[es 88 [125 37_] { Proofs for Eternity, Creation ~ and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy “Ny \t / HERBERT A. DAVIDSON University of California, Los Angeles New York * Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1987The von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies PROOFS FOR ETERNITY, CREATION AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHYeee ee ee Oxford University Press Orford New York Toronto Delhi Bomby Caleta Madrar Karsh Peuliag ipa Singapore Hore Kong Tokyo ‘Nat Darer Stam. Cape Town Melbourne Auckland and socated companies in Beit “Boe Ibadan Nila Copyright © 1987 by Herbert A. Davidson Publi by Oxford Uniery Prt, ne, 200 Madison Aveawe, New York, New York 16 Ontos is epistered uademark of Orford Univessiy Press iva of Congress Catsboging in Pbiation Dat Davidos, Herbew A. (Hebert Alan) root for eealy,exeston, andthe extense of Godin medieval amie an ew phony. New York: Onford Universi Pes, 197, 1. God (im) Prot Hiner of done 2 God (ubasm)—Hision of dctines 3. Phioeopy, ais “. Phiocopy, Jom. 1. Tie [BHS.GexD36 196) 217.0902 8633179 ISBN O19.508535 Published wit th aistene of The Lois nd Mins Epicin Fund of tie Ameren Academy fr Jewish Reseich 1357918642 Pinte inthe United Snes of Ameria fon acre paper For Rachel and JessicaAcknowledgments Chapters LV and V of the present book are a reworking of an article that appeared the Journal of the American Oriental Society, Volume 89. Chapter VI incor porates material from articles appearing in Philosophy East and West, Volume 18, and Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge, 1979). An expanded version of Appendix A, part 2, appeared in Studies in Jewish Religious dnd Intellectual History Presented to Alexander Altmann (University, Alabama, 1979), The National Endowment for the Humanities and the UCLA Academic Senate have supported my work; the von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, UCLA, took responsibility for preparing a camera-ready copy; a grant from the ‘American Academy for Jewish Research to the von Grunebaum Center helped to defray some of the composition costs, I wish to express my warmest thanks 10 all those institutions. I also wish to thank Marina Preussner of the von Grunebaum Center for her invaluable aid and irrepressible good cheer. ‘My wife subjected the book to a painstaking, and often painful, critique. Any clarity that is t0 be detected is her doing. "The book was complete in 1980.u Vv Contents Introdueti 1. Eternity, ereation, and the existence of God 2. The present book Proofs of Eternity from the Nature of the World 1. Proofs of eternity 2. Proofs of eternity from the nature of the physical world 3. Replies to proofs from the nature of the world 4, Summary Proofs of Eternity from the Nature of God 1, The proofs 2. Replies to proofs from the nature of the cause of the universe 3. Summary John Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation and Their Entry into Medieval Arabic Philosophy 1, Philoponus’ proofs of creation 2, Saadia and Philoponus 3. Kindi and Philoponus 4, Summary 2 46 49 49 1 86 86 95 106 16ve vit von IK Contents Kalam Proofs for Creation 1. Proofs from the impossibility of an infinite number 2. Responses of the medieval Aristotelians to proofs of creation from the impossibility of an infinite number 3. The standard Kalam proof for creation: the proof from accidents 4. Juwayni’s version of the proof from accidents 5. Proofs from composition Arguments from the Concept of Particularization 1. Inferring the existence of God from creation 2. Arguments from the concept of particularization 3. Particularization arguments for the existence of God without the premise of creation; particularization arguments for creation 4. Ghazali and Maimonides 5. Additional arguments for creation in Maimonides and Gersonides Arguments from Design 1. Cosmotogical, teleological, and ontological proofs of the existence of God 2. Teleological arguments 3. Summary ‘The Proof from Motion 1, Aristotle's proof from motion 2. Maimonides’ version of the proof from motion 3. Hasdai Crescas’ critique of the proof from motion 4. Another proof from motion Avicenna’s Proof of the Existence of a Being Necessarily Existent by Virtue of Itself 7 17 127 134 143 146 134 154 174 187 194 203 213 23 216 26 237 237 240 249 215 281 xL Contents |. First cause of motion and first cause of existence ‘The existence of God: a problem for metaphysics . Necessarily existent being and possibly existent being ‘The attributes of the necessarily existent by virtue of itself . Proof of the existence of the necessarily existent by virtue of itself ‘Questions raised by Avicenna’s proof 7. The version of Avicenna’s proof in Shahrastani and Crescas 8, Summary Averroes’ Critique of Avicenna’s Proof 1. The proof of the existence of God as a subject for physics 2, Necessarily existent by virtue of another, possibly existent by virtue of itself 3. The nature of the celestial spheres according to Avertoes 4. Averroes’ critique of the body of Avicenna’s proof 5. Summary Proofs of the Existence of God from the Impossibility of an Infinite Regress of Eficient Causes 1, The proof from the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes, 2. Unity and incorporeality 3. The proof from the impossibility of an infinite regress of efficient causes and the proof from the concepts possibly existent and necessarily cxistent Resumé 5. Crescas on the impossibility of an infinite regress . Ghazali’s critique of Avicenna’s proof Summary 281 284 289 293 298 304 307 309 3 312 318 321 331 334 336 336 345 362 365 366 315ail Contents XIL_ Subsequent History of Proofs from the Concept of Necessary Existence 1, Maimonides and Aquinas 2. The influence of Avicenna’s proof 3. Proofs of the existence of God as a necessarily existent ‘being in modern European philosophy 4, Summary 5. Concluding remark ‘Appendix A. Two Philosophie Principles 1. The principle that an infinite number is impossible 2. The principle that a finite body contains only finite power Appendix B. Inventory of Proofs Primary Sources Index of Philosophers Index of Terms 378 378 385 388 405 406 407 407 409 412 414 a 427 PROOFS FOR ETERNITY, CREATION AND ‘THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHYI Introduction 1. Eternity, creation, and the existence of God ‘One might well expect the existence of God to be the inital issue of natural theology: but such was not the case in the Islamic and Jewish Middle Ages. Medicval Muslim and Jewish philosophers did as a matter of course construct their natural theology and their metaphysics in general onthe existence of God. The provability ofthe deity’s existence was, furthermore, disputed for whereas most philosophers were confident that the city’s existence can be demonstrated rationally, some denurzed. When the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God was challenged, the challenge came, however, not from radicals who doubted the propesition, but from conservatives who questioned the competence of Iumman reason to demonstrate it, While the provabiity of Gods existence ‘might, then, be subject to dispute, God's existence never was. and the Middle ‘Ages wore ee from atheism and agnosticism, at least public atheism and agnos- ticism, on the philosophic plane. The existence of God could not, as a conse- «quence, be the intial issue For natural theology. The existonee of God. as distnet from the provabilty of God's existence, was not strietly an issue at al “The inital issue of natural thoology for Muslims and Jews, the most funda- ‘mental issue where opinions divided, was, it may be ventured, the inguiry con cerning whether the world is eternal or had a beginning. Much more is at stake there tha whether the scriptural account of the genesis of the universe should be taken literally o¢allegorcally. The issue of eternity and creation’ provided an arena for determining the relationship of God tothe universe, for determining. specit= ically, whether God is a necessary or a voluntary cause. Ifthe world should be ‘ternal, and a deity is recognized, the deity’ relationship tothe universe would likewise be eternal. Since eternity and necessity are, by virtue of an Anstotetian chronology or hermeneuties—the age of the universe or the question "employ the term creation ta mean the thesis that the Weel came into existence afer mat tuving exit the one epcie tess that creator br he world nt xine. Medieval thers who accepted the former ths were iaraby certain that he later thesis can be inferred from2 Introduction ‘ule, mutually implicative,? an eternal relationship is a relationship bound by necessity; and necessity excludes will." The eternity of the world thus would imply thatthe deity is, as the cause of the universe,* bereft of will. A beginning, of the world would, by contrast, lead to a deity possessed of will. Should the ‘world be understood to have a beginning, all medieval thinkers agreed, the exis- tence of a creator can be inferred; and the decision on the creator's part to bring world into existence where no world existed before would constitute a supreme and paradigmatic act of volition. Will in the deity would, therefore, be ruled out by the eternity of the world and entailed by creation. The issue of eternity and creation often interwwined with the enterprises of proving the existence of God. The majority of Islamic and Jewish proofs for the existence of God take either eternity of creation as a premise, and require @ resolution of that issue before their own proper subject can be broached. In the Aristotelian proof of the existence of God as the prime mover and in kindred proofs, the eternity of the world is an indispensable premise and must be estab. lished prior tothe proof itself. The world is shown to be eternal, and the eternal ‘motion or the eternal existence of the universe is shown to have a cause, which is identified as the deity.? In Kalam proofs of the existence of God, the indis- ppensable premise is creation. The Kalam thinkers followed what has been called the Platonie procedure,® that is, the procedure of first proving the creation of the wworid and then inferring therefrom the existence of a creator, again identified as the deity.” The decision to demonstrate the existence of God from the premise of eternity, ‘on the one hand, or from the premise of creation, on the other, was not the result merely of one party's happening to be convinced of the truth of eternity and the ‘other's being convinced of the truth of creation. The decision was connected with the diverse conceptions of the deity which accompany the two premises. ‘The choice of one or the other premise would be reflected in the conclusion of a proof * pratt, De Goeratone I, 11, 338, 1 plains speaks of “nocessary ice will” Enncads, IV, 8,3); and Avicenna and Avertoes speak ofthe diy’ eter wll” (Avicenna, Shi: Hayat, el, Anawati and S. Zayed [Car 1960), p. 366; Averoes, K,aKaxl, od. M. Muller [Monich, 1859), p32; German transatnn, with pgioaton of tbe Arb indicated: Philosophie und Theologie von Averes, tans. M. Musee [Munich 1875). Crescas, Or ha-Shem, Ili, also defends te posibiy of an eternal wil God, But these ate Pikowickian senses of will ef Maimonides, Gale to he Perplesed, I, 2 *Canceivably he diy could, thowgh the univers i sera exercie hi wil im some fathion {hat des not ela tothe universe. Bu that thought fit has any meaning a all was no entrained by he medieval Ct below, 239 "CL Plato, Timarut, 28: Moses Naroni, Commentars om Moimonier” Guide (Vina, 1883). 1, 2; C. Bacumber, Wielo (Muenster, 1908), pp. 320 f.; H. Wolfen. "Notes on Proof of Ue Exiseace of God in Jewish Philosophy. tepid im his Studies the History of Philosophy and Religion, ol. (Cambridge, Mass. 1973), pp. 71-872. "CL. beim. pp. 156 Introduction 3 for the existence of God, since, as already seen, a proof from the premise of cternity would lead to a deity bound by necessity and a proof from the premise ff ereation would lead to a deity possessed of will. Something more might be involved. Proofs proceeding from the two different premises ean differ in their understanding of what constitutes a genuine proof ofthe existence of God. Every proof of the existence of God must at some stage, whether explicitly or—as ‘occurs far more often—implicitly presuppose a definition of God, a set of spec- ifications requisite and sufficient for the deity. A proof of the existence of God isachain of reasoning which concludes with the existence of a being distinguished by certain attributes. Unless the attributes qualify the being possessing them as the deity, no proof, however correctly reasoned, can claim thatthe being whose existence it arrives at is God. Proofs of the existence of God from the premise ‘of eternity, at least among Islamic and Jewish philosophers, implicitly assume or explicitly state three specifications forthe deity. By deity, a being is meant which is, firstly, an uncaused cause; secondly, incorporeal; and thirdly, one.¥ Any chai ‘of reasoning concluding with the existence of a single, uncaused, incorporeal ceause would accordingly constitute a successful proof of the existence of God. Volition isnot, in proofs from the premise of eternity, included among the spec fications. In fact, Volition is ruled out, since, as has been seen, the deity would bee bound by necessity if the world is eternal. As Ghazali explains the virtue of the proof from the opposite premise, the premise of creation, that proof must be resorted to because of the inadequacy of the definition just given. To be an tuncaused cause, incorporeal, and one, Ghazal insist, is @ good deal less than to be the deity. For nothing could conceivably be designated as the deity if itis unable to make decisions affecting the course of events in the universe.” The specifications presupposed in proofs from the premise of eternity must, on this View, be supplemented with a further attribute, volition. Ghazali had an additional reason for rejecting any proof of the existence of God not based on the premise of ereation. He contends that the notion of cternal sation is intrinsically nonsensical, that what comes into existence after not existing can alone be thought of as having a cause. To advocate eternity would thus be tantamount to denying a cause ofthe universe, and to countenance eternity, ‘would be tantamount to countenancing the causelessness of the universe, AtgU- ‘mentation that does not employ the premise of creation hence would fail to prove the existence of God not merely for those who number volition among the req uisite spocifications, It would fal to prove the existence of God even on the view ‘of the proponents of the proofs from eternity; for it would fail to establish the aptly in Maimonits, Guide, 1, 7h. Ato of Alea, K. Ara” Ab! ab Madina oF sx, F Distr (Leiden, 189), bopinning: German anslaton: Der Muster an, F, Dieterich (Ui, 1900), Ascenng, Sif aya. pp. 37—47 “Glare, M, eoype (seu, 1927), M883, 1: Fnginhtasaion in Ars Tat al tras Svan do gh (Lond. 1984), pp 89.6,4 Introduction ‘existence of anything having the frst ofthe three specifications —the attribute of| beeing the cause of the universe—which the proponents of proofs from cternity themselves deem requisite for the deity."® Besides proofs for the existence of God from one or the other premise, from the premise of the eternity of the world or the premise of creation, proofs were also advanced with neither eternity nor creation as a premise. In some instances, creation is established in the course of proving the existence of God; a single train of reasoning actives at both the existence of God and the creation of the world." In other instances, the issue of eternity and creation is nowise touched on. ? Proofs of the latter sort avoid taking a position on the presence oF absence of volition in the deity. Nevertheless, they cannot avoid taking a position on the specifications for the deity. By professing to be genuine proofs of the existence of God without demonstrating that God possesses will, they tacitly affirm that willis nota requisite specification, Still another procedure for proving the existence of God was in evidence. Ibn ‘Tufayl and Maimonides, as well asthe Scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas, do not themselves subscribe to the eternity of the world, yet they pat forward proofs of the existence of God resting on the premise of eternity. They demon: state the existence of God on two parallel, alternative tracks, on both the hypoth: esis of eternity and the hypothesis of creation; and proofs resting on the premise ‘of eternity serve them hypothetically, as a means for establishing the existence ‘of God on one of the two conceivable alternatives, The world, so their reasoning ‘20cs, cither is eternal or had a beginning. Should the world be eternal, the “Aristotelian proof from motion and other proofs from the premise of eternity establish a first incorporeal cause, who is the deity; whereas if the world should not be eternal, its having come into existence permits the immediate inference ‘ofa creator. In either event, the existence of God is established. Ibn Tufayl chose the procedure outlined in order to refrain from any stand whatsoever onthe issue of eternity and creation. He explains that the issue is unresolvable and that the ‘existence of God will have been demonstrated only if shown to follow from both the hypothesis ofthe eternity of the world and the hypothesis of creation.° The Tationale of Maimonides and Aquinas was different, They do take a stand on the issue of eternity and eteation, and advocate the latter. They nonetheless wish t0 "Ghali, Tha a Fasifa, IM, $817, 28; X. $1; English tansation, pp. 96,102,250. The omepion ht ctrl caution i ncn] ie found eleowber; ef. Below pp. 190 193,210, "Below. pp. 149-150, 151, 18, 190,387 "The naabe example i Aviceneas prof, below, Chapter IX. Kalam writers subsequent ‘Avicenna commonly advance versions of Avicenna’ proof se by side withthe wadonal Kal arguments "Hayy ben Yagi, ead tans. L- Gai (Beeu, 1936), Arabic text, pp. 8186: French ‘eanation, pp. 6268; English ansltion wit poginaton ofthe Arabic indicated: Hayy fn Yq teas. L- Goorman (New York, 1972) Introduction 5 avoid linking the more fundamental and less problematic doctrine ofthe existence cof God to the less fundamental and more problematic doctrine of creation. They therefore leave the question of creation open while demonstrating the existence ‘of God and, like Iba Tufayl, prove the existence of God on parallel tracks. on both the hypothesis of eternity and the hypothesis of ereation."* Once having shown that God exists whether or not the world i eternal, they return, however — Unlike Ibn Tofayl—to the issue of creation and eternity: and Maimonides, for his part, offers “arguments.” acknowledged by him to be less than apodietic dom= Constiaions, for creation." In espousing creation, Maimonides and Aquins clearly ‘espouse, as wel, the presence of volition in God. But by postponing the subject ‘of ereation until after proving the existence of God, they tacitly affirm tha volition isnot integral to the concept ofthe deity, that a proof of the existence of a single incorporeal cause, albeit a necessary cause, would constitute a genuine proof of the existence of God. Various procedures For proving the existence of God are, in sum, discernible in medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy, some of which do, whereas others do not, require thatthe issue of eternity and creation be seitled before a proof of tive existence of God can be accomplished. The existence of God! might be proved through the premise of the world’s eternity. In proofs of the sort, the deity is ‘explicitly or implicitly defined as an uncaused cause, incorporeal, and one. The txistence of God might be proved through the contrary premise, creation, the attendant conclusion being a deity possessed of will. Ghazali, who expatiates ‘upon the import of proofs based on the premise of creation, stresses that volition is integral to an adequate concept of the deity, that unless a proof establishes a first cause possessed of will, itis not a genuine proof of the existence of God The existence of God, creation, and hence the attribute of will, might all be established by means of a single train of reasoning. Here, itis not clear whether volition is viewed as integral to the concept of God. The existence of God might also be proved utilizing neither the premise of eternity nor the premise of ercation, ‘The implication now would plainly be that whether or not God does possess will, volition is not part of the irreducible conceptof the deity. Finally, a proof from the premise of eternity might be employed by philosophers who do not themselves subscribe to the premise. The proof from eternity would serve a hypothetical function ax) would be supplemented through a parallel proof from creation ‘Again, the implication would be that the irreducible concept of the deity Joes ‘ot contain volition ‘Maimonides, Gide, 1, 7M, 2; Aauis, Strona cna Gentiles 1,13. Ao ef, Aiaas. Commentary on Phsies, VL, $970, and Commenuary on Metaphysics, XI lect $ (end "Mimeries, Guide, Hh 195 22. Aquinas, Sumena Theolosie, 1. 46, as. 1, 2; Summa conte Gentes, Il hap. 38, Ab 6. A. Male, “Problem des ake Uncnlichen” Awigchender Miretater ol 1 (Rome, 1964), p486 Introduction In a later chapter it will be seen that medieval Islamic and Jewish arguments for the existence of God are, in the main, cosmological; teleological arguments, are also found; and no argument is ontological." 2. The present book ‘The chapters to follow examine medieval Islamic and Jowish arguments for eternity; responses to the arguments for eternity on the part ofthe proponents of creation; medieval Islamic and Jewish arguments for creation; responses thereto by the proponents of eternity; proofs for the existence of God resting on the premise of creation, the premise of eternity, or neither premise; and refutations of proofs for the existence of God. Medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy will be treated here as asi sophie tradition. Treating the several branches of medieval philosophy. Jewish, and Christian-—in conjunction with one another is surely justified con- sidering the extent to which they draw sustenance from the same, or similar sources and are animated by the same spirit."” From the standpoint of medieval Jewish philosophy, treating Islamic and Jewish philosophy conjointly has an ‘additional justification, inasmuch as Jewish philosophy is rooted in Islamic phi losophy and cannot be properly understood in isolation from it. The reverse is of course not true: Medieval Islamic philosophers barely knew of the existence of the Jewish philosophers. Yet when viewed historically, Jewish philosophy does shed light on medieval Islamic philosophy in a number of arcas, notably in wo, For the carly period, Jewish thinkers who read and wrote Arabic, especially Sadia, complement the available Islamic material and help delineate the bexin- rings of Arabic philosophy; and for a later period, Hebrew sources are an inval- uable aid in the study of Averroes. Many of Averroes” writings are preserved ‘exclusively in Hebrew, and Hebrew commentaries furnish the best, and often the sole, access to the meaning of even those preserved in Arabic. T have not tried (0 take account of each and every argument for eternity, creation, and the existence of God, which might be unearthed in medieval Arabic ‘and Hebrew literature, but | have tried to take account of every argument for those doctrines which is of a philosophic character. Kalam reasoning conse- ‘quently Falls within the scope of the present work when it appears to me to be philosophic, but has been disregarded when it does not. ‘The difficulty in drawing, ‘up a satisfactory definition of philosophy always lies in the demarcation of the precise boundary between philosophy and other domains, Still, any thoughtful aceeptation of the term will distinguish philosophy from pure theology, from speculation whose underlying premises are founded entirely on religious faith, and will also exclude from the domain of philosophy enunciations that fall below ‘some minimal level of plausibility. The Kalam arguments that I have disregarded “Below, pp. 214-216. CE. H. Wolfion, Philo (Cambridge, Mass, 1948), chap. 14 Introduction 7 are of a purely theological character or so unsubst ‘with magnanimity, be taken seriously. ™ ntl that they cannot, even My discussion purports to be exhaustive as regards Arabie and Hebrew argu ments; that is, Ihave undertaken to examine every medieval Arabic and Hebrew philosophic argument for eternity, creation, and the existence of God. Arguments inthe two literatures which are not discussed were cither judged to be nonphilo- sophic, were subsumed under other arguments that are discussed elsewhere in the book,!” of were simply overlooked. In a number of instances | have pursued the penetration of Islamic and Jewish arguments into medieval Chistian philos- ‘phy, and in a few instances into modern European philosophy. There, though, TTmake no pretense at exhaustiveness, and the eitations are ofa kind that are ready at hand in obvious primary and secondary works. ‘The discipline to which the present study belongs is what I would venture to call the history of philosophic ideas, 1 am attempting to trace the history of philosophic constructions rather than reproduce the complete system of any ind ‘ual philosopher or philosophic school. My concern i chiefly with the history of proofs—of eternity, cteation, and the existence of Goul; but also worthy of attention isthe history of the components from which the proofs are fashioned, ‘The starting point both for the history of the proofs and the history of their ‘components is, with rare exceptions, Aristotle. That is hardly surprising; the importance of Aristotle for medieval philosophy is common knowledge. The direction in which the Aristotelian conceptions developed in the Middle Ages was, however, often determined by the late Greek philosophers, and their impor- tance forthe Middle Ages i far from common knowledge, In ach of the material to be cxamined, Proclus (Sth century) and, in greater measure, John Philoponus (6th century) are responsible forthe direction in which Aristotelian conceptions developed, The significance for medieval Islamic and Jewish thought of Proclus, ‘one of the last Greek Neoplatonists, and of Philoponus, a Christian and sometime commentator on Aristotle, isa subordinate theme ofthe present book The proofs for eternity, creation, and the existence of God are admirably suited for an organized presentation. They arrange themselves spontancously and grace fully into chapters and chapter sections. Unfortunately, the arrangement into chapters and sections according tothe proofs tends to obscure the history of the {components from which the proofs are fashioned, The components wend their ‘way through one proof after another. A principle or conception may originate in Aistotle; undergo development at the hands of Proclus or Philoponus. oF both; "8; have, for etample, pase over the argument for creation fered by Ash’ ai K. abana’, 3 Gin Phe Theology of abs ari and tans, R, MeCarthy [Bert 1953), an aso recorded hy Stubraiet.K Nihdsaul-fgdim, ed. A. Guillaume (Oxfort and London, 1938), p12. WolGn, Philosophy ofthe Kalam (Carbrge, Mass, 1976) pp 382~ 383, terms ithe “arguneRt Faom th analogy of things in he world” eis imply am expatsion of Quran 23:12-14 "sr example, sone ofthe Kala argumcns for cretion listed by Wolo, Phone of dhe olan. p- 374 wl be wcaled bere, Chapters IV, and VI as variations of ther argues8 Introduction and repeatedly cross linguistic, confessional, and school! boundaries—as well as the chapter headings ofthe present book—while raveling dwn fifteen centuries ‘or more, In crossing boundaries, the principle may remain imbedded within the context with which it was originally associated, but may also be transformed and. eembodied in a new context. And a principle or conception originally formulated by a given party may be converted by the opposing party into ammunition for attacking the basic tenets of the former.” Particularly far-reaching examples will be offered in Appendix A. It races the peregrinations of two Aristotelian prin- ciples—the principle that an infinite number is impossible, and the principle that 8 finite body can contain only finite power—which make their appearance in several chapters but do not lend themselves to a complete treatment at any single place in the body of the book." Medieval Islamic and Jewish arguments for eternity and responses made 10 ‘them by the adherents of creation are discussed in Chapters II and Ill. Chapters IV and V treat a group of arguments for creation which ean be linked with John Philoponus, together with refutations of the arguments. Chapters VI and VIL explore two styles of reasoning, argumentation from the eoncept of particular zation and teleological argumentation, which were used in the formulating of proofs for both creation and the existence of God. Chapter VIII analyzes the Aristotelian proof of the existence of God as a prime mover, together with Hasdai Crescas" refutation. Chapter IX examines Avicenna’s proof of the existence of God as a being necessarily existent by virtue of itself, and Chapter X analyzes Averroes’ refutation of Avicenna’s proof. Chapter XI discusses a family of prools for the existence of God, all resting on the principle that an infinite regress of causes is impossible; refutations of the proofs are treated in the same chapter, Chapter XUl deals withthe history, subsequent to Avicenna, of arguments for the existence of God as a necessary being. >this ecu ia conection with both panciplesdscusted in Append A. other principles appearing repeatedly and enployed by different partes, cach for is own purpone—are the principe tat evry possiblity mst eventaly be realize, andthe principle that ‘whatever is peered is desructibe, and vice vere, Ul Proofs of Eternity from the Nature of the World 1. Proofs of eternity “The writings of medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophers reveal stack proofs ‘of the eternity of the world, profs that recur repeatedy through the centri with Tithe change. Proofs ofthe eternity ofthe world ae, of couse, advanced by philosophers espousing eternity. But they are also reconled by philosophers ‘who, on the contrary, espouse creation; and since the advocates of creation were ‘more numerous than the advocates of eternity, more citations of the standard roofs for eternity can be gleaned from the writings of the Former than from the Writings of the latter. When the advocates of creation record proofs of eieznity, their purpose, naturally enough, isto prepare the way fora refulaion. In that, John Philoponus may well have served asthe modet;Philoponus ha painstakingly refuted all the arguments for eterity which he had discovered in Aristotle and Proclus, and his reutations of Aristotle and Proclus together with his own ag ments for eration were known to, and used by, the Islamic and Jewish philos- ‘ophers." Not only were the proofs fr eternity standardized; the reutations were, fs well. A repertoire of stock refutations was thus arrayed against a repertoire of Stock arguments. And the refutations, in ther turn, often elicited surejoinders from the proponents of eternity. This chapter andthe next examine the philosophic proofs for cterity appearing in the writings of medieval Islamic ara Jewish dvocates of eternity or eeation; rebuttals ofthe proofs for eternity; and sure- joiners to the rebuttals ‘Ancient and medieval proofs of eterity do not all have the same aim. The tore comprehensive seck to establish tat the world has existed from eternity in the form in which it exists today. But less comprehensive proofs, too, are in evidence, They seck to establish the eternity of the matter ofthe world, leaving ‘open the possibility tha the form ofthe world isnot eternal that the world was, “Examples ae offered inthis and the following tee chars. 910 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World in other words, created out ofa precxistent matter. Unfortunately, both adherents of cternity and adherents of creation often fail to state explicitly what a given proof is intended to accomplish; and it sometimes even happens that proofs ostensibly ofthe eternity of the world as a whole argue, in fat, for nothing more than the eternity of matter. ‘As will be seen in later chapters, the doctrine of ereation is likewise supported by more comprehensive and less comprehensive proofs. A more comprchensive proof of creation secks to establish the creation of the world ex nihilo, whereas 4 less comprehensive proof seeks only to establish the ercation of the form of the world, leaving open the possibility that the matter of the woeld is eternal, A less comprehensive proof of eternity, that is, a proof ofthe eternity of matter, is plainly compatible with a less comprehensive proof of creation, a proof solely of the creation of the world in its present form. Accordingly, a proof of the eternity of matter is compatible as well with volition in the deity; For ereation any mode, even creation from a preexistent matter, would constitute a voluntary act on the part ofthe creator. Maimonides drew a dichotomy that is highly helpful if not indispensable, for any analysis of proofs for eternity. The pros of cterity deserving consideration, he explained, fall into two categories. There are, on the one hand, arguments formulated by Aristotle which take their departure *from the world." On the other hand, there are arguments “extracted” by subsequent philosophers “from Aris- totle’s philosophy.” these, in contrast to the previous category, taking their depar: ture “from God.”? The distinction between proofs of eternity from the nature of the world and proofs from the nature of God does not seem to have been artic- tlated before Maimonides, but almost every medieval Istamic and Jewish phi- losopher who treats the issue of eternity does adduce proofs belonging to both categories. If Maimonides’ dichotomy were to be collated with the distinct between proofs of the eternity of the world in its form as well as its matter and proofs ofthe eternity of matter alone, the result would be as follows: Some proofs from the nature of the world, it turns out, seek to demonstrate the eternity of the universe—or, to be more specific, the eternity of the physical universe’ —in its entirety, whereas others merely have the aim of demonstrating the eternity of imatte;* proofs of eternity from the nature of God, however, are invariably of the more comprehensive kind and aim at demonstrating the eternity of the uni verse in its entirety. Guide 1 He Perpleed, I, 14. The dichotomy reappears in Albertus Maprus, Bonsventre, ‘Aaron ben Eh, and Creseas. Agunas inthe Suna conta Gentes, l 2 34, sobs pts from tenia ofthe world into two categories and hereby reaches archon sta Abravane, ‘wo knew Aquinas’ works, has a similar eichotomy in Malo (Venice, 1592), 1V-VL proofs rom the nar ofthe physial ward can ead, aatualy enough, only wo the eerity of he physical world oo the etry ofthe unerying mater of te wot. Pros rm he rate ofthe deity would lead the eternity of the entire universe, nonphyical aswel a physica “See below p. 29-30, Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World u ‘Maimonides’ identification of Aristotle as the author ofthe proofs for eternity from the nature of the world is not inaccurate. The medieval Islamic and Jewish roofs in that category cither are borrowed directly from Aristotle or are aap- {ations of arguments he put forward. Maimonides’ description of proofs from the nature of God as having been “extracted... from Aristotle's philosophy.” in other words, as having been fashioned out of Aristotelian components. i less exact for one ofthe three proofs in this category is animated by a Neoplaton ‘heme that Aristotle would have found uncongenial. The main source or channel through which proofs for eternity from the nature of God reached the Middle ‘Ages was apparently Proclus.® Heeding Maimonides’ dichotomy, I dal in the remainder of the present chapter with profs of eternity from the nature ofthe world, and inthe next chapter with roots of eternity from the nature of God. Besides those discussed. arguments for eternity are occasionally referred to in the writings of the proponents of creation hich are so flimsy that they ean handly be regarded as more than straw ‘men; they cannot conceivably have been advanced by intelligent, self-respecting proponents of the eterity of the world.® Arguments of the sort have been dis- regarded here except insofar as they can be related to serious philosophic proofs, In clasiying proofs of eternity itis sometimes difficult to decide whether a proof should be assigned to one general category or the other, to the category {hat seasons fom the nature ofthe world or to the category that reasons from the nature of God.” And when enumerating separate and dstint proofs within each category arbitrariness is unavoidable. Through the centuries the arguments sub divided and underwent variations; and should all subdivisions and variations be listed as separate proofs, the total number swells. For example, arguments for clernity which Maimonides listed as single proofs* were later subivided by ‘Ctescas into two oF three proofs, with the result that Crescas Fist is several times as long as Maimonides’. Aquinas, by enumerating subdivisions and variations, ‘was able in one work to draw up alist of over twenty-five philosophic proofs for eternity. "® Whereas some philosophers thus subdivide the arguments, others com bine them. Proofs that ean stand independently may coalesce to form a single complex chain of reasoning. Or else, what was originally an independent proof for eternity may be advanced by a philosopher not as such, but as a surreoinder See bolo, pS See, fr inance, hn Haz, K- aba al Mil (Csiro, 1961, bp 10S). Spanish tas lation; Abeicu de Credo yu Historia Crica de las Ides Relisisas. tans, M Asin Palacios, ol (Maid, 1928), p99 example the tegument fom motion, which i cussed im tis chapter. Bends ito the srgument fo the unchangesbilty ofthe ease of he universe whichis diseussedi th ext chap, "Guile, Or a Shem, Uli 1. Silay, Above, Mia 1, 3: V1 Ve "pe Potent 43. an 17 Aaa, i fact, tity arguments for seriy, Bu seme ate stp and not pisopic, and some ae duplicates.n Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 10 the refutation of another proof of etcrity."" 1 found thatthe requirements of ‘exposition would be best served by distinguishing six separate proofs of eternity {rom te nature of the world and three separate proofs from the nature of God Alternative enumerations would undoubtedly be equaly justi The medieval advocates of eternity who willbe cited here are: the authors of 8 corpus of Arabic writings (precise dates unknown) attibuted to Alexander of ‘Aphrodisias, Avicenna (980-1037), Abi al-Barakit (ca. 1160), Averres (1126— 1198), and Moses Narboni (d. 1362). In addition, two philosophers argue for the eternity of matter, although they espouse the creation of the word in its ‘resent forms they are Abi Bakr b. Zakariya Razi (ca. 864-925) and Gersonides (1288-1344), The modieval advocates of exeation ex niilo who will be cited are: Sania (892-942), Bagillan (A, 1013), “Abd al-Jabbar (4, 1025), bn Hazim (094-1064), the authors ofthe Jabir corpus (10th century), Juwayai (1028 1085), Bazdawi (Pazdawi (d. 1099), Ghazal (1058—1111), Shabrastnt (1086 — 1183), Maimonides (1135-1204), Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (11491209110), Ami (1156-123), Tasi (1274), Albertus Magnus (1206-1280), Bonaventure (1221 1274), Thomas Aquinas (12251274, ijt (d. 1385)" Aaron ben Elijah (. 