundraiser from Los Angeles, to Tokyo. Roos may turn out to be an excellent envoy. But he will have his work cut out. The Japanese election it becomes clearer every day represents a sea change in politics there. If the alliance is not now to drift into irrelevance, some high-level attention to its purposes in the new world is needed.
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2NC A2 nuke deterrence Key

(_/_) Conventional and nuclear deterrence are inextricably linked. Conventional deterrence
The analysis that follows seeks to explore the possible role that U.S. nuclear and conventional forces might play in four stages of potential conflicts: deterrence, prior to the start of the conflict; crisis stability in the early stages of the conflict; warfighting during the height of the conflict; and war termination, through either a negotiated settlement or a battlefield victory. This report highlights a number of policy issues that may bear consideration in the ongoing debate regarding military investments. For example, this report suggests that nuclear and conventional military capabilities can simultaneously have positive effects on deterrence or warfighting and negative effects on crisis stability or war termination objectives. Therefore, changes in military force structure or capabilities to improve deterrence, for example, should consider potential effects on crisis stability, for example. Further, investments in military capabilities that may positively contribute to all potential stages of military conflict (e.g. deterrence, crisis stability, warfighting, and war termination), might be preferred to investments that have a mixed effect on the potential range of conflict. This report will not be updated.
(_/_) Conventional forces are crucial to deterrence in lieu of deteriorating nuclear deterrent credibility
During the Cold War, assessments of the interplay between nuclear and conventional forces were most relevant, and most often debated, in scenarios that pitted the United States and its NATO allies against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Defense planners recognized and calculated the effect a perceived balance or imbalance of conventional and nuclear forces might have on deterrence, crisis stability, and the outcome of potential conflicts in Europe. Specifically, the United States sought to extend deterrence and protect its NATO allies with both conventional and nuclear forces. For much of the Cold War, NATOs conventional forces were perceived to be weaker than those of the Warsaw Pact and were allowed to stay that way in part, because nuclear weapons were seen as a less costly alternative to large conventional force structure. Many analysts argued that under these circumstances, the United States and NATO could deter a Soviet and Warsaw Pact attack by threatening to escalate the conflict to nuclear use. Others, however, questioned whether such threats were credible, in light of the fact that the Soviet Union could have responded with nuclear attacks of its own. As a result, analysts often argued the pros and cons of increasing NATOs conventional force capabilities, and the potential this might have for enhancing deterrence and raising the nuclear threshold.3
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2NC A2 Nuke weaps deterr

