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DRAFT- Team Five Monograph

II. Terrorist embedding tactics, use of the INS laws and regulations

"Those who should get in, get in; those who should be kept out, are kept
out; and those who should not be here will be required to leave. "

-Rep. Barbara Jordan, Chairwoman,

Commission on Immigration Reform,

Terrorists need time to accomplish their mission

Terrorists who enter the United States must remain in the United States long
enough to accomplish their mission. This may be a short stay to deliver or receive
communications. It may involve extensive travel within the country to conduct
surveillance, obtain information, research an operational objective, etc. In some
cases, such a sleeper cells, the terrorist must make long term plans to remain in the
United States for years. The more complex the terrorist objective, the more
important it becomes that members of the plot effect entry and remain undetected
within the United States. After terrorists enter, how do they remain in the country?

Before we examine how terrorists have managed to remain in the United States, we
have to understand the broader picture of immigration law and practice. Two
constant themes predominate. First that we are "a nation of laws". Secondly that
we are "a nation of immigrants". These two themes at times complement each
other and at times conflict with each other. We will not examine the economic
impact or diplomatic aspects of this situation. Our purpose is to investigate its
relationship to terrorism.

An "alien" is defined as any person who is not a citizen or national of the United
States.1 Aliens within the United States can be divided into three general categories.

• Illegal aliens
• Non-immigrants
• Immigrants

1 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended Section 101 (a)(3), a "national" means a
person owing permanent allegiance to a state INA 101 (a)(22)

Before 9/1 1, only selected applicants were checked against IBIS (Interagency Border
Inspection System). The IBIS system combines some of the State Department, former
Customs and former INS lookout databases. When IBIS checks were made mandatory,
some local INS offices were unable to check IBIS since they didn't have access to TECS
(Treasury Enforcement Computer System). Now the Service Centers check all names,
petitioners and beneficiaries, through IBIS. This has added to the application processing
time and backlog reduction has stalled. IBIS does not contain all names from all watch
lists. ^


Federal Bureau of Investigation

Previously, INS had an MOU with the FBI to return name checks within a certain amount
of time. Most were returned within 60 days. If there was some possible interest in the
individual, the response could take up to 1 80 days. If a possible criminal record was
found, the case had to be reviewed by an INS supervisor before setting up the
naturalization or benefit interview.

There are limitations to the FBI name check. In one case, CIS was told that they had
naturalized a terrorist suspect. A review of the FBI name check records showed that the
FBI had twice returned a "no record" on the subject. Consultation with the FBI revealed
that the FBI never checked the name against the corporate side of their database. This
meant that all the previous name checks may have been invalid. Also if the FBI had an
applicant under investigation, it did not notify CIS of this fact. As a result of this
discovery over 3.2 million names had to be rerun through the FBI. o^fx /•> *M //

Today the name checks are conducted at the same time the APIS (Automated Fingerprint
Identification System) fingerprints are submitted. Each FBI name check is logged in and
tracked until a response is received. Most name checks are now returned within 2-48

Central Intelligence Agency

A copy of the G-325 (Biographic Information) has always been sent to the CIA. Prior to
9/11, the CIA name check was not tracked. Post 9/11, the CIA name check is tracked
and positive "hits" are forwarded to DHS/ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
There the NSU (National Security Unit) within the Investigations Branch analyses the

9/11 Closed by Statute

9/11 Closed by Statute

CIS has taken a position that it will not approve an application on anyone who is under
investigation by the FBI or CIA for terrorism, drug trafficking or criminal activity. CIS
has limited authority in these cases particularly when the information falls within the
intelligence community. Applicants can take CIS to court and respond to derogatory
information. In the worst case, CIS may have to grant the benefit but CIS will not issue
the form 1-551 (Green Card). These are difficult cases for CIS to resolve.

Name Variations Make Name Checking Difficult

Much of the problem with name checks is the variety of name variations. Many foreign
born individuals have different spellings of their names. This may be due to the different
systems of transliteration used to convert to names to English. For example Chinese or
Arabic names can be difficult to convert to English. In some cultures, names change with
age or marital status or family position. Government agencies may misspell names on
passports, identification cards or visa.

As an example of this, Mr. Yates stated that after 9/1 1 there was an urgent effort to
identify any INS records relating to the nineteen hijackers. A study concluded that there
were 255 variations of the nineteen hijacker names. The National Security Unit ran all
possible names against the INS automated systems. There were 3.2 million possibly
related files, -v

TIPOFF and the TSC (Terrorist Screening Center)

CIS has access to the TIPOFF watch list through IBIS. CIS would like to see all terrorist
watch lists consolidated into the TSC. CIS could then go through the TSC and not have
to go to the CIA. Mr. Yates feels that this would reduce the wait time for responses. A
copy of the G-325 (Biographic Information) would still be provided to the CIA. There
have been discussions on this issue with the ICE Director of Operations, Michael T.


