NOTES

Development of Muslims
Comparing Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh in the early 2000s
Kancha Ilaiah

By the early 2000s Muslims in Gujarat were far behind those in Andhra Pradesh in terms of indicators of community well-being, such as educational attainment, industrial employment and public sector employment. Studying the well-being of the Muslim community in Gujarat is important in the context of the claims of Narendra Modis much hyped Gujarat development model. This article seeks to understand the status of the Muslim community in Gujarat in the period prior to the 2002 violence and compare the situation with that in AP, which has a somewhat similar prole.

ujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi has moved into national politics with an ambition to become the prime minister of India. He has made the Gujarat model of development his slogan. In other words, India should become Gujarat and he would make it happen. If the Gujarat model of development has positives for all sections of people, there is nothing wrong if that model is adopted for the whole nation. Any model of development has to improve the lives of the poorest of the poor, while paving a way towards equality of all citizens, with the assurance that the future of the nation is safe in the given global economic, social and cultural environment. Inclusive Development? Any model of development, in the Indian context, has to assure that it transforms and empowers the tribals, dalits, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and minorities, who by and large, do not stand on an equal footing with other communities that are historically advantaged. A model that has already been experimented in parts of the country and that ensures upward mobility of the socially disadvantaged people should be seen as positive. Narendra Modi, who belongs to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with his early training with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), has been attacked by his critiques for his communal politics. His role as the chief minister of Gujarat for a period of about 12 years is also judged in the light of the 2002 communal carnage that Gujarat Muslims suffered. But there are hardly any studies to show how the Gujarat administrative model empowered, in real terms, the tribals, dalits, OBCs and minorities, without considering the 2002 carnage.
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The Centre for Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, Maulana Azad National Urdu University, Hyderabad intends to examine the basic model of development of Gujarat with regard to the Muslim community. Our approach is that the development of the Muslim community must be seen independent of other factors like communal carnages. If the massive 2002 suffering of the Muslim community is treated as an accidental occurrence and Narendra Modi has overcome that incident to administer the state for development of all including Muslims, a different criteria should be adopted to judge the administration. In order to bring clarity to the issue we adopted a compare-and-contrast method to judge the development of Muslim communities in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh (AP), as their population ratio is more or less the same. As per the Census of India 2001, Gujarat has a Muslim population of 9.1% of the total state population whereas AP has 9.2%. This article therefore compares the development of the community in key areas in 2001. This shows where Muslims of Gujarat stood by the time Narendra Modi took over the reins of Gujarat in comparison with where the community stood in AP. Education The literacy rate of Gujarat Muslims was 73.5% whereas in AP it was of 68%. Gujarat Muslim education was closely linked to the other communities as they too are Gujarati speaking. In AP, Muslim education is divided into two languages Urdu and Telugu. Though the basic literacy level of Gujarat Muslims was slightly better, overall, in terms of each level of education AP Muslims were doing much better (Graph 1, p 75). Up to primary school, in terms of school attendance, communities in both states were at the same level 74.9% in Gujarat and 74.7% in AP. Those who completed middle school in Gujarat constituted 45.3% whereas in AP it was 52.6%. As they move on to matriculation, just 26.1% of Gujarat Muslims could complete, whereas 40.6% of AP Muslims could complete high school education. This obviously shows that the
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The author thanks Mohasina Anjum Ansari for committed and informed assistance. Kancha Ilaiah (ilaiahk@rediffmail.com) is with the Centre for Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, Maulana Azad National Urdu University, Hyderabad.

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Graph 1: Literacy Rates
73.50% 68.00% Andhra Pradesh Gujarat 45.30% 40.60% 26.10% 9.10% 9.20% 5% Population Literacy Rate Completed Primary School Completed Middle School Completed Matriculation Graduation 52.60% 74.90% 74.70%

9.60%

Source: Sachar Committee Report.

