Georgetown University Law Center

Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 762385

Business, Economics and Regulatory Policy Research Paper No. 762385

Aspects of the Theory of Moral Cognition: Investigating Intuitive Knowledge of the Prohibition of Intentional Battery and the Principle of Double Effect
JOHN MIKHAIL

This paper can be downloaded without charge from: Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=762385

JohnMikhail,2002 Allrightsreserved

AspectsoftheTheoryofMoralCognition: InvestigatingIntuitiveKnowledgeoftheProhibitionofIntentionalBattery andthePrincipleofDoubleEffect

1 JohnMikhail

Abstract: Wheredoourmoralintuitionscomefrom?Aretheyinnate?Doesthebraincontaina modulespecializedformoraljudgment? Questionslikethesehavebeenaskedinoneformor anotherforcenturies.Inthispaper,wetakethemupagain,withtheaimofclarifyingthemand developingaspecificproposalforhowtheycanbeempiricallyinvestigated.Thepaperpresents datafromsixtrolleyproblemstudiesofoverfivehundredindividuals,includingonegroupof ChineseadultsandonegroupofAmericanchildren,whichsuggestthatadultsandchildrenages 812relyonintuitiveorunconsciousknowledgeofspecificmoralprinciplestodeterminethe permissibilityofactionsthatrequireharmingonepersoninordertopreventharmtoothers. Significantly,theknowledgeinquestionappearstobemerelytacit:whenaskedtoexplainor justifytheirjudgments,experimentalsubjectswereconsistentlyincapableofarticulatingthe operativeprinciplesonwhichtheirjudgmentsappeartohavebeenbased.Weexplainthese findingswithreferencetoananalogytohumanlinguisticcompetence.Justasnormalpersons aretypicallyunawareoftheprinciplesguidingtheirlinguisticintuitions,sotooaretheyoften unawareoftheprinciplesguidingtheirmoralintuitions. Thesestudiespavetheway forfuture researchbyraisingthepossibilitythatspecificpovertyofthestimulusargumentscanbe formulatedinthemoraldomain.Differencesbetweenourapproachtomoralcognitionandthose ofPiaget(1932),Kohlberg(1981),andGreeneetal.(2001)arealsodiscussed.

1. Introduction
Wheredoourmoralintuitionscomefrom?Aretheyinnate? Doesthebraincontaina modulespecializedformoraljudgment? Doesthehumangeneticprogramcontaininstructions fortheacquisitionofasenseofjusticeormoralsense? Questionslikethesehavebeenaskedin oneformoranotherforcenturies.Inthispaperwetakethemupagain,withtheaimofclarifying themanddevelopingaspecificproposalforhowtheycanbeempiricallyinvestigated.

InSection 1,wesummarizeourapproachtothetheoryofmoralcognitionandexplain somebasicelementsofourtheoreticalframework.Wealsointroduceexamplesofthe perceptualstimuliusedinourresearchanddiscusssomeofthepropertiesofthemoralintuitions theyelicit.InSections27,wepresenttheresultsofsixtrolleyproblemstudiesdesignedto investigatethemoralcompetenceofadultsandofchildrenages812inparticular,theirintuitive or unconsciousknowledgeoftheprohibitionofintentionalbattery andtheprincipleofdouble effect.InSection8,weprovideageneraldiscussionofourfindingsandcontrastourapproachto moralcognitionwiththoseofPiaget(1932/1965),Kohlberg(1981),andGreene,Sommerville, Nystrom,Darley&Cohen(2001).Section9isanAppendixcontainingboththestimulus materialsusedinourexperimentsandoursubjectsresponsestothem.

1.1 TheoreticalFramework Likemanytheorists,webeginfromtheassumptionthatthetheoryofmoralcognition maybeusefullymodeledonaspectsofthetheoryoflinguisticcompetence(see,e.g.,Chomsky, 1978 Cosmides&Tooby,1994 Dwyer,1999Goldman,1993Harman,2000Mahlmann, 1999Mikhail,2000Mikhail,Sorrentino&Spelke,1998Rawls,1971Stich,1993).Our researchisthusorganized,inthefirstinstance,aroundthreequestions,closeanaloguesofthe fundamentalquestionsinChomskys(1986)frameworkfortheinvestigationofhumanlanguage. (1) (a)Whatconstitutesmoralknowledge? (b)Howismoralknowledgeacquired? (c)Howismoralknowledgeputtouse? Abriefoverviewofsomeoftheconceptsandterminologyweusetoclarifythese questionsmaybehelpful.Inourframework,theanswerto(1a)isgivenbyaparticularmoral grammarortheoryof moralcompetence:atheoryof themind/brainofapersonwhopossessesa systemofmoralknowledge,orwhatmightbereferredtoinformallyasamoralfaculty,moral

senseorconscience.Theanswerto(1b)isgivenby UniversalMoralGrammar(UMG):a theoryoftheinitialstate ofthemoralfacultywhich,inkeepingwithconventionalassumptions ofmodularity(see,e.g.,Fodor,1983Gazzaniga,1992Gazzaniga,Ivry&Magnum,1998 Pinker,1997),weprovisionallyassumetobeadistinctsubsystemofthemind/brainalongwith anaccountofhowthepropertiesUMGpostulatesinteractwithexperiencetoyieldamature systemofmoralknowledge.Theanswerto(1c)isgivenbyatheoryof moralperformance:a theoryofhowmoralknowledgeentersintotheactualrepresentationandevaluationofhuman actsandinstitutionalarrangements,aswellasotherformsofactualconduct(see,e.g.,Dwyer, 1999Mikhail,2000compareRawls,1971Nozick,1968). FollowingChomsky(1965),weusethetermsobservationaladequacy,descriptive adequacyandexplanatoryadequacytorefertoincreasinglevelsofempiricalsuccessatheory ofmoralcognitionmightachieve. Amoraltheoryisobservationallyadequate withrespecttoa givensetofmoraljudgmentstotheextentthatitprovidesacorrectdescriptionofthosejudgments insomemannerorother,forexample,bylistingthemorbyexplicitlystatingasetofprinciples fromwhichtheycanbederived.Amoraltheoryisdescriptivelyadequate withrespecttothe matureindividualsmoralcompetencetotheextentthatitcorrectlydescribesthatsystem,inother words,totheextentitprovidesacorrectanswerto(1a).Finally,amoraltheorymeetsthe conditionof explanatoryadequacy totheextentitcorrectlydescribestheinitialstateofthemoral facultyandcorrectlyexplainshowthepropertiesoftheinitialstateitpostulatesinteractwith experiencetoyieldamaturesystemofmoralcompetenceinotherwords,totheextentthatit
2 providesacorrectanswerto(1b)(Mikhail,2000).

UnlikeKohlberg(1981),wedistinguishsharplybetweenanindividualsoperative moral principles(thoseprinciplesactuallyoperativeinherexerciseofmoraljudgment)andher express

principles(thosestatementsshemakesintheattempttodescribe,explain,orjustifyher judgments).Wemakenoassumptionthatthenormalindividualisawareoftheoperative principleswhichconstitutehermoralknowledge,orthatshecanbecomeawareofthemthrough introspection,orthatherstatementsaboutthemarenecessarilyaccurate.Onthecontrary,we hypothesizethatjustasnormalpersonsaretypicallyunawareoftheprinciplesguidingtheir linguisticorvisualintuitions,sotooaretheyoftenunawareoftheprinciplesguidingtheirmoral intuitions.In anyevent,theimportantpointisthat,aswithlanguageorvision,thetheoryofmoral cognitionmustattempttospecifywhatthepropertiesofmoralcompetenceactuallyare,notwhata personmayreportaboutthem(Haidt,2001Mikhail,2000Mikhail,Sorrentino&Spelke,1998). Finally,wefollowChomsky(1995),Lewontin(1990),Marr(1982),andother commentatorsinassumingthattheproblemsofdescriptiveandexplanatoryadequacypossessa certainlogicalandmethodologicalpriorityovermorecomplicatedinquiriesintotheneurological andevolutionaryfoundationsofmoralcognitionandbehavior.Hencewecarefullydistinguish (1a)(1c)fromtwofurtherquestionsacompletetheoryofmoralcognitionmustanswer: (1) (d)Howismoralknowledgephysicallyrealizedinthebrain? (e)Howdidmoralknowledgeevolveinthespecies?

Althoughmanyresearchershaveaddressedquestionslikethese,theireffortsseematthis juncturetobesomewhatpremature.Justasourabilitytoaskwellfocusedquestionsaboutthe evolutionandphysicalbasesoflanguagedependsonsolvingtheproblemsofdescriptiveand explanatoryadequacyinthelinguisticdomain(Chomsky,1995Hauser,Chomsky&Fitch, 2002),sotooisourunderstandingof(1d)and(1e)advancedbyachievingreasonablycorrect solutionstoquestionslike(1a)and(1b)inthemoraldomain.Putsimply,wecannotprofitably askhowmoralknowledgeevolvedinthespeciesorwhereitresidesinthebrainuntilwhat constitutesmoralknowledgeandhowitisacquiredarebetterunderstood.

1.2 PerceptualStimuliandPerceptualModel ResearchinthePiagetiantraditionhasattemptedtoanswerquestionslike(1a)and(1b) byinvestigatingthedevelopingchildsmentalrepresentationsofthesubjectiveand objectiveelementsofmoraljudgment,theformerconsistingofthegoalsandintentionsofan action,thelatterconsistingofanactionseffectsandmaterialconsequences.InPiagets (1932/1965)originalstudies,childrenwerefoundtobasetheirmoraljudgmentsonmental representationsofeffects,notintentions,untilaroundagenine.Morerecently,many investigatorshavesuggestedthatthesefindingswereanartifactofthemethodsandassessment proceduresPiagetemployed.Someresearchers(e.g.,Baird,2001Berndt&Berndt,1975 Costanzo,Coie,Grumet&Farnhill,1973Lilliard&Flavell,1990Nelson,1980)have discoveredthatchildrenasyoungasthreeuseinformationaboutmotivesandintentionswhen makingmoraljudgments,ifthatinformationismadeexplicitandsalient.Moreover,a considerablebodyofresearchoninfantcognition(e.g.,Gergely,Nadasdy,Csibra&Biro,1995 Johnson,2000Meltzoff,1995Woodward,Sommerville&Guajardo,2001)suggeststhateven younginfantsarepredisposedtointerprettheactionsofanimateagentsintermsoftheirgoals andintentions. Ourresearchseekstobuildonthesepriorstudiesbyinvestigatinghowexperimental subjectsreconstructandutilizeinformationaboutintentionsandeffectswhenevaluating morallycomplexactsthatis,actsandomissionswhicharecomprisedofmultipleintentions andwhichgeneratebothgoodandbadeffects.Toillustrate,considerthefollowingexamplesof thesocalledtrolleyproblemandrelatedthoughtexperimentsinventedbyFoot(1967)and Thomson(1985).

TheTrolleyProblem Charlieisdrivingatrainwhenthebrakesfail.Aheadfivepeopleareworkingon thetrackwiththeirbacksturned.Fortunately,Charliecanswitchtoasidetrack,ifheacts atonce.Unfortunately,thereisalsosomeoneonthattrackwithhisbackturned.If Charlieswitcheshistraintothesidetrack,hewillkilloneperson.IfCharliedoesnot switchhistrain,hewillkillfivepeople. IsitmorallypermissibleforCharlietoswitchhistraintothesidetrack? TheTransplantProblem Dr.Brownhasfivepatientsinthehospitalwhoaredying.Eachpatientneedsanew organinordertosurvive.Onepatientneedsanewheart.Twopatientsneedanew kidney.Andtwomorepatientsneedanewlung.Dr.Browncansaveallfivepatientsif hetakesasinglehealthypersonandremovesherheart,kidneys,andlungstogiveto thesefivepatients.JustsuchahealthypersonisinRoom306.Sheisinthehospitalfor routinetests.Havingseenhertestresults,Dr.Brownknowsthatsheisperfectlyhealthy andoftherighttissuecompatibility.IfDr.BrowncutsupthepersoninRoom306and givesherorganstotheotherfivepatients,hewillsavetheotherfivepatients,butkillthe personinRoom306intheprocess.IfDr.BrowndoesnotcutupthepersoninRoom 306,theotherfivepatientswilldie. IsitmorallypermissibleforDr.BrowntocutupthepersoninRoom306? TheBystanderProblem Edwardistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Edwardseeswhathashappened:thetraindriversawfive workmenmenaheadonthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedand thedriverfainted. Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivementhebanksaresosteep thattheywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Edwardisstanding nexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack. Unfortunately,thereisonepersonstandingonthesidetrack,withhisbackturned. Edwardcanthrowtheswitch,killingtheoneorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthe fivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforEdwardtothrowtheswitch? TheFootbridgeProblem Nancyistakingherdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenshenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Fivemenarewalkingacrossthetracks.Thetrainismoving sofastthattheywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Nancyisstandingnexttoa man,whomshecanthrowinfrontofthetrain,therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen. Nancycanthrowtheman,killinghimbutsavingthefivemenorshecanrefrainfrom doingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforNancytothrowtheman?

Aswediscussbelow,whenexperimentalsubjectswerepresentedwiththesescenarios, theyjudgedCharliesturningthetraininTheTrolleyProblemtobepermissible,Dr.Browns cuttingupthepatientintheTransplantProblemtobeimpermissible,Edwardsthrowingthe switchintheBystanderProblemtobepermissible,andNancysthrowingthemaninthe FootbridgeProblemtobeimpermissible(Table1).Theseresponsesconfrontuswitha potentiallysurprisingcontrastbetweentheTrolleyandBystanderProblems,ontheonehand, andtheTransplantandFootbridgeProblems,ontheother.Intheformerproblems,savingfive peopleatthecostofkillingonepersonisthoughttobepermissible.Inthelatterproblems,by contrast,savingfiveatthecostofkillingoneisheldtobeimpermissible.

Table1:MoralIntuitionsofTrolley,Transplant,Bystander,andFootbridgeProblems
Problem Trolley Transplant Bystander Footbridge Action Charliesturningthetrain Dr.Brownscuttingupthepatient Edwardsthrowingtheswitch Nancysthrowingtheman GoodEffect Preventing5deaths Preventing5 deaths Preventing5deaths Preventing5deaths BadEffect 1Death 1Death 1Death 1Death Deontic Status Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible

Thesefactsleadustospeculateaboutthecognitivemechanismsthemindemploysin respondingtothesefourscenarios.Inthefirstinstance,theyleadustoaskthefollowing question:whataretheoperativeprinciplesofmoralcompetencethatareresponsibleforthese divergentresponses?Theproblemismoredifficultthanitmayseematfirst.Ontheonehand, comparativelysimpledeontologicalandconsequentialistmoralprinciples(e.g.,Ifanactcauses death,thenitiswrong,Iftheconsequencesofanactarebetterthantheconsequencesofanyof availablealternative,thenitisrequired,etc.)areincapableofexplainingthepatternof intuitionselicitedbytheseproblems.Forexample,asimpledeontologicalprincipleforbidding

allkillingwouldgeneratetheintuitionthatCharliesswitchingtracksintheTrolleyProblemand EdwardsswitchingtracksintheBystanderProblemareimpermissible.Buttheseactionsare judgedtobepermissible.Likewise,asimpleutilitarianprinciplerequiringagentstoperform actionswiththebestforeseeableconsequenceswouldpresumablygeneratetheintuitionthatDr. BrownscuttingupthepatientintheTransplantProblemandNancysthrowingthemaninthe FootbridgeProblemareobligatory,oratleastpermissibleyettheseactionsarejudgedtobe impermissible. Ontheotherhand,conditionalprincipleswhoseantecedentssimplyrestatethoseaction descriptionsfoundinthestimulus(e.g.,Ifanactisofthetypethrowingtheswitch,thenitis permissibleIfanactisofthetypethrowingthemanthenitisimpermissible,)arealso descriptivelyinadequate.Thisisbecausetheyleadustomakeinaccuratepredictionsofhow theseactiondescriptionswillbeevaluatedwhentheyareembeddedinmateriallydifferent circumstances.Forexample,aswediscussbelow,whenthecostsandbenefitsintheBystander Problemaremanipulated,sothatanactiondescribedasthrowingtheswitchwillsave$5 millionofequipmentatthecostofkillingoneperson,individualsjudgetheactionsodescribed tobeimpermissible.Likewise,whenthecircumstancesoftheFootbridgeProblemaremodified sothattheactiondescribedasthrowingthemanispresumedtoinvolveconsensualtouching, subjectsjudgetheactiontobepermissible.Ingeneral,itiseasytoshowthattheaction descriptionsusedintheseproblemsaremorallyneutral(Baird,2001Nelson,1980),inthe sensethatthepermissibilityjudgmentstheyelicitarecircumstancedependent. Sincethecircumstancesofanactioncanvaryalonganindefinitenumberofdimensions (e.g.,DArcy,1963Donagan,1977Lyons,1965Stone,1964),theconclusiontowhichwe quicklyareledbyconsiderationsliketheseisthatanyattempttoexplainthemoralintuitions

elicitedbytheseexamplesbymeansofasimplestimulusresponsemodelisdoomedatthestart. Althougheachofthesemoralintuitionsisoccasionedbyanidentifiablestimulus,howthemind goesaboutinterpretingthesehypotheticalfactpatterns,andseparatingtheactionstheydepict intothosethatarepermissibleandthosethatarenot,isnotsomethingrevealedinanyobvious waybythesurfacepropertiesofthestimulusitself.Instead, aninterveningstepbetween stimulusandresponsemustbepostulated:apatternoforganizationofsomesortthatisimposed onthestimulusbytheminditself.HenceasimpleperceptualmodelsuchastheoneinFigure1 isinadequateforexplainingthesemoralintuitions.Instead,asisthecasewithlanguage perception(Chomsky,1964),anadequateperceptualmodelmust,ataminimum,lookmorelike theoneinFigure2.

PERMISSIBLE INPUT

?
IMPERMISSIBLE

Fig.1:SimplePerceptualModelforMoralJudgment

PERMISSIBLE INPUT

STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTION

?
IMPERMISSIBLE

Stimulus: FactPattern

Conversion Rules

Unconscious Mental Representation

DeonticRules

Perceptual Response: Moral Judgment

Fig.2:ExpandedPerceptualModelforMoralJudgment

TheexpandedperceptualmodelinFigure2impliesthat,likegrammaticalityjudgments, permissibilityjudgmentsdonotnecessarilydependonthesurfacepropertiesofanaction description,butonmorefundamentalpropertiesofhowthatactionismentallyrepresented.Put differently,itsuggeststhattheproblemofdescriptiveadequacyinthetheoryofmoralcognition maybedividedintoatleasttwoparts:(a)theproblemofdeterminingthenatureofthe computationalprinciples(i.e.,deonticrules)operativeintheexerciseofmoraljudgment,and

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(b)theproblemofdeterminingtherepresentationalstructures(i.e.,structuraldescriptions) overwhichthosecomputational operationsaredefined. Whatarethepropertiesoftheseinterveningmentalrepresentations?Inourview,it seemsreasonabletosupposethatmorallycognizablefactpatternsarementallyrepresentedin termsofabstractcategorieslikeact,consequence,andcircumstanceagency,motive,and intentionproximateandremotecausesandotherfamiliarconceptsthatarethestockintradeof philosophers,lawyers,andjurists(Mikhail,2000seealsoDonagan,1977Sidgwick,1907).But whichspecificconceptsdoesthesystemofmoralcognitioninfactuse?Inwhatmanner,i.e., accordingtowhatprinciplesorrules,doesitusethem?Answerstoquestionslikethese,if available,wouldbegintosolvetheproblemofdescriptiveadequacy.

1.3 OurHypothesis OurhypothesisisthatthemoralintuitionsgeneratedbytheTrolley,Transplant,Bystander, andFootbridgeproblemsandstructurallysimilarthoughtexperiments(henceforth,trolley problems)canbebestexplainedbypostulatingintuitiveknowledgeofspecificmoralprinciples, includingtheprohibitionofintentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdoubleeffect.Theformeris afamiliarprincipleofbothcommonmoralityandthecommonlawproscribingactsof unpermitted,unprivilegedbodilycontact,thatis,oftouchingwithoutconsent(Prosser,1941 Shapo,2003).Thelatterisacomplexprincipleofjustification,narrowerinscopethanthe traditionalnecessityorchoiceofevilsdefense,whichinitsstandardformulationholdsthatan otherwiseprohibitedactionmaybepermissibleiftheactitselfisnotwrong,thegoodbutnotthe badeffectsareintended,thegoodeffectsoutweighthebadeffects,andnomorallypreferable alternativeisavailable(Mikhail,2000seealsoFischer&Ravizza,1992). Bothofthese

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principlesrequireclarification,buttakentogetherandsuitablyelaboratedtheycanbeinvokedto explaintherelevantpatternofintuitionsinarelativelysimpleandstraightforwardmanner.The keystructuraldifferencebetweenthetwosetsofexamplesisthat,in TransplantandFootbridge problems,theagentcommitsaseriesofdistincttrespassespriortoandasameansofachieving hisgood end,whereasintheTrolley andBystanderproblems,theseviolationsaresubsequent andforeseen sideeffects. Figures3and4illustratethisdifferenceinthecaseoftheFootbridge andBystanderproblems.

Dscommitting (+n+p) homicideatt Dskillingtheman (+n+p) att

Dspreventingthetrain (+n+o) fromkillingthemen att

End

(+n) Dscommittingbatteryatt

Side Effects

Dscausingthetrain (+n) tohittheman att

(0) Dscommittingbatteryatt

Means

(0) Dsthrowingtheman att

Fig.3:MentalRepresentationofFootbridgeProblem

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Dscommitting (+n+o+p) homicideatt Dskillingtheman (+n+o+p) att Dscommittingbattery (+n+o) att Dscausingthetrain (+n+o) tohitthemanatt Dspreventingthetrain (+n) fromkillingthemenatt
(+n) Dsturningthetrainatt

End

Means SideEffects
(0) Dsthrowingtheswitchatt

Fig.4: MentalRepresentationofBystanderProblem

OurcomputationalhypothesisholdsthatwhenpeopleencountertheFootbridgeand Bystanderproblems,theyspontaneouslycomputeunconsciousrepresentationslikethosein
3 Figures3and4. Notethatinadditiontoexplainingtherelevantintuitions,thishypothesishas

furthertestableimplications.Forexample,wecaninvestigate thestructuralpropertiesofthe underlyingrepresentationsbyaskingsubjectstoevaluatecertainprobativedescriptionsofthe relevantactions.Descriptionsusingthewordbytoconnectindividualnodesofthetreeinthe downwarddirection(e.g.,Dturnedthetrainbythrowingtheswitch,Dkilledthemanby turningthetrain)willbedeemedacceptablebycontrast,causalreversalsusingbytoconnect nodesintheupwarddirection(Dthrewtheswitchbyturningthetrain,Dturnedthetrainby killingtheman)willbedeemedunacceptable.Likewise,descriptionsusingthephraseinorder totoconnectnodesintheupwarddirectionalongtheverticalchainofmeansandends(D

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threwtheswitchinordertoturnthetrain)willbedeemedacceptable.Bycontrast,descriptions ofthistypelinkingmeanswithsideeffects(Dthrewtheswitchinordertokilltheman)will bedeemedunacceptable.Inshort,thereisanimplicitgeometrytotheserepresentations,which anadequatetheorycan andmustaccountfor. Ourhypothesisisinterestingandcontroversialforseveralreasons.First,whilemany theoristshavesuggestedthattheprincipleofdoubleeffectmaybepartofadescriptively adequatetheoryoftrolleyintuitions(e.g.,Harman,1977,2000),andofhumanmorality generally(e.g.,Nagel,1986Quinn,1993),nopriorexperimentalstudieshavedirectlytestedthis assumption.TheexperimentsbyPetrinovichandhiscolleagues(Petrinovich&ONeill,1996 Petrinovich,ONeill&Jorgensen,1993),whichutilizetrolleyproblems,donotadequately clarifythisissue,becauseoftheirfocusonbehavioralpredictions(e.g.,askingparticipantsto answerthequestionWhatwouldyoudo?)ratherthanondeonticjudgmentsperse(e.g.,asking participantstoanswerthequestionIsXmorallypermissible?).Likewise,Greeneetal.(2001), whoalsousetrolleyproblemsasprobes,alsoappeartoleavethisissueunresolved(see8.2.3). Second,ourhypothesisissignificantbecause,ifitistrue,itimpliesthatthemental operationsinvolvedintheexerciseofmoraljudgmentaremorecomplexthaniscommonly thought.Fortheprincipleofdoubleeffect,forexample,tobeoperativeinitsstandard formulation,adultsandchildrenmustpossessalistofintrinsicallywrongacts,asetofrulesfor generatingmorallycognizableactrepresentations,andacalculusofsomesortforcomputing andcomparingtheprobabilitiesofanactionsgoodandbadeffects.Theymustalsohavethe cognitiveresourcestodistinguishtheactitselffromitseffectsandfurtherconsequences,to distinguishtheactsforeseeneffectsfromitsintendedeffects,and,moregenerally,to differentiatetheactscausalandintentionalpropertiesfromthoseofitsalternatives.Further,

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theymustcomputeactrepresentationsintermsofpropertieslikeends,means,andsideeffects, eventhoughthestimuluscontainsnodirectevidenceoftheseproperties.Inshort,our hypothesisimpliesthatordinarypeoplenotjusttrainedlawyersorphilosopherspossessa complexsenseofjusticethatincorporatessubtleelementsofafullyarticulatedlegalcode, includingabstracttheoriesofcausationandintention. Finally,ourhypothesisraisesinterestingandnovelquestionsforthetheoryofmoral development.Specifically,itleadsustoaskwhetherchildrenareexplicitlytaughttheprinciple ofdoubleeffect,andifnot,whethertheprincipleorsomevariantofitisinsomesenseinnate. AsHarman(2000)explains,thisquestionnaturallyarisesassoonasonesettlesonan explanationofthestructureofourmoralintuitionsthatmakesreferencetothisprinciple.An ordinarypersonwasnevertaughttheprincipleofdoubleeffect,Harmanobserves,anditis unclearhowsuchaprinciplemighthavebeenacquiredbytheexamplesavailabletotheordinary person.Thissuggeststhat[it]isbuiltinto...moralityaheadoftime(Harman,2000,p.225). Similarreasoningmaybethoughttoapplytotheprohibitionofintentionalbattery,atleastas
4 thatprohibitionisdefinedandutilizedhere. Onreflection,itseemsdoubtfulthatchildrenare

affirmativelytaughttogeneratethespecificrepresentationspresupposedbythisprincipletoany significantextent. Wethusseemfacedwiththepossibilitythatcertainmoralprinciplesemerge andbecomeoperativeintheexerciseofmoraljudgmentthatareneitherexplicitlytaught,nor derivableinanyobviouswayfromthedataofsensoryexperience.Inshort,weappear confrontedwithanexampleofwhatChomskycallsthephenomenonofthepovertyofthe stimulusinthemoraldomain(Dwyer,1999Mikhail,2000compareChomsky,1986).

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CHILDS LINGUISTIC DATA

LINGUISTIC GRAMMAR

UG

English Japanese Zapotec Malagasy Arabic

CHILDS MORAL DATA

MORAL GRAMMAR

Howmuchdiversity?

UMG

Figure5:AcquisitionModelsforLanguageandMorality

Theargumentfrom thepovertyofthemoralstimulus(Mikhail,2000)canbedepicted graphicallybymeansofanacquisitionmodelsimilartotheoneChomsky(1964)initiallyproposed inthecaseoflanguage(Figure5).Inthelinguisticversionofthismodel,UniversalGrammar (UG)mayberegardedasatheoryofinnatemechanisms,anunderlyingbiologicalmatrixthat providesaframeworkwithinwhichthegrowthoflanguageproceeds,andproposedprinciplesof UGmayberegardedasanabstractpartialspecificationofthegeneticprogramthatenablesthe childtointerpretcertaineventsaslinguisticexperienceandtoconstructasystemofrulesand principlesonthebasisofthatexperience(Chomsky,1980,p.187).Likewise,inthecaseof

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moraldevelopment,UniversalMoralGrammar(UMG)mayberegardedasatheoryofinnate mechanismsthatprovidesthebasicframeworkinwhichthedevelopmentofmoralcompetence unfolds,andspecificprinciplesofUMGmayberegardedasapartialcharacterizationtheinnate function thatmapsthedevelopingchildsrelevantmoralexperience(hermoraldata)intothe maturestateofheracquiredmoralcompetence(i.e., hermoralgrammar). Thelinguisticgrammarschildrenacquirearehopelesslyunderdeterminedbythedata availabletothemaslanguagelearnerslinguiststhereforepostulateasignificantamountofinnate knowledgetofillthisgap (e.g.,Baker,2001 Pinker,1994).Further,becauseeverynormalhuman childcanandwilllearnanyoftheworldsnaturallanguagessimplybybeingplacedinan appropriateenvironment,UGmustberichandspecificenoughtogetthechildoverthelearning hump,butnotsospecificastoprecludeherabilitytoacquireeveryhumanlanguage(Chomsky, 1986).TurningtoUMG, itisunclear whether asimilarsituationandasimilar tensionbetween descriptiveandexplanatoryadequacy obtains.Nevertheless, theacquisitionmodelwehave sketched,though abstract, canbemademoreconcretebyconsideringthespecificexampleof trolleyintuitions.Ifacomputationalmoralgrammardoesinfactenterintothebestexplanationof theseintuitions,thentwofurtherquestionsarisewithintheframeworkofthismodel:First,what arethepropertiesofthemoralgrammarsthatpeopledoinfactacquire,andhowdiversearethey? Second,whatinformationalgaps,ifany,canbedetectedbetweentheinputsandoutputsofthe model?Thatis,whatifanyprinciplesofmoralgrammarareacquiredforwhichtheenvironment containslittleornoevidence?Accordingtotheargumentfromthepovertyofthemoralstimulus, ifspecificprinciplesemergeandbecomeoperativeinthecourseofnormalmoraldevelopment, buttheacquisitionoftheseprinciplescannotbeexplainedonthebasisofthechildsmoraldata, thenthebestexplanationofhowchildrenacquiretheseprinciplesmaybethattheyareinnate,in

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Chomskysdispositionalsense(Chomsky,1986seealsoBaker,2001Dwyer,1999Mikhail 2002 Pinker,1994 Spelke,1998).