The following forms can be filed electronically:

1-129, used to classify a non-immigrant worker seeking status as an alien in a specialty

occupation, an alien of extraordinary ability or achievement or an alien who is an
internationally recognized athlete, artist or entertainer.
1-140, a petition for an immigrant worker

1-539, application for non-immigrants requesting a change of non-immigrant status or

extension of stay

Aliens seeking TPS (Temporary Protected Status) may also file their initial claim via the

1-907, a request for premium service (requires the payment of an additional fee of $1,000) ,.
to expedite case processing , v, u * T H
cjtrv i
In some cases an application can be filed electronically but the applicant/will have to be
processed and/or interviewed at an ASC (Application Support Center).- The ASC also
takes the digital photograph, fingerprints and digital signature. This prevents someone
from submitting a fingerprint card in their name but with the fingerprints of someone who
does not have a criminal record. The ASCs are located in metropolitan areas. They
operate by appointment and may be a distance from the applicant's residence.

CIS plans to expand the number of forms that can be filed electronically. Paper forms
must be converted into an electronic format to be handled efficiently. About 80% of all
applications are eventually captured electronically. These applications are maintained in
the CLAIMS 3 (Computer Linked Application Information Management System)
database. The CLAIMS 3 database has some links to the US VISIT Entry-Exit system
through name checking. However, at the present time the two systems are not connected
through biometrics. This could present problems. US Visit will in the future capture two
fingerprints and a photo of some aliens who depart the United States. CIS may not know
when an alien with a pending application leaves the United States. Applications are
considered abandoned in these cases and should be denied. This was the case with the
change of status applications for 9/11 hijackers Mohammed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi. ,
Both left the country but their applications for vocational student status were not denied JL . /j * /
as the adjudications branch was unaware of their departures. V .-V. y^^/' *

CIS is in the process of designing and building a new database.


Biometrics offer the best way to insure that an alien only has one identity with CIS. The
current biometric for all of CBP (Customs and Border Protection), ICE, and CIS is
fingerprints. In most cases one or both index fingers of an applicant are captured
electronically. These are flat prints, not rolled fingerprints which go from nail edge to
nail edge. Flat prints capture a smaller fingerprint area. This reduces the amount of
information to be stored but also limits the minutia points that can be compared. The FBI
requires a standard rolled ten finger print for identification. The two flat finger
impressions are used by an APIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) system
utilizing advanced matching technology to verify identity. A digital photograph is also a
part of the IDENT system. This photograph assists in identification when the search
returns multiple possible records.

Note: The IDENT (INS Automated Biometric Identification System) utilizes two flat
index fingerprints. IDENT is an inkless system that is used to collect two fingerprints
from aliens who are arrested for immigration violations, some applicants for immigration
benefits, persons entering the United States under the US Visit program and persons who
were registered under the NSEERS (National Security Entry Exit Registration System )
program The FBI also contributes some criminal alien fingerprints to IDENT but only
the two index fingerprints which are stripped from the FBI ten fingerprint cards and
converted into the IDENT format. The IDENT two fingerprints cannot be matched
against the ten fingerprint FBI IAFIS system.

Some applications such as political asylum and naturalization require that all ten fingers
be printed and submitted to the FBI fingerprint division for a search. These are checked
against the FBI criminal fingerprint records for any matches. The civil applicant cards
are retained by the FBI and CIS is notified if any criminal records are found. The FBI
does not enter civil applicant fingerprint cards into a searchable database. The FBI only
enters criminal fingerprint cards into their database.

The IDENT system is used throughout the application process to verify the identity of
applicants. A CIS adjudicator can verify the identity of the alien at interviews,
processing, etc. This prevents aliens from using a new identity if their previous
application is denied.

Mr. Yates felt that biometrics were a key to the integrity of the application system. He
stated that some of the delays were due to the transition from INS to DHS. He also feels
that the systems integration board, which directs and approves major systems changes at
DHS, was aware of the needs at CIS.


Mr. Yates was asked about the amount of benefit fraud that CIS has to deal with. He
stated that there were previous studies that indicated significant fraud. Also that fraud
was systemic but the amount of fraud varied among the different benefit programs. He
does not want to approve any applications where there is an indicator of fraud.

