Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION April 29, 1957 G.R. No.

L-8957 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANDRES O. FERRER, defendant-appellee. Jacinto Calanta for appellee. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacipico P. de Castro for appellant. Padilla, J.: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the dispositive part of which states: Five (5) days after receipt of a copy of this Order by the prosecution, the information in this case shall be deemed cancelled and released, unless in the meantime the prosecution amends the information so as to allege sufficient facts constituting an offense under section 51 of our Revised Election Code. The information held defective by the trial court reads as follows: The undersigned Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan and the Provincial Fiscals of Nueva Ecija and Batanes, on special detail in Pangasinan by Administrative Orders Nos. 6 and 13, dated January 12 and 27, 1954, respectively, of the Secretary of Justice, accuse Andres G. Ferrer of the offense violation of Sections 51 and 54 in the relation to Sections 51 and 54 in relation to Section 183, 184 and 185 of the revised Election Code, committed as follows: That on or about 10th day of November, 1953, (Election Day), and for sometime prior thereto in the municipality of Binmaley, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Andres G. Ferrer, being then and there a Foreign Affairs Officer, Class III, Department of Foreign Affairs, and classified civil service officer, duly qualified and appointed as such, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, in utter disregard and defiance of the specific and several legal prohibition on the subject, and in disregard of the civil service rules and regulations, induce, influence, sway and make the electors vote in favor of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the following manner, to wit: (1) that sometime before the elections on November 10, 1958, the said accused, Andres G. Ferrer, delivered a speech during a political rally of the Liberal Party in Barrio Caloocan Norte, of the said municipality of Binmaley, Pangasinan, inducing the electors to vote for the candidates of the Liberal Party but more particularly for President Quirino and Speaker Perez; that during said political meeting the said accused caused to be distributed to the people who attended said meeting cigarettes and pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party; and (2) that the said accused, Andres G. Ferrer,

sometime prior to the last elections campaigned in the Barrio of Caloocan Norte, of the said municipality of Binmaley, going from house to house and induced the electors to whom he distributed sample, ballots of the Liberal Party. Contrary to sections 51 and 54 in relation to Sections 183, 184 and 185 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended. (Crim. Case No. 20320.) The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that it charges more than one offense and that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of either section 51 or section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The trial court is of the opinion that causing cigarettes or pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party to be distributed to the people who attended a political meeting, charged against the defendant, does not constitute a violation of section 51 of the Revised Election Code, because it is not giving food for tobacco is not food; nor does it constitute a violation of that part of section 51 which makes unlawfully the contributing or giving, directly or indirectly, of money or things of value, because the information merely charges the defendant with-having caused cigarettes, etc. to be distributed, and it does not state that the cigarette belonged to the defendant and were being given away by him as his contribution for electioneering purposes. True, cigarettes are not food, but they have and are of value and the charge that the defendant caused cigarettes and pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party to be distributed to the people who attended a political meeting mentioned in the information is a sufficient allegation that he gave or contributed things of value for electioneering purposes. If the cigarettes did not belong to him, that is a matter of defense. The trial court is also of the opinion that the defendant is not a classified civil service officer or employee, because to be such it is necessary that he be assigned in the Department of Foreign Affairs under section 6, Republic Act. No. 708 and if and when thus assigned he will for purposes of civil service law and regulations, be considered as first grade civil service eligible, and that even if the prosecution could establish that the defendant at the time of the commission of the violation charged was assigned in the Department of Foreign Affairs under the section just mentioned, still such assignment would not make him a classified civil service officer embraced within the provisions of section 54 of the Revised Election Code, for, according to the trial court, section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the classified civil service embraces all persons not expressly declared to be the unclassified civil service and section 671 enumerates the persons embraced in the unclassified civil service; and concludes; that the defendant is in the unclassified civil service under section 671, paragraph b, of the Revised Administrative Code, because the defendant was appointed by the President first as Foreign Affairs Officer Class III, Department of Foreign Affairs, and later on as Vice Consul the last appointment having been duly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and that the, assignment or detail in the Department of Foreign Affairs would make him by mere legal fiction a first grade civil service eligible under section 6, Republic Act No. 708. The reason advanced by the trial court are defense matters. The allegation in the information that the defendant is a classified civil service officer, duly qualified and appointed as such, for purposes the motion to quash, is deemed admitted. The trial court cannot go beyond the allegations of the information.

Nevertheless, the information is defective, because it charges two violations of the Revised Election Code, to wit: section 51 to which a heavier penalty is attached, and section 54 for which a lighter penalty is provided. And the prosecuting attorneys had that in mind when at the end of the information filed by them they stated: Contrary to Sections 51 and 54 in relation to Sections 183, 184 and 185 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended. Causing cigarettes which are things of value to be distributed, made unlawful by section 51 and punished by section 183, cannot be deemed a necessary means to commit the lesser violation of section 54 were the penalty attached to it taken into consideration. The rule in the case of People vs. Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 536, cited and invoked by the State, has no application to the case, because there the defendant, who was not a duly licensed physician, gave medical assistance and treatment to a certain person and advertised himself and offered services as a physician by means of cards or letterheads and advertisement in the newspapers, latter being a means to commit the former, and both violations are punishable with the same penalty, whereas in the present case causing cigarettes or things of value to be distributed by the defendant to the people who attended a political meeting is a violation distinct from that of electioneering committed by a classified civil service officer or employee. The former has no connection with the latter. If the penalty provided for violation of section 51 and 54 were the same as in the case of the violation of the Medical Law, the rule in the case of People vs. Buenviaje supra, might be invoked and applied. That a violation of section 51 is distinct from that of section 54 is further shown by the fact that a violation of the former may be committed by any candidate, political committee, voter or any other person, whereas a violation of the latter may only be committed by a justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, officer or employee of the Army, member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and classified civil service officer or employee. Under the information in question, if the charges be proved, the defendant may be convicted and sentenced under either section or both. The rule enjoining the charging of two or more offenses in an information has for aim to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge to enable, him to prepare his defense. The State should not heap upon the defendant two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. The order appealed from is affirmed, not upon the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but on the ground that the information charges two different violations, without pronouncement as to costs. Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1208 January 26, 1995 JACINTO MAPPALA, complainant, vs. JUDGE CRISPULO A. NUEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, respondent.