2. Experiment1
Havingintroducedsomeelementsofourtheoreticalframework,weturndirectlytoa discussionandanalysisofourexperimentalfindings.Attheoutsetofourinvestigations,we wereinterestedinavarietyofquestionsthatmightbeaskedaboutthoughtexperimentslikethe trolleyproblemsandthemoralintuitionstheyelicit,includingthefollowing:First,arethese intuitionswidelyshared?Aretheysharedacrossfamiliardemographiccategorieslikegender, race,nationality,age,culture,religion,orlevelofformaleducation?Second,whatarethe operativeprinciples?Howpreciselycanwecharacterizetherelevantmentaloperationsandto whatextentaretheyopentoconsciousintrospection?Third,howaretheoperativeprinciples learnedoracquired?Whatmightexamplesliketheseeventuallytellusaboutmoral developmentandtheacquisitionofthemoralsense? Ourfirststudyattemptedtoaddressonlyasubsetofthesequestions,including(1) whetherandtowhatextenttheseintuitionsarewidelyshared (2)whataretheoperative principlesand(3)whethertheoperativeprinciplesareopentoconsciousintrospection.

2.1 Method 2.1.1 Participants Participantswere40adultvolunteersfromtheM.I.T.communitybetweentheagesof18 35.Thegroupconsistedof 19womenand21men.

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2.1.2 StimuliandProcedure Eightscenarioswereused,allofwhichwereadaptedfromFoot(1967),Thomson(1986), andHarman(1977)(see9forthecompletetextofthesescenariosseealsoMikhail,2000).In alleightscenarios,anagentmustchoosewhethertoperformanactionthatwillresultinone personbeingkilledandfiveotherpersons,whowouldotherwisedie,beingsaved. Thescenariosweredividedaccordingtoourhypothesisintotwogroups.Fourscenarios, whichweremodeledontheTransplantandFootbridgeProblems,describedachoicebetween (a) committinganintentionalbattery inordertopreventfiveotherpeoplefromdying,knowingthat thebatterywillalsoconstituteaforeseeablebutnonintentionalhomicide,and(b)refraining from doingso,therebylettingthefivedie.Fourotherscenarios,whichweremodeledonthe TrolleyandBystanderProblems,describedachoicebetween (a)doingsomethinginorderto preventfivepeoplefromdying,knowingthattheactionwillconstituteaforeseeablebutnon intentionalbatteryandaforeseeablebutnonintentionalhomicide,and(b)refrainingfrom doing so,therebylettingthefivedie. Themorallysalientdifferencebetweenthetwosetsofcases,inotherwords,concerned thetypeofbatteryembeddedintheagentsactionplan.Inthefirstgroupofscenarios,the batterywasintentional,embeddedwithintheagentsactionplanasameans(henceforth IntentionalBattery).Inthesecondgroup,thebatterywasforeseeable(butnotintentional), embeddedwithintheagentsactionplanasasideeffect(henceforthForeseeableBattery). Eachparticipantreceivedawrittenquestionnairecontainingonescenario.The participantwasfirstinstructedtoreadthescenarioandtojudgewhetherornottheproposed actionitdescribedwasmorallypermissible. Theparticipantwasthenaskedonaseparatepage ofthequestionnairetoprovidereasonsexplainingorjustifyinghisorherresponse. Twenty

19

participantsweregivenanIntentionalBatteryscenario.Theothertwentyparticipantswere givenaForeseeableBatteryscenario.Theassignmentofparticipantstoscenariotypewas random.

2.2 Results 2.2.1 Judgments ThemainresultsofExperiment1arepresentedinFigure6.2of 20participantsinthe IntentionalBatteryconditionjudgedtheactionconstitutingintentionalbatterytobepermissible. Bycontrast,19of20participantsintheForeseeableBatteryconditionscenariojudgedtheaction

2 constitutingforeseeablebattery tobepermissible.Thisdifferenceissignificant:x (1,N=40)=

28.96,p<.001,suggestingthatthescenariosevokedifferentactionrepresentationswhose
5 propertiesaremorallysalient.

MaleandfemaleresponsesinExperiment1arepresentedinFigure7.Ofthe10men givenanIntentionalBatteryscenario,2judgedtheactionconstitutingintentionalbatterytobe permissibleand8judgedittobeimpermissible.Ofthe10womengivenanIntentionalBattery scenario,all10judgedtheactionconstitutingintentionalbatterytobeimpermissible. Meanwhile,all11ofthemenand8ofthe9womenwhoweregivenaForeseeableBattery scenariojudgedtheactionconstitutingforeseeablebatterytobepermissible.Thesedifferences

2 2 arealsosignificant,x (1,N=19)=15.44,p<.001(women)andx (1,N=21)=14.6,p<.001

(men),suggestingthattherearenosignificantgenderdifferencesinthewaythetwotypesof scenarioarementallyrepresentedandmorallyevaluated.

20

Figure6:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment1 (IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery)
20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Intentional Battery Foreseeable Battery

2 (1,N=40)=29.0, X p<.001

Subjects

Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

Figure 7: JudgmentsofActTypesinExperiment1byGender (IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery)

12 10 8
2 X (1,N=19)=15.44, p<.001(women). 2 (1,N=21)=14.6, X p<.001(men).

Subjects

6 4 2 0 Men Women Men Women

Permiss. Impermiss.

Intentional Battery

Foreseeable Battery

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2.2.2 Justifications Subjectsexpressedprinciplestheresponsestheyprovidedtojustifyorexplaintheir judgmentswerealsocodedandanalyzed.Threecategoriesofincreasingadequacywereused toclassifytheseresponses:(1)nojustification,(2)logicallyinadequatejustification,and(3) logicallyadequatejustification.Responsesthatwereleftcompletelyblankwerecategorized undertheheadingofnojustification.Responsesthatwerenotblankbutwhichfailedtostatea reason,rule,orprincipleortoidentifyanyfeaturewhatsoeverofthegivenscenariothat couldinprinciplegeneratethecorrespondingjudgmentwereclassifiedaslogicallyinadequate justifications.Finally,responsesthatdidstateareason,rule,orprinciple,ordidotherwise identifyatleastonefeatureofthegivenscenarioevenonethatwasobviouslyimmaterial, irrelevant,arbitrary,oradhocthatcouldinprinciplegeneratethecorrespondingjudgment wereclassifiedaslogicallyadequatejustifications. Utilizingthistaxonomy,tworesearchersindependentlycodedasubsetofjustifications andachievedaninterobserverreliabilityof89%(n=36).Oneresearcherthencodedthe completesetofjustificationscollectedinExperiment1.32.5%(13/40)ofparticipantsgaveno justification,17%(7/40)providedlogicallyinadequatejustifications,whileonly50%(20/40) providedlogicallyadequatejustifications.Furthermore,manyofthelogicallyadequate justificationsconsistedofsimpledeontologicalorconsequentialistprinciplesthatwereevidently incapableofgeneratingtheconflictingpatternofintuitionsinExperiment1.Thesejustifications thusfailedthetestofobservationaladequacyinthesensedefinedin1.1.Thesefindings togetherwiththedataonexpressedjustificationsgatheredinourremainingstudiesarediscussed againin8.

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2.3 Discussion Experiment1wasdesignedtoachieveseveraldifferentobjectives.First,itwasmeantto investigateasetofuntestedempiricalclaimsimplicitinthephilosophicalandlegalliterature abouthowthetrolleyproblemsarementallyrepresentedandmorallyevaluated.Intheir accountsoftrolleyproblems,philosophersandlegaltheoristsoftentakeforgrantedthedeontic statusreaderswillassigntoagivenactionsequence(e.g.,Fischer&Ravizza,1992Katz,1987 Thomson,1985).Priortoourstudies,however,nocontrolledexperimentshaddirectlytested theseassumptionsorattemptedtoextendthemtobroaderpopulations.Instead,prior experimentalresearchusingtrolleyproblemsasprobes(Petrinovich&ONeill,1996 Petrinovichetal.,1993)hadlefttheseissueslargelyunresolved.Aswepredicted,conventional assumptionsaboutthedeonticintuitionselicitedbytheseproblemswereconfirmed,andthe intuitionsthemselveswerewidelyshared. Second,Experiment1wasdesignedtoinvestigatewhethertheparticipantsinour experimentscould,whenasked,providecoherentandwellarticulatedjustificationsfortheir judgmentsaboutindividualtrolleyproblems.Basedoninformalobservation,aswellastheory dependentconsiderationsarisingfromthelinguisticanalogyinparticular,theinaccessible statusofprinciplesofgrammarwepredictedthatmanyormostofoursubjectsbeincapableof doingso.Thispredictionalsoheld:evenunderanextremelyliberalcodingscheme,accordingto whichajustificationwasdeemedlogicallyadequateifitpickedoutatleastonedistinguishing featureofthegivenscenario,evenonethatwasobviouslyimmaterial,irrelevant,arbitrary,orad hoc,thatcouldinprincipleserveaspartofthepremisesofanargumentthatarrivesatthe matchingjudgments(Rawls,1971,p.46),only50%oftheparticipantsinourstudyprovided logicallyadequatejustificationsfortheirjudgments.Additionally,asindicated,manyofthese

23

justificationswereinadequatetoaccountforthepattern ofintuitionsgeneratedinExperiment1 andthusfailedthetestofobservationaladequacyinthesensedefinedin1.1.Thissuggested thatawithinsubjectdesignwouldelicitconsiderablefewerlogicallyadequatejustificationsthan abetweensubjectdesign,becauseintheformerconditionsubjectswouldberequiredto reconcileandexplaintwocontraryintuitionsbymeansofanoverarchingrationaleorprinciple. Onthisbasis,wedecidedtoutilizeawithinsubjectdesigninExperiment2(see3). AfurtherobjectiveofExperiment1wastoinvestigateourhypothesisthatthemoral intuitionsgeneratedbythetrolleyproblemscouldbeexplainedbypostulatingintuitive knowledgeoftheprohibitionofintentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdoubleeffect.As interpretedhere,thecombinedeffectofmechanicallyapplyingtheseprinciplestothesescenarios wouldbetopermitthrowingtheswitchandturningthetrainintheTrolleyandBystander conditionsbuttoprohibitcuttingupthepatientandthrowingthemanintheTransplantand Footbridgeconditions.Thisishowparticipantsdid,infact,respondintheseconditions,thus confirmingtoalimitedextentourhypothesisaboutoperativeprinciples. Finally,Experiment1wasalsomeanttobegintheprocessofinvestigatingthepotential universalityofacertainclassofmoralintuitions,suchasthoseelicitedbythetrolleyproblems, bydeterminingwhetheronesampleofadultmenandwomenwouldshareintuitiveresponsesto theseproblems.Again,baseduponinformalobservation,aswellasvarioustheorydependent considerations(Mikhail,2000),wepredictedthattherewouldbenostatisticallysignificant genderdifferences.Thispredictionalsoheldafindingthatisatleastpotentiallyinconflict withtheclaimsofGilligan(1982)andothersthatmenandwomentypicallydifferinhowthey evaluatemoralproblems.

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Insum,thefindingsofExperiment1constituteevidencethatonecomponentofmoral knowledge,deonticknowledge,consistsofasystemofrulesorprinciples(amoralgrammar) capableofgeneratingandrelatingmentalrepresentationsofvariouselementsofanactionplan (Mikhailetal.,1998). Ourfindingsalsoconstituteevidencethatthemoralgrammarcontains principlescapableofdistinguishingintentionalbattery(batteryembeddedwithinanagents actionplanasameans)andforeseeablebattery(batteryembeddedwithinanagentsactionplan asasideeffect),aswellasafurtherprinciple,suchastheprincipleofdoubleeffectorsome comparablycomplexorderingprinciple(Donagan,1977),prohibitingintentionalbatterybut permittingforeseeablebatteryinthecontextofcasesofnecessitysuchasthetrolleyproblems. Becausesubjectsdisplayedonlyalimitedabilitytoprovideadequatejustificationsoftheir intuitions,Experiment1alsoimpliesthat,asisthecasewithlinguisticintuitions,theprinciples generatingmoralintuitionsareatleastpartlyinaccessibletoconsciousintrospection.Finally, ourfindingsalsosuggestthatatleastsomemoralintuitionsarewidelyshared,irrespectiveof gender.

3. Experiment2
InExperiment1,wediscoveredanapparentdifferencebetweenthewayintentional batteryandforeseeablebatteryarementallyrepresentedandmorallyevaluated,atleastinthe contextofcasesofnecessitysuchasthetrolleyproblems.Wealsodiscoveredthatthemoral competenceofbothmenandwomenappearstoconsist,atleastinpart,ofintuitiveor unconsciousknowledgeoftheprohibitionofintentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdouble effect.Experiment2wasdesignedtobringadditionalevidencetobearonthesehypotheses,in threedifferentways.

25

Thefirstwaywastoinvestigatetheconceptofbatterythatwasusedinouranalysisof Experiment1.InExperiment1,wedrewonestablishedlegaldoctrineinassumingthatbattery couldineffectbedefinedasunpermittedorunprivilegedcontactwithaperson,thatis,as contactwithoutconsent(Prosser,1941Shapo,2003).Moreover,wefollowedthetraditional lawoftortinassumingthatthenotionofunprivilegedcontactextendstoanypartofthebody, ortoanythingwhichisattachedtoitandincludesanytouchingofonepersonbyanotherorby anysubstanceputinmotionbyhim(Hilliard,1859).InExperiment2,weinvestigatedthis conceptofbatterybymodifyingoneoftheIntentionalBatteryscenariosusedinExperiment1, sothatanactiondescribedasthrowingtheman,whichpreviouslyconstitutedbattery,no longerdidso,becauseunderthemodifiedcircumstancestheactionwouldlikelyberepresented asconsensual.Wedidthisbyconstructingascenarioinwhicharunawaytrolley threatenstokill amanwalkingacrossthetracksandtheonlywaytosavethemanistosavehimistothrowhim outofthepathofthetrain,therebyseriouslyinjuringhim. ThesecondwayweextendedtheresultsofExperiment1wastoinvestigateoursubjects knowledgeoftheconsequentialistprovisionoftheprincipleofdoubleeffect.Asstatedin1, theprincipleofdoubleeffectisacomplexprincipleofjustificationrequiring,amongother things,thattheintendedandforeseengoodeffectsof anactionoutweighitsforeseenbadeffects. OurimplicitassumptioninExperiment1wasthateachofthescenariosusedinthatexperiment wasmentallyrepresentedbyoursubjectsassatisfyingthatcondition.Inparticular,wetookfor grantedinExperiment1thatindividualsrepresentedpreventingthedeathsoffivepeopleasan intendedandforeseengoodeffectthatoutweighedtheforeseenbadeffectofthedeathofone person.

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InExperiment2,wetestedoursubjectspresumedknowledgeofthisconsequentialist provisionoftheprincipleofdoubleeffectdirectlybymodifyingoneoftheForeseeableBattery scenariosusedinExperiment1,sothatanactiondescribedasthrowingtheswitch,which previouslygeneratedintendedandforeseengoodeffectsoutweighedbyitsforeseenbadeffects, nolongerdidso,butrathergeneratedtheoppositeresultofitsintendedandforeseengood effectsbeingoutweighedbyitsforeseenbadeffects.Wedidthisbytakingoneversionofthe standardBystanderProblem andsubstitutingavaluablethingfivemilliondollarsofrailroad equipmentlyingidleacrossthetracks forwhatwaspreviouslydescribedasfivemenwalking acrossthetracks.Wereasonedthatoursubjectswouldtakeforgrantedthatthemoral worthof apersonisgreaterthanthatofavaluablething. Finally,ourthirdmodificationwastoconverttheexperimentaldesignofExperiment1 fromabetweensubjectdesigntoawithinsubjectdesign.Althoughfullyhalfoftheparticipants inExperiment1providedlogicallyadequatejustificationsoftheirjudgments,oninspectionit wasclearthatmanyofthesejustificationswereunabletoexplainthealternatingpattern of intuitionsgeneratedinExperiment1.Forexample,manyofthesenominally adequateresponses tooktheformofeithersimpledeontologicaljustifications(e.g.,killingiswrong)orsimple utilitarianjustifications(fiveversusone)thatweremanifestlyincapableofexplainingthe essentialcontrastbetweentheForeseeableBatteryscenarios(i.e.,theTrolleyandBystander Problems),ontheonehand,andtheIntentionalBatteryscenarios(i.e.,theTransplantand FootbridgeProblems),ontheother.HenceinExperiment2wedecidedtoexaminethisissue andtobegintoexplorerelatedissuessuchasframingeffectsbyaskingparticipantstoprovide judgmentsandjustificationsofapairoftrolleyproblemspresentedtothemsimultaneously.

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3.1 Method 3.1.1 Participants Participantswere65adultvolunteersbetweentheagesof2235,55ofwhomwere graduatestudentsattheJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernmentatHarvardUniversity,and10 ofwhomwereemployeesoftheCableNewsNetworkinWashington,DC.Therewere33 womenand30men.Twosubjectsdidnotprovideinformationabouttheirgender.

3.1.2 StimuliandProcedure Fivescenarioswereused,oneofwhichwastheTrolleyProblempresentedin1.2.The otherfourscenarios,whichwereourmainconcerninExperiment2,arereprintedbelow.Each wasderivedfromatemplatethatwasdesignedtoallowforsystematiccontrolandvariationin thisandfutureinvestigations(Mikhail,2000).Differencesbetweenthelastthreescenariosand thefirstareunderlinedanditalicizedheretomakethemmorenoticeable.Participantswere givenquestionnaireswithoutthesemarkings. TheBystanderProblem(Hank:ForeseeableBattery) Hankistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Hankseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsaw fivemenwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedand thedriverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthat theywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Hankisstandingnexttoa switch,whichhecanthrow,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingit fromkillingthemen.Unfortunately,thereisamanstandingonthesidetrackwithhis backturned.Hankcanthrowtheswitch,killinghimorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis, lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforHanktothrowtheswitch? TheFootbridgeProblem(Ian:IntentionalBattery) Ianistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Ianseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfive menwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthe driverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthat

28

theywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Ianisstandingnexttoa heavyobject,whichhecanthrowontothetrackinthepathofthetrain, thereby preventingitfromkillingthemen.Unfortunately,theheavyobjectisaman,standing nexttoIan withhisbackturned.Iancanthrowtheman,killinghimorhecanrefrain fromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforIantothrowtheman? TheModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl:BadEffectsOutweighGoodEffects) Karlistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Karlseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsaw fivemilliondollarsofnewrailroadequipmentlyingidleacrossthetracksandslammed onthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushing towardtheequipment.Itismovingsofastthatit willbedestroyed.Fortunately,Karlis standingnexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack, therebypreventingitfrom destroyingtheequipment.Unfortunately,thereisaman standingonthesidetrackwithhisbackturned.Karlcanthrowtheswitch,killinghimor hecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingtheequipmentbedestroyed. IsitmorallypermissibleforKarltothrowtheswitch? TheModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke:ConsensualContact) Lukeistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrain thatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Lukeseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawa manwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthe driverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardtheman. Itismovingsofastthathewill notbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Lukeisstandingnexttotheman, whom hecanthrow offthetrackoutofthepathofthetrain,therebypreventingitfrom killingtheman.Unfortunately,themanisfrailandstandingwithhisbackturned.Luke canthrowtheman,injuringhimorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthemandie. IsitmorallypermissibleforLuketothrowtheman?

Inthefirstscenario,theagent(Hank)mustchoosewhethertothrowaswitchinorderto preventarunawaytrainfromkillingfivepeople,knowingthatdoingsowillcausethetrainto rundownandkillaninnocentbystander(henceforthForeseeableBattery).Inthesecond scenario,theagent(Ian)mustchoosewhetherto throwamaninfrontofarunawaytrainin ordertopreventthetrainfromkillingfivepeople(henceforthIntentionalBattery). Inthethird scenario, theagent(Karl)mustdecidewhethertothrowaswitchinorder topreventarunaway

29

trainfromdestroyingfivemilliondollarsofequipment,knowingthatdoingsowillkillan innocentbystander(henceforth BadEffectsOutweighGoodEffects).Finally,in thefourth scenario, theagent(Luke)mustdecidewhethertothrowamanwalkingacrossthetracksout ofthepathofthetrain,knowingthatdoingsowillinjurehim(henceforthConsensual Contact). UnlikeExperiment1,whichusedabetweensubjectdesign,Experiment2employeda withinsubjectdesign. Each ofthe65participantsreceivedawritten questionnairecontaining
6 twoscenarios,includingoneormoreofthefourscenariosreprintedabove. Participantswere

firstaskedwhethertheproposedactionsweremorallypermissibleandthen toexplainor justify theirresponses. 25participantsweregiventheIntentionalBatteryscenario,25 participantsweregiventheForeseeableBatteryscenario,25participantsweregiventheBad EffectsOutweighGoodEffectsscenario,and25participantsweregiventheConsensualContact scenario.Theassignmentofparticipantstoscenariotypewasrandom.

3.2 Results 3.2.1 IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery WepresentthemainresultsofExperiment2instages,beginningwiththecomparison betweenintentionalandforeseeablebattery(Figure8).2of25subjectsintheIntentionalBattery conditionjudgedtheactionconstitutingintentionalbattery(throwingtheman)tobe permissible.Meanwhile,19of25subjectsintheForeseeableBatteryconditionjudgedthe actionconstitutingforeseeablebattery(throwingtheswitch)tobepermissible.Thisdifference

2 issignificant:x (1,N=50)=24.4,p<.001.

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Figure8:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment2 (IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery)
25 20
2 (1,N=50)=24.4, X p<.001

Subjects

15 10 5 0 Intentional Battery Foreseeable Battery Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

Figure9:JudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment2byGender (IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery)
2 (1,N=21)=11.4, X p<.001(women). 2 (1,N=27)=13.38, X p<.001(men).

12 10 8

Subjects

6 4 2 0 Men Women Men Women

Permiss. Impermiss.

Intentional Battery

Foreseeable Battery

ActType

31

Maleandfemaleparticipantswhoweregiventhesetwoscenariosshowedasimilar patternofresponses(Figure9). 2of 14men and0of11womenintheIntentionalBattery conditionjudgedthrowingtheman theactionconstitutingintentionalbattery (throwingthe man)tobepermissible.Meanwhile,11of13menand6of10womenintheForeseeable Battery conditionjudgedtheactionconstitutingforeseeablebattery (throwingtheswitch)tobe
2 permissible.Thesedifferencesarealsosignificant,x (1,N=21)=11.4,p<.001(women)and 2 x (1,N=27)=13.38,p<.001(men).

3.2.2 GoodEffectsOutweighBadEffectsvs.BadEffectsOutweighGoodEffects Next,wedescribetheresultsofExperiment2intermsoftheweighingofgoodandbad effects(Figure10).Asindicated,19of25subjectswhoweregiventheHankscenario(nowre categorizedasGoodEffectsOutweighBadEffects)judgedHanksthrowingtheswitchtobe permissible.Bycontrast,noneofthe25subjectswhoweregiventheKarlscenario(Bad EffectsOutweighGoodEffects)judgedKarlsthrowingtheswitchtobepermissible.This

2 differenceissignificant:x (1,N=50)= 30.65,p<.001.

Mensandwomensresponsesfollowedthesamepattern(Figure11).11of13menand 6of10womenjudgedthrowingtheswitchtobepermissibleintheGoodEffectsOutweighBad Effectscondition.Bycontrast,0of14menand0of 11women heldthrowingtheswitchtobe impermissibleintheBadEffectsOutweighGoodEffectscondition.Theseresultsarealso

2 2 significant,x (1,N=21)=11.4,p<.001(women)andx (1,N=27)=19.99,p<.001(men).

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Figure10:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment2 (GoodEffectsvs.BadEffects)
25 20
2 (1,N=50)=30.65, X p<.001

Subjects

15 10 5 0 BadEffect> GoodEffect GoodEffect> BadEffect Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

Figure11:JudgmentsofActTypesinExperiment2byGender (GoodEffectsvs.BadEffects)
2 (1,N=21)=11.4, X p<.001(women). 2 (1,N=27)=19.99, X p<.001(men).

12 10 8

Subjects

6 4 2 0 Men Women Men Women

Permiss. Impermiss.

BadEffect> GoodEffect

GoodEffect> BadEffect

ActType

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3.2.3 IntentionalBatteryvs.ConsensualContact Third,weexaminethecomparisonbetweenintentionalbatteryandconsensualcontact (Figure12).Asindicated,2of25subjectsintheIntentionalBatterycondition(Ian)judgedthe actionconstitutingintentionalbattery(throwingtheman)tobepermissible.Bycontrast,24of 25subjectsintheConsensualContactcondition(Luke)judgedtheactionconstituting

2 consensualcontact(throwingtheman)tobepermissible.Thisdifferenceissignificant:x (1,

N=50)=38.78,p<.001. Again,maleandfemaleresponsesconformedtothesamepattern(Figure13). 2of14 menandnoneofthe11womenintheIntentionalBattery conditionjudgedthrowingthemanto bepermissible.Bycontrast,all7ofthemenandall16ofthewomenintheConsensualContact

2 conditionjudgedthrowingthemantobepermissible,x (1,N=27)=27.0, p<.001(women)and 2 7 x (1,N=21)=14.0,p<.001(men).

3.2.4 Justifications Finally,weturntooursubjectsexpressedjustifications,thatis,theresponsesthey providedtojustifyorexplaintheirjudgments.Becauseweutilizedawithinsubjectdesignin Experiment2,weexpectedthatthesejustificationswouldbesignificantlylessadequatethanthe correspondingjustificationsinExperiment1,whichreliedonabetweensubjectdesign.In addition,wepredictedthatsubjectspresentedwithbothanIntentionalBatteryscenarioanda ForeseeableBatteryscenario,inparticular,wouldnotbeabletojustifytheirconflicting intuitions.

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Figure12:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment2 (IntentionalBatteryvs.ConsensualContact)
25 20
2 (1,N=50)=38.78, X p<.001

Subjects

15 10 5 0 Intentional Battery Consensual Contact Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

Figure13:JudgmentsofActTypesinExperiment2byGender (IntentionalBatteryvs.ConsensualContact)
16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Men Women Men Women
2 (1,N=21)=14.0, X p<.001(men). 2 (1,N=27)=27.0, X p<.001(women).

Subjects

Permiss. Impermiss.

Intentional Battery

Consensual Contact

ActType

35

Bothofthesepredictionswereconfirmed.First,35.4%(23/65)ofparticipantsgaveno justificationand38.5%(25/65)providedlogicallyinadequatejustifications,whileonly20.0% (13/65)providedlogicallyadequatejustifications.ThiscontrastssharplywiththeExperiment1, inwhich50%ofsubjectsprovidedlogicallyadequatejustifications. Second,only10%(1/10)ofthosesubjectswhoweregivenboththeIntentionalBatteryand ForeseeableBatteryscenariosandwhoattemptedtoprovidesomesortofexplanationfortheir judgmentsprovidedlogicallyadequatejustifications.Theother90%(9/10)providedlogically inadequatejustifications.Further,asTable2reveals,thisgroupsexpressedprincipleswere widelydivergent.Manyparticipantsmerelyrestatedtheproblemtheywereaskedtoresolveor otherwiseprovidedanswerswhichwerenonresponsive.Moreover,several participants appearedpuzzledbythenatureandstrengthoftheirintuitionsandbyhowthoseintuitions shiftedasaresultofapparentlyminorandinconsequentialdifferencesintherelevantaction descriptions.