child labour is involved. We have no data to compare child labour in Gujarat and AP. A targeted study needs to be taken up for this purpose. Further, we look at available data about their respective share of employment in agriculture, small-scale industry, and state employment (Graph 4). In terms of state employment in sectors like education, health, police, transport and judiciary, Gujarat is far behind AP. In agriculture, it was 4.8% in both the states. Representation By and large, the urbanisation levels of Gujarat and AP of the Muslim community was the same. In fact, in AP the urbanisation process was rather rapid in the Telangana region where the community was

dropout rate in Gujarat was far higher in 2001 compared to AP in the same year. What was more surprising was that Gujarat Muslims were completing graduation only to the tune of 5% whereas 9.6% of Muslims could complete graduation in AP. This had serious implications on their access to the job market for employment with better pay. Since Gujarat Muslims were more integrated in terms of language, living in big villages where the population was 1,000 and below, they had good access to education facilities at the primary level. For villages of this size with at least 40% Muslim population, 98.7% Muslims had access to educational facilities whereas in AP it was slightly lower at 97.7% (Graph 2). Access to Public Utilities But the access to primary health facilities for Mulsims was much better in Gujarat (52.9%) than in AP (22.9%). The availability of post and telegraph services for Muslims were more or less equal with 56.8% in Gujarat and 55.9% in AP. Bus stop availability was 93% in Gujarat and 72.9% in AP. Even in access to pucca roads Gujarat Muslims were better placed at 69.6%, whereas in AP it was 67.8%. Employment Because of the difference in higher education levels between Gujarat and AP, the representation of Muslim workers in the manufacturing sector, where better wages are paid, the situation in Gujarat was worse. In Gujarat 13.3% of workers were Muslims, as against 19.6% in AP. This is an important indicator of development. Gujarat being a far more industrially advanced state than AP, Muslim
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employment levels in Gujarat should have been higher than AP. Gujarat is also more advanced in terms of trade, where Muslim participation was 22.7%, slightly higher than AP where it was 20%. But in terms of selfemployment where Muslims sweat day

Graph 2: Villages Where Population Is Less Than 1,000 and Population of Muslims Is More Than 40% in 2001
98.30% 97.70% 56.80% 93.00% 72.90% 52.90% 22.90% Gujarat Andhra Pradesh Post and Telegraph Service Available Bus Stop Available Pucca Approach Road Available 55.90% 69.60% 67.80%

Facility of Facility of Primary Education Health Centre Available Available Source: Sachar Committee Report.

Graph 3: Percentage of Muslim Workers in 2004-05

53.70% 54.50% Gujarat 13.30% 19.60% 22.70% Andhra Pradesh 20%

Manufacturing Trading Sector Source: Sachar Committee Report.

Self-employed

and night, Gujarat and AP present a similar picture 53.7% and 54.5%, respectively (Graph 3). The self-employment of Muslims of both Gujarat and AP ranges from family businesses to occupations such as cycle repair services, vehicle and tube repair services. This is where Muslim

spread out with substantial ownership of agrarian property including the ownership of vast jagirs. But after Police Action in 1948 even the Muslim landlords migrated to urban areas for safety and community support. The Muslim community in the Nizam state was terrorised at the time of Police Action in 1948. Once united Andhra Pradesh was formed, Muslims preferred to live in urban and semi-urban areas both for protection and survival. The transformation of the Razakar force into All India Majilis-eIttehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) served as a protection force as well as a political mobiliser for the community. Even by
16.30% 14.60% 10.00% 7.90% 6.40% 1.50%

Graph 4: Percentage Share of Muslim Workers in 2002-05

Andhra Pradesh Gujarat 6.80% 4.80% 4.80% 5.80%

8.80% 5.40%

4.50%

5.60%

Agriculture

Small-Scale Industry

State Employment

Education Department

Health Department

Home Department

Transport Department

Source: Sachar Committee Report.