QUIASON, J.: This is an administrative complaint filed by Jacinto Mappala against Judge Crispulo A. Nuez, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela for gross inefficiency, serious misconduct and violation of the code of Judicial Ethics. I In 1989, the Provincial prosecutor of Isabela filed: (1) an information against Alejandro Angoluan for illegal possession of a firearm in violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Criminal Case No. 22-954); (2) an information against Angoluan and five other co-accused for frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 22-955); and (3) an information against Alejandro and Honorato Angoluan for violation of the Omnibus election code (Criminal Case No. 22-965). The complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 22-955 was Jacinto Mappala, the complainant against respondent in this administrative case. All the actions were consolidated and assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, presided by respondent. On December 20, 1993, respondent rendered a consolidated decision in the aforementioned cases, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and considerations, in Criminal Case No. 955, this Court finds that the accused ALEJANDRO ANGOLUAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide. The prescribed penalty is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years orprision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be taken from the penalty one (1) degree lower which is prision correcional. He is therefore sentenced to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correcional as Minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the complainant Jacinto Mappala the sum of P18,514.00 representing hospitalization and medical expenses; and to pay the costs. The accused Honorato Angoluan, Bienvenido Angoluan, Jr., Zaldy Angoluan, Teodoro Zipagan, Jr., and Ramon Soriano are hereby ACQUITTED FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In Criminal Case No. 954, this Court finds the accused ALEJANDRO ANGOLUAN "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Violation of P.D. No. 1866. Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law. The penalty imposed is governed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Section 1 of which provides: Sec. 1 . . . If the offense is punished by other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

The prescribed penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearms under P.D. 1866 is Reclusion Temporal toReclusion Perpetua. The Court hereby sentences him to an imprisonment from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY. The firearm, Exhibit "H", is forfeited to the government. And in Criminal Case No. 965, for Violation of the Omnibus election Code against Alejandro Angoluan and Honorato Angoluan, this Court finds both accused "NOT GUILTY" of the crime and therefore are ACQUITTED (Rollo, pp. 45-46). The said decision is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals. In his letter-complaint dated March 28, 1994, complainant alleged that while the trial of the three cases was terminated in December 1992 and the last pleading in the case, the prosecution's memorandum, was submitted on May 27, 1993, respondent rendered his decision only on December 20, 1993 (Rollo, p. 14). Complainant charged respondent with: (1) gross inefficiency for rendering the decision beyond the reglementary period of ninety days or seven months after the cases were submitted for decision; (2) serious misconduct for acquitting Alejandro Angoluan of violation of the Omnibus Election Code in Criminal Case No. 22-965; and (3) violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics for giving credence to the alibi of the accused Rizaldy Angoluan in Criminal Case No. 22-955 in the absence of any corroborating testimony of any witness (Rollo, pp. 10-11). Complainant likewise accused respondent of accepting bribes in connection with cases pending before him ( Rollo, p. 11). In his comment, respondent averred that the three actions involved grave offenses that required more time in the preparation of the decision. He alleged that he had to await the memorandum of the public prosecutors who requested additional time for the submission thereof ( Rollo, p. 6). He justified the acquittal of Alejandro of violation of the Election Law in Criminal Case No. 965 on the ground that ". . . the firearm was not taken from his person within the precinct but was not taken . . . more than 50 meters away from the precinct" (Rollo, p. 7). Furthermore, he claimed that what the law considered as a crime was the "carrying of firearms within (50) or 100 meters away from the precinct. The firearm was not taken from the accused within the 50 or 100 meters distance from the precinct because in truth and in fact the said firearm was surrendered by the accused two (2) days after the elections. The mistake in the distance is merely a clerical error. But be it 50 meters or 100 meters, still the accused could not be convicted under the said provision, specifically Section 261, Subsection (p) of Article XXII of the Omnibus election Code" (Rollo, p. 7). Respondent claimed that the charge of violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics was utterly irresponsible and baseless, being the handiwork of a disgruntled litigant with the purpose of discrediting his reputation (Rollo, pp. 7-8). Respondent denied having received bribes. II

As to complainant's charge of gross inefficiency, we find that respondent rendered the decision beyond the reglementary period of ninety days, reckoned from May 27, 1993, the date when the last pleading was filed. We are not impressed with respondent's excuse that it took time to resolve the three consolidated actions involving grave offenses. If respondent required more time to resolve the cases, he is not without recourse. He should have asked for more time to decide the cases from this Court, giving the justification therefor. In Alfonso-Cortes v. Maglalang, 227 SCRA 482 (1993), we emphasized "for the guidance of the judges manning our courts, that cases pending before their salas must be decided within the aforementioned period and that failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge" (citing Marcelino v. Cruz, Jr., 121 SCRA 51 [1983]). Respondent acquitted Alejandro Angoluan of violation of Section 261 (p) of the Omnibus Election Code. Said provision reads as follows: Deadly weapons. Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof during the days and hours fixed by law for the registration of voters in the polling place, voting, counting of votes, or preparation of the election returns. However, in cases of affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer or public officer authorized by the Commission to supervise the election is entitled to carry firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving and enforcing the law. In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant herein inside Precinct No. 2 located at the elementary school building in Santo Tomas, Isabela, during the barangay elections on March 28, 1989. Respondent also found that Alejandro was the one who surrendered the gun. To respondent, the surrender of the weapon was an implied admission that it was the one used by Alejandro in shooting complainant. Inspite of all these findings, respondent acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying a deadly weapon inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him while he was the precinct. According to respondent: . . . With respect to the other accused Alejandro Angoluan, although there is evidence to prove that he shot the complainant Jacinto Mappala, the gun which he allegedly used was surrendered by him two (2) days after the incident and he was not apprehended in possession of the gun within 100 meters radius of the precinct. This Court believes that he should not be prosecuted (sic) in violation of Article 22, Section 261, Subsection (p) of the Omnibus Election Code (Rollo, p. 45; Emphasis supplied). To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code, it is not necessary that the deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused carried the deadly weapon "in the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof" during any of the specified days and hours. After respondent himself had found that the prosecution had established these facts, it is difficult to understand why he acquitted Alejandro of the charge of violation of Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code. The charge of serious misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics in connection with the acquittal of Rizaldy Angoluan after sustaining his defense of alibi pertains to respondent's judicial

functions in the appreciation and evaluation of evidence. there is not enough evidence to set aside said finding of fact. For failure of complainant to substantiate his charge that respondent accepted monetary favors in resolving the cases pending before him, we dismiss the same. While the Judiciary is in the process of cleansing its ranks, we do not favor complaints based on mere hearsay. WHEREFORE, respondent is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to be paid within thirty days from receipt hereof, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or of acts calling for disciplinary action will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 133343-44. March 2, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ILDEFONSO BAYONA y CALOSO, accused-appellant. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. TG-2436-95 and TG-2437-95, finding appellant guilty of two (2) counts of rape, sentencing him to death, and ordering him to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for each count of rape. The facts of the case are as follows: On October 31, 1994, at around 3:00 A.M., in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite, appellant entered the room where his daughter, Marilou, and his three (3) sons, Michael, Melvin, and Marlon, were sleeping. Appellant, who was wearing only his briefs, woke up his daughter, pulled her feet and dragged her towards him. Appellant started touching his daughter in her private parts. When Marilou struggled ("nagwawala"), appellant boxed her in the abdomen until she lost consciousness. When Marilou regained consciousness, she noticed that she was no longer wearing her shorts, only her tshirt. She also found blood on her private parts.[1] On November 2, 1994, at around 10 oclock in the evening, appellant again entered the room where his daughter was sleeping. He told her that he would give her everything if she would accede to his sexual desire ("Ibibigay niya ang lahat, pumayag lang ako.") When Marilou refused, he boxed her. Then she lost consciousness. When she woke up, she found herself naked. She could barely stand up because of the pain in her private parts.[2] After the rapes, Marilou stopped going to school. She told her paternal grandmother about the rapes but the latter merely advised her to just ignore it. She also told her paternal uncles about it. On November 11, 1994, two of her uncles, German and Lando Bayona, accompanied by the barangay captain, finally brought her to the Municipal Health Center for examination. [3] While Marilou was