1369), Haxdai Crescas (1340-1410), Joseph Albo (1380-1444), and Isaac Abravanel (14371508). A final writer to be cited, Leone Ebeeo Judah Abravancl) (a, 1535), oes not state clearly whether he endorses creation from a preexstent mater ot creation ex nihil 2. Proofs of eternity from the nature of the physical world Six proofs for eternity from the nature of the world can, as was mentioned, be distinguished; and some of the six undergo variations. In every instance Aris. totle is either the immediate or ultimate source. The first four ofthe six proofs disclose an identical structure. To begin, they all proceed indirectly, establishing their own thesis by focusing on the opponent’ position and showing itto be untenable: They argue that the world must be eternal since creation is impossible. Inditect reasoning is far from unique to them, how- ever. The fifth proof from the nature of the world also reasons indirectly, Much Of the argumentation in the second category, where eternity is proved from the nature of God, proceeds in the same fashion. And the advocates of creation too hhad a predilection for indirect reasoning; proofs for creation, as will appear in later chapters, typically focus on the thesis of eternity and argue that it is untenable. What is unique in the frst four proofs for eternity is the manner in which they establish the untenability of creation and thereby indirectly establish the eternity of the world, They all contend that the laws of nature—of, to be more accurate, "ror cumple, teow, pp 75-76, "A have oot distngised between the text of If and tbe commentry of Jani, which is Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World B the laws of Aristotelian physics—are such that for creation to have taken place, something would already have had to exist similar to what was supposedly coming into existence for the first time. In order that matter should have come into existence, matter would already have had (o exist; and in order that a world should come into existence, a world would already have had to exist. Hence the assumption of an absolute beginning of matter oF an absolute beginning of the ‘world is solf-contradictory, and the world, or matter, must exist from eternity turn now to the individual proofs. (a) The argument from the nature of matter Tn the course of an exhaustive analysis ofthe nature of matter, Aristotle argucd that the underlying maiter of the universe mast be eternal, and his procedure reveals the pattern just outlined. He established the eternity of matter by showing the ereation of matier to be untenable; and his grounds forthe untenability ofthe creation of matter are that matter could only have come into existence from an already existent matter. Aristotle reasoned: Everything that comes into existence dloes so from a substratum.'® If the underlying matter ofthe universe came into existence it also would come into existence from a substratum. But the nature of matter is precisely to be the substratum from which other things arise. Con sequently the underiying matter of the universe could have come into existence only from an already existing matter exactly like itself; and to assume that the underlying matter of the universe came into existence would require assuming, that an underlying matter already existed. The assumption is thus self-contradic- tory, and matter must be eternal.'* The argument that the underlying matter of the universe must be eternal since matter could only come into existence from an alrcady existing, prior matter is adduced by the adherents of eternity in defense oftheir position, and itis recorded by adherents of creation who have in view a subsequent refutation, The adherents of the eternity of matter adducing the argu- ment are Avicenna," Averroes,'® and Gersonides:" the adherents of creation recording it are Maimonides,"* Albertus Magnus,"* Aquinas,2" Iii?" Aaron ben payee 47. paste 1,9, 12a, 29-31 "su: Ua, eG. Anawat and S. Zayed (Cai, 1960), p. 376. "Eptiome of Physics, i Ras’ In Rush (Hydra, 147), p. 1; Middle Commentary on Physics (Oxford, Bodean Libary, Hebrow MS. Nevbaer 1380 = Won, 79). fii 3a 5: Long Commentary on Physics in Aristelis Opera cum Averris Conmentaris, Vol. IV (Wei, 1562), 1, comm. 82; Long Commentary on De Caeo, i ibid, Vol. V1. cam. 22 Mihamot ho hom (Leipzig. 186). VI, 3,3, pp. 300, 302 In VI, 17, p. 368, Gensonies| in eet acces the argument "Guide, 142). "physics, in Opera Omni, eA. Borget, Vo. (ars, 190). VIIA chap. HL Compendium of Tools chap. 99. CL Semana Theos, 1 6, 1, 0.3 ghana (Cat, 1907), Vp. 228“6 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World Eljah,™ Creseas,” Isaac Abravanel.** and Leone Ebreo.*8 In most instances, the fore ofthe argument is sharpened. Matic, inthe Aristotelian physical scene, ncter exists in actuality devoid of all form, and the generation of any object therefore starts not merely with a previously existing matter but with a previously «existing compound of matter and form." Generation is the process wherein the ‘compound of matter and form receives an additional form or exchanges its own fora for another. The sharpened medieval version ofthe argument forthe eternity of matter accordingly runs: The underlying mater of the world could only have come into existence from an already existing matter. Matter, however, never exists devoid of form, but solely in a compound, together with form. To assume an absolute beginning of the underlying matter of the universe would, then, not ‘merely require assuming an already existent mater before matter existed. 1¢ would require assuming that before matter existed, there already existed a full-blown ‘compound of matter and form?” “The heart of the foregoing argument or arguments clearly isthe principle that ‘whatever comes into existence does so from a substratum. Once the principle is accepted, discussion is virtually precluded; for if whatever comes into existence docs so from an already existing substratum or matter, mater obviously is eternal. As for the eritical principle, Aristotle in one passage supported it inductively. We can, he wrote, “always” observe “something underlying, from which the enerated object comes, plants and animals, for example, [coming] from seed"?* Elsewhere, though, Aristotle treated the impossibility “that generation should take place from nothing” as self-evident.” lithe Middle Ages, the presupposition upon which the argument forthe eteni- ty of matter rests received frequent attention. Generally it was adherents ofthe ‘opposing position whose attention was roused, thei abject being to expose the argument’s feeble foundation; but an exception to the generalization is Zakariy ii, Rai, an advocate ofthe eternity of matter although not of the eternity of the world, is reported to have maintained the eternity of matter on the grounds that “intellect” rejects the coming into existence of something from nothing.” In effect, that isto say, Razi regarded the presupposition ofthe argument for the Pfs Haryim, ed. Desc Leipzig, 881), chap. 6 SO haShem Miler. VA) ™Diaiogh Amore (Bai, 1929). p. 237; Hebrew waelation: Wikuah “al ha Ababa (Lyk, 87D, p. Sb; English tansbtion: The Phlaxphy of Love, ans. F. Friedberg Sesey and Jean Hh. Burns (Londo, 1937, pp. 278-279, De Generatine Uy 1, 329, 26-26; Physics IV, 7,214, 1S, such isthe implication in Avetees’ version. The argumentation i explicit in Maines, Alberts, I, Aaron ben El, Creses, and Abrvane Physics, 1906, 35 "Metphssicr Il, 4, 999, sce Ross's ote, ad locum, Rani, Opera Philophico, ed P. Kraus (Car, 1939} 1, p. 221 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World Is cternity of matter as self-evident. Aquinas, Aaron ben Elijah. and Crescas, all ‘alvocates of eration ex nihilo, similarly record arguments for the eternity of inatter which rest on a supposedly self-evident proposition, Aquinas reports an ‘argument for “eternity"—which isin fact an argument for the eternity of mat- {er—resting on the “universal opinion of philosophers that nothing is made from nothing."®* Aaron and Creseas likewise refer to an argument for the eternity of ‘matter resting on the premise that—in Aaron's words—"something cannot be ‘Eenerated from nothing.” or—in Crescas’ words—“the generation of a body out (of nothing is absurd.” * ‘Among Kalam writers and writers affiliated with the Kalam, the belief not merely inthe eternity of matter but also in the eternity of the world is commonly {raced to an induction or analogy, one thatthe Kalam, of course, deemed improp- crly drawn.” Saadia, for example, avers that the “strongest argument” of the adherents ofthe eternity ofthe world in its entirety (al-dahr) i the circumstance that an absolute beginning of the processes of nature has never been witnessed. ‘The Jabir corpus wrestles with, and endeavors to refute, two parallel contentions, ‘one tothe effect that the world must be eternal since nobody ever observed the world’s coming into existence, and the other to the effect that every man must, have been born of woman since man was never observed not 10 be bora of woman." bn Hlazm represents the adherents of eternity (dahriva) as reasoning: "We do not see anything coming into existence except from something or in something, and whoever maintains the contrary is maintaining what neither is row observed nor has ever been observed.""* “Abd al-Jabbir records a proof possibly containing an echo of the passage in which Aristotle cited the fact that “plants and animals [come] from seed?” According to “Abd al-Jabbar, the alvo- cates of eternity reasoned: “We do not find a hen except from an eee or an egg except from a hen, and things must therefore always have been so. That implies the eternity ofthe world." Juwayai’s account is similar to ‘Abd alJabbair’s. He describes the advocates of eternity (dahriva) as arguing: “Since we never observe a hen except from an egg or a man except from the sperm of male and female, the judgment that such takes place must be extended to what is hidden from us Lin past time]:"* Bazdawi reports an argument forthe eternity of matter resting Sunona cna Genie, I 34, SEs Hasyim,ebap 6, OF laShem, yi See belo, pp. 30. °K abdmindt aL tgdda, eS. Lande (Leiden, 1880), 1, 310), p. 6. English wns Iain, with pagination of the Arabic indeed: Book of Beles and Opinions. tars. 8, Rosenblatt (New Haven, 1948. 2syabie ibn Hlyyan, Teves Coss, ed. . Kraus (Cain, 1988). 422, Klay fail, p. 9 Spanish tanslaton, I, p. 98 Above, m2 Shark l-Usil (Caio, 196), p. 117. See bekom, Chip Vn. 162 °K. al Sham (Alexandria 1969), p. 224.16 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World ‘on the circumstance that “we never have scen’anything created from nothing, and concluding “that the world was not created from nothing.” Aaron ben Elijah—who, as already seen, refers to an argument for the eternity of matter based on the supposedly self-evident “premise . . . that something cannot be generated from nothing"*'—also gives what seems to be an argument by induc tion: Since what is generated is generated “only from something else. . . and only from something specifically [adapted to the resulting product]. .. it follows ‘afortiori that nothing can be generated out of nothing." Finally, Isaac Abravanel records two closely related arguments for the eternity of matter, one in almost the same language as Aaron, and the other explicitly labeled as “inductive.” The latter begins with an examination of “particular things, whether substances or accidents, which come into existence”; it discovers that whatever comes into existence does so from “from something, not from nothing”; and it arrives atthe “judgment that everything comes into existence from something, and nothing ‘can come into existence from nothing," (8) The argument from the concept of possibilty In the Aristotelian physical system, possibility and matter are closely related concepts, matter being the locus of potentiality. or possibility. * The relationship, between the concepts led fo the development ofa proof forthe eternity of matter from the concept of possibilty, alongside the proof from the nature of matter, examined in the preceding paragraphs. The germ of the proof from the concept of possibilty can be discovered easly enough in Aristotle. In one passage, for example, Aristotle established that the process of coming into existence “nec- essatly” requires “the prior presence of something existent potentially [or: pos sibly}, but not existent in actuality”; * it follows that nothing whatsoever, includ ing matter, can come into existence from absolute nothingness. In the Middle ‘Ages, the proof takes a distinctive cast, however, and the earliest philosopher to ‘whom I could trace the new and distinctive formulation is Avicenna. Considering that the concept of possibility was a central concern of Avicenna’s,** he very likely is the author of the argument as it is found inthe Middle Ages: Avicenna lays down the proposition that prior to a thing's coming into actual existence, is existence must have been possible; were its existence necessary, he explains, the thing would already have existed, and were its existence impossible, the thing would never exist” The “possibilty (imkdn) of the existence” of a “SBazdavi(Padaw,K. Us a Din, ed, H.Linse (Caio, 1963) p. 16 above, m3. Ses Hayy, chop 6 Miao, V3.2) ‘ZC. Metaphysics XIV 1, 1088, 1 Pema and porsiiy bh tsa he Greek Bivens, "De Genertione 13,317, 16-17 ‘ee below, Chapter IX PCE. Arise, De Generation 9, 3358, 32 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 0 thing must, moreover, in some sense have its own existence. For ifthe possibilty were completely “nonexistent,” it could not legitimately be spoken of as “being prior” to the thing's aetual existence, and everyone will surely acknowledge that the possiblity is prior. Mere possibility of existence is plainly nota substance. Iv can only belong to the class of entities that are “present in a subject.” Thus ‘whenever anything comes into existence, the possibility ofits existence must previously have subsisted in a subject. The “possibility (ink) of existence’ ‘may also be termed the “potentiality (gina) of existence"; * and the subject in which possibility or potentiality is found is called “matter” (médda, haya). Whenever anything comes into existence, the possibilty or potentiality of its ‘existence mus, then, previously have subsisted in an already existent subject, or matter, But, Avicenna concludes, if an already existent matter must precede ‘everything coming into existence, elearly nothing, including matter, can come ino xine io, that, able ingress. An abolt beaning ‘of the existence of mater is impossible.”” ‘The argument for the eternity of matter fom the concept of possibilty is cited in Ghazali’s critique of Avicenna’s philosophic system.*? in Shanrastani's account of Avicenna’s philosophy.*" in Fakhr al-Din a-Razi,”? Averroes,°* Maimon: ides," Amidi,* Albertus Magous.** Aquinas," Gersonides.** Ij,” Aaron ben Elia, and isaac Abravanel.*! (6) The argument from the nature of motion In Physics VIII, 1. a6 a preliminary to his demonstration of the existence of a first mover of the universe, Aristotle undertook to prove the eternity of motion. is proof contains several strands, and they were put to various uses inthe Middle Ages. “ivayssunleries bol ihn a ie “nar (Cairo, 1938), pp. 219-220; FSH Hav, pp. 170-178 hapa alfalfa, eh: M, Bouyges cit. 1927, 1 488182; English vansaion in Aver- roe Tbafin al Taba an. S, van den Bergh (Landa, 1954). . ST °IK. ial wa Nihal, ed. W.Curion (Landon, 1842-1846), p. 371 SMubosa (Car, 1908). 91; K.aArba in Hyderabad, 1888. p. 4 tuk ab Taba, o3, M. Bouypes ie, 1930), 1, pp 6%, 74, HH: English Wansation, with pagination ofthe Arabic inicled:Averoce Tahu a Taf, ans. S. van den Bergh (Landon, 1959), "Gide, I, 14), Gina al Maram (Cairo. 1971, p. 267 phic, VI chap, Summa Theologiae, 148, a0, Sathamot ha Shem, VI. 17. p 365; be accepts he argument Massif, Vip. 23 the argument isnt fll developed ‘Es Haryim, cap. 6 "Malt WV, 38), ‘obj, 1 Stn contra Genie. 343) De Peni, 4.3 a18 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World Aristotle's proof ran; Motion—taking the term in the broad sense that includes change of all types®—obviously can occur only if an object undergoing motion is *present” (Gmapyew).© If an absolute beginning of motion should be assumed, the object to undergo the first motion must cither (i) have come into existence, ‘or (i) have been eternal, That is to say, an absolute beginning of motion can be construed in one of two ways: (i) The world came into existence and began to ‘move; or (ji) the world existed in an eternal state of rest before beginning 10 ‘move, The eternity of motion will be established when both alternatives are ruled out. Inasmuch as coming into existence is one type of motion, alternative (i) asserts in effect that before the world performed its absolutely first motion, it had already performed another motion, namely the motion of coming into exis tence. Alternative (i) asserts, therefore, that the absolutely frst motion was not afer all the first motion, which is a self-contradiction; and the proposition that the world came into existence and thereupon began to move is thus untenable. Its to be noted that Aristotle fails to explain why the absolutely first movement ‘may not have been precisely the coming into existence of the physical universe. On such a theory, motion and the physical universe would have come into exis ‘ence together; the requirement that motion takes place only if an object undergo- ing motion is “present” would be met; and an absolute beginning of motion as well as ofthe world could be defended. The question is taken up by Themistius™ and Averroes.®” Afier Aristotle had, to his satisfaction, ruled out alternative (i) —an absolute beginning of motion in a world that likewise had a beginning—alternative (i) remained. Alternative (i) is the thesis that motion had an absolute beginning but the world is eternal, in other words, the thesis that the world existed in a state of rest for an eternity before starting to move. Aristotle found the thesis to be inadmissible for two reasons. * ariste distinguished for srs of mation or change, cc of which takes pac ina ifferet ‘category: change in he category of substance, thai os, coming int eitenceor desruction. ‘hung in the category of quantity, dat so say. growth or dination, change inthe category of ‘quay, that is tsa. alain; an change inte catepry of place. His statements ne by me. sistent, however. See E. Zaller, Die Philowphie der Griechen, Vol. Patt2, he Leia, 1921), pp. 389-390; W D, Ross, Aristo (Lon, 1953), pp. 82-83 ‘Arist bases te ropesion both on commonsense al on his dfn of motion. See a. 62 physics VI, 1, 2514, 2, ‘Themisis deals with the question indnety. Me has Aristotle cantend aot tha the object tudesgo moon mst be “presen” in ode for musi o tke place, Betta ma be “prevensiy pesen.”Somshing woul accordingly always have to exit pit to the cecurence of mation. Se ‘Toemisis, Paraphrase of Physics, ed. H.Schenel, CommentariainArisielom Grace. Vl. V2 (Bean, 1900), 9.210. "Sc below, P 2 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 19 (a) Just as some factor must be posited as the cause of the motion of whatever undergoes motion, so to0, Aristotle writes, must a factor be posited as the cause of the state of rest of whatever is at rest. If the world had been at rest before starting to move, something must have produced its state of rest. But producing. the state of rest would itself be a motion. A motion would consequently have preceded the supposed absolutely first motion; and the assumption that the phys- ical universe existed in a slate of rest from all eternity before undergoing an absolutely first motion embodies, like the previous alternative, a self-contradition.°* Aristotle's thinking, again, has puzzling aspects. In the frst place, once he laid down the rule that everything at rest must be set at rest he could have proceeded more simply. He could have argued thatthe thesis of a world in eternal test is in itself self-contradictory because it implies a prior motion whereby the ‘world was et at rest; and the supposedly eternal state of rest would not be eternal after all. In the second place, the rule that everything at rest must have been set at rest by something else is most strange and gratuitous. What grounds ean there bee for supposing that every state of rest is produced and has a cause? The like- lihood—and this addresses only the second of the two puzzling points—is that Aristotle was arguing not in the abstract but ad hominem; @ few lines eatlier he had been discussing Empedocies, and in Empedocles" system the world in its state of rest is indeed set at rest through a prior process. Atany rate, the contention that a precristent state of rest would have had to be brought about by a cause ‘does not, as far as I could discover, recur in the Middle Ages. (B) Aristotle offered a second reason for ruling out alternative (i), He submits that the world’s beginning to move after having been stationary allows only a single interpretation. The relationship between the world and whatever causes its ‘motion would previously not have permitted motion, whereupon the relationship would have changed, the motion of the world being an outcome of the chan, ‘But if that had happened, the supposed first motion would have been preceded by another motion, to wit, the change in relationship between what produces and what undergoes motion. The thesis thatthe body of the universe existed ina state of rest before undergoing an absolutely first motion is seen once more to inyply 4 prior motion and to embody a self-contradiction.”” In sui: If motion should have had a beginning and the world is (i) assumed to be generated, its generation would have constituted a motion prior to the supposed absolutely first motion. If motion should have had a beginning and the ‘world is (i) assumed fo be eternal—if the world is assumed to have existed in an eternal state of rest before starting to move—then (a) the process whereby the world was set in its state of rest would have constituted a motion prior to the supposed absolutely first motion. Moreover, (8) the change in relationship which Physic Vil 1, 2514, 20-28 tid 2508, 26-27, id. 2510, 1-1020 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World initiated the first motion—that is, the change in the relationship between the ‘world and the cause producing its motion—would also have constituted a motion before the supposed absolutely first motion. Having exposed the inadmissbilit ‘of the two possible ways of construing an absolutely first motion, Aristotle con: Cluded that motion cannot have had a beginning but must, together with a world capable of undergoing motion, be eternal. In the Middle Ages, Aristotle's complex argumentation was sometimes advanced with both alternatives carefully laid out and shown to be untenable. In addition, his teason for ruling out alternative (i) was sometimes advanced as an independent proof either forthe eternity of motion or forthe eternity ofthe celestial spheres. Instances ofthe complete argument In one ofa collection of Arabic works attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the conceivable ways of construing an absolutely frst motion are spelled out as “Anisotle had speed them out: The object to undergo the first motion—that is, the physical universe—would either (i) have to come into existence, or (ii) be eternal. As for alternative (i), the world's “coming into existence would clearly precede [its existing and moving]. . . . Coming into existence occurs, however, only through” motion, and consequently motion would have existed before motion existe.” That is to say.” the body undergoing the first motion would have come into existence through a motion preceding what was, by hypothesis, its frst motion. The supposed absolutely first motion would have been preceded by another motion and would not in fact be first. {As for alternative (i, its ruled out by two considerations. The frst isnot the ‘one offered by Aristotle—the strange notion that if the world had been at rest some factor would have had fo produce its rest. Instead, a substitution is made ‘and the rhetorical question is posed: (a) “How might anyone explain the world’s starting to move now, after having been at rest for an infinite time?” That question reflects a separate, widely utilized proof of the eternity of the world, ‘which isto be taken up in the next chapter.”* The second consideration advanced by the text attributed to Alexander is a slight expansion”® of Aristotle's second reason for the inadmissibility of alternative (i). Here the argument is: (B) Ifthe world were stationary before beginning to move, “either the factor producing motion did not exist previously . .. or else the factor proxiucing motion did not stand in the requisite relation to the object that was to undergo motion.” But to assume either thatthe factor producing motion came into existence or that the rio reasoned that coming int existence sa motion. See Averres’ version ofthe argu ment, mediately below sinc speaking, fran Aisttlian there woud have been no ime without main Below. p52. >is dd not mention the pots that the cree producing mation was ot ein existence Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 2 relationship between it and the object undergoing motion changed would be to assume a motion prior to the supposed first motion. The assumption that the ‘world was cternally at rest and thercupon began to move thus entails, once more, motion prior tothe frst motion, which is sell-contradiction, Sine the possible ‘ways of conceiving a first motion are untenable, motion, the conclusion is drawn, must be eternal.” “Averroes also offers a proof of the eternity of motion which repeats Aristotle's distinction of the two conceivable ways for motion to have begun. Should it be assumed, Averroes writes, that () “the object to undergo the first motion came into existence,” a prior motion would thereby be implied. In specifying what the implicd prior motion would be, Avertoes fills ina gap left by Aristotle. Aristotle had failed to explain why the coming into existence of the object to undergo ‘motion—that is, the creation of the world—might not itself be the very first motion ever to have occurred” the deficieney is now made up by Averroes with the aid of a tenet of Aristotelian physics. Four genera of motion or change are recognized in Aristotelian physics, and the most primary of the four is motion in place, 2 motion in place ultimately lying behind all incidents of motion or change in the other genera.” Avertoes accordingly completes his elimination of | alternative (i) by arguing that the “motion of coming into existence cannot be the first {motion ever to have occurred, since coming into existence is always dependent upon a {prior| motion in place"” To assume, therefore, either that the physical universe came into existence and then performed the frst mation to have occurred, or alternatively, to assume that the coming into existence of the physical universe was itself the fist motion ever to occur, is self-contradictory. In cither ease, “the motion that was by supposition first would notin fact be first,” since a prior motion in place would perforce be implied. 'As forthe assumption that (i) “the object to undergo motion was at rest for aan cternity and thereupon moved,” such an assumption would also imply “a motion prior to the supposed fist motion. . . . For if what produces motion and what is to undergo motion exist eternally . . . {and yet motion occurs only at a certain moment], some further factor must come into existence which induced the cause producing motion to produce motion and the object undergoing motion to undergo motion, after not having done so. But what comes into existence”? is >eaterander of Aptos (2), Mab” a Kull in Ars “nd Arab, eA Ba (Cito, 1949), p 263 sce above, p18 Phys VIN, 7, a ct below, 9.24 madd pt mae by Aveo is tha when motion i taken in a narrow sense the process of coming intoenstecealthouph a form casge ot formof motion. Astle sot consent tm the question whether coming ito entence shoul o should net be characterize as min See rterncer a Zeller and Ross, above, n. 62 Ome wuepect vero to ate write “the proces of cain nt existence amon2 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World either a motion or the result of a motion."*" Consequently, the coming into existence ofthe factor inducing motion would constitute, oF atleast entail a prior ‘motion; and the supposedly first motion again turns out to have been preceded by another. The two possible ways of construing an absolute beginning of motion having been ruled out, motion—and hence something capable of undergoing ‘motion—must be eternal. Versions of the complete Aristotelian proof for the similar to Averroes’ version appear in Albertus Magnus," who could have bor: rowed the proof from Averroes; in Gersonides,** who undoubtedly did in Cres: cas," who drew from either Averroes or Gersonides; and in Abravanel,*® who copies from Gersonides. eternity of motion very Instances where the argument eliminating alternative (i) is offered as an independent proof Side by side with the composite argument just examined, Averroes offers @ ‘proof from motion which has the specitic aim of establishing the eternity of the heavens. His proof consists in a slight claboration of the reasoning whereby Aristotle had eliminated alternative (i) in the complete, composite argument. In Aristotelian physics, as already mentioned, motion in place is the primary genus of motion and change, every incident of motion and change in the other senera being ultimately traceable 0 a motion in place. Averroes now reasons: “Motion in place is responsible forthe other kinds of motion and change. When- ever motion and change occur in the sublunar world, what i ultimately respon- sible is the circular motion in place ofthe celestial spheres. Should the celestial spheres themselves have come into existence, there must exist a body “prior to the celestial spheres” which “undergoes motion in place . . and is thereby ‘responsible forthe spheres’ coming into exisence.” Should the body that brought about the existence of the celestial spheres have itself come into existence, its coming into existence must be duc to the motion in place of stil another body, prior to it, Since an infinite series of these bodies is impossible." the series must “end at {a class of] eternal bodies undergoing a motion in place precisely like "pears ads the words “the result fa tin” Because he understands tht the proses of coming ino existence isnot strictly a mation, See. 79. "Middle Commentary on Phir, Vl i 2, ahen together With Epitome of Phi. 108 109, "commenary on I Sentences, im Opera Onna, eA. Uoreet, Vol. XXVH Pais, 98), 3 1, Beant 10 AsthumethasShom, Vi, 3 9 299-10. Or Shem, Ik, 1 A ow lines ve fallen ost nthe pit elton dE ave so one ofthe manuscrins Mi ae, V1) oth tecaue of the impossibility of an ifinte munber of ods (t,he, p. 243) a because of the poslty of aniline repens feast bel, p 241) Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 2B that ofthe celestial spheres.” Consequently cither the celestial spheres are eter- nal or there exis's something prior to them and precisely like them which is eternal." ‘A proof of the eternity of the celestial spheres frame inthe same pattern is recorded by Gersonides,” who undoubtedly took it from Averroes; by Crescas,”” whose source was either Averroes or Gersonides, and who condenses the argu ‘ment considerably; and by Abravanel,”" who copies the argument from Creseas, ‘A somewhat similar argument is recorded by Maimonides. Like the original proof of Aristotle, Maimonides’ version undertakes to demonstrate the eternity ‘of motion; but his formulation is plainly designed to simplify Aristotle’, where separate treatment had been given to the alternative that the world was ereated and the alternative thatthe world is eternal. Ignoring the distinction between the {wo alternatives, Maimonides’ version reads: “Whatever comes into existence is, preceded by a motion, to wit, its passing [from potentiality} to actuality and its coming into existence after not having existed” Therefore, “if motion itself should hhave come into existence ... [a prior] motion would already have had to exist, namely the motion through which motion supposedly came into existence.” The very coming into existence of motion would, in other words, itself have been a motion, Should, moreover, the motion through which motion came into existence Tikewise be assumed to have a beginning, its coming into existence too would have been a motion. The assumption of an absolute beginning of motion thus entails the assumption of “an infinite regress” of motions. The assumption is hhence contradictory and self-destructive, and motion taken collectively must be eternal.” Virtually the same argument is also recorded by Bonaventure. °° “Moses Narboni subsequently discovered a flaw in the reasoning. Aristotle's isis had established the plausible proposition that “there cannot be motion of motion, or a coming into existence of coming into existence, of, in general, ‘change of change." What the proposition means is thatthe beginning of a given change is not a change distinct from, and prior to, the given change. Aeconlingly. [Narboni insists, no true philosopher of the Aristotelian school would maintain that motion comes about through a process which is itself a motion; and the argument recorded by Maimonides is neither cogent nor genuinely Aristotlian.”> In its place, Narboni offers his own adaptation of Aristotle’ original composite proof of the eterity of motion. "midile Commentary on Plies, VIM i 2 "MithamothaShem, VI, i, 3, pp. 298-299. Or haem, the pred texte again have to be cored withthe ad of the mane sets. Crescas omits expt mention of he celestial spheres possibly Bcavse he was ot certain of ice extence Mi alt, Ve 1), "Commentary on I Sentences, 1, p. Lea. 1. 22). phies V2. 225, 15-16 “Commentary om Gide Wie, 4ESD, A 1, pM this, Guide, 1400,a Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World Another argument of the type we are considering appears in Aaron ben Elijah ‘Aaron's version opens with the statement that “every change is preceded by @ motion,” but he furnishes no explanation as to why the statement is true or ever ‘what exactly is meant by change. If the motion preceding a given change is preceded by another motion, and the latter by still another, an infinite regress ensues, which is absurd. As motions are traced back, therefore, a motion must eventually be reached which never underwent change, which is ever constant, and hence is eternal.®” The conclusion is stronger than the conclusion of the argument recorded by Maimonides. Maimonides’ version established that motion taken collectively and generically must be eternal; Aaron's version establishes tut there must exist a single specific motion—the motion of the eclesial spheres — which is eternal Brief arguments for the eternity of motion also appear in Albertus Magnus, Aquinas,” and Leone Ebreo.'% (2) Argumenis from the nature of time Alter Aristotle presented hiis proof for the eternity of motion, he added that eternity is implied by the nature of time. He brought forward two considerations. He argued (i) that time must be eternal because there can be no “before and afier without time.” That is to say, should time be assumed to have a beginning, ‘what was before time could still legitimately be spoken of. The term before has, however, a temporal connotation, signifying prior in time, and therefore everyone ‘who assumes a beginning of time inescapably finds himself referring to prior time. An absolute beginning of time is consequently impossible, and time must bbe eternal. Since time must be eternal, and since time goes hand in hand with motion," there being no “time without motion, . . . motion too must be eternal.” ‘And if motion is eternal, something undergoing motion must have always existed. ‘The impossibility of an absolutely first time entails, then, the eternity of time as well as the eternity of motion and some sort of physical world." Aristotle further argued (li) that the concept of time and the concept of the ‘moment are interrelated: “Time can neither be, nor be thought of, apart from the moment.” But the nature of the moment is to divide past from future; for the ‘moment serves as “a beginning of the future and an end of the past” The assump- tion of an absolutely first moment would consequently caery with it the inmpli- cation of a period of time which is terminated by, and prior to, that first moment; Es Mays. cap. 6 phir, VII 1, cap. Summa Theoogiae, 1 46.1 bj 5 "°Dialogh Amare, p- 238 “physics eH, 208, 24~ “physics Vil 1, 2516, 10-13 Time i the number of motion in respect of before and afer” Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 25 and the prior time would itsefcontain moments. The assumption of an absolutely first moment is thus self-contradctory. Inasmuch asa first moment is impossible, time together with motion and a world undergoing motion must he eternal." ‘These Atistotelian grounds for the eternity of time might strike us as highly dubious, since they rest not somuch on the nature of time as on the idiosyneracies ‘of human discourse and on the Aristotelian definitions of time and the moment." Nevertheless, the arguments were taken seriously in the Middle Ages. i) A number of philosophe:s cite the argument that if time should be assumed to have a beginning, what was before time could still legitimately be spoken of. Frequently the reasoning is that, atthe least, the “nonexistence (adam) of time,” ‘could be described as preceding time. But if anything, even nonexistence, can be spoken of as before the assumed first time, time already existed, An absolutely first time is therefore impossible; and time, as well as motion, and a world, are ternal. ‘The argument as thus formulated is to be found in Avicenna,""* Ibn Tufayl! Averroes, Fakhe al-Din al-Réz,'® Amidi,'® Aquinas,'"® Gerson- ides," ij," Crescas,!" and Abravanel.!? ‘A minor variation consists in the combination of the argument from time with the argument from the concept of possibility, examined earlier." The reasoning ‘now is: To assume that the world was created would be to assume thatthe world hhad the possibility of being created before actually being created. But to speak of a possiblity before creation is co imply a time before creation; and to imply lime before creation is to imply that motion and a world already existed before creation, The assumption ofthe creation of a world where no world existed before is therefore untenable. This version of the argument, like the previous version, spi. 19-28 "™C{- G. Howani, “The Dialogue Betcen a-Ghatl and he Philosopers onthe Origin ofthe Work” Mralim World, XEN (1988), 190 gt efjary en Yoh, ea ans. L. Gautier Weir, 1986), Arabic text mR French esa, p62 lsh ansain: ayy Fi Magn, tas, L, Gooinan (New York, 1972). with asnation of the Arabi init, OF the ites eed ore on Talis th aly oe who des at {easonspiicall that iis the noncistenceof tie which would precede tine "Leng Commentary on Phsis. VI, com. 1; Epitome of Metaphysics ed and Spanish as 6. Quin trae (Mas, 1), IVR Geenantasltion: Die Epiome der Metaphysk des ‘Avevres rns. Svan don Hergh Use, 1928) p. 106. K. al Kash. M, Maser (Muni 1659), p34. Gena tanslton: Philosophie und Theologie von Averres, wan, M. Mueller Mun ich, 1875), with pagination of the Arb indicated ietgahaget p91; K. abarla'M, p. 30. GhivaabMaram.p. 266 "Summa conta Gentes, I, 36), "giana Shem. NIL 3,» 298, peng Vl p28 ora Shen. Mi above, 166 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World is found in Avicenna" and probably originated with him. It subsequently appears in Ghazali’s critique of Avicenna’s philosophy." in Shahrastani, who cites it in the name of Avicenna! in Gersonides,"" in Aaron ben Elijah, and in Creseas."2! ‘Another variation insists thatthe creator would surely have had to exist before any assumed creation of the world. The assumed beginning of time would for that reason be preceded by another time, and time would not afterall have an absolute beginning. The philosopher responsible seems again to have been Avi cenna.' The argument reappears in Ghazal’ critique of Avicenna’ philosophy!” and in Aquinas." ‘Yet a further variation plays onthe term wie rather than the term before. The reasoning is that should a beginning of time be assumed, the period when there ‘was no time could nonstheless be spoken of; and atime prior to the assumed fist time would be acknowledged. The contention appears in Proclus."