Republic vs Bagtas FACTS: May 8, 1948: Jose V.

Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of 1 year for breeding purposes subject to a breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls May 7, 1949: Jose requested for a renewal for another year for the three bulls but only one bull was approved while the others are to be returned March 25, 1950: He wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the 3 bulls October 17, 1950: he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction of yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General. October 19, 1950: Director of Animal Industry advised him that either the 3 bulls are to be returned or their book value without deductions should be paid not later than October 31, 1950 which he was not able to do December 20, 1950: An action at the CFI was commenced against Jose praying that he be ordered to return the 3 bulls or to pay their book value of P3,241.45 and the unpaid breeding fee of P199.62, both with interests, and costs July 5, 1951: Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and Manalo, answered that because of the bad peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio of Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines, he could not return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

RTC: granted the action December 1958: granted an ex-parte motion for the appointment of a special sheriff to serve the writ outside Manila December 6, 1958: Felicidad M. Bagtas, the surviving spouse of Jose who died on October 23, 1951 and administratrix of his estate, was notified January 7, 1959: she file a motion that the 2 bulls where returned by his son on June 26, 1952 evidenced by recipt and the 3rd bull died from gunshot wound inflicted during a Huk raid and prayed that the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. ISSUE: W/N the contract is commodatum and NOT a lease and the estate should be liable for the loss due to force majeure due to delay. HELD: YES. writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs If contract was commodatum then Bureau of Animal Industry retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable if he keeps it longer than the period stipulated the estate of the late defendant is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has not been returned because it was killed while in the custody of the administratrix of his estate

Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the CFI, the money judgment rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of execution but must be presented to the probate court for payment by the appellant, the administratrix appointed by the court.

Court of Appeals dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2 and 3. Issue: Whether or not the failure to return the subject matter of commodatum constitutes an adverse possession on the part of the owner Held: No. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. Petitioner repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes. Quintos et al. vs. Beck November 3, 1939[GRN 46240 November 3, 1939] MARGARITA QUINTOS and ANGEL A. ANSALDO, plaintiffs and appellants, vs. BECK, defendant and appellee. 1. COMMODATUM; OBLIGATION OF THE PARTIES.-The contract entered into between the parties is one of commodatum, because under it the plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant, reserving for herself the ownership thereof; by this contract the defendant bound himself to return the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latter's demand (Clause 7 of the contract, Exhibit "A"; articles 1740, paragraph 1, and 1741 of the Civil Code). The obligation voluntarily assumed by the defendant to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand, means that he should return all of them to the plaintiff at the latter's residence or house. The defendant did not comply with this obligation when he merely placed them at the disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps. 2. ID.; ID.; EXPENSES FOR DEPOSIT OF FURNITURE.-As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latter's demand, the Court could not legally compel her to bear the expenses occasioned by the deposit of the furniture at the defendant's behest. The latter, as bailee, was not entitled to place the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a duty to accept the offer to return the furniture, because the defendant wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps.

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC v. CA G.R. No. L-80294-95 September 21, 1988 Gancayco, J. Doctrine: The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor does not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. Facts: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto since their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed.. After trial on the merits, the land registration court promulgated its Decision confirming the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Heirs of Juan Valdez appealed the decision of the land registration court to the then Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the

3. ID.; ID.; VALUE OF FURNITURE.-As to the value of the furniture, we do not believe that the plaintiff is entitled to the payment thereof by the defendant in case of his inability to return some of the furniture, because under paragraph 6 of the stipulation of facts,the defendant has neither agreed to nor admitted the correctness of the said value. Should the defendant fail to deliver some of thefurniture, the value thereof should be later determined by the trial Court through evidence which the parties may desire to present. 4. COSTS OF LITIGATION.-The costs in both instances should be borne by the defendant because the plaintiff is the prevailing party(section 487 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The defendant was the one who breached the contract of Commodatum, and without any reason to refused to return and deliver all the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand. In these circumstances, it is just and equitable that he pay the legal expenses and other judicial costs which the plaintiff would not have otherwise defrayed. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Vera, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mauricio Carlos for appellants. Felipe Buencamino, Jr. for appellee. IMPERIAL, J.: The plaintiff brought this action to compel the defendant to return to her certain furniture which she lent him for his use. She appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered that the defendant return to her the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps found in the possession of the Sheriff of said city, that she call for the other furniture from the said Sheriff of Manila at her own expense, and that the fees which the Sheriff may charge for the deposit of the furniture be paid pro rataby both parties, without pronouncement as to the costs. The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff and as such occupied the latter's house on M. H. del Pilar street, No. 1175. On January 14,1936, upon the novation of the contract of lease between the plaintiff and the defendant, the former gratuitously granted to the latter the use of the furniture described in the third paragraph of the stipulation of facts, subject to the condition that the defendant would return them to the plaintiff upon the latter's demand. The plaintiff sold the property to Maria Lopez and Rosario Lopez and on September 14, 1936,