being examined, her maternal aunt, Teresita D. Agaen, who was a Barangay Health Worker, saw the uncles. She asked Lando what they were doing there. He replied that they were having Marilou treated because she was always dizzy. When Marilou came out of the examination room, she saw her aunt and embraced her. She told her aunt that her father raped her. [4] On November 11, 1994, Marilou, assisted by her aunt Teresita, filed a Complaint[5] against her father, alleging that she was raped on three occasions - October 31, 1994, November 2, 1994, and November 8, 1994. During preliminary investigation, appellant could not be located at his address. On January 6, 1995, the investigating judge rendered a Resolution[6] finding probable cause that appellant raped his daughter on two occasions. For some reason, the aforesaid Resolution failed to include the rape committed on November 8, 1994. On April 18, 1995, appellant was charged with two counts of rape under the following Informations:[7] CRIMINAL CASE NO. TG-2436-95 "I N F O R M A T I O N The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, based on a verified complaint filed by one Marilou Bayona, hereby accuses ILDEFONSO BAYONA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows: That on or about the 31st day of October, 1994, in the Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Marilou Bayona, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW. Imus, Cavite, February 13, 1995. (SGD.) OSCAR R. JARLOS Asst. Provincial Prosecutor" CRIMINAL CASE NO. TG-2437-95 "I N F O R M A T I O N The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, based on a verified complaint filed by one Marilou Bayona, hereby accuses ILDEFONSO BAYONA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows: That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1994, in the Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Marilou Bayona, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. Imus, Cavite, Febraury 13, 1995. (SGD.) OSCAR R. JARLOS Asst. Provincial Prosecutor" Upon arraignment on June 24, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Crisostomo Dario, Jr., entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.[8] The two cases were jointly tried.[9] During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Dra. Engracia A. dela Cruz, Municipal Health Officer of Silang Cavite; (2) Private complainant Marilou Derla Bayona, and (3) her aunt, Teresita Derla Agaen. Dra. Cruz testified that she examined the victim on November 11, 1994. She found that the hymen was not intact, the vagina had lacerations at 7 oclock, which refers to the lower left portion of the vagina, and that the vagina easily admitted two fingers. She concluded that it was possible that the victim had sexual intercourse within the past three (3) days.[10] After the prosecution rested, the defense requested for numerous postponements inorder to secure the presence of appellants sons as witnesses. Having failed to do so, appellant was finally presented as sole witness for the defense.[11] Appellant categorically denied the rape charges. He claimed at the time of the alleged rapes, he was then working in Gitasin, Sitio Kaong, Silang, Cavite, which is more or less seven (7) kilometers from their residence where the rapes took place. Because of the distance, he explained he went home only during weekends. He further testified that he was separated from his wife because she eloped with another man, and that she egged their daughter to file the rape charges so that he will be imprisoned and could no longer filed adultery charges against her. He also testified that his daughter filed the rape charges because he spanked her for having an affair with the son of the brother of his wifes paramour.[12] On April 8, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision[13] finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision states: "WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused ILDEFONSO BAYONA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in both criminal cases and sentences him In Criminal Case No. TG-2436-95, to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim Marilou Bayona the sum of P50,000.00 as damages; In Criminal Case No. TG-2437-95, to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim Marilou Bayona the sum of P50,000.00 as damages. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED." Hence, the present automatic review. Appellant now raises the following issues: [14] "I. THE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE INCONCLUSIVE AND WEAK EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION." Appellant contends, and the Office of the Solicitor General concurs, that the trial court erred in imposing the death sentence since the two (2) Informations failed to allege the special qualifying circumstance of relationship between appellant and his daughter. Hence, appellant could only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, and not qualified rape.[15] Appellant, however, assails also the credibility of the victim by pointing out this inconsistency in her testimony - that the victim could not have felt the pain in her private parts during the rape since she testified that she was unconscious at that time. Appellant assails as baseless the conclusions made by examining physician since (1) there was no evidence of external aggression on the victims body, and (2) there was only one vaginal laceration while the victim claimed she was raped three times. The medical certificate, appellant argues, is merely proof of loss of virginity and not of rape. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the victims categorical testimony, which never wavered even under rigorous cross-examination. A daughter would not accuse her own father of such a heinous crime unless it were true. Further, the medical certificate corroborates her testimony that she was indeed raped. In view of the failure to allege the special qualifying circumstance of relationship, the OSG recommends, however, the modification of the penalty and civil indemnity awarded to the victim. The pertinent issues here pertain first, to the credibility of witnesses; second, the sufficiency of the evidence against appellant; and lastly, the correctness of the penalty imposed upon him. Anent the first issue, the well-entrenched rule is that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under crossexamination.[16] Appellate courts are bound by the findings of the trial court in this respect, unless it is shown that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misappreciated certain facts and circumstances which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case. [17] Our own review of the victims testimony confirms the conclusion of the trial court that "her testimony deserves full faith and credence."[18] The alleged inconsistency in her testimony pertaining to the pain she felt during the rape is only a minor detail and should detract from the weight and credibility of her testimony.[19] Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. [20] The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged assault is likewise of utmost importance so as to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.[21] In this case, the victim reported her ordeal to her paternal grandmother, who chose to ignore what happened. The victim turned to her paternal uncles who eventually brought her to the Municipal Health Office for physical examination. The victims conduct after the rapes reaffirm the truth of her charges. Appellant contends that his wife merely used their daughter as an instrument to prevent him from filing adultery charges. This argument is too shallow. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject them to embarrassment and even stigma.[22] In the same vein, it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape at the expense of being ridiculed,[23] merely because he spanked her. Parental punishment is not a good reason for a daughter to falsely accuse her father of rape.[24] It would be the height of depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father for most of his remaining life in jail, if not put him to his death, and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame. [25]

Anent the second issue, we find that the elements of the crime of rape were duly proven by the prosecution. First, carnal knowledge took place between father and daughter as proven by the victims testimony. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.[26] Further, the medical findings corroborate the findings of rape. While no external injuries were found on the body of the victim, we have ruled that it is not indispensable that marks of external bodily injuries should appear on the victim.[27] Medical authorities attest that no mark of violence may be detected if the blow is delivered to the abdomen.[28] Contrary to the assertions of appellant, it was not totally impossible for the victim to sustain only one vaginal laceration despite the repeated rapes. Lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.[29] Second, carnal knowledge took place under circumstances of force and intimidation since appellant would box his daughter to submissiveness. As we have held in one case:[30] "In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the formers moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the fathers parental authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the childrens duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughters will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants." As to the place of commission of the rape, we have held that for rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, or the weather to be fine, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out their evil deed.[31] Thus, rape has been committed even in the same room where other family members also sleep.[32] Regarding the third issue, the basis for the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was the existence of the attendant circumstance of relationship between the offender and the victim pursuant to Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides: "... The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x" A cursory perusal of the two Informations reveal that they failed to allege the age of the victim and her relationship to appellant. As early as People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, 577 (1998)[33] we have ruled that both minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be clearly alleged in the Information and duly proved. In People v. Medina, 300 SCRA 98, 118 (1998), we held: "In a criminal prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every e lement of the crime charged must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."