These coming regional disputes can only be addressed with conventional deterrence. Our ev is comparative
Lichtenstein02LieutenantColonelintheUSArmy[WENDYL.LICHTENSTEIN,CONVENTIONALMILITARY DETERRENCEITSRISETODOMINANCEANDITSFUTURE,U.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategy ResearchProject,28February2002]
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During the Cold War a considerable amount of world instability was directly linked to bipolar geopolitics and U.S.-Soviet rivalry. In the post-Cold war era however, instability tends to be entrenched more in regional concerns and rivalries." This does not imply that during the Cold War there was an absence of regional disputes. In fact, regional conflicts were a major part of Cold War competition, except those conflicts usually received global interpretation, as projections of superpower antagonism into what was viewed as relatively unimportant regions. 12 Deterrence on a regional basis means paying more attention to balance of power and U.S. regional interest considerations in those areas. But this post-Cold War focus has essentially left the U.S. without a credible deterrence policy and strategy because the steady deterrent relationship embedded in the bilateral nuclear framework of forty-plus years was not transferable to current regional deterrence predicaments.13 A major reason was that U.S. policy makers were faced for the first time with the challenge of integrating regional perspectives, including national and regional sensitivities and dynamics, into a realistic and stable approach to pursuing deterrence and global security.14 As such, it required a broader political perspective and less destructive military strategic approach which nuclear deterrence simply did not provide. The problem facing postCold War U.S. policymakers was outlined in the basic structural premise of superpower nuclear deterrence. Detailing the framework's flaws, Keith Payne explains: If the modeling demonstrated that both sides possessed a manifest and secure capability for devastating nuclear retaliation, "mutual deterrence" generally was judged to be "stable." The underlying assumption was that neither side, being rational and reasonable, would intentionally initiate a war if the end result could be widespread mutual destruction. .... In short, rational leaders would be deterred via mutual nuclear threats because, by definition, they would be irrational if they were not so deterred.15 The assumption of rationality and thus, predictability of action, highlighted the ineffectiveness of nuclear deterrence outside of the bipolar construct. As previously discussed, deterrence theory addresses the myriad of difficulties associated with relationships between state and non-state actors; the strategic nuclear framework simply could not address the diversity of regional actors and requirements. Overall, the nuclear framework did not fit because deterrence on a global scale faded when the Cold War ended and regional relevance came to the geopolitical forefront. Shifting to a regional focus pointed toward primacy of conventional rather than nuclear deterrence partly due to the many complex considerations in a multipolar, regionally arrayed environment. Some of the key considerations included obligations to consider regional sensitivities, the need for development of regionally focused foreign policies, and expansion of regional security arrangements. Because the U.S. has some interests in almost every region, strengthening regional security will continue to be a primary objective of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. 16 Globalization The other key feature of the post-Cold War geopolitical structure that argues for predominance of conventional deterrence and diminished need for nuclear deterrence is globalization. This occurrence has greatly complicated the security environment, heightening the interrelationships between nations, linking and binding them politically, culturally, industrially and financially. Such intense interdependence further diminishes the credibility of nuclear deterrence because these inextricable interdependencies make the use of nuclear weapons anywhere extremely counterproductive to U.S. and global economic stability and prosperity. For one, technological innovations - robotics, computers, semiconductors, fiber optic communications, and integrated financial systems - have directed an economic shift away from industrial production to knowledge-based market economies.17 This has led to qualitative changes in the strategic orientation of businesses, banking and markets. Rather than bilateral links, the transnational orientation actually encourages global strategic activity.' 8 This global disposition implies that the effect of a nuclear attack on one country means invariably all countries will experience some negative effect because of direct or indirect links between transnational businesses, financial markets and economies. Thus, economic stability is reduced because it depends greatly on communications and computer networks, which are greatly disrupted from nuclear attack electromagnetic pulse effects. Furthermore, though conventional attacks would also disrupt trade, banking and economic stability, the lingering effects are significantly less than from nuclear attacks. Communications and computer systems recovery is quicker from conventional attack not only because many systems are redundant but also because of less physical destructiveness. Lastly, negative economic impact from nuclear attack would also be manifest through long lasting aid requirements that could potentially stress financial systems of even prosperous countries. To summarize, change in the geopolitical structure from the Cold War to post-Cold War era helped punctuate the primacy of conventional deterrence. Without a global perspective and predictable geopolitical environment, nuclear deterrence is not as relevant or effective, and therefore, not a credible deterrent. Certainly, its preeminence as a "cornerstone" of defense strategy has withered. A shift from the bipolar, predictable security environment, in which nuclear deterrence operated in a stable realm, to a multipolar, regional focus complicated by globalization interdependencies, has resulted since the end of the Cold War in a condition much more suitable for the employment of a conventional deterrent strategy. FACTOR TWO - THREATS For over 40 years during the Cold War, the greatest U.S. military focal point was the Soviet strategic and ideological threat. The strategic component was comprised of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military power and force capabilities. It was a significant threat that dominated all aspects of the U.S. defense community -- planning, doctrine, training, force development, intelligence assets, and weapons procurement. It provided U.S. military strategists and planners with a defined benchmark against which to determine the appropriate quantity and quality of U.S. forces.' 9 The ideological threat was largely played out through Soviet surrogates that would challenge U.S. containment policy. These challenges frequently resulted in some type of U.S. intervention, directly with military forces as in Korea and Vietnam, and indirectly with aid, training and arms sales as in
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Nicaragua and Afghanistan. The threat was familiar and fit a mold constructed by the U.S. To prevent expansion and defeat the monolithic Soviet power, the threat received complete U.S. examination and expenditure of resources. Nuclear deterrence was defined and refined over decades, stabilized by indicators and warnings, and the Single Integrated Operations Plan. It was routine to wargame against the nuclear threat to estimate costs and benefits of specific deterrent means and actions. The threat was predictable and therefore, conducive to applying specific military means to defeat it, including the proper amount of nuclear capability and complementary deterrence policy. During this period, many regional and national issues were submerged within the confines of the bipolar framework. When bipolarity disappeared at the end of the Cold War, these issues emerged in the form of ethnic, criminal and cultural unrest and disorder. In addition to resurrecting old threats and hatred, the changed security structure has given rise to new ones in the intervening decade. Threats arising from factions within failed states, cultural and ethnic disputing groups, rogue states, antiglobalist movements, international criminal elements, militants and terrorists, to name a few, further have fractured the framework of Cold predictability and steadiness within which the old Soviet threat operated. Threats have become progressively harder to identify as diverging and multifaceted passions, political ideologies, and socioeconomic conditions have grown in complexity and type. Nevertheless, employing nuclear threats to deter nuclear weapons states still has a viable function in U.S. defense strategy. Further, nuclear weapons may have some role in deterring rogue states that possess chemical and/or biological weapons of mass destruction, such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya. However, nuclear weapons threats against non-nuclear weapons states that are signatories of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty would not be credible and run counter to U.S. policy.20 Moreover, nuclear deterrence of nonstate actors, like terrorists, militants, and disputing ethnic groups like Serbs, Kosovars and Palestinians would also prove quite ineffective. Stemming aggression of these type threats with nuclear deterrence would not only be assessed as incredible, communicating the threat would prove equally challenging. Put succinctly, a threat of nuclear retaliation is extremely difficult to mount against individuals and groups without an address. Moreover, clearly communicating that threat to leaders and decision bodies without knowing who they are and what their precise goals may be would likely prove intensely challenging and subject to failure. It is doubtful, for instance, that nuclear deterrent threats to Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist group would prove very effective in deterring future aggression. In addition, such nuclear deterrent threats exceed the international tolerable threshold of punishment given these types of aggressor non-nuclear, conventional and unconventional capabilities. Combating the broad range of threats that emerged in the post-Cold War world involved moving from increasingly incredible single-effect nuclear deterrence to an escalating, more flexible scale of conventional deterrence. For instance, current U.S. conventional weapons attacks on al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan and expressed threats of future attacks will have more of a deterrent effect than would threats of nuclear attack. For one, the U.S. has never before used nuclear weapons from its deterrent threats but has a clear history of using conventional attacks since the end of the Cold War. Thus, the credibility of conventional deterrent threats is fairly high and superior capability is now proven. Though communication of conventional deterrent threats toward these non-state actors remains a concern, referencing previous successful actions of following through with deterrent threats portrays a credible image and message to an adversary.
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2NC - A2 Nukes solve deterrence