* in the medi eval Arabic translation of Proclus’ arguments for eternity," in Shahrastini’s paraphrase of Proclus’ arguments," and in the Arabic corpus atributed to Alex- ander of Aphrodisias."* (ii) A number of philosophers also cite Aristotle's second consideration, the argument that since the moment by its nature divides the past from the future, every moment is preceded by other moments, and an absolutly first moment is impossible. That line of reasoning is advanced by the Arabic corpus attributed to Alexander! and by Averroes.'” It is recorded by Albertus Magnus,'" Bon- aventure,! Aquinas," Gersonides,'™ Creseas,!"” Abravanel,"" and Leone Bbrco." "eScethe passage from an unpublished work of Avceam's quoted by S. Pines, “An Arabic ‘Sunumary of Lost Work af Job Pilopons: Iral Orienal Studie, I (1972), 380. af oad, |, 91: English tansatin, p87 ‘IM. Niky algdar el. A. Gaiam (Oxfrd aed London, 1934). . 33 pfilhomot ha Sher, Vii 3. 299 2 Havin, oh. 6 sq ania, p37. "57a a Fadil |. $857, 7; English anstatin, pp. 37.48 "Syma Theologie, ly 4, 1, obj 8: De Poem, g 3 tt 720) "Quoted by John Philbponus, De Acerniate Mundi Contra Procum, ed. H. Rabe (Leip, 1899, p. 103. See Philoponis’ exposition, sid. p. 108 Teppblisie by A. Bada in Neoplaonc ud Arabes (Cir, 1955). p. 38 °K, abil wa Na p. 339. "eyfabad”ab-Kul, 9.264 ia "efitome of Phys. 111; Mile Commentary on Phys, VI i, 3: Long Commentary on Physce, Vill comm. U1; Epitome of Metaphysics, V3 "Commentary on I Sentences 1. Byatt 10. "Gommentary on I Sentences, 81, p 814.2 "Summa Theologie,fM6, 1 bj 7 Summa contra Gentle. M335) "dthamot bashers NU 3,3, p. 298 01 haShem, sl Malt, Ne 1B) 0 haste, Mi "Diath deamon, 9.238 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 2 (ii) addition to Aristotle's two considerations, the following line of thought is t be found: Everything that comes into existence, comes into existence in time. IF time itself eame into existence, it too would have come into existence in time. Time would therefore extend back beyond the assumed first ime; and the :ssumption that time had an absolute beginning turns out, once more, to be self conttidictory, The argument is revorded by “Abd al-Jabbar,"™ Bonaventure," Gersonides,"™® and Abravanel."*" (€) The argument from the vacuum Aristotle had established that a vacuum, completely empty space, cannot pos- sibly exist, and the impossibility of a vacuum became one of the principles of his physies. In one passage he utilized the principle in constructing a proof of the eternity of matter, He reasoned: Material objects can come into existence only in place. On the hypothesis of “absolute” generation, that is, the hypothesis that something ean imo existence from nothing, “the place to be occupied by what comes into ex tence would previously have been occupied by a vacuum, inasmuch as no body existed.” But a vacuum is impossible, Consequently, the generation of something, from nothing is impossible, and matter must be eternal."? In the Middle Ages the argument from the vacuum is hinted at by Saadia' and is given by Aver oes," Aquinas,!" Gersonides,"* Créscas,"*” and Abravanel.'** Kaba f atu BLA, J Hous Deiat 1965), pp. 6566 Gammmeary ont Sates ps bea, tea. 2 thao Shem, VU 1 3. 29%: 2, pM, Gens sent tite the punt to Aviles tae iti Ase but the source coud be Aver! Mile Cnmmetary fon Pst, VII 3 hace Avertoeswries “What enerated and destroyed undergoes those process in @ moment atthe nomen i the Beginning of the fre and the end of the past” ‘Averroes probably means merely tht i ve Bean, ts itl terminus would be a moment tat tring the verse of Avisos Phuice VM 1 280b, 28, which Ke is parphnsing. But Avrroes oul also he ks a caning hae underwza the proces of generation, i would have ee rtd in nomen, en ie alt, VN) physics WV, 6-9; De Colo, 2, 3016, 31 8K abdmand, p71 ome Commentary om De Car, i, comm. 295K, a-Kask, pM. un Thesogin, tA, 1 bj "ithamor haShem. NH, i 3s 30 (ton) om Vi 17. 364 Gersonids aces the Matt WV, 328 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World (The argument from the nature of the celestial spheres In De Cacia 1, Aristotle set forth an argument forthe cterity ofthe celestial spheres which rests on one of the fundamentals of his physics, his analysis of the process of generation. Aristotle understood the process of generation to consist in something's losing its previous character and adopting the contrary character. When a substance is generated," a portion of matter loses its previous character, which was the absence, or “privation.” of the form being acquired, and it adopts the contrary character, which isthe new form.'®? The process of destruction likewise is a passage from one contrary to the other: In the destruction of a substance, the ‘matter loses its form and is left with the absence or privation of the form, which, again, is the contrary of its previous character. The two processes differ in that the outcome is positive in the case of generation and negative in the case of destruction; generation begins with, whereas destruction ends'with, the absence ‘of a given form." It follows from Aristotle's analysis that the process of gen- cation as well asthe process of destruction can occur only where a substratum is amenable to coniraries. For without a substratum amenable to contraries, no substance can be generated through the acquisition of a new form nor destroyed through the loss of a present form. Aristotle further explained that the nature of a thing expresses itself in the thing’s motion, and contrary natures express themselves in contrary motions, Yet he demonstrated, or thought he demonstrated, that one type of motion has n0 contrary: "No motion is contrary to motion in a circle."'™ Now the celestial spheres do. by their nature, undergo circular motion. Since the motion of the celestial spheres has no contrary, their nature has no contrary; and whatever substratum the spheres have," Aristotle inferred, must be ofa type not amenable tocontrares. The substratum of the spheres can, consequently, never have passed from a condition wherein it did not have its present nature and form tothe contrary condition wherein it does, and the spheres can never have undergone the process of generation. They, together with the sublunar region whose existence is implied by theirs, must have always existed. '* "aistt' analy alto covers cates where x bstance aching a cera characterise aes ‘he character, ae bon an unmusial man becomes # mie mah. "pie I 7. Ear one of two tings can be tought ofa having come ito existns: the biting matealsabstuatum together withthe coaary character opted by itor alternatively. and ina titer sense, only the new character adopted by the underlying substan, "cf. Pcs Vb "De Caco 4 ™Dtferen psitions were taken in the Midle Ages onthe question whcier he celestial seres ave a maerialsubtratm analogous othe substratum of abject te lower subunar work! Soe H, Wolfen, CrescasCrigue of Arse (Cambridge, Mass. 1929). pp. 594-59 "De Caco I 3, Mba, 12-22. Arise mor oles aks for gamed tht the existence of the ssblunar region i ental by the existence ofthe celestial epln. See De Cato I, 8 Zaller, Die Philosophie der Grech, I. 2, pp. 432-433 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 2» In the Middle Ages, the foregoing argument, usually much abbreviated, is found in Proctus,"* Avicenna (?),"% Averroes,1"? Aquinas,’ Gersonides.'*? ‘Aaron ben Elijah," Creseas,"" and Abravanel."" ‘A slightly roundabout variation appears as well. It starts not withthe process of generation but with the process of destruction; and it combines Aristotle's analysis of the process of destruction with the principle—also demonstrated by ‘Aistotle inthe De Caelo'®—that wha is nt subject to destruction isnot subject to generation, The reasoning is: Since the celestial spheres undergo only circular ‘motion, their motion has no contrary and hence their nature has no contrary. The substratum ofthe spheres is therefore not amenable to contrares and can never ‘pass from the condition wherein it does have its present nature and form to the contrary condition wherein it no longer will; and the spheres are not subject to destruction, But what is not subject fo destruction is not subject 10 generation. “The spheres, together with the sublunar region," must accordingly have existed forever. This variation of the argument is recorded by Shahrastani,"©° Maimon- ides," Albertus Magnus,"°" Aquinas," Gersonides," Creseas,'”” and Leone Bbreo.!7! ‘Another variation is alluded to by Maimonides,"”? and is reported by Aqui- nas," Aaron ben Elijah,!” and Leone Ebreo.'”® I¢ runs simply, and perhaps speciously: The celestial spheres cannot have a “beginning” because the shape and motion of the spheres are circular, and the eile has no beginning, The arguments from (a) the nature of matter, (b) the concept of possibility, and (c) the vacuum, would establish the eternity of matter. They disprove creation "uote by Phys, De Aeterna, p. 478 "De Cueto, chap. 4, Opera (Venice, 108). This seems to be paraphrase of Theiss" De Cala, and nt 9 gemine work of Avicenna’. See M. Alonso, “Hunayn Traduca al Latin? Al: ‘Andel, XVI (1981), 37-47 "Epitome of De Calo in Rasa Ton Rushd (Hyerabad, 1947), pL: Mie Commentary De Carlo Vaan Library Hebrew MS. Urb. 40) | i; Long Commentary on De Cael, com, 20. "summa cont Genes, 33(1, Cf, Summa Theoloiae 1.4, ob. 3 "=Milhamot ha Shem, VI i 3, p- 300, ‘Es Hayy chap. 6 °\0r ha-Shem. Ml | "pe Caelo 112: Ch below, pp. 9, 320. "SSK, ab Mill we. ial, . 0. Spice, VI, 1 chap. 1 "unm conta Gentes, Il, 33(2). Cf Summa Theoogie. 1 Ab, 1 bj 25 De Poenti,g. 3. ant 170). "thant ha Shem, Vii 3s p= 30. °Diaoght Amore, pp. 297 9Gyide Ml 17. CE, 8. Munk ansation, Le Guide des Egurés, Nol (Paris, 186), p. 138, ag obo, V1. esc hove, m. 184 "Guide, MC), "or bashem, Lie De Peni, 3, a. 17 (17, 18, a eeples) PSpIaloghi Amore, p. 238 Pe Hosyin, chap. 630 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World ex nihito, bat are compatible with the creation of the present form of the world ‘The arguments from (€) the nature of motion and (4) the nature of time would establish that a world always existed. Whether or not they would establish spe- cifically that the world we know today has existed forever would depend upon whether oF not the eternity of motion implies the eternity, specifically, of the celestial spheres.'® The argument from (f) the nature of the celestial spheres, ‘would establish the eternity of the physical universe as it exists today. Replies to proofs from the nature of the world, ‘The arguments we have been examining all reason from the laws of nature to the eternity of the world, and they invite a single overall response, An adherent of creation could maintain that the laws of nature govern the world as it now cxists, but need not have governed the process whereby the world would have comie into existence. A response more or less along that line was already made by Philoponus when he was dealing with arguments for cternity resting on the rule tha “something cannot come from nothing.” Philoponus explained that although the rule is in truth inviolable within the natural realm, it does not constrain “God, whose essence and actuality transcend the universe,” and therefore it does not prove eternity."”’ In the Middle Ages, the response thatthe laws of nature ope ative today would not have governed the process of creation appears in various forms, both as an overall refutation of arguments from the nature of the world taken collectively and also as a refutation of the individval arguments ‘Several Kalam writers describe their opponents, the advocates of cterity having proceeded from what is “present and perecivable” (shdhid), that is, from ‘what can be observed in the world today, co what is "not present and perceivable” (gha" ib), to the conditions that would have obtained when the world came into existence. But the nature of what is present and perceivable, the same weiters object, is no infallible guide to the nature of what isnot, “The Negro” is some= times brought as an illustration, It would be not science but the height of foot- ishness for the African Negro to generalize from his personal experience and to affirm that all mankind is black; itis no less foolish to affirm of a previous state ‘of the world everything that is known about the present state, This response to arguments for eternity is offered by *Abd al Jabbar," Iuwayni,!”? and the Sabir corpus. "aise and Avsees were cetan that he ceri of mon does imply the eerity spi ‘ally ofthe clei spheres. See De Calo I 2, an above, n- 88, "ehioponas cited by Simplicius, Commentary on Phys, ed, H, Diels, Cimmentara in Aritelem Groce, Nol. X (Bedi, 1898), 9. 11 "Sharh aU p17 "°K. a Shmal 9.224, Juwayni add «general osereton: The alerts of eternity failed 0 support thir analogy by showing tht the percivabe and aonpercsvable reals are subst to the same aes "Phubie ba Hayy, Teter Choi, pp. 422-423. Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 31 A simitar thought is formulated by Maimonides much more circumstantially nd precisely. la 4 comprehensive refutation of all arguments for eternity from the nature of the world, Maimonides writes: “Whenever something comes into existence after not having existed, even in instances where the matter already existed and merely divests itself of one form to assume another. the nature ofthe thing after it has already come into existence . .. is different from its nature during the process of coming into existence . . . and different as well from its nature before it began the process, [that is to say, different from the nature of ‘whatever it might have come into existence from]. For example, the nature of the female seed [before pregnancy] . . . is different from its nature during preg nancy... and different as well as from the nature of a complete living being alter the living being is born.” Given the differences between the three stages, through which generated objects pass, “no inference can be drawn from the nature of the thing when already existent... to its state while progressing towards existence, nor can an inference be drawn from the latter tothe state of the thing before it began to move towards existence.” Proponents of eternity thus commit a fallacy in citing “the nature of the stable, perfected, actual universe” and concluding therefrom thatthe universe must have existed forever. The adherents, of crcation, Maimonides continues, do not believe that the word came into existence under the laws of nature operative today; such, plainly could not have ‘occurred. They believe that “God brought the work, in its totality, into existence aller nonexistence.” and that the state ofthe world “when stable and perfected, in no way resembles the state of the world during its coming into existence.” “Maimonides proceeds to show how each of the arguments from the nature of the world recorded by him is resolved, once the laws now governing the world are understood to be different from those that would have governed the world during the process ofits coming into existence." His comprehensive response to arg ‘mens from the nature of the work reappears, somewhat condensed, in Albertus Magnus! and Aaron ben Elia." CCrescas,t00, recommends it; *Maimonides’ comprehensive response” he finds, is “clearly correct, and sufficient to refute the arguments” for eternity from the nature of the world. ™ In discussing i€Crescas does not, however, employ Mai- ‘nonides’ own terminology, but borrows a formulation from Gersonides."™ He thas Maimonides distinguish between “general coming into existence.” tha is, the coming into existence of the world asa whole, and “partial coming into ex tence.” the coming into existence of objects within the world,"™ The error in pais, VI 1 chap. 1; Commentary on I Sentences dB. at. 1, SE Hayy, chap. Or ha Shen, i epi "CE. below, 7-32 In Milhamot hah, p_ 306, Gersnides seems to atiate the foreltion 1 Maimonides, at om p. 366, he uses Maimonies” genuine formation, "sfaimonidesdtngised Retcen he Separate stages in he generation of an objet, whereas ‘Crexcas h dstingi Btween the prt a the whole2 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World arguments from the nature of the physical world is, as Creseas explains Mai- ‘monies’ intent, that they draw an improper “analogy between partial coming into existence and general coming into existence.” The laws governing the coming into existence of objects within the world were transferred by the adherents of eternity to a phenomenon of a different kind, the coming into existence of the ‘world as a whole; since the coming into existence of the world as a whole need rot have been governed by the laws of partial coming into existence, the argu- ‘ments in question are all fallacious.” Aquinas similarly offers a comprehensive refutation of arguments for eternity from the nature of the world and he arrives at the same result as the writers already quoted, although I could see no evidence of direct filiation. ™* The dis- tinction Aquinas delineates is that between the realm of “nature.” on the one hhand, and the realm of “divine” action, on the other. In the realm of nature, there ‘occur “change” (muatio) and “particular” production, that is to say, the produc- tion of a particular object from another particular object; whereas in the realm ‘of “divine” action, there occur “creation,” “simple emanation,” and “universal production,” that isto say, the bringing forth of being when nothing at all pre- viously existed. Arguments for eternity from the physical world reason from laws that relate to the phenomenon of particular production, but not necessarily to the phenomenon of universal production or creation, As a consequence, the argu ‘ments are intrinsically invalid," ‘The foregoing refutations of arguments from the nature of the world invalidate every argument of the sort, without exception, Nothing in the present state of the world, the recurrent objection goes, is pertinent to the issue of creation and eternity, since the laws of nature operative today need not have been operative during the process of creation. Gersonides takes a separate tack. He 100 proposes ‘an overall refutation of arguments for cternity from the nature of the world, but his refutation is qualified and restricted. A certain group of arguments from the nature of the world is, for Gersonides, fallacious, whereas another group is vali. Gersonides begins with the distinction, which in one passage he appears to attribute to Maimonides," between “partial coming into existence” and “general ‘coming into existence.” And he warns against indiscriminate “analogy"—to be specific, against analogies wherein “we affirm of [general] coming into existence, everything that can be affirmed of the coming into existence of each single part Of the world.” But the distinction between partial and general coming into cxis- tence is found by Gersonides to be too loose for a definitive resolution of the issue of creation, inasmuch as some characteristics of partial coming into exis- tence can properly be affirmed of general coming into existence. Only "what "Or haShem, i, 2 8 Aguioas” refutation is very simi o Philopono’ above, a. 177 Commentary on Pics, VI, 9978, HT, Suma Theologie, jy 45,2, 2. *uithamothosShem. VI, i 4, 306: ef above, p 3, and. 15, Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 3 belongs tothe work! because it is in its present state io'ar).” he understands, “need not have belonged to the word before it was in that state. What, by contrast, belongs tothe world simply because it exists, irespective of its state, would have had to belong to the world even during the period ofits coming into existence." ‘Tho unqualified distinction between partial and general coming into existence inust accordingly be supplemented, oF replaced, by a distinction between char- scteristes that are and those that are not linked to the world’s existing in its present state, Characteristics linked to the world’s existing in its present state ‘would not appertain to the world’s coming into existence as a whole: but char- acteristics of existent beings, nt related to any given state of the world, would. Consequently, any argument for eternity which takes its departure from charac- teristics of the former sort is invalid, since the characteristic in question would have been absent—as Maimonides and other advocates of creation had insisted — during the world’s coming into exitenee. But arguments from characteristics of the latter sort, from characteristics of existent beings which are not related to any given state of the world, retain their validity; for even at the moment of is generation the world would have been something existent. Gersonides criticizes Maimondes for having fale to take account ofthe distinction between these wo sorts of characteristics and for having therefore rejected, without exception, every inference from the state of the world when already existent to the state of the world during the proces of its coming into existence.""® One may wonder how Gersonides could recognize and identify characteristics of things which are and characteristics of things which are not due to the preset stat ofthe world, but he seems to have thought that the identification could be made intuitively.” It will appear that his qualified refutation of arguments from the nature ofthe world has the effect, as he applies it, of sanctioning arguments forthe eternity of mater, while atthe same time euling out arguments forthe eternity of the form of the world Thus far we have scen the comprehensive refutation of arguments for eternity from the nature ofthe world. In addition to their comprehensive refutations, the xvocates of creation offered nvidal refwatons fr each ofthe several argumenis (a) Responses to the arguments from the nature of matter ‘The argument from the nature of mater, stated briefly, had been that whatever comes into existence does so from a preexisting substratum, or matler; matter too could only have come into existence from a preexisting substratum, or matter; ‘consequently, to assume an absolute coming into existence of matter is self- contradictory." "'Nithame ha: Shem, cic 4 p38; 1, 366 bid 4 306; 17 . 366. CE iid. 17. pp. 364-366 above, PD.1 i ' { 34 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World ‘The sole grounds Aristotle provided to support the rule that whatever comes, into existence does so from an already existing substratum were inductive; other- wise he treated the rule as self-evident." And as has been seen, writers asso- ciated with the Kalam school repeatedly ascribe their adversaries" position to induction or analogy.’ When Kalam writers take up the task of refuting their ‘opponents, their reply consists largely in exposing the unreliability of inductions and analogies from what is empirically known. Saadia and Ibn Hazm had represented the advocates of “eternity” (dak) as accepting nothing but the reports of the senses and as rejecting the creation of matter and the world because sense perception cannot attest to an instance of creation. In response, Saadia and Ibn Hazm point out that no man has ever had sense perception of the eternity of the world or a single one of its parts, Con- sistency therefore would demand that anyone who relies exclusively on analogy ‘and induction from what he perceives should reject not merely the creation of ‘matter and the world, but also the eternity of matter and the eternity of the world, Saadia goes on to list various items of nonempirical knowledge—such as mem- fries and inferences, including inductions themselves—which are not dircctly acquired through sense perception, yet are perforce accepted by all mankind including the advocates of eternity. The conclusion he and Ibn Hazm reach is ble and that “analogy” from what is perceived through the senses cannot settle the issue of eternity and creation." “Abd al-Jabbar, Juwayl, and the Jabir corpus respond to the argument from the circumstance that no instance of creation ex nikilo has ever been observed by pressing their comprehensive refutation of arguments from what is “present and perceivable.” The nature ofthe perecivable, they contend, is no reliable guide to the nature of what i not perceivable, and events need not always have occurred as they now are perceived to occur." ‘Maimonides and advocates of creation who follow his lead refute Aristotle's argument from the nature of matter by applying their own comprehensive refu- {ation of arguments from the nature ofthe physical world. Maimonides concedes that the underlying matter of the universe cannot be generated and have come into existence in the manner in which generated-destructible things ate generated and come into existence; for, as Aristotle correctly held, all generated-destructible ‘objects are generated from a preexisting substratum. The belif of the advocates of creation, Maimonides explains, is that “God created (awjada) matter from nothing” and that the act of creation is entirely different from the process of ‘generation as it takes place within a stable world. Creation consequently docs that uncompromising empiricism is inde! above, pM pbove, BIS "Saati, A adm, 13, pp, 6365; Ibn Hazm, Ka fail 1 p10 "Abd alSabhir, Sharh a Usu,p. 117; Juvaya, .al-Shamilp. 224 abr, Tees Choi pam Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 35 not require a preexisting substratum thus Aristole's argument from the nature of matter bas no beating on the doctrine of ereation ex milo." Albertus Mag: rus." Aquinas," Aaron ben Elijah,°” Crescas.2" and Leone Ebreo™ larly rebut the argument from the nature of matter by distinguishing, through one formula or another, the phenomenon of generation within the world from the completely different phenomenon of the ereation ofthe world in its entirety ‘Aaron ben Elijah appends a further consideration in an ad hominem mode. He notes that Aristotelian philosophy recognizes instances of things" coming into ‘existence from nothing. When a new object comes into existence within the world, its material side is indeed drawn from already existing matter. But the form of the new object comes neither from the atcady existing matter nor from anything ‘else whatsoever; the form comes from nothing, Since the Aristotelian adherents of eternity do not gainsay the constant coming into existence of forms fro rothing."® how, Aston marvels, can they balk at the coming into existence of ater from nothing?" In contrast to the foregoing, Gersonides’ overall response to arguments for eternity fom the nature of the world?” is formulated in a way that lets the argument from the nature of matter stand. Gersonides excludes any inference regarding the coming into existence of the world asa whole which reasons from characteristics tied to the present state of the world, The impossibility “that a ‘body should come into existence from. . . absolutely nothing” is not, he under- stands, such a characteristic. It is rather @ universal law of physica existence. unrelated tothe state in which the world exists:"2"* To assume thatthe physical universe came into existence from absolutely nothing therefore embodies for Gersonides, as for Aristotle, a setf-contradiction, and Gersonides concludes that matter is eternal. His considered position is that the world was created from a procxistent eternal matter.?”” Gide, Me 1. >ephyses, VIL, 1 hap. 14 Samm Thelogiae, {46 fa 3: Samm contra Genes. bap. 370). Be Hani. chap. 6 Or bh. M5 palo Amore p29 2% Merpies Vil, 8, 1083, $6, Aristotle state tat forms aren generate ut. 15, 10396, 26, he concedd hat forms, though aoe generated, sometimes “are and sos ie not” CE. Ross's mae to 10833, 56, The anomalowsess of Aristle’s position is usin hy Zaller De Pitephie der Griechen, 2, pp. 67-348, ao C. Bacar, Das Problem der Matre (Muenster, 1890), pp. 247238, i Hayyim, chap 8 "The sme pink wis made hy Piles se De Actermiate,p. 381 td Sips, Cmenury on Pies, p. 142 Above p32. aia ha Shem, Vlei 7. pp 365-34. Abravane! rejoins hat the impossiiiy of sme thing's coming iro existence from absolutely mobi i a Tat a characteristic ied othe preset State uf the wok a, I. 3 Milhamot ha-Shem. Nei 17. pp 367-368. To be more pect, Gersnies' poston that36 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World (b) Responses to the argument from the concept of possibility ‘The argument had been: Prior to something's coming into existence, there is a possibilty ofits existing. The possibility of existing must subsist somewhere; and it can only subsist in an already existing substratum, hence in an already existing matter. The assumption that matter came into existence from absolutely nothing consequently embodies a self-contradiction, and matter must be eter nal.2!” Medieval advocates ofthe creation ofthe world developed three responses (0 the argument, (One response consists in referring the possibility of matter’s coming into exis tence to the agent that produced matter. The premise is accepted according to which the possibility of matter’ existing would have to precede the actual exis- tence of matter. But the prior possibility of matter’s existing is not located in a substratum, from which matter would have come into existence. It is instead idemtiticd with the power of the creator to create. When the possibility of the existence of matter so construed, the assumption of creation ex nihilo no longer contradicts itself by implying the prior existence of a substratum containing the possibility. ‘This response to the argument from the concept of possibilty is mentioned, but not seriously, by Avicenna,?"” the apparent author of the argument that is bbeing rebutted. It is also mentioned in passing by Ghazali”"? and is employed by Aquinas,2!° Aaron ben Elijah?" Creseas 2"? and Abravanel.™"* The same response was known as well to Averroes, who attributed it to John Philoponus, and 10 Maimonides, who attributed it to the later Kalam.?"” Both Averroes and Mai: ‘monides reject it because of a certain distinction that had been dravn by Aristotle Aristotle had distinguished two Bvvapets—“powers,” or “potentialities,” or “possibilities”—in the process of change, namely the power, or possibilty, of the agent to effect the change, and the power, or possibility, of the object to undergo the change.” Accordingly, Averroes and Maimonides maintain, although ‘one possibility ofthe existence of matter may properly be identified as the agents the world was created from a peexistent “boy fee of al form; inte passage ca, he tems to ltchne the concep, 2 above, pp 16-17 2K, al lharat wo Tanbiha, 6. J Foget (Leiden, 1892), p. 151; French uaasation, with tation of Arabic inetd: Live des Diecives et Remarqut, ans. A, Gighon (Beir 3 Pais, 1950, af ala 1, 98; English asain, p. 39 Summa Theologio, i 6,1, 2 1 Sama contra Gentiles, I, chap. 37. Esai, chap. 6 2 0r ha Shem 5 Mi ale, V, 3 2 averoes, Long Commentary on Metaphysics XII comm, 18; Averoes writes hate drew his Inforstion fom Alfabi's work On Changeable Beings. Maimonides. Guide, Ml, 14(4, Meuphsics V2, 1019s, 18-22; ef sbi, IX, 1 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World a power to create matter, there remains the question of the other possibilty of the existence of matter, the possiblity from the side of some object that isto undergo the process of becoming matter. Until the latter possibilty is explained or explained away, the argument that the prior possiblity of the existence of matter would have to be located in an already existing substratum will not have boen answered." Perhaps because ofthe point raised by Averroes and Maimonides, some writers— ‘Aquinas, Aaron ben Elijah, and Abravanel—do not utilize the first response 10 the argument from the concept of possibility by itself, but always buttress it with additional considerations.” ‘The second response to the argument from the concept of possibility seems to have originated in Ghazali. Ghazali construes the “possibility” of something's ‘coming into existence—along with the impossibility, and the necessity, of some- thing's consing into existence—as nothing but an “intellectual judgment,” a judg ‘ment on the part of the intellect thatthe thing may—or that it cannot or that it ‘must—exist. Since possibility, impossibility, and necessity, have no objective existence in the external world, they do “not require anything existent” to serve as their substratum, And since the possibilty of matter’ existing does not require ‘substratum, the argument from the concept of possibility has no validity.** Following Ghazali, Shahrastini construes the possibility of matters coming into existence as a “mental supposition” (tagdir);* Fakhe al-Din al-Razi denies thatthe possibility of matter’ coming into existence is an “existent attribute” ;2?? ‘Amid writes that itis not "a real essence.” Aquinas offers an interpretation in the same vein, and even finds support in Aristotle. In the course of analyzing the divers meanings of the term “possible” (Bvva76v). Aristotle had isolated what we should call the logically possible. And, he had stated, the possible in its logical sense carries no implication of a power—or potentiality, or possibility (Bévaits)—in either an agent producing change or an object undergoing change.” ‘Aquinas calls attention to Aristotle’ statement; and he explains that the coming. into existence of matter and of the world was possible “in the way a thing is said to be absolutely possible, that is, not by virtue of any potentiality, but solely from the relation of the terms, which are compatible with one another"? The possibility of existence preceding the actual existence of matter was thus not anything with an external existence ofits own. A possibility of existence preceded 2 race, Thu Tahf, pp. 100-101; Maimonides. Gide, 4 See belo, p38, 2 yuh al Palat,1 987; English anslaon,p- . 22K. Nina aad, p34. yas, ps: Karen, SL 24GhiyaalMaram, 9.272 ®*MeraphsiesV. 12, 10198, 27-29, 46-35, This ste caper in the Meaplosies ered to shove ian 218 Sma Tholopae, 16. 1a38 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World te actual existence of matter and of the world only inasmuch asthe terms in the proposition ‘matter exists" or the world exists’ were logically compatible—only inasmuch as the proposition involved no logical impossibility —before thone things ‘did cist. Aquinas combines the previous response to the argument from the concept of possibility with the response we are now examining. When the pos- sibility of the existence of the word is said to have preceded its actual existence, the meaning, Aquinas writes, is either thatthe ereator had the power to create the world, or else thatthe ereation of the world was logically possible.?”” ‘third response to the argument from the concept of possibility consists in applying the comprehensive refutation of all arguments from the nature of the world. The requirement that the possibility of existence must be located in a substratum is held to be a characteristic of change and generation within the world, but not necessarily a characteristic of the creation of a world. Such is Maimonides’ response. He stats that what comes into existence must be preceded by its possibility “only in our stable universe, where things are generated solely from something existent. When, by contrast, something is cre- ated ex niko, nothing at all existed [previously . .. which might permit the thing coming into existence} to be preceded by possibilty"= The same inter- preiation is given by Albertus Magnus? and Leone Ebrco.? Tisi rejects the previous response tothe argument from possibility the response that construes possibility as a *nonceal” (ghayr wujdt) attribute; for, according t© Tis, the possiblity of being generated is unquestionably a “disposition” that “requires a subject” in which to inhere. In preference to the previous response, Tas offers the one now being examined. He distinguishes between the generation of things within the word and creation; and he contends that creation is a completely different phenomenon, that in the case of “created things, no disposition is con- ceivable prio to ther existence."?") Aaron ben Elijah joins the third response t© arguments from the concept of possibility wit the ist. He writes: The possibility ofa thing’ coming into existence precedes the actual existence of the thing only inthe *stable, settled universe” but would not do so, in the ereation of matter ex rikilo; moreover, whatever possibility there might be in the ease of creation ex nihil is tbe referted to the “agent,” that isto say, the creator. Abravanel similarly explains that in “frst ereation” as distinet from “generation,” no “pos- sibility ina substratum” precedes the process of coming into cxistence. ‘The sole true possibilty at that stage is the “possibility of action” on the part of God's “infinite power”?* Aquinas in one passage combines all three solutions. He bid: De Poventia. 4.3, a. 17 (a 10). Guide, Mh 17. > phais, VIL. 1, chap. 14 *Diclogh Amore, 9.238 Glass to Riars Mudge, p92. 2265 Hayyim, chap. 6. malt V, 3. See below, n. 254, Proofs oj Eternity from Nature of World » ‘maintains that the phenomenon of ereation is radically different from the phe- ‘nomenon of things’ coming ino existence by motion; in the former, as distinet fron the later, the pine ponsibility of existence isto be referred tthe alternatively, it to be construed as nothing ater than the logical compatibility ‘of the terms in the proposition “matter exists”? {6} Responses to arguments from the nature of motion Aristotle's argument from the nature of motion, it was seen, reappears in the Middle Ages in its original complex form as well as ina simplified form. The contention in both forms ofthe argument was that the supposedly very frst motion ‘would, by virtue of the laws of motion, have to be preceded by another motion, ang! hence the supposedly first motion would not in fact be first.?"