This doctrine is not a mere technicality; it rests on the constitutional principle that an accused is entitled "to be informed of the nature and cause" of the accusation against him, as stated in the information.[34] Accordingly, appellant can only be convicted of the crime of rape, which for lack of a better term, has been designated as simple rape. We affirm the award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape.[35] The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape without need of further proof, is likewise proper.[36] Relationship between appellant and the victim can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.[37] Pursuant to Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, the presence of one aggravating circumstance justifies the award of exemplary damages. Hence, we likewise award exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 for each count of rape to deter other fathers with perverse or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their daughters.[38] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. TG-2436-95 and TG-2437-95 finding appellant Ildefonso Bayona y Caloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. He is also ORDERED to pay complainant for each count of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 94521 October 28, 1991 OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSIONER HAYDEE B. YORAC OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. G.R. No. 94626 October 28, 1991 OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER ON ELECTIONS and JEJOMAR C. BINAY, respondents. Pedro Q. Quadra for petitioner. Romulo B. Macalintal for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:p

Petitioner Oliver L. Lozano filed these two special civil actions for certiorari, namely: G.R. No. 94521 which seeks the review of the undated order 1 of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac denying the motion for her voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs. Mayor Jejomar C. Binay"; and G.R. No. 94626 which prays for a reversal of the en banc resolution 2 promulgated by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on August 7, 1990 3 dismissing the disqualification petition and criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Mayor Jejomar C. Binay in connection with the January 18, 1988 local elections, and its minute resolution of August 15, 1990 4 denying due course to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The backdrop of this case on record reveals the following antecedent facts: 1. On January 11, 1988, prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections, petitioner and Bernadette Agcorpa, a registered voter of Makati, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against then candidate for mayor Jejomar C. Binay on the ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 million of municipal funds to enhance his candidacy and his entire ticket under the Lakas ng Bansa. 2. The disqualification case was assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC composed of Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac, as presiding officer, and Commissioners Andres R. Flores and Magdara B. Dimaampao, as members. 3. The Second Division, through its Presiding Commissioner, referred the case to the Law Department of respondent commission for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect. On February 4, 1988, Binay filed his counter-affidavit with said department. 4. On June 21, 1988, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioners Yorac and Africa. This was the first of several motions for inhibition filed by petitioner before respondent commission. Petitioner also prayed that the disqualification petition be referred for consideration en banc. Commissioner Yorac denied the motion for inhibition. On August 10, 1988, the COMELEC en banc denied the prayer that the case be heard en banc, ruling that "no substantial reason exists why this case should be taken en banc; and considering finally that the case is set for hearing by the Second Division." 5. On October 26, 1988, petitioner Lozano himself filed a motion to disqualify Commissioner Yorac because she postponed motu proprio a hearing set on the ground that she will study the issue of jurisdiction. Said motion was denied. 6. On November 3, 1988, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2050 which provides that petitions for disqualification filed prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code but not resolved before the elections shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department which shall submit its report to the Commission en banc. Pursuant to said resolution, the Second Division on even date referred back the disqualification case against respondent Binay to the Law Department "before taking any action thereon." 7. On November 8, 1988, petitioner filed another motion praying that the disqualification case be heard and decideden banc invoking therein COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Instead of issuing a formal resolution, respondent COMELEC authorized then Chairman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a member of this Court) to reply to petitioner's counsel.

8. On May 23, 1990, the Law Department submitted its investigation report 5 recommending that criminal charges be filed against respondent Binay for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, as follows: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division) RECOMMENDS as follows: 1. To file the necessary information against Mayor Jejomar Binay before the proper Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, the prosecution thereof to be handled by the Special Prosecution Committee; 2. To dismiss the charge against Mayor Jejomar Binay for threats and intimidation under Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code for lack of evidence; and 3. To dismiss the charge against Conchitina Bernardo for insufficiency of evidence. 9. On July 2, 1990, petitioner filed a motion praying that the disqualification case be, resolved jointly with the investigation report of the Law Department. 10 On July 9, 1990, petitioner filed a third motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioner Yorac for having issued a previous memorandum addressed to the chairman and members of respondent commission expressing her opinion that Binay should first be convicted by the regular courts of the offense of vote buying before he could be disqualified. The full text of said memorandum 6 reads: I submit for the Commission's consideration the matter of the procedural problems in the above case. The chronology of events, so far as this case is concerned, is as follows: 1. SPC No. 88-040 for the disqualification of Jejomar Binay, then candidate for Mayor of Makati was filed on January 11, 1988. It was assigned to the second Division. 2. On July 29, 1988, petitioners filed a motion to set the case for hearing alleging that the Commission on Audit (COA) had officially confirmed the allegations of the complainants. 3. Hearings were actually conducted on August 11, September 12, October 12 and October 19, 1988. 4. On November 3, 1988, the Commission en banc adopted Resolution No. 88-2050, which, inter aliaprovides that: 1. . . . In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the commission may motu proprio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election;

xxx xxx xxx 3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the information for filing with the appropriate court. 5. On the same date, conformable with Resolution No. 88-2050, the Second Division referred SPC No. 88-040 to the Law Department. 6. In the course of the investigation by the Law Department, the case became entangled with procedural difficulties the resolution of which has been sought in the Second Division. My own personal thinking on the matter is that since the preliminary investigation is the determination of criminal liability, with the administrative consequence of removal imposable only as long term sanction, i.e., after final criminal conviction, the matter of procedure in the preliminary investigation is one that should be addressed to the commission en banc rather than to either of its divisions. 11. On August 2, 1990, petitioner received a notice setting the promulgation of judgment en banc for August 6, 1990. Petitioner on August 3, 1990 filed an objection to the promulgation of judgment en banc, allegedly because there was no showing that the case was referred to the commission en banc upon unanimous vote of all the members of the Second Division. 12. In its aforestated August 7, 1990 resolution which is herein assailed, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition for disqualification and the criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Binay. During the promulgation of judgment, petitioner asked that the same be suspended until after the resolution of the legal issues raised involving constitutional and jurisdictional questions. Commissioner Yorac was likewise requested by petitioner to decide the motion for her inhibition. In her undated order subject of the petition in G.R. No. 94521, as stated in limine, Commissioner Yorac denied the motion for for inhibition, stating that: During the deliberations on this case, I seriously considered inhibiting myself from participating and voting despite the flimsy basis which was cited for it. But I became convinced, from the information that was coming in, that the motion was really part of a numbers game, being played out on the basis of information emanating from the Commission itself as to the developments in the deliberation and the voting. Reliable information also shows that approaches have been made to influence the voting. It is for this reason that I do not inhibit myself from the voting in this case consistent with my reading of the law and the evidence. 13. The aforesaid resolution of August 7, 1990 dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 1990, on the ground that "pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling of the Commission is one of the prohibited pleadings, and therefore not allowed under the Rules. Succinctly condensed, the petition filed against respondents COMELEC and Binay raises the following issues:

1. Contrary to the requirement under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, SPC No. 88-040 was referred to the Comission en banc without the required unanimous vote of all the members of the Second Division. 2. The minute resolution of August 15, 1990 is null and void for having been issued without prior notice to the parties and without fixing a date for the promulgation thereof. 3. Respondent commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amount to lack of jurisdiction in not finding Binay guilty of vote- buying, contrary to the evidence presented by petitioner. 7 In G.R. No. 94521, this Court issued on August 16, 1990 a temporary restraining order 8 ordering respondent Commissioner Yorac to cease and desist from participating in the deliberation and resolution of the motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1990 filed in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs. Jejomar Binay."The order was served in the office of Commissioner Yorac on August 17, 1990 at 11:25 A.M. 9 It appears, however, that the motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent commission en banc in a resolution dated August 15, 1990, copy of which was served on petitioner on August 17, 1990 at 12:35 P.M. Consequently, the issue on the inhibition and disqualification of Commissioner Yorac has been rendered moot and academic. Granting arguendo that the petition for inhibition of Commissioner Yorac has not been mooted by the resolution en banc dismissing the main case for disqualification, petitioner's postulation that she should have inhibited herself form hearing the main case, for allegedly having prejudged the case when she advanced the opinion that respondent Binay could only be disqualified after conviction by the regional trial court, is of exiguous validity. In the first place, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 1, Rule 4 thereof, prohibits a member from, among others, sitting in a case in which he has proof. There is no showing that the memorandum wherein Commissioner Yorac rendered her opinion was ever made public either by publication or dissemination of the same to the public. Furthermore, the opinion of Commissioner Yorac was based on prior cases for disqualification filed with the COMELEC wherein prior conviction of the respondent was considered a condition sine qua non for the filing of the disqualification case. 10 We accordingly find no compelling reason to inhibit Commissioner Yorac from participating in the hearing and decision of the case. Similarly, we find the petition in G.R. No. 94626 devoid of merit. Petitioner first avers that under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a case pending in a division may be referred to and decided by the Commissionen banc only on a unanimous vote of all the members of the division. It is contended that SPC No. 88-040 which was pending before the COMELEC's Second Division was referred to the Commission en banc without the required unanimous vote of all the division members, petitioner alleging that Commissioner Andres R. Flores voted for the referral of the petition for disqualification to the division. It is, therefore, the submission of petitioner that the resolution of the Commission en banc dated August 17, 1990 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction and for being unconstitutional. The argument of petitioner is not well taken. COMELEC Resolution No. 1050 issued by the commission en banc on November 3, 1988 is the applicable law in this disqualification case. It provides: xxx xxx xxx

RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646 otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987: 1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts complained (of), the Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate. In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election. 2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of the Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the Commission. Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. 3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the information for filing with the appropriate court. 11 xxx xxx xxx Contrary to petitioner's submission that said resolution has been repealed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which took effect on November 15, 1988, there is nothing in the resolution which appears to be inconsistent with the procedural rules issued by the COMELEC. Firstly, Resolution No. 2050 was passed by reason of the variance in opinions of the members of respondent commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of disqualification filed pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, and the manner of disposing of the same had not been

uniform. Hence, the COMELEC decided to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of these disqualification cases. Within this purpose in mind, the Commission en bancadopted Resolution No. 2050. The transitory provision under Section 2, Rule 44 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that these rules shall govern all cases pending at the time of effectivity thereof, except to the extent that in the opinion of the commission, or the court in appropriate cases, an application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply. We believe that Resolution No. 2050 qualifies and should be considered as an exception to the generally retroactive effect of said rules. Secondly, prior to the issuance of Resolution No. 2050, petitioner had filed several motions with the Second Division asking for the referral of the disqualification case to the Commission en banc. After the COMELEC en bancissued Resolution No. 2050, petitioner filed another motion for the referral of the case to the Commission en banc, specifically invoking Resolution No. 2050. 12 In the words of petitioner in his said motion, under the aforesaid resolution, "once the petition for disqualification is forwarded to the Law Department, the case is deemed en banc because the report is submittedEn banc by the law Department." Petitioner having invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc is now estopped from questioning the same after obtaining an adverse judgment therefrom. Thirdly, Commissioner Andres R. Flores, who opined that the disqualification case should first be resolved by the Second Division, has since then clarified his position after he was reminded that Resolution No. 2050, which he had admittedly "completely forgotten" had "laid down a definite policy on the disposition of disqualification cases contemplated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. 13 Lastly, Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in general. Hence, as between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail. Anent the propriety of the issuance of the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, suffice it to say that the requirement of notice in the promulgation of resolutions and decisions of the COMELEC embodied in Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules does not apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision is not allowed under Section 1, Rule 13 thereof. Respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for disqualification and in holding that respondent Binay is not guilty of vote buying, ruled as follows: xxx xxx xxx The commission concurs with the findings of the Law Department on enumeration Nos. 2 and 3 but rejects exception to the recommendation for prosecution of respondent Binay under No. 1 therefor, it appearing that there is a clear misappreciation of the evidence submitted considering the inconsistencies in the testimonies of material witnesses for the petitioners, as well as the correct interpretation and application of the law cited as basis for the prosecution of respondent Binay. xxx xxx xxx The seventeen (17) Affidavits submitted by petitioners attached to their original petition for disqualification dated January 11, 1988, differ form the twenty (20)

affidavits attached to the memorandum of petitioners filed with the Commission (Second Division) on August 22, 1988. The records of the case do not show that these seventeen (17) affidavits attached to the original petition were affirmed by the affiants during the investigation conducted by the Law Department of this Commission. Of the twenty (20) affidavits appended to the Memorandum of August 22, 1988, only five (5) of the affiants were able to affirm their testimonies before hearing officer Alioden Dalaig of the Law Department of this Commission . . . xxx xxx xxx In his counter affidavit, respondent Jejomar C. Binay denied the allegations in the petition for disqualification and interposed the defense that: The Christmas gift-giving is an annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati ever since the time of Mayors Estrella and Yabut in the spirit of yuletide season wherein basic and essential items are distributed to the less fortunate and indigent residents of Makati out of funds appropriated for the purpose duly budgeted and subject to audit by the Commission on Audit and same were prepared sometime on October 1987 long before I filed my certificate of candidacy and ceased to be the Acting Mayor of Makati, . . . The alleged ticket bearing my name, assuming its existence, indicates nothing of significance except that of a Christmas and New Year greeting and is not suggestive of anything which may be considered or interpreted to be political in nature such as indorsing my candidacy for that matter. . . . xxx xxx xxx It is undisputed that at the time the supposed "gift-giving" transpired between the periods of December 22-30, 1987, respondent Binay was no longer Mayor of the Municipality of Makati having resigned from the position on December 2, 1987, to pursue his candidacy for re-election to the same position. The OIC Mayor of Makati on the dates complained of, December 22-30, 1987, was OIC Mayor Sergio S. Santos who stated in his affidavit dated February 4, 1988, that he was Officer-in-Charge of Makati, Metro Manila, from December 2, 1987 to February 2, 1988, and that as such he implemented on December 18, 1987 the municipal government's annual and traditional distribution of Christmas gifts. There is ample evidence to show that it was not respondent Binay who "gave" the plastic bags containing Christmas gifts to the witnesses who executed affidavits for the petitioners. The "giver" was in fact the Municipality of Makati. And this is evidenced by the following documents attached to the records of this case: 1) Certification dated January 11, 1988 issued by OIC Roberto A. Chang attached as Annex A to respondent Binay's counter affidavit dated February 5, 1988. 2) COA Report dated January 11, 1988 attached as Annex "R" to the pleading denominated as Motion to Set Hearing filed by complainant Oliver Lozano dated July 26, 1988, filed in connection with SPC No. 88040 for disqualification against respondent Binay;