Nuclear threats arent credible
Gerson,analystatCenterforNavalAnalyses,9292009 (Michael,RETHINKINGU.S.NUCLEARPOSTURE, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0929_transcript_nuclear_posture.pdf,ldg)
My argument is essentially this: Nuclear first use is one of two things. Its either not credible, in which case it adds nothing to U.S. security, but rather is politically complicating in the nonproliferation context. Or, if it is credible, its potentially dangerous by fostering crisis instability. So thats Im going to talk a few more minutes about that. On the one hand, I think you can make a case that U.S. threats, whether theyre implicit or explicit and really what were talking about here is the ambiguous threat are simply not credible. Its not credible for a variety of reasons. I mean, one is the nuclear taboo, this moral and political aversion to using nuclear weapons that has emerged in the long absence of nuclear use and conflict. In the nuclear arena, the United States is largely seen as cool-headed, risk-averse and sensitive to casualties and collateral damage. The United States does not seem to be able to benefit from the sort of rationality of irrationality type argument. The prospect that the United States would unilaterally shatter the almost seven-decade record of non-use in conflict I think contributes to the belief that the United States would in fact not use nuclear weapons. Another argument is I think that one could make the case that an unintended consequence of the United States first use the United States efforts to lead to the global non-proliferation regime is that it reduces the credibility of the United States to use nuclear weapons first. If the United States spends all of this time working on the efforts to prevent others from getting nuclear weapons, it seems it makes it less credible that the United States would risk shattering that and throwing it all away by using nuclear weapons first. And finally, in the Gulf War, despite the threats of calculated ambiguity and the ambiguous threat of nuclear weapons, which some believe deterred Saddam, Bush, Scowcroft, Powell, and Baker, all said after the conflict that they had actually never intended on using nuclear weapons. And such public admission I think reduces the credibility of those threats.
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2NC - Conventional Deterrence Key