3.3 Discussion TheresultsofExperiment2corroborateandextendthoseofExperiment1.First,they lendfurthersupporttothehypothesisthatbothmenandwomenpossessintuitiveorunconscious knowledgeoftheprohibitionofintentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdoubleeffect.By imputingknowledgeoftheseprinciplestooursubjects,wecanexplainandpredicttheirmoral intuitions.Specifically,wecanexplainwhytheirintuitionsflipsopredictablywhenthestandard BystanderProblemismodifiedsothatthecostsofthrowingtheswitchoutweighitsbenefitsand thestandardFootbridgeProblemismodifiedsothatthrowingthemannolongerconstitutes intentionalbattery.

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Table2:Justificationsfor BystanderandFootbridgePairofProblemsinExperiment2
Problem Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Typeof Battery Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Foreseeable Intentional Judgment Permissible Justification

Veryodd.Idon'tknowwhyIchosedifferentlyinthesecond scenario.Theendresultisthesame. Ijustchosemygut Impermissible responseandnowamintriguedwithhowtoreconcilethem. Permissible It'samazingthatIwouldnotthrowapersonbutthrowaswitchto killaperson.IreallywishtherewasmoreIcoulddoforthe1 Impermissible guyontheothertrack. Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Theman,Hankcanhereactivelyinfluenceasequenceofevents whichwilllimit damage(#ofdeaths).Inthesecondevent,he Impermissible cannotthrowanothermanontothetracksbecausehewillactively anddeliberatelykillaninnocentbystander.Really animpossible choice. Permissible Moralactorsmaybeforcedtomakeadecisionbetweentwo passivechoiceswherebothwillendrights.Buttomakeaction Impermissible overpassivechoicesrequiresanotherkindofanalysisanddegree ofbenefit. Permissible Impermissible Permissible Permissible Ibelievethattheultimatequestionisthatofliveslost. Some wouldarguethatHankandIanwouldbemorallyjustifiedinnot stoppingthetrain.Whilethismaybetrue,itdoesnotnecessitate thatitbemorallyunjustifiedtostopthetrain. Inthefirstscenarioitwouldbepermissibletoactasautilitarian optimizer.Inthesecondrightscomeintoquestion. Iknowfivelivesarefivelivesit'sallabouttheguts.That's whatitcomesdownto.BlaisePascalgotitallwrong. Notacceptabletodecidetorisksomeoneelse'slifetosaveothers. Ineithercase,themoraldecisionruledependsonhowcloseto theactivekillingofthemanis.

Impermissible Forthefirstscenario,Iwantedtodrawadistinctionbetween"isit permissibleforhimtothrowtheswitch"and"doeshehaveaduty Impermissible tothrowtheswitch,"thoughIdon'tknowifthatwouldhave changedmyanswer.

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Second,theresultsofExperiment2suggestthatindividualshavelimitedconscious accesstotheseprinciples(ortowhicheverprinciplesareactuallyresponsibleforgeneratingtheir intuitions).Evenunderaliberalcodingscheme,only20%ofsubjectsprovidedlogically adequatejustificationsfortheirjudgments.Further,only10%didsowhenaskedtoexplainthe mostchallengingpairofmoralintuitions,namely,theperceivedcontrastbetweentheBystander andFootbridgeproblems. Third,Experiment2providessomeinitialevidenceofframingeffects.Mostnotably, only76%(19/25)ofrespondentsintheForeseeableBatteryconditionjudgedHanksthrowing theswitchtobepermissible,amuchlowerpercentagethanthe95%(19/20)ofparticipantswho gavethisresponseinExperiment1.Theseeffectswereslightlylesspronouncedinmalesthanin females,buttheywerediscernibleinbothgroups:85%(11/13)ofmengavethisresponse,as comparedwith100%(11/11)inExperiment1,whereas60%(6/10)ofwomengavethis response,ascomparedwith89%(8/9)inExperiment1.Thesesamplesizesareobviouslyquite small,anditthereforewouldbeprematuretodrawanyfirmconclusionsabouttheseeffectsat thispoint.Itseemslikely,however,thatamoresystematicinvestigationof framingeffectsin largerpopulationswouldyieldsignificantresults,perhapsincludingsignificantgender differences.Nevertheless,themainpatternofintuitionsExperiment2fellinlinewiththoseof Experiment1,inthatbothmenandwomenintheaggregaterecognizedtherelevantdistinctions amongtheBystander,Footbridge,GoodEffectsOutweighBadEffects,andConsensualContact Problems.HenceExperiment2providesadditionalevidencethatatleastsomemoralintuitions andtheprinciplesthatgeneratethemarewidelyshared,irrespectiveofdemographicvariables likegender.

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4. Experiment3 ParticipantsinExperiments12includedpersonsfromcountriesotherthantheUnited States,includingBelgium,Canada,Columbia,Denmark,France,Germany,Israel,Japan,Korea, Lebanon,Mexico,andPuertoRico.Nonetheless,onlyoneorafewindividualsfromeachof thesecountrieswererepresented,andthemajorityofparticipantswereUnitedStatescitizensor membersofotherWesternnations.Accordingly,Experiment3wasdesignedtoinvestigatethe moralintuitionsofanonWesternpopulation.

4.1 Method 4.1.1 Participants Participantswere39adultvolunteersages1865fromthebroaderCambridge, Massachusettscommunity,allofwhomhademigratedfromChinawithinthepreviousfiveyears andmostofwhomhaddonesowithintheprevioustwoyears.Thegroupincluded19women

8 and19men1participantdidnotvolunteerinformationabouthisorhergender.

4.1.2 StimuliandProcedure SameasExperiment2, exceptthatparticipantsinthisstudywerenotaskedtojustify theirjudgments. 14participantsweregiventheIntentionalBatteryscenario,16participants weregiventheIntentionalBatteryscenario,15participantsweregiventheBadEffectsOutweigh GoodEffectsscenario,and16participantsweregiventheConsensualContactscenario.The assignmentofparticipantstoscenariotypewasrandom.

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4.2 Results 4.2.1 IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery Onceagain,wepresenttheresultsofExperiment3instages,beginningwiththe comparisonbetweenintentionalandforeseeablebattery(Figure14).2of14subjectsinthe IntentionalBatteryconditionjudgedtheactionconstitutingintentionalbattery(throwingthe man)tobepermissible.Meanwhile,11of14subjectsintheForeseeableBatterycondition judgedtheactionconstitutingforeseeablebattery(throwingtheswitch)tobepermissible.

2 Thisdifferenceissignificant:x (1,N=28)=11.72,p<.001.

4.2.2 GoodEffectsOutweighBadEffectsvs.BadEffectsOutweighGoodEffects DuetothelimitednumberofsubjectsinExperiment3,werefrainfromanalyzingour responsesbygender.Instead,weturndirectlytothecomparisonbetweengoodandbadeffects (Figure15).11of14subjectsintheGoodEffectsOutweighBadEffectsconditionjudged throwingtheswitchtobepermissible.Meanwhile,only1of15subjectsintheBadEffects OutweighGoodEffectsconditionjudgedthrowingtheswitchtobepermissible. Thisdifference

2 issignificant:x (1,N=29)=16.81,p<.001.

4.2.3 IntentionalBatteryvs.ConsensualContact Third,weexaminethecontrastbetweenintentionalbatteryandconsensualcontact (Figure16).2of16subjectsintheIntentionalBatteryconditionjudgedthrowingthemantobe permissible.Meanwhile,14of16subjectsintheConsensualContactconditionjudgedthrowing

2 themantobepermissible.Thisdifferenceissignificant:x (1,N=32)=18.0,p<.001.

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Figure 14:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment3 (IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery)

12 10 8
2 (1,N=28)=11.72, X p<.001

Subjects

6 4 2 0 Intentional Battery Foreseeable Battery

Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

Figure15:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment3 (GoodEffectsvs.BadEffects)
14 12 10
2 (1,N=29)=16.81, X p<.001

Subjects

8 6 4 2 0 BadEffect> GoodEffect GoodEffect> BadEffect Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

41

Figure16:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment3 (IntentionalBatteryvs.ConsensualContact)
14 12 10
2 (1,N=32)=18.0, X p<.001

Subjects

8 6 4 2 0 Intentional Battery Consensual Contact Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

4.3 Discussion TheresultsofExperiment3suggestthatthecentralfindingsofExperiments12arenot limitedtopersonseducatedorraisedintheUnitedStatesorotherWesternnations.Instead,they suggestatleastsomeoperativeprinciplesofmoralcompetence,includingtheprohibitionof intentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdoubleeffect,aretransnationalandmaybeuniversal. Whileclaimsofuniversalityareoftencontroversialandshouldbemadewithcare,this hypothesisisconsistentwiththeroletheseprinciplesalreadyplayininternationallaw(i.e., the lawofnations).Forexample,theprincipleofdoubleeffectsimpliednormofnoncombatant immunitythatis,itsprohibitionagainstdirectlytargetingcivilians,togetherwithitsqualified

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acceptanceof harmingciviliansasanecessarysideeffectofanotherwisejustifiablemilitary operationhaslongbeenpartofcustomaryinternationallawandiscodifiedinArticle48ofthe FirstProtocol(1977)tothe1949GenevaConventions(e.g.,Henkin,Pugh,Schacter&Smit, 1993,p.36465).Likewise,theprincipleofdoubleeffectsimpliednormofproportionalityis alsopartofcustomaryinternationallawandiscodifiedinArticles2223oftheHague Conventionof1907(e.g., Henkinetal.,1993,p.368). Further,manyimportantlegaldoctrines, inboth Americanlawandthedomesticlawof othernations, turnonananalysisofpurposeand thedistinctionbetweenintendedandforeseeneffects(Mikhail,2002). Henceitisperhapsnot surprisingtodiscoverthatthoughtexperimentsliketrolleyproblems,whichimplicatethese concepts,elicitwidelysharedmoralintuitionsfromindividualsofdifferentcultural backgrounds. Nevertheless,whileExperiment3providessomeinitialsupportfortheexistenceofmoral universals,thissupportisobviouslyquitelimited.Moreempiricalinvestigationonamuchwider scaleisnecessarybeforespecificclaimsaboutuniversalitycouldbedefensible.Inthecontextof ourhypothesis,whatwouldperhapsbemostcompellinginthisregardwouldbetocollect additionalevidenceontrolleyintuitionsfromindividualsfromaroundtheworld,inparticular thosefrommarkedlydifferentcultural,social,religious,andsocioeconomicbackgrounds.Todo this,onewouldpresumablyneedtotranslatethesethoughtexperimentsintodifferentlanguages. Onemightalsoneedtomodifytheminculturallyspecificways,insofarascertaininessential elementsofthescenarios(e.g.,trolleys)maybeunfamiliar.Wedonotattempttheseextensions inthispaperbutmerelyidentifythemasobjectivesoffutureresearch whichflownaturallyfrom
9 thestudiespresentedhere.

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5. Experiment4
Experiments13suggestthatthemoralcompetenceofadultsincludestheprohibitionof intentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdoubleeffect.Byattributingintuitiveknowledgeofthese principlestooursubjects,wecanexplainandpredicttheirmoralintuitions. AsTable3indicates,thecomputationspresupposedbythisexplanationcanbe reconstructedinthesimpleformofseriesofyesnoquestionsordecisiontree.Presentedwitha presumptivelywrongaction,suchasthoseharmfulactionsatissueintheTrolley,Transplant, Bystander,andFootbridgeproblems,thedecisionmakerfirstaskswhethertheproposedactions goodeffectsoutweighitsbadeffects.Iftheanswerisno,thenthedecisionmakerconcludesthe actionisimpermissible.Iftheanswerisyes,thenthedecisionmakernextaskswhetherthe actioninvolvescommittingabatteryasameanstoachieveagivenend.Iftheanswerisno,then thedecisionmakerconcludesthattheactionispermissible.Iftheanswerisyes,thenthe decisionmakerconcludesthattheactionisimpermissible.

Table3:ExplanationofTrolley,Transplant,Bystander,andFootbridgeIntuitionsasa FunctionofthePrincipleofDoubleEffect
Problem(Agent) Homicide? Battery? GoodEffects Outweigh BadEffects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Batteryasa Means? No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Deontic Status Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Impermissible Permissible

Trolley(Charlie) Transplant(Dr.Brown) Bystander(Denise) Footbridge(Nancy) Bystander(Hank) Footbridge(Ian) ModifiedBystander(Karl) ModifiedFootbridge(Luke)

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Table3illustratesthatourcentralfindingsuptothispointcanbeexplainedinthe foregoingterms.However,ourfindingsarealsoconsistentwithanalternativeexplanation, accordingtowhichtrolleyintuitionsdonotdependprimarilyonthementalstatepropertiesofan agentsactionplan,butonitstemporalproperties,inparticularwhetheritsbadeffects(orits primafaciewrongssuchasbattery)arementallyrepresentedasoccurringbeforeorafterits goodeffects.Inparticular,ourcentralfindingscouldbeequallyexplainedbythesocalled PaulinePrinciple,whichholdsthatitisimpermissibletodoevilthatgoodmaycome (Anscombe,1970Donagan,1977). Suitablyformalized,atemporalinterpretationofthis principlewouldineffectcomputeasimpermissibleanyactionplanwhichrepresentseithera badeffectorabatteryoccurringbeforeagoodeffect.AsTable4reveals,allbutoneofthe impermissibleactrepresentationsexaminedthusfarpossessthisproperty,theloneexception, KarlsthrowingtheswitchintheModifiedBystanderProblem,beingexplainableonother
10 grounds. HencethePaulinePrinciple(orsomesuitableformalizationofit)alsoconstitutes

(partof)anobservationallyadequateexplanationoftheresultsofExperiments13.

Table4:ExplanationofTrolley,Transplant,Bystander,andFootbridgeIntuitionsasa FunctionofthePaulinePrinciple
Problem(Agent) Homicide? Battery? GoodEffects Outweigh BadEffects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes BatteryorBad EffectsPriorto GoodEffects? No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Deontic Status Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Impermissible Permissible

Trolley(Charlie) Transplant(Dr.Brown) Bystander(Denise) Footbridge(Nancy) Bystander(Hank) Footbridge(Ian) ModifiedBystander(Karl) ModifiedFootbridge(Luke)

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Experiment4wasdesignedtoinvestigatethislogicallypossiblealternative,aswellasto provideanadditionalcheckontheabstractconceptofbatteryutilizedinExperiments13.To accomplishtheseobjectives,weconstructedthefollowingtwonewscenarios(Mikhail,2000): TheLoopedTrackProblemIntentionalBattery(Ned) Nedistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Nedseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsaw fivemenwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedand thedriverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthat theywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Nedisstandingnexttoa switch,whichhecanthrow,thatwilltemporarilyturnthetrainontoasidetrack.Thereis aheavyobjectonthesidetrack.Ifthetrainhitstheobject,theobjectwillslowthetrain down,therebygivingthementimetoescape.Unfortunately,theheavyobjectisaman, standingonthesidetrackwithhisbackturned.Nedcanthrowtheswitch,preventingthe trainfromkillingthemen,butkillingtheman.Orhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,letting thefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforNed tothrowtheswitch? TheLoopedTrackProblemForeseeableBattery(Oscar) Oscaristakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Oscarseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsaw fivemenwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedand thedriverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthat theywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Oscarisstandingnexttoa switch,whichhecanthrow,thatwilltemporarilyturnthetrainontoasidetrack.Thereis aheavyobjectonthesidetrack.Ifthetrainhitstheobject,theobjectwillslowthetrain down,therebygivingthementimetoescape. Unfortunately,thereisamanstandingon thesidetrackinfrontoftheheavyobject,withhisbackturned.Oscarcanthrowthe switch,preventingthetrainfromkillingthemen,butkillingtheman.Orhecanrefrain fromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie.
11 IsitmorallypermissibleforOscartothrowtheswitch?

Inthefirstscenario(Ned),batteryisembeddedwithintheagentsactionplanasameans.In thesecondscenario(Oscar),batteryisembeddedwithintheagentsactionplanasaside effect.UnlikethescenariosusedinExperiments13,however,theNedOscarpairisnot distinguishableintermsoftheirmorallyneutralbasicactions(e.g.,throwingtheswitchvs. throwingtheman)orthetemporalpropertiesoftheirgoodeffects,badeffects,andbatteries.

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Instead,fivefundamentalpropertiesareheldconstantbetweenthesetwoscenarios:(1)good effects,(2)badeffects,(3)ultimatepurposeorgoal,(4)morallyneutralbasicaction(throwing theswitchineachcase),and(5)thetemporalorderofgoodeffects,badeffects,andbatteries. Further,bothareimpersonalscenariosinthesensedefinedbyGreeneandcolleagues(Greene etal.,2001).TheNedOscarpairisthereforethepurestminimalpairofscenariosusedthus farinourinvestigations.

5.1 Method 5.1.1 Participants Participantswere309adultvolunteersages1835fromtheM.I.T.community.Because thepostulateddifferencebetweentherelevantscenarioswasquitesubtle,wegreatlyincreased oursamplesizesinordertobeabletodetectstatisticallysignificantdifferencesintheir underlyingrepresentations.Forthepurposesofthisstudy,wedidnotactivelycollect informationonparticipantsgender.However,aretrospectiveanalysisofparticipantsnames indicatedthatatleast119menandatleast117womenparticipatedinthisstudy.Anadditional 73individualsdidsowhosegenderwasnotreadilyascertainableinthismanner.

5.1.2 StimuliandProcedure Twoscenarioswereused.Inone(Ned),batterywasembeddedwithintheagents actionplanasameans(henceforthIntentionalBattery).Intheother(Oscar),batterywas embeddedwithintheagentsactionplanasasideeffect(henceforthForeseeableBattery).In bothscenarios,goodeffects,badeffects,ultimatepurposeorgoal,andmorallyneutralbasic

47

action(throwingtheswitch)wereheldconstant.Inaddition,temporalorderofgoodeffects, badeffects,andbatterieswerealsoheldconstant. Abetweensubjectdesignwasutilized.Eachparticipantreceivedaquestionnaire containingonewrittenscenario,accompaniedbyadiagramdesignedtomakethescenariofully comprehensible(onfilewithauthor).Theparticipantwasinstructedtoreadthescenarioandto determinewhethertheproposedactionitdescribedwasmorallypermissible. Unlike Experiments1and2,theparticipantswerenotaskedtoprovidejustificationsfortheir judgmentsnevertheless,manyindividualsdidprovidejustificationsontheirowninitiative,and theseresponsesareanalyzedbelow.159individualsweregiventheIntentionalBatteryscenario (Ned)and150weregiventheForeseeableBatteryscenario(Oscar).Theassignmentof participantstoscenariotypewasrandom.

5.2 Results 5.2.1 Judgments ThemainresultsofExperiment4aresummarizedinFigure17.76/159or48%of participantswhoweregiventheIntentionalBatteryscenario(Ned)judgedthrowingtheswitch tobepermissible.Meanwhile,93/150or62%ofparticipantswhoweregiventheForeseeable Batteryscenario(Oscar)judgedthrowingtheswitchtobepermissible.Thisdifferenceis

2 significant:x (1,N=302)=6.52,p<.025.

JudgmentsofmenandwomenarepresentedinFigure18.54%(29/54)ofmenand45% (32/71)ofwomenintheIntentionalBatteryconditionjudgedthrowingtheswitchtobe permissible.Meanwhile,72%(47/65)ofmenand59%(27/46)ofwomenheldthesameaction tobepermissibleintheForeseeableBatterycondition.Thesecontrastsaresignificantformen,

48

Figure17:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment4 (IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery)

Subjects

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Intentional Battery Foreseeable Battery

2 (1,N=302)=6.52, X p<.025

Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

Figure18:JudgmentsofActTypesinExperiment4byGender (IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery)
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Men Women Men Women
2 (1,N=117)=2.07, X p<.2(women). 2 (1,N=119)=4.42, X p<.05(men).

Subjects

Permiss. Impermiss.

Intentional Battery

Foreseeable Battery

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2 2 x (1,N=119)=4.42,p<.025,butnotforwomen,x (1,N=117)=2.07,p<.20.Hence,based

onthisdata,thenullhypothesisthatthesescenariosareindistinguishableisfalsifiedformenbut notforwomen.However,largersamplesizeswouldpresumablysupportthesameconclusion withrespecttowomen.Theseresultsalsoindicateaslightbutdiscernibletrendinwhich,inthe aggregate,menappearmorewillingthanwomentopermitthrowingtheswitchinthese circumstances.

5.2.2 Justifications Althoughwedidnotaskforjustifications,49subjectsprovidedsomesortofverbalized explanationoftheirjudgmentsontheirowninitiative.30ofthese49responses,or9.9% (30/302)oftheoveralltotal,werelogicallyadequatejustifications,while19ofthese49 responses,or6.3%(19/302)oftheoveralltotal,werelogicallyinadequate.Meanwhile,83.8% (253/302)ofsubjectsinExperiment4gavenojustification.

5.3 Discussion Accordingtoourhypothesis,whenindividualsencounterhypotheticalfactpatternslikethe Trolley,Transplant,FootbridgeandBystanderproblems,theyspontaneouslycompute unconsciousrepresentationsoftherelevantactionsintermsofends,means,andsideeffects. Theyalsodistinguishbatteryasameansfrombatteryasasideeffect,prohibitingtheformerbut permittingthelatterinthespecificcircumstancesdepictedbytheseproblems.Consequently,we wereledtomaketworelatedpredictionsabouttheNedandOscarpairofscenarios.First,we predictedthatsubjectswouldperceiveanintuitivedistinctionbetweenthesescenarios,even thoughtheirovertdifferencesarequitesubtle,becauseinonlyoneofthem(Ned)doestheagent

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intendtocommitabatteryasameansoffurtheringhisgoodend.IntheOscarscenario,by contrast,weassumedthatsubjectswouldcomputearepresentationaccordingtowhichbatteryis notameansbutaforeseensideeffect.Second,wepredictedthat,onthebasisofthisdistinction betweenmeansandsideeffects,subjectswouldjudgeOscarsactofthrowingtheswitchtobe permissiblebutNedsactofthrowingtheswitchtobeimpermissible. TheresultsofExperiment4confirmedthefirstprediction.Althoughthedifferences betweenthesefactpatternsareminimal,oursubjectsdidinfactdistinguishthetwoscenariosto astatisticallysignificantextent.Thatis,wewereabletofalsifythenullhypothesisthatthese scenariosareintuitivelyindistinguishable.Thisimpliesthat,despitesharingthefive fundamentalpropertiesdescribedabove,theNedandOscarscenariostriggerdistinctmental representationswhosepropertiesaremorallysalient.Thisinturnlendsatleastsomesupportto thehypothesisthattheoperativedistinctionbetweenthesescenariosisthedistinctionbetween batteryasameansandbatteryasasideeffect. Bycontrast,thesecondpredictiondidnothold,orrather,itheldonlytoalimitedextent. Althoughamajority(62%)ofthoseparticipantsintheForeseeableBatteryconditionheld Oscarsthrowingtheswitchtobepermissible,whileaminority(47%)ofthoseinIntentional BatteryconditionheldNedsthrowingtheswitchtobepermissible,thecontrastbetweenthese percentageswaslesssharpthaninourpreviousstudies.Further,theNedresponseswereno differentthanchanceinthisregard.Thiswasalsoadeparturefromourpriorstudies,inwhich thenumberofparticipantsholdingactsconstitutingintentionalbatterytobepermissiblewas smallenoughtowarranttheclaimthat,asageneralmatter,individualsregardtheseactstobe impermissible.

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Nevertheless,Experiment4didconfirmanintuitivedistinctionbetweenthispairof cases,despitetheirclosesimilarities.Further,severalexplanationsofthesecomparatively anomalousresultssuggestthemselvesandraiseinterestingproblemsforfutureresearch.We brieflymentiontwosuchpossibilitieshere,leavingtheirinvestigationforanotheroccasion. First,althoughtrolleyintuitionsarenormallyquitesharp(Thomson,1986),itisalsoa familiarobservationthattheybegintofailaboveacertainlevelofcomplexity(Nagel,1986,p. 174).Indeed,sometrolleyproblemsaresocomplexandbizarrethattheydonotappeartobe particularlyusefulgiventhecentralaimsandmethodsofcognitivescience(e.g.,Unger,1996). WhiletheNedOscarpairarguablydoesnotfitthelattercategory,thesescenariosalsoare undeniablymorecomplexanddifficulttoprocessthantheproblemsusedinourpriorstudies. Indeed,thisisonereasonweprovidedparticipantsinthisstudywithadiagramtofacilitate comprehension.Considerationslikethesesuggestthatthecomparativelyanomalousresultsof Experiment4maybeunderstoodasthepredictableeffectofincreasingtheamountofrelevant informationsubjectsarerequiredtoprocessinthecourseoffasteninguponamorallysalient structuraldescription.Inthecaseoflanguage,itiswellunderstoodthatcertainnonlinguistic factors,suchasmemorylimitationsandothergenerallimitsonhowthemindprocesses information,caninterruptorinterferewiththeparsingoflinguisticexpressions.This,ofcourse, isonereasonwhylinguistsdrawthecompetenceperformancedistinctionandarelated distinctionbetweengrammaticalityandacceptabilityjudgments(Chomsky,1965Haegeman, 1994Mikhail,2002).Asimilarsituationhasbeenthoughttoobtaininthemoraldomain (Dwyer,1999Mikhail,2000).Ifso,thenitispossiblethatthecomparativelyanomalous findingsofExperiment4canbeexplainedwithintheframeworkofamoralcompetence performancedistinction.

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Second,adisparitybetweenintendedandactualresult(LaFave,2003)mayalsohelp explainthesefindings.Thestandardoperationaltestfordistinguishingnecessarymeansfrom unnecessarysideeffectisacounterfactualtest,accordingtowhichoneaskswhethertheactor wouldhaveacteddifferentlyif thenegativeresultcouldhavebeenavoided.Bythismeasure, NedbutnotOscarispresumedtointendabatteryameanstoachievinghisend,becauseNeds objectivesincludecausingthetraintohittheman,whereasOscarsobjectivesdonot.Put differently,ifcircumstanceswerealteredandthemanwerenolongeronthesidetrack,then presumablyNedwouldnot throwtheswitch,becausehisimmediatepurposeindoingsoisto causethetraintohittheman.Bycontrast,Oscarpresumablywouldstillthrowtheswitchin thesecircumstances,becausehisimmediatepurposeistocausethetraintohittheobject,of whichthemanisstandinginfront. Thedisparitybetweenintendedandactualresultcomplicatesthisanalysis.Thisconcept referstothefactthat,althoughOscarsintentionsdonotincludesavingthemenbycausingthe traintohittheman,theactualresultofhisactionwilllikelybejustthat,becauseunlesstheman jumpsoffthetrackintime,Oscarsthrowingtheswitchwillcausethetraintohittheman before thetrainhitstheobject.Ifso,then,froman expostperspective,thereisasenseinwhichitwill betruethatOscarcommittedabatteryasameanstosavingthefivemen,eventhough,froman exanteperspective,itwasnothisintentiontodoso. Significantly,thispotentialdisparity betweenintendedandactualresultisnotpresentin any of theotherForeseeableBatteryscenariosusedinourinvestigations.Instead,intheseother scenarios,theintendedgoodresultofsavingthefivemennecessarilyoccursbefore,and independentlyof,theforeseenbadresultofcommittingabatterybycausingthetraintohitthe
12 man. HencethisimportantstructuraldifferencebetweentheOscarscenarioandthe

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ForeseeableBatteryscenariosutilizedinourpreviousexperimentsmayalsohelpexplainthe comparativelyanomalousresultsofExperiment4.

6. Experiment5
Asinterpretedhere,theprincipleofdoubleeffectisacomplexprincipleofjustification whichholdsthatanotherwiseprohibitedactionmaybepermissibleif(1)theactitselfisnot wrong,(2)thegoodbutnotthebadeffectsareintended,(3)thegoodeffectsoutweighthebad effects,and(4)nomorallypreferablealternativeisavailable. InExperiments14,wefocused mainlyonthefirstandthirdprovisionsof thisprinciple.InExperiment5,weturnedour attentiontothesecondandfourthprovisions.

6.1 Method 6.1.1 Participants Participantswere60adultvolunteersages1865fromtheWashington,D.C.area.The groupconsistedof32womenand28men.

6.1.2 StimuliandProcedure Fourscenarioswereused,oneofwhichwastheBystanderProblem (see3.1.2)andthe otherthreeofwhichwerethefollowingmodificationsofthisproblem: ModifiedBystanderProblem#2(Mark:IntentionalHomicide) Markistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Markseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsaw fivemenwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailed,and thedriverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthat theywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Markisstandingnexttoa switch,whichhecanthrow,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingit fromkillingthemen.Unfortunately,thereisamanonthesidetrack.Markcanthrow theswitch,killinghimorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthemendie.