° The adherents ‘of creation who respond (0 tie proof in one or the other of its forms all adduce the comprehensive refutation of arguments from the nature of the world. ‘They distinguish between natural processes within the world and creation; and they explain that argumentation fom the nature of motion can be valid only where the laws of nature are operaive but can have no bearing on God's creating the ‘world ex nihil, This response is given by John Philoponus,2*° and itis repeated in the Middle Ages with minor variations by Maimonides,2” Albertus Mag- rus,?* Bonaventure,” Aquinas," Gersonides,*** Aaron ben Elijah." Cres: cas,2"* Abravanel,}*# and Leone Ebreo.° (d) Responses to arguments from the nature of time “The proof for eternity from the nature of time reasons in one Fashion or another that anyone assuming an absolute beginning of time cannot avoid recognizing 3 rior time; hence time cannot have a beginning but must be eternal; time, how ever, involves miotion and a moving body; and time being eternal, motion and a world undergoing motion must also be cternal.™ A response might proceed cither by rebutting the premise that time involves motion and a moving body, cbse by rebutting the grounds that had been advanced for the eternity of time ‘The only writer I could find taking the former course is Aaron ben Elijah. In reply to one of the versions of the proof, he acknowledges tht time is eterna, but denies that time involves motion, “Time,” he asserts, “is something extrinsic Suma cont Gets 33) Aone, pp. I-20 uated by Simplicius, Commentary om Pls, pp. 141, 118. "Guide, "Commentary on I Senences, 8b, 310 "Commentary on It Seaenes. JA. pe Bea. Le 2.x 2. "Conmentary on Pcs, Vil 997, Suruma Theologian, 1 46, A, ad 8: Sma coma Gen ties, 3013, 2am hae, Wi 4s 304; rte elaborate and sane. ii 24, p95. 2-5 Hass, chap. 6 20, haShom, lei 4 bepianig Milo, V8 "Diaoghi dame, p23. *Ahwe. pp 24-25.40 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World to motion” and motion is not entailed by it. Arguments establishing the preex- istence of time are therefore irrelevant tothe issue of creation.” ‘Most proponents of creation from Plato onwards take the other course. They ‘accept the premise that time involves motion and @ moving body, but maintain that time is not eternal, that there was no time before the world was ercated.2** ‘These proponents of ereation had fo refute Aristotle's arguments for the eternity of time: (i) The fist argument forthe eternity of time ran: On the assumption of an absolute beginning of time, the period before time and when there was not yet time could still be spoken of; but the terms before and when imply time; time ‘would thus already have existed before the assumed absolute beginning of time. ‘The tenor of medicval refutations was set, oF anticipated, by John Philoponus Philoponus was addressing the version of the argument according to which the ‘words ‘when there was no time” imply that time already existed. He explains that with care the mischievous expression is easily avoided. A careful speaker can avoid mentioning the period “when there was no time” and restrict himself to saying, “simply, that time is not eternal"? But the complete solution, Philo- ponus holds, goes deeper. The complete solution lies in understanding that the argument is “sophisical,” since itis concerned with “wording” rather than with ‘what is “meant” thereby. Nothing can be inferred about reality from the “weak ress" of human speech, and attention should always be directed to “intent” rather than “words.”22° The expression “when there was no time” and similar expres- sions consequently shed no light on the issue of creation and eternity. In the Middle Ages, itis repeatedly stated that language seeming to connote time does not imply actual time. Philoponus’ distinction between intent and words does not explicitly appear, but another motif that may have derived from him does. Aristotle had affirmed the finiteness of space side by side with the infinite ress of time, and proponents of creation pounce on the apparent inconsistency. ‘They deaw an analogy between temporal and spatial extension and contend tha {ust as space is universally acknowledged to have aterminas beyond which there is no space, so too may time have a beginning before which there was no time. For example, the following critique of the Aristotelian doctrine of eternity is, reported inthe name of “Yahya,” that isto say, Yahya iba "Adi or, possibly, John Philoponus:2*" The proposition that time began ata certain moment with no time, "5 Haim, chap. 6, Aaron is answering the argent that tthe very east he possibilty of the existence of te work would be present before the word cae inv existence, 20d ence time ‘woul aendy exit before the suppose begioning of tne tsee Plato, Tinaeus, 38; Philo, De Opifcio Mund, vi. 26; Avgustine, City of Gd, Xl, 6: Confessions, XL, 30-1. Wolfon, Philo, Vo. (Canvige, Mass, 188), . 311 He aerate, p10. Sd pp. 108,116. 2ujq Arai, Pilapors is called aby aL Nab Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 4 preceding is neither more nor less admissible than the proposition that space {erminatcs ata certain point with nothing beyond. It is a familiar tenet of Aris- {ofclian physies that the world is finite and that “no extension whatsoever.” neither “plenum nor vacuum,” exists outside the world. By what righ then do the Atis- tovelians reject a parallel theory in regard to time’? By what right do they brand as “inconceivable, the thesis that there was no time” before creation, that time extends back to a certain moment with absolutely no time preceding?*"? Ghazali weaves together two moiifs, the contention that the vagaries of lan- ‘guage shed no light on the issue of creation, and the analogy between temporal nd spatial extension. ‘The former motif is developed in a manner akin to his response f0 the arguments from the concept of possibilty. There he contended that the possibilty preceding the creation of the world is merely a judgment of the mind, a logieal judgment, representing nothing inthe external world;"* here hhe contends that the time preceding the creation of the world can represent nothing inthe external world because itis purely imaginary.?* is answering the argument that the statement “God! exists before cre- ies aime before the assumed creation of the world. He replies that the issue cannot be settled through the testimony of human language. The state- tment that God existed before creation can be recast in the form: “God was, without a world and without time, then was, with a world and time"; and the implication of a time before ercation vanishes.™ But in any event, even if a speaker should not trouble, or should be unable, to avoid language with temporal connotations in referring to what was before time, no actual preexistent time is thereby implied. For the creation of the world is preceded by time only in our imagination”; creation is preceded by nothing more than a “suppesition” (tar) of time, ‘The situation is exactly analogous to that obtaining in spatial extension, 22 Ana ab Fara (2 comment to Phi Vl, In Arie, Ta (medieeal Arabic ranstion Pines tether wit Tour mesic Arabic conus, A Ha (Cit, 19D HIG Test ck om the printed txt whcther Aba a Fars quoting *Yahyi™ ox whether the passage behongs not to Abi ary commentary bul 1 the commentary of Yahya iba “Ad apo, p37 2S1The ltr Kaa writers wh main ha the psi of eaters omg ints existence {smo a abo, p37), anepesaly Sharda (ave, 222)- may welt have hee lowing GGrarl’s responce tothe argument frm te, rater than his responce to the argument fo he concept of poeiily. Thy may have meant, in other words, aot that the pssbiity of mater ‘ming nt existence a gical emer, bt that 3 product ofthe imagination. An urambi ‘ous tnstace where the response tothe argment frm tne i apie to the argument fan he Concept a psstliy can be foun in Abavanel. At giving the reply t the argue! From the concep of possibility qucted above, m 233, Abravanel als: "Ie als can he stated that he sub ‘fh psy sn certs sese the hua tlie Justa hepioning of ine inconceivable Seaout a ie extending Deon at pene hee, soo i cl wo eneeive of the actual coming ito existence of an wet witht the notion tat be pssibiy of the ting recedes its actual exisince,» » But tat nly ental precedence” Taha al Half, 484; Engh wanltion, p38a Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World Nothing whatsoever lies beyond the boundary where the workd and its space terminate, although the human imagination “balks” atthe notion and mistakenly insists upon *supposing” an empty space beyond the world. Similarly, no time whatsoever existed before the worid and time came into existence, although the ‘human imagination again balks and insists upon “supposing” a prior ime, 2° In rebutals of arguments for the eternity of time, the phrases imagination, oF supposition of time become catchwords; and the analogy between the termination of space and the beginning of time also recurs. Shabrastani answers arguments of the type we are examining by explaining that any implication of time prior to the world is “an imaginary supposition, like the supposition of a vacuum beyond the world”? Merely imagining that a vacuum exists beyond the world does not ‘establish that a vacuum exists in actuality. By the same token, merely imagining that time existed prior to the world docs not establish that time truly existed Maimonides, who does not include an argument from time in his Formal clasi- fication of proofs for eternity, forestalls such an argument. The statement *God ‘existed before creating the world” and other phrascology that scemingly implies time prior to creation refer, Maimonides writes, solely to the “supposition of time or to the imagination of time, and not to real time.”?5* Fakhr al-Din al-Razi maintains that “priority isnot an existent attribute" ora “positive atrbute."? Amid characterizes the assumption of a temporal extension prior to the world as “imaginative supposition?" Aquinas writes thatthe “before we speak of as preceding time” does not refer to time “in reality, but solely in four] imagination.” ‘The situation, he adds, is analogous to “saying that there is nothing above the hneavens.” In that sentence, the term above does not have a genuine spatial ref- erence but merely an imagined reference, and all will acknowledge that no actual space above the heavens is implied. By the same token, the words “before time” should be acknowledged to contain no implications of an actual prior time. Gersonides’ response to the argument from the nature of tine is similar (o the responses made by his predecessors, but—as Gersonides often dees when repeat- ing commonplaces—he appends a small twist of his own, The statement that time did not exist “before” the creation of the world is, he writes, analogous the statement that “nether a vacuum nor plenum is to be found outside the world. ‘The term before in the one instance and the term outside inthe other are employed i. 61-63; English anslation, pp. 4-42, anf. van den erg ot, 2K Nikdyeablqdam p. 82 Gade, 130), Nahas 9.91 2K, abArba'n. 9.5 *'Ghayn ab-Maram,p. 272 Summa contra Genes, I, 96). CE. Commentary on Phir, Wl, §99; Summa Theoloiae, 146, ade Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 43 ‘equivocally and notin their ordinary sense, and hence their use cannot serve as rounds for inferring cither the infinity of space or the eternity of time. We have here, Gersonides continues, an area where human language, which isin any event “conventional,” fails to provide the technical terminology required by philosophy sand science; the result is that philosophers must use ordinary words in a “bor- rowed” sense,2*" A similar reply to the argument is made by Abravanel.?* ii) Aristotle's second argument for the eternity of time was that the moment invariably divides past from future; to assume a first moment would therefore mount assuming a preceding past time that terminates at the first moment; ind the assumption of an absolutely first moment is self-contradictory.2"* The sument uid not receive as muuch attention as the previous argument from time, ‘but several responses can be cited. Philoponus condemns the argument as “being the questo ing that every moment divides past from future, the eteraity of time is presup= posed from the outset. To elucidate his meaning, Philoponus draws another anal- ‘ogy between space and time. Aristotle had once characterized the moment in time as analogous to the point on a line,2 inasmuch as the point divides a ine ino two segments and the moment divides past time from future time. It clearly would, Philoponus writes, be a begging of the question fo presuppose that every point, without exception, divides a Tine into two segments, to infer therefrom that no point can ever stand at the terminus of a line segment, and to conclude that every line must be infinite. It is no less begging the question to presuppose that every moment, without exception, divides past time from future time, to infer that no moment can stand at the very beginning of time, and to conclude that time must be eternal.” Alfarabi and Averrocs knew that the argument from the natute of the moment right be rebutted on the grounds that the moment in time is analogous to the point on a Hine, and every Tine segment does begin ata point Any rebuttal of laos hee, Whi 21, pp 384 38S. . en ala, V3 atove, p24 epi WV, 11,2208, 9 13,2223, 13 =" Qued by Sinpicts, Commentary on Plies, p. 167 Epitome of Metaphysics, 1, $4, wth reference to Alfrabl Taf aT ep. 77 ery ‘ely was thanks to Alfarabi and Avertues that Piloponws” reba reach the Mille Ages. Averacs pacts that Alfaras book On Chargeable Beings now ost il bare he spn i ny “comparison between the porsby of hopiaming of te a a ment and che posit of bepining ofa ine st «point, As far as col see, Aveo dacs nat mention Pikopos in this ‘conection Bu efuingPhilsponss i hoown o have been one of Alfarab's objectives im his Book ‘On Changeable Beings (ee above, 8.217: bom, p. 12K M. Sleaschocider,AF-Farah |S. Pte fare, IM, pp. 12122). Hwy three wel have fen est Popes wh Afra ha Ini inthe passage refered o by Avena that ay nthe saree the rebut of he Argue onthe mature ofthe momen“ Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World the sort is dismissed by them as a sophism,2 but several medieval adherents of creation employ it nonetheless and they for their part dismiss their adversaries’ ‘imputation of sophistry. ‘Aquinas makes a reply to the argument from the nature of the moment which is strikingly like Philoponus’. He contends that a moment may stand atthe begin- ning of time, with no past time preceding, in exactly the way a point can stand at the end of a line segment with nothing beyond. It would clearly be circular reasoning to presuppose that every point must have a Tine segment on each side and then proceed to prove that all lines are infinite. Aristotle's argument from the moment is guilty ofthe same circularity; the argument presupposes its own conclusion in assuming that every moment must be preceded by time.?”° Gersonides does not speak of question begging or circular reasoning, but he too uses the analogy between space and time. He compares the argument that a ‘moment is always preceded by time and time is therefore eternal, to a possible argument to the effect that the universe must be infinite since one body comes 10 ‘an end only where it mects another body. Both arguments are a product of the ‘human “imagination which refuses to allow a point with nothing beyond or a ‘moment with nothing before; and the imagination is not a reliable guide in the realm of science. Gersonides appends a lengthy disquisition on the nature of the ‘moment, wherein he shows that not every moment need have the characteristic of dividing the past from the future, ‘The upshot is that a moment might serve as the absolute beginning of time just as a point can serve as the absolute beginning, of a line segment.2”" 4 highly condensed restatement of Gersonides' reply to the argument from the nature of the moment is offered by Crescas,?”* and Abravancl also offers a restatement of Gersonides’ rply.?”> Epitome of Metaphysics, WV, $4; Taft al-Tbaft, 1, p. 71. Aves exposition of the sophism is extemely sible. The reason a point an serve a the terminus ofa ine he explains viously wih Anise, Physics IV, 13,2224, 13-14 in eind—tat the ine "ate" and the int atthe end ofthe line enjoys “actual” exsence. A moment, by const, canna ere 358 ‘oll termini of time fete reason tht tine isnt a et moment evr exits in actuality sd therefore no moment an eve exist except a subsequent othe pas an antecedent to the ature Hence, Averroescoluds, It a sophism Io infer the possiblity of tine’ having i etm in ‘omen rom the possibility of ines having is termi in a pint and Anse’ argument for ‘derity rom the nate af the moment acorn renin intac. "Commentary on Phsies, Vill, $983; ef Sunma contr Gentiles, M, chop. 36. Aquinas ds ‘misses vero imputation of sopistica reasoning a ollows: The fst tht alin a et whereas lime is eve Howing cam have no Bearing onthe question wheter alin rte might hve an initia termini. Therefore line ca begin ata point, ime sould beable fo bein ata mone mithamot ha-Shem, VI, 21 pp. 388~390. In an ingest reference to Averoes tices (above 1.268), Gerson, ibid. . 89, explains hat the potty associated with the moment «an have nothing to do withthe ability, o inability of a moment to serve a a eginning of tine with ‘oti preceding, Or haShem, i 3 PMY alts V3 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World 45 An alternative answer t0 the argument for eternity from the nature of the ‘moment consists in applying the comprehensive response to all arguments from the nature of the world. Albertus Magnus,?™ Bonaventure.” and Leone Ebreo?”® ‘grant that the moment always divides past from future in the present state of the world; but, they maintain, the moment need not have divided past from future during the process of creation, (ii) A further argument for the eternity of time had run: Everything that comes imto existence does so *in” time; therefore the supposed absolutely first time ‘would have to be preceded by another time, namely, the time in which it came into existence. ‘Abd al-Jabbir,?”” Bonaventure,?”* Gersonides,2”* and Abrava- nel,2° who record the argument, all refute it by rejecting the premise that time ‘would have to come into existence in time. (€) The response to the argument from the vacuum Te argument had becn thatthe doctrine of creation ex milo implies the prior existence of a vacuum in the location the world was to occupy, whereas a vacuum is impossible*” Aquinas responds that on the assumption of creation ex nihil, “thore was no place of space prior to the world,” and consequently no vacuum, space being created together with the worl. Creseas and Abravanel offer the same solution. The argument from the vacuum can, they write, be answered by understanding that “prior to the world, no dimensions existed, and God created thom when he ereated body from nothing."?"* Creseas makes an additional and atypical observation, however. He finds Aristotle's grounds forthe impossibility fof a vacuum unconvincing" and is therefore not inthe least discomited by the implication of a vacuum prior to creation. Prior tothe existence ofthe world. he is quite willing to admit, a vacuum did exist, ad in it God ereated the world.2*° Gersonides is an adherent of creation who accepts the argument from the vacuum. As was seen, he ruled out only those arguments for eternity which rest ‘on characteristics of the universe tied to its present state, whereas he endorsed arguments which he viewed as resting on universal laws of existence. The argu- ment from the vacuum is understood by him to belong tothe latter type; for the Commentary on Sentences, 1, By at. 10. "Commentary onl Senencer, 1p. La. WA 2 Ppialhi d Amore, 9.239 27K. at Maina’ . 66 "Commentary on Il Sentences, dsp. Asa beg. 2 > Mithamot ba Shem, Wi. 20 pp. 32-383, Miao, V3 2 above, p27 2ynma Theologie, 1, 46, 384 A sina point is made by Stata, K: el Amanat. Th or haShem I, 5:Mi alot IV, 3. 1g Abavanel the eniece ends". «when he rated something fr mshi” Or ba-Shem, i 1 id46 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World proposition that objects come into existence in place states a universal charac- teristic of physical existence, and the impossibility of a vacuum is also absolute Gersonides accordingly accepts the conclusion that the place now occupied by the world nust always have contained something. His position, as has been ‘mentioned, was that matter is eternal and that the world was ereated out of a preexistent, eternal forraless matter.2°° () The response to the argument from the nature of the celestial bodies ‘The argument here had been thatthe process of coming into existence as well as the process of destruction consist in a passage from one contrary to another; but whatever substratum the heavens might have cannot be amenable to contear- ies; consequently, the heavens cannot have come into existence and must be ternal." The advocates of creation who undertake to refute the argument employ the standard comprehensive response to arguments from the nature of the world ‘They distinguish between natural processes and creation, and maintain: The law ‘that things come into existence only from their contraries is a law peculiar to the process of generation within the present state of the world, whereas in creation, things may well come into existence in a different manner, This solution is put forward in one version or another by Maimonides," Albertus Magnus,” Aqui- ras, Gersonides,”"" Aaron ben Elijah”? Abravanel,2"” and Leone Ebreo.?™* 4. Summary ‘The argument for eternity from the nature of matter rested on the premise that everything coming into existence does so from a preexistent substratum or matter; ‘matter to0, it followed, could have come into existence only from an already existing matter; hence an absolute coming into existence of matter, the coming into existence of matter from absolutely nothing, is impossible. The proponents of creation reply thatthe critical premise can be justified solely by induction or **44itamerba-Shom, Vi 17. p68. Abra, Mi alo, V, 3 utes Garage” esoing. 2” atone, p28 Guide, We Commentary om I Sentences, dt, Bs 10. 2*Sunma Theoloic, 1 46, 1,383. CE. ibid. 142; Summa contre Gentiles, 361) *'Milhamor ha-Shem, VI, i, 26. Gersonies ads »sateme that {think mises the point of Ariss argumest, He corlends that not everthing i generated fr is conary; forms, for ‘example, are no generate rom ether forms tat athe cosrane. Aristo’ contention, Howerer ha ot been that a given form is peerae rom he coneary form, His ontnton ba ben tht 3 sivon form is generated in situation whersin the substatur acks the given fre; and ta she ofthe form. See abot, p 2. "Es Hayy, chap. 6 2M alot. V3. Dialog d'Amore,p. 23. Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World “7 analogy, and inductions and analogies are unreliable, Alternatively, the propo- rents of creation bring to bear their comprehensive refutation of arguments from the nature of the world, They maintain that although in the present state of the world everything coming into existence does so fron a preeristent substratum, no preexistent substratum need be assumed for creation. Creation ex niilo—the creation of the world together with its matter—accordingly remains a viable hypothesis, ‘The argument from the concept of possibility reasoned that everything coming, into existence is preceded by the possibility of its existence; the possibilty of existence must inhere in a substratum or matter; matter would therefore have had {o exist before matter could come into existence; thus the absolute coming into existence of matter is impossible. The proponents of creation respond in one of three ways, They deny that the possibilty of the world’s coming into existence is to be located in an already existing matter and refer that possibility instead (0 the creator. They construe the possibility of the existence of the world as a judgment of the mind and as having no objective existence in the external world. Or else they resort to their comprehensive refutation of arguments from the nature ‘of the world; and they maintain that in the phenomenon of ereation, the possibility of existence need not precede actual existence. The upshot is that creation x nihilo is a viable hypothesis. ‘The argument from motion showed that the assumption of a beginning of ‘motion inescapably involves prior motion; and therefore motion, as well as some sort of world undergoing motion, must be eternal. The proponents of creation respond by again applying their comprehensive refutation of arguments from the ‘nature of the world. They explain that although in the present state of the world, motion cannot occur without a prior motion, in the creation of the world as a whole, an absolute beginning of motion is conceivable. The world and its motion may accordingly have had a beginning, Te argument from time reasoned that a beginning of time cannot be spoken of without implying a prior time, and hence time is cternal. The companion argument from the moment reasoned that moments invariably divide past from future, and therefore a first moment, with no time and no moments preceding. is impossible, Both arguments conclude that since time is eternal, motion and some sort of world undergoing motion must also be efernal. In one instance these arguments are countered with the denial that time does involve motion and a ‘moving body. If ime does not involve motion, the eternity of time may be granted without admitting the eternity of the world, The usual response, however, is that rcither the nature of time nor the nature of the moment implies, im fact, the eternity of time, The argument from the nature of time—the contention that there is no avoiding the implication ofa time prior to the supposed beginning of time — is answered by ascribing the implication to deceptive human language: all that in truth precedes the beginning of time, the explanation goes. is & supposition of time or imaginary time. A supporting consideration is provided by an analogy48 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of World between time and space. It was universally acknowledged that the physical world is finite and that nothing whatsoever, not even empty space, lies beyond the world; by the same token, the adherents of creation submit, time might be finite with no time whatsoever preceding the beginning of the world. The argument from the nature of the moment is answered by the adherents of creation with the aid of another analogy between space and time. They maintain that a moment ‘might serve as the absolute beginning of time just as a point can serve as the absolute terminus of a line segment. If time need not be eternal and if a first ‘moment is possible, then the beginning of motion, and of a world undergoing ‘motion, remains a viable hypothesis. The argument from the vacuum rested on another principle of Aristotelian physics, the impossibility of a vacuum or completely empty space. The argument ‘was that the creation of matter is impossible since it would imply the prior existence of a vacuum where the world was to come into existence; and a vac is impossible. The proponents of ereation respond that the place the world occu- pies was created together with the world, so that no vacuum would have preceded creation; and in one instance, the premise that a vacuum is impossible is also rejected, It follows once again that creation ex nihilo is a viable hypothesis. ‘The argument from the nature of the celestial spheres ran: Everything coming into existence does so from its contrary; the circular motion of the celestial spheres reveals that the substratum of the spheres is not amenable to contraries; conse ‘quently the spheres and the rest ofthe physical universe—the existence of which is entailed by the existence of the spheres—cannot have come into existence ‘The proponents of creation respond by applying their comprehensive refutation ‘of arguments from the nature of the world. The rule that everything coming into ‘existence does so from its contrary is, they hold, valid only in the world as it ‘exists today and need not be true of the phenomenon of creation. The hypothesis of the creation of the world thus remains viable. Ill Proofs of Eternity from the Nature of God 1. The proofs ‘The proofs for eternity discussed in the previous chapter proceeded from the nature of the physical world to the eternity of the physical world, or, in some instances, to the cernity merely ofthe underlying matter ofthe world. The proofs to be discussed in the present chapter take their departure not from the world but from its cause; moreover, thry cover not merely the physical universe, but the onphysical universe as wel.. They argue that the eause of the universe being, such as itis, the entre universe, whether physical or nonphysical, must be eternal Tree basic proofs from the nature of the cause of the universe can be difer- entiated, and other argumerts may be treated as variations of the three. ‘The themes of the basic proofs ar: clearly distinguishable. The first proof argues that ‘no given moment, as against any other, could have suggested itself to the creator 1 the proper moment for creating the Universe, The second proof argues thatthe cease ofthe universe must be unchangeable and could not, therefore, have under- taken the act of creation afte: having failed to do so. The third proof argues that the cause of the universe possesses certain eternal attributes and that the existence of the universe is an expression of those attributes; nee the attributes are eternal, the universe, which they give rise to, must likewise be eternal. While these three lines of reasoning are sufficiently distinct, a difficulty in classification does arise. ‘Sometimes a variation on a basie proof or an argument as an individual phitos- ‘opher happened to formulate it can plausibly be subsumed under more than one basic proof, and the decisior to classify it under one rather than another is to an cextent arbitrary." The three basic proofs differ in a significant respect that can be brought out by considering a possible ertcism of any argument for eternity from the nature ‘of the cause of the universe. Does not any argument ofthe sort, it may be asked. rest on the unwarranted presupposition that the universe in truth has a cause "Ch. for example, blow, pp. 9, 64-65, 4930 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God outside itself? In the case of the first proof, a satisfactory reply i at hand: The Standpin there i, in principle, hypothetical, the intent being to reduce the adversary’s position to absurdity. A cause of the existence of the universe is not presupposed. Rather, the reasoning is that on the assumption of creation, the Universe would have had to be brought into existence by a cause;? the cause supposedly bringing the universe info existence would not have been able to éreate it at any given moment; hence the assumption of cretion is untenable ‘When stating that the standpoint of the fist proof is hypothetical the qualification has tobe added thatthe proof is so in principle, since not every instance of the proof keeps the hypothetical standpoint consciously in viw. Inthe third proof, the standpoint has plainly shifted away from the hypothetical Presuppositions now are in evidence fo the effect that the universe docs have a cause ofits existence, thatthe eause of the existence of the universe possesses certain eternal attributes, and thatthe attributes express themselves in the exis tence ofthe universe, Te proof is valid only ifthe presuppositions are granted ‘Most actual instances ofthe socond proof—the proof from the unchangeabilty ofthe cause ofthe universe—similarly appear to rest ona presupposition, namely. that the universe owes its existence to an unchangeable cause. The second proof nevertheless differs from the tied in that any argument from the unchangeability ofthe cause of the universe can easily be read or reeast ina hypothetical mode, On the assumption oferetion, the reasoning can be construed, some cause must be ultimately responsible for bringing the universe into existence. The cause ultimately responsible for bringing the universe into existence would have to be immune from change; for were i wo undergo change, it would be dependent upon ‘whatever produced the change, and it would not, after all, be the ultimately Fesponsible eause.” And je, to bring @ universe into existence after having filed to do so, would constitute change. Creation would thus imply an unchangeable ceause that undergoes change, and the assumption of ervaton is sef-contraditor. The standpoint ofthe fist proof, then. is hypothetical; the second proof ean casily be ead or reeast in a hypothetical mode; whereas the standpoint of the third is not hypothetical but dogmatic. ‘Maimonides, it will be recalled, characterized proofs of eternity from the ature of the cause ofthe world as having been developed from Aristotle's prin- ciples by philosophers following Aristotle.‘ The characterization i ap in respect to the first and second of the three proofs. A trace ofthe first proof isto be found in Aristotk’s physical works, and Aristotle seems to have articulated a version ‘ofthe proof in an early dialogue." The second proof canbe seen asa development of one ofthe sirands from which Aristotle's argument forthe eternity of motion, 2 te princi that thing cul come into exisence witout a case Ebel: pp. se fer. elo. ‘ove. m1. Sibel, p32 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God SI iscussed in the previous chapter. is woven.° Furthermore, the conception of the ultimate cause of the universe which is operative inthe tWo proofs accords ith Aristotle’ conception of the prime mover. On the assumption of creation. itis argued in both proofs, the ultimate cause of the universe's coming into existence would have to be an emtity that is unaffected by anything outside itself and that is unchanging: and those are traits of Aristotle's prime mover. Maimonides’ characterization isnot, by contrast, accurate as regards the thi proof from the cause ofthe universe. The third proof presupposes that there is indeed a being from whom the very existence of the universe flows, something quite foreign to the spirit of genuine Aristotelianism, where a cause anly of the motion of the universe is recognized. The third proof would be more accurately characterized as Neoplatonic. Proclus apparently was the main source or channel through which medieval “Arabic philosophers received the thrce proofs for eternity from the cause of the ‘world. A list of eighteen proofs of eternity had been drawn up by him,” and part if not all, of the list was available in Arabic in the Mid Ages: A medieval ‘Arabic transation of the first nine of the eighteen proofs has been discovered,” and in addition Shahrastini records, in Proclus” name, a paraphrase of seven of| the nine, together with an eighth proof taken from the second half of Proclus’ tis.” The three basic arguments for eternity from the nature of the cause of the Universe, although not every variation, ean be discovered among the proofs of Proclus* which have been preserved in Arabic," and he may for that reason be taken as the medievals’ probable source. (a) The argument that nothing could have le a creator to create the universe ‘ata particular moment “The contention that what exists cannot have come into being goes hack at least to Parmenides. In conjunction with other considerations, Parmenides is reported low, 9.37 Preserved in oka Philp, De Aeterniae Mund core Proc eH, Rabe Leip. 1198. "oA. Baw. Nerplatonie apd Arabs (Cato. WSS). pp. 38-42. CG, Ansa, “Ua exgner pened de wtermtae mundi Pacis > Mélanges de phlosopi recgue fferts a Mat Dies (Pars, 1956). pp. 21-25. Sh ual Mill we Nia. W, Cocton (Leda, 1842-1886), 3380, Teeth prot sven hy Shahvastin is Poca” hee IK, Ma aigdam. ed A. Guillaume (Oxford at London, 1934) 4546, Shlain records in Pools fame, tee pots fom the ist all ‘oF Prato’ tis. nd ve of Pret prouls—the int. thin fourth sistent an eighicenth—tobe versions ofthe thre pro discussed in the present caper. The tity of Prot” epieen prot sa version tthe agument fom te nate of fin: cf. ahve, p. 24, Most ofthe remsining are excel They undertake to show ht Plato's ison imple he eeaty of he work, and that Pat to, kate the spare sense ofthe Timaes,blive the word te ete the pst wel ay the fut,52 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God to have posed the rhetorical question: “What need could have inade that which ‘ists, exist later rather than sooner?" The purport of the question is that since nothing could have determined a later. rather than an earlier, moment for the existence of the universe, the universe eannot have come into existence at any moment whatsoever, but must have existed from eternity, An intimation of the same thought can be unearthed in Aristotle. In the course of proving that what is indestructible cannot have been generated, Aristotle remarked: “Why .. alter not existing for an infinite time, would the thing be generated . .. ata particular moment?" The argument is known students of modern philosophy from Kant." Neither the fragment from Parmenides nor the passage in Aristotle makes reference to whatever it might be that brings the world into existence. But the snedieval philosophers as well as Aristotle were certain that nothing could have ‘come into existence spontancously and without a cause. Should the eause respon- sible forthe supposed creation of the world be taken into account, the argument being examined would run: On the assumption of ereation, no given moment in ‘an undifferentiated eternity could, as distinct from any other moment, have tec ‘ommended itself tothe cause bringing the world into existence as the proper time for it to exeate the worl; the cause that would, on the assumption of exeation, have had to ercate the world could not therefore have acted at any moment whatsoever. This tain of reasoning, too, was employed by Aristotle, not however in his preserved works but in a lost dialogue. Aristotle as reported by Cicero. argued for the eternity of the world on the grounds that no “new plan” (nove consilio) could have arisen which might have occasioned the world’s creation." ‘The mention of a *plan” indicates thatthe argument has in view not merely the ‘moment at which the world would have come into existence on the assumption of creation, but also a cause, specifically an intelligent agent. that wouk! have had t© docide upon and execute the project. Aristotle's meaning rust in other ‘words, have been that creation is impossible because there was no moment at which the creator might have decided to act. Similar formulations appear els where before the medieval period. Cicero, the source of the passage from the forementioned Arisotelian dialogue, represents a member of the Epicurean school as asking thetorieally: "Why should the builders of the world suddenly have sprung into action after innumerable ages of slumber?” Augustine takes up certain unnamed skeptics who had a like predilection for rhetorical questions. HL Diels, Fragment der Vorsobrtkr (Dertn, 1934-1938), Parmesids, agaent 8. English teaslation in 1 Bare, arly Greek Philosphy (Londan, 1930). 