Regional conflict inevitable only conventional deterrence solves. Our ev is comparative
Lichtenstein,LieutenantColonelintheUSArmy,2002(Wendy,CONVENTIONALMILITARYDETERRENCE ITSRISETODOMINANCEANDITSFUTURE,U.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategyResearchProject,28 February2002,http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA401016&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, ldg)
During the Cold War, military deterrence evolved into a mutually supportive, strategic nuclear and conventional approach. Conventional deterrence, though, was subordinate to nuclear deterrence. Operationally this framework of deterrence extended to U.S. allies and friends, and functioned with a focus on escalation and punishment. Beginning in the early 1990's as the Cold War environment dissipated, the requirement to reassess U.S. deterrence strategy became evident. Based on the changing security environment, conventional deterrence could no longer remain subordinate to or implicitly attached to nuclear deterrence. The purpose of this paper is to explore what factors gave rise in the years since the Cold War to a concept of conventional deterrence equal in standing to nuclear deterrence. These factors are also applied to current and potential trends to examine the future of conventional deterrence in U.S. strategy. Theoretical concepts of deterrence will serve as a foundation fordiscussion and analysis of the factors that have undergone fundamental changes since the Cold War. Overall, dynamics of the conventional and nuclear components of deterrence strategy must be balanced properly in response to the strategic environment in order to capitalize on the effectiveness of deterrence strategy.
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2NC A2 Nukes key