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Markthenrecognizesthatthemanonthesidetrackissomeonewhohehateswitha passion. Idontgiveadamnaboutsavingthosefivemen,Markthinkstohimself,but thisismychancetokillthatbastard. IsitmorallypermissibleforMarktothrowtheswitch inordertokillthemanontheside 13 track? ModifiedBystander Problem#3(Richard:BetterAlternative) Richardistakinghisdaily walknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Richardseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrain sawfivemenwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailed, andthedriverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofast thattheywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Richardisstanding nexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack,thereby preventingitfromkillingthemen.Unfortunately,thereisamanonthesidetrackwith hisbackturned.Richardcanthrowtheswitch,killinghimorhecanrefrainfromdoing this,lettingthemendie. Bypullinganemergencycord,Richardcanalsoredirectthetraintoathirdtrack,where nooneisatrisk.IfRichardpullsthecord,noonewillbekilled.IfRichardthrowsthe switch,onepersonwillbekilled.IfRicharddoesnothing,fivepeoplewillbekilled. IsitmorallypermissibleforRichardtothrowtheswitch? ModifiedBystanderProblem#4(Steve:DisproportionalDeath) Steveistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Steveseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawa manwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthe driverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardtheman.Itismovingsofastthathewill notbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Steveisstandingnexttoaswitch, whichhecanthrow,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingitfrom killingtheman.Unfortunately,thereare fivemen standingonthesidetrackwiththeir backsturned.Stevecanthrowtheswitch,killingthefivemenorhecanrefrainfrom doingthis,lettingtheonemandie. IsitmorallypermissibleforStevetothrowtheswitch?

Inthefirstscenario,theagent(Mark)contemplateswhethertothrowtheswitch,notforthe purposeofsavingthemen,butforthepurposeofkillingthemanonthesidetrack(henceforth
14 IntentionalHomicide). Inthesecondscenario,theagent(Richard)mustchoosewhetherto

throwtheswitchinordertopreventthetrainfromkillingfiveatthecostofkillingone,butthere

55

isathirdoption thatwillresultinnoonebeingkilled(henceforth,BetterAlternative). Finally, inthethirdscenario,whichwasdesignedtoreplicateandextendtheresultsofExperiments23 concerningthemanipulationofgoodandbadeffects, theagent(Steve)mustchoosewhetherto throwaswitchinordertopreventarunawaytrainfromkillingoneperson,knowingthatdoing sowillcausethetraintokillfiveotherpeople(henceforthDisproportionalDeath). A withinsubjectdesignwasutilized.Eachofthe60participantsreceivedawritten questionnairecontainingtwoscenarios,including(1)oneofthesethreescenariosand(2) the original BystanderProblem (Hank). Hencetherewerethreeconditions,with20participants assignedrandomlytoeachcondition.Participantswereasked toreadthescenariosanddecide whethertheproposedactionsweremorallypermissibleandthentoexplainorjustifytheir responses.

6.2 Results 6.2.1 IntentionalHomicidev.BystanderProblem WepresenttheresultsofExperiment5instages,beginningwiththecomparisonbetween theIntentionalHomicideProblemandtheoriginalBystanderProblem(Figure19).4of20 subjectsinthisconditionjudgedtheactionconstitutingintentionalhomicide(Marksthrowing theswitch)tobepermissible.Meanwhile,16of20subjectsinthisconditionjudgedthesame action(Hanksthrowingtheswitch)intheoriginalBystanderProblem tobepermissible.This
2 differenceissignificant:x (1,N=20)=14.4,p<.001.

56

Figure19:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment5 (IntentionalHomicidevs.BystanderProblem)
16 14 12 10
2 (1,N=20)=14.4, X p<.001

Subjects

8 6 4 2 0 Intentional Homicide Bystander Problem

Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

Figure20:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment5 (BetterAlternativevs.BystanderProblem)
16 14 12 10
2 (1,N=20)=8.12, X p<.01

Subjects

8 6 4 2 0 Better Alternative Bystander Problem

Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

57

Figure21:MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment5 (DisproportionateDeathvs.BystanderProblem)
18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Disproportional Death Bystander Problem

2 (1,N=20)=7.03, X p<.01

Subjects

Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

6.2.2 BetterAlternativev.BystanderProblem DuetothelimitednumberofsubjectsinExperiment5,werefrainfromanalyzingour responsesbygender.Instead,weturndirectlytothecomparisonbetween theBetterAlternative ProblemandtheBystanderProblemand(Figure20).15of20subjectsinthisconditionjudged HanksthrowingtheswitchtobepermissibleintheBystanderProblem. Bycontrast, only6of 20subjectsjudgedthesameaction (Richardsthrowingtheswitch)tobepermissibleinthe
2 presenceofabetteralternative.Thisdifferenceissignificant:x (1,N=20)=8.12,p<.01.

6.2.3 DisproportionalDeathv. BystanderProblem Third,weturnto thecomparisonbetween theDisproportionalDeathProblemandthe BystanderProblemand(Figure21). 3of20subjectsinthisconditionjudgedtheaction

58

generatingDisproportionaldeath (Stevesthrowingtheswitch)tobepermissible.Bycontrast, 11of20subjectsinthisconditionjudgedthesameaction(Hanksthrowingtheswitch)inthe

2 originalBystanderProblem tobepermissible.Thisdifferenceissignificant:x (1,N=20)=7.03,

p<.01.

6.2.4 Justifications Finally,weturntoparticipantsjustificationsfortheirjudgments.Thefactthatwe utilizedawithinsubjectdesignledustoexpectthatjustificationsinExperiment5wouldbeless adequatethanthoseinExperiment1(whichusedabetweensubjectdesign)andmorelikethose inExperiment2(whichusedawithinsubjectdesign).Thispredictionwasconfirmed.Fifty threepercent(32/60)ofparticipantsgavenojustification,23%(14/60)providedlogically inadequatejustifications,while23%(14/60)providedlogicallyadequatejustificationsafigure muchclosertothepercentageoflogicallyadequatejustificationsinExperiment2(20%)thanin Experiment1(50%).

6.3 Discussion TheresultsofExperiment5lendfurthersupporttoourhypothesisthatthemoral competenceofadultsincludesintuitiveknowledgeoftheprincipleofdoubleeffect.By attributingknowledgeofthisprincipletooursubjects,wecanexplainwhytheirdeontic intuitionschangewhenthestandardBystanderProblemismodifiedsuchthat(1)thebadbutnot thegood effectsareintended,or(2)amorallypreferablealternativeisavailable.Additionally, theresultsofExperiment5confirmourpreviousfindingthatindividualsdeonticintuitionsare alsosusceptibletosystematicmanipulationofgoodandbadeffects.

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Experiment5alsoprovidesadditionalevidenceofframingeffects.Forexample,80% (16/20)ofparticipantsintheIntentionalHomicidecondition(inwhichparticipantsweregiven boththeIntentionalHomicideandBystanderProblemsinawithinsubjectdesign)and75% (15/20)ofparticipantsintheBetterAlternativecondition(inwhichparticipantsweregivenboth theBetterAlternativeandBystanderproblemsinawithinsubjectdesign)judgedthrowingthe switchintheBystanderProblemtobepermissible. Further,only55%(11/20)ofparticipantsin theDisproportionalDeathcondition(inwhichparticipantsweregivenboththeDisproportional DeathandBystanderproblemsinawithinsubjectdesign)judgedthrowingtheswitchinthe BystanderProblemtobepermissible.Thesepercentages,andparticularthelastfigure,contrast sharplywiththe95%of respondentswhojudgedthrowingtheswitchin theBystanderProblem tobepermissibleinthebetweensubjectdesignutilizedinExperiment1.Thisinturn suggests thatwhetherindividualsarepreparedtopermitforeseeablebatteryorhomicideonbroadly utilitariangroundsinthesecircumstancesmaydependonhowthatquestionisframed.However, becausethenumberofparticipantsinExperiment5wasagainrelativelysmall,werefrainfrom drawinganyfirmconclusionsaboutframingeffectsatthisstageofourinquiry andmerely identifythisissueasatopicforfutureresearch.

7. Experiment6
Experiments15weredesignedtoinvestigatethemoralcompetenceofadultsonly.In Experiment6,weextendedthisinquiryinaprovisionalwaytoincludethemoralcompetenceof childrenages812.Ourobjectivesinthisregardwerelimited.First,wewishedtodetermine whetherchildreninthisagegrouphadmoralintuitionsaboutapairofrelativelysimpletrolley problemsthatweresimilartotheintuitionsofadults.Second,andmoregenerally,wewishedto

60

explorethepotentialofusingtheseandsimilarthoughtexperimentstoinvestigatethemoral competenceofyoungchildren.AcentralpremiseofbothPiagets(1932/1965)andKohlbergs (1981,1984)theoryofmoraldevelopmentisthatthemoralconceptionsofadultsandchildren consistoffundamentallydifferentprinciples.Acorollaryistheassumptionthatmoral developmentissomethingthathappensgraduallyoverthecourseofoneslifetime,andthus shouldbeinvestigatedbymeansoflongitudinalstudies.Inthisstudy,webegantestingthese assumptionsbypresentingagroupofchildrenwithtwoofthescenariosweusedinstudyingthe moralintuitionsofadults.Finally,wewantedtoinvestigatewhetherthesechildrensmoral intuitionscouldbeexplainedwithreferencetotheprohibitionofintentionalbatteryandthe principleofdoubleeffect.Thatis,wewishedtodiscoverwhetherchildren,likeadults,would treatthesetwocasesofnecessitydifferently,dependingonwhetherbatteryisusedasan intendedmeanstoagivenendorasaforeseensideeffect.Inthisway,wesoughttoinquire whethertheseprinciplesemergeandbecomeoperativerelativelyearlyinmentaldevelopment, therebyraisingthepossibilitythatspecificpovertyofthestimulusquestionscouldbeformulated inthemoraldomain.

7.1 Method 7.1.1 Participants Participantswere30childrenages812whowererecruitedwithparental consentfrom fourmetropolitanareas:Cambridge,MassachusettsKnoxville,TennesseeToledo,Ohioand theDistrictofColumbia.Therewere14girlsand16boys.

7.1.2 StimuliandProcedure

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Twoscenarioswereused.Inthefirstscenario(Dr.Brown),whichwasmodeledonthe TransplantProblem,batterywasembeddedwithinanagentsactionplanasameans(henceforth IntentionalBattery).Inthesecondscenario(Charlie),whichwasmodeledontheTrolley Problem,batterywasembeddedwithintheagentsactionplanasasideeffect(henceforth ForeseeableBattery)(see9foractualtext). Abetweensubjectdesignwasutilized.Eachofthe30childrenwasgivenawritten questionnairecontainingeithertheIntentionalBatteryortheForeseeableBatteryscenario.The childwasfirstinstructedtoreadthescenarioandthentodecidewhethertheproposedactionit describedwaswrong.Forthepurposesofthisexperiment,wetookforgrantedthestandard assumptionindeonticlogicthatwrongislogicallyequivalenttonotmorallypermissible (Prior,1955VonWright,1951)andreasonedthatthechildrenwouldhaveaneasiertime answeringaquestionusingthetermwrongthanoneusingthephrasemorallypermissible. Thechildwasalsoaskedonaseparatepagetoprovideanexplanationforhisorherresponse.15 childrenweregiventheIntentionalBatteryscenarioand15weregiventheForeseeableBattery scenario.Assignmentofparticipanttoscenariotypewasrandom.

7.2 Results 7.2.1 Judgments ThemainresultsofExperiment6aresummarizedinFigure22.6of15childreninthe IntentionalBatteryconditionjudgedtheactionconstitutingintentionalbatterytobepermissible. Bycontrast,14ofthe15childrenintheForeseeableBatteryconditionjudgedtheaction

2 constitutingunintentionalbatterytobepermissible.Thisdifferenceissignificant:x (1,N=30)=

9.6,p<0.01.

62

Figure22: MoralJudgmentsofTwoActTypesinExperiment5 (IntentionalBatteryvs.ForeseeableBattery)

14 12 10
2 (1,N=30)=9.6, X p<.01

Subjects

8 6 4 2 0 Intentional Battery Foreseeable Battery Permiss. Impermiss.

ActType

7.2.2 Justifications Duetothelimitednumberofparticipantsinthisexperiment,werefrainfromanalyzing

15 participantsresponsesbygender. Instead,weturntochildrensexpressedjustificationsfor

theirjudgments.Thesejustificationswerecategorizedaccordingtothesamecodingscheme usedinourpreviousexperiments.46.7%(14/30)ofparticipantsgavenojustification,13.3% (4/30)providedlogicallyinadequatejustifications,while40%(12/30)providedlogically adequatejustifications.

7.3 Discussion AlthoughtheresultsofExperiment6arelimited,theyconstituteatleastsomeinitial evidencethatthemoralcompetenceof812yearoldchildrenincludestheprohibitionof

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intentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdoubleeffect.Putdifferently,theysuggestthatsimple deontologicalorconsequentialistprinciplesalonemaybeinadequatetodescribetheintuitive moralknowledgeofchildrenages812.Moregenerally,theseresultssupporttheefficacyof usingtrolleyproblemstoinvestigatethemoralcompetenceofchildren,notonlythoseofthisage groupbutpossiblyevenmuchyoungerpopulations. Thisconclusionissignificantinpart becausetrolleyproblemsarequalitativelymorecomplexthanthequestionsusedbyresearchers inthePiagetiantradition(see8.2.1). Turningtoadequacyofjustifications,itisnotablethatthejustificationsofferedby childreninExperiment6wereonlymarginallylessadequatethanthecorresponding justificationsofferedbyadultsinExperiment1(whichalsorelieduponrelativelysimpletrolley problemspresentedinabetweensubjectdesign).Inparticular,thepercentageofchildrenwho providedlogicallyadequatejustifications(40%or12/30)comparesfavorablywiththe percentageofadults(50%or20/40)ofadultswhodidsoinExperiment1.Nevertheless,aswas thecasewithadults,manyoftheselogicallyadequatejustificationsweremanifestlyincapableof accountingforthedivergentpatternofintuitionselicitedinthisexperiment,inwhichsavingfive peopleatthecostofkillingonepersonisfelttobepermissibleinonecasebutnottheother. HenceExperiment6providesfurtherevidencethat,likeadults,childrenages812possess unconsciousmoralknowledgethatmaybelargelyinaccessibletodeliberateintrospection. TwofurthertentativeconclusionsmaybedrawnfromExperiment6.First,togetherwith theresultsofourpreviousexperiments,theresultsofExperiment6implythatatleastsomeof theoperativeprinciplesofmoralcompetence,suchasthedistinctionbetweenintendedmeans andforeseensideeffect,areinvariantthroughoutthecourseofmoraldevelopment,atleast betweenages865.Thisconclusionrunscountertooneofthemostbasicassumptionsofboth

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Piagets(1932/1965)andKohlbergs(1981,1984)approachtomoraldevelopment,accordingto whichtheadultsandchildsmoralcompetencearecomprisedoffundamentallydifferent principles.Acorollaryofthisassumptionistheviewthatmoraldevelopmentissomethingthat happensgraduallyoverthecourseofoneslifetime,andthusshouldbeinvestigatedbymeansof longitudinalstudies.ThefindingsofExperiment6callatleastsomeaspectsofthisinvestigative procedureintoquestion,raisingthepossibilitythat,likelanguage,vision,andothercognitive systems,moraldevelopmentinvolvespredeterminedcriticalstages,afterwhichmoral competencemoreorlessstabilizes. Finally,theresultsofExperiment6alsosuggest,atleasttentatively,thatitmaybe possibletoformulatepovertyofthestimulusargumentsinthemoraldomain.Whilethis possibilityistheoreticallyintriguing,werefrainfromdrawinganyfirmconclusionsaboutithere. Instead,wesimplynotethatmoreexperimentalworkmustbedonetodeterminewhethercertain complexmoralprinciples,suchasthoseinvestigatedhere,areexplicitlytaughtorotherwise availabletothedevelopingchildduringtheacquisitionprocess(Harman,2000Mikhail,2000). Offhand,thisseemsunlikely,particularlyinlightofthediscoverythatadultsdonotexplainor justifytheirownmoralintuitionswithreferencetotheseprinciples.Indeed,thefactthatatleast someoperativemoralprinciplesappeartobenonintrospectiblemakesitplausibletosuppose thattheseprinciplesarenottaughttosuccessivegenerationsexplicitly.Hencewemay reasonablyassume,asaworkinghypothesis,thattheyarethedevelopmentalconsequencesofan innatecognitivefaculty(Mikhail,2000Mikhailetal.,1998).However,thisassumptionis largelyspeculativeandtheissuerequiresmoreempiricalinvestigation.

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8. GeneralDiscussion
Takentogether,thestudiespresentedhereconstitutesignificantevidencethatadults possessintuitiveorunconsciousknowledgeofcomplexmoralprinciples,includingthe prohibitionofintentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdoubleeffect.Additionally,Experiment6 providessomeevidenceforinferringthatthesamemaybetrueofages8to12.Byattributing thisknowledgetoexperimentalsubjects,wecanpredictandexplaintheirmoralintuitions. Becausetheimputedknowledgeisintuitiveandnotfullyopentoconsciousintrospection,wecan alsoadvanceatentativeexplanationofwhyrelativelyfewindividualsappearcapableof providinglogicallyadequatejustificationsoftheirjudgments,evenonanextremelypermissive interpretationofwhatcountsaslogicallyadequate,andwhyvirtuallynoindividualsappear capableofprovidingobservationallyadequatejustifications,thatis,justificationsfromwhichthe systematicpatternofintuitionselicitedbytheseexperimentscanbemechanicallyderived(see 1.1).Theexplanation,simplyput,isthatmoralcognitionappearstoinvolveunconscious computation,thatis,mentaloperationswhicharenotconsciouslyaccessible.Inthisrespect, moralcognitionmaybecomparedtoothercognitivecapacities,suchaslanguage,vision,object perception,andfacerecognition,allofwhichalsoinvolveunconsciouscomputation.Human language,inparticular,iswellunderstoodtodependonmentalprocessesthatarefarbeyondthe levelofactualorevenpotentialconsciousness(Chomsky,1965,p.8).Hencethediscrepancy betweenmoraljudgmentsandjustificationsobservedhereisinkeepingwiththenontransparent characterofmentalactivitygenerally.Withintheexpositoryframeworkwehaveadopted,the phenomenacanbeexplainedrathereasilywithreferencetotheanalogytolinguisticcompetence: Justasnormalpersonsaretypicallyunawareoftheprinciplesguidingtheirmorallinguistic
16 intuitions,sotooaretheyoftenunawareoftheprinciplesguidingtheirmoralintuitions.

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In8.2,weelaborateonthesefindingsandplacethemwithinabroadercontextby comparingandcontrastingourapproachtothetheoryofmoralcognitionwiththoseofPiaget (1932/1965),Kohlberg(1981),andGreeneetal.(2001).Beforedoingso,however,weturn directlyin8.1toamoreextensivediscussionoftheunconsciousmentalrepresentationsthat appeartobetriggeredbythoughtexperimentslikethetrolleyproblems.

8.1 DescribingtheOperativePrinciples InFigure2(see1.2),wesketchedanexpandedperceptualmodelformoraljudgment, accordingtowhichpermissibilityjudgmentsdonotnecessarilydependonthesurfacestructure ofanactiondescription,butonhowthatactionismentallyrepresented.Themaintheoretical problemwithinthisframeworkisaninformationprocessingproblem,namely:Howdopeople managetocomputeafullstructuraldescriptionoftheactionthatincorporatescertainproperties, suchasends,means,sideeffects,andprimafacie wrongslikebattery,whenthestimulus containsnodirectevidencefortheseproperties?Thisissimilarinprincipletodetermininghow peoplemanagetoextractathreedimensionalrepresentationfromatwodimensionalstimulusin thetheory ofvision(e.g.,Marr,1982),ortodetermininghowpeopletorecognizetheword boundariesinanundifferentiatedauditorystimulusinthetheoryoflanguage(e.g.,Chomsky& Halle,1968).Inourcase,thequestionishowandwhyindividualsmaketheinferencestheydo aboutthevariousagentsandactionsinourexamples,evenwhenwedeliberatelydeprivethemof directevidenceofthoseagentsmentalstatesandothermorallysalientproperties. AsFigure23depicts,thisproblemmaybedividedintoatleastfourmainparts. Presumably,tocomputeamorallycognizablestructuraldescriptionofagivenaction,onemust

67

PERMISSIBLE INPUT

STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTION

?
IMPERMISSIBLE

Stimulus: FactPattern

Conversion Rules

Unconscious Mental Representation

DeonticRules

Perceptual Response: Moral Judgment

Figure2:ExpandedPerceptualModelforMoralJudgment

68

INPUT

Stimulus: FactPattern

Temporal Structure

Causal Structure

Moral Structure

Intentional Structure

ConversionRules
Fig.23:ComponentsofConversionfromStimulustoStructuralDescription

69

generateacomplexmentalrepresentationofthatactionwhichencodesrelevantinformation aboutitstemporalproperties,itscausalproperties,itsmoralproperties,anditsintentional properties.Buthowdoestheindividualmanagetoextracttherelevantcuesfromthestimulus andconvertwhatisgivenintoafullstructuraldescription?Thefollowingisonehypothesis (Mikhail,2000).

8.1.1 TemporalStructure Theprocessappearstoincludethefollowingsteps.First,onemustidentifythemorally relevantactiondescriptionscontainedinthestimulusandorderthemseriallyaccordingtotheir relativetemporalproperties.Forexample,intheBystanderProblem,onemustrecognizethat HanksseeingwhathappenedoccursbeforeHanksthrowingtheswitch,whichoccurs beforeHankskillingtheman(Figure24).

(m) t

(0) t

(+n) t

[Hanksseeingwhathappened]

[Hanksthrowingtheswitch]

[Hankskillingtheman]

Fig.24:TemporalOrderofThreeActRepresentationsintheBystanderProblem

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Thereisanimportantconventionthatthistimelineincorporates,whichistodatean
(0) (+n) actionfromitstimeofcompletion.Anactthatbeginsatt andendsatt isinasense (0), (+n) performedneitheratt noratt , butinthatperiodoftimeboundedbythem.Forpresent

purposes,wesimplifythissituationbyfollowingtraditionaljurisprudenceinlocatingthetimeof anactionaccordingtowhenitiscompleted(Salmond,1902/1966).

8.1.2 CausalStructure Second,onemustinterpretthemorallyrelevantactiondescriptionscontainedinthe stimulusintermsoftheirbasiccausalandothersemanticproperties.Forexample,onemust identifyandinterpretcausativeexpressionssuchasHankkilledtheman,Hankpreventedthe trainfromkillingthemen,andHankletthemendieintermsoftheirunderlyingsemantic structures.Figure25illustratesboththesurfaceandsemanticstructuresofHankkilledthe man.Figures26and27dothesameforthesemanticstructuresofHankpreventedthe train fromkillingthemenandHankletthemendie,respectively.

S NP N V Det VP NP N Agent

Cause

Effect Patient Event

Hank

killed

the

man

(person)

(death)

Fig.25:SurfaceandSemanticStructuresofHankkilledtheman

71

S1 Agent Cause Neg Agent Cause Patient Effect Event Effect S2

(person)(death)

Fig.26: SemanticStructureof Hankpreventedthetrainfromkillingthemen

S1 Agent Cause Neg Agent Cause Neg Agent Cause Patient (person) Effect Event (death) Effect S3 Effect S2

Fig.27: SemanticStructureof Hankletthemendie

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Additionally,presumablyby relyinginparton temporal information(Kant,1787/1953), onemustcomputearepresentationofthecausal structureoftherelevantactsandomissionsin theformofacausalchainororderedsequenceofcausesandeffects.Figure28illustratesoneof threesuchcausalchainsatissueintheBystanderProblem,namely,thechainlinkingtheagents throwingtheswitchtotheoutcomeofkillingtheman. Atleasttwofurthercausalchainsmust begenerated,thefirstlinkingthesameaction(throwingtheswitch)totheoutcomeof preventingthetrainfromkillingthemen,andthesecondconnectingtheforbearanceofthis action(notthrowingtheswitch)tothe outcomeoflettingthemendie.(InFigure28,theeffect ofcausingthetraintohitthemenisplacedinbracketstosignifythatthisrepresentation,unlike theothers,isnotderiveddirectlyfromanactiondescriptioncontainedinthestimulus,butrather mustbeinferredfromassumptionsabouthowobjectsinteractwithoneanother,presumablyin accordwithcertaincoreknowledgeofcontactmechanics(Carey&Spelke,1994Spelke, Breinlinger&Jacobson,1992).Inotherwords,thebracketsidentifyonelocationinthecausal chainwherethemindsuppliesthemissinginformation(Pinker,1997,p.28)thatkillingthe maninthesecircumstancesrequirescausingthetraintocomeintocontactwithhim.)

Agent Cause

Effect Cause

Effect Cause

Effect Cause

Effect

Patient

Event

Patient Event Patient Event Patient Event

(thing) (move) (thing) (move) (thing) (contact) (person) (death) Hank switch throw train turn [train] [hit] man kill

Fig.28:Causal ChainGeneratedbyThrowingSwitchinBystanderProblem 73

8.1.3 MoralStructure Third,onemustapplythemoralprincipledeathisbadtothesemanticstructuresin Figures2527,transformingeachofthosestructuresintoanewonethatencodesabadeffect. Figure29illustratesthisoperationinthecaseofthesemanticstructureofHankkilledtheman.

S Agent Cause Patient (person) Effect Event (death) Agent

Cause Patient (person)

BadEffect Event (death)

Fig.29:MoralTransformationofHankkilledtheman

Thisoperationstates thataneffectwhichconsistsofthedeathofapersonisabadeffect,and mayberewrittenassuch. Likewise,onemustapply thelogical principlepreventingabad effectisgood to themorallytransformedstructureofsentenceslikeHankpreventedthetrain fromkillingthemen,therebyconvertingthatstructureintoonethatencodesagoodeffect.

S1 Agent Cause Neg Agent Cause BadEffect Effect S2 Agent

S1

Cause Neg

GoodEffect S2

Agent Cause BadEffect

Fig.30:ConversionofTransformofHank preventedthetrainfromkillingtheman

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Thisoperationstatesthataneffectwhichconsistsofthenegationofabadeffectisagoodeffect, andmayberewrittenassuch(Figure30). Additionally,onemustapplythelogical principlefailingtopreventabadeffectisbad tothemorallytransformedstructureofsentenceslikeHankletthemendie,therebyconverting thatstructureintoanotheronethatencodesasecond,overarchingbadeffect:

S1 Agent Cause Neg Agent Cause Neg Agent Cause BadEffect GoodEffect S3 Effect S2 Agent Cause

S1 BadEffect Neg Agent Cause Neg Agent Cause BadEffect GoodEffect S3 S2

Fig.31:Conversionof Transformof Hank letthemendie

Thisoperationstatesthataneffectwhichconsistsofthenegationofagoodeffectisabadeffect, andmayberewrittenassuch (Figure31). 8.1.4 IntentionalStructure Fourth,onemustapply whatmaybecalledapresumptionofgoodintentionsto the representationalstructureswhichhavebeengenerateduptothispoint,therebyconvertingthem intonewstructuresthatrepresenttheintentionalpropertiesofthegivenaction.Thatis,taking therepresentationofanactionwithbothgoodandbadeffectsasinput,onemust(absent countervailinginformationofthetypepresentedintheIntentionalHomicideProblemin6) generatetheintentionalstructureoftheactionbyidentifyingthegoodeffectastheintended

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effectorgoaloftheaction andthebadeffectastheforeseenbutunintendedsideeffect.This operation canalsoberepresentedgraphically(Mikhail,2000seealsoDonagan,1977Goldman, 1970).InFigure32,forexample,thetree diagramontheleftrepresentsonepartofthe underlyingstructure,notofasentence,butofanactionwithbothgoodandbadeffectsthatwe maypresumethemindspontaneously constructsuponencounteringthoughtexperimentslikethe trolleyproblems. ThearrowinFigure32indicatesthatthisacttreemustbeconvertedintothe tree diagramontheright,whichinturn signifiesthattheintendedoutcomeofSsaction,her ultimateaim orgoal,istoachievethegoodeffect(asrepresentedbytheverticalchainofmeans andendsconnectingthebaseofthetreetoitsfinalend),whereasthebadeffectisanunintended sideeffect.