Last year, Mr. Yates requested that ICE conduct field investigations on a sampling of a
few types of applications. This was to assist CIS in determining the fraud rate. A small
number of applications chosen at random were given to ICE Special Agents to
investigate. For instance, agents were asked to check if the photo on the Form 1-90
(Request to Replace Form 1-551) matched the original card holder and were not of an
impostor. The initial finding was that only 1% of these cases were fraudulent. What this
example does not show is how many of the replacement "green cards" were obtained for
use by relatives or friends.
The ICE Director of Operations, Michael T. Dougherty terminated the investigation at
about the midpoint of the study. He felt that the results were skewed and invalid because
investigations were not being thoroughly conducted. Some ICE Special Agents never did
the required field investigations but completed cases at their desks. Mr. Dougherty felt
that the data was going to be inaccurate and that it was better to terminate the sampling
then try to explain the results.

Mr. Crucetti stated that CIS has the responsibility to identify any fraud in the application
process. The most simple and expedient option in fraud cases is to deny the benefit and
remove the alien from the United States. If the fraud was complex and widespread, the
case would be given to ICE to determine if an ICE Special Agent would be assigned to
the investigation. ICE tentatively agreed to make this determination within 30 days of
receiving the case from CIS. If the case referral is refused by ICE, CIS also had the
option to do further review of the case and again present it to ICE with any new evidence.
CIS feels that the regulations governing the benefits program preclude CIS from
prosecuting its own criminal cases. Therefore it is critical that CIS and ICE have a
working agreement on how cases will be accepted or refused for investigation by ICE
Special Agents. Mr. Crucetti said that he has been working on a Memorandum of
Understanding between CIS and ICE on this critical issue. No MOU had been signed at
the time of the interview.

Fraud Detection Units (FDU)

These are located within the CIS Service Centers. There are 44 FTEs for this purpose.
Not all are currently filled. The FDUs will do analytical work with the adjudications
staff to identify both individual and systemic fraud. They will use data mining, matching
technologies, CLAIMS 3 programming and intelligence leads to prevent the approval of
suspected fraudulent applications. Many complex fraud rings operate in multiple
locations. The Service Centers will have to share their data to be effective.

The FDUs will also assemble the basic cases and evidence. Yates said that when he was
the director of the Vermont Service Center, a large, complex case that involved over
7,000 fraudulent political asylum cases was identified. This case resulted in a successful
Federal prosecution. The FDUs will pass on their suspected cases to the Benefit Fraud

Benefit Fraud Units (BFU)

The benefit fraud units are-mad^ up of ICE Special Agents to be assigned to each Service
Center. Currently most are working in Vermont and California. In most cases these
Special Agents had previously been assigned to the INS Regional Offices. The Regional
Offices were dissolved with the transition to DHS/ICE. The current distribution of these
ICE Special Agents among the service centers varies greatly. The BFU will take the
suspect cases from the FDUs and develop them further. They will assemble the evidence,
determine the administrative and criminal violations, use advanced investigative
techniques, and determine how the case can be successfully prosecuted.
ICE, with a limited number of special agents, only wants to prosecute large, complex
conspiracies or those involving national security. ICE has not said how many ICE
Special Agents will handle the CIS fraud cases. Until last year, some ICE Special Agent
positions were funded through the application fees received by CIS. The regulations
dividing the former INS into three different branches under DHS prevents the transfer of
any CIS fee monies to ICE. Therefore, there may be only a few Special Agents under
each ICE SAC who will be available to do these immigration fraud prosecutions. It is
unresolved how ICE will determine which cases will be accepted and what will happen to
the potential criminal cases that ICE does not accept. Mr. Yates is also concerned that
historically INS has been very successful in prosecuting the key conspirators but made
little or no effort to remove the aliens who benefited by the fraud.

Referrals to ICE Special Agents

How the case referral process is to be handled is not finalized. The MOU is still under
negotiation. BFU will forward to ICE cases that involve benefit fraud organizations,
facilitators and individuals who pose an imminent threat to public safety or national
security. CIS will also refer large, complex conspiraciw-cases. ICE will accept or reject
the case. If it accepts the case, ICE will investigate it and prosecute it or return it to CIS
with recommendations. Timelines on how long ICE will have to make a decision on
each case «F&*ot decided.

ICE has a very limited complement of special agents. It remains to be seen how many
CIS fraud cases ICE will be willing and able to investigate.