17S "De Cae I 12, 283, 11-12; ef Pastor VIM 12523, 18-16 "Kant, Cetique of Pre Rearon, AS2TIASS ot ofthe anthesis of dhe Gt atin. The root ofthe chosis ofthe fst aninomy can be ace wo ohn Philopnws; helo. PM uel by Cicero, Academica H.X8Xvi, 19. "De Nats Deoram, Lit, 2 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 33 “Why the skepties asked, “did the eternal God choose at a particular point to make the heavens and carta, which he had not made previously’?"!® “How did the idea of making something come into his mind despite his never having made anything before?"!” In the Middle Ages, the argument we are examining—the argument that no tziven moment could, in pre‘erence to any other, have served us the proper moment for the world’s coming into existence—invariably contains a reference to the creator, The reasoning invariably is that no given moment could have suggested itself to the creator as the proper moment for him to create the world. Avicenna, for example, defends the etrnity of the world by posing, once again, a rhetorical {question. He asks: “How within {the stretch of] nonexistence could one time be differentiated for [a creator's] not acting and another time for {his} starting [10 sel? How might one time differ from another?” Instances of the argument that ‘ho moment could have suggested itself to the creator as the moment for creating the world can be found in Ghazali,"” Maimonides,” Albertus Magnus,?! Aqui- nas,” Crescas,” and Joseph Albo.”* A distinction can be drawn—and itis admittedly a fine distinction—between instances of the argument which do not and a larger number of instances which do include an additional element, the element of the creator's motive. Avicenna and the philosophers just mentioned asked: How could any given moment have suggested itself to the erealor, in preference to infinite identical moments, as the time for creating the world? In the examples to be examined now the question is: On the assumption that the creator did choose one moment in preference to ‘others, what could possibly have induced him to make the choice? What could his motive have been? The theme can already be detected in the passage where Aristotle spoke of a “new plan,"?5 and in the passage where Augustine's skeptics wondered how the “idea” of creating the world could have come into the mind chy of Go, XI Canfesims, XL x44; 6, XL, xf City of God, XH, 1S, Aupustae sates hs own positon "hot Goal was nor mative by “nw plan” (novo =. scons) in rating te word "Shi: asa, ed. G. Anawati ad S. Zayed (Cait. 1960), p. 378, "Fa al sf, 8. M. Boyes (Birt 1927), $28: English wanton in Aeros suf aT, ans 8. van den Bergh (London 1984. p. 18 nid othe Perplesed. Il, LAB), Maimonides inclades api aso met elsewhere, namely that tis nimaginable that the diy shoul hve remained “ile” foram etrity before creating the ‘meld. CX Cicero. De Nata Deora, I, 2; Augustine, City of Gi, 18 Simplicius. Com mentary on Posies, ed, H. Digs, Commeniaria in Ariatelem Graea, Nol. X Bein. 1895), 31, A elated motion is hat the deity is never “asbging"s ct. below 96. Commentary on I Sentences, im Opera Omnia, ed A. Borges, Vol. XXVH (Pais, 1998), 2 Smantcomon Genes, 32S), 20 meShem li above, n. 1acy Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God ‘of the creator.** An especially clear statement of the theme is provided by Mai- ‘monides. He portrays the proponents of eternity as reasoning: “An agent acts at fone time and not at another because of either preventative factors (mdni") oF ‘motivating factors (dain) which occur (arin) in him. The former bar an agent from accomplishing what he wills; the latter lead the agent to will what he previously did not wil. Since the creator, [who must be absolutely self-sufficient] is subject to neither motivating factors . . . nor preventive factors, . .. it is impossible for him to act atone time but not at another" ‘The contention that nothing imaginable could have motivated the creator to act at one given moment in preference to others was common, Baqillini alludes ‘oi, and forestalis it, when he stresses that in ercating the world “after not having. done so,” the creator was not led to act by a “motivating Factor (da"in), .. . oF ‘moving factor, .. . oF inducing factor (bd"ith), .. or disturbing factor, .. . oF new idea (khdnir."7¥ Aba al-Barakat argues that no new “state” (hal), oF “induc- ing factor” (bd“ith), of “necessitating factor” (mugtadin) could conceivably have led the creator to select “a given time as distinct from what preceded and what succeeded, inasmuch as all times were equivalent.” The conclusion Abi al-Bar- kit draws is that the world must be eternal. With variations in wording, the reasoning recurs in Ibn Tufayl,2! Averroes,"® Albertus Magnus,’ Aquinas, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi,®® Gersonides,® Aaron ben Elijah,2” Creseas,™* and ‘Abravanel.2? Proclus’ version of the argument we are examining exhibits still a further clement. His contention is that on the assumption of the creator's acting to create the world, the factors inducing him to act atthe critical moment would regress infinitely. For, ifthe world were created, the creator would, up to the moment of creating the world, have been a “potential creator.” and something would have 2 pnove, a. 1. Ot bel, p66 Guide, 180. °K’ al:Tbid, eR. MeCathy (Bora, 1987), 9.30 2K. guar iabor (Hyderabad, 1939), pp 33, 43 Ab al-Barkat includes the pola tt the sity would have been “le for an erty. "Hayy bo Yagdhdn, ed, and tans. G. Gator (sire, 1996), Arabic tox, p82: French leansation, pp. 626 English anslation with pagination of he Arabic indicate Hayy Ib Yayo, ‘tans, L. Gorsiman (New York, 1972) 3. abKasif ed. M. Mucler (Munich, 1859), p. 31; German tansation with pagination of the Arabi indeale: Philosophie und Theologi von Averoet ans. M. Mul (Muni, 187) “Physic. im Opera Omnia, ed. A. Borget, Vo i (Pas, 1890, Vil 1 chap. 1146). De Penta, 3. ac. 173) auhasa (Cao, 1908), p. 9 siamo ba Shem (Leipag, 1866), Vb 18, p. 37. "Es flay. e. F Delivseh (Leigng, 1840) hap. 7 Or ha Shem, Mi, Myler (erie, has, 62),.V1, (1), quoting what appears to be Ghazal, Tai Ful, Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 55 had to “activate” him, But the activating factor would, before inducing the creator to ereate the world, have been a “potential” activating factor, and hence would have stood in necd of a prior factor to activate it as well, And the prior factor would in its tra also have had 10 be activated. The supposition of ereation therefore leads to an intinile regress of factors activating the creator. Since an infinite regress of causes is absurd,"” the world, Proclus concludes, must be ternal." ‘Argumentation of the same type is alluded to and forestalled, as ina previous instance,*? by Bagillint. He explains that the creator cannot be understood 10 have created the world “fora reason” (lila), since the “reason” forthe world’s jon would have been absent up until the moment of ereation and would only then have come into existence. Its coming int existence at the moment of ereation could only have been due (9a different reason; and the reasons forthe ereation fof the world would regress infinitely"? “Abd al-Jabbar records an argument for clernity according to which the creator's becoming active ater having been inac- tive would have to be due to a factor (mand). The factor’s being present and ‘operative precisely at the moment of creation would have to be duc to another factor, and it, in turn, to yet another. Therefore, the argument concludes, the assumption of creation implies an infinite regress of causes, and is absurd.** ‘Averroes defends the doctrine of eternity, writing: Ifthe creator be assumed to have “acted at a given time and not at another, some cause would have had to assign him the one state as distinet from the other” But then an additional cause ‘would have to be responsible for the cause’s being present atthe critical moment, and so forth ad infinitum. The thesis of ereation is consequently absurd.** In a separate passage, Averroes contends in a similar vein that to assume a beginning, ‘of motion in the universe would imply an infinite regress of movers, which is absurd."© That argument is Iter recorded by Gersonides."7 The Kalam writers were fond of the notion that when events might take more than a single course, something must tp the scales between the equivalent pos- sibilities and determine the course that is taken.**'The notion of sipping the scales is employed now by several Kalam writers in restating their opponents” argument that creation would imply an infinite regress of motivating factors. Ghazali has, "sco bow, pp. 281, 397 Que by Pops, De Acternate, pp. 82-43, “abwve, 29 ‘i Kal Tami, pp. 31-32. “Sharh a Usa (Cai, 1965), p. 118, Rou Kai. p30. “pine of Metepsics, ch an trans C. Quis Rodger (Mate, 1919). 1V, 88: German translation: Die Epitome der Menphyik der Avrror, ans. 8. van den Bergh (Leiden. 192. pp 15-106, Ts argument che related tthe argument foes mio, discussed inthe pevios shaper aathamot ha Sem, V1 8 p29. C1 lo 16256 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God the adherents of eternity reason: The world’s being produced at a given moment would require the presence at the given moment of a “factor tipping the scales” (nurajjh) in favor ofthe creator's acting. The presence of the factor at just the required moment would demand another factor to tip the scales in favor of it ‘and so on aad infinitum. But an infinite regress of causes is inadmissible; hence the assumption of creation is inadmissible.” Similar formulations are recorded by Fakir alDin al-Razi,"° Amii,®" and Ij. And Razi and Ijt describe the argument that creation would imply an infinite regress of factors tipping the scales asthe “pillar” of the adherents of eternity. Resumé ‘A progression can be discerned. As far back as Parmenides we find the thought that no given moment in the undifferentiated stretch of eternity could, in pret crence to any other, have lent itself to the world’s coming into existence. The argumeat thereupon developed that no given moment could have recommended. itself tothe creator as the proper moment for him to create the world. A number ‘of medieval philosophers offer that version, usually through the’ medium of a thetorical question, An even larger number offer a version into which the element of motivation is introduced. The thinking here is that no imaginable motive could have induced the ereator to act and create the world at one given moment rather than another. Finally, the element of an infinite regress is added by Proclus nd by a line of medieval philosophers who ate probably dependent directly or indireetly on him. They contend that the factors, or reasons, or causes, or factors tipping the scales, which would have led the creator to create the world ata given ‘moment would regress infinitely. Since an infinite repress of causes is impossible, the creation of the world is impossible as well. (b) The argument from the unchangeability of the cause of the universe Should an unchangeable cause of the existence of the universe be presup- posed, an argument for eternity can be framed which runs: An unchangeable ‘cause is known to be responsible for the existence of the universe, But an unchangeable cause would not pass from a state of inaction toa state of action. ‘The cause of the universe cannot, therefore, have acted to bring its effect into existence after having failed to do so, and the universe must be eternal. The argument can also be put in a hypothetical form, although, it must be confessed, actual instances of the hypothetical form are not the rule. Put hypothetically, the argument would go: On the assumption of creation, the universe must have been brought into existence by a cause. The ultimate and true cause of the coming into aha ala, 1, 883, 8; English aston 1 °K rb in Hyerabad, 1934), p. 2, Ghia a Maram (Cito, 1971), 285, Msg Caro, 1907), Vi, pp- 228-229. Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 7 existence of the universe would have to be unchangeable, For if the immediate ceause of the universe's coming into existence underwent change, it would be dependent on whatever produced the change; if what produced the change under- went change, it would in its turn be dependent upon something else; and unless ‘an unchangeable cause should be reached, nothing would be truly and ultimately responsible forthe universe’s coming into existence. ** The assumption of creation implies, then, an ultimate cause that is unchangeable. Yet the assumption equally implies thatthe cause ultimately responsible for the universe's coming into exis tence did change inasmuch as it passed from a slate of not acting to a state of, acting. Creation thus embodies a self-contradiction and is untenable, and the ‘universe cannot have been created but must be elernal "The argument from the unchangeability ofthe cause of the universe, especially ‘when formulated hypothetically, resembles and could well have been suggested by @ strand in Aristotle's proo! of the eternity of motion, a proof that will be recalled from the preceding chapter. At one stage of that proof Aristotle reduced the assumption of an absolute beginning of motion to absurdity by looking atthe relationship between the cause producing, and the body performing, the supposed first motion or change. The relationship between what produces and what per- forms the supposed first motion would, he reasoned, have had to change before the motion could occur; and the motion or change assumed to be absolutely first ‘would, consequently, not be first after all. The argument we are presently ‘examining, the argument from the unchangeability of the cause of the universe, looks, for its part, not atthe relationship between the cause of the universe and the universe, but at the cause alone. The argument reduces the assumption of a beginning of the universe to absurdity by showing that the assumption would imply a change inthe cause ultimately responsible for creation, whereas anything. subject to change could not after all be an ultimately responsible cause. The argument from the unchangeability of the cause of the universe can also be seen as an extension of the proof examined under the previous heading, the argument that no given moment could have suggested itself to the ereator as the proper moment (0 act In the argument from the unchangeability of the cause of the universe, the impossibility ofan infinite regress can explain—although other explanations are possible too"—why the cause ultimately responsible for the cxistence of the universe would have to be unchangeable: The unchangeability of the ultimate cause must be posited in order to avoid an infinite regress of changeable causes. Creation is thereupon found to be untenable because it would imply that a cause which must be unchangeable nevertheless changes. Inthe final version of the proof examined under the previous heading, the contention was, ‘more simply, that a cause of the universe could not act to bring the world into Pct. below, p. 397 above, pp. 19-20. Sc, lor exarple, Prot’ argueat inmeulatey below58 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God existence at a given moment because the factors inducing the cause to act would ogress infnitely.°* The present argument gocs beyond the previous one in only a single detail, The unchangeabilty of the cause of the universe is explicit here but not there. “The argument for eternity from the unchangeability ofthe cause ofthe universe jis found in Proclus, who defended the eternity of the universe by reasoning: The ‘cause of the universe must be “immovable.” For were it subject to motion, it would pass from a state wherein it was “imperfect” to a state wherein it was “perfect,” which is inconceivable in regard to the highest being. And it would ‘moreover “stand in need of time,” which is inconceivable in the being that isthe cause of everything outside itself, including time, But if “an agent is immovable, itis unchangeable; and if unchangeable, it. . [cannot] pass . . . from [a state cof] not acting to [a state of] acting. .. . Therefore, if something . . . is an immovable cause of something else . .. it is so eternally . . . and ifthe cause of the universe is immovable . . . the universe must be cternal.”*” In the Middle Ages, the argument for eternity from the unchangeability of the cause of the universe was employed or recorded by Avicenna,"* Ibn Hazm, Shalirastant in his paraphrase of Proclus,” Shahastant in his account of Aristotle's philosophy." and Averroes. Averroes” formulation runs: The assumption of creation entails, either that things come into existence spontancously, which is absurd: or else that the agent bringing the world into existence underwent “change and hence stood in nocd of an agent apart from itself to bring about the change.” On the later allernative, the second agent would stand in need of a further agent; and we ‘would be left in the end with no “frst agent” who is responsible for the world’s coming into existence, The creation of the world is accordingly untenable and the world must be eternal." Sometimes the concepts of potentiality and actuality are called into play. On the hypothesis of creation, the reasoning goes, the creator would have passed from the state of being a potential ereator to the state of being an actual creator: such a transition would be a change; but change is impossible for the cause of S above, pp 4-55. uote By Pilaponas, De Acternite, pp. $$~S6. Tis sony part of Prot argunent andthe et i ean unde the next heading, The notion that the unchangeability ofthe dty implies the eternity of the work leo appear in ocr profs of Proc sce Piopoms, bid p42, 608 “Ssh Mayas, p. 376. °K. al Fal aia, (Caro, 19, ,p. 20 Spanish ransation: Abenizem de Cordoba 1 Historia Crhica de las Ideas Rliioae, was. M. Asi Palacios, VoL IY (Maid, 1928), pp. 113th Kabila wiih, p. 389K. Niki a qd, p46, Kabila aha, p.320 rahi ab Taba, 1p Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 9 the universe: and hence creation is impossible. That formulation is recorded by Sharastin,” Albertus Magrus,** Bonaventure, Aquinas.®” Gersonides."* Aaron ben Elijah” Creseas.”” and Abavancl.”! Maimonides,” and Aquinas! record a truncated version, which runs: Ifthe world had been created, the creator would have passed from state of potentiality to a state of actuality; something would have had to bring about the transition; and nothing could possible bring about a transition from potentiality to actuality in the eause of the universe, The reason \why no transition from potentiality o actuality can be brought about in the cause ofthe universe is not stated. Very likely, the intended reason is thatthe cause of the universe must be unchangeable.” But the reason could equally be—as inthe {inal version ofthe proot examined under the previous heading”*—that the act vating factors would regress infinitely. And. since the eternal actuality of the timate cause had been established by Aristotle and other philosophers.” the reason could also be that the eause of the universe is always in a sate of pure actuality, In faet, these ostensibly different reasons are interconnected. The impossibility ofan infinite regress of aetivatng factors can serve as grounds both for the unchangeabilty, and the eternal actuality ofthe ultimate cause;”” and the Uunchangeabilty ofthe ultimate cause both entail, and is entailed by. its state of ‘ternal actuality.” All three principles—the impossibility of an infinite regress, the unchangeability ofthe eause ofthe universe, and the eternal state of actuality ofthe cause of the universe—were commonplace in the Middle Ages, and any Cr all of them eould easily have been taken for granted. Sc the spun of Proc’ iscssed unr the previous healg, abv p. 5. Pilon, be Acteriae,p. #2, ques an agament fom anther work of Pros” wo the effec hati the ‘wold wor erent theres woul have Been na sat ately, ahonce npefet before econ ata eal Mill me Nia, p. 339: K. Nike lgdim, 4. Shavasl is paraphrasing the argument of Prive wiv cl sete peviows aling, above, pp. 4-85. “Sphaies Vl te chap. 1 “Commentary ont Sentences. dp Aya 1a. 2 De Morena, a. 3. ac. 1702) **MalnamothiShem, VI, 5 28. p- 393 6 Haim, chap. 7. Pana, MI Guide, 45) Summa contra Gates. I, 3202), 2epgoinas eves this eatoncleewbere: above, n 67. above, 58 ™ aisle. Menpsice XI, 6 1071, 20; blow, p. 347. Ga avoi an ante regres of cases, ast cause must be posted which cher changeable ort oa asl on psa actly, A cue that st subj to change wilalways be ins sate facta ad anything hat is lernally atl wil never changeC Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God ‘The argumentation thus far has been thatthe ultimate cause of the universe rust, in general, be unchangeable and consequently could not pass from inaction to action, Several variations are in evidenee as well, each of which directs its ‘attention to @ respect wherein the cause of the universe would have to be unchangeable. One variation appears in Augustine,” Proclus,#” Maimonides,** ‘Agron ben Elijah, and Gersonides.? Proclus argues, and the others record the ‘argument, that the decision to ereate the world at a particular moment would constitute a change in God's will, Inasmuch, however, as God's will must be identical with his essence, and his essence is unchangeable, his will must be ‘unchangeable. God consequently could not have decided to ereate the world after having filed to make the decision, and the world must be cternal, According to another variation, reported by “Abd al-Jabbar, creation would imply a change in God's *knowiedge,” hence “a change in his state"; for the creator would have spent an eternity without knowing that the world exists, ‘whereupon, at the moment of creation, he would acquire a new item of knowl edge, the knowledge that the world does exist. But since God is not changeable, his knowledge is not changeable. Thercfore the external object of his knowledge, the universe, is unchangeable and rust have existed forever.®® Still another variation was probably inspired by Aristotle's point that the assumption ofa beginning of motion would imply a prior change in the relation- ship between the cause producing, and the object performing, the supposed abso- lutey first motion.® Creseas records an argument concerned not with the change of relationship which would precede ereation but with the change of relationship ‘hich would result. The argument i that on the assumption of creation, the cause of the univers, or the deity, would enter a new relationship; for before creation he would not have had a relation tothe universe, whereas subsequently he would. But a change in the creators relationship to the world would entail a change in himself, which is an impossibility. Consequently, ereation is an impossibility.” ‘The argument is repeated by Abravancl.** Cty of Gad. XU 18 Quoted ty Priloponts, De Aeterna, 9. S60. "Guide, M186) 1, Ee asym, chap. 7. atmos ha-Shen, VA i 1, p. 37 The reason stat the essence of te Fat cause mms be absolutely simple, Ci, Plt, Enneads, VI, 13. On the question whether an Arittlian o Pinan diy cen properly be ‘ire a having wil, see. Zaller, Die Pilorophe der Griechen, Vo. H, Par? (th 0, Leipzig. 1921, pp. 368-370; I 2 (Sth ed; Leipzig, 1923), pp. 539540 "Sharkal-Usl,. 117. ‘Abdal lab des no explain bow the aubors ofthe agement would narmonize the uncbangesbiliy of God's Knowledge withthe contant changes inthe objects of Hs ‘Lolege within an trl universe. Reatoning smile o tht recoded by “Abd a Ish appears in Khayyt, Kobi ed. and ans. A. Nader (Beirut, 1957), 971 Above, p19. Sor haem i nal, Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 6 In sum, it was argued that creation would imply a change in the cause of the universe, or a change in his will, oF in his knowledge, or in his relationship 10 the world; but a change of any sort is impossible inthe cause of the universe; therefore the creation of the world is impossible. ‘Arguments from Gods eternal attributes ‘An argument for eternity from the attribute of divine goodness™ was known fo Augustine. He portrays the Stoics as defending their peculiar theory of an cternity of world cycles—as distinct from the eternity of a single world—on the ‘grounds that God's “goodness” could never have been “inoperative”: since God's goodness must always have been in operation, the reasoning went, these must always have existed an expression of his goodness, that is to say, a world. AA similar argument appears in a more fully developed form in Proclus, who characterizes it asthe “most convincing . . . demonstration”? of the eternity of the world, The original Greek text of the passage in Proclus is lost, but Philo- ‘ponus" refutation has been preserved inthe original Greck, and a medieval Arabic translation of Proclus has also been preserved. Philoponus’ refutation indicates that the argument had originally ken God's gooxness—together with his power— as its premise.®” In the medieval Arabic translation, however, a small change has bbeen made and the proof rests on God's beneficence (jad), together with His power, Proclus, as refracted through the Arabic translation, lays down the proposition that “when an agent does not act, he fils to act either beciuse he does not wish to of because he is unable to." In the issue at hand, the world’s coming into cexistenee, itis impossible that the agent should not have wished to act. For itis unimaginable that the supreme being should be merely “sometimes beneficent awa), sometimes not.” He undoubtedly is “eternally beneficent”; and, being, cternally beneficent, he must eternally “wish the universe to resemble him,” to cexist and be good, even as he exists and is good." The impossibility that the ity should not have wished to bring the world into existence is matched by the "The sons in which he deity can have trite, andthe proper manner of construing terms predicated of him, were of courte perennial and much dsbuts! questions. CF H. Wolfson, Philo. ol 1 (Csibridge, Mass. 1988), pp. 149-168; hem, Suds in the History of Philosophy and Relision, Vl (Cabs, Mass, 1973). pp 98-169; en, Philesophy ofthe Kalam Came. Mass 1976), pp. 112-234 “= rhat Gals goes & the source ofthe eisene of things outside of Ga was tenet of Platonic and Neoplntonie philesophy. Soe Plato, Republic, 5090: Psims, Ennead. V, 8, 10:1 [Arabic paraphrase: Points pad Araber, ed A- Badawi (Caio, 1988). p. 182; Pros, Elements ff Theology. E. rahi (Oxtor, 1963), $12, Aristo, for bis pst, caratrized the prime mover 1 supremely god, Setaplsics XM, 7 apd 9 City of God, XI 18. In Had, Neoplatoncl apd Arabs, pM "De Aeteritate, p13 ef pasin. CF Pato, Timaeus, 29,oe Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God Jinpossiblity that he should be ineapable of accomplishing what be wishes. Inas- rch as the deity must have wished eternally to bring the universe into existence and must, moreover be eternally able to effect what he wishes, he nist have brought the universe into existence eternally.” Unlike the Stoie arguments in ‘Augustin’s report, Procus’ argument concludes that G's benetcenee—witch perfore produces something as similar to God as possible—nust single eternal universe, as distinct from an eternal succession of universes. Vie- tualy all medieval arguments from the eternal divine aributes likewise eonelu+ ded that Go’ attributes must ive rise toa single eternal univers In Arabic, the argument for eternity from the benefieence of the fist cause is common. The adherents of eternity, “Abd Jabbar explains, “base their thesis” on, among other things, the premise “that the creator is eternally beneficent.” If God were not eternally beneficent, "he would be sometimes beneficent and at ‘other times not beneficent . . . (but) niggardly.° [which is unimaginable}, Once te foregoing is established, the eternal existence of the world follows." The argument from God's “beneficence” is alluded to by Avicenna.” and is found ia tpn arm.” in Shabratin’s paraphrase of Proclus, in Fakhiral-Dina Amid", and Leone Ebreo."™ Aquinas records an argu. ‘ein which infers the eternity ofthe word from God's “most perfet” and “infinite goodness." ‘Te prof fr cterity from the dety’s eternal attributes. like the other prools for eternity, exhibits a numberof variations. In each variation an eternal atibute of God is shown to express itself eternally in the existence ofthe workd, God's knowledge, his wisdom, his perfection in general, and his character as Lord of the universe, all being brought into play as grounds for eternity. “Abd al-Sabbir, for example, takes up an argument to the effect that God cannot have brought the world into existene through the “inducement of need (dar al-hj), since he is self-sufficient and immune from need." God could ony have brought the tniverse into existence through the “inducement of wisdom" (da al-hukma). God's wisdom comprises “his knowledge ofthe goodness of the world and his knowledge of the benefit others will derive from it, That tknowledge} is frm Je tise t0 8 tm Badawi, Neplatonet apud Arabs, p. 34 Far the doctie tht the deity sie of “grudging” (g05v06), see Pao, Phaedra. 247A; Timacus, 29: Aste, Mewphsies I, 2, 983 2 Piloponss, De Acer. p13, A. sla fal Tk, 3. Houben Sct, 1969, p65 sia: p.380 "°K aba fail, |, p. 20. The passage is quoted below, p. 64 °K Mia wa bNiel, p. 39; K Maya atgdam, p45 1K obtrban, p50 Gaya alMardn. . 266 ewieif. VIl, p20. Diaoghi Amore, 9.238 Summa conra Gentle, I, 32) CF De Ptema. 3, art 17 (1, "Tas pt ofthe arguncat is elated wo the arguments Uscsse above, pp. 53-S4 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 63 Aheough eternity, And cteraity” "Here the contention is that God's eternal wisdom and knowledge woul require him to produce the world eternally, Aquinas fas a kine arg crefore the existence of the world is necessary through | perhaps confuses two notions, the notion that Goals mont, whieh intert is ternal knowledge is the cause ofthe universe and the notion that true knowledge ‘mirsors objects in the external world. Aquinas’ version reads: “God is the cause of things through his knowledge.” Knowledge is “relative” tothe thing known:!" for knowledge and the object of rnowledge “exist together by nature truc know! cedge occurring solely when something actually exists to serve as its object. God's knowledge of what is brought into existence through his knowledge accordingly requires, for it to be true knowledge, thatthe things in question actually exist ‘And inasmuch as "God's knowledge is eternal, things apparently are prexluced by him from eternity "™ "The notion that true knowledge must mirror objects in the external world also plays a role in a passage where Gersonides, followed by Crescas and Abravai, speculates about the underlying considerations leading Aristotle to the doctrine ‘of eternity, Gersonides observes that “an intelligible thought corresponding 10 ro object oulside the mind would soom necessarily to be false.” But "God is the Limteligible| order [nimus of the universe”; that is to say, God's thought, which is identical with his essence, comprises a mental representation of the universe ‘Aristotle concluded herefrom, in Gersonides’ reconstruction, thatthe actual and external order of the universe must exist whenever God and his thowght—which ‘comprises the intelligible order ofthe universe—exist, God consequently “could not exist without the universe,” and since God is eternal, the universe must be eternal." ‘Another ground adduced for the eternity of the world was the broad attribute Of divine perfection. Averraes writes that since God is perfect, he cannot “| to perform the superior act and perform instead the lesser act; for that would be ‘a defect” in him. It would surely be the “greatest defect” in “the eternal agent, whose existence and act are [in fact] unlimited, . . . were his act to be limited and finite.” God's act, the causation he exercises vis-a-vis the universe," must, therefore, be infinite in duration, and the universe, which is the product of his ‘causation, must be eternal." Eternity could, as has been seen, be inferred from the attribute of divine perfection or from the attribute of divine wisdom, Maimonides, followed by Sharh asap. 6 "anc Arist, Ties 1, 1, 128, we Potente, 3,28. 741). crsonies,Milbamot h-Shem, WI, ic 3, 302; Crseas, Or haem, Nic (vry ch stevie; Abravanel, AU? aft. VE 1 (copying fom Cress) Tivjq Aves" view, God's causation i primary in theres of muon: ut. asa cause of ‘maton, Ged also te cause of the eistenee ofthe universe. See below, pp. 325-326. 341, ih a Tau. p=.o Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God ‘Albertus Magnus, shows how eternity might be inferred from the two attributes conjintly. The adherents of eternity, Maimonides reports, argued that since “God's acts are perfect and contain no defect,” and God makes “everything as perfect ascan be," our “universe must be the most perfect possible." The existence of the world lows, moreover, from God's wisdom, which undoubtedly maxi- mizes the perfection of the world. God's wisdom is, in its turn, “identical with his essence" and hence “eternal.” so that the maximum measure of existence it could bring forth is eternal existence. The world, as the most perfect possible product of God's eternal wisdom, must likewise be eternal." Proclus” argument for eternity from the deity’s goodness or beneficence had cited the attribute of divine power side by side with the attribute of divine good- ness. Proclus had reasoned that since God is good and beneficent, he could not {ail to wish the existence of the world; and since God is powerful he could not fail to accomplish what he wishes." Ibn Hazm knows of a singularly spare argument combining not two but three divine attributes: “[The proponents of eternity] affirm that the cause ofthe creator's act is his beneficence, wisdom, and power; he is always beneficent, wise, and powerful; and seeing tht the cause of the world always exists, the world must always exist"! Coincidentally, Aquinas too records an argument combining the atributes of divine knowledge, divin power, and divine goodness. It runs: God is “not ignorant”—not lacking. in knowledge—and hence he must know how to produce the world from eternity. He is “not impotent"—not lacking in power—and hence he must be capable of producing the world from eternity, He is not “envious"—not lacking in ‘Roodness—and hence he must want to produce the world from eternity. The world must consequently be eternal." One more variation of the proof from the eternity of God's attributes was, suggested to Aquinas by a passage in which Augustine described God as “Lord from eternity." It might be argued, Aquinas observes, that since God is eter- nally the “Lord.” he must eternally have subjects with respect to whom he can be designated as the Lord; and a universe must therefore always exist.""® ‘The foregoing are arguments for eternity from God's eternal attributes. A further recurring argument consists inthe inference of the eternity ofthe universe from the deity’s being a cause, but the appropriate location of that argument in the classification scheme I am observing is not clear-cut. The argument posits thatthe deity is, by his nature, eternally a cause by virtue of itself or that he is Maimonides, Gide, A, 14(7); Alberts Magus. Physics, VI, 1, chap, Apove, pp. 61-82 SK aa fa Mil 1, 20, De Potent 3, act. 122), "augustine Cy of God, XM, 16: he quotation is not exc. The eons of De Pret ster 10 Augustine, De Trae, V. 16, bt I cou td a appropriate passage ther. "De Potena. qa. 172), Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 65 an eternally actual cause. Both those terms are convertible into unchangeable cause," and the argument from the deity’s being a cause may accordingly be as- similated to the argument from the unchangeability of the cause of the universe “The deity’ being a cause by his very nature may, however, also be regarded as 1 divine attribute, and the argument may accordingly be treated as an added variation of the proof from the eternal attributes of God. It can thus be plausibly assigned to either of two headings. In any event—and wherever the argument is best classified —the earliest instances I could discover are two passages in Proclus whore the deity’s character as an eternal cause appears not independently. but interwoven with other considerations “The first passage happens to be the one in which Proclus proved that the cause of the universe must be unchangeable." In the course of working out his proof forcterity from the unchangeability of the cause of the universe, Proclus explains that what is unchangeable cannot be a cause “sometimes.” IF it is a cause tall, it must be “a cause eternally”; and the cause of the universe, which is indeed known to be unchangeable, must eternally possess the character of being a cause. Having come this far, Proclus proceeds to the inference that is of interest here. He lays down the rule that an eternal cause is perforce “a cause of something eternal." Inasmuch as the eause ofthe universe is an eternal cause, and an eternal cause is a eause of something eternal the cause of the universe must, Protas coneludes, brings forth an eternal universe."2! The second pertinent passage in Proclus isthe one in which he has been seen to contend that creation would imply an infinite regress of factors activating the crcator.!2" The complete argument there takes the form ofa dilemma. The eretor, Proclus writes, was either once potential, whercupon he became actual, or else hhe was eternally actual. Ifthe former alternative were correct and the creator hhad once been potential the factors required to activate him would. as was seen caulir, regress infinitely, which is impossible. The latter alternative, then, remains, and the cause ofthe universe must be eternally actual. But Aristotle showed that “when... the cause is actual, the effect is ikewise actual."!?" Given Aristotle's proposition together with the proposition that *the creator is an eternally actual creator.” the eonclusion “ensues that his effect is likewise eternally actual” An eternally actual cause ofthe universe must bring an actual universe into existence eternally." In the Middle Ages, Ibn Hszm recorded an argument resembling the second of the (wo arguments just quoted from Proclus. Ibn Hazm's version takes the 1p something Shul exis exchively by vita of el, there would be mo Facto that coh ring i iat ae condi: and sinialy, A soning Is purely actual and completely fee of Patil, coal never be breil a new condition "Above, p88. "Quoted by Philopons, De Aeternitte, 9. So "Cr, above, pp S485 'Pisies 3, 198b, 1-18, 28. Also el. Pits, Emus. 1V.5, 7. "¥Quted by Pilopors, De Actertae, pp. 42136 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God form, again, of a dilemma: On the assumption of ereation, the creator brought the universe into existence either “by reason of himself (Ii-annahu) or... by reason of a cause [distinct from himself.” The later alternative is inadmissible us since it would imply an infinite regress of eauses inducing the creator to ae ‘The former alternative therefore remains, and the creator must have acted to produce the world “by reason of himself.” But a “cause is inseparable from its effect”; that isto say, when the cause is present, its effect is present. Inasmuch as the creator is a cause by reason of himself, he is a cause as long as he exists, and inasmuch as he exists eternally, he is a cause eternally. Consequently, effect, the universe, must also exist eternally." Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and record the same argument, formulated with the aid of the same dilemma?” ‘Avicenna is more direct. The most expeditious way of settling the issue of creation and eternity is, be maintains, through understanding that the deity is cause by virte of itself. “A cause by virtue of itself produces its effect by necessity (awjaba) so that whenever it exists, it acts. “If such a cause exists eternally, it acts to produce its effect eternally” Therefore, the eternal cause of the universe must produce an eternal universe. "8 Averroes drops the qualification “by virtue of itself,” and argues: When the agent “is eternal,” in other words, ‘when something is eternally an agent, “its action must be... eternal, and its effects must be eternal." Bonaventure and Aquinas know of an argument based on the deity’s being a “sufficient” cause, aterm akin to cause by reason of itself or cause by virtwe of itself. A sufficient cause is such that it does not require the aid of auxiliary causes ‘or conditions to accomplish its ends, which means that as soon as a “sufficient cause is given, its effect is given.” Since God is a sufficient cause and since he exists eternally, his effect, the conclusion goes, must also exist etermaly.'™” Besides the argument from God's being a sufficient cause, Aquinas records the contention that God's “action . .. must be eternal” because it “is identical with his sub- stance, which is eternal.” The conclusion again is that “the effect” of God's action, the universe, must be eternal.""" Fakhe al-Dio al-Razi has yet another version of the argument from the deity’s being an eternal cause. He describes the proponents of eternity as maintaining, in astonishingly good Kalam style, that to be an agent (mu'athihir) is not a “negative attribute” but an “eternal. .. positive attribute added to the essence.” ‘To be an agent, the thinking continues, isa “relative attribute” that is, an altibute implying a correlative." Since being an agent is both a positive and a relative Ct, stove,» $8 Ral abla. bp. "2. gerba’In, pp Al-2; Mawalf. VL 228-28, "Sa Mayas. 373. PR aKa p30, ponsventur, Commentary on Sentences, ia Ope Omni, Vl. (Quaacch, 1882), 4 peta. trq 2:Aquinae, Suma Theologian, 146, ae. 104.9 Summa contra Gemies 323) Suna Pheoogie, 146, at 1, 0b. 10: De Potent, 3 ac. 17) MCE, above, p63 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God a attribute, its presence impli the existence of a positive correlative, that is. an ‘actually existing corresponding effect. God's being an agent eternally thus implies the eternal existence of his effect the universe.""* Gersonides, followed by Creseas andl Abravane!, provides stil anoxher version, Medieval Aristotlians had been divided on the question whether the fist eause oF not identical wit the incorporeal mover of the outermost ne philosophers, most notably Avicenna, understood that the frst cause ofthe universe—the deity—is a being beyond the incorporeal mover of the outermost sphere;!™ but others understood thatthe highest being in ex tence, the deity, isthe mover ofthe outermost sphere, and that yond the movers ‘of the spheres nothing further exists, The second position was espoused by Aver- roes,!* and Gersonides naturally enough takes it to be the genuine position of Aristotle. Gersonides now speculates that one of the underlying considerations, ‘which lod Aristotle to his belie in eternity must have been his pestion regarding, the mover of the outer sphere. Aristotle's reasoning, as reconstructed by Ger- sonides, was that since the deity is by his nature the cause of the motion of the Coutermost celestial sphere, he could not exist without a sphere to move. The eternal existence ofthe first cause would imply the eternal existence of the sphere moved by him, and henee the eternity of the rest of the world as well, seeing that the existence of the rest of the world is entailed by the existence of the sphere." 2. Replies to proofs from the nature of the cause of the universe ‘The medieval advocates of ereation have no single comprehensive response 10 arguments for eternity from the nature of the cause of the universe similar to their comprehensive response to arguments from the nature of the world itself." ‘What we do find is that each of the three proofs from the nature of the cause of the universe elicits its own set of responses, and that some ancillary motifs recur in angwers to more than one proof. It is, I think, not unfair to add that the responses to arguments from the nature of the cause are less satisfactory than ‘were the responses 10 um ;guments from the nature of the world 1K, alleen, p49, "404 Avicenna, Sha: Habit, pp, 392-398, a0 '9¢¢ avcrmes, Lang Conmentry om Mevphyses, XM omen "°Gersonides.Mihuner haShem. VI. i 3, p- 302: Crescas. Or haem, i 1s Avan Miao. VI 1. Creseas at Abeavanel give the argument ina very abbreviated or CE ave, pp. 30-33 this in repaired hy Crees, Or Shen, 4 and S, and Abeavael MiP wht, Vie 3 (om. Ax a meas of escaping the agents for terry from the mature of the ease, Crescas inclines ards and Abravanel embrace, an ol bine tory (Geners Rabbah, 2) acoeing 1 which Goa contatally eetes and destroys a succession of wards. Se Or har Shm. ML iS MiP-aet, Vil 3400 5 (Abra! dsinguises sown theory of successive weld rom Ceseas™ ‘hoor. His lil tse, however, jul how the theory of soceaive works answers the ss fol he dee pros. Leone Eten, Dilgh«FAmore,p. 282, ais theory of successive wens“6 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God (a) Responses tothe arguntent that nothing could have Ted a creator to create the world ata particular moment ‘The proof, as willbe recalled, had several variations or stages. The proponents ‘of eternity argued that no given moment in an undifferentiated eternity could, in preference to any other, have suggested itself as the proper moment forthe ereator to create the universe; that there could be no imaginable motive for the creator to create the universe ata given moment; that the fators motivating the ereator to create the universe at a given moment would regress infinitely, whereas an infinite regress is impossible. Medieval responses to the proof in its several variations rest largely on the thesis thatthe creator brought the world into exis: tence through an exercise of will, the central thesis then being buttressed with secondary considerations. The central thesis as well as the secondary consider- ations can be discovered in Augustine and John Philoporus, either in contexts ‘where the two were replying to the present proof, or in contexts where they were replying to other proofs for eternity. "Augustine takes up the question how the creator might have ercated the workd ‘ata given moment in time as distinet from the infinite other identical moments ‘when the world could have been created. He does not so much answer the question as dismiss it, branding it as a sophism on the grounds that there was “no time” before ereation, and consequently the act of ereation cannot legitimately be spo- kon of as having eccurred in time at al." As for the question what the new factor might have been which induced the creator to act after not having acted for an eternity, Augustine denies that any factor need be posited. No new cit cumstances, he submits, induced the creator to create the world atthe moment ‘when he did. For God did not ereate the world “in accordance with a new [plan] but rather in accordance with an eternal plan," and in accordance with one and the same eternal and immutable wil” From all eterity God's will, determined the moment at which the world should come into existence. Through ‘one andthe same eternal plan, and one and the same eternal act of will, creatures “previously were not, as long as they were not”; “and they thereupon were,” 2 at what Augustine—despite his insistence that creation did not strictly occur in time at all—allows himself to style a given “time.” ™” In addition to thus respond ing to the arguments on their own merits, Augustine voices an ad hominert ani- rmadversion, It consists in applying the analogy between space and time, an analogy that advocates of ereation were eaticr seen to utilize when responding to arguments fo eternity from the nature of the world.'** Augustine is addressing "civ of Gol. Xl, 6: Confessions, XL, 30 ‘Cy of God. XI, 1S. ens in Si 8 Abo, pp. dl-A2 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God co) proponents of eternity who recognize a cause of the existence of the universe, and he contends that they, at least, do not have the right t pose difficulties regarding the moment chosen for creation. Such proponents of eternity must acknowledge that the deity has determined a location in space for the existence ‘of the finite physical world in preference to the infinite alternative places where the world might exist. Consistency would therefore require that they acknowledge the dety’s ability to determine a moment in eternity for the beginning of the cxistence ofthe world in preference to the infinite other moments when the world ‘might have begun to exist.° Augustine's position, in sum, is thatthe world cannot legitimately be described as having been created at a moment in time. No new factor motivated the creator toact, forthe previous nonexistence, and subsequent existence of the world were determined eternally and immutably through an eternal divine plan and an eternal fact of the divine will, Proponents of eternity who recognize a cause of the exis- tence of the universe cannot pose difficulties about the deity’s ability to create the world at one given moment in preference to other possible moments, since they must admit something analogous, namely the deity’s ability to produce the ‘world—albeit eternally—at a given place in preference to the other possible places where the world might exist John Philopoous was confident that the creation of the world was not merely defensible, but demonstrable,"* and his response to the proof for eternity we are ‘examining builds on his demonstration of creation. It must be recognized, Phil ‘oponus stresses, that ereation can be demonstrated and that the universe must hhave come into existence at some moment. It must further be recoenized that questions such as “why the universe did not come into existence earlier” ean be asked about every moment at which the world might have been created, Since the universe is Known to have come into existence at one moment or another, and since questions can be raised about whatever is assumed to have been the moment of creation, the questions, Philoponus holds, are pointless and can be dismissed. "7 Like Augustine, Philoponus explains that creation took place in conformity with an eternal decision of God's eternal will. Philoponus is answering Proclus, who, for his part, had also affirmed the cternity of God's will, but had inferred therefrom, in another proof for eternity than the one we are now examining, that the world is eternal. Proclus' reasoning had been that since the wosld exists by Virtue of God's will, which is cternal, it must likewise be efernal.'** In response, Philoponus insists upon the distinction between God's eternally willing that a thing should exist and his willing that the thing should exist eternally. Although iy of Gd. XI. S. sce below: . 9. pe Aeterna, pp A Ct above, 9.600 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God the adherents of creation do maintain that God willed the existence ofthe work from cteroity. this isnot identical with, nor does it entail, God's having willed the eternal existence of the world." To support the proposition that an eternal will Uifferent from Augustine's. He is adessing philosophers who acknowledge, as Philoponus understands Proclus to have done, thatthe divine willis responsible for whatever occurs in the universe. Those philosophers concede, in effect, that through a “single. . simple... . act of willing! the deity wills the occurrence ‘of myriad noneternal and changing events at given determinate moments in the ‘course of history. How, Philoponus marvels, can the same philosophers shrink from the proposition that God eternally willed the occurrence of an additional noneternal event at @ given moment, 19 wit, the coming into existence of the world as a whole?!" ‘The following motifs, to recapitulate, are brought into play by Augustine and Philoponus ether in answer specifically tothe proof for eternity we are presently examining or in answer t0 ober proofs. No moment in time can silly be described as having been chosen for ereation, inasmuch as there was no time before creation, ‘The creation of the world at a given moment came about in accordance with an eternal decision on the part ofthe creator. To will something cternally is not equivalent to willing its eternal existence. Once creation is con= clusively demonstrated, the question why one moment rather than another was ‘chosen becomes pointless, At any rate, proponents of eternity who recognize a cause of the existence of the universe perforce acknowledge that the deity is responsible for the existence of the world in a given location, as distinct from every other possible location where the world might exist. They can therefore hardly balk atthe thesis thatthe creator is capable of choosing a given moment forthe existence ofthe universe. Proponents of eternity who, moreover, recognize a being possessed of will which is the cause of everything occurring in the universe perforce acknowledge that an eternal unchanging will can decide upon the occurrence of given events at given moments; they therefore cannot balk at the thesis that an eternal unchanging will could decide upon the creation of the world as well at a given moment. In the Middle Ages, these motifs recur in varying combinations. “The question “Why did God not create the worl prior to the time” when he did is taken up by Stadia, And Saadia responds: Prior to creation “there was 10 time that could be asked about; furthermore, itis of the character of a voluntary agent to act when he wishes.”!*? determine none 1 events, Philoponas develops an a hominem devie De Actes, p. 566. "ppp SOB p. "pd pp $4686; $80. "Sadia, Ke ebm wl Wigit, ed 8. Landauer (Leiden, 1880), p_ 73 Enplish tan tain with pognation of Arabi indented: Boot of Bellefs and Options, as. S. Rosenla (New Hoven, 1%). Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God n Ghavali addresses the rhetorical question what could differentiate one specific Lim from carlicr and later times as the moment For ercation, and responds by referring to the ereator's will Is, he too expla rnd not merely divine will, precisely to differentiate between things that are similar in covery respect. Hence by the exercise of sheer will. God could selet one from ‘among. an infinite numiber of identical moments and designate it asthe moment for ereation. To support his assertion, Ghazali has recourse o the analogy between time and space. He observes, much as Augustine had done, that adherents of acknowleding wholly arbitrary determinations in the spatial of the north and south poles'** ata given pair of points on the celestial sphere is, inthe example he offers, wholly arbitrary seeing that any other pairof opposit points would be as suitable, Since Ghavali’s adversaries recognize that the frst cause, the deity, did arbitrarily determine a pair of points for the poles. how. he remonsrates. can they question the deity’ competence arbitrarily to determine 4 moment for the world to begin to exist?" Ghazali also responds to the argument thatthe factor “tipping the scales favor of ercation ata particular moment would have to have the scales tipped in its favor by a previous factor, and the later by yet another factor. ad infinitum ‘An eternal will, he maintains, is capable of determining that something should femain nonexistent up « & certain stage and only thereupon begin to exist: con- sequently, no faetor need have tipped the scales atthe critical moment." Ty support the assertion, Ghazali observes, as Philoponus had done, that his adver saris also trace myriad temporal events in the universe back to the eternal first cause of the universe. To grant that the eternal first cause is responsible forthe ‘occurrence of temporal events, even through intermediate causes ito grant that the frst cause is ultimately responsible for the moment at which each event jccurs. How then, Ghivali again remonstrates, can the proponents of eternity «question the ability of the eternal first cause to bring about one auitional non- cternal event ata determinate moment, namely the coming into existence of the entire universe?!" havali’s contentions reappear in Abi al-Barakat, who cites them in the name of “the creationists” The etcationsts, Abi al-Barakit informs us, answer their auversries by anaintaining thatthe divine will" is fully competent to difer= ceniate between things similar in every respect, such as identical moments; that the adherent of eterity too has to acknowledge arbitrary determinations made by God's will in the realm of space and should not shrink from arbitrary deter- tiation by God's wil inthe realm of time; that an eternal will can decide upon of the nature of will, who recngnize a cause of the existence of the universe cannot avoid m. The location ttt aye ois around which the eesti spheres we ‘Saha o-alf 1, $30, 38 English tataton pp. Hi, 2 yp. 8; Els raat, p 8 ‘sei. $49; English cansaion.p. 32, "S7Ghaval sted hs of wll in posaln Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 4 noneteral effect thatthe adherent of eternity trices events occurring at given ‘moments back tothe divine will and consequently should not question the com petence of the divine wil to bring the entire universe into existence ata given ‘moment.'** Abd al-Barakat was not in the least swayed by any of these consid- ‘erations and his belief in the eternity of the world remained unshaken.'*? Kalam writers coming after Ghazali were, however, confident thatthe proof for eternity under discussion had been refuted. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi takes up the «question: What tipped the scales in favor of creation ata particular moment? He responds that 90 factor had to “tip the scales” fr the selection of the moment ‘was accomplished exclusively by God's “will” The arbitrary selection of a moment for eretion, Rizk adds, is analogous to the arbitrary selection of a location for the stars onthe celestial spheres. Inasmuch a adherents of eternity acknowledge the ability of God's will in the spatial realm, to assign given locations to the stars in preference to othe possible locations, they cannot deny the ability of his will inthe temporal realm, to fix upon a given moment for creation in preference to others. The creation of the world at » given moment is, Razi observes in another work, analogous tothe emergence of sundry individual events at count- less moments through history. The adherents of eternity recognize that sundry temporal events do flow from the unchanging state of actuality ofthe frst case, albeit through intermediate causes; and they recognize that no factor standing behind the first cause tips the scales to activate him, since to assume such a factor would lead to an infinite egress. The adherents of eternity thereby acknowledge, in effect, thatthe frst cause is ultimately responsible for the moment at which cach temporal event occurs. How then can they question the ability ofthe first cause to determine a moment for one addtional event, the coming ino existence ofthe entire universe?" The argument that creation would involve an infinite regress of factors “tipping the scales” is also dealt with by Ami and fi, Amidi counters by reference to God's eternal “will? which determined “that the nonexistence ofthe work! would extend up 1" a particular moment and thatthe world would "come into existence at the moment when it did come into existence.” ji writes: “A voluntary agent” is capable of “tipping the seals ... in favor of one of to fequipollent) alter- natives within his power by pure will, with no need of an “inducing factor added to himself” And at any rat, the adherent of eteation isin no worse @ predicament than adherents of eternity who admit that the universe has a cause ‘The later acknowledge that individual “things daily coming into existence” are traceable back tothe eternal cause ofthe universe and that no factor intervenes Sl tabar pp. 38,4346 "Below. 75 Muha, 9. . "ig. abra'in,p-Sh "SSGhay aMardm, . 268 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God B 'o tip the scales and induce the eternal cause to act. They can han seruple at atributing the coming into existence of one more thing—the world in is entirety — to an ctermal cause, without the intervention of a factor tipping the scales." ‘Aquinas similarly espouses the theory, which he could have learned from either Augustine or Ghazali, that an eternal willis capable of deciding from eternity ‘when a noneternal product should come into existence, No new factor, he writes, ‘need have activated the ereator at the moment of creation. For God produced the ‘world through his “thought and will,” which are eternal, and they both eternally determined that the world should come into existence at the moment when it aa Maimonides aftirms thatthe ereator could act at a given moment without any xducement” (dai), prompting him to act, norany “preventive Factor” (mn) blocking his action up to the moment he acted; and Maimonides defends that position by setting forth the difference between two kinds of voluntary agent ‘The voluntary agents that act of fail o act because of inducing oF preventative factors are, he explains, agents that seck to attain “a purpose . . . external to the will itself” For example, a man is induced to build a house by factors outside his will, such as the weather or environment; and he may be prevented from building the house by factors outside himself, such as the absence of building materials. By contrast, the agent who acts “exclusively by will” is not affected by external factors, Nothing external to the will motivates such an agent, and nothing outside him prevents him from acting. He acts or refrains from acting ‘with absolute autonomy and exclusively as his will dictates; consequently, without external inducement, and exclusively as his will determined, he would be com petent to decide upon the moment for ereation,"** Aaron ben Elijah'™® responds to the argument that nothing could have induced the creator to create the world ata given moment in the same manner as Maimonides, In the foregoing instances, medieval adherents of creation explain away diffi- culties regarding the moment chosen for creation, Several medieval adherents of creation take the more radical step of branding their adversaries’ questions as illegitimate and disallowing the questions outright. Part of Augustine's response to difficulties regarding the moment chosen for creation was the consideration that before creation time did aot exist.” The thought reappears when Tusi—who hardly could have had any link, direct or indirect, 10 Augustine—addresses the familiar question; How could God have settled upon a moment for ereation in preference to the infinite other possible ‘moments when creation might have occurred? To handle the matter properly, *'Mawdgy, VU, 229-230. uma contra Gentes, 38. Guide, 142), "Es Mayyim, chap. 7.4 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God asserts, one must understand that time did not precede the existence ofthe world. ‘The supposed time before creation was imaginary.” not real, and any *differ- entiation” between moments before ereation is equally “imaginary.” ™ fn no true sense was a choice made between moments, and it i illegitimate even to ask how God could have seitled upon « particular moment." ‘Aquinas, in one passage, combines the consideration that time did not exist before creation with an application of the analogy between time and space. The ‘question why the creator should have chosen a given moment for creation, rather than any other, is compared by him to the question why God should have chosen to locate the world ata given spot in space, rather than any other. Outside the ‘world, Aquinas notes, there is no space, and to speak of places outside the world ‘where the world might have been located is illegitimate. Similarly, there was n0 time before creation, and to speak of moments before the existence ofthe world when the world might have come into existence is no less illegitimate. Questions regarding the time before creation, like those regarding space outside the world, may be dismissed." In Gersonides, the thesis that Goss eternal will eternally determined the moment for creation is joined with a consideration found earice in Philoponus,!” but presumably reached by Gersonides independently. Gersonides treats the Familiar problem: What might have led God to ereate the world atthe moment when he did? And the familiar solution is offered: The choice of a moment may be ascribed to God's eternal unchanging will. But Gersonides understood creation to be demonstrable and not merely defensible, whieh means that if a workd was to exit, it could not be eternal but had to be ereated."? That being so, he continues, the question why creation occurred ata given moment rather than any other loses legitimacy. Inasmuch as the workd must have come into existence at some moment, and inasmuch asthe question regarding the moment of ereation could have been raised regarding whatever moment God should have chosen, the question may be dismissed as pointless."”? ‘Thus far the adherents of ercation have cither answered or disallowed their adversaries’ questions regarding the possibility of a moment's being selected for ‘reation, Kalam writers perceived that the thrusts and parties over the possibilty ‘of a moment's being selected for creation could also be turned to a constructive end, The defense of the doctrine of ercation led almost invariably tothe creator's will an exercise of sheer will had to be assumed in onler to explain the selection CE. above, pp 41-82. "Gloss to Muhassul,p. 92. similar position is then by Litwin A cllection of Papers hich pased bene the Late Me Leite and Dr Clarke (Landen, 1717), M86 WSS Summa contra Gene, I, 3513. Prabove. . 68 Cr. pp 208-21, >Mithamot a Shim, Ve. 18, p. 37766. ti. 24. pp. 395-397. Alerts Magnus answers ‘questions abou he fairs icing the creator 1 at (CL above, m.A3) sa sii Faso ‘espe i that a ternal wor is imple, See Alberts, Plc, IM, te Ue chap. 14 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 15 of a moment for eration. As long as advocates of creation adopted a purely defensive attitude, will in Ge ereator remained nothing more than an assumption offered in support of another assumption. the assumption of ereation, ‘The Kalan school was, however, certain that ereation can be demonstrated eonclusively. ‘Aad once creation is demensteated, will in the eeator may be seen a its d= ‘onsirated corollary. For if the world is known to have been created, one out of an infinite number of ideatical moments is known to have been selected for ‘creation, and the creator, who selected the moment, is known to be possessed of will. The realization that will inthe creator is implied by the doctrine of ereation was incorporated into the standard Kalam procedure for proving the existence of God, which consisted ia demonstrating the eeation of the workd and inferring the existence of God from ereation."”* Inasmuch as the selection of a moment for ereation would imply wll inthe creator, Kalam thinkers could, after having proved creation, infer not merely the existence of a creator but the existence of 4 erealor possessed of wil The procedure of proving ereation and inferring therefrom not merely a deity. but a deity possessed of will. is employed by BBagilini,""8 “Abd al-Jabbér," Juwayni,"”” Ghazali!™ Riz!” Amidi,!™ ad ii" “The theory that @ moment for ereation could have been selected by God's ternal will elicited surrejoinders from Abd: al-Barakat and Averroes. Abi al arakit makes two points, only the second of which he regards as decisive. Adherents of eternity can, he writes, surrejoin by noting that whenever an agent resolves to do something in the future, “another resolution (‘aziina) or exercise ‘of will” is required to activate the agent when the awaited moment arrives, ‘The theory of eternal will does not, therefore, exempt the proponents of creation from, explaining what might have induced the creator to create the world when the ‘moment did artive for him to act. The second point made by Abii al-Barakat— and, in his view, the decisive one—is that effects are never deferred fortuitously. Whether a cause acts “through will or without will” its effect is delayed only. because of "a delicicncy i the causality” that is to say, either because “know!- edge... . strength, ... will” happen to be absent, or because “preventative factors” happen to interfere, Inasmuch as the deity lacks nothing needed for action and nothing ever hinders him from acting, his action can nowise be delayed Whatever he wills must be accomplished forthwith, and if he should will the existence of a universe, he could not help but bring a universe into existence immediately." SC. abone p. 2b, 1 °K al Kid 27 Sharh a Ue, p10, OK. abtrshad pp. 28-2. 2K lid aE" (ora, 1962), pp. LOT 102. °K abArain pp. A7-148, with anes. "Gv at Mardi, pA. 2K Mtb pp. M-38. 6... pp. 47— aoa VM, pp A28816 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God Both these points reappear in Averroes, who reasons: On the assumption that an eternal will predetermined the moment for the world to come into existence, anew “resolution 'azm), . .. which did not exist prior the moment in ques. tion would sil be required in onder thatthe eternal agent snd his eternal will should be activated. The theory of eternal will consequently does not exempt the ‘adherents of creation from the necessity of explaining what induced the creator to act atthe moment when he did.!® And in another work Averroes writes: No “delay” is conceivable between a “voluntary agent's resolution to act™ and his acting," nor is any delay conceivable between the “agent’s acting” and the appearance ofthe effect. Immediately upon God's resolution to produce the world, the world must have existed; and if God's resolution to produce the world is eternal the world cannot have come into existence later but must have existed from all etersity."** (6) Responses to the argument that creation would imply change inthe creator The second proof for eternity from the nature ofthe cause of the universe turns ‘on two propositions: the proposition that a cause ultimately responsible for the existence of the universe would have to be unchangeable, and the proposition that should creation be assumed, the cause ultimately responsible forthe existence ofthe universe would have undergone change in passing from inaction to action If, on the one hand, an ultimate cause of the universe must be unchangeable ‘whereas eration would, on the other hand, involve change inthe ultimate cause, the assumption of creation is untenable."™* The advocates of creation usually respond by inverting the reasoning. ‘They agree that the ultimate cause, oF deity, rust be unchangeable. But the line they take is that since the deity must be unchangeable, the act of creating the world would not, in his case, have const tuted a change ‘That response is offered by bn Hazm, who imparts to it a Kalam tinge “Alteration,” bn Hazm writes, “consists in something's coming into existence inthe subject of alteration which was not there before, with the result thatthe subject exchanges its [previous] attribute... for another” A situation ofthe sort is nt possible in God inasmuch as “he is never the subject of an atibute.” God accordingly cts or does not act “by virtue of his essence” and without change."*” Bonaventure employs similar language, although historical links with It Hazm cannot easily be supposed. When the deity produces something new, Bonaventure "aKa 9.31 'averroes obviously fusing the expression resolution tat sense tha exces a vlunary agents resolving to do what he sno eapabe of "Tokai al-Tehifut, I pp. 7-8. the English uansatio is ot satisfactory. What peat here In Averrocs as surejinerisecorded by Aquinas 8 an independent argument for cleat. Sunn conta Genes , 320), above, pp. 56-57 "Rafal fab ial, ,p. 2 Proofs of “rity from Nature of God n ‘maintains, nothing “is added” to him which was not there before; consequently, the act of ereation would not constitute change in God. ** ‘The same appeo so taken by Maimonides except that. as would be expected, Aristotelian terminology is now used, Maimonides deals with the ver- sion ofthe argument where creation is shown to involve a transition from poten- tiaity to actuality in the agent responsible for ereation, while the cause ultimately responsible for ereation could not undergo such a transition.'"” And Maimonides, replies: A transition from potentiality to actuality occurs, as all Aristoelians recognize," solely in material objects. Therefore when an incorporeal agent does produce something after not having done so. no passage from potentiality to actuality occurs in him.'®" Maimonides’ solution is repeated by Aaron ben Elijah.""? Another formulation is provided by Aquinas, but the burden is stil the same, "A new divine effect docs not,” in Aquinas’ words, “signify a new action in Goa; for God's action is identical with his essence” and hence is, like his sernally unchangeable. God could therefore produce a new effect with- coat undergoing change. One variation of the proof for eternity from the unchangeability of the cause of the universe concerned itself with will, the contention being that a change specifically in the creator's will would be implied by exeation."™* The advocates, ‘of creation respond here as they do to the basic argument. Maimonides and, following him, Aaron ben Elijah lay down the proposition that voluntary agents tundergo a change of will only when they are corporeal; for any comporeal vol- luntary agents act “to attain an external end,” henee their wills alone are moved by external inducing and preventative faetors.!"* By contrast, the will of an incorporeal agent, which secks no external end, is immune from change. So far, ‘of course, the advocates of eternity would concur; and they would conclude that an agent who is unaffected by circumstances outside himself and who is immune from change could not possibly decide at a particular moment to bring the world into existence. Maimonides and Aaron, however, conclude not that creation is impossible, but rather that creation would involve no change in the will of an incorporeal agent: Inasmuch as the will of an incorporeal agent is not moved by external factors, when—or if—an incorporeal agent did begin to bring the uni- verse into existence, his action would be accompanied by no change of will.'™ Commentary ol Sentences dhe. La Leg. 2,286. "wove, 9p. 58-89 ‘sce Zeer Die Pllasphie der Griechen, MH, 2, pp. 38-23, Guide 18) "Be Hasyn, hap. 7 "Suna coma Gentes, vAbane, 60 CH above, p73. Mune, Gide, M182); Aaron ben Eliah Es Havvim, chap 7. (1), CF, Be Poentia,g. 3, nt 17 (a 12.B Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God Another version ofthe argument from the unchangeabiity ofthe deity te that creation would involve a change of relationship in the ercator.” Crescas, ‘who gave that version, responds: “A new relationship does not constitutes change ‘of essence [in the case} of an incorporeal being."""* An incorporeal, as distinct from a corporeal, agent could asa consequence bring something new into exis tence and thereby enter a new relationship without undergoing any change in himself. The line taken by these adherents of ereation betrays more than a whiff of question begging. Their adversaries had pressed the plausible thought that if an agent never undergoes change he cannot conceivably do something he did not do before. In-responding, the adherents of ercation insist, as firmly as their ‘opponents, on the deity’s immunity from change. And they nowise reveal how an agent might begin doing something he previously did not do without changing. They circumvent the straightforward and obvious conclusion that the deity never ‘asses from the state of not creating the world tothe state of ercating it, and they assert instead that when the deity Joes pass fom the one state tothe other, he does so without changing. Philoponus and, in the Middle Ages, Shahrastini and Gersonides make a dif- ferent response, which—whether cogent or not—does come to grips with their ‘opponents’ argument. All three belong to the circle of philosophers who are confident that the cretion of the world can be demonstrated definitively. Taking the truth of creation and the impossibility of eternity as a premise, they explain The deity cterally wills the creation of the world (Philoponus and Gersonides) and is eternally an “actual creator” (Shahrastn), but since an eternal world is intrinsically impossible, the world cannot possibly be produced! by God from eternity, The world comes into existence as soon as it can, and the soonest it can come into existence is inthe finite past. God, thus, eternally and unchangeably wills the existence of the universe and is eternally in the state of ereating it; yet all that his cternal willing of the universe and his eternal act of creation gives rise tis a noneternal universe." ‘The response 1 one final version ofthe argument from the unchangeability of the deity may be mentioned. “Abd alJabbar recorded a version according to ‘which creation is inadmissible because it would imply a change in the creator's Knowiedge: the ereator would previously not know, and subsequently would Know, that the universe is in existence.” The response ‘Abd al-Jabbi makes is that knowledge of something not yet existent is nowise different from knowledge Above p60 Or ha Shem, l,i, 2. The pine etons ae corrupt and have oe coreecte with he aid of mantcrps of the et "ilopons, De Acteraite,p. 81 taken ogther with p. 8; Shabrastl Mia Fg, 47-48; Gersonies, Mihamot hae, V4 18, 9. 3TT xnav, p. 6. Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 9 of the same thing when i exists, ‘The assumption of ereation does not therefore, innply that any change occurred in the ereator’s knowkedge.2"" (c) Responses tothe arguments for eternity from God's eternal auribuies The contention here had been that God's atributes— including his character ‘of being a cause by his very nature. Universe, and therefore the eternity of his attributes entails the eternity of the universe. Rebuttals take three forms. The adherents of ereation deny thatthe attributes concerned are eternal attributes of God; they maintain that although God may possess the attributes eternally, the attributes do not necessarily express themselves by producing a universe eternally; or else they undertake to show that, it would be intrinsically impossible for God's attributes to express themselves in an eternal universe ‘The first form of response is to be found in “Abd alJabbar, who refuses to “concede that God is eternally beneficent"; and if God is not eternally beneticent, the eternity of the world plainly cannot be inferred from his benetivence.