[BadEffect]

[GoodEffect]

[BadEffect]

[GoodEffect]

(a) C [SsVingatt ]

(a) C [SsVingatt ]

Fig.32: GenerationofIntentionalStructureofActwithGoodandBadEffects

Notethatsomeoperationofthisgeneralcharactermustbepostulated toexplainhowthe mind/braincomputesintendedandnonintendedeffects,sincecruciallythereisnomental stateinformationinthestimulusitself. Intheoperationdepictedhere,thepresumptionofgood intentionsactsasadefaultprinciplewhichsays,ineffect,thatunlessevidencetothecontraryis presented,thedecisionmakeristoassumethattheagent,S,isaperson ofgoodwill,who

17 intendsandpursuesgoodeffectsandavoidsbadones. Inparticular,thepresumptiondirects

76

onetoassumethatS intendstopreventthetrainfromkillingthemen andregardskillingtheman asanunintendedsideeffect(Figure33).

[killingtheman][preventingthetrain fromkillingthemen]

[killingtheman]

[preventingthetrain fromkillingthemen]

[throwingtheswitch] [throwingtheswitch]

Fig.33:GenerationofIntentionalStructureinTrolleyProblems

8.1.5 AdditionalMoral/DeonticStructure Theactrepresentationsconceptualizedthusfararecomplexinthattheyrepresentthe givenactionsintermsofmorallysalientpropertieslikeends,means,andsideeffects,even thoughthestimuluscontainsnodirectevidenceoftheseproperties.Nevertheless,these representationsarenecessarybutnotsufficienttodistinguishthetrolley problemsinaccordwith theircorrespondingmoralintuitions.ThetreestructuredepictedontherightsideofFigure33, forexample,appliesequallytobothoftheloopedtrackscenariosusedinExperiment4,andthe generaldistinctionitcaptures,betweenthegoalofpreventingthedeathoffivepersonsandthe sideeffectofkillingoneperson,isapropertysharedbymostofthetrolleyproblemswehave discussedsofar.Hencetheseintuitionscanbeadequatelyexplainedonlybyattributingsome additionalmoral ordeonticstructuretotherepresentationstheseproblemselicit. Whatadditionalstructureisneeded?Thespecifichypothesiswehaveadvancedhereis thattherelevantactionsmustberepresentedintermsof primafaciewrongs,suchasbatteryor homicide.Forexample,intheFootbridgeProblem,onemustderivearepresentationofbattery

77

byinferringthat(1)theagentmusttouch themaninordertothrowhimontothetrackinthepath ofthetrain,and(2)themanwouldnotconsent to beingtouchedinthismanner,becauseofhis desireforselfpreservation(andbecausenoevidenceisgiventothecontrary).Utilizing standardnotationinactiontheory(e.g.,Mikhail,2000Goldman,1970)anddeductivelogic (e.g.,Leblanc&Wisdom,1993),thislineofreasoningcanbeformalizedinthefollowing derivation(Figure34):

(0) C 1.[Iansthrowingthemanatt ] (0) 2.[Iansthrowingthemanat t ] (0) 3.[Ianthrowsthemanat t ] (0) (0) 4.[Ianthrowsthemanat t ] [Iantouchesthemanat t ] (0) 5.[Iantouchesthemanat t ] (0) 6.[Themanhasnotexpresslyconsentedtobetouchedat t ] (0) (+n) 7.[Ianthrowsthemanat t ] [Iankillsthemanatt ] (0) (+n) 8.[[Ianthrowsthemanat t ] [Iankillsthemanatt ]] (0) [themanhasnotimplicitlyconsentedtobetouchedat t ] . (0) [themanwouldnotconsenttobeingtouchedat t , ifasked] (0) 9.[themanhasnotimplicitlyconsentedtobetouchedat t ] (0) 10.[themanwouldnotconsenttobetouchedat t , ifasked] 11.[Iantouchesthemanwithouthisexpress,implicit,orhypothetical (0) consentat t ] 12.[Iantouchesthemanwithouthisexpress,implicit,orhypothetical (0) (0) consentat t ] [Iancommitsbatteryat t ] (0) 13.[Iancommitsbatteryat t ] (0) 14.[Ianscommittingbatteryatt ]

________________ Given 2LinguisticTransformation Analytic 3,4ModusPonens Given Given

18 SelfPreservationPrinciple 7,8ModusPonens 7,8ModusPonens 4,5,9,10

Definition 11,12ModusPonens LinguisticTransformation

Fig.34:DerivationofRepresentationofBatteryintheFootbridgeProblem

Additionally,onemustlocatetherepresentationoftheseprimafaciewrongswhichare derivedinthismannerinthecorrecttemporal,causal,andintentionallocationinonesacttree, therebyidentifyingwhethertheyareanintendedand/orpriormeanstoagivenend,ora subsequentand/orforeseensideeffect.Forexample,onemustlocatethebatteriescommittedin theFootbridgeandBystanderProblemsinthemannerdepictedinFigures34,butnotinFigures 3536.

78

Dspreventingthetrain (+n+o) fromkillingthemen att Dskillingtheman (+n+p) att

(+n) Dscommittingbatteryatt

End

Side Effects

Dscausingthetrain (+n) tohittheman att

(0) Dscommittingbatteryatt

Means

(0) Dsthrowingtheman att

Fig.3:MentalRepresentationofFootbridgeProblem

Dskillingtheman (+n+o+p) att Dscommittingbattery (+n+o) att Dscausingthetrain (+n+o) tohitthemanatt Dspreventingthetrain (+n) fromkillingthemenatt
(+n) Dsturningthetrainatt

End

SideEffects

(0) Dsthrowingtheswitchatt

Fig.4:MentalRepresentationofBystanderProblem

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Dscommitting (+n+p) batteryatt Dskillingtheman (+n+p) att

(+n+o) Dscommittingbatteryatt

End

Dspreventingthetrain (+n+o) fromkillingthemenatt

Side Effects

Dscausingthetrain (+n) tohitthemanatt

(0) Dsthrowingtheman att

Means

Fig.35:InaccurateRepresentationofFootbridgeProblem

Dskillingtheman (+n+o+p) att Dscausingthetrain (+n+o) tohitthemanatt

Dspreventingthetrain (+n) fromkillingthemenatt

End

(+n) Dsturningthetrainatt

(0) Dscommittingbatteryt

Means

SideEffects
(0) Dsthrowingtheswitchatt

Fig.36:InaccurateRepresentationofBystanderProblem

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Finally,onceonehasgeneratedafullstructuraldescriptionoftheagentsactionthat encodesinformationaboutitstemporal,causal,moral,andintentionalproperties,aswellasthe locationofitsprimafaciewrongssuchasbattery,onemustapplytherelevantsubstantivemoral principlesordeonticrules(e.g., theprohibitionof intentional batteryandtheprincipleofdouble effect)tothatstructuraldescription. Whiletheforegoingaccountisincomplete,acompletetheoryofthestepsconverting proximalstimulustoperceptualresponsebymeansofamorallycognizablestructuraldescription canbegivenalongtheselines.Inprinciple,acomputerprogramcouldbewrittenthatcould executetheseoperationsfromstarttofinish. Thetheorypresentedherethusgoessomeway toward achievingthefirsttwoofMarrs(1982)threelevelsatwhichanyperceptualinformation processingtaskmaybeunderstood,namely,thecomputationallevelandtherepresentationand algorithmlevel. Inthissense,the theory isarguablyamajorstepforwardintermsof satisfying thedemandsof bothobservational anddescriptiveadequacy.

8.2 ContrastwithAlternativeFrameworks 8.2.1 ContrastwithPiagetsFramework:Complexvs.SimpleActs Fromthepointofviewofthetheoryofmoralcognitionandmoraldevelopment,the thoughtexperimentstestedintheseinvestigationsarefascinatingforseveralreasons.Perhaps themostimportantreasonisthattheyarequalitativelymorecomplexthanthestimulusmaterials usedby researchersworkingwithinthePiagetiantradition.Aswementionedin1,inhis originalstudiesPiaget(1932/1965)soughttoaddresstheproblemofdescriptiveadequacyby focusingattentiononthesubjectiveandobjectiveelementsofmoraljudgment.Tothisend, heaskedchildrentocompareanactioncharacterizedbygoodintentions(e.g.,helpingmomset thetable)whosenegativeconsequencesweresignificant(e.g.,breakingfifteencups)withan actioncharacterizedbybadintentions(e.g., takingacookiefromthecookiejar)whose

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negativeconsequenceswereslight(e.g.,breakingonecup),andtodeterminewhichagentwas naughtier.Piagetdiscoveredthatuntilaroundagenine,childrentendedtojudgetheagent whoseactionischaracterizedbythegoodintention/greaternegativeconsequences combinationtobenaughtier.Afteragenine,thisresponsepatternchanged:theolderchildren tendedtojudgethattheagentwhoseactionischaracterizedbythebadintention/slightnegative consequencecombinationwasnaughtier.ItwasonthisbasisthatPiagetconcludedthat childrenbasedtheirmoraljudgmentsoneffects,notintentions,untilaroundagenine. Assubsequentresearchershavenoted,Piagetsconclusionswereunjustified,becausehe usedstoriesthatcovariedtwoandsometimesthreeparametersatonce.Theexactroleplayed byintentionsandconsequencesinthechildrensjudgmentswasthereforeimpossibleto determine.Toremedythissituation,researchersmodifiedPiagetsprocedurebypresenting childrenwithstorieswhichpermittedtheindependentvariationofintentionandconsequence parametersalongtwodimensions,goodandbad.Inthisway,subjectscouldbepresented withactionscharacterizedbyoneoffourpossiblecombinationsoffeatures:(1)good intention/goodeffect,(2)goodintention/badeffect,(3)badintention/goodeffect,and(4) badintention/badeffect. InoneofNelsons(1980)experiments,forexample,childrenweregivenfourdifferent storiestoevaluate.Inthefirst,aboy,whoseeshisfriendissadbecausehedoesnothave anythingtoplaywith,throwsaballtowardhisfriendinordertoplaycatchwithhimandcheer himup(goodintention).Thefriendcatchestheballandishappy(goodeffect).Inthesecond, theboythrowstheballwiththesameintention(goodintention)butendsuphittinghisfriendon theheadandmakinghimcry(badeffect).Inthethird,theboyismadathisfriendthatdayand throwstheballtowardhiminordertohithimwithit(badintention).However,thefriend

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catchestheballandishappy(goodeffect).Finally,inthefourth,theboyagainthrowstheballat hisfriendinordertohithimwithit(badintention).Thistimehesucceedsin hittinghisfriend ontheheadwiththeballandmakinghimcry(badeffect).WhenNelsonpresentedthesefour storiestoherexperimentalsubjects,shediscoveredthatchildrenasyoungasthreeyearsofage utilizedinformationaboutintentionswhenmakingmoraljudgments(Nelson,1980).

Table5.MoralJudgmentsElicitedbyTrolley,Transplant,Bystander,andFootbridge ProblemsasaFunctionofPiagetsVariables
Problem(Agent) Trolley(Charlie) Transplant(Dr.Brown) Bystander(Denise) Footbridge(Nancy) Bystander(Hank) Footbridge(Ian) GoodEffect Preventing5deaths Preventing5 deaths Preventing5deaths Preventing5deaths Preventing5deaths Preventing5 deaths BadEffect 1Death 1Death 1Death 1Death 1Death 1Death GoodIntention (UltimateAimor Goal) Preventing5deaths Preventing5deaths Preventing5deaths Preventing5deaths Preventing5deaths Preventing5deaths Deontic Status Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible

AlthoughexperimentssuchasNelsons,whichpermittedtheindependentvariationof intentionsandeffects,wereanimprovementonPiagetsoriginalstudies,theynonetheless limitedtheirattentiontowhatwemightcallmorallysimpleacts,i.e.,actswhosemental representationsarecharacterizedbyonlyonemorallysalient(goodorbad)ultimateintention (i.e.,purposeorgoal)andonlyonemorallysalient(goodorbad)effect.Bycontrast,the examplesweinvestigateherearemorecomplex,becausetheyinvolveactrepresentationswhich arecomprisedofmultipleintentionsandwhichgeneratebothgoodandbadeffects.Moreover,as Table5reveals,threeofthefourvariablesinthePiagetianframeworkgoodandbadeffects andgoodintention(i.e.,ultimateaim,purposeorgoal)areheldconstantintheTrolley, Transplant,Footbridge,andBystanderProblems,whilethefourth badintention isnot relevant.Thissuggeststhatsomeotherpropertyorpropertiesareresponsibleforthedivergent moraljudgmentsgeneratedbytheseexamples. 83

Thekeyinsightofourpaperisthattheseintuitionscanbeadequatelyexplainedonlyby drawingoncomplexmoralandlegalprinciples,suchastheprohibitionofintentionalbatteryand theprincipleofdoubleeffect.Piagetemphasizedwhathecalledthejuridicalcomplexityof childrensmoraljudgmentsandobservedthat,tounderstandthosejudgments,psychologists mustfamiliarizethemselveswiththecommonlaw(Piaget,1932/1965,pp.20,13).Yet Piagetsownstimulusmaterialsoftenfailedtotestforcommonlegaldistinctions,suchasthose betweenjustificationandexcuse,recklessnessandnegligence,proximateandremotecausation, orwhatappearsmostrelevanthereintendedandforeseeneffects. Piagetmaynotbealoneinthisregard.AsRobinsonandDarley(1995)haveobserved, manysocialscientistsseekingtodescribesocialnormsandthecommunityssenseofjustice appeartorelyondefinitionsandconceptsthatarebothdescriptivelyinadequateandlegally inaccurate.Asaresult,theyoftenunderestimatethesubtletyandcomplexityoflaypersons intuitivegraspoflegalconceptsanddistinctions.Andtheyoftenbegimportantquestionsabout howmoralknowledgeisacquired.Forexample,inarecentwideranginglawreviewarticle criticizingtheroleofmoralintuitionsinlegalanalysis,KaplowandShavellinsistthatnorms mustberelativelysimplebecausetheymustbeimpartedtochildrenandappliedwithout sustainedanalysis(Kaplow&Shavell,2001,p.1033).KaplowandShavellsobservationbegs thequestionwhetherandtowhatextentnormsareimpartedtochildreninanymeaningful sense.Ifmoralityislikelanguage,someoftheprinciplesgeneratingourmoralintuitionsmay turnouttobeinnateindeed,assomecommentatorshaveargued,theprincipleofdoubleeffect mayturnouttobeonesuchprinciple(Harman,2000).Inanycase,wewouldsimplyobserve thatitseemshighlyquestionablefornormstheoristslikeKaplowandShavelltoinvertthe logicalrelationshipofdescriptiveandexplanatoryadequacyinthisfashion.Thesuccessof

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researchprogramsinothercognitivedomainssuggeststhattheoriginofourmoralintuitionscan beadequatelyinvestigatedonlyinsofarastheirstructureisclearlyunderstood.

8.2.2 ContrastwithKohlbergsFramework:Operativevs.ExpressPrinciples Manyresearchprogramsinmoralcognitiondonotdistinguishsharplybetweenmoral judgmentandmoralreasoningandtacitlyassumethatmoralprinciplesareintrospectible. PerhapsthemostinfluentialresearchprogramofthistypeistheonedevelopedbyLawrence Kohlberg(1958,1981,1984).OnKohlbergsview,Piagetwascorrecttoassumethatthe capacityformoraljudgmentpassesthroughaseriesofdevelopmentalstages.However,whereas Piagetproposedtwobroadstages,Kohlbergstheorypostulatessix.Further,although KohlbergstheoryispartiallybasedonPiagets,hisconclusionsarefarbettersupported empirically. TheaspectofKohlbergsframeworkmostrelevanttoourdiscussionconcernshisfocus ontheexplicitstatementspeoplemaketojustifyorexplaintheirmoraljudgments.Kohlberg assessedmoraldevelopmentbyhavingtrainedresearcherscodeanexperimentalsubjectsstated justificationsforherdecisionsonaseriesofmoraldilemmas.Oneofhisbestknownpuzzlesis theHeinzdilemma,whichdealswiththeexampleofamanwhosewifeslifecanbesaved onlybyamedicinehecannotafford.Underthesecircumstances,woulditberightforthemanto stealthedrug?Kohlbergandhisassociatesputtheseandsimilarquestionstochildrenandadults ofallages,askingthemtojustifywhateverdecisiontheyreached.Byevaluatingnotthe decisionitselfbutthejustificationaccompanyingit,Kohlberg(1981,1984)claimedtodiscover thatmoraldevelopmentprogressesthroughanunvaryingsequenceofsixstages.

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Kohlbergsoveralltheoryisrichandcomplex,andwemakenoefforttoevaluateit systematicallyhere.Instead,wesimplynotethatourinvestigationsappeartoconfirminrather dramaticfashionthatthosecommentatorswhohavequestionedKohlbergsmethodological decisiontofocusonverbalizedjustificationsratherthanmoralintuitionsthemselvesarecorrect tocriticizethisaspectofhisframework(e.g.,Darley&Shultz,1990Haidt,2001Kagan,1987 MacNamara,1990,1999Mikhail,2000). UnlikeKohlberg,wedistinguishedattheoutsetofourinvestigationsbetweenoperative moralprinciplesandexpressprinciples(1.1).Wealsoassumedthatjustasnormalpersonsare typicallyunawareoftheprinciplesguidingtheirlinguisticintuitions,sotooaretheyoftenunaware oftheprinciplesguidingtheirmoralintuitions.Further,basedonbothinformalobservation anda reviewoftherelevantliterature,wepredictedthatanempiricalinvestigationofthetrolley problemswouldrevealthatoursubjectslocusofmoralcertitude(Jonsen&Toulmin,1988) wouldbetheirintuitivejudgmentsthemselves,nottheirunderlyingjustification. Ourstudiesconfirmedthisprediction.Whentheparticipantsinourexperimentswere askedtoprovideverbalrationalesfortheirjudgments,theywereconsistentlyincapableof articulatingtheoperativeprinciplesonwhichtheirjudgmentswerebased(Table6).Indeed,in sharpcontrastwithKohlbergs(1981,1984)findingsconcerningtherelevanceofdemographic variableslikegender,nationality,age,andeducation,butinaccordwithourexpectations,our subjectsmoraljudgmentswerewidelyshared,irrespectiveofthesefactors.But,asquotations likethesereveal,oursubjects expressedprincipleswerewidelydivergent.Moreimportantly, theyconsistentlyfailedtostatetheoperativereasonsfortheirjudgmentsinanytheoretically compellingsense.Theyoftensaidthingsthatwereincompatiblewiththeirownjudgments,or eveninternallyincoherent.Andtheyoftenappearedpuzzledbythenatureandstrengthoftheir

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intuitions,andbythewaythoseintuitionsshiftedwhen weintroducedsmallchangesinthe wordingoftheactionsequenceswegavethem,inordertoevokedistinctmentalrepresentations.

Table6:AdequacyofJustificationsinExperiments12and46
Experiment andDesign Experiment1: BetweenSubject (n=40) Experiment2: WithinSubject (n=65) Experiment4: BetweenSubject (n=309) Experiment5: WithinSubject (n=60) Experiment6: BetweenSubject (n=30) Degree ofLogicalAdequacy Number Responses 13 7 20 23 25 13 260 19 30 32 14 14 14 4 12 Percentage Responses 32.5 17.5 50.0 35.4 38.5 20.0 84.1 6.1 9.7 53.3 23.3 23.3 46.7 13.3 40.0

NoJustification InadequateJustification AdequateJustification NoJustification InadequateJustification AdequateJustification NoJustification InadequateJustification AdequateJustification NoJustification InadequateJustification AdequateJustification NoJustification InadequateJustification AdequateJustification

ArelatedpointworthhighlightingconcernsaquestionofmethodunderlyingKohlbergs controversialfindingsabouttheroleofgenderandotherdemographicvariablesinmoral development.AscriticssuchasGilligan(1982)haveobserved,theoriginalresearchfromwhich Kohlbergderivedhistheorywasbasedonastudyof84AmericanboysfromsuburbanChicago whosedevelopmentKohlbergfollowedforaperiodofovertwentyyears.AlthoughKohlberg claimeduniversalityforhisstagetheory,subsequentresearchrevealedthatgirlsandothergroups whowerenotincludedinKohlbergsoriginalsampletendedtoreachonlythethirdorfourth stageofhis6stagesequence(Gilligan,1982seealsoEdwards,1975Holstein,1976Simpson,

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1974).CriticslikeGilliganhavecriticizedthesefindingsastheinevitableoutcomeofaresearch programwhichisinsensitivetothefactthat,inmoralmatters,menandwomenoftenspeakina differentvoice(Gilligan,1982).Generallyspeaking,however,thesecriticshavenotstrayedfar fromKohlbergsparadigmandhavecontinuedtomeasureorotherwiseevaluatethecharacter ofanindividualsmoraljudgmentbylookingtoheractualutterances. Wethinkthedissociationbetweenmoraljudgmentsandjustificationsidentifiedhere callsintoquestiontheentireapproachofbothKohlbergandmanyofhiscritics.Simplyput,our studiessuggestthatthesepsychologistsmayhavefocusedtheirattentiononthewrong phenomena.Acomparisontothestudyoflanguageandvision,neitherofwhichconstructsa theoryofdevelopmentbasedonexpressedjustifications,bringsthepointintosharperfocus. Neitherlinguistsnorvisiontheoriststaketheposthocexplanationsofexperimentalsubjects forexample,statementsexplainingorjustifyingtheintuitionthataparticularutteranceis ungrammaticaltobetheirprimarysourceofdata.Rather,theirdataisthesubjectsintuitions themselves. Whileourfindingsclearlyestablishasignificantdiscrepancybetweenjudgmentsand justifications,itwouldbeamistaketoconcludefromwhathasbeensaidthusfarthatexpress principleshavenoevidentiaryroletoplayinthetheoryofmoralcognition.Onthecontrary,an individualsintrospectivereportsmayoftenprovideimportantandevencompellingevidencefor thepropertiesofhermoralcompetence(cf.,Chomsky,1965).Indeed,manyofthejustifications offeredbyadultsandevensomeofthejustificationsofferedbyyoungchildreninour experimentswereilluminatinginthattheyrevealedanintuitivegraspofaspecificlegalconcept. Forexample,severalofthechildrenwhoweregiventheTransplantProblemandaskedto explaintheirjudgmentsinExperiment6referredontheirowninitiativetothecrucialissueof

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lackofconsent.Oneparticipant,aneightyearoldboy,whojudgedDr.Brownscuttingupthe patienttobewrongmadethefollowingcomment: Okay,ifgivenconsent Asecondparticipant,anelevenyearoldboy,saidthefollowing: IthinkthatDr.BrownshouldaskthepersoninRoom306iftheywouldliketobecutup tosavetheotherpeopleslives. Athirdparticipant,alsoanelevenyearoldboy,said: Isaidnobecauseitneversaidthatshegavepermissiontokillhertogiveawayher bodypartsIdidnotfeelgoodaboutitbecauseIwouldnotlikesomebodytotakemy bodyparts. Finally,afourthparticipant,atwelveyearoldgirl,said: Ibelievethatitwouldbewrongtocutthis306personupwithoutthemevenknowingit. ItwouldbedifferentifDr.Brownhadaskedthispersoniftheywoulddonatetheirorgans andhehadreceivedtheirpermission.ThatiswhyIwouldblamehimifhetooktheir life. Astheseremarkssuggest,thedistinctionbetweenoperativeandexpressprinciplesdoesnot implythatresearchersshoulddisregardordiscountthesignificanceofverbalizedjustifications. Althoughnoneofthesechildrenusedthetermbatterytoexplaintheirjudgments,their commentsclearlysuggestanintuitiveappreciationforoneofthekeyelementsofbattery, namely,lackofconsent. Insum,thedistinctionbetweenoperativeandexpressprinciplesappearstovitiate,orat leastseriouslycompromise,theKohlbergparadigm,whicharguablywasthedominantapproach tothepsychologyofmoraldevelopmentinthesecondhalfofthetwentieth century (e.g.,Gilligan, 1982Kohlberg,1981,1984Rest,1983Turiel,1983).Kohlbergsstagetheoryofmoral developmentisonewhichprimarilytracksthedevelopmentofapersonsabilitytoexpressor articulatemoralprinciples.Whilethisisanimportantskill,andperhapscorrespondswiththe

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abilitytoengageinmorecomplexactsofmoralreasoning,itdoesnotnecessarilyrevealthe propertiesofmoralcompetence.Onthecontrary,asoursubjectsresponsestothetrolley problemsreveal,apersonsintrospectiveverbalreportsandgeneralviewpointabouthermoral knowledgemaysometimesbeinerror.Yet,atthesametime,asubjectsreportsmaycontain importantevidenceofthespeakersintuitiveknowledgeofaspecificlegalconcept,knowledge thatrunstheriskofbeingoverlookediftheresearcherispreoccupiedwiththesearchfor articulatejustificationsinthemannerprescribedbyKohlberg.Inthefinalanalysis,the importantpointisthat,asisthecasewithatheoryoflanguageorvision,thegoalofthetheoryof moralcognitionmustbetoexplainanidealobserversactualmoralintuitionsandtheir underlyingcognitivemechanisms,ratherthantoaccountfor anindividualsownstatements, explanations,orjustificationsofwhatsheintuitsandwhy.(Forsimilarremarksonthis inadequacyofKohlbergsframework,seegenerallyDarley&Shultz,1990Haidt,2001Kagan, 1987MacNamara,1990,1999Mikhail,2000.Forparallelremarkswithrespecttolanguage, seeChomsky,1965).