Non-criminal Investigations

Many suspected benefit fraud cases require some field investigation below the level of
criminal investigation. This may be a simple drive by to establish that a residence is
actually a residence and not a mail drop. Or that a business that claims to have fifty
employees is not a "mom and pop" deli. These investigations do not require highly
trained Federal criminal investigators but they still need to be done. CIS is proposing that
about 270 compliance positions be created to meet these needs. These employees will
not have arrest powers. They may be Federal employees or contract employees. They
will be located throughout the country. This will be a new approach which is
necessitated by the transition from INS to DHS.

Volume of Applications

Even if there is only a 1% fraud rate, the numbers of aliens benefiting from fraud is
staggering. 1% of the 5.6 million back log is 50,600 aliens. Any fraud strategy has to
deal with massive numbers of applications. According to CIS, each adjudicator
completes 1 .2 cases an hour. At that rate the backlog canset be reduced. Any future
expansion of immigration benefits will have to be considered in light of the current
volume and backlog.
Every day the Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services
issues 20,000 "green cards", conducts 140,000 background checks, adjudicates 30,000
applications, receives 50,000 telephone calls, takes 8,000 fingerprints at the ASCs, and
naturalizes 3,000 new citizens. Benefit fraud detection and prevention is critical to the
integrity of the overall immigration program. The challenge is to integrate an effective
fraud detection and prevention program into a system that is overwhelmed with volume,
under going restructuring, under funded by a fee system and reducing a 5.6 million
application backlog while responding to enhanced national security concerns.

Illegal aliens

Illegal aliens are those foreign-born individuals who are not citizens of the United
States and are not legally entitled under the Immigration and Nationality Act to be
in the United States. The popular misconception is that all illegal aliens sneak
across our international borders. This is true of about 60 per cent of the estimated 8
to 10 million illegal aliens in the United States. Most of this illegal activity takes
place across the open and overwhelmed border with Mexico. However, the
remaining 40 per cent entered the United States at land, sea and air port of entry.
They were examined by Federal inspectors and permitted to enter the United States.
Some had fraudulent documents, some had visas that only permitted them to
remain for a limited period of time and some entered who were supposed to briefly
pass through the United States while enroute to another country.

The overwhelmed


An "immigrant" means every alien except an alien who is a non-immigrant^ .

Immigrant visas permit the individual to permanently reside in the United States.
The number of immigrant visas available is based on a complex system. These
visas are based on nationality, family relationships to persons legally in the United
States, occupational skills, refugees, special classes, etc. Both the type and
numbers are determined by law and regulation. Immigrant visas obtained outside
the United States are issued at State Department Consulates overseas. Aliens may
also adjust their status within the United States to that of an immigrant. In 2001,
411,059 aliens entered the United States on immigrant visas. Another 653,259
aliens adjusted their status while in the United States3. Family unification and
insuring the flow of needed labor are the primary grounds for the majority of
immigrant visas.

All applications for immigrant visas must be adjudicated. Most are processed by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)4. The difficulty of handling the
massive growth in applications for immigration benefits was a major criticism of
Immigration and Naturalization Service5. Many of these applications require
personal interviews and the careful review of supporting documents. The result of
this complex process is that there are more applications submitted then

2 INA101(a)(15)
3 INS 2001 Statistical Yearbook, Table A, page 13
The Immigration and Naturalization Service was dissolved on 2/28/03. The adjudication of applications
for immigration benefits is now under the Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration
5 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Immigration Benefits, Several Factors Impede
Timeliness of Application Processing, May 2001
adjudicated6. Applications for immigration benefits in 2001 increased to
4,200,0007. In many cases, aliens may legally remain in the United States while
their applications for immigration benefits are pending. In other cases, the pending
immigrant may not enter and must remain outside the United States until the
application is approved and an immigrant visa is available.

The time required for INS to complete the processing of an application is

influenced by the type of application, the location where the application is filed,
and the number of aliens filing for that particular immigration benefit. The several
regional INS service centers handle over 50 different types of applications8. For
example, a United States citizen may petition to have his spouse, parent or child
under age 21 enter the United States as an immigrant9. The United States citizen
must file Form 1-130 (Petition for Alien Relative) at one of the INS service centers.
Immigrant visas for this family relationship are not limited by a numerical quota
system. However, it can take two years for the application to be adjudicated .

Other classes of immigrant visas are within those controlled by a numerical quota
system. The number of immigrant visas issued in each category are limited to a
specific number each year. This determination is made by the Department of State.
The number of refugees who are admitted each year is

The same CIS Form 1-130 can also be used to file for an immigrant visa for the
brother or sister of a United States citizen. This immigrant classification, fourth
preference, is limited to a certain number of visas each year. The wait for these
types of visas is from three to six years.