™”* Shabirastani’s thinking is more subtle, He denies that beneficence is an “essen- tial atribute added to the essence,” and interprets it instead “as an attribute of action” or “a relation The statement that God is beneficent means ao more than that God is an “agent”; and the statement that God “is sometimes beneficent, ‘sometimes no” means no more than that “he is sometimes an agent, soxnetimes not an agent.” Since the term agent and the attendant term beneficent have their reference not in God but in what he has produced, in the relation of the universe to God, nothing in God's essence could disclose whether he is eternally, or merely sometimes, benelicent. ‘The question whether God is, or is not, eternally benef cent and eternally an agent cannot, then, serve as a starting point for settling the issue of eternity and creation. On the contrary, that question is itself the “locus of dispute” between the proponents of creation and the proponents of eternity, and can be resolved only through settling the issue of eternity and creation on its own merits. The eternity of God's beneficence hinges on the eternity of the universe and not vice versa." Tova similar vein, Ami refuses to interpret divine beneficence as an “attribute ‘of perfection” in God, that is to say, a8 an attribute pertaining to the perfection ‘of God's essence and consequently cocternal therewith. Beneticence is “an ate ule of action” reducible to God's “being an agent” with no “end” or “profit” in ‘view. Amidi gives two reasons for not construing divine beneficence as an atsib- ‘ute of perfection. The proposition that beneficence is an “attribute of perfection” press themselves in the existence of the Sharh abi, p17 2 Aone, pp. 61-62, 6b 2K el an, 9.6 °K. Nita alga, p46. CE. ASH, Magar atone H. Riter(Ustanbul, 1929 1930). p- 18280 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God in God cannot, he writes, be accepted a priori since itis not an item “of necessary or immediate {knowledge]";25 and since there is no way in which it can be knovn a posterior cither, the proposition is groundless. Furthermore, and more importantly, beneficence could not possibly be an attribute of perfection in God. For if beneficence were such an attribute, God's perfection would be dependent on the existence of his creatures, who are the expression of his beneficence,2* and the “superior would acquire perfection through the inferior, which is absurd.” Seeing that boncficence is not an attribute of perfection and does not pertain to God's essence, the eternity of the world cannot be inferred from it.?”” Inthe instances to follow the adherents of ereation do not merely refuse to ‘admit the eternity ofthe attributes from which the eternity of the world had been inferred. They reuse to admit thatthe attributes or tats are in any sense pos- sessed by God. Ibn Hazm recorded an argument for eternity turning on the proposition that God could only have produced the world insofar as be is a cause “by reason of himself” If God produces the world insofar as he is a cause by “reason of himself,” the thinking went, his effect must have existed for as long ashe has himself existed. The response In Haz makes is that Gad does not act by “reason of himself" nor, indeed, “by reason of” anything whatsoever. God simply acts “as he wishes" to act. Sinee the proposition that God acts by reason of himself is false, nothing can be inferred from it.?” Gersonides reconstructed and ascribed to Aristotle an argument for eternity from the premise of the dety’s being the mover of the outermost sphere. The reconstructed reasoning was that since the deity is by his nature the mover of the outermost sphere, the sphere must exist as long as the deity exists." Ger- sonides responds by denying that the deity has the trait in question. It can be nhore, 9.63 Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 83 his thought are eternal, the actual universe must be eternal.2”* Aquinas and Gersonides make virtually identical replies tothe argument, God's knowledge and thought, they stess, isin no sense dependent on the world. being, instead. the eause of the world and prior thereto. Consequently, in Aquinas’ words: “God. can have knowledge even should the object of his knowledge not exist." And in Gersonides’ words: The *[intllgible] order may exist even if the existent things, whose existence can flow from that [intelligible] order do not exist."?* God could, that is to say, have eternal knowledge of what the universe would eventually be after it came into existence.” Aquinas recorded two additional arguments for eternity from the eternal at butes of God and he finds that those arguments also fail because the attributes they focus on, although belonging eternally God, do not imply eternity. One argument went: Since God is a sufficient cause from all eternity and since when- ever a “sufficient cause is given, its effect is given,” God's effect must exist from all eternity." In his reply, Aquinas has recourse to the thesis that the creator is a voluntary agent. ‘The “proper effect” of a voluntary cause, he writes, is an effect that comes about as “the will wills” that conforms to the “intention” of the agent. In other words. the proper effect is nothing other than what is willed. and if what a voluntary cause wills should be a noneternal product, a noncternal product and nothing else is the appropriate effect of the cause. An eternal, but voluntary suficient cause could produce a noneternal world no ess appropriately {han an eternal world." A similar response to the same argument for eternity is offered by Bonaventure.?”* ‘There was, finally, the argument that the world must be eternal because God is eternally the *Lord."® Aquinas responds by explaining that God is the Lord inthe sense of having the “power of governing” and not necessarily in the sense of actualy governing.?™ God therefore can be the Lord eternally although the universe does not exist eternally. bi De etn 3a ad 19). Again refers to Aro’ characterization of etan ings sensing “ngstes by nature; sce Categories 1.7, 1S. Tings existing tether by nature ate ‘hing sch hat either ane of he pir Ys ot eis the ther car exis, Gea’ Knowledge att the oct of is kaowledge pido wo mst the description: for Go's knowledge press the ‘word andy cans, whereas the converte 1 mt tue, Am that theresa “Gea cak hve nde even sol the jet of hs Knog mens.” pian Shem, Vice. 9p. 903-308 2, ‘A al abr’ regan ode argument ht creation would enti chang inthe creator's Anos: above, pp. 78-79 Anov, m6 2S ent Cees, 38 lad 3). CE, Sana Theolegiae . A6 a La 9: De ote Bar 17 (al. BeCommentary on I Sentences, p18. 142 above, p Be Potent, 3, 7982En Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God ‘The third form of response to arguments from the eternity of God's attributes, consists in showing that it would be utterly impossible for God's attributes to give rise to an eternal universe. Two procedures are in evidence: One rests on the intrinsic impossibility of an eternal universe, without qualification; the other, cn the intrinsic impossibility specifically of an eternal universe that has a cause of its existence. ‘The former procedure is employed by John Philoponus, who builds on his proof of creation, Proclus had argued that the eternity of the world is implied by the dcity's “goodness,” and Philoponus counters—as he and others had done ‘when answering some of the previous arguments for eternity” *—with the truism that God can produce only what is possible. Since it can be demonstrated defin- itively, so Philoponus understands, that an eternal world is absolutely impossible, even God could not produce such a world. The most that God could produce, the most his goodness could express itself in, is a created world. If an eternal ‘world is impossible, the eternity of God's goodness obviously cannot entail the eternity of the world. The same position is taken in the Middle Ages by Amid. In thé course of an elaborate rejoinder to the argument from God's “beneficence,” Armiat remarks that God's failure to produce the world from eternity betokens no lack of beneficence on his part; for the eternity of the world is demonstrably impossible,” and “there is no defect in failing to produce what is impossible."?* Ton Hazm employs the other procedure, the procedure resting not on the unqualified impossibility of the world’s being eternal, but on the impossibility that the world should be eternal and nevertheless have a cause of its existence. “To have a cause of existence and to be eternal are, Ibn Hazm explains, mutually exclusive, For “an effect is what passes from nonexistence to existence . . . and thus is tantamount to shat which comes into existence. The meaning of that which ‘comes into existence is that which does not exist and subsequently exists, something quite different from thar which is eternal.” To state that the world has 1 cause and is an effect, yet is eternal, is accordingly to enunciate a “total absurdity.” an absolute impossibility. And what is absolutely impossible lies out- side even the deity’ control. Now the argument from “divine beneficence, wis dom, and power” does acknowledge—in fact presupposes—that the world has a cause, that itis an effect, and hence that it has been brought into existence. Given this acknowledgment, the argument, far from establishing the eternity of the worl, falls into a blatant contradiction by concluding that the world is eterna. ‘The argument is therefore wholly invalid. Ibn Hazm's response tothe argument from divine beneficence, wisdom, and power, 2s outlined here, would apply, of Above, pp. 69,78 pe detente, p. 2°Cr, bet p. 1 Gaya al Marae, p. 270. 2K, ab Fal ali, lp. 20. Proofs of Eternity from Nature of God 85 ‘course, to any argument for elerity from God's eternal attributes, and indeed 10 any argument for cternity which presupposes a cause of the existence of the Shahrastant makes virtually the same response to the argument from God's beneficence as Ibn Hlazm.2® 3. Summary ‘The first argument for eternity from the nature of the cause of the universe reasoned that the ereator could not have selected a given moment for creation in preference to any other moment. The adherents of creation respond that although all moments before creation were equal, and no explanation can be provided for the creator's having chosen one in preference to another, a particular moment could have been sclected arbitrarily by God's eternal will. Subordinate consid cations are that there was no time before creation, hence no moment was strictly selected out of an infinite tine; that deist adherents of eternity are in the same predicament as the adherents of ereation, since they for their part must recognize arbitrary determinations by God in the spatial realm; that adherents of eternity who trace events occurring in the universe back to the divine will must recognize the ability of an eternal will-—albeit through intermediaries and within the frame- work of an already existing universe—to make determinations in the temporal realm; that once creation is demonstrated and the world is known to have come into existence at some moment, itis pointless to ask why creation took place at ‘certain moment rather than at another. ‘The second argument for eternity from the cause of the universe reasoned that an ultimate cause must be urchangeable, whereas creation would imply a tran- sition from inaction to action, and hence change, in the cause ultimately respon- sible for bringing the universe into existence. The adherents of creation usually respond by inverting the thinking; they assert that since the cause of the universe ‘must be unchangeable, creation would not, in his ease, imply change. An alter- native response is that the creator is eternally and unchangeably in the state of| bringing the world into existence, but since an eternal world is impossible, the world could come into existence no sooner than in the finite past. The third argument was that God's beneficence and other divine attributes express themselves in the existence of the world: and since they are eternal, the existence of the world, which is their expression, must likewise be eternal. The adherents of creation responc either by denying that God eternally bas the attri= butes in question; by denying thatthe attributes need express themselves in an eternal world; or by showing that it would be intrinsically impossible for the attributes to express themselves in an eternal word, 84 wihay abtgdam, p47.IV John Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation and Their Entry into Medieval Arabic Philosophy 1. Philoponus’ proofs of creation John Philoporus carefully distinguished the nogative task of refuting the argu- tmenis advanced by proponents of eternity from the positive task of proving creation." To accomplish te latter task, (0 prove creation, he drew up two sets ‘of proofs, one built around the impossibility of an infinite number, the other based ‘on the principle that a finite body can contain only finite power. Both sets of proofs are mentioned in Philoponus’ surviving works, but ony in passing Their systematic development was undertaken by Philoponus in atleast two works n0 longer extant: the Contra Aristotelem, and another brief work which was some how connected to it.? The Contra Aristotelem and the related work have been partially preserved in Simplicius’ commentaries on Aristotle and either they ot ‘Simplicius’ excerpts from them were, as will appear, accessible to the medieval ‘Arabic philosophers. Piloponus” first set of proofs for ereation comprises three arguments, each giving a different reason why an infinite series of past events is impossible, The conclusion in each instance is that the world cannot have existed for a infinite time but must have had a beginning "Yoh Pitponus, De Aeeritate Mundi Contra Prctun, ed. H. Rabe (Leipzig. 1899). 9.9 Sinplcivs, Canmentary on Physic, ed H, Del, Commenara i Avioelem Graea, Nol. X (Bein, 1895), p17, tp: S. Pines, “An Arabic Summary of a Lost Work of Jn Pilopoms” ante Oriental Stubs, (1972), 322. *pilopoas, De Aeterna, pp. ©=9, 328. °Reganting tha ref work and conection wih the Contra Avstelem, see H. Davison, “John Phiepas aba Source of Medieval Islamic ard Jewish Proofs of Creation Journal of the ‘Amerian Oriental Society EXXXIX (1960), 388-359, “Simplicius, Commentary on Phycs. pp. 1171 fC; Commentary an De Caco, el 1 Heiberg. CCommentaria in Aristoelom Grueca, No. VI Beri, 1894), pp. 28. 86 Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation 87 (1) The first of the three arguments pointedly draws from Aristotle. In the De Generatione et Corruprione, Philoponus recalls, Aristole rejected the thesis elements into each other “goes to infinity ‘straight line that is, the thesis that earth, for example, becomes water, water becomes air, air becomes fire, and fire, rather than reverting —circulsrly, as it » ar is transformed into a fifth type of element, and so on ad infinitum. One of Aristotle’s objections to the thesis in question was that at least some of the hypothetical infinite elements could come into existence only after an infinite umber of transformations, whereas—as Philoponus spells out Aristotle ‘meaning’ —*the infinite cannot be traversed.” so that the point never could be reached where those elements actually did come into existence. Consequently. at Teast some of the elements in the supposed infinite series could never exist, and i part ofthe series could never exist, the series itself could not be an actuality.” ‘Aristotle's reasoning is subtly turned by Philoponus against the assumption of the eterity ofthe world, Philoponus does not consider the transformations oecur- ring “in # stright line” through an infinite series of different types of physical clements. Instead he takes up the no less infinite series of transformations that. fn the assumption of eternity, necessarily have taken place circularly among the Four recognized types of elements, and linearly among individual elemental par- ticles, Philoponus reasons: The existence of a given particle of the clement fire must have been preceded by the generation of that fire from a particle of air. the ‘existence of the air must have been preceded by its generation from, let us s water, the water from either earth or air, and so on. In an eternal world, these transformations would constitute an infinite series. Now it is evident that an infinite number can neither “actually” exist nor be traversed. Therefore. in an ternal world, the infinite series of transformations leading up to the generation of a given particle of fre could never be completed, and the particle known to exist atthe present moment could never have come into existence. “The same argument,” Philoponus adds, “can be applied to other particular motions” as well that is, to the various series of transformations leading up to the emergence of whatever individuals exist in the world today.” In each instance, an infinite series of transformations would, on the assumption of eternity, have to be trv- cersed in order that what exists today might emerge “ct. Pitopones. Commentary on De Generation oH, Nie, Commentaria i Aristo Grveca, Wo. XIVI2 sin, 1872). p. 284 TCL. Aisle, De Generations ef Corrine Il, 8.3325, 2383, 12, The concep of incl setos appears nM 11- 3382, 8 The priciplethat an nie canoe be avers 1m ‘xvicily stl thy Arise ther, but is alae by his ebewbere in conection with bath the Spotl and nonspatialreains. C,H. Hone, dex Aristtlcn ti, 1870), p. 14. tines = Mand espovlly the relerences 10 Posterior Analties 1 22. X16, 6 al Phvics, 2040, 810 oto, 42653, 19, "implica, Commentary om Pies, pp. 1178-11788 Philoponus' Proofs of Creation ‘When Philoponus states the argument concisely, he rests it on the general rule that “the infinite cannot be traversed”; and the inference drawn is that if the “numberof individuals going up (vw) [into the past)” were infinite, the process ‘of generation could never have been traversed and "come down to each of ws."* ‘When Philoponus presented the argument more fully, so Simplicius informs us, he employed the same general rule but supplemented it with an additional rule. ‘The additional rule affirms that if something must be preceded by something else in order to be generated, then “the former will not be generated unless the latter is generated prior thereto” In other words, ifthe prior existence of y isa condition for the coming into existence of x, then x obviously will never come into existence unless y has already been in existence, The inference now drawn is that “if for the generation ofa given thing there must first exist an infinite number of things that are gencrated from one another, then the given thing cannot be generated"? If x cannot come into existence unless an infinite series of things has already ‘come into existence—a condition that cannot conceivably be fulilled—x will never come into existence. Students of Kant will observe the similarity to the ‘proof of the thesis of the first antinomy. ‘The upshot of Philoponus” frst proof of creation is that transformations in the sublunar world cannot be “conceived to precede one another infinitely” but must hhave a beginning; and since the translunar world is inextricably connected with the sublunar world, "it too must have a beginning, {acit)Philoponus” second argument for creation from the impossibility of an infinite number employs a principle which although apparently not strictly Aris- totelin," does appear inthe Peripatetic tradition. The principle affirms that since an infinite cannot conceivably be exceeded, one infinite cannot be greater than another." Philoponus applies the principle thus: “Since motions yet to be gen- erated, when added to those already generated, increase their number, and since, moreover, the infinite cannot be increased, it follows that the motions already sceumulated cannot be infinite"™ That is to say, each new movement in the sublunar world and each new revolution ofthe celestial spheres ada tothe rumber that has gone before. Ifthe number that has gone before should be infinite, each new movement would add to an infinite number. But the infinite cannot be increased. *Prtoporus, De Aeterniate, pp. 10-11; ef 8s Commentary on Phys, ed. H. Vitel, Com imentara in Arittlem Groce, Nol. XV% (Bedi, 1857), pp. 428-429. *simpicia, Commentary on Phir. 1178. Op. 1199, Piloporus is reported tohave spoken of “going backup vob)” zoo theif, "SCY, arse, De Culo I 3; Piloponus, a reported by Simplicas, Commentary on Physics. P17, Simplicius, Commentary on Physics, p. 1179. "Sta fat, Physics, 6, 2072, 1. sers to state the contrary "Aletander of Aphrodisia, Aporiai eT Bruns, Commentaria in Avistotelem Graec, Supple: mentary Vol. 112 (erin, 1892, Il, 12, p. 103. Alexander observes thatthe assumption of an Infinite mui indnitely would be the Rghest abet. "Simplicius, Commentary on Physics. p. 1179. CE Pilopous, De Aeternitae.p. 1 | Philoponus' Proofs of Creation 9 The number of past motions must therefore be finite, and the universe can have existed for only a finite time. (aii) Philoponus' third argument is not independent ofthe previous two. Itis| ‘variation ofthe second, repeating, for good measure, the central thought of the first. Whereas the second argument rested on the principle that an infinite cannot ‘be increased, the thied rests on the principle that an infinite cannot be multiplied: ‘multiplication, though, is simply a type of addition. To reinforce the argume tation, Philoponus again refers to the rule that an infinite cannot be traversed. Philoponus’ attention is here restricted to the heavens, and his reasoning is reported thus by Simplicius: “If. .. the motion ofthe heavens has no beginning, the sphere of the planet Saturn has performed infinite revolutions, the sphere of the planet Jupiter almost thrce times as many, the revolutions of the sun will be thirty times those of Saturn, the revolutions of the moon will be 360 times as ‘many, and the revolutions ofthe fixed sphere [which revolves once cach twenty four hours] will be more than 10,000 times as many. Considering that the infinite ‘cannot be traversed even once, is it not beyond all absurdity to suppose the infinite ‘multiplied by 10,000, nay multiplied infinitely? It necessarily follows that the circular motion of the heavens had a beginning.”'® Aristotelians understood cir- ‘cular motion to be an essential expression of the nature of the spheres. As long. as the spheres exist they would have to perform such motion and could not exist in a state of rest." Once Philoponus has established that the motions of the hheavens had a beginning, he can therefore conclude as well that “the heavens themselves also had a beginning of their existence:""” (b.i) Philoponus’ second set of proofs for creation rests on the Aristotelian principle that a finite body can contain only finite power. The principle has & peculiar history."® Its eareer began in Aristotle's proof of the existence of a first ‘mover, where it served as an essential premise in establishing thatthe first mover, is incorporcal, Aristotle reasoned that infinite power is needed to sustain the ‘motion of the universe for an infinite time; that all bodies are finite; and that a finite body can contain only finite power. The conclusion he drew was that the first cause of the motion of the universe cannot be a body, but must be an incor- poreal being." Proclus subsequently took up the Aristotelian principle that a Finite hody can contain only finite power and arrived at a more far-reaching result than Aristotle, He converted Aristotle's argument thatthe motion ofthe universe ‘must depend upon an incorporeal cause into an argument showing thatthe very ‘existence ofthe physical universe must depend upon an incorporcal cause. Proclus reasoned that infinite power is needed to sustain not only eternal motion, but Sinplcias, Commentary on Phsscs,p. 1179. Philopons, De Acterniate, ph. Cf above an ‘sprite, De Cael 12. Simplicius, Commentary om Phys, p. 1179 "Soe Appendix A. "Anstle, Phsice VI, 10; blow, p. 24.9 Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation ternal existence as well; and since the finite physical universe can contain only finite power, the physical universe must depend upon an incorporeal being outside itself for its very continued existence.” Philoponus knew of the arguments of Aristotie* and of Proclus,”® and they led him to a proof of creation. Since the corporeal universe contains only finite power, the universe, such will be Philo- ‘ponus’ argument, is not merely incapable of sustaining its own eternal motion ‘or eternal existence; itis incapable of existing eternally no matter what the cause sustaining its existence might be. As will be seen in later chapters, Philoponus’ adaptation of the argument from the finite power of finite bodies would elici response from Averroes,?? and Averroes’ response would, in turn, elicit from Crescas a critique of the original Aristotelian proof of the incorporeality of the first mover. Here we are interested in Philoponus’ proof. Philoponus is reported by Sim= plicius to have contended: Inasmuch as “the body of the heavens and of the Universe is finite, it contains fonly] finite power. And what contains finite power lis] destructible" That isto say since the corporeal universe contains only finite power, itis, considered in itself, incapable of existing through infinite future ‘ime and consequently is liable to destruction. * The proposition that the corporeal Universe is liable to destruction will not be invalidated even by the assumption thatthe universe is maintained in existence by a “transcendent” power as, for example, the *will of God."?” For even should such an assumption be made, the universe will remain incapable of existing infinitely into the future, insofar as it is considered in itself; the universe, considered in itself, will remain liable 10 destruction. Stated otherwise, the universe will still have the “logos (nature or ‘ground of destruction." Now a well known and widely employed? Aristotelian principle affirms that over an infinite time every possibility must eventually be realized.®" Accordingly, Philoponus concluded, the logos of destruction in the universe must “sometime come to actuality” and the universe must some day actually be destroyed." Cf. below, pp. 281-282 2simplicis, Commenary on Physics, p. 1327; Pilopoms, De Acteraate,p. 238. Bpilopons, De Aeterna, pp. 238-240 below, pp. 323 Simplics, Commenory on Physic, 1327 Cr. Pilopons, De Aeterna, 9. 235 Simplicis. Camomenaryon Psi, pp. 1330, 1331, 1333 id, pp. 1331, 133. "ACE. below. pp. 320, 38 Sarit, Plies Hl, 4, 2080, 30; Metphssies IX, 4, 1087, 4-518, 10808, 8-15. Cr 5. Mika, Time and Necessity Oxford 1973). pp. 9596, 103-108, 107. Simplicius, Commentary on Phir, p. 1333. Cr. Arise, De Cao, 12,281, 20-25 and 2834, 24-28. Meapysice XIV, 2 Aletaner, por, 1,18 and the pasagetaslted by Pines. “An Arabi Summary of a Lest Wok of Philopanss” pp. 324~325. In Simpliivs, Commentary on ‘Phorice. pp. 1331 133, and Philoponus, De Acernitae. pp. 241-24, Philopons seems to com tenance the possitlity of the future eterety of he worl, elo, pp. 264-265 Philoponus' Proofs of Creation 3 ‘That is the extent of Simplicius" report, and it falls short of an explicit proof of ereation. Another work by Philoponus makes clear however, how Philopomus, passed from the destructiblity, and actual future destruction, of the world to creation, He employed yet another well known Aristotelian principle, one that happens to rest on the principle just cited, according to which every possibility ‘must eventually be realized. The other principle affirms that “whatever is des- tructible must be generated.”>* If something is destructible, if it has the possibility of not existing. that possibility must have been realized at some point in the infinite past just as it must be realized at some point inthe infinite Future, Just as a destructible universe must eventually become nonexistent in the future, 0 {00 ‘must a destructible universe have been nonexistent in the past. Our universe, thorefore, cannot have existed forever, but must have come into existence.” Philoponus’ reasoning, then, was this: Since a finite body can contain only finite power, the corporeal universe has the logos of destruction. Since, moreover, every possibility is eventually realized, the universe must eventually undergo destruction. And since whatever is destructible is generated, the universe must have been generated. The Aristotelian principle that a finite body ean contain only finite power, taken together with two other Aristotelian principles, leads to the highly un-Aristotelian conclusion thatthe world can aeither exist forever in the future nor have existed forever inthe past. Apparently Philoponus understood that he was demonstrating not merely the creation ofthe universe in its present form but the ereation ofthe matter of the universe ex mii for his is that the very matter of the universe, being finite, lacks the power to sustain itself in existence for an infinite time Philoponus was not content simply to cite the authority of Aristotle for the Principle that a finite body can contain only finite power. He proceeded to offer a set of five or six™ auxiliary arguments, all ostensibly intended to support the Principle. fn fact the auxiliary arguments are not uniform. Some of them do Support the proposition thatthe heavens, or the entire universe, can contain only finite power; the proof for ercation is then to be completed through the consi ration that what contains finite power is destructible, hence also generated. Inexplicably, however, some of the auxiliary arguments?® move in the other direction, They start by establishing that the corporeal universe is destructible ‘and infer therefrom that the universe can contain only finite power. The reader is left cither again to draw the further inference, now quite redundant, that what "arise. De Caco 1.12. 282, 2: ib. 281, 26—282a, Philopomis, De Aceritate, pp. 228,230, 238, 20, 24 Sips, Commentary on Psi, emerson four mary aguas. But on p. 132, between the “thi” and “our” be quotes an aditona aniary argument ot into i the ‘umeration: nl he sie argument that Re enumerates p. 1333 4 the ourth> coms ¢vo ‘Separate considerations Inthe rice refered to above, m1, oie al he arguments excep the ne designated by Simplicius asthe *secon.” That argument is dcal wth here below (i) "See te,92 Philoponus' Proofs of Creation has finite power is destructible, and hence is generated; or else to derive the generation of the universe dircctly from its finite power. One of Philoponus* auxiliary arguments even drops the issue of finite power altogether.”° For our purposes, the first three of Philoponus’ auxiliary arguments are of interest. (ait) In the “first” of his auxiliary arguments, Philoponus is reported to have reasoned that “the heavens are {composed} of matter and form; what is [com posed} of matter requires the matter for its existence: what requires something is not self-suicient; what isnot self-sufficient isnot infinitely powerful. From all this he concludes thatthe heavens, considering their own natute, are not itinitely powerful and therefore are destructible." It remains for us to add that what is destructible must be generated, and consequently the heavens and the rest of the ‘corporeal universe eannot—at least in their present form—have existed for all ‘eternity but mast have come into existence. (bait) Philoponus’ “second” auxiliary argument, as reported by Simplicius, drops the issue of finiteness of power. Philoponus contends: “The essence of ‘matter consists in its being suited to receive all forms. It does not possess that ‘power in vain; the same matter cannot admit several forms at once: nor can matter retain any form eternally insofar as its own nature is considered” Since matter is by nature such that it does not retain any form permanently, “nothing [com- posed} of matter and form will, considering its matter, be indestructible The corporeal univers is thus destructible. "* The reader islet to supply the principle that everything destructible is also generated and to draw the conclusion thatthe corporeal universe in its present stato—cleatly not the mater of the universe— ‘must have come into existence. (G.iv) The “third” of the auxiliary arguments opens, like the first, with the ‘contention that the heavens are “composed . . .of substratum... and form,” the latter here being specified as “solar or lunar form” and the forms of the other heavenly bodies. Anyone who would exclude the distinction of matter and form from the heavens would, Philoponus adds, still have to acknowledge the presence in the heavens of “extension in three dimensions,” which too is a mode of com- position. Philoponus does not hercupon reason, as he had done in his first aux iliary argument, that composition implies the absence of self-sufficiency, hence the absence of infinite power. Instead, he pursues a line of thought going back to Plato's Phaedo, where the proposition had been laid down that the fact of something's being composite implies its being subject to decomposition.” What- Below, (i Sips, Commentary on Phrict, p. 1329. The tin of resoning ist a large extent torre fom Prot, Element of Theol e. and tans. E. Dodds (Oxford, 1983), $127 "Simplicius, Commentary on Phsics,p. 1329. ™Phaedo, TAC. Arse. Meaphzicr XIV, 2, ORR, 14-24, contends tht what is compte hase pseaiaity of ot exiting, and wht has the potty of not existing not terra Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation 93 ever has the “logos (nature or ground) of composition” has, Philoponus explains, the “logos of dissolution” andthe “logos of destruction.” And what has the “logos of destruction snot infinitely powerful" The heavens, therefore re not infinitely Powerful.” Here, as will b observed, isan instance of Philoponus” moving not from the finiteness ofthe power of the heavens to their dstructblity, but vice versa. The argument must be comploted either by reasoning, redundantly, back again from the finite power ofthe heavens to their destructiilty and then alduc- i the principle that everything destructible is generated; or else by inferring the generation ofthe heavens without returning to their destrucibility. The infe- tence might, for example, be tht what has finite power eannot maintain itself indefinitely, henee contains the possibility of not existing, and hence cannot have existed forever. To summarize: Philoponus formulated two sets of proofs of creation, both of which employ Aristotelian principles to draw the un-Aristotlian conclusion that the world is not eternal but had a beginning. Each set of proofs rests on the impossbiliy of an infinite of one sort or another. The fst set argues in three ditferent ways that an infinite number of events cannot conceivably have preceded the present moment. The second set argues that a finite body canaot contain infinite power, that what contains only finite power has the possibility of not existing, and what has the possiblity of not existing cannot have existed forever. “The socond set comprises general stalement ofthe proof and supporting agumen, The most important source of the first ofthe two sets of proofs is Philoponus" Contra Aristotelom. The Contra Aristotelem, whichis no longer extant and which is accessible tay solely through Simplicius’ excerpts, was available in some form to the medieval Arabs.*” Its listed by the Arabic bibliographers,*? a fact that, by itself, does not necessarily mean the book was translated into Arabic. But, in addition, passages from the book, cited in Philoponus’ name, have been discovered in the writings of Alfarabi,® Sijstni**(912~985), and Avicenna,” although unfortunately none ofthe passages that have been discovered is from the section containing the proofs for creation. Philoponus’ second sc of argU- ments, fom th finite power ofthe corporeal universe, was developed ina sepa- rate work that might possibly have been written as an appendix to the Contra “simpicvs, Commentary on Pics, p. 331 “Simplicius is probably notte source, since his commeataris cn the Phsics and De Cael, which preserve the exerts rom Phioponss, re nat meine by the medieval Abi ibn: tes, (or the Arabic Bbiographrs' knowledge of Simplicius, Iam lying on M.Stiaschneier. Die Araischen Uebersetzungen as dem Griechschen [ep Gra 160.) CE Ibn a-Nati, Kal Fir (Lepeg, 1871, 25, a ors QM and Ton Abi Usps, IM. Steimstnider,A-Farab St Peterburg 1R69). pp 162, 220-224 “ML Mabdi “Alfa agains Phloponus” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, XXVIL1961), 236 “4, Kraemer, “A Lost Paap from Phileoms” Contra Aristotle, in Arabic Teasation,” Journal of he American Oriental Society, LXXXW (1965), p. 319, 9.4, and p. 325, “Ibid. p. 324 0.2794 Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation Aristotclem.*© This other work was also available to the medieval Arabs. The Arabic bibliographers list, among the works of Philoponus, A Single Treatise Showing that Every Body is Finite and has Finite Power” Again, that's not necessarily evidence thatthe work was translated into Arabic; but in additio Yahya ibn “Adi (892-973) knew ofa treatise in which Philoponus set forth the proof from finite power, and the main thesis ofthe proof is cited in Philoponus ‘name by Ibn Suwar® in the tenth century, and by Averroes."® Further evidence that both seis of proofs were current in the Middle Ages is furnished by a she recently discovered Arabi text, which styles itself a summary of three “teats of Philoponas. In each of the three treatises Philoponus is represented as having given a different proof of creation.®' One of the three proofs turns out to be a statement of the fist of Philoponus’ arguments from the impossibility of an infinite number, some of the wording even being identical with the version report ‘ed by Simplicius;* a second of the three proofs consists in a general statement of the proof from the finite power of finite bodics:** whereas the third proof is probably atibuted to Philoponus erroncously.** ‘There is thus ample evidence that Philoponus’ proofs were accessible to readers of Arabic in the Middle Ages. As will appear in the remainder of the present ‘chapter and inthe following chapter, Philoponus beeae a mos important source for medieval proofs of creation *Sce Davidson, “Joa Philoponus as «Sour of Meeval slaic and Jewish Proofs of Cre ony. 358-389 “Cf, 8. Pics. “A Tenth Contry Philosophical Crrspunce”Prcecdngs ofthe Aeris Academs for Jewish Research, XXIV (1958). IS “CE. th bet tweatse by Iba Suwar pushed in A. Badawi ed, Nenplaanct apd Arabs (Cito, 1955), . 