8.2.3 ContrastwiththeFrameworkofGreeneetal.:Computationvs.Emotion Arecentpaperrelyingontrolleyproblemstoinvestigatemoralcognitionwhich was publishedafterthestudiespresentedherewerelargelyconcludedandwhichhasreceived widespreadattentionisGreeneetal.(2001).Inthissection,webrieflycommentonthispaper andcontrastitwiththeinvestigationpresentedhere. Tobeginwith,wenotethattheauthorshavewrittenahighlystimulatingpaper.They deservecreditforshowinghowaproblemthathaspreoccupiedphilosopherscanbestudied usingthemethodsofbrainimaging.However,theauthorsconclusionthatthemoraljudgments

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theyexaminearecausedbydifferencesinemotionalengagementseemsdecidedlypremature. Theirstudyappearstohaveseriousmethodologicalflawswhichsuggestthisconclusionmaybe
19 suspect. Additionally,Greeneandcolleagueshavegiveninsufficientconsiderationtothe

competinghypothesisthattheirmoraldilemmaselicitmentalrepresentationswhichdifferin theirstructuralproperties.Putsimply,acomputationaltheoryofmoralcognitionhasbeenruled outtoosoon. Theauthorscentralthesisisthatthecrucialdifferencebetweenthetrolleydilemmaand thefootbridgedilemmaliesin thelatterstendencytoengagepeoplesemotionsinawaythatthe formerdoesnot.Thethoughtofpushingsomeonetohisdeathis,wepropose,moreemotionally salientthanthethoughtofhittingaswitchthatwillcauseatrolleytoproducesimilar consequences,anditisthisemotionalresponsethataccountsforpeoplestendencytotreatthese casesdifferently(Greeneetal.,2001,p. 2106).Theyadvanceafurthergeneralization:Some moraldilemmas(thoserelevantlysimilartothefootbridgedilemma)engageemotional processingtoagreaterextentthanothers(thoserelevantlysimilartothetrolleydilemma),and thesedifferencesinemotionalengagementaffectpeoplesjudgments(Greeneetal.,2001,p. 2106).Finally,onthebasisoftheseobservations,theauthorspredictandthenconfirmthat certainemotionalcentersofthebrainaremoreactivewhensubjectsrespondtotheFootbridge Problem than whentheyrespondtotheTrolleyProblem. Theseclaimspromptthreerelatedobservations.First,theauthorsdatadonotexclude thepossibilitythattheFootbridgeandTrolleyproblemsandrelatedthoughtexperimentsengage perceptualandcognitiveprocessinginsystematicallydifferentways,andthatitisthese differences,ratherthan(orinadditionto)differencesinemotion,thatinfluencepeoplesmoral judgments.Rather,theirdataareconsistentwithassumingthatpeopledistinguishpermissible

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andimpermissibleactionsforindependentreasonsandrespondemotionallyoncetheseprior determinationshavebeenmade. Second,ontheauthorsownview,someaccountoftheprocesswherebysubjects interprettheverbalstimulusandextractinformationalcuesisnotmerelypossible,butnecessary. Indeed,Greeneandcolleaguespresupposejustsuchanaccount,suggestingthatpeoplemanage toconcludethatitisacceptabletosacrificeonepersonforthesakeoffiveintheTrolleyProblem butnottheFootbridgeProblem byspontaneouslyanalyzingthesecasesintermsofthree features:whethertheactioninquestion(a)couldreasonablybeexpectedtoleadtoserious bodilyharm,(b)toaparticularpersonoramemberormembersofaparticulargroupofpeople (c)wherethisharmisnottheresultofdeflectinganexistingthreatontoadifferentparty (Greeneetal.,2001,p.2107).Greeneandcolleaguesexplaintheirsubjectsmoraljudgments andpredictpatternsofbrainactivityonthebasisofthesethreefeatures. Third,theauthorscharacterizationofthefunctionthatmapsverbalstimulustomoral responseisneithercompletenordescriptivelyadequate.Itisincompletebecausewearenottold howpeoplemanagetorecognizewhetheragivendilemmacontainsthesefeaturessurprisingly, Greeneandcolleaguesleavethisfirststepin theperceptualprocessunanalyzed.More importantly,theauthorsaccountisdescriptivelyinadequatebecauseitcannotexplainsimplebut compellingdatatowhichatheoryofmoralcognitionmustanswer. Consider,forexample,twomarginalvariationsof theFootbridgeandBystander problems,whichweinvestigatedinExperiments23andExperiment5,respectively.Inthefirst, whichwelabeledtheConsensualContactProblem(see3.1.2), arunawaytrolleythreatensto killamanwalkingacrossthetracks.Theonlywaytosavehimistothrowhimoutof thepathof thetrain.Throwingtheman,however,willseriouslyinjurehim.Inthesecond,whichwe

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labeledtheDisproportional Death Problem (see6.1.2), thesamerunawaytrolley again threatenstokill themanwalkingacrossthetracks.Thistime,theonlywaytosavethemanisto throwaswitchthatwillturnthetrolleyontoasidetrack,whereitwillkillfivepeople. Takentogether,thesetwoproblemscreateapuzzleforGreeneetal.(2001). Throwing themanoutofthepathofthetrainisanactionwhichcouldreasonablybeexpectedtoleadto seriousbodilyharmtoaparticularperson...wherethisharmisnottheresultofdeflectingan existingthreatontoadifferentparty(Greeneetal.,2001,p. 2107). Ontheauthorsaccount, therefore,itshouldbeassignedtotheirmoralpersonalcategory andjudgedimpermissible. Butacombinedtotalof93%(38/41) ofparticipantsin Experiments23thoughtthisactionwas permissible. Conversely,whileturningatrolleyontoasidetrackwhereitwillkillfivepeople insteadofoneisanactionwhichcouldreasonablybeexpectedtoleadtoseriousbodilyharmto ...aparticulargroupofpeople,itisalsotheresultofdeflectingan existingthreatontoa differentparty(Greeneetal.,2001,p.2107). Ontheauthorsaccount,therefore,itshouldbe assignedtotheirmoralimpersonalcategory andjudgedpermissible.Yet,85%(17/20)of respondentsinExperiment5 thoughtthisactionwasimpermissible.Howdidoursubjects managetocometotheseconclusions?TheanswercannotbetheoneproposedbyGreeneetal. (2001). Aswehaveargued,asimplerandmorepowerfulexplanationof allof thesemoral intuitionsisreadytohand,onethatgrowsoutoftherationalismthatGreeneandcolleaguestoo hastilyreject. Weneedonlyassumepeoplepossesstacitknowledgeof specificmoralprinciples andtheabilitytocomputementalrepresentationsofvariousactionsinmorally cognizableterms. TheoperativereasonwhypushingthemanintheFootbridgeProblemisimpermissibleis becauseitconstitutesintentionalbattery.Theoperativereasonwhyturningthetrolleyinthe

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BystanderProblem ispermissibleisbecausethebatteryandhomicideitgeneratesareforeseen butnonintendedsideeffects thatareoutweighedby theintendedgoodeffectofpreventingthe trainfromkillingthemen.Bycontrast,theoperativereasonwhyturningthetrolleyinthe Disproportional DeathProblemisimpermissibleisbecauseitscosts outweighitsbenefits. Finally,theoperativereasonwhythrowingthemanoutofthepathofthetrainintheConsensual ContactProblem ispermissibleisboth becauseitsbenefitsoutweighitscostsandbecausethis actionisnotabatteryatall.Inlightofthereasonablepresumptionthatapersonwouldconsent tobeingthrownandinjuredifthatwerenecessarytosavehislife,themanshypothetical consenttobeingthrowninthesecircumstancesmaybeassumed. Greeneandcolleaguesraiseanimportantobjectiontothecomputationalapproach.They observethatinanunusualvariantoftheBystanderProbleminventedbyJudithThomson (Thomson,1985), in whichthesidetrackleadingtotheonepersonloopsaroundtoconnectwith thetrackleadingtothefivepeople,mostpeopleagreethatitwouldbepermissibletoturnthe trolley,eventhoughdoingsowouldappeartoviolate theKantianinjunction againstusinga persontoachieveaworthyend(Greeneetal.,2001,p.2106).Buttheauthorsfailtonote that theoriginal BystanderProblemandThomsonsloopedtrackexampledifferintheirtemporal, causal,andcounterfactualproperties(Costa,1987). Moreimportantly,Greeneandcolleaguesdo notexplainwhy onemustaccepttheirtacitassumption thatthetrolleywouldbeturnedin Thomsonsloopedtrackexampleforanypurposeotherthantheonemotivatingtheagentinthe original BystanderProblemtopreventthetrainfromkillingthemen.Ifonerefrainsfrom makingthisassumption,thentheintuitionthatturningthetrainispermissibleinthese circumstancescanbeexplainedalongfamiliarlines.

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Recallthattheloopedtrackscenariosweutilizedin Experiment4weredesignedin part toinvestigatejustthisissue. InExperiment4,wediscoveredthatevenin thiscontext subjectsremainedsensitivetothedistinctionbetweenintendedmeansandforeseensideeffect. Moreover,theydidsoeventhough theprocessofrecoveringtheseintentional propertiesfrom theimpoverishedstimulusisnontrivial.Further, therelevantdatapresumably cannotbe explainedbyappealingtovaryinglevelsofemotional engagement,becausebothscenarios involvean impersonalaction (Greeneetal.,2001)describedasthrowingtheswitch. The datacanbeexplained,however,withreferencetounconsciouscomputational principles. Finally,weemphasizethatGreeneandcolleaguesdonotprovideaclearprocedurefor determiningwhetherthethreefeaturestheyidentifyarecontainedin(orotherwisederivable from)theirstimuli.Wearetoldthatpatternsofbrainactivitycanbepredictedonthebasisof whetheranactioncanreasonablybeexpectedtoleadtoseriousbodilyharmtoapersonor groupwherethisharmisnot theresultofdeflectinganexistingthreatontoadifferentparty (Greeneetal.2001,p.2107),butwearenottoldhowagivenstimulusistobeanalyzedinthese terms.Afurthervirtueofourcomputationalalternativeisthatthesecrucialfirststepsinthe perceptualprocessarefullyanalyzed.Thatis,notonlycanoursubjectsjudgmentsbegenerated byfixedandrecognizablemoralprinciples,onceappropriatementalrepresentationshavebeen computed.Thementalrepresentationsthemselvescanbederivedfromtheircorresponding stimulibyaprocessthatispurelymechanical(8.1).In short, acompleteandexplicittheoryof thestepsconvertingproximalstimulustoperceptualresponsecanbegiven.Inthissense,the theory ofmoralcognition presentedhereisatleastobservationally ifnotdescriptivelyadequate. Greeneetal.(2001) offernocomparableexplanationoftheconversionofproximalstimulusto perceptualresponse.Hencetheirtheoryisnotevenobservationallyadequate.

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8.3 Conclusion Thispapersummarizestheresultsof six experimentsperformedon 543individuals, including513adultsand30children ages812. Theresultsconstituteevidencethatbothadults andchildrenages812possessintuitiveorunconsciousknowledgeofspecificmoralprinciples, includingtheprohibitionofintentionalbatteryandtheprincipleofdoubleeffect. Significantly, thisknowledgeappearstobemerely tacit:when participantswereaskedtoexplainorjustify theirjudgments,theyconsistentlyfailedtoprovideadequatejustificationsfortheirjudgments. Ourfindingsalsosuggestthatatleastsomemoralintuitionsandtheprinciplesthatgeneratethem arewidelyshared,irrespectiveof demographicvariableslikegender,nationality,age,and education. Finally,ourfindingsimply thatlongstandingquestionsinmoral cognitionmaybe fruitfullyinvestigatedwithintheframeworkof theoretical modelssimilarto thoseutilizedinthe studyoflanguageandothercognitivesystems. Specifically,wehaveshownhowitmaybe possibletopursueaGalilean style(Chomsky,1980)of scientificexplanationinthisdomain,in whichobservabledataarerigorouslyexplainedintermsof computational rulesand representations. Havinggatheredevidencethatindividualspossessintuitiveknowledgeofmoral principles,wearenowinabetterpositiontodeterminehowthisknowledgeisacquiredand whetherandtowhatextentitmaybeinnate.Our study thuspavesthewayforfutureresearch intothenatureandoriginof humanmoral intuitions.

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Acknowledgments:
Wethanktheparticipantsinourstudyandthefollowingindividualswhoenabledusto recruitsubjectsandcollectdata:CaryCoglianese,NagwaHultquist,LauraSandler,Amber Smith,LailaWaggoner,KennethWinston,FeiXu,andYaodaXu. IzzatJarudiandMartin Hewittprovidedassistancecodingandanalyzingdata. ThanksalsotoKirstenCondry,who createdtheloopedtrackdiagramsusedinExperiment4,andtoPaulBloom,NoamChomsky, DannyFox,SteveGoldberg,TomGrey,MarcHauser,LisaHeinzerling,RayJackendoff,Emma Jordan,MarkKelman,JoshuaKnobe,DonLangevoort,DavidLuban,MatthiasMahlmann, JamesMcGilvray,ShaunNichols,PhilippeSchlenker,MikeSeidman,SteveStich,Josh Tenenbaum,andKathyZeilerforhelpfulsuggestionsandencouragement. Researchsupportwas providedbytheDepartmentofBrainandCognitiveSciences,MassachussetsInstituteof TechnologytheDepartmentofPsychology,NewYorkUniversitytheDepartmentof Psychology,HarvardUniversityStanfordLawSchool GeorgetownUniversityLawCenter and thePeterWallInstituteforAdvancedStudiesattheUniversityofBritishColumbia.

References:
Anscombe,G.E.(1970).Warandmurder.InR.Wasserstrom (Ed.),Warandmorality (pp.42 53).LosAngeles:WadsworthPublishingCompany. Baker,M.(2001). Theatomsoflanguage:Themindshiddenrulesofgrammar.BasicBooks. Baird,J.A.(2001). Motivationsandmorality:Dochildrenusementalstateinformationto evaluateidenticalactionsdifferently? PaperpresentedtoBiennialMeeting,Society forResearchinChildDevelopment,Minneapolis,MN. Berndt,T.J.,&Berndt,E.G.(1975).Childrensuseofmotivesandintentionalityin personperceptionandmoraljudgment.ChildDevelopment,46,904912. Carey,S.&Spelke,E.(1994).Domainspecificknowledgeandconceptualchange.InL.A. Hirschfeld&S.A.Gelman(Eds.), Mappingthemind:Domainspecificityincognition andculture(pp.169200). NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Chomsky,N.(1964). Currentissuesinlinguistictheory. TheHague:Mouton. Chomsky,N.(1965). Aspectsofthetheoryofsyntax.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Chomsky,N.(1978).InterviewwithNoamChomsky.LinguisticAnalysis,4(4),301319. Chomsky,N.(1980). Rulesandrepresentations.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress. Chomsky,N.(1986). Knowledgeoflanguage:Itsnature,origin,anduse.Westport,CT:Praeger. Chomsky,N.(1995). Theminimalistprogram.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Chomsky,N.&Halle,M.(1968). ThesoundpatternofEnglish.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Cosmides,L.&Tooby,J.(1994). Beyondintuitionandinstinctblindness:Towardan evolutionaryrigorouscognitivescience.Cognition,50,4177. Costa,M.J.(1987).Anothertriponthetrolley.InJ.M.Fischer&M.Ravizza(Eds.), Ethics: Problemsandprinciples(pp.303307).FortWorth,TX:HarcourtBraceJovanovich. Costanza,P.R.,Coie,J.D.,Grumet,J.F.,&Farnhill,D.(1973).A reexaminationoftheeffectsofintentandconsequenceonchildrensmoral judgments.ChildDevelopment,44,15461. DArcy,E.1963. Humanacts:Anessayintheirmoralevaluation.Oxford:ClarendonPress.

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reasoning.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress. Kagan,J.(1987).Introduction.InJ.Kagan&S.Lamb(Eds.), Theemergenceofmoralityin youngchildren(pp.ixxx).Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. Kant,I.(1787/1965).Critiqueofpurereason.(N.K.Smith,Trans.).St.MartinsPress. Kaplow,L.&Shavell,S.(2001).Fairnessversuswelfare.HarvardLawReview,114,9611061. Katz,J.(1972). Semantictheory.NewYork:HarperandRow. Katz,L.(1987). Badactsandguiltyminds:Conundrumsofthecriminallaw.Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress. Kohlberg,L.(1958). Thedevelopmentofmodesofthinkingandchoicesinyears10to16. Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation,UniversityofChicago(onfilewithauthor). Kohlberg,L.(1981). Essaysonmoraldevelopment:Vol.1.Thephilosophyofmoral development.NewYork:HarperandRow. Kohlberg,L.(1984). Essaysonmoraldevelopment:Vol.2.Thepsychologyofmoral development.NewYork:HarperandRow. LaFave,W.R.(2003).Principlesofcriminallaw.St.Paul,MN:WestGroup. Leblanc,H.&Wisdom,W.(1993). Deductivelogic(3rded.).EnglewoodCliffs,NJ: PrenticeHall. Lewontin,R.(1990).Theevolutionofcognition.InD.N.Osherson&E.E.Smith(Eds.), AnInvitationtoCognitiveScience:Vol.3(pp.22946).Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Lyons,D.(1965). Formsandlimitsofutilitarianism.Oxford:ClarendonPress. Macnamara,J.(1990).Thedevelopmentofmoralreasoningandthefoundationsofgeometry. JournalfortheTheoryofSocialBehavior,21,12550. Macnamara,J.(1999). Throughtherearviewmirror:Historicalreflectionsonpsychology. Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Mahlmann,M.(1999). Rationalismusinderpraktischentheorie:Normentheorieund praktichekompetenz.BadenBaden:NomosVerlagsgesellschaft. Marr,D.(1982). Vision.SanFrancisco:Freeman. Meltzoff,A.(1995).Understandingtheintentionsofothers:Reenactmentofintended actsby18montholdchildren.DevelopmentalPsychology,31,83850. Mikhail,J.(2000).Rawlslinguisticanalogy:Astudyofthegenerativegrammarmodelof moraltheorydescribedbyJohnRawlsinATheoryofJustice.Unpublisheddoctoral dissertation,CornellUniversity. Mikhail,J.(2002).Law,science,andmorality:AreviewofRichardPosnersThe problematicsofmoralandlegaltheory.StanfordLaw Review,54,10571127. Mikhail,J.(inpress).Rawlslinguisticanalogy. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Mikhail,J.,Sorrentino,C.,&Spelke,E.(1998).Towardauniversalmoralgrammar.InM.A. Gernsbacher&S.J.Derry(Eds.),Proceedings,TwentiethAnnualConferenceofthe CognitiveScienceSociety(p.1250).Mahwah,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Nagel,T.(1986). Theviewfromnowhere.InJ.M.Fischer&M.Ravizza(Eds.), Ethics: Problemsandprinciples(pp.16579).FortWorth,TX:HarcourtBraceJovanovich. Nelson,S.1980.Factorsinfluencingyoungchildrensuseofmotivesandoutcomesas moralcriteria.ChildDevelopment,51,823. Nozick,R.(1968).Moralcomplicationsandmoralstructures.NaturalLawForum,13,150. Piaget,J.(1932/1965). Themoraljudgmentofthechild.NewYork:TheFreePress. Petrinovich,L.&ONeill,P.(1996).Influenceofwordingandframingeffectson moralintuitions.EthologyandSociobiology,17,145171. Petrinovich,L.,ONeill,P.,andJorgensen,M.(1993).Anempiricalstudyofmoralintuitions: 99

Towardanevolutionaryethics.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,64(3), 467478. Pinker,S.(1994). Thelanguageinstinct:Howthemindcreateslanguage.NewYork:Harper Collins. Pinker,S.(1997).Howthemindworks.NewYork:Norton. Prior,A.N.(1955).Formallogic.Oxford:ClarendonPress. Prosser,W.(1941).Casebookontorts.Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress. Quinn,W.S.(1993). Moralityandaction.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Rawls,J.(1971). Atheoryofjustice.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Rest,J.(1983).Morality.InJ.Flavell&E.Markman(Eds.), Manuelofchildpsychology:Vol.3. Cognitivedevelopment(4thed.).NewYork:Wiley. Robinson,P.H.&Darley,J.M.(1995). Justice,liability,andblame:Communityviews andthecriminallaw.SanFrancisco:WestviewPress. Salmond,J.(1902/1996). Salmondonjurisprudence(12thed.,P.J.Fitzgerald,Ed.).London: Sweet&Maxwell. Shapo,M.S.(2003). Principlesoftortlaw.St.Paul,MN:ThomsonWest. Sidgwick,H.(1907). Themethodsofethics.Indianapolis,IN:Hackett. Simpson,E.(1974).Moraldevelopmentresearch:Acasestudyofscientificculturalbias.Human Development,17,81106. Spelke,E.(1998).Nativism,empiricism,andtheoriginsofknowledge.Infant BehaviorandDevelopment,21. Spelke,E.S.,Breinlinger,K.,andJacobson,K.(1992).Originsofknowledge.Psychological Review,99,60532. Stich,S.(1993).Moralphilosophyandmentalrepresentation.InM.Hechteretal.(Eds.), Theoriginofvalues.NewYork:AldineDeGruyter. Stone,J.(1964). Legalsystemandlawyersreasonings.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress. Thomson,J.J.(1985).Thetrolleyproblem.InJ.M.Fischer&M.Ravizza(Eds.), Ethics: Problemsandprinciples(pp.6776).FortWorth,TX:HarcourtBraceJovanovich. Thomson,J.J.(1986). Rights,restitution,andrisk.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press. Turiel,E.(1983).Thedevelopmentofsocialknowledge:Moralityandconvention. Cambridge,MA:CambridgeUniversityPress. Unger,P.(1996). Livinghighandlettingdie:Ourillusionofinnocence.NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress. VonWright,G.H.(1951). Anessayinmodallogic.Amsterdam:NorthHolland PublishingCompany. Woodward,A.L.,Sommerville,J.A.,&Guajardo,J.J.(2001). Howinfantsmakesenseof intentionalaction.InB.Malle,L.Moses&D.Baldwin(Eds.), Intentionsand intentionality:Foundationsofsocialcognition (pp.149169).Cambridge,MA:MIT Press.

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9. Appendix
In thisAppendix,wereproduceforeachexperimentboth thescenariosweusedandour subjectsresponsestothem.

9.1Experiment1
9.1.1 Scenarios 1.TransplantProblem IntentionalBattery(Dr.Brown) Dr.Brownhasfivepatientsinthehospitalwhoaredying. Eachpatientneedsaneworganin ordertosurvive.Onepatientneedsanewheart.Twopatientsneedanewkidney.Andtwo morepatientsneedanewlung.Dr.Browncansaveallfivepatientsifhetakesasinglehealthy personandremovesherheart,kidneys,andlungstogivetothesefivepatients.Justsucha healthypersonisinRoom306.Sheisinthehospitalforroutinetests.Havingseenhertest results,Dr.Brownknowsthatsheisperfectlyhealthyandoftherighttissuecompatibility.IfDr. BrowncutsupthepersoninRoom306andgivesherorganstotheotherfivepatients,hewill savetheotherfivepatients,butkillthepersoninRoom306intheprocess.IfDr.Browndoes notcutupthepersoninRoom306,theotherfivepatientswilldie. IsitmorallypermissibleforDr.BrowntocutupthepersoninRoom306? 2.FootbridgeProblemIntentionalBattery(Frank) Frankisonafootbridgeoverthetraintracks.Heknowstrains,andcanseethattheone approachingthebridgeisoutof control.Onthetrackunderthebridgetherearefivepeoplethe banksaresosteepthattheywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Frankknowsthatthe onlywaytostopanoutofcontroltrainistodropaveryheavyweightintoitspath.Buttheonly available,sufficientlyheavyweightisalargemanwearingabackpack,alsowatchingthetrain fromthefootbridge.Frankcanshovethemanwiththebackpackontothetrackinthepathofthe train,killinghimorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforFranktoshovetheman?YorN 3.FootbridgeProblemIntentionalBattery(Ian) Ianistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatisapproaching isoutofcontrol. Ianseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfivemenwalkingacross thetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted.Thetrainis nowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbeabletogetoffthe trackintime.Fortunately,Ianisstandingnexttoaheavyobject,whichhecanthrowontothe trackinthepathofthetrain,therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen.Unfortunately,the heavyobjectisaman,standingnexttoIan withhisbackturned.Iancanthrowtheman,killing himorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforIantothrowtheman?

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4.FootbridgeProblemIntentional Battery(Nancy) Nancyistakingherdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenshenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Fivemenarewalkingacrossthetracks.Thetrainismovingso fastthattheywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Nancyisstandingnexttoaman,whom shecanthrowinfrontofthetrain,therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen.Nancycanthrow theman,killinghimbutsavingthefivemenorshecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefive die. IsitmorallypermissibleforNancytothrowtheman? 5.TrolleyProblemForeseeableBattery(Charlie) Charlieisdrivingatrainwhenthebrakesfail.Aheadfivepeopleareworkingonthetrackwith theirbacksturned.FortunatelyCharliecanswitchtoasidetrack,ifheactsatonce. Unfortunatelythereisalsosomeoneonthattrackwithhisbackturned.IfCharlieswitcheshis traintothesidetrack,hewillkilloneperson.IfCharliedoesnotswitchhistrain,hewillkillfive people. IsitmorallypermissibleforCharlietoswitchhistraintothesidetrack?YorN 6.TrolleyProblemForeseeableBattery(Denise) Deniseisapassengeronatrainwhosedriverhasjustshoutedthatthetrain'sbrakeshavefailed, andwhothenfaintedoftheshock.Onthetrackaheadarefivepeoplethebanksaresosteepthat theywillnotbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Thetrackhasasidetrackleadingofftothe right,andDenisecanturnthetrainontoit.Unfortunatelythereisonepersonontherighthand track.Denisecanturnthetrain,killingtheoneorshecanrefrainfromturningthetrain,letting thefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforDenisetoswitchthetraintothesidetrack?YorN 7.BystanderProblemForeseeableBattery(Edward) Edwardistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Edwardseeswhathashappened:thetraindriversawfive workmenmenaheadonthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthe driverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivementhebanksaresosteepthattheywill notbeabletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Edwardisstandingnexttoaswitch,which hecanthrow,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack.Unfortunately,thereisoneperson standingonthesidetrack,withhisbackturned.Edwardcanthrowtheswitch,killingtheoneor hecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforEdwardtothrowtheswitch?YorN 8. BystanderProblemForeseeableBattery(Hank) Hankistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Hankseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfivemen walkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted.

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Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbeableto getoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Hankisstandingnexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow,that will turnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen.Unfortunately, thereisamanstandingonthesidetrackwithhisbackturned.Hankcanthrowtheswitch, killinghimorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforHanktothrowtheswitch?YorN

9.1.2 Responses A.IntentionalBatteryScenarios

Problem Footbridge (Ian) Judgment Impermissible Justification Obviously,thereisnorightorwronganswertothis scenario.Bothoptionspresentedarenot"optimal"ones. Inasensethequestionmaybeinterpretedifonelifeis morevaluablethanfivelives.Allliveswereinnocent bystandersinthescenarioandeitherway,thekillingof5 versus1isstillthelossofalife. Themoralpermissibilityofthisactionisdependenton thehealthypatient'sownjudgmentsastowhethershe wouldbewillingtoofferherbodyinthisway.Ifshedid offerpermission, thenthingswouldbedifferent. Basedonthewordingofthescenario,Iamlefttoassume thatFrankdoesnotknowthelargemanorthefivepeople onthetracks.Assuch,heisathirdparty,passive spectatortotheupcomingtragedy,andhasnomoral positionatstakeheisnotresponsibleforthetrainbeing outofcontrolorthepresenceofthefivepeopleinits path.Butbycausingthedeathofthelargeman,he becomesactivelyinvolved,inamorallynegativeway. Becausethetrainisinanimate and makesnomoralchoice inkillingthefive,thisscenarioisnotamoraldilemma foranybody.Inconsideringthetradeofonelifeforfive, Frankassumesthathisimmoralactwouldfightthe greaterimmoralityofthetrain,therebyraisingthemoral equilibriumofthesituation.Infact,becausethetrainhas nomorals,heonlylowersthemoralequilibriumofthe scenario.Itisnevermorally permissibletolowerthe moralequilibrium....Iamfascinatedthatittookme5 secondstodeterminemyanswer,and45minutesto justifyit,above.Ihavenevergivenanythoughttoa moralequilibriumbefore,orwhetherallmydecisions considerraisingorloweringit,butasIthinkabout choicesI'vemade,itseemsthatmyviewofthe"right" choiceistiedtotheideaofhowitbalancesthemorality ofthesituation.Iwonderwhenthiswasinstilledinme. Inthiscase,Ianhasthemorallysuperioroptionof throwinghimselfinfrontofthetraininsteadofthe innocentbystander.EvenifIanistoolighttostopthe train,hecannotthrowthebystanderinfrontofthetrain withoutbearingmoralresponsibilityforthebystander's death,eventhoughtheactwouldsavefivelives. Adequacy Adequate

Transplant (Bob)

Impermissible

Adequate

Footbridge (Frank)

Impermissible

Adequate

Footbridge (Ian)

Impermissible

Adequate

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Footbridge (Nancy)

Impermissible

Transplant (Bob)

Impermissible

Transplant (Bob)

Impermissible

Footbridge (Nancy)

Impermissible

Footbridge (Ian) Footbridge (Ian)

Impermissible

Impermissible

Footbridge (Nancy) Transplant (Bob) Footbridge (Frank) Footbridge (Nancy)

Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Permissible

Shovingthemanistantamountto[her]takingsomesort ofresponsibilityfortheotherwiserandomlyoccurring situation.Idon'tfeelthatitisappropriateforherto decideto"sacrifice"thisman,whoisinassafeaposition assheis,simplybecauseonlyonepersonwillbeinjured insteadof5.Shecoulddropaheavyrockortheman's backpack,ifthatwouldbesufficient,buttochooseonher owntoputthisman'slifeinjeopardyorcausehim physicalharmseemsbeyondtherealmofwhatone humanbeingshouldbeallowedtodo."Shecannotplay God!"Anicesimplecrystallizationofmuchmore complicatedsituationsthatprobablyoccurallthetimein theworld,ondifferentlevelsandindifferentcontexts. Asitwaswritten(withthedonorpatienthealthy),itwas veryeasytoconsider[thedoctor's]actionimmoral. However,ifshehadbeenterminallyillandina vegetativestate,Iwouldhavehadtothinkalittleharder (thoughofcourseIwouldwanttoknowthewishesofher andherfamilybeforedeciding). Thescenariopresentisonewhich,tomy thinking[/feeling],leavestheparticipantswith[no] feelingofambiguity[in]dilemma.Myresponsewas immediate,clear.Despitethemathematicalgaininlives saved,tosacrificeonehealthylifetosavethelivesoffive othersisunacceptable. Whatifthedriverwasabletostopintimebeforehitting thefivepeoplebuttheheavymanwasinjuredanyway? Besides,shedoesnothavetherighttoriskhislife withouthispermissionifhewantedto,hecouldjump infrontofthetrain(orshecould)butshecan'tforcehim. Ianisnotjustifiedindecidingwhogetstoliveordie.I'm notsurehowplausibleitisforatraintobestoppedby oneman,nomatterhowheavyheis. Becausethefiveworkerswillbekilledinouraccident wherenoonewillbeblamed,buttheheavymanwill havetobedeliberatelymurderedtosavetheworkers. Afterall,accidentshappenandpeopledietheforceof nature.It'smoreacceptablethanamurder. Replace:5with100,peoplewithschoolchildren=>no judgment(oreven:"no"becomes"yes") Inprinciple(absolutesecrecyetc.)shoulddoforgreater good. Hecanjumphimself,ifhewantsto... Idislikelargemenwithbackpacks,butsomewould[like me]tobepushedmyself.