Nuclear ambiguity makes deterrence impossible
Kristensen,directornuclearinformationproject,2007(Hans,U.S.STRATEGICWARPLANNINGAFTER9/11, NonproliferationReview,Vol.14,No.2,July2007,ebsco,ldg)
The New Triad has been sold on the presumption that it is a positive development to deepen the mix of nuclear and non-nuclear highly offensive capabilities in U.S. strategic deterrence, or global deterrence, as it is increasingly called. This presumption has been taken to the extreme in the new Global Strike mission, in which the nuclear/non-nuclear mix is integrated into declaratory strike options, policy, guidance, delivery platforms, and strategic war planning systems. To the war-fighter and the policy planners it seems so straightforward: better capabilities, and more of them, increase the credibility of deterrence and therefore improve national and international security. Yet mixing nuclear and conventional offensive forces, especially preemptive capabilities, raises a number of serious issues. How will this affect crisis stability in potential future wars with nuclear weapon states? How will the different capabilities apply to different scenarios? Which potential adversaries will they actively deter, which allies will they assure, and how? More than a decade and a half after the Cold War ended * and more than six years after the creation of the New Triad was formally ordered * the answers to these questions remain elusive and surprisingly poorly defined, much less understood, even among military planners directly involved in creating the New Triad. It is as if the uncertainty and unpredictability of the post Cold War world have clouded strategic deterrence thinking and caused planners to incorporate all capabilities, just to be safe, into every potential scenario. The result may be deterrence overkill, where opaque differences between capabilities and the blurry distinctions between crisis and war situations make it increasingly difficult to see which part of the posture has what purpose. This is important because potential adversaries base wartime decisions and peacetime weapon modernization planning in part on how they perceive U.S. capabilities and intentions. If the U.S. posture appears too aggressive, large potential adversaries are likely to design postures that may decrease U.S. security in the long term. Both Russia and China have made numerous references to new U.S. capabilities and policies in justifying their own modernizations. Even worse, in a crisis an adversary * especially a smaller adversary * might decide to resort to WMD use earlier than otherwise if it is convinced or detects indications that the United States intends to preempt. An aggressive doctrine that uncritically mixes nuclear and conventional capabilities with strong declaratory policy may aggravate this risk. And if war does break out, the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept acknowledges, deterring adversary use of WMD while defeating his forces may prove to be impossible.28 These use-them-or-lose-them fears drive U.S. planning toward preemp- tion, but does anyone really know how they affect potential adversaries? In a hypothetical war with Russia, the United States would probably be deterred from conducting a preemptive strike by Russias early warning system and large number of nuclear weapons. Yet such constraints seem to be missing if the adversary is a rogue state or a terrorist organization that does not have the capability to threaten the national survival of the United States or its allies. In such a scenario, it is more likely (although far from certain) that a U.S. president could be tempted to authorize limited use of nuclear weapons to ensure destruction of a timecritical target * or to prevent undermining the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence in the future. The mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities has serious implications for crisis stability because of the risk that conventional strike preparations can be misinterpreted as preparations for a nuclear attack. This is one of the primary concerns that so far have prevented Congress from authorizing development of conventional warheads for the Trident missiles. STRATCOM insists that it has a strong and reliable command and control capability on the SSBNs, and that submarines on Global Strike patrol will stand down the nuclear missiles when the conventional ones are on alert. But that explanation sounds like the navy simply has too many nuclear warheads deployed at sea and begs the question of why they havent been removed in the first place. And because CONPLAN 8022 contains both nuclear and conventional options, the same submarine might be required to have both options ready, especially if the target includes both soft and deeply buried hardened time-urgent targets.
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2NC Conventional deterrent key

Relying solely on conventional deterrence solves opponents; risk calculation
DFIInternational,2001 (NonNuclearStrategicDeterrenceofStateandNonStateAdversaries,October2001, http://www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/NNSDFinalReport.pdf,ldg)
Alternatively, the US could explicitly exclude the use of nuclear weapons in certain contexts (such as BW or CW threats). Even then, the continued US possession of nuclear weapons means that such a declaration that nuclear weapons will not be used could simply be ignored. Still, this pledge would certainly play a role in an adversarys risk calculation and focus attention on the US conventional deterrent rather than on whether or not the US would use nuclear weapons. This may be very significant since focusing on the credibility of US nuclear threats (whether explicit or implicit) may mislead WMD-armed adversaries in their risk calculations and cause them to take risks by concluding that nuclear use was not credible and the other deterrent capabilities not important. Therefore, explicitly excluding nuclear weapons could make NNSD more effective as a primary deterrence strategy than not addressing nuclear weapons at all.
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*****AFF ANSWERS***** Aff NUQ Deterrent not credible now

US transformation from a nuclear to increasingly conventional force has destroyed the nuclear deterrent
Kim2010.(HyunWook,ProfessorattheInstituteofForeignAffairsandNational Security.NuclearPostureReview andItsImplicationsontheKoreanPeninsula.PolicyForumOnline10028A:May8th,2010.Nautilus InstituteforSecurity.
Second, the 2010 NPR indicates that although a U.S. "nuclear umbrella" is provided by a combination of the strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons, many of these weapons were removed at the end of the Cold War. Instead, the U.S. has developed missile defense (MD), counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and integrated command and control as its main tools for enhancing regional security. While continuing to maintain nuclear deterrence, the United States seeks to strengthen its regional deterrence capability through MD or conventional long-range missiles. Such a possibility raises the concern that U.S. deterrence capability achieved with nuclear weapons could be weakened, including U.S. extended deterrence capabilities provided to South Korea.
Status quo deterrence fails- unilateral reduction of nukes solves best