For some visa classifications, here is a waiting period of many years before
immigrant visas become available. There is also a special lottery that permits
50,000 people from selected countries to emigrate to this country.

Persons who enter as immigrants have the right to remain in the United States
indefinitely. These immigrants also have most of the rights of United States
citizens including employment. They can lose their immigrant status and be
deported if they violate certain immigration regulations or are convicted of serious
crimes. Some immigrants become United States citizens through the naturalization
process but there is no requirement that immigrants naturalize.

The second large group of aliens enter the United States as non-immigrants. Non-
immigrants enter for a specific purpose and specific time. There are over fifty non-
immigrant visa categories. Each has its own requirements and conditions. They

6 There were 4,083,052 applications pending in September 2001, INS Monthly Statistical Report
7 INS Monthly Statistical Report, September FY2001 Year End Report
8 Some applications are also filed at INS District Offices.
9 INA Section 201(a)(2)(A)(i) Immediate relatives
GAO, Table 8, Wait Times Associated With Pending Applications, page 29
may violate their non-immigrant status by remaining beyond their authorized time
or by violating their terms of admission. For example, a non-immigrant tourist may
not work in the United States. If the non-immigrant tourist accepts unauthorized
employment, they can be deported from the United States.

• Tourists get three to six months to stay in the United States

Terrorists need time to accomplish their mission. Current immigration regulations
permit visitors who enter the United States with B-2 tourist visas up to remain for
six months. In fact the primary immigration inspector must send the arriving
passenger to a supervisor in secondary inspection if the primary inspector
determines that less then six months stay is appropriate. Citizens of countries that
do not need visas, visa waiver countries, routinely get three months to stay. This
means that the terrorist with a visa can remain in the United States for six months,
half a year. If the terrorist uses a passport from a visa waiver country, such as
France, they are given three months to remain. The terrorist using a student visa
will often be admitted for duration of status which can be for a number of years.
Other types of visas permit varied lengths of stay.

Tourists can get an extension of their authorized time by filing the proper
paperwork with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS). A form is completed and a fee is paid. The CIS
adjudicates the application and mails back its decision to the applicant.

• Illegal entrants
Persons also enter the United States illegally. This can be as simple as sneaking
across the border or as complex as an international alien smuggling operation. It
can involve one person tying plastic water jugs to his belt and crossing the border
from Mexico in a few hours. Or it can involve conspirators around the world who
arrange for a group of Chinese to be concealed in a broken down freighter that sails
halfway around the world. There is no limit to the number of ways that people
illegally attempt to enter the United States. There is a limit to the ability of the
United States government to prevent these illegal entries.
BRIEF SUMMARY W.T. Hempel 4/27/04

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 19861

This legislation was designed to address a number of immigration problems. It was to be

a one time amnesty, a way of supplying additional agricultural workers, and a redirection
of immigration enforcement from the illegal alien to his/her employer. There were two
amnesty programs;
• Special Agricultural Program (SAW)
• Legalization Program (LAW or the pre- 1 982 applicant program)

SAW Must provide evidence that they had worked on perishable crops for at least "90
days" between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986. Residence did not have to be
"continuous" or "unlawful".

LAW Must provide evidence of unlawful entry into the US before January 1, 1982 and
unlawful residence since that time.

IRCA was "subject to widespread abuse". Over one million illegal aliens received legal
permanent residence under SAW. (This is twice the number of foreign employees
normally employed in agriculture.)2 Mahmud Abouhalima, one of the WTC 1 terrorists,
was granted legal permanent resident status ("green card") via the SAW program. LAW
permitted over 1.7 million illegal aliens to adjust their status in the United States3.

Mir Aimal KANSI, an alien from Pakistan, applied for legalization even though he
legally entered the United States in February, 1991.xHe was able to do this by joining a
case action suit filed by the United Latin America Citizens (LULAC)4 falsely claiming
that he had entered the US through Mexico in 1981 . The documents he submitted, two
leases, four employment letters and a letter from Pakistan, all appear to have been typed
on the same typewriter. On January 25, 1993 KANSI murdered two CIA employees and
injured three others in Langley, VA.

IRCA was designed to protect the illegal alien applicants from being arrested by INS
while their applications were pending by prohibiting the disclosure of any of the IRCA
file information to law enforcement. The law granted temporary resident status and work
authorization as soon as it was determined that all the necessary documents were received
in a case but BEFORE any of the documents were verified. The alien then received legal
permanent residence when the application was approved. IRCA created a vast market for
the fraudulent document industry.