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2001 there was no independent political platform to articulate the Muslim interests in Gujarat. The Gujarat Muslim community did not produce a political force of their own as the AP Muslims had done. Public-Sector Employment If we examine Graph 4 we notice that the employment level of Gujarat Muslims was far lower than AP during this period. Given that Gujarat was known as a highly industrialised state by then, the low level of Muslim employment in the state sector speaks for itself. Only 5.8% of employees in the small-scale industry in Gujarat were Muslims as against 6.8% in AP. In state employment on average, 5.4% were Muslims in Gujarat as against 8.8% in AP. In the education sector (teachers, lecturers, university professors and other tertiary jobs) Gujarat Muslims constituted 4.5% of those employed compared to 7.9% Muslims in AP. Even if we consider the special Urdu medium schools and colleges that gave better employment opportunities to AP Muslims, the general exclusion of the Muslim community in the education sector of Gujarat could only mean lack of preferential treatment in Gujarats policy framework. Lower education level from middle school onwards and lower employment in educational institutions had its impact on other sectors as well. The health sector, for example, was worst represented. Muslims in this sector in Gujarat constituted just 1.5% as against 6.4% in AP. Similarly in home (police) department, Muslims in Gujarat were very poorly (5.6%) represented, as against 14.6% in AP. This may be due to discriminatory recruitment in Gujarat and the lack of leadership to lobby on behalf of the community. The only sector where Gujarat Muslims were better represented than AP was in transport, where 16.3% of those employed were Muslims as against 10% in AP. This also may be because the jobs in transport sector were low-paying (like drivers, cleaners and so on) and also Muslim youth were better trained to acquire those skills. It must be noted that even in AP, Muslim representation is higher than their population ratio in transport. But in critical sectors like the judiciary, data for Gujarat is not
76

available and in AP Muslims constituted 5% of those employed. What Does This Mean? One major conclusion that can be drawn from this comparative analysis is that in spite of several setbacks to Muslims in AP (like the suppression in 1948, recurring communal riots in the Telangana region) a gradual upward mobility could be seen in all walks of life. But in Gujarat such upward mobility was slow and skewed. Gujarat Muslims faced one major riot in 1969, before the 2002 massacre. The 1985 riot was mainly a caste riot that was started by anti-reservationists. In that sense Muslims of Gujarat were much more integrated than that of AP Muslims. The communitarian identity of AP Muslims was stronger with visible communication channels such as their own newspapers, TV channels, a political party (AIMIM) and other channels of mobilisation. Gujarat Muslims do not have their own newspapers to represent their problems, culture and history. Identity formation of Muslims in Gujarat was weak. Even if we assume that the assimilation of Gujarat Muslims into the Gujarati population was better than that of AP Muslims because of their linguistic homogeneity, their economic, social and educational conditions do not reect

the same. Assimilation should be meant for upward mobility, not for underdevelopment. What we propose based on the analysis of data available till the beginning of the 2000s, is that a similar comparative study of the same two states should be under taken for the period when Narendra Modi was in power.1 This will give us a clearer picture about the nature of development and how inclusive or exclusive development was during his tenure.
Note
1 After 2002 the Gujarat Muslim community got national attention but before that it appears they were by and large taken for granted. Unlike other states till 2002, Gujarat was known for its caste communalism, as this was the only state where the upper castes conducted a riot against the Other Backward Classes. There are no studies to give us clarity on how Narendra Modi tackled caste communalism in Gujarat. What kind of inclusive development mechanisms were adopted to de-communalise caste relations in Gujarat? Ornit Shani (2007) in her book Communalism, Caste and Hindu Nationalism examined the 1985 riots; but what happened to that caste-communal consciousness later, particularly during the tenure of Narendra Modi has not been studied.

References
Shani, Ornit (2007): Communalism, Caste and Hindu Nationalism - The Violence in Gujarat (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press). Sachar, Rajinder et al (2006): A Report on Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India, Prime Ministers High Level Committee, Government of India.

REVIEW OF URBAN AFFAIRS

March 30, 2013
(Un)Settling the City: Analysing Displacement in Delhi from 1990 to 2007 Revitalising Economies of Disassembly: Informal Recyclers, Development Experts and E-Waste Reforms in Bangalore Biometric Marginality: UID and the Shaping of Homeless Identities in the City Protest, Politics, and the Middle Class in Varanasi Revisiting the 74th Constitutional Amendment for Better Metropolitan Governance Governing Indias Megacities: Governing Indias Megacities Gautam Bhan, Swathi Shivanand Rajyashree N Reddy Ursula Rao Jolie M F Wood K C Sivaramakrishnan Ashima Sood

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