The findings of the COA Report itself (dated June 21, 1988) upon which petitioners rely heavily in their disqualifications case against respondent Binay, identify the "giver" of the Christmas gifts as the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Binay. . . . xxx xxx xxx Respondent Binay's allegation that the gift-giving was an annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati was not denied nor disputed by the petitioners who in fact made capital of the aforequoted findings of the Commission on Audit in their charge against respondent Binay for alleged misuse of public funds. Also, petitioners in their latest pleading filed with the Commission on July 2, 1990, entitled "Motion To Resolve The Disqualification Case Jointly With The Investigation Report of the Law Department" instead of rebutting respondent Binay's allegation that the Christmas gift giving is an annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati ever since the time of Mayors Estrella and Yabut, merely stated that: . . . Assuming arguendo that Mayor Estrella had practiced this gift-giving every Christmas, the fact is, that there had been no electoral campaign on-going during such distribution and/or no election was scheduled during Mayor Estrella's tenure. "This is also true in the case of Mayor Yabut." More Petitioners' documentary evidence, among which are Exhibits "A", "A-1"; "A-2"; "A-20";"B"; "B-1"; "B-2"; "B-25"; "C-1"; "C-2"; "C-27"; "D"; "E" and "F", all show indubitably that the Christmas packages which were distributed between the periods of December 22-30, 1987, were ordered, purchased and paid for by the Municipality of Makati and not by respondent Binay. There is more than prima facieproofs to show that those gift packages received by the witnesses for petitioners were intended as Christmas presents to Makati's indigents in December 1988. It would therefore appear from the evidence submitted by the petitioners themselves that the giver, if any, of the Christmas gifts which were received by the witnesses for the petitioners was in fact, the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Jejomar C. Binay. The presence of respondent Binay, if at all true at the time the gifts were distributed by the Municipality of Makati to the recipients of the Christmas gifts, was incidental. It did not make respondent Binay as the "giver" of those Christmas gifts. Nor did the giving of such gifts by the Municipal Government of Makati influence the recipients to vote for respondent Binay considering that the affiants themselves who testified for the petitioners admitted and were aware that the gift packages came from the Municipality of Makati and not from respondent Jejomar C. Binay. The foregoing conclusion is confirmed by petitioners' witnesses in the persons of Lolita Azcarraga, Johnson Carillo, Rommel Capalungan, Renato Leonardo, Manuel Allado, Edwin Pascua, Wilberto Torres, Apolonio De Jesus, Caridad Reposar, Artemus Runtal and Jose Ermino who, in their sworn statements, uniformly described the gift package as labelled with the words "Pamaskong Handog ng Makati", a clear indication that the "giver" of the Christmas gifts was indeed the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Binay. There is one aspect of this case which somehow lends credence to respondent Binay's claim that the instant petition is a political harassment. It is noted by the commission that while the criminal indictment against respondent Binay is for alleged

violation of Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioners did not implead as party respondents the affiants who received the Christmas packages apparently in exchange for their votes. The law on "vote buying" [Section 261 (a) supra] also penalizes "vote-buying" and "vote-selling", then the present indictment should have been pursued against both respondent Binay and against the affiants, against the former for buying votes and against the latter for selling the votes. 14 xxx xxx xxx We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas season is not refuted. That it was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that respondent was trying to influence and induce his constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too far. Petitioner deduces from this act of giftgiving that respondent was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote-buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence or, at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in vote-buying. We are convinced that the evidence presented, as swell as the facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not warrant such finding. Finally, we have consistently held that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, and the same is true under the present one, this court cannot review the factual findings of the Commission on Elections absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitratriness in its decision, order or resolution. Thus: The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the certiorari jurisdication of this court as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, "not as broad as it used to be" under the old Constitution and it "should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process." Moreover, the legislative construction of the constitutional provision has narrowed down "the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review." And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, a case decided under the Constitution of 1935, this Court speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion, ruled that "this Court can not . . . review rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections," as there is "no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to place the [said] Commission created and explicitly made "independent" by the Constitution itself on a lower level" than statutory administrative organs (whose factual findings are not "disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings.") Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in proceedings brought either "as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari. . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorari is one of jurisdiction lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" while "petitions for review oncertiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law." The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon and Bashier. Indeed, as early as the year 1938, applying Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, this Court held that the Electoral Commission's "exclusive jurisdiction" being clear from the language of the provision, "judgment rendered . . . in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except "upon a clear showing of

such arbitrary and improvement use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Originally lodged in the legislature, that exclusive function of being the "sole judge" of contests "relating to the election, returns, and qualifications "of members of the legislature was transferred "in its totality" to the Electoral Commission by the 1935 Constitution. That grant of power, to use the language of the late justice Jose P. Laurel, "was intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature . . . " . . . . . . A review of the respondent Commission's factual findings/conclusions made on the basis of the evidence evaluated is urged by the petitioner, "if only to guard against or prevent any possible misuse or abuse of power." To do so would mean "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment" rendered on matters within the exclusive function of the Commission, which is proscribed by the Aratuc and other decisions of this Court. . . . 15 The charge against respondent Binay for alleged malversation of public funds should be threshed out and adjudicated in the appropriate proceeding and forum having jurisdiction over the same. Consequently, it was properly dismissed by the Commission on Elections. WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac in G.R. No. 94521 and the challenged resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections subject of the petition in G.R. No. 94626 are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued in G.R. No. 94521 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., J., took no part. Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 87743 August 21, 1990 ROBERT F. ONG, petitioner vs. MARIA TERESITA HERRERA-MARTINEZ, THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA and THE CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria for petitioner. F.B. Santiago, Nalus, Magtalas, Catalan & Associates for respondents. Nemesio C. Garcia, Jr. for City Council.