1 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Section 210 and Section 245A
2 Testimony of Paul Virtue, INS General Counsel before the House Immigration and Claims
Subcommittee, 3/4/99
3 The 1990 Immigration Act granted IRCA amnesty for 160,000 spouses and minor children
4 The President of LULAC was found guilty in Federal Court on 5/8/95 of 10 counts of fraud involving
thousands of fraudulent SAW and LAW applications.
Bill Yates.
March 19, 2004


Currently Assoc Director of Operations. #3 at CIS. I'm in sharge of all domestic field

30 yr veteran. Cirm invest in Newark, NJ.

At Newark, after 6 yrs, became a supervisory immigration examiner at Newark. Then e

region of INS where handled adjudications. Did first INS service center. In 1986, ass't
regional comm'r for finvestigations for most of east coast. From there, in 1990, became
INS OCDETF, until 1993. Left to become Director of Vermont service Center in St.
Alban's Vermont. In 1995, sent to West Coast to direct Cal Service Center, brought into
hdqtrs to become deputy exec assoc comm'r for field operations (BP, inspection,
adjudications, and deportantion, and investigations). In 1998, E region director of INS,
all operations. Later, in July 98, detailed back to hdqtrs after crisis with naturalizations,
detailed to oversee the program, and then assigned to take over immigration services, and
then when INS abolished, became in new position.

DHS Organization.

CIS reports to the deputy secretary. Admiral Loy. Liasion with CBP and ICE is frankly
handled through agency by agency basis. There needs to be a centralized policy board
that can balance the service and enforcement interest. Right now have an enforcement
policy board, but not an immigration policy board. We generally resolve issues directly
with CBP and ICE, which is good for relationship. Our regs are reviewed by ICE and
CBP,a nd they ours, and all reviewed by general counsel of DHS. But we don't develop
an overall policy plan. We made recommendation to Loy when he took over. We heard
that it is under consideration, but we haven't heard a start date. Any issues re admissions
of aliens, including the types of biometrics we will end up, and that will result in us
changing the permanent resident card. We expect to go from a % photo to full face, and
the software used, and whether we need a chip for info. Decisions about admissions
periods, simplify regs. If I change employment authorizations, that affects the agents in
the field. Antifraud issues on budget, and budget for US VISIT which includes
seamlessness and money for development of reading green cards. US VISIT knows the
importance of linking with us. US VISIT is only capturing visa holders, but we are
responsiable for all the others who get here, so we all need the same standards. IF done
right, we won't replicate costs. If change of address, or biometric, or tracking, we build
off of it, not our own version.

This has been a concern of mine since the beginning. Putting us in a huge law
enforcement operation of BTS would only replicate the only the former INS problems.
Yes, there have been situations that we know that enforcement only has weighed in on
issues. Not that DHS in wrong direction, but that only seems to replicate one side of the
story. For example, our identity documents have a big impact on inspectors, so they need
a voice in changes in those documents. There was a arecommendation coming out of
enforcement that any person wanting any kind of benefit should be fingerprinted. It costs
about $75 per fingerprint, and we hadn't been consulted about cost or infrastructure or
impact on FBI or need. We need to make sure all parties are there to make sure before a
final decision made.

A shared service team was developed to (1) to ask all our leaders to make a statement that
was to make sure no mission fails: so if inspections needs more inspectors; CIS has a lot
of trained inspectors, has said okay and in reverse as we need. As to budgets, a lot more
complicated. WE split people first, and decided to have budget follow. When we
decided that CBP would provide personnel to CIS and ICE, then we owe them money.
So we are athe service provider for records. ICE does financial considerations, to pay for
all the decisions we are making. There were operational issues too. Jay Ahern got
together to figure out outstanding issues. Who handles corrections on I-94s (CBP says
they will correct own errors); nonimmigrant waivers I-92s from Canadians trying to enter
the US for a visit and something in past requires a NI waiver, and we did a lot of them
using inspectors, we haven't finalized, but will consolidate in CBP; on discretionary
waivers at POEs, except some of immigrant visa waivers, but tentatively agreed to CBP
will adjudicate those waivers. In our discussions, we do know that we need an overhaul.
We need an overall the regulations. Dea Carpenter is our chief legal advisor. They
haven't identified our chief counsel right now.