Adequate

Adequate

Adequate

Adequate

Adequate

Adequate

Inadequate Inadequate Inadequate Adequate

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B.ForeseeableBatteryScenarios
Problem Trolley (Denise) Judgment Permissible Justification Idon'thaveastrongpreference.Itseemsthateitherway somethingbadwillhappen,andyoucanargueeither actionorinactionisthemoralroute.Butthereisn'ttime todecideintherealsituation,sothereisnomoral obligationtoactonewayortheother. IwouldthinkthatHank'sintentionsshouldbeexamined. IfHank'sintentionwasfedbypersonaldesire(i.e.,desire toparticipateintheactofkilling),thenthere wouldbea differentlightthrownonthesubject. SinceD.knowswhatisgoingtohappenifshedoes nothing,shewouldberemissnottoact.Inaperverse sortofwayitisbettertokillonepersonthanfive,allelse beingequal.Ontheotherhand,iftheonepersononthe spurseesthetrainandbelievess/heissafeandfailsto move,whilethe5onthemaintrackknowwhat's happening,thesituationmightbedifferent.Butifthere's nottimeforpeopletorunoffatraintrack,howisthere timetoswitchtrackssafely? Iamautilitarian,sothescenarioof1deathispreferable tofivedeaths.Suchdecisionsaremadeeveryday, althoughthedifferencesbetweenmortalityinalternate scenariosarein"statistical"terms,ratherthanattachedto particularpeople. Giventhatineitheroutcomesomeonewilldie(and barringanywaytoalertanyofthepeopleonthetracks), itseems morallyjustifiabletotakeanactionwhich lessensthelossoflife. Denisehasonlytwochoices:1)actionturningtotheside trackandkillingonepersonor2)inactionwhichwilllead tofivedeaths.Ithinkthattheonlyviablechoiceis action,turningthetrain.Bydoingso,shewillsavefour livesthatwouldhavebeenlost.Thescenario'swording makesitseemthatDeniseisinsomewayresponsiblefor killingthepersonontherightsidetrackratherthanbeing aheroforsavingthelivesoffivepeople. Byyes,ImeanEITHERoptionismorallypermissible. Theotherwouldhavebeenjustasmorallypermissible. Eitheroptionissuboptimal.Ifeelthat5liveslostequals onelifelostwithoutfurtherinfo.Bothareawful.But saythe5peoplewereserialmurderersandrapistsplus theonepersonwassay,somesaintlyperson,thenone mightconsidertheirviewsoncapitalpunishmentand reevaluate. Iwentthroughseveralstagesinansweringthisand generallyfoundittroubling/morallydifficult.1st reaction:yes,throwswitch.2ndreaction:no!Isactive killing.3rdreaction:rampuptolargecity/bombvs. countryside.Obviouslywoulddiverttocountryside. Itwasadifficultdecisiontomake!!Thewordsthatstand outarekillingthemanvs.lettingthefivedie...which isagreaterresponsibility?Dowedeterminethevalueof lifebynumber(5vs.1)?I'mleftlookingforabetter solutiontotheproblem.CouldHankwarnthesingle Adequacy Adequate

Bystander (Hank)

Permissible

Adequate

Trolley (Denise)

Permissible

Adequate

Trolley (Charlie)

Permissible

Adequate

Trolley (Charlie)

Permissible

Adequate

Trolley (Denise)

Permissible

Adequate

Bystander (Edward)

Permissible

Inadequate

Bystander (Edward)

Permissible

Inadequate

Bystander (Hank)

Permissible

Inadequate

105

Trolley (Denise)

Permissible

Trolley (Charlie)

Permissible

Bystander (Hank)

Permissible

Bystander (Hank)

Impermissible

manstandingonthetrack?IsitreallyHank'srightto choosewhowilldiethatday?Doesitmakehimmore responsiblefordeathingeneralnowthathehasplayedan activerole?Italsobringsupthequestionofbystander apathyareweperpetratorsbynotacting? Ithinkthattheobviousansweris"Yes"(andinfactitis likelytheansweryouwouldpredictthatmostpeople wouldchoose).Forthatreason,Iwouldwordthe questiondifferently(sothatitislessloaded).Iwould ask:"IsitmorallypermissibleforDenisetorefrainfrom turningthetrain." Thegutreactionistoturn.Inthegivenscenario,Ireadit asifIwasthedriver,movingquicklyinapanicsituation. IbelievethatIwouldturnoffthemaintrack,THENsee the1personworkingthere.Ifthedriver(me)hadtaken thetimetolookatthe1person,thendecide,the opportunityto...[restistoolight toread] Comparewithfollowingscenario:Hankisaphysician withfivesickpatients.Eachneedsanorgantransplantto live:oneneedsalung,oneakidney,oneaspleen,onea heart,oneabrain(thisishypothetical).Fortunately, thereisahealthyvisitor(withabackpack,coincidentally) whohasahealthysetoforganslung,kidney,spleen, heart,brain. IsitmorallypermissibleforDr.Hankto sacrificethebackpackguyfororgans? ThereasonIwrotenoisbecauseIdon'tbelievethatone canevaluatetheworthofhumanlivesbynumbersalone. Thescenariooutlinedhere,ifitmandatedoneoftwo actions,thenIwouldchoosetopulltheswitch,not becauseitismorallypermissiblebutbecause itis the best availableoption.

Inadequate

Inadequate

Inadequate

Inadequate

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9.2Experiment2
9.2.1 Scenarios 1. BystanderProblemForeseeableBattery(Hank) Hankistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Hankseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfivemen walkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted. Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbeableto getoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Hankisstandingnexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow,that willturnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen.Unfortunately, thereisamanstandingonthesidetrackwithhisbackturned.Hankcanthrowtheswitch, killinghimorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforHanktothrowtheswitch? 2.FootbridgeProblemIntentionalBattery(Ian) Ianistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatisapproaching isoutofcontrol.Ianseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfivemenwalkingacross thetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted.Thetrainis nowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbeabletogetoffthe trackintime. Fortunately,Ianisstandingnexttoa heavyobject,whichhecanthrowontothe trackinthepathofthetrain, therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen.Unfortunately,the heavyobjectisaman,standingnexttoIan withhisbackturned.Iancanthrowtheman,killing himorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforIantothrowtheman? 3. ModifiedBystanderProblemBadEffectsOutweighGoodEffects(Karl) Karlistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Karlseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfive milliondollarsofnewrailroadequipmentlyingidleacrossthetracksandslammedonthe brakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthe equipment.Itismovingsofastthatit willbedestroyed.Fortunately,Karlisstandingnexttoa switch,whichhecanthrow,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingitfrom destroyingtheequipment.Unfortunately,thereisamanstandingonthesidetrackwithhisback turned.Karlcanthrowtheswitch,killinghimorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthe equipmentbedestroyed. IsitmorallypermissibleforKarltothrowtheswitch? 4. ModifiedFootbridgeProblemConsensualContact(Luke) Lukeistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Lukeseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawaman walkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted.

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Thetrainisnowrushingtowardtheman. Itismovingsofastthathewillnotbeabletogetoff thetrackintime.Fortunately,Lukeisstandingnexttotheman, whom hecanthrowoffthetrack outofthepathofthetrain,therebypreventingitfromkillingtheman.Unfortunately,themanis frailand standingwithhisbackturned.Lukecanthrowtheman,injuringhimorhecanrefrain fromdoingthis,lettingthemandie. IsitmorallypermissibleforLuketothrowtheman? 5.TrolleyProblemForeseeableBattery(Charlie) Charlieisdrivingatrainwhenthebrakesfail.Aheadfivepeopleareworkingonthetrackwith theirbacksturned.FortunatelyCharliecanswitchtoasidetrack,ifheactsatonce. Unfortunatelythereisalsosomeoneonthattrackwithhisbackturned.IfCharlieswitcheshis traintothesidetrack,hewillkilloneperson.IfCharliedoesnotswitchhistrain,hewillkillfive people. IsitmorallypermissibleforCharlietoswitchhistraintothesidetrack?YorN 9.2.2 Responses A.Pair #1:BystanderProblem(Hank)andFootbridgeProblem(Ian)
Problem Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Bystander Footbridge Judgment Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Permissible Permissible Iknowfivelivesarefivelivesit'sallabouttheguts. That'swhatitcomesdownto.BlaisePascalgotitall wrong. Inadequate Notacceptabletodecidetorisksomeoneelse'slifeto saveothers. Inadequate Justification The man,Hankcanhereactivelyinfluenceasequenceof eventswhichwilllimit damage(#ofdeaths).Inthe secondevent,hecannotthrowanothermanontothe tracksbecausehewillactivelyanddeliberatelykillan innocentbystander.Reallyanimpossiblechoice. It'samazingthatIwouldnotthrowapersonbutthrowa switchtokillaperson.IreallywishtherewasmoreI coulddoforthe1guyontheothertrack. Ineithercase,themoraldecisionruledependsonhow closetotheactivekillingofthemanis. Adequacy Inadequate

Inadequate

Inadequate

Forthefirstscenario,Iwantedtodrawadistinction Inadequate between"isitpermissibleforhimtothrowtheswitch" and"doeshehaveadutytothrowtheswitch,"thoughI don'tknowifthatwouldhavechangedmyanswer. Ibelievethattheultimatequestionisthatofliveslost. Adequate SomewouldarguethatHankandIanwouldbemorally justifiedinnotstoppingthetrain.Whilethismaybetrue, itdoesnotnecessitatethatitbemorally unjustifiedto stopthetrain.

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B.Pair#2:BystanderProblem(Hank)andModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl)
Problem Bystander Modified Bystander Bystander Modified Bystander Bystander Modified Bystander Judgment Permissible Impermissible Justification Firstscenariomorallyjustifiableifhefeelsthatanet savingsof4lives(andknowinglytakinganactiontokill aman)wouldbebetterthannonactionandtherefore, savingthelifeofone.Secondscenariolifeismore importantthanmoney. Forthefirstscenario,saving5atexpenseof1isbetter thansaving1atexpenseof5.Forthesecondscenario, valueofeven1person'slifeisgreaterthan$5million,if onlybecauseequipmentcanbereplaced. ItismorallypermissibleforHanktothrowtheswitch. Thiscanbeframedasa"binary"decision.Ifweassume thatHank'sdecisionis100%accurate,hewillchooseto throwratherthannottothrow.Karlisthusdirectly responsiblefortheman'slife.Notswitchingthetrain wouldmakehimmorallyresponsiblefortheman'sdeath (Throwswitch=>1killedDon'tthrowswitch=>5 killed). Whilealifeshouldnotalwaysbepreferredto$5million, inthiscasetherailroadequipmentisprobablynotgoing tobeputtoanybetteruseitwillprobablyjustservethe greedyinterestsoftherailroadfirmitself.(Furthermore, therailroadfirm probablygotthe$5millionunjustly.) Adequacy Adequate

Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible

Adequate

Inadequate

Bystander Modified Bystander

Permissible Impermissible

Inadequate

C.Pair#3:FootbridgeProblem(Ian)and ModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke)
Problem Footbridge Modified Footbridge Footbridge Modified Footbridge Footbridge Modified Footbridge Judgment Impermissible Permissible Justification Onecannotplaceanotherinharm'sway.Ianmaychoose tothrowhimselfinfrontofthetrainonly.Itismorally permissibleforLuketoriskhimselfifhesochooses. Theseareallindividual,privatedecisionsrelatingto controloverone'sself. IguessIdidn'tthinkIanshouldactivelymurder someone,butifLukedidn'tmindriskinghisownlife, that'sfine.Heshouldn'tbemorallyobligatedtodoso, however. ForQuestion1,it'sOKtothrowyourselfonthetracksto savethefive.It'snotOKtokillsomebodyelse(who's innocent)tospareyourownlife.ForQuestion2,it'sOK toforcepeopleifyouthinkit'sintheirbestinterest,in circumstanceslikethis. Adequacy Adequate

Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible

Adequate

Adequate

D.Pair#4:FootbridgeProblem(Ian)andModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl)
Problem Footbridge Modified Bystander Footbridge Judgment Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Justification Inscenario1,theissueis essentiallyallowing5todie (passive)orkilling1(active).Idon'tfeelthatutility justifiesthekillingoftheonetosavethe5.Similarlyin scenario2,rightsnottobekilledtrumputility. Inthefirstcase,killingapersonismuchdifferentthan lettingpeoplelive.Youcanchosetokillyourselfifyou Adequacy Adequate

Adequate

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Modified Bystander

Impermissible

Footbridge Modified Bystander

Impermissible Impermissible

feelthatsacrificewillbenefitsociety,butyoucannot choosetokillsomeoneelsewithouttheirconsent. Secondcase,moneyisacheapsubstituteforlife.I realizethatwecannotspendlimitlessmoneytosave lives,buthecannotkillapersonduetoourchoiceto reducecosts. My [judgment] isintuitiveandIrealizenotlogically justifiable.Myintuitionisthatthrowing1manontrack ofapassingtrainwillnotstopthetrain.Ialsoam reluctanttogradelifeandthusequate[the]valueofone life asworthmore than5,eventhoughIknowthiscanbe done.

Inadequate

E.Pair#5:BystanderProblem(Hank)andModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke)
Problem Bystander Modified Footbridge Bystander Modified Footbridge Judgment Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Justification Whileinsituation1Hankmightnothavethemoral authoritytokillthemanonthesidetrack,itmaybethe bestpolicydecisiontodoso. Adequacy Inadequate

Option1:theutilityofkillingamantosave5doesnot warrantatransgressionofone'srightnottobekilled unjustly.AndIamnotmorallyobligated(itisnotright) todeliberatelykillsomeonetosaveotherlives.

Inadequate

F.Pair#6:ModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl)andModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke)
Problem Modified Bystander Modified Footbridge Modified Bystander Modified Footbridge Modified Bystander Modified Footbridge Judgment Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Onthe2ndquestion,clearlyitismorallypermissiblefor himtodosobutheisnotmorallyobligatedtodoso. Inadequate Justification Moneyshouldnotdeterminewhetheryousavealifeor notifthosearetheoptionsgiven.$5,000,000vs.killing life. Lukeisnotmorallyrequiredtothrowtheman,butitis permissibleandevenniceofhimtodoso. Adequacy Inadequate

Inadequate

G.Pair#7:TrolleyProblem(Charlie)andBystanderProblem(Hank)
Problem Trolley Bystander Trolley Bystander Judgment Impermissible Impermissible Permissible Permissible Justification Itishardformetoallowonepersontomakethechoice regardingwhetherotherpeopledie,regardlessofthe numberofpeople. Ofcourseit'swrongtoallowanyonetodieinboth scenarios,butkillingoneisnotasbadaslosing5lives. Adequacy Adequate

Adequate

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Trolley Bystander

Permissible Permissible

Myimmediateinstinctwouldbetoenvisionthefamilies of5vs.1

Inadequate

H.Pair#8:TrolleyProblem(Charlie)andFootbridgeProblem(Ian)
Problem Trolley Footbridge Trolley Footbridge Trolley Footbridge Judgment Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Justification Veryodd.Idon'tknowwhyIchosedifferentlyinthe secondscenario.Theendresultisthesame.Ijustchose mygutresponseandnowamintriguedwithhowto reconcilethem. Adequacy Inadequate

Moralactorsmaybeforcedtomakeadecisionbetween Inadequate twopassivechoiceswherebothwillendrights.Butto makeactionoverpassivechoicesrequiresanotherkindof analysisanddegreeofbenefit. Inthefirstscenarioitwouldbepermissibletoactasa Inadequate utilitarianoptimizer.Inthesecondrightscomeinto question.

I. Pair#9:TrolleyProblem(Charlie)andModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl)
Problem Trolley Modified Bystander Judgment Permissible Impermissible Justification Adequacy Ibelievethatitisalwaysbesttominimizethenumberof Adequate liveslostinachoicesituation,throughdirectaction. AlthoughIhaveaproblemwithcomparinganysumof moneytohumanlife,thesituationcouldbemoredifficult formeiftheequipmentweresovaluableitwouldsave lifeinthefuture,orirreplaceable. Yesforthefirstscenarioisyouwillsavefivelivesatthe Adequate expenseofone.AndIwouldtreatalllivesequally.For thesecondscenario,lifehastobegreaterthandollar amounts. Forthefirstscenario,firstone[wouldbeanutility reasoning?](moreutilityforsocietyifyoukillone comparetofive).Forthesecondscenario,thisanswer dependsonthevalueyouputonlife,whichisequalto theutilityoftheperson.Ipersonallyputalargevalueon life. Doesn'tthetrainhaveahorn? Adequate

Trolley Modified Bystander Trolley Modified Bystander Trolley Modified Bystander Trolley Modified Bystander Trolley

Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible

Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible

Inadequate

IfIamdirectlyresponsiblefortheoutcomeinthegiven situations Iwillalwayschoosetheseanswers.

Inadequate

Onthesecondcase,Iamabletoplaceaboundary betweentherighttolifeandautilitarianoption.Inthe

Inadequate

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Impermissible

firstcase,Iamdealingalsowiththerighttolife,butin thiscaseIprefertosave5lives(isthatutilitarian?Idon't thinkiscomparable).

J.Pair#10:TrolleyProblem(Charlie)andModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke)
Problem Trolley Modified Footbridge Trolley Modified Footbridge Trolley Modified Footbridge Judgment Permissible Permissible Permissible Permissible Permissible Permissible Inthesecondcase,itismorally"permissible"forLuketo Inadequate throwtheman.However,heisnotmorallyobligatedto dosoashemayriskhisownlifeintheprocess. Justification Adequacy Itwasnotdifficulttoanswerbecausethequestionwas Inadequate about"morallypermissible."AskmewhetherornotI wouldriskmylifetosaveanotherperson,Imightsayyes butifIwasinLuke'ssituation(2ndscenario)Idonot knowwhatIwoulddo. Ihadnodoubtat allonmyanswers. Inadequate

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9.3Experiment3
9.3.1 Scenarios SameasExperiment2. 9.3.2 Responses SubjectsinExperiment3werenotaskedtoprovidejustifications.

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9.4Experiment4
9.4.1 Scenarios 1.LoopedTrackProblemIntentionalBattery(Ned) Nedistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Nedseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfivemen walkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted. Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbeableto getoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Nedisstandingnexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow,that willtemporarilyturnthetrainontoasidetrack.Thereisaheavyobjectonthesidetrack.Ifthe trainhitstheobject,theobjectwillslowthetraindown,therebygivingthementimetoescape. Unfortunately,theheavyobjectisaman,standingonthesidetrackwithhisbackturned.Ned canthrowtheswitch,preventingthetrainfromkillingthemen,butkillingtheman.Orhecan refrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforNedtothrowtheswitch?

2.LoopedTrackProblemForeseeableBattery(Oscar) Oscaristakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Oscarseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfivemen walkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted. Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbeableto getoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Oscarisstandingnexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow, thatwilltemporarilyturnthetrainontoasidetrack.Thereisaheavyobjectonthesidetrack.If thetrainhitstheobject,theobjectwillslowthetraindown,therebygivingthementimeto escape.Unfortunately,thereisamanstandingonthesidetrackinfrontoftheheavyobject,with hisbackturned.Oscarcanthrowtheswitch,preventingthetrainfromkillingthemen,butkilling theman.Orhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforOscartothrowtheswitch?

9.4.2 Responses A.LoopedTrackProblem IntentionalBattery(Ned)

Judgment Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Justification Themanhasthesamerighttoliveasthe5men.IthinkthatNedmust notinterferewithwhatnaturallyisgoingtohappen. Hedoesnthavetherighttoimposehismoralsonothers(without consent/agreement). wouldbeplayinggod...(besides,ifNedhadtimetohatchthisplan, thenhowcomethe5mendidn'thavetimetojump?) Theonlydecisionsofmoralityyoucanmakeinvolveyourself.i.e. shouldIdietosavethem. Adequacy Adequate Adequate Adequate

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Impermissible

Maybethemanwouldn'twanttosacrificehislifetosavethe5 IfNedwereabletosavethe5menwithoutkillingasixth,Ibelievehe should.Ifthereweresomewaytoalertthemanonthesidetrackandlet himescape(beingthathisbackisturnedandhehasno reasontobelieve heisgoingtobehitbythetrain),thenIcouldjustifythrowingthe switch. Icouldseehowsomeonewouldbelieveitwasmoralinthat5lives wouldbesavedattheexpenseofone.Andhonestly,Idon'tknowwhatI woulddoifIwere Ned,butsomehowchoosingwhoisgoingtodie... thatis,decidingwhichlifehasmorevalue,isnot"morallypermissible" inmyvaluesystem. Question:howcanamanslowatraindown? Iwouldn'tknowwhattodo.IdonotthinkIhavetherighttojudgethe importancevalueoflifebasedonthequantity,ortheage.Lookfor differentalternative.Idonothavetherighttotakeone'slifeinorderto save5others.Itwouldbewrong. Thisquestionsucks.Whoistodecideonelifeformany?Onelifeis worthasmuchastherestordotheynotweighmoreforthegreater need?Yuck.Icantdecidemorality! ButIthinkIwould.(?) AlthoughIbelieveNedshouldhittheswitchanywayfornonmoral reasons,Ialsobelievethatbothhittingandnothittingtheswitchis morallywrong.AssumingthatNedhasabsoluteknowledgethatoneact killsfivemenandtheoppositeactkillsone,thereisnomoraloption.In addition,thereisno"more"moraloption.Takingaction(ornottaking action)thatresultsinthedeathofhumanbeingisimmoralregardlessof whetherthesameactionsavesanotherhumanbeingorotherhuman beings.Themakingofthisdecisionisbeyondthebailiwickofmorality. (1)Howcouldyouknowitwouldgivethemsufficienttimetoescape? Wouldyouguaranteeaman'sdeathforthechanceofsavingafewothers. Wouldyoubesobold?Whatifyoumisjudgedtheviscosity? Thissituationisexactlyalike,ineveryrespect,tooneinwhichadoctor hasfivepatientsonagivenday,eachneedingatransplantofadifferent organwithoutsuchatransplant,theywillalldiewithinaday.Asixth perfectlyhealthypatientcomesin.Thequestionis,assumingthatthe doctorcanperformallfivetransplantsperfectly,guaranteed,shouldhe killthehealthymantosavethefive?Imustanswerthisno,hencemy responsetothequestionabove. {Respondentdrewarrowsfromthefivementothetrain,andfromthere totheobjectontheothersideofthetracks,andcommented:}Timeis longerherethanhere. Givemoretimeachance. (1)But tryyellingattheguytogetoffthetrack (2)Itsucksbut5livesto1right?Whatifthose5arecriminalsandthe1 isasaint. There'salsotheFatManintheCaveProblem.Whereyou'rewitha groupofpeopleexploringacaveandtheentrancecavesintrappingafat manintheentrance(hisrearisstickingoutofthecaveandtorsointhe cave).Andyouhaveonestickofdynamite.Thetideisrisingandyou

Adequate

Impermissible

Adequate

Impermissible

Inadequate

Impermissible Impermissible

Inadequate Inadequate

Impermissible

Inadequate

Impermissible

Inadequate

Impermissible

Inadequate

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Permissible

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willalldrownifyoudon'tgetout.Blowupthefatguyornot?Oneof themostinterestinganswersI'veeverheardisthatiftheentiregroup decidestoblowuptheentrancetherebyblowingupthefatman,thenat leastthepersontellinghimcouldholdhishand.2livesforthegroup.Is thattheethicalthingtodo? TheproblemasstatedisimperfectinthatNedhassomeuncertainty aboutthesituation hecannottrulyknowthatflippingtheswitchwill tradeonelifeforfive(allsixcoulddie,orthedrivercouldregain consciousness,etc.).However,theessenceofthequestionis"killoneto savefive?"Iconsiderthis"permissible"fromatheoreticalviewitisthe logicallysuperiorchoicegivennootherinformation."Yes."Inpractice, though,Idon'tknowifIwouldpersonallyhavethestrengthto directly killanotherhumanunderanycircumstancestheremaybeanalmost physicallimitonmyabilitytodoharm.Iagreethatdoing100pointsto save+500hasanet+400balance,butmy"evil"limitmaybe 10, beyondwhichImightnotbeabletoact. Bythrowingtheswitch,hewouldbe"killing"theonemanbuthe'llbe savingthelivesofthe5men.That'stheonlywayIcanjustifyit. Otherwise,he'dbeignoringagraveproblemandwatchingithappen. That ismorallyirresponsible. Yellatthe5men. EitherwayNedwillhavenightmaresaboutit. "Thisissick" "Thissucks" Butheshouldntbecausethe5menknowwhatscoming.Thesingle manhashisbackturnedandhasnoideawhatisgoingon.Butitis perfectlymoralforhimtothrowtheswitchandspare5lives.

Adequate

Adequate

Inadequate Inadequate Inadequate Inadequate Inadequate

B.LoopedTrackProblem ForeseeableBattery(Oscar)
Judgment Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Justification Idon'tknow.Idon'tthinkthatOscarhastherighttodecidewholivesor whodies,butheshoulddosomething.Iguess,no. No,becauseOscarhasnorighttoplayGod. BecauseOscariskillinganindividualhimself,thereforebeing accountableforamurderratherthanamishapthathewasnotresponsible for. Themanonthesidetrackmightknowthatnotrainwasdue,sowas justifiedinhavinghisbackturnedhowever,the5mencrossingmay havebeendoingsoknowingaboutthepotentialrisk. No,sinceitwouldnotbemorallyrighttoinvolveandkillaninnocent bystander,eventhoughitwouldsavethelivesof5men. Itsnevermorallyrighttokillsomeoneevenifitmeansthat5otherlives canbesaved. Mygutfeelingisno,it'snotmorallypermissible heisplayingGodand humanbeingsaren't"quantifiable"likethat(5more important thanone). Ontheotherhand,Ithinkthe actionistothrowtheswitch. Ifhethrowstheswitchheistakingadeliberateactionwhichwill(or likelywill)resultinthedeathofaninnocentbystander. Ifhedoesnothing, heisallowinganactofgodtoproceedoverwhichhe hasnocontrolotherthantodecidetokillsomeone(morally unacceptable). Adequacy Adequate Adequate Adequate

Impermissible

Adequate

Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible

Adequate Adequate Adequate

Impermissible

Adequate

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Impermissible

Impermissible Impermissible

Impermissible

Impermissible Impermissible

Impermissible Impermissible Permissible Permissible

Permissible

Permissible

Permissible Permissible Permissible Permissible

Permissible Permissible Permissible

The5potentialvictimsareaccountablefortheirownsituation(i.e. standingonatraintrackwhichisinservice). MorallyIbelievethathumansdonothavetherighttodecidetotakethe livesofotherhumans,andinthissituationnatureshouldbeallowedto runitscourse.Therefore,Ibelievethatitismorallyimpermissibleto throwtheswitch. Inothercases,however,suchasthetakingofone's ownlife(euthanasia),Ibelievethattherearecertaincircumstanceswhere theswitchcouldmorallybe"thrown." {Respondentdrewanarrowpointingtothefivemenandcommented}: Shouldn'thavebeenthereinthefirstplace. Those5peoplewerewronginbeingonthetrack.Tokillamanthatis innocentandnotdoinganythingwrongiswrong.Theotherpeopleare walkingonthetrackindanger. Sincethemanonthesidetrackisinnocent.Thesidetrackisnotopen foroperationbecausethereisaheavyobjectonthetrack.Soitsokfor themanstandingonthesidetrack. Oscarisinnopositiontoplay Goddecidingwhoselife(lives)aremore important. It'snotmorallypermissibleforhimtoletthe5mendieifitwereinhis powertochangethat.Meanwhile,itisalsonotpermissibleforhimto takethisotherman'slife.I thinkOscariscaughtinasituationinwhich neitherchoicewouldbemorallyrightheisgoingtohavetobasehis decisiononsomeotherstandardsotherthanmorality. Overpopulationisaseriousprobleminmanyareasoftheworld. Thisisnotaquestionofthevalueoflife. Ifhecansavethelivesoffivepeople,hehasthemoralrighttodoso.He cansavemorepeoplethisway. BTW,meandmyfriendsweretalkingaboutthisyesterdayandtheman isactuallyOscar'sfriendinhisversion.Andwoulditbemorewrongfor Oscartoturntheswitchwhilethetrainisgoingtowardshisfriendon whilethetrainisgoingtowardsthemaintrack.Ithinkneitherwayis permissiblebutifIhavetochoose,savingmorelivesismoredesirable. Ithinkeitheractionthrowingtheswitchornotispermissiblewith respecttoany"universal"morallaw,thatis,whateverHankdoes,we mustpresumewasthelesseroftwoevilsinhismind.Therefore,Hank wouldhavetriedtodotherightthing,asheunderstandsit.Doingwhat onethinksisrightseemstobetheequivalentofdoingone'sbest,which isallthatcouldeverbeexpectedofanyone,andthereforeseems universallydefensible Thequestioniswhichissaferforthetrainhowmanypeopleareonit. Assumingthetrainwouldbefineandtheonlyworryisthepeople,oneis tolosetheonetosavethe5.Forthemostpart,itseemsdowntonumber ormorality[Toolighttoreadwell] Theneedsofthemanyoutweightheneedsofthefew,ortheone. Instinctivelyyesbecauseyouregoingtosave 5people. Simplemath:1mandeadvs.5men.Noneofthemshouldhavebeen crossingthetracks!! Murderisnotimmoralifitpreventsothermurders.Butthelawwould disagree.WereIplacedintheroleofOscar,Imighthavetoconsiderthe optionofnottakinganyaction,andpretendingnottobeabletohelp. 1<5 It is morallypermissibleforOscartodoeither,butifyouwanttoknow whatIwoulddoifIwasOscar,Iwould notthrowtheswitch. Whenansweringthisquestion,Iinnowayusetheargumentthatone

Adequate

Adequate Adequate

Adequate

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Inadequate Inadequate Adequate Adequate

Adequate

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deathisbetterthanfive,butinsteadlookatthepossibilityofhavingno deaths.Ifthetrainstaysonitspresentcourse,5peoplewilldie. However,if thetrainisredirected,thereisachance,thoughaslightone, thateveryonemaylive.Iwouldredirectthetrain,doingeverythingI couldtogettheman'sattention,and,Godwilling,he'dturnaroundand beabletoescapetheoncomingtrain. Ontheonehand,nobodymayactasGod,anddecidewholivesandwho Inadequate dies.Analternativeisonlyfeasibleifitdoesnotimpliesthedeathofa humanbeing.Ontheotherhand,therealworldiscomplex.Sincealong timeagothatthat humanlivesarelosttosaveaculture,anation,etc. Furthermore,Ispentalmost10minutestryingtodecideandIamstill undecided.So,itisreasonablethatthemanisalsoundecided,andany optionwillthereforebeacceptable. Themanonthesidetrackcanheartrainandthustrytojumpofftrack. Inadequate Thussaving5menandprobably6. IdontknowifthatswhatIwoulddo,butIdontthinkitsimmoralto Inadequate doit.