PARAS, J.: Petitioner Robert F. Ong assails the appointment and assumption of duties as Councilor in the City Council of Manila of respondent Ma. Teresita Herrera-Martinez, in place of deceased Councilor Saturnino Herrera who represented the Third District of Manila. It appears that Saturnino Herrera, who was the father of respondent Martinez, was one of the Liberal Party candidates duly elected as Councilor for Manila's Third District in the local elections of January 18, 1988. He performed his duties as such councilor until his death on October 14, 1988, thus leaving the position open for the appointment of a qualified replacement from the same political party where the deceased councilor belonged. Petitioner, who was a defeated candidate of the Liberal Party in the Third District of Manila, on the strength of an indorsement by the Treasurer of the said party in the district which was allegedly supported by 80% of the ward leaders of the party of the same district as embodied in their resolution, was appointed on February 9, 1989 as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) by the Secretary of Local Government to fill the vacancy created by the late Councilor Saturnino Herrera. On the same date, petitioner took his oath of office as such councilor after which the Secretary of Local Government informed Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. and Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer Danilo Lacuna of the appointment of petitioner. Likewise, in his lst Indorsement of March 13, 1989, the Undersecretary of Local Government forwarded petitioner's appointment to Presiding Officer of the City Council Danilo Lacuna. In the regular session of the City Council held on March 9, 1989, said Council, acting on the letter of the Secretary of Local Government dated February 9, 1989 informing them of the four appointments including that of petitioner, moved to exclude petitioner and the other appointees from the session hall. In the subsequent session of the Council on March 14, 1989, petitioner and his co-appointees were formally excluded from the session hall with sixteen (16) councilors voting for such exclusion and none against it, with the rest of the Council members abstaining. The records show that respondent Martinez went through the legal formalities or standard procedure prior to her appointment to the vacated position subject of this. controversy. Thus, on November 4, 1988, nine out of the eleven incumbent LP Councilors in the City Council endorsed the appointment of respondent per their resolution. This resolution was forwarded to the Office of the Chairman of the Liberal Party, Manila Chapter. On March 1, 1989, aforesaid Chairman, in turn, nominated respondent for appointment per his letter-nomination to President Corazon Aquino thru the Secretary of Local Government. On March 8, 1989, Senate President Jovito Salonga as National Head of the Liberal Party was furnished with a copy of this letter-nomination. On March 13, 1989, Congressman Leonardo Fuguso as President of the LP Third District Chapter also nominated respondent to National President Salonga of the Party. President Salonga, in turn, nominated respondent to Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of Local Government pursuant to Section 50 of the Local Government Code. On March 17, 1989, Secretary Santos, acting for the President, issued an appointment to respondent. Then on March 21, 1989, the first session day after respondent's appointment, the City Council, by a vote of twenty-four members in favor with no member opposing recognized her as member of said Council.

Finally, the Presiding Officer of the City Council directed its Secretariat to include the name of respondent in the payroll of the City Council. Respondent thus assumed and performed her duties as Councilor for the Third District of Manila until the restraining order of the Court issued on April 20, 1989 was received by respondent. This petition now seeks to annul the appointment of respondent Martinez and to declare petitioner to be the holder of the position of Councilor in place of deceased Saturnino Herrera. Petitioner anchors his appeal on the following grounds: 1. The Secretary of the Department of Local Government, in appointing respondent Martinez on March 17, 1989, violated the election ban on appointments under Res. No. 2054 of the Comelec dated December 7, 1988 since her appointment was not cleared for exemption from the election ban and, therefore, the same was made beyond and in excess of the Secretary's authority and by reason of which, the appointment is null and void. 2. Respondent Martinez is not a member of the Liberal Party and cannot be appointed to the position of Councilor, a vacancy created by the death of a member of said Party. 3. Petitioner's appointment is valid, complete and beyond recall. 4. Petitioner is entitled to the position held by respondent. Respondent, on the other hand, argues: 1. Petitioner misled the Court in claiming that he has a right to the contested position. His appointment was indorsed only by the Treasurer of the LP Chapter, 3rd District of Manila. The Treasurer's indorsement was not known nor authorized by the head of the LP in said district. Neither was the nomination brought to the attention of the Chairman of the LP, Manila Chapter. The proper procedure was not observed by petitioner. The unauthorized action of petitioner cannot be cured or ratified by an alleged resolution of 80% of ward leaders and which resolution was adopted long after the appointment of petitioner. Hence, petitioner's appointment was void from the very beginning for lack of authority of the Treasurer who nominated him. Contrary to petitioner's claim, respondent also contends that the former has not assumed office; neither has he exercised or performed the functions of the position because he was prevented from doing so by the outright refusal of the City Council to recognize his appointment. 2. Petitioner has no right to the position and for which reason, he lacks the legal personality to institute the present petition for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition. While petitioner claims that he took his oath on February 9, 1989 which was a calculated move to avoid the election ban on appointments, he used a Residence Certificate issued on February 22, 1989 only. This means that he could not have taken his alleged oath before the issuance of the residence certificate. 3. The appointment of respondent possesses all the requisites of a valid appointment according to legal and regular procedures. She avers that her appointment was indorsed by nine out of eleven LP incumbent councilors and that her nomination was favorably indorsed by the Liberal Party hierarchy from the Chairman of the Third District, thru the Chairman of the Manila Chapter up to the National President of the LP; and, that she was duly appointed on the basis of the series of nominations of the LP hierarchy.

4. The appointment of respondent is not covered by the election ban contemplated under Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The case for respondent appears meritorious. Respondent had gone through the regular and standard nomination process which had been officially acknowledged by the Secretary of Local Government. Sec. 50 of the Local Government Code specifically provides: In case of permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, sangguniang bayan or sangguniang barangay, the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Minister of Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang panglunsod of highly urbanized and component cities; the governor, in the case of sangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay members. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the political party of the sangguniang member who caused the vacancy, and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. (Emphasis supplied) Since deceased Councilor Saturnino Herrera who had caused the contested vacancy comes from the Liberal Party, it follows that his mode of replacement should be governed by the standing rules of the aforenamed Party. Thus, We quote the pertinent sections of the 1967 Liberal Party Revised Rules (1971 Reprint furnished by the Comelec): Rule 32. Approval of Resolution of District, Provincial, City of Municipal Government . Resolutions adopted by provincial, district, city or municipal committee shall not be final unless approved by the National Directorate, the Executive Committee, or the Party President. (Under Chapter Ill on The Manila City Special Rules) Thus, too, Section A (3) of Rule 10 of the Liberal Party Rules (on the Powers of the National Directorate) provides: 3) To choose and proclaim official candidates of the Party for provincial positions, and whenever necessary, convenient or proper, also for Municipal and City positions, in accordance with the requirements of these Rules. Conformably with the aforequoted provisions of the Liberal Party Rules, all resolutions, which may include resolutions nominating replacements for deceased city councilors, should first be approved either by the National Directorate, the Executive Committee or the Party President in order that said resolutions could be considered final and valid. Logically and by analogy, the National Directorate or in its stead, the Executive Committee or the Party President may choose and nominate the party's proposed appointee, from among its members, to the position vacated by a deceased city councilor. Correspondingly, We quote hereunder the body of the letter-nomination of the then LP National President Jovito R. Salonga explicitly manifesting the full support of the party hierarchy for herein respondent. Thus