Homeland Security Council. Michael Petrucelli, our Chief of Staff and Deputy, is does
that liaison. I don't know the HSC issues with CIS. If there discussion to be had, he does
them. He does brief me Domestic Policy Council, and that's pretty consistent.
Margarent Spelling runs it. Diana Schacht is the person I usually deal with her: refugee,
HI and 2B, and temporary worker program, and national security discussion with the
focus on the refugee and asylee and doing risk assessments. Going back to legacy INS,
we had our overseas officers felt didn't have enough local knowledge to properly vet
local populations (accents, geography etc), and had knowledge from CIA that infiltrated
by intel agents from Iraq. About a year ago or so, before the war started. Mtg at NSC
with DOJ/DOS/FI/CIA/DIA and temp stopped program in certain areas. No one was
willing to commit people b/c no one had anyone to spare, but did review interview notes
etc and got sign offs on certain cases. 1 OOs of cases that we were reviewed. DOS was
saying potentially thousands. These cases where people had been cleared to come into
US, but then had knowledge of infiltration, and had reason to be concerned. I still held
some back since not in person interviews. We got a lot of heat for not meeting refugee
numbers. Camp located in Bierut was the most important. We made recommendations
to Garcia about it. Mainly Iraqi agents, but some Al Qaida as well. We held back up
100s, but then more than Vy. went through. When we did the split, and became CIS, then
went to Office of International Affairs that Joe Cutahey heads up.

We had a pre 9/11 problem with asylees. Our asylum officers were complaining that
process at risk b/c INS didn't have its own interpreters, brought their own in. Issue went
back to mid-1990s. Post 9/11, more sense of urgency. Joe Langlois, Director of Asylum,
lives in International Affairs office at DHS. He has always wanted gov't interpreters, and
only now has been able to get it through. We told the Secretary that we needed a refugee
corps with localized expertise (not just detailed there). Perviously, most refugee
processing done by asylum adjudicators on detail. We need to have an interpreter corps
as well, and is incorporated in new fee schedule. A little over a month ago, we published
an increase of fees for each application. (OMB wants us to be completely fee sufficient.)
Average increase is $55 per fee per application, to pay for IBIS and namechecks, the
refugee corps (CIA, DIA to identify high risk individuals, don't know if will have
interpreters, and DOS are the principal players who handle documentation and transport
after we have told them they are approved, DOS also does camp security and intel—like
Africa where safety of officers not guaranteed, but we are the decision makers, as well as
UNHCR and present us with already interviewed individuals and cull for those interested
in coming to the US, and there is a classification process for relatives in US, etc—
Kathleen Thompson for refugees has the lead here under Cutahey), the interpreter for
asylum program, and compliance officers on fraud (200 to be stationed in service centers
and district officers to verify application information, including drivebys to see if
addresses exist, and if company isn't there, then refer to ICE; if it is there, then will be
adjudicated. (The 44 fraud adjudicators is for the H1B expedited approvals.) Our link
databases exceed ICE's and we reach out to the FDL to get exemplars of breeder
documents, but we don't do criminal investigations. We just don't want to send ICE on
fishing expeditions and we want to hand over the (1) the type of fraud; (2) the laws
violated; (3) the scheme; (4) the violators. If we find fraud, and we verify, then we will
require that the alien be placed in removal proceedings (notice to appear we serve, with
ICE as the immigration prosecutors. If there is a failure to appear on the beneficiary. We
can't use the fact that ICE successfully prosecuted the vendors, and so we need to prove
the fraud with each case, and we will flag the beneficiary, so the next time petitioner is
encountered by CBP, CIS or ICE, then we will note how to interview that person. This
will help prevent greater immigration benefits being afforded to the person if indeed that
alien did get benefit by fraud. Our officers believe they must protect themselves against
persons that have been arrested for a crime, we need to do more than just send a denial
out, but request a removal proceeding as well.

US VISIT. WE've been capturing fingerprints and % photo and signature for a number
of years. We capture digital 10 rolled and flat fingerprints live scan since 1999 (LPR,
asylum, naturalization, temporary protected status, anyone adopting a child and their
household members, certain waivers.. 99% of them are back to us in 6 hours. We
require photos on applications for replacement of alien registration cards (green card),
employment authorization (BAD)- these are both digitized, and working to digitize
naturalization papers. When the immigrant visas arrive, go through CBP, and they send
to us and we digitize photo and create the card. With US Visit, we will get them
automatically after admittance, and that will generate the card order, which is good for us
and alien. For national security, we don't want a temporary stamp, but are instituting a
pilot project next week in LA for replacement of alien registration cards where we are
going to get online applications, and when receive, will send a notice to applicant that
they are to appear for interview, will be fingerprinted and photo taken, and the card will
be noted to be produced and no temporary stamp given. Backgrounds will be done too.
We think it will cut down on imposter fraud. The original photo will be called up. So
where we go with US VISIT, as DOS is generating biometrics for immigrant visa
applications, and electronically passing to CBP, and then that information updated and
alien registration card created, but information passing to us at beginning of process with
the consular officer. To be sent to address on immigration visa application. Will have
the ability to replace the 1-90 lost application form—now electronic filing and then come
in for interview and verification of information.