Stanley Foundation 08 [Toward an Integrated US Nuclear Weapons Policy: Address US Security in an Interconnected World, Final Report of the US Nuclear Policy Review Project 2008, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/USNuclearPolicyReviewESc.pdf] If the entirety of the strategic problems surrounding the unilateral use of force and the overreliance on force as a foreign policy tool stood alone, the outcome might be characterized as not good, but at least acceptable. Perhaps the United States could live with
more costly or time-consuming approaches to achieving its goals. In that circumstance, the need for change for efficiencys sake would be balanced against the perceived benefits of staying with a familiar set of approaches. However, the political calculus changes when combined with new nuclear
pressures. In the face of this new calculus, the maintenance of the status quo will not perpetuate or guarantee US security. Rather, continuing current policies will corrode US security. US strategic policy must adjust accordingly, even if the new policies present a significant departure from the past.
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Aff - Impact turn

Nukes arent an effective deterrent- the umbrella strategy risks nuclear destruction globally
Crandell 09 [Steven, Director of Development & Public Affairs for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, July 13, Start a Revolution With A Video -- A 17 Year-Old Wins National Competition http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-crandell/start-a-revolution-with-a_b_247941.html] Last century, the United States and other nuclear nations created an international power system based on the perverse idea that we could keep our countries safe by developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction that target large numbers of civilians. This century the fallacy of that argument has become apparent. Proliferation has become the norm while nuclear security grows more and more problematic. Developing nuclear power is deemed a right of all countries and yet it is also the first step on the path to developing nuclear weapons. There is a sense of increasing danger and vulnerability. As the world becomes more unstable under the influences of poverty, injustice, environmental degradation, resource scarity and climate change, the post-modern idea of a nuclear weapons defensive "umbrella" grows more ridiculous and risky. These weapons can only do harm -- whether through being detonated or by detonating arms races around the world as new nations push to join the Nuclear Bullies' Club. This is no protective umbrella, but the means to seed clouds of destruction with black rain . So the first step is to discard the old idea of nuclear weapons as essential to the world order. Cold War thinking that nuclear weapons protect us must be identified for what it is- -- old-fashioned, misguided and just plain false.
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Aff a2 Heg G/ Impact

US power projection causes multipolar alliances to coalesce against the US
Primacy, in particular, depends on vast, omnicapable military power, which is why the Bush administration pushes a military agenda that aims self- confidently to master the "contested zones."'13 President Bush and his advisers believe that the United States need not tolerate plausible threats to its safety from outside its borders. These threats are to be eliminated. Insofar as preven- tive war is difficult to sell abroad, this policy therefore requires the ability to act alone militarily-a unilateral global offensive capability. The effort to achieve such a capability will cause unease around the world and will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to find allies; it may cause others to ally against the United States. As they do, the costs of sustaining U.S. military preeminence will grow. Perhaps the first problem that primacy will create for U.S. command of the commons is greater difficulty in sustaining, improving, and expanding the global base structure that the United States presently enjoys.
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Aff Link/Turn
Withdrawing troops from SoKo would bolster security assurances with Japan
Perry,Yoshihara2003.CharlesM.Perry,ToshiYoshihara,InstituteforForeignPolicyAnalysis.TheU.S.Japan alliance:preparingforKoreanreconciliation&beyond.
That said, even if a substantial or full withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea were to take place, it is not at all clear concerns about singularization notwithstanding that pressures for a similar disengagement by American forces from Japan would actually carry the day. To be sure, as discussed already, a U.S. pullout from Korea could trigger, at the very least, calls among certain segments of Japanese society for additional adjustments in the level and composition of American troops deployed in Japan (and especially on Okinawa) beyond those that Tokyo and Washington may agree to over the next few years. However, given the strategic uncertainties to which it could give rise, American withdrawal from the Peninsula could just as easily increase the importance of the U.S.Japan alliance to both partner nations. For Japan, maintaining a sure tie with the United States in a post-unification setting that did not include an American presence in Korea would likely still be viewed as reassuring, especially if that environment were to spawn increased pressures toward WMD and missile proliferation. Tokyo, moreover, has become increasingly comfortable with the idea of assuming a more prominent security role within the alliance framework, and this greater sense of confidence and competence in the defense realm seems only likely to grown in the years aheadperhaps to such an extent that any anxieties that may currently exist over the prospect of Japans emerging as Washingtons sole treaty ally (and host nation for U.S. troop) in Northeast Asia will have long faded by the time the two Koreas reconcile and reunify.
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Deterrence Disadvantage Samford