these three notified the defendant of the conveyance, giving him sixty days to vacate the premises under one of the clauses of the contract of lease. There after the plaintiff required the defendant to return all the furniture transferred to him for his use. The defendant answered that she may call for them in the house where they are found. On November 5, 1936, the defendant, through another person, wrote to the plaintiff reiterating that she may call for the furniture in the ground floor of the house. On the 7th of the same month, the defendant wrote another letter to the plaintiff informing her that he could not give up the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps because he would use them until the 15th of the same mouth when the lease is due to expire. The plaintiff refused to get the furniture in view of the fact that the defendant had declined to make delivery of all of them. On November 15th, before vacating the house, the defendant deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture belonging to the plaintiff and they are now on deposit in the warehouse situated at No. 1521, Rizal Avenue in the custody of the said sheriff.In their seven assigned errors the plaintiffs contend that the trial court incorrectly applied the law: in holding that they violated the contract by not calling for all the place the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a duty to accept the offer to return the furniture, because the defendant wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps. As to the value of the furniture, we do not believe that the plaintiff is entitled to the payment thereof by the defendant in case of his inability to return some of the furniture, because under paragraph 6 of the stipulation of facts, the defendant has neither agreed to nor admitted the correctness of the said value. Should the defendant fail to deliver some of the furniture, the value thereof should be later determined by the trial court through evidence which the parties may desire to present. The costs in both instances should be borne by the defendant because the plaintiff is the prevailing party (section 487 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The defendant was the one who breached the contract of commodatum, and without any reason he refused to return and deliver all the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand. In these circumstances, it is just and equitable that he pay the legal expenses and other

judicial costs which the plaintiff would not have otherwise defrayed. The appealed judgment is modified and the defendant is ordered to return and deliver to the plaintiff, in the residence or house of the latter, all the furniture described in paragraph 3 of the stipulation of facts Exhibit A. The expenses which may be occasioned by the delivery to and deposit of the furniture with the Sheriff shall be for the account of the defendant. The defendant shall pay the costs in both instances. So ordered. LUCIA TAN, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ARADOR VALDEHUEZA and REDICULO VALDEHUEZA, defendants-appellants. Facts: An action instituted by the plaintiffappellee Lucia Tan against the defendantsappellants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza for (a) declaration of ownership and recovery of possession of the parcel of land described in the first cause of action of the complaint, and (b)consolidation of ownership of two portions of another parcel of (unregistered) land described in the second cause of action of the complaint, purportedly sold to the plaintiff in two separate deeds of pacto de retro. Parcel of land described in the first cause of action was the subject matter of the public auction sale in Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, wherein the TAN was the highest bidder .Due to the failure of defendant Arador Valdehueza to redeem the said land within the period of one year as being provided by law, MR. VICENTE D. ROA who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff executed an ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE in favor of the plaintiff LUCIA TAN. Civil case 2002 was a complaint for injunction filed by Tan on July 24, 1957 against the Valdehuezas, to enjoin them "from entering the above-described parcel of land and gathering the nuts therein ...." This complaint and the counterclaim were subsequently dismissed The Valdehuezas appealed to the lower court alleging that it erred in making a finding on the econd cause of action that the transactions between the parties were simple loan, instead, it should be declared as equitable mortgage. Held: The trial court treated the registered deed of pacto de retro as an equitable mortgage butconsidered the unregistered deed of pacto de retro "as a mere case of

simple loan, secured bythe property thus sold under pacto de retro," on the ground that no suit lies to foreclose anunregistered mortgage. It would appear that the trial judge had not updated himself on lawand jurisprudence; he cited, in support of his ruling, article 1875 of the old Civil Code anddecisions of this Court circa 1910 and 1912.Under article 1875 of the Civil Code of 1889, registration was a necessary requisite for thevalidity of a mortgage even as between the parties, but under article 2125 of the new CivilCode (in effect since August 30,1950), this is no longer so. 4If the instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is nonetheless binding between the parties. (Article 2125, 2nd sentence).The Valdehuezas having remained in possession of the land and the realty taxes having beenpaid by them, the contracts which purported to be pacto de retro transactions are presumed tobe equitable mortgages, 5 whether registered or not, there being no third parties involved.