We would verify with IDENT the US VISIT, and we are doing the IAFIS as well.

We are creating electronic immigration histories with the core work being done by US
VISIT. Entry-status-exit, not just entry exit.

Identification of hijackers. If can link biometric to a name, may come back with the rap
sheet (FBI does this for us now) of 10 different names, but all the same biometric. We
store the information that comes back from FBI, and by end of summer will be able to
retrieve that information. We haven't added the FBI number in the application record,
but the FBI information is in the record. Will also be hi national automated database, and
also developing an FBI namecheck system to track everything we send to FBI and all
Itheir responses and will be stored so we can call it up. Right now, can only if FBI
responded and whether or not they had a record, and the schedule is for the end of July.

We are vulnerable until we can link biometric with name from the time of issuing visa.

Permitted length of stay shortened: increases extension of stay applications and pending
applications that are backlogged and person becomes illegal with no documentation. Six
months is not the right thing. Inspectors have authority to use discretion. We don't want
to hurt commerce. But should only be for tune needs it. Concern about Ziglar's
approach: if you do that, inspector will feel that will get in trouble if give more than 30
days. I would rather see analysis done to see where categories are for being more or less
generous. Have an analysis done of NIIS for true stays.

When we have a business employee application, we have to look closely at the company
for its viability for each case; but we are going to a precertification of certain businesses.
SEVIS went over to ICE b/c the Secretary and Asa wanted it to go, and that was the sense
of Congress. I think its CIS responsibility to adjudicate those cases, and I wouldn't have
booted it.

We need to id the high risk areas (that's why I want the fraud analysis done) and id our
lowest risk areas and not spend tune on that. Spend time on Russian organized crime and
the Chinese.

All applications get name background checks; only immigration applications get name
and fingerprint applications. I-90s also get the photo biometric check.
Temporary Worker Program.

It depends on if it has a legalization provision; wants the registration and checks and
identity card for CIS to do. Potential volume is huge. But there are some reasonable
ways to do this: where ERs are filing electronically and databases are accessed and fed
by DOL, DHS, Social Security and DOS, could set up program where get people through
identity and verification process with biometric when issue card. We've got the way to
do it, but need the infrastructure to do it. We can only handle 3 mil a year right now.
We've heard 8-11 mil are aliens working or living illegally in US. The subset of those
persons is what we don't know. We could handle 2-3 million. They'd have to have lots
of checks b/c worker doc would be good for 3 years. We can cost it out. ICE has got to
run and at least do a check on anti-fraud piece for false vendors. Create online
registration. Application could cost $200. One of the flaws in legalization process was
that Congress didn't permit info to be used beyond the naturalization process b/c of
confidentiality provision. (Al Q says yahoo- we're in!). FBI may not be able to handle.
CIS offered to develop the proposal, but EOP (DPC) said no: confidentiality, anti-fraud,
document people, national security checks need to be done. White House says you are
too complicated. White House not going to give Congress a draft, Diana Schacht. Don't
seem to understand the value of the information we have, the risk if we don't do it right,
and the risk of national security. Created a huge fight for us. Eduardo just wanted us to
focus on backlogs, as did the White House. I've spent hour and 1A argument with the
Secretary on this issue.

Garcia told his people recently that his official position that we will neither support nor
attack from preventing CIS from developing their anti-fraud unit. DHS budget office
was trying to force us out b/c the CIS forced out of the enforcement business. Dougherty
keeps being fed with "CIS is the bad guy". I need to worry about the integrity of the
beneficiary process. I'm not looking to hire officers, but compliance agents. As soon as
we find out fraud, you own it. ICE is telling Dougherty is setting us up for failure. CIS
gave NYC investigations, one with 75 files, and one with 5000 files involved, and then
we had a two timers (Girls being recruited to marry multiple men, with a total potential of
20,000). We've got a religious worker case in CAL right now that we can't work. Our
fraud has 138 applications per category.

Field guides on adjudication supporting docs. New ones worked on previous to 9/11, and
are trained on various applications.