246; Pench wansation in B. Lewin, “La Notion de mt dane Kam dan sxonhic” Oriemala Sueno IE (1984), 91 Artes Midale Commentary on Phas (Oxford, Balan Library, Hstrew MS. Nexbasse Hunt 79), Vil vi 2 Long Commentary on Meaphsic Taro daa. M. Bouygss [eirul 1938-1948), XI comm, 41; Steinshneier, AL-Fari, p. 123, eto 2— 5.CL Davidson, “Su Philoponas a Source of Medieval inc an Jewish Poof of Creation Polen at pines, “An Arabic Summary ofa Lost Work of Philp” pp. 320-352, pid, pp. 330-336. Compare the ttc “principles” in Pies tansation ofthe Arabic et wath Uae atoms se by Simpicis, Commemurv om Phsis. p. 117%, hte Arabi et tbe ky consideration tha an ifn cannot b waters swe, ed the aguas made ws the inpossbity of ever counting an atl infinite umber "Pins, “An Arabic Summary ofa Lost Work of Philepoaus” pp. 323-325, Sip pp. 325-329. The arguments tha the ives of inivals mak off the ie contin inv pment ach of which srt: and te sgments Ft, mater Hw many Ere ig tb couldnt join gether to consi infinite ane. By coast, Pilopnas, De Aeterna, . takes the common sense pion that an ininte numberof pst ime semen each of wh was Ane, woud inded const a ne pas tne Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation 95 2. Saadia and Philoponus ‘The Jewish philosopher Saaia (882-942) never mentions Philoponus by name nor quotes hin directly, but Saadi's discussion reveals that he drew fron the two ses of proofs of creation formulated by Philoporus Saadia's aim was to treat the problem of creation in all its aspects. te begins by offering four proofs ofthe generation (hadath ofthe world; he demonstrates thatthe world not only had a beginning but was created ex milo; and he reviews ‘varios alternatives 10 the doctrine of eration ex mila, ane of which is the theory that the eternal heavens are the cause of the universe. From the entire discussion, seven items ae of interest to us: Saadia’s four proofs ofthe “gener ion” of the world, one of several demonstrations designed to establish thatthe world was created ex aio, and 6w0 of his refuations—"the thd” and “the fourth" —of the thesis thatthe heavens are eternal. Five ofthe seven items ean be shown unquestionably o be derived from Philoponus, and the other two ean be traced to Philoponus with some plausibility The comparison with Philoporus will be facilitated by rearranging the seven items from Saadia. The order in which I shall take them up will be: Ssadia’s fourth proof of eration, "the argument for eration ex mihi, the two refatations ofthe eternity ofthe heavens, and finally, Saaia's rt second. and third proofs of creation. ‘The following table lists the seven items from Saadia as 1 have rearranged them, together with the corresponding arguments from Philoponus. rangi Saudia Philoponus (i) Fourth proof of ereation (a.i) The infinite iy not taversable Gi) An argument for creation ex (ai) The infinite isnot traversable hilo (iil) A refutation of the eternity (a.i) ‘The infinite eannot be added of the heavens to (iv) Another refutation of the (ait) The infinite eannot be eternity of the heavens multiplied (9) First prot of creation (©. Proof from the finite power of finite bodies (vi) Second proof of creation (b.i) Auxiliary argument from ‘composition (vii) Third proof of creation (bit) Auxiliary argument from the succession of forms aver rater ulia’s fourth proof ofthe “generation” of the world carries the title “from time” and runs thus; Assuming that time is eternal, should a person “attempt ‘mentally to ascend in time from the present moment, he would be unable to Jof 96 Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation 50, since . . . thought cannot travel up across the infinite and traverse it. The same reason would prevent existence from traveling down through time and traversing itso as to reach us. But if existence had not reached us, we should not ‘exist... Inasmuch as I find that I do exist, 1 know that existence has traversed time... and. . time isfinite. .. "As a'sort of appendix to the proof Saadia ‘mentions that his postion “on future time” agrees with his position “on past time." He means that future time is, in his opinion, finite, and perhaps also that the finiteness of future time ean be demonstrated. If he is indeed alluding to a demonstration ofthe finiteness of future time, the argument would presumably be that no moment in an infinitely distant future could be reached; for existence ‘could not conceivably travel across and traverse infinite Future time so as to reach ‘whatever might be thought to exist atthe infinitely distant moment. ‘The proof of creation just quoted from Saadia unquestionably derives from Philoponus’ first proof of creation from the impossibility of an infinite number: ‘The key to Philoponus” proof was the rule that an infinite cannot be traversed.*° ‘And the same is now the key to Saadia's proof. Characteristic details from Phil ‘ponds are also echoed in Szadia, namely the impossibility of things’ existing today if they had to be preceded by an infinite past; the impossibility “mentally* (aadia) to “conceive” (Phitoponus)" an infinite’s extending back into the past; and the comparison between going back “up” through the infinite past, on the one hand, and coming “down to each of us” (Philoponus) or “traveling down, to reach us” (Saadia), on the other. ‘Saadia’s proof does differ from Philoponus’ in. significant respect. Philoponus considered transformations whereas Saadia considers ti Pons’ infinite is an infinite series, whereas Saadia’s is an infinite continuum ‘The shift from the former infinite to the latter permits a certain simplification in the argument. Philoponis’ reasoning established a beginning for the existence of the sublunar region, where everything undergoes transformation, but not forthe celestial region, where, in the Afistoteian universe, transformations never occur. {In order to extend his proof to cover the celestial region, Philoponus had to ad that the sublunar and celestial regions are inextricably connected, so that the beginning of the one implies the beginning of the other.” The addition is no longer needed in Saadia’s version of the proof, since the contention that existence could not have “traversed” infinite past time to reach the present momicat applies ‘equally to the sublunar and celestial regions." and therefore Philo- ania, K, akon wal gad, of. S. Landauer (Leiden, 1880), 1,1, p36; Emlish ‘ransaion with papintio ofthe Arabi lnieatd: Boot of Beles and Opinions, tras, Rosenblatt (New Haven, 1988) "above. pp. 87-88 Above. m1. Asstt, Posterior Anais 1, 2, 83b, 6-7, tats tha iis imposible for an infinite o be “taered a tought” “above, n. 8, nd Arstte, ibid above, m1. ‘Thee is atleast one consideration that could rake Phloponas formulation stronger than Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation ” Sadia, at any rate, reveals indirectly that he di not recognize the difference between an infinite series and an infinite continuum. He takes up a possible objection tothe proof, an cbjection which is, essentially, Zeno’ first paradox. an which is attested to e'sewhere in Arabic philosophic literature." It runs Since distance is infinitely divisible, would not the train of thought embodied in the proof render a person’ moving from one place to another impossible, inas- much as the person would nave to traverse an infinite number of parts? Stadi response is thatthe objection misleadingly addces the traversing not ofan “actually existing infinite, but of an infinite existing solely in “imagination”: the proof, by contrast, rests on the fact that “existence does actually traverse {past} time and. reach us" and an actual ininite cannot be traversed." ‘The objection faced here by Saadia views distance not as an infinite continuum, as Saadia’s proof viewed time, but rather as an infinite series of discrete parts. Since Saadia considers the objection to be pertinent, either he is consciously drawing an analogy between an infinite series of discrete parts and an infinite continuum, or else he did not detect any distinction between the two. In either ‘ease the fact that Philoponus' proof addresses the former kind of infinite, whereas Saadlia’s addresses the latte, can occasion no hesitation about tracing Saadia’s proof back to Philoponus; ‘or Saad, as now seen, does not recognize the dif- ference between the two kinds of infinite Saadia's response tothe possible objection t his proof incidentally reproduces a furthor detail from Philofonus: ‘The principle that infinites cannot be traversed applies exclusively to atuelinfnies. Gi In a proof intended t establish that creation took place ex ili, Saadia seasons: IF instead of accepting eration ex nihil, “we were to Suppose something, ‘coming from something, then the second thing inthe hypothesis would resemble the first and would have to meet the condition tat it can only come from a third thing. The third thing in the hypothesis would resemble the second, and would have to meet the condition that t can only come from a fourth thing, And this would zo on 1 infinity, But since the infinite cannot be completed... . we could not exist. Yet behold, we do exist! .. . whereas ifthe things preceding us were not finite [in number} they would not have been completed so that we might exist" Saadia has, in a more abbreviated fashion, again offered the argument Sead, although PhiloponosRinslf dacs no state as The assumption of an inti series of| ‘rasformations would involve no: oly the aves ofan infinite it would als involve an infinite repress of cases, which was rej by Arse on independent rounds. bebop. 337. Shee, W. Ross ediionof Arsaies Price (Oxford, 1958), p. 72 264 teton p18 Saalia, Kl Amini, 1 pp. 36-37. CE. above, n. 7. On the qustion whether infinite past tie would he an actual aint, see below. 128 ‘ania, K,al-Amana, 1, 2,p- 40. The same argue i alluded to in Sandi's Commentary on Sefer Ysa. published 8 Commentaires le ifr Yea i. M. Lambert (Pai, 191), Arabic section, p. 3: French wasltion 9.1698 Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation that the present could not have been reached if, prior thereto, an infinite past had to be traversed. He has, in other words, again offered a version of Philoponus” fist proof of creation from the impossibility of an infinite number. The argument, Saadia now claims, establishes creation ex mihilo, although the new version, like Saadia’s previous version and like the original proof in Philoponus, does not seem to preclude an eternal matter from which the world might have been formed. What is noteworthy about the new version is that it omits the details of Philo- pponus' proof which were reproduced in Saadia’s previous version, while including two significant details that were absent there. The details appearing here but absent in the previous version are these: Saadia does not consider the time con- tingum but rather, like Philoponus, the series of transformations leading up 0 what exists at the present moment. And he appends a statement to the effect that “ifthe things preceding us were not infinite, they would not have been completed so that we might exist” The statement appears to reflect Philoponus” contention that “if forthe generation ofa given thing there mus fist exist an infinite number ‘of things that are generated from each other, then the given thing cannot be yenerated."® Pwo tens inthe list of scven that | wish to examine in Sadia have been shown to derive from Philoponus’s first proof from the impossibility of an infinite num- ber, namely, item (i), Saadia’s fourth proof for creation, and item (i), the arg ment just discussed wherein Saadia claims to have demonstrated creation ex nihil. (it) After presenting his proofs of creation ex nihilo Sandia takes up the unac~ ceptable alternatives, among which is the theory that the heavens are eternal and they bring the world into existence. In the course of refuting the eternity of the heavens he presents an argument entitled “from inerease and diminution.” which reads: “Every day elapsing from the time of the sphere is an increase over what thas passed and a diminution from what is to come. But whatever admits increase and diminution is of finite power; and finiteness implies generation. Should any~ ‘one venture to assert thatthe clapsing of a day does not increase what has pascal ‘of diminish what isto come, he would fy inthe face of reality and experience." Sadia here has repeated the essential elements in Philoponus’ second proof from the impossibility of an infinite number, the proof based by Philoponus on the “The present version could establish craton ex nile enly i one of Sania’ For ps of «reatin —which I ave designated items), i, a (vt)—hal cay proved thal he very ‘utr of he univere i creat; Bot pone of hose proofs spree hy Saas a doing 0 ln fac, the previous version af the poof unde consideration that, tem i}—could make a ronger arguncat for etetion ex nil tan the preset version, although Saul epesets the previous ‘ese as «poof mercy of ceation and the presen versun axa proto ere xe. Should ‘te maintained that formless matters properly described se eisting i ine. then could he age tha since—in accordance with the previous versions ine must he iit, mater cana have cist forever, above, #9 Sania, Kok Amant, 3 eighth ery), 6 Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation 9 Principle that an infinite cannot be inereased. As in the fist item from Saadia is been shifted into the realm of time. Sadia reasons that each passing day adds to the time already past; thatthe iniite cannot be increased; and that time must consequently be finite. Philoporus had ‘made the same points regarding past “motions."”” There ae two clements in Saadia’s proof which do not come from Philoponus. ‘One is the statement that each elapsing day not merely ads to past time but aso diminishes future time, ‘The inexorable diminishing of future time contributes nothing to the proof for eteation, But the consideration that what is subject to ‘diminution cannot be infinite does appear in Arabie philosophy in a related eon- text, in arguments for the impossibility of an inginite magnitude.” Saadia prob- ably intends by his statement to intimate am argument agains the future eternity ‘of the world, The thinking would be: Future time is steadily being diminished, the infinite cannot be diminished, therefore future time eannot be infinite. “The other element in Saadia’s proof which docs not come from Philopans is {the conclusion that past time is “of finite power"; we would have expected instead a conclusion to the effect that past time is oF finite extent oF of finite duration Saadia surely has expressed himself poorly: for time cannot properly be described as possessing power, whether finite oF infinite. Finite power was, 3s will be recalled, a central concept in a different proof of creation the proof from the pineipie that finite body ean ‘only finite power. And that proof, as will Appear, was known to Saaia and employed by him.” We may conjecture that finite power intrudcd into the present proof as an echo from the other proof, where it originally belonged. Both proofs eoneern themselves with finiteness, although of different types, and Saadia—or someone earlier thaw be in the fine ‘of transmission —must have mechanically transfered the expression “finite power” fom the proof where it is appropriate toa proof where itis not. (iv) lnmeiately after the argument just examined, Saadia continues his refu- tation of the thesis thatthe heavens are eternal with an argument entitled “from the variation in movements” It reads: “Infinite power dees not vary in its Since we observe that the movements ofthe heavens vary tothe extent that they tre thirty oF 365 times one another, and still more, we realize that each fof the movements] is finite, The explanation is as follows: The castern movement of the highest sphere performs a revolution once in twenty-four hours, whereas the western movement of the fixed stars [ie., the precession of the equinoxes| pro «ceeds one degree each hundred years, at which rate the complete revolution witl be performed in no less than 36,000 years or 13,140,000 days... . How ean {you say that a power whose movement varies so widely is not fiite?~?* which we examined,” the argument Above. pp. 95-96, above. PB toto. pp 26-127 Sania, Kr alAnn, 13h thoy). 0-81100 Philoponus' Proofs of Creation Partly explicitly and partly implicitly, Saadia has reproduced the key elements in Philoponus’ third proof from the impossibility ofan infinite number, the proof based on the impossibility of an infinite number's being multiplied. Like Philo- ‘ponus, Saadia reasons that the heavenly bodies move at varying velocities; their revolutions accumulate in varying multiples of each other; and therefore, “each” that is to say, the number of revolutions undergone by each of the heavenly Dodies—must be “finite"™ Saadia even remains faithful to the original proof in leaving the discussion within the realm of numbers of motions rather than trans- {erring it—as he did in items (i) and (ii) —to the realm of time. There arc small changes in detail: Saadia does not reproduce all the astronomical data given by Philoponus.”® In one instance, a substitution has been made; the figure "365" (the ratio of the revolutions of the diurnal sphere to the revolutions of the sun, and hence the number of days in a year), if nota scribl error, has been substituted by Saadia or by his immediate source for the less familiar figure 360" (the ratio of the revolutions of the moon to the revolutions of Saturn,” And an additional astronomical datum is evinced, with the unmistakable intent of magnifying the effect. The slow movement of the fixed stars, the phenomenon known today as the procession ofthe equinoxes, had been calculated as one degree each hundred years. Accordingly, to the paradoxes of multiple infinites cited by Philoponus— as reported by Simplicius —Saadia or his immediate source adds that the infinite revolutions of the daily sphere would, over an eternity, have to be no less than thirteen million times as numerous as the infinite revolutions of the fixed stars! ‘Asin the previous item,”” Saadia speaks of finite power, the references to finite power appearing here not in the body of the argument but in an introductory and a closing statement. The introductory statement, which happens to have a close parallel in Aristotle,” affirms that “infinite power does not vary in itself”; and the closing statement affirms that “a power whose movement varies” must be finite. These references to finite power are less incongruous than was the reference to finite power in the previous argument. Movement may after all be described as due ta finite of infinite power whereas time can hardly be described as ‘possessing cither. Nevertheless, the introduction of finite power is again inap- propriate. The present argument can be understood solely as reasoning from the nature of number, from the impossibility of one infinite number's being a multiple ‘of another. The fact thatthe numbers of celestial revolutions accumulate in vary- ing multiples is pertinent when the argument is so understood; it supplies cogent ‘grounds forthe conclusion that the number of revolutions of each heavenly body is finite. That fact in no way exhibits, however, the finiteness of the power oF powers moving the spheres. The opening reference to finite power and the con- ct, save, p. 19. See iid, re above, pp. 98-99. *ansuile, De Calo 1,7, 286, 27-29. Philoponus' Proofs of Creation 101 cluding statement that “a power whose movement varies” is finite thus merely ‘obscure the issue. The proper conclusion should be that the number of the rev ‘lutions of the heavens must be finite, x exist without revolving—as Sadia states explicitly elsewhere””—they cannot have existed forever. The concept of finite power, if may again be conjectured, has intruded into the present proof as an echo from a separate proof of creation, the proof from the finite power of the body of the universe. To recapitulate the discussion so far: The four items in Saadia which we have been examining are derived [rom Philoponus" three proofs for creation from the impossibility of an infinite number. The first of Philoponus’ three proofs was the argument that no event could oceur if, in order to reach it, an infinite series of transformations had to be traversed. The argument appears in Saadia in two versions, which complement each other in reproducing virtually al the details of| Philoponus’ proof. Philoponus” second proof was the argument that the number ‘of past events mus be finite since an infinite number cannot be added to; and his third proof was the argument that the number of the revolutions of the spheres rnust be finite since an infinite number cannot be multiplied. Those wo proofs reappear in Saadia as part of a refutation of the eternity of the heavens. Saadia’s versions reveal departures in detail from the original proofs, but the Key elements, of Philoponus’ reasoning are preserved and Saadia even presents the proofs in the same sequence as Philoponus. (») L1urn to Saadia’s frst proof of ereation. It is entitled “from finitude™ and reads: “The heavens and earth clearly are finite inasmuch as the earth is in the center and the revolution of the heavens goes around it. Hence their power is finite; for, as is well known, an infinite power cannot be present ina finite body. Since the power that maintains the heavens and earth ceases, they necessarily have a beginning and end.” Saadia expanus on the evidence for the finiteness of the heavens and carth™® and concludes: "Since the bodies [of the heavens and carth] are limited, their power is limited, reaching a certain limit where the power stops. They cannot continue after the destruetion of that power nor exist before it does."** Sama epi th acannon, sce ts comer hy he if heen tian what an becuse. He expat Bsn ot inane, se he hearers eve ard he nth nd an nie by eld neve oe 3 ‘lun Tht spunea tvs fom Arte earl. 2716260, Sse Sia ica bun Kl ser Bap K. Uso in i, 908, p. 6. Noe tctonp. 287 Sania} exp ha he univer conan by vo of eg com Sanne mane heers and carts oro ing ot a multi Baer nd Cart art care te or men an harem more tan oe mrp. Tat guns $e fom Aste: De Coro 8 ad Blo, pp. 4-273 Sdn ltd pp. 32-38. The pn ai 1 by Sain his Consens sn Sof es ech tao, 33102 Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation Here Saadia has reproduced Philoponus’ proof of ereation from the principle that a finite body can contain only finite power. The “well known” proposition cited by Sadia to the effect that “an infinite power cannot be present in finite body” is exactly the Aristotelian principle upon which Philoponus’ proof had been constructed. Saadia establishes thatthe corporeal universe i in truth finite, and hence can, by the principle in question, contain no more than finite power, ‘And he infers both the generation and the future destruction of the world on ‘commonsense grounds: A finite power must eventually “eease" and “stop.” and nothing can continue to exist after its power is exhausted. The inference reflects Pitoponas’ contention that what contains only finite power is subject to destruc tion." An indispensable step is, however, omitted by Saudia. Philoponas had explained that since the corporeal universe contains the possibility of not existing, it cannot be maintained in existence eternally even by an infinite power outside itself for, over an infinite time, the possibility of not existing must like every possibility, inevitably be realized. Unless the step is included, the corporeal Universe is shown by the argument merely to be incapable of maintaining itself ‘eternally in existence through its own power. The universe is not shown to be absolutely incapable of existing eternally. Saadia’s proof is, then, a simplified restatement of Philoponus’ proof from the finite power of finite bodies, with an indispensable step missing." (0) Saadia's second proof for creation is entitled “from the joining of parts ‘and the composition of segments.” “Bodies.” he contends, "consist of combined parts and composed members and thereby reveal ... signs of generation and of the art of an artisan.” As evidence, Sadia cites various types of composition discoverable in the corporeal universe, such a the combination of “earth, stones, ‘and sand” to constitute the lower world, and the combination of the “several layers of spheres” and the “stars” to constitute the elestal region. He concludes: “Alter establishing joining, conjunction, and composition, which are things (asd in the body of the heavens and the rest fof the universe}, I was convinced . . . that the heavens and everything they contain are generated."* ‘What is significant for us in this proof is its location, Saadia presents it imme= diately after his proof from the finite power of finite bodies. Philoponus, as will bee recalled. had supported his own proof from the finite power of finite bodics with a number of auxiliary arguments, intended primatily to shove tl Poreal universe can indeed contain only fnite power. The firs. and also the third ‘of the auxiliary arguments reasoned from the composite nature of the corporeal snerated above, p88. nbove, p90. tia "i Wolo, “Kalam Argument for Crest Sada Anniscrsary Vlune (Now York, 1945), _. 203, offersan interpretation af Sai, the fest of which sto discover in Sania the ecicaliies OF Philoponus poo! "alia, A. alAmand, 1, 1, p34, Wolfson, “Kalam Arguments for Creston” p. 208. 34, testa he erm aris athe Began of he agutent might Ean ams. Philoponus' Proofs of Creation 103 universe." Thus Philoponus’ proof from the finite power of finite bodies was Followed immediately by an argument from the fact that all bodies in the universe ae composite; and Saadia's proof from the finite power of finite bodes is now also followed immediately by an argument from the Fact that all bodies im the universe are composite wia’s argument from composition differs from Philoponus’, The evidence cited by Sala for the composite nature of the corporeal universe is hot the evidence cited by Philoponus,"* and there is no bint in Saadia of a connection between composition and finiteness of power. Yet in whatever light Suadia’s proof might be regarded," Saadia undoubtedly has omitted something from his source or left part of his thinking unexpressed, for he fails to explain hhow the premises lead to the conclusion that the world was created. He merely takes for granted that if things are composite they must be generated. The only imation of grounds for a conclusion is given by him in the statement: “Con- junction and composition . .. are generated things in the body of the heav- ns... 2 The thought behind the statement plays an important role in another proof for creation offered by Sadia, the proof to be examined next. The appear ance of the same thought here is perhaps an additional instance of the intrusion. of echoes of one proof into another; alternatively, itis a conscious attempt to assimilate the present proof tothe other in order to justify the conclusion. But thowever that thought came to be introduced, it cannot represent the original point of the argument, for then there would be no reason for distinguishing between the present proof from “composition” and the succeeding one “from accidents.” (v1) Saadia’s thied proof for creation is, as just mentioned, entitled “From dents.” It begins: “Bodies cannot avoid accidents which occur in cach of them, either from itself oF from outside it the earth as a whole, discovers that they are indeed “not free of change, which In content, elf. >" Saauia examines animal life and above, pp. 92-93 "Above, p92. Sada’ faire to mention the composition of mat an forma might be xpi bythe fat tha the rot ere t in ater had Been eoumaated by Kalam inks who rjc ‘he Aistelian mater at fo, Several argues for ceation fom composition were pt forward in the Mid: Ayes ef ews pp. 6 "rat is sees by M. Vea, Za Pho de Sania Gon Pai. WD. p89 the plase “ete fw sel fons ose sel” ca Be ciphers witht ad fr lations the pool n ther Arabic wis. Asa premise wis commun prose dear {he Klum dt of acids, the dctene ht one ofthe carters physic fe finn o te depomdcat upon a incr essence, bt rater alate sd the ntl sr tons that serve ab the material Bae ofeach jet Teta the exstense of ascent i was bow that he characteristics of things capnot be doef heaton o isl, and therefor Be ie ‘oa factor distinct from the tom oe bay hai, co an “accident”: cf below. p. 181. By sta that he secon he is speaking of do belong 10a boy “either Tom il fr was Sau explicit the propio that no characterise of x thing can oe“ to” ad he implicitly reject the Kalam darine of acces, He woul we may supfane. hive PSC te uvfrtble withthe Aristeian they of form. But be aprrcay did at ave the phobic ose allo him ts we cf, Vera, La Philosphie de Some, pp. 10210,104 Philoponus' Proofs of Creation is a “generated thing,” and concludes that “what cannot avoid what is generated is known to be of the same character.” He hercupon extends bis investigation to the heavens, discovers that the too are not free of motion and other accidents, and concludes again: "When I discovered that generated things embrace these bodies, and the latter do not precede the former [in time], 1 was convinced that whatever does not precede what is generated is of the same character by virtue of its falling under the same elass (addi) 72 Saacia’s proof addresses accidents and bodies, while a parallel version of the proof known from Islamic writers addresses not accidents and bodies but acci- dents and atoms.” The dichotomy of accident and body, or of accident and atom, is a Kalam analogue of the familiar Aristotelian dichotomy of form and matter The Aristotelian concept ofa form, which carries the essential nature of a given object, was rejected by the Kalam, and whatever trac it left was absorbed into the Kalam concept of accident.° The specific phenomenon that Saadia’s proof considers is the continous and unavoidable presence of generated accidents in ‘each body in the universe; the phenomenon tha the parallel version considers is the continuous presence of generated accidents in each atom. That phenomenon, translated back into the Arisiotclian framework, would be the continuous presence of generated forms in matter. As will be recalled, the second of the auxiliary arguments with which Philoponus supported his proof from the finite power of finite bodies focused precisely on the succession of forms across mater.%® Sa- adia's proof thus corresponds, in a most general way, to Philoponus’ second auxiliary argument: Philoponus dealt with the continuous succession of forms lover matter, while Sadia deals with the continuous presence of changing gen- erated accidents in bodies. The similarity goes no further. Saadia does not repeat any details from Philoponus; and his argument rests on a problematical rule, not reflecting anything in Philoponus, namely, the rule that “what cannot avoid what is generated is known to be of the same character." ‘The situation we have discovered is this: Philoponus had offered a proof from the finite power of finite bodies followed directly by a supporting argument from Sadia, K,abAmindt 1 yp. 35. The prot also appears in Sania’ Commentary t Ser Desir, pp. 38 TE: French wnslation pp. 83 Iti alae to by Sead in his etation of Hse EL Davidson, Sandia's Poemic Again Hii Aah (Nest York, 1915), p75, 868. The lst sine words in the proof are undcstocl by Ventura, Rosca, a Ata 3s meaning: “by vite ofits [ie that which is generated entoig is deisiton[.. he dein ofthat whch doesnot precede ° This would seem to rege the following, rather force iter ‘ation of de tent Since he concep acide i sey the Kalam in deinng dy, and since all, cients ae generated it follows tht “what is generated” enters he definon of ody, and body [also geerated. Definitions of body’ terms of ecient ar infact be found in Aha, Mog fatsomiyn. e. W. Rites (stanbl, 1929-1930), pp. 304, andthe ist ofthe debntion ven ‘here would be patclay appropiate for our context PCE. below, pp. (34, MCL. Maimesides, Guide, 1,718): R. Frank, The Metaphysics of Created Being According 10 Ab dhol (Istanbul 1966), 9.82 above, p92. *Regaedng that ule, se below, p14. Philoponus' Proofs of Creation 10s the composition of all bodies in the universe and thereupon by & supporting argument from the unceasing succession of impermanent forms over matter. Sidi for his part, offers proof from the finite power of finite bodies followed Uircetly by a peoo! from the composition of all bodies in the universe and the ‘upon by a proof from the continuous presence of impermanent accidents in bod- Jes. Saadia’s proof from the finite power of finite bodies is unmistakably derived. from Philoponus. The similarity of Saadia’s second and third proofs to the cor- responding auxiliary arguments in Philoponus is limited. Saadia’s proofs consider the general phenomena considered by Philoponus’ proofs, and likewise appear directly after the proof from finite power, but they difer from Philoponus” prools in all particulars In each of the three proofs, Saadia’s reasoning is incomplete. His restatement fof the first proof, the proof from the finite power of finite bodies, omits a step ‘without which the conclusion cannot cogently be drawn.” As he formulates his second proof, the inference of creation from composition is not explained. And bis thied proof, the proof “from accidents,” rests on the unproved rule affirming that *what cannot avoid what is generated is known to be of the same character.” The proof from accidents must already have been current in Arabic by Saadia’s time, since two of his contemporaries, Ash‘ari%¥ and Aifarabi.” expected their readers 10 be acquainted with it. Ash‘ari significantly attributes the proof to the “philosophers” and “those who follow them.” T would suggest that Philopoms’ proof from finite power may have circulated in Arabic together with at least two! auxiliary arguments as a group; and that _roup of proofs underlies Saadia’s frst, second, and third proofs of ercation, the items 1 have designated as (¥), (vi), and (vii). If the suggestion is correct, fare reaching changes must have occurred somewhere along the line of transmission: The connection between the auxiliary arguments and the basie proof was Forgot ten; essential parts of the reasoning were omitted; and in the case of the third proof, the original concepts were translated into their Kalam analogues and pro- Vided with a completely new line of argumentation, If the suggestion is. not correct, pure chance is the only explanation for what has been shown, namely. that the Iwo proofs following the proof from finite power in Saadia exhibit a correspondence fo the wo auxiliary arguments following the proof from finite power in Philoponus. Ahove.p. 102 sce m 10, bok, pp. 1-13. a Rs a Thal, Puicaione of the Toca Fac tn WNC) Reta, ~AbAsh'at's Conception of te Nature and Rode of Speculative Reayning in Tvl Provesdngs ofthe Vd Coneres of Arabic and sane Stadies Sckhen, 972), pL. ASH ‘note spill, ties te agent to “the phlopter, and those who follow them am sane the adr, he avs heres, athe Svinte rth opt” He probably hs the tain ind "That soy, the Bit 40 or it he aoeiry arguesI 106 Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation Resumé! Philoponus’ three proofs for creation from the impossibility ofan infinite num- ber were known to and used by Sandia {items (i)-tiv).!®" Philoponus had pre- sented the three proofs as ase, but whether Saadia received them as a set isnot certain, Philoponus’ proof from the finite power of finite bodies was also known, to and used by Saadia [item (v)].! After his proof from finite power, Sadia offered two other proofs items (vi) and (vii)] which in their general subject ‘matter and order of presentation correspond to the frst two auxiliary arguments, ‘whereby Philoponus had supported his own proof from finite power.'°? The resemblance, I have submitted, is not fortuitous. ‘An interrelation i likely as wel between the transmission of Philoponus’ proofs from the impossibility of an infinite number and the transmission of bis proof from finite power: for in Saadia, two proofs from the former group betray echoes of the later." Quite possibly, therefore, a list of six—or more—prools for creation, all of them concerned with finiteness of one sort or another, may have Circulated and been available to Saadia. The list would have consisted of Philo- pponus’ three proofs from the impossibility of an infinite number, his proof from Finite power, and at least two auxiliary arguments supporting the proof from finite power 3. Kindi and Philoponus everal generations before Saadia, Kindi formulated four arguments that also exhibit unmistakable traces of Philoponus. For the purpose of exposition, I shall disregard the order in which the arguments appear in Kindi. The following table ‘of corresponding items may again be helpful Kind Philoponus (Argument forthe finiteness (a.) The infinite is not of past time traversable (ii) Argument forthe finiteness (aii) The infinite cannot be of bodies added to (ii) Another argument for the (aii) The infinite cannot be finiteness of past time added to (iv) Argument from (bi, Biv) Auxiliary argument ‘composition support of proof from finite power "See table, above, p 105 above, pp. 98-99. "Above, pe 1 "above, pp. 102-104, "above, pp. 99, 100. Philoponus’ Proofs of Creation 107 (i) The first item in Kindi to be examined is a proof ofthe finiteness of time, which reads: “II past time were infinite, then before every segment of time there would be anotber segment. ad infinitum. But i that ease no given time could ever be reached. For the duration} from the ifinite past to the given time would be equal t0 the duration ascending back from the given time .. . 10 intinity, .. . If something is infinite, its interval cannot be traversed.” "” After proving that past ine cannot be infinite, Kind explains that time eannot become “aetually infinite” inthe future either; for no matter what “definite time” might be added tothe already aecunulated finite past time, the total must remain inte." Kindi is plainly offering another restatement of Philoponis’ first proof for creation from the impossibility of an infinite number. Like Philoponus, he lays ddowa the rule that an infinite cannot be traversed: he draws an analogy between ving back wp through the infinite past and coming down from the infinite past to the present: and he concludes that the present could never have becn reached if an infinite past were to precede it." Kindi departs from Phitoponus in trans= ferving the discussion from ihe realm of past transformations—the realm consid- ed by Philoponus'”°—to the realm of past time, something that Saadia, as will be recalled, also dd in his restatement of Philoponus' proof." Kinds departure from Philoponus is not, however, identical with Saadia’s, since Kindi, unlike Saudia, does not treat past time as & continuum but instead asa series of intervals ‘The conception of time as aseries of intervals is quite atypical and would appear to serve a single purpose: Itallows Kindi to argue specifically against an infinite past series, as Philoponus had done. Another similarity between Kind's version find Saadia’s, in addition te transferring the discussion to the real of time. is, that both versions supplement Philoponus" proof for the finiteness of past tine with a proof, or at least a statement," of the finiteness of future time. ‘The supplement indicates that Kindi and Saadia borrowed from a common Tine of transmission in which the Fniteness of future time—a theme appearing in Phi ‘oponus” arguments for creation from finite power—had attached itself to Philo Pponus” proof for the finiteness of past time, Also to be observed are clear « ‘minological similarities between Kindi and Sadia. Both use the same distinctive terms for ascending in time (K: murasaidan:! S: su'id ") and traversing time (K: fd nugta; S: lam yegtahu "5 Kind Ras ed. M. Abu (Car, 1980) 1, p12. Pall versions appear, bi. 9p 197,205 206, English tanltion, with pagination of te Arabic iadicaed: And’ Meth. tea, A. ory CAT, 1978, Kin, Rad, 1p. 122 Se below, m 12; Atte, Pics I, 6,206, 25-29, ‘Above, pp. 87-88 "ego, p87 hove, pp 95-96, "Qo 996 "ave given the seaing of» parallel passage, Rasp. 197. The editor of King's Rosi