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9.5Experiment5
9.5.1 Scenarios 1.BystanderProblemForeseeableBattery(Hank) Hankistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Hankseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfivemen walkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted. Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbeableto getoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Hankisstandingnexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow,that willturnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen.Unfortunately, thereisamanstandingonthesidetrackwithhisbackturned.Hankcanthrowtheswitch, killinghimorhecanrefrainfrom doingthis,lettingthefivedie. IsitmorallypermissibleforHanktothrowtheswitch?

2. ModifiedBystanderProblem#2(Mark:IntentionalHomicide) Markistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Markseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfivemen walkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailed,andthedriver fainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbe abletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Markisstandingnexttoaswitch,whichhecan throw,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen. Unfortunately,thereisamanonthesidetrack.Markcanthrowtheswitch,killinghimorhe canrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthemendie. Markthenrecognizesthatthemanonthesidetrackissomeonewhohehateswithapassion. I dontgiveadamnaboutsavingthosefivemen,Markthinkstohimself,butthisismychance tokillthatbastard. IsitmorallypermissibleforMarktothrowtheswitch inordertokillthemanonthesidetrack?

3. ModifiedBystander Problem#3(Richard:BetterAlternative) Richardistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Richardseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawfive menwalkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailed,andthedriver fainted.Thetrainisnowrushingtowardthefivemen.Itismovingsofastthattheywillnotbe abletogetoffthetrackintime.Fortunately,Richardisstandingnexttoaswitch,whichhecan throw,thatwillturnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingitfromkillingthemen. Unfortunately,thereisamanonthesidetrackwithhisbackturned.Richardcanthrowthe switch,killinghimorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingthemendie.

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Bypullinganemergencycord,Richardcanalsoredirectthetraintoathirdtrack,wherenoone isatrisk.IfRichardpullsthecord,noonewillbekilled.IfRichardthrowstheswitch,one personwillbekilled.IfRicharddoesnothing,fivepeoplewillbekilled. IsitmorallypermissibleforRichardtothrowtheswitch?

4.ModifiedBystanderProblem#4(Steve:Disproportional Death) Steveistakinghisdailywalknearthetraintrackswhenhenoticesthatthetrainthatis approachingisoutofcontrol.Steveseeswhathashappened:thedriverofthetrainsawaman walkingacrossthetracksandslammedonthebrakes,butthebrakesfailedandthedriverfainted. Thetrainisnowrushingtowardtheman.Itismovingsofastthathewillnotbeabletogetoff thetrackintime. Fortunately,Steveisstandingnexttoaswitch,whichhecanthrow,thatwill turnthetrainontoasidetrack,therebypreventingitfromkillingtheman.Unfortunately,there are fivemenstandingonthesidetrackwiththeirbacksturned.Stevecan throwtheswitch, killingthefivemenorhecanrefrainfromdoingthis,lettingtheonemandie. IsitmorallypermissibleforStevetothrowtheswitch?

9.5.2 Responses

A.Pair #1:BystanderProblem(Hank)andIntentionalHomicideProblem(Mark)
Problem Bystander Intentional Homicide Judgment Permissible Impermissible Justification 1.BecauseIdon'tthinkthereisarightandwrong answerandthattherearemultiplealternativestothis scenario,IthinkHankcanthrowtheswitchandprobably alsosavethemanstandingonthesidetrack.Ithink Hankcanwarnthemantomovewhileheisthrowingthe switch.Furthermore,Ithinkthatbynotthrowingthe switchthetraincancausemoredamagethanwhatisnow foreseeable. 2.WhileMarkwouldbesavingthemenwalkingacross thetracks,itisnotrightforMarktothrowtheswitch primarilytokillthemanonthesidetrack. Scenariototallyimplausiblefroma time/speed/distance/safetyequipmentperspective.Also, throwingtheswitchmightderailthetrain,killingallsix pedestrians&theengineer. AlthoughI'mnotadvocatingtakingaperson'slifeinthis situationIbelievethat thelossofonewouldbefar greateranoutcomethanfive.Withthatbeingsaid,I mightnotfeelthatwayiftheonepersonwassomeoneI hadpersonaltieswithsuchasafatherorbrother. Question#2:Idonotbelievethatmaliciousintentofany kind isanacceptablesolutiontocausinganyoneharmor lossoflifeevenifIdespisedanindividual.I'mafirm believerthatwhatgoesaroundcomesaroundandI Adequacy Inadequate

Bystander Intentional Homicide Bystander Intentional Homicide

Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible

Inadequate

Inadequate

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Bystander Intentional Homicide Bystander Intentional Homicide Bystander Intentional Homicide

Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible

believethatGodcanandwilltakecareoftheindividual inHisowntime. Mark'schoicetokillistheamoraldecisioninthe2nd scenario.

Inadequate

HankScenario:Dowhat'sbestforthegreatergoodas longasthedecisionisnotimpactedbypersonalfeeling. MarkScenario:Personalfeelingtomakelifethreatening decisionisnotmorallycorrect. I'mnotsurewhatismeantbythephrase"morally permissible."I'mnotsureifthatissupposedtomean whetherIthinkaparticularactisjustifiedorwhetherI thinkamajorityofpeoplewouldapproveofaparticular decision.UltimatelyIdecidedtoavoidtaking affirmativestepstoendanotherperson'slife.Ihaveno ideaifthatis"moral,"however. Thehypomadeitsoundlikethechoicewasbetween certainlysaving5peoplev.certainlysaving1.Ifthe chancesofsavingthose5werenotascertain,Iwould feeldifferentlyeven90%wouldchangemyanswer.

Adequate

Adequate

Bystander Intentional Homicide

Permissible Permissible

Inadequate

B.Pair#2:BystanderProblem(Hank)andBetterAlternativeProblem(Richard)
Problem Bystander Better Alternative Bystander Better Alternative Bystander Better Alternative Bystander Better Alternative Bystander Better Alternative Judgment Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Easyquestions.Thequestionsaboutterminatinglife withoutdignityareharder.Questionsaboutthedeath penaltyareharderstill. Withoutknowingtheindividualsinthescenarios,I believethat,ifitispossibletosave5whileharmingonly 1,thenyoushoulddoso.However,ifyouhaveathird optionwhichwouldharmnoone,thenthatistheideal choice. "Firstdonoharm,"andthenwithinthatcontext"doas littleaspossible."SinceRichardhasathirdandvastly preferablechoice,itisnotmorallypermissibleforhimto takeanactiveroleinchoosingwhatheconsidersthe lesserof2evils.Ifhecan"firstdonoharm"heshould morallyalwayschoosethatrole. Reasonforfirst:thefiveareatfaultandthoughitwould Inadequate Heshouldpullthecordandsaveeveryone'slives. Inadequate Justification 1)Whileitismorallypermissible,itisnotmorally advisable. Adequacy Inadequate

Adequate

Adequate

Bystander

Impermissible

Adequate

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Better Alternative

Impermissible

benicetohelpthem,Idon'tthinkit'smoraltokilla completelyinnocentpersontodothis.IfIwouldsayyes, IfeellikeIwouldbemakingastatementthatfiveguilty people'slivesaremoreimportantthanoneinnocent person's.Ithinkthat'swrong. Reasonforsecond:hehasanalternativetosaveeveryone andit'smorallyrighttochoosethatone. Ithinkitwouldbefineifhepulledthecordtosave Adequate everyone,butitisnotmorallypermissibletodecideif1 manor5hastherighttoliveordie.

Bystander Better Alternative Bystander Better Alternative

Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Permissible

Firstscenario:Thefivemenonthetrackschosetobe Inadequate thereonthetracksandknowtherisksasthetrainis approaching.Themanonhisownisona differenttrack unknowing...AndIwouldbechoosingtomurderhim tosave5others...Myliability.Secondscenario:A chancetosaveall6...onlyissueis...whataboutthe speedofthetrain?Isitapassengertrain?Bymakingthe switchwoulditderail?CouldIputmorepeopleatrisk byattemptingtomaketheswitchanditnotbe successful?

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C.Pair#3: Bystander Problem(Hank)andDisproportionateDeathProblem(Steve)

Problem Disproportional Death Bystander Bystander Disproportional Death Judgment Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Whilenoinnocentperson'sfateshouldbeinthehands Adequate ofanotherinanidealworld,inthiscase,deathis inevitable,anditwouldbemorallybesttodothe greatestgoodforthegreatestnumber.Therefore, interveningandputtingthetrainoffofitscoursefora netoffourlivessavedismorallyjustifiable,ifnot ideal.Inthiscase,mydefinitionofmoralisdoingthe right/rationalthing. Theyshouldbothtaketheactionthatsavesthemost Adequate lives Justification Lifeof5isgreaterthan1. Adequacy Adequate

Bystander Disproportional Death Disproportional Death Bystander Bystander Disproportional Death

Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible Permissible Impermissible

Due tothepreservationoflife,itisbettertoloseone Adequate lifethantolosefive.Myvoteisdonotthrowthe switch,butpraythattheonethatisonthetrackisable togetoffsafely. Thesedon't takeintoaccount: Inadequate A)ThatHankcouldyelltothepeople/themanonthe sideofthetrack(whooughthave[illegible]) B)Thathisthrowingoftheswitchcouldactually derailthetrainandkill/injureevenmorepeople. Nevertheless,while5peopleismorethanoneperson inthestandpointofpotentialcasualties,thefiveare also5timesmorelikelyasaunittonoticethesound ofthespeedingtrain. HankisinapositiontoplayGod.Perhaps. Bothscenariosprovokealotofthoughtandhuman Inadequate introspect.Thefactthatyou(Hank)hastheabilityto changefateissomewhatscary.Therearealotof questionsthatshouldbeansweredpriortomakinga trulyinformeddecision.Myhopeisthatgiventhe circumstancesHankwouldhavetheabilitytowarnall ofthementogetthemoutofharm'sway. WhoamItosaywhoshouldliveordie.Itisthe Adequate Lord'swill. Hank/Stevecannotbecertainoftheoutcomeofhis actionsorhowhisactionswillaffecttheoutcome. Adequate

Disproportional Death Bystander

Permissible Impermissible

Disproportional Death Bystander Disproportional Death Bystander Bystander Disproportional Death

Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible Impermissible

Ifeltthatwhetheritwas5menonthetracksor1,it Adequate waspartlytheirresponsibilityforbeinginharm's way.Thebystandersshouldn'tinterfereandcausean innocentmanorman'slivestobelostbasically.The

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Bystander Disproportional Death

Impermissible Impermissible

Bystander Disproportional Death Disproportional Death Bystander

Impermissible Impermissible

Permissible Permissible

menonthetracksshouldhavebeenmorecareful theirlackofcareshouldnotresultinanother'sdeath. ThemainreasonthatIanswered"No"toboth Adequate questionsisthatthethoughtofmakingavalue judgmentregardinghumanlifeseemsimmoral(orat leastuncomfortable)tome.Iunderstandthatfroma utilitarianstandpoint,5livesareworthmorethan1, butthat1personisstillvaluedimmenselybythose wholovehim.Itdoesn'tseemappropriateformeto intervene,therebydecidingwhoselifeorlivesare moreprecious. Itsoundsasifthemenwalkingacrossthetrackssee Adequate thetraincoming.Theyshouldhavemadesurethe trackswereclearbeforecrossing.It'snotfairtokill someman(ormen)whosebackisturnedandhasno ideawhatisgoingon. Question1:ThedilemmainvolvingHank(1st Inadequate Paragraph)asksthequestionifitis"morally permissible"forHanktothrowtheswitch.Itis "permissible"usingaUtilitarianmoralsystem the greatestgoodforthegreatestnumberofpeople. Hence,thereisatleastonemoralsystemwherethis actispermissible.Theironyisthatthis Enlightenmentpositiondevalueslife(initstotality) anditcanalsobereasonedthatthemanwithhisback turned,whowillpresumablybekilled,mayhavea morevaluablelifethantheothers.Ultimately,then, eitheractionwouldpermit a"moral"result dependingonyourcognitiveframework.Question2: Sameanswerasabove,thoughculturallyaharder argumenttomake.Thepositionofmodernityisto counthumanbeings andtherebyassumetheir equivalence.Thisisseen,forexample,inthe economicpresumptionof["homoeconomics"] whicheconomics(contemporary)isbasedupon.The ultimateequivalenceofhumanbeings,however, sharesthesamefateasthisconcept inpracticehomo economicsdoesnotexist,thoughitmustbeassumed intellectually.

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9.6Experiment6

9.6.1 Scenarios 1.TransplantProblem IntentionalBattery(Dr.Brown) Dr.Brownhasfivepatientsinthehospitalwhoaredying.Eachpatientneedsaneworganin ordertosurvive.Onepatientneedsanewheart.Twopatientsneedanewkidney.Andtwo morepatientsneedanewlung.Dr.Browncansaveallfivepatientsifhetakesasinglehealthy personandremovesherheart,kidneys,andlungstogivetothesefivepatients. Justsucha healthypersonisinRoom306.Sheisinthehospitalforroutinetests.Havingseenhertest results,Dr.Brownknowsthatsheisperfectlyhealthyandoftherighttissuecompatibility.IfDr. BrowncutsupthepersoninRoom306andgivesherorganstotheotherfivepatients,hewill savetheotherfivepatients,butkillthepersoninRoom306intheprocess.IfDr.Browndoes notcutupthepersoninRoom306,theotherfivepatientswilldie. IsitwrongforDr.BrowntocutupthepersoninRoom306? 2.TrolleyProblemForeseeableBattery(Charlie) Charlieisdrivingatrainwhenthebrakesfail.Aheadfivepeopleareworkingonthetrackwith theirbacksturned.FortunatelyCharliecanswitchtoasidetrack,ifheactsatonce. Unfortunatelythereisalsosomeoneonthattrackwithhisbackturned.IfCharlieswitcheshis traintothesidetrack,hewillkilloneperson.IfCharliedoesnotswitchhistrain,hewillkillfive people. IsitmorallypermissibleforCharlietoswitchhistraintothesidetrack?YorN

9.6.2 Responses

A.TransplantProblem IntentionalBattery(Dr.Brown)
Judgment Impermissible Justification Ibelievethatitwouldbewrongtocutthis306personupwithoutthem evenknowingit.ItwouldbedifferentifDr.Brownhadaskedthis personiftheywoulddonatetheirorgansandhehadreceivedtheir permission.ThatiswhyIwouldblamehimifhetooktheirlife. IthinkthatDr.Brownshouldaskthepersoninroom306 iftheywould liketobecutuptosavetheotherpeoples'lives. Isaidnobecauseitneversaidthatshegavepermissiontokillhim to giveawayherbodypartsIdidnotfeelgoodaboutitbecauseIwould notlikesomebodytotakemybodyparts. Okay,ifgivenconsent. Forquestion#1Isaidyes,becausethepersoninroom306wasnot informedshewoulddieandneitherwasherfamily.Butthe5patients arepreparedandtheirfamilieswereawarethattheywereclosetodying. Dr.Brownshouldaskthepersoninroom306permission. Adequacy Adequate

Impermissible Impermissible

Adequate Adequate

Impermissible Impermissible

Adequate Adequate

Impermissible

Adequate

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Impermissible Permissible Permissible

It'snotfairtokillaperfectlyhealthypersonthathasnotdoneanything wrong. Itdependsonhowoldtheyare. Ithinkit'sokbecauseyoursaving5livesforone.

Adequate Adequate Adequate

B.TrolleyProblem ForeseeableBattery(Charlie)
Judgment Permissible Permissible Justification It'sbettertokillonepersonthanfive ifyouhavenootherchoice.Less peoplewilldie. Becauseifyoukill5peopleitisworse.Justkilling1personisnotas badaskilling5people.Iwouldshoutoutinfrontofthepeopletoget outsoIwouldn'thittheperson.Couldturningwork? IthinkCharlieshouldchangetracksbecausethenhesavesatleast5but oneiskilledunlesshehearsthetrainsoallandalltochangewouldbe better. Ihavenocommentsorquestions.Idonotknowwhattosay. Ifheswitchestracks,willhestillbegoingto thesameplace?" Adequacy Adequate Adequate

Permissible

Adequate

Permissible Permissible

Inadequate Inadequate

Permissible Impermissible

Ifhedidn'tswitchhemaybeblamedmoreandprobablyfired.Hewould bedoingagoodthingifheswitchedtothesidetrack. Wouldn'ttheyhearthetraincoming? Inadequate Notblaminghimbecausehehadtomakeachoiceeitherway. Inadequate

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Notes
1

Althoughthispaperwaswrittenbyme,itsummarizesseveralyearsofresearchconductedwithmycolleagues ProfessorElizabethSpelkeoftheDepartmentofPsychology,HarvardUniversity,andDr.CristinaSorrentinoofthe DepartmentofPsychology,NewYorkUniversity.HenceIusepluralformsthroughout.Iwasprincipal investigatorinthesestudies,whichbeganwhileIwasa Lecturerand ResearchAffiliateintheDepartmentofBrain andCognitiveSciencesatthe MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology andcontinuedwhileIwasalawstudentat StanfordLawSchool.Althoughourfindingshavenotyetbeenpublished, theyhavebeenpresentedinpostersat annualmeetings theCognitiveScienceSocietyandtheSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,aswellasin lectures,workshops,andgraduateseminarsatCornellUniversity,HarvardUniversity,M.I.T.,StanfordUniversity, theUniversityofBerlin,and thePeterWall InstituteforAdvancedStudiesat the UniversityofBritishColumbia. 2 The distinctionbetweendescriptiveandexplanatoryadequacyis potentiallyconfusingbecausecorrectanswersto bothproblemsare both descriptiveandexplanatoryintheusualsense.Asolutiontotheproblemofdescriptive adequacyisa descriptionofthematureindividualsmoralcompetenceatthesametimeitis an explanationofher moralintuitions.Likewise,asolutiontotheproblemofexplanatoryadequacyisa descriptionoftheinitialstateofthe moralfacultyatthesametime,itisanexplanationbothoftheindividualsacquiredmoralcompetenceand(atadeeper level)thosesameintuitions(Mikhail,2000 Mikhail, inpress). 3 Thesyntacticformoftheactiondescriptionslocatedonthe nodesoftheseacttrees(Goldman,1970) callsfor comment.DrawingonGoldman(1970)andGinet(1990),wetakethecentralelementofwhatwecalla complex acttokenrepresentation(Mikhail,2000)tobeagerundivenominal,whosegrammaticalsubjectispossessive. FollowingKatz(1972),weusethesymbolatttodenotesomeunspecifiedpositiononanassumedtimedimension, andweusesuperscriptsonoccurrencesofttorefertospecificpositionsonthisdimension.Weassumethat (0) superscriptscanbeeithervariablesorconstants.Wetaketwiththesuperscriptconstant0,i.e.,t ,tofunction asanindexicalelementinthe complexacttokenrepresentation,servingtoorientthetemporalrelationshipsholding betweenitand othersuch representations. Superscriptvariables(n,m,etc.)denotemembersofthesetofnatural numbersand appearinsuperscriptswithprefixedsigns+and,indicating anappropriatenumberofpositiveand (0) (+n) negativeunitsfromtheoriginpoint(t )ofthetimedimension.Forexample,the symbolt signifiesnunitsto (n) therightoftheorigin,andthe symbolt signifiesnunitstotheleftoftheorigin. Wealsouse additional variablesafterthesigns+andinoursuperscriptswhoseinterpretationproceedsinaccordwiththeconventions (+n+( m)) foraddingandsubtractinginalgebra.Forexample,the symbolt signifiesn munitstotherightofthe (n+(m)+(o)) origin,whereasthe symbolt signifiesn+m+ounitstotheleftoftheorigin. Thustheordered sequenceofrepresentationsontheverticalline(i.e.,thetrunk)oftheacttreeinFigure3indicatesthatthrowingthe manoccursbeforecausingthetraintohittheman,whichoccursbeforepreventingthetrainfromkillingthemen. Aswediscussin8.1,thisnotationalsystemforrepresentingtemporalstructurealsoadoptsanimportant convention, whichisto dateanactionfromitstimeofcompletion.SeeMikhail(2000)forfurtherdiscussion. 4 Theelementsofintentionalbatteryintortlawaremorecomplexandvaryamongcommentatorsandjurisdictions (e.g.,Dobbs,2000Shapo,2003).Forthepurposesofthisstudy,wecharacterizebatteryastouchingwithout consent, intentionalbattery astouchingwithoutconsentusedasameanstoagivenend,andforeseeablebattery (a neologism)astouchingwithoutconsentembeddedinanagentsactionplanasasideeffect(see2.1).Theseare notmeanttobelegallyadequatedefinitions,buttheyareadequategivenourpresentpurposes. 5 Analphalevelof.05wasusedforallstatisticaltests. 6 Theexactbreakdownofparticipantsandscenariopairsislistedbelow.Eachparticipantreceivedaquestionnaire withoneofthefollowingtenpairs,withthenumberofparticipantsineachconditionlistedinbrackets: Pair#1:BystanderProblem(Hank)andFootbridgeProblem(Ian)[10] Pair#2: BystanderProblem(Hank)andModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl)[5] Pair#3:FootbridgeProblem(Ian)andModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke)[5] Pair#4:FootbridgeProblem(Ian)andModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl)[5] Pair#5:BystanderProblem(Hank)andModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke)[5] Pair#6:ModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl)andModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke)[5] Pair#7:TrolleyProblem(Charlie)andBystanderProblem(Hank)[5] Pair#8:TrolleyProblem(Charlie)andFootbridgeProblem(Ian)[5] Pair#9:TrolleyProblem(Charlie)andModifiedBystanderProblem(Karl)[10] Pair#10:TrolleyProblem(Charlie)andModifiedFootbridgeProblem(Luke)[10] 7 RecallthattwosubjectsinExperiment2didnotprovideinformationabouttheirgender. Bothweregivena ConsensualContactscenario.Onejudgedtheactiontobepermissibleandonejudgedittobeimpermissible.

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8 9

WethankFeiXuandYaodaXufortheirassistanceincollectingthisdata. Foronenotableeffortinthisdirection,seeHauser,Cushman,Young,Jin&Mikhail(manuscriptsubmittedfor publication). 10 Accordingtoourhypothesis,thisactionisjudgedtobeimpermissiblebecauseitsbadeffectsareperceivedtobe disproportionaltoitsgoodones. 11 Differencesbetweenthetwoscenariosareunderlinedanditalicizedtomakethemmorenoticeable.Participants weregivenquestionnaireswithoutthesemarkings.TheNedOscarpairanditsloopedtrackdesignwerealso inspiredbyanotabledebateovertheprincipleofdoubleeffectinthephilosophicalliterature(seeThomson,1985 Costa,1987). 12 Thisismerelyanimplicationofthetemporalorderofgoodeffects,badeffects,andbatteriesinthese representations,whichitmayberecallediswhatledustocreatetheNedOscarpairinthefirstplace. 13 Differencesbetweenthetwoscenariosareunderlinedanditalicizedtomakethemmorenoticeable.Participants weregivenquestionnaireswithoutthesemarkings. 14 Toclarify,weassumedthatrespondentswouldrepresentMarkasintendingthebadeffectbutnotthegoodeffect. Amorecomplexscenariowouldbeoneinwhichtheagenthasboth intentionsandthe opportunitytohittwobirds withonestone,sotospeak. Weleave investigationof thisalternative foranotheroccasion. 15 Althoughwedonotpursuetheissuehere,thebreakdownofresponsesbygenderdidappearsignificant.7of8 girlsandall7oftheboysintheForeseeableBatteryconditionjudgedtheactionconstitutingforeseeablebattery (Charliesturningthetrain)tobe permissible.Bycontrast,1of6girlsintheIntentionalBatteryconditionjudged theactionconstitutingintentionalbattery(Dr.Brownscuttingupthepatient)tobepermissible,but surprisinglyamajorityofboys(5outof9)disagreed.Theseresultssuggest,albeitprovisionally,thatboysmaybe slowerthangirlsin arrivingatthestandardadultviewthatcertaindeontologicalviolationsareimpermissible.More researchisneededtoclarifythisissue. 16 Thesameholds,ofcourse,forothercognitivedomains,likevision,musicalcognition,facerecognition,andso on.Ineachofthesedomains,wetakeforgrantedandcandiscoverempiricallythatexperimentalsubjectsare consistentlyincapableofarticulatingthe operativeprinciplesonwhichtheirintuitivejudgmentsarebased.Moral cognitionappearstobesimilartoothercognitivedomainsinthisrespect,thatis,tobebothprincipled and intuitive, involvingpatternsofunconsciousinference(e.g.,Helmholtz,1867/1962). 17 Soconceived,thepresumptionofgoodintentionsappearsrelatedtothesocalledfirstprincipleofpractical reason,accordingtowhichgoodistobedoneandpursuedandevilavoided(Macnamara,1990Mikhail,2000). 18 TheSelfPreservationPrincipleholdsthatifanagentsdoingsomethingtoamoralpatientnecessitateskilling her,thenthemoralpatientwouldnotconsenttoit(Mikhail,2000).Theprinciplemaypresumablybeoverriddenin certaincircumstances,butwedonotaddressthattopichere. 19 LikePetrinovichandcolleagues,Greeneetal.(2001)donotappearto investigatedeonticknowledgeassuch, becauseinsteadofaskingsubjectstodecidewhetheragivenactionismorallypermissible,theyaskwhetherthe actionisappropriate.SeeGreeneetal.293(5537):2105DataSupplementSupplementalDataat http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/293/5537/2105/DC1(lastvisited9/25/2001).Thatthisquestionappears inappositecanbeseenbyconsidering theanalogousinquiryinthestudyoflanguage:askingwhetheralinguistic expressionisappropriateratherthangrammatical.Chomsky(1957,p.15)emphasizedtheimportanceof distinguishing grammaticalfromcloselyrelatedbutdistinctnotionslike significant ormeaningful, andthesame logicappearstoapplyhere.Additionally,Greeneetal.(2001)donotprovideevidencethattrolleyintuitionsare stable,systematic,orwidelyshared.Instead,theymerelyreportthatmostpeoplesaythatone oughttoturnthe trolleyintheTrolleyProblembutoneoughtnottopushthe manintheFootbridgeProblem, and they thennotein passingthat[p]articipantsresponsestoversionsofthetrolleyandfootbridgedilemmaswereconsistentwiththe intuitionsdescribedabove(Greeneetal.,2001,p.2108, n.11).Further,whetherone ought toperformagiven actionisdistinctfromwhetherthe actionismorallypermissible,andtheauthorsconflatethiscrucialdistinction. Finally,none oftheintuitionsstudiedbyGreeneandcolleaguesappearto qualifyasconsideredjudgmentsin Rawls(1971)sensethat is,asmoraljudgmentsinwhichourmoralcapacitiesaremostlikelytobedisplayed withoutdistortion(Rawls,1971,p.47)because alloftheirprobesarephrasedinthefirstperson(e.g.,Youare onafootbridge overthetracks Isitappropriateforyou to pushthe stranger?)(emphasisadded).Thisnotonly contravenesRawlssensible warningthatthe theoristsdata setshouldexcludethosejudgmentswhicharelikely tobeinfluencedbyanexcessiveattentiontoourowninterestsorwhicharegivenwhenweareupsetor frightened,orwhenwestandtogaininonewayortheother(Rawls,1971,p.47).It also appearsto stackthedeck infavoroftheauthorshypothesisthat variationsinemotionalengagement(Greeneetal.,2001)areresponsible forgenerating thisparticularclassof moral intuitions.

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