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Deterrence DA Grayson/Lewis/Bell-Ard

1NC Deterrence (1/2)

1NC Deterrence (2/2)

Deterrence is on the brink. Reassurance is key.

DDP News 9(Germany'sforeignministerhailsObama'snuclearnonproliferationmoveDDPNews,April7,

Germany is pursing disarmament and fast international non-proliferation treaties.

Indo-Asian News Service 7/9(India,GermanydiscussnucleardisarmamentNewDelhi.July9,2009.LexisAD

UQ Umbrella strong now

US just re-affirmed its nuclear umbrella over Japan

UQ Troop deployment in ME high

US occupation in the ME at an all-time high

UQ Troop deployment in ME high

*****Links***** 2NC Link - Deterrence

2NC Link - Deterrence

2NC - Link Asian relations

2NC - Link Chinese Expansion

2NC - Link Forward deployed troops

2NC - Link Deployment in Europe

2NC - Link Power projection

2NC - Link troop presence

2NC - Link Troop Withdrawal HEG I/L

2NC I/L Extended Deterrence German Prolif

Germany is an integral part of US nuclear deterrence- if we win germany, we win deterrence-

2NC - I/L regional stability

2NC - I/L Extended deterrence key to Europe prolif

2NC I/L - Alliance key to Asian stability

2NC - I/L Heg collapse causes Chinese modernization

2NC I/L Extended Deterrence key to solve Terrorism

2NC I/L - Alliance key to power projection

2NC I/L SoKo Econ

2NC I/L Extended Deterrence solves Japn rearm

2NC I/L NoKo prolif

2NC I/L - Alliance key to terror, pandemics, warming

*****2NC Impacts***** 2NC Impact Noko Prolif

2NC Impact Chinese expansion

2NC Impact China modernization

2NC Impacts - Terrormism

The impact is extinction.

2nc Impacts - Disease

2NC Impact - Warming

2NC Impacts Prolif

2NC Impacts - Prolif

2NC Impacts SoKo Econ

Economic Decline Causes Nuke War:

2NC Impacts Japan rearm causes Asia Prolif and War

2NC Impact Japan Rearm Prolif

2NC Impacts - HEG

2NC Impact - HEG

*****2NC Answers To***** 2NC - A2 Alliance is resilient

Time Magazine 9-21-09(RethinkinganAlliance,

2NC A2 nuke deterrence Key

2NC A2 Nuke weaps deterr

2NC - A2 Nukes solve deterrence

2NC - Conventional Deterrence Key

2NC A2 Nukes key

2NC Conventional deterrent key

*****AFF ANSWERS***** Aff NUQ Deterrent not credible now

Status quo deterrence fails- unilateral reduction of nukes solves best

Aff - Impact turn

Aff a2 Heg G/ Impact

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Links 2NC Link - Deterrence

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