I hereby nominate in behalf of the Liberal Party of which I am the incumbent President Ms. Maria Teresita Herrera-Martinez, to take the place of Councilor Saturnino C. Herrera of the Liberal Party who passed away on October 14,1988. Ms. Martinez is likewise the recommendee of the Liberal Party, Manila Chapter headed by former Assemblyman Lito Atienza. She is also recommended by Congressman Leonardo Fuguso. Please be advised that the Liberal Party, under which the late Councilor Saturnino C. Herrera was elected, has no nominee to the vacated position other than Ms. Maria Teresita Herrera-Martinez. This is also to serve notice that no other person is authorized to nominate any LP member to any vacancy in the City Council of Manila." (Emphasis supplied) Acting on the solid recommendation of the LP hierarchy, from the district level up to the national level, the Secretary of Local Government correspondingly issued the letter-appointment to respondent Martinez, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: Upon the recommendation of the President of the Liberal Party and the Chapter President of the Liberal Party, 3rd District of the City of Manila, and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, City of Manila, Vice Councilor Saturnino C. Herrera. (Emphasis supplied) Notably, respondent's appointment was accepted or recognized by the City Council in its session of March 21, 1989. The minutes of said session reveal that twenty-four (24) councilors voted to accept the appointment of respondent and not a single member objected to or opposed the acceptance. Right then and there, the Presiding Officer announced the acceptance of respondent's appointment and the Chair directed the Secretariat to include her name as a new member of the City Council. In the case of petitioner, however, a very different scenario took place. The letter dated February 9, 1989 of Secretary Luis Santos informing Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer Lacuna that he had appointed petitioner and three other appointees, carried a request that due recognition be accorded to them, particularly petitioner as member of the Council. Petitioner and the other appointees, as per minutes of the Council's session of March 9, 1989, were excluded from the session hall by reason of the seconded motion of the Majority Floor Leader. In the subsequent session of the Council on March 14, 1989, petitioner and his co-appointees were formally excluded from the session hall when sixteen (1 6) members of the Council voted in favor of their exclusion and no one against it. Significantly, such exclusion meant that the City Council refused to recognize their appointments. As a conclusive confirmation of the non-recognition of petitioner's defective appointment, the Secretary of Local Government recalled the former's appointment in his letter of March 17, 1989. The letter thus reads: Dear Mr. Ong: In connection with our letter of February 9,1989, appointing you as Sangguniang Panglunsod member of the City of Manila as a consequence of the death of Councilor Saturnino C. Herrera, please be informed that we are recalling said appointment it appearing that you were not recommended for the position by the appropriate leader of the Liberal Party as mandated by the sub-section b(1) Rule XIX of the, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337). (Emphasis supplied)

Both petitioner and respondent have invoked the election ban imposed under Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The election ban covered the period from February 11 to March 27, 1989 by reason of the Barangay election held on March 28, 1989. Both parties have capitalized on the prohibitive provision for the purpose of having their respective appointments declared illegal or null and void. Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code provides thus: (g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. During the period of forty- five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void. The aforequoted provision does not apply to both assailed appointments because of the following reason: The permanent vacancy for councilor exists and its filling up is governed by the Local Government Code while the appointment referred to in the election ban provision is covered by the Civil Service Law. For having satisfied the formal requisites and procedure for appointment as Councilor, which is an official position outside the contemplation of the election ban, respondent's appointment is declared valid. The issue on the alleged discrepancy between the dates of petitioner's oath and his residence certificate need not be tackled now because it will not anymore affect the recalled appointment of petitioner. If ever, the matter casts a doubt on petitioner's credibility and honesty. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the temporary restraining order is correspondingly LIFTED. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., are on leave,

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115962. February 15, 2000] DOMINADOR REGALADO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Spped DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Negros Oriental, which found petitioner Dominador Regalado, Jr. guilty of violating 261(h) of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), as amended.[2] The Information against petitioner alleged: Josp-ped That on or about January 25, 1988, at Tanjay, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR., [as] OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and illegally TRANSFER one MRS. EDITHA P. BARBA, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the Office of the [M]ayor of Tanjay, from her permanent assignment to a very remote Barangay of Sto. Nio during the election period and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from the Commission on Elections, Manila. The evidence for the prosecution shows that on January 15, 1987, complainant Editha Barba was appointed nursing attendant in the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental by then Officer-InCharge Mayor Rodolfo Navarro.[3] Although she was detailed at, and received her salary from, the Office of the Mayor, she reported for work at the Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay. As Navarro decided to run for mayor of Tanjay in the January 18, 1988 elections, petitioner Dominador Regalado, Jr. was appointed substitute OIC-Mayor. His brother, Arturo S. Regalado, was also a mayoralty candidate. Petitioners brother won in the elections. Four days later, on January 22, 1988, petitioner, still sitting as OIC-Mayor, issued a memorandum to Barba informing her that effective January 25, 1988, she would be reassigned from Poblacion, Tanjay to Barangay Sto. Nio, [4] about 25 kilometers from Poblacion.[5] The transfer was made without the prior approval of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Barba continued to report at the Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay, however. Hence, on February 18, 1988, petitioner issued another memorandum to Barba directing her to explain, within 72 hours, why she refuses to comply with the memorandum of January 22, 1988.[6]Spp-edjo In response, Barba, on February 21, 1988, sent a letter to petitioner protesting her transfer which she contended was illegal.[7] She then filed, on February 16, 1988, a complaint[8] against petitioner for violation of 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, and after preliminary investigation, the Provincial Election Officer of Negros Oriental, Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, charged petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Negros Oriental. On September 27, 1991, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:[9] Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 261, paragraph (h), of the Omnibus Election Code, the accused Dominador S. Regalado,

Jr., is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from one (1) year minimum to three (3) years maximum without the benefit of probation and to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. He is further sentenced to indemnify the offended party, Editha P. Barba, as civil liability arising from the offense charged[,] in the sum of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos . . . . for moral damages. Mi-so As petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied,[10] he elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which, on February 3, 1994, affirmed the lower courts decision. He moved for a reconsideration, but his motion was likewise denied, hence this appeal. Petitioner alleges that I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE RURAL HEALTH UNIT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANJAY, NEGROS ORIENTAL, VIZ-A-VIZ, THE LETTERS OF APPOINTMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT. II. THE MEMORANDUM DID NOT EFFECT A TRANSFER, BUT MERELY A "REASSIGNMENT" OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT. III. EXIGENCIES OF SERVICE WERE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR.[11] Petitioners contentions have no merit. First. The two elements of the offense prescribed under 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, are: (1) a public officer or employee is transferred or detailed within the election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.[12]Ne-xold The implementing rule involved is COMELEC Resolution No. 1937,[13] which pertinently provides: Section 1. Prohibited Acts. .... Effective November 19, 1987 up to February 17, 1988, no public official shall make or cause any transfer or detail whatsoever of any officer or employee in the Civil Service, including public school teachers, except upon prior approval of the Commission. Section 2. Request for authority of the Commission. - Any request for . . . . approval to make or cause any transfer or detail must be submitted in writing to the Commission stating all the necessary data and reason for the same which must satisfy the Commission that the position is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the . . . . filling thereof shall not in any manner influence the election. Petitioner admits that he issued the January 22, 1988 memorandum within the election period set in Resolution No. 1937 without the prior approval of the COMELEC. He contends, however, that he did not violate 261(h) because he merely effected a "re-assignment" and not a "transfer" of personnel by moving Barba from one unit or place of designation (Poblacion, Tanjay) to another (Sto. Nio, Tanjay) of the same office, namely, the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros

Oriental.[14] In support of his contention, he relies upon the following portions of 24 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law):[15]Man-ikx (c) Transfer a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break of service involving the issuance of an appointment. .... (g) Reassignment an employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency. Provided, that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary. Petitioner, however, ignores the rest of 24(c) which provides that: [A transfer] shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of the public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Commission. The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency: Provided, however, That any movement from the non-career service to the career service shall not be considered a transfer. (Emphasis added) Manik-s Thus, contrary to petitioners claim, a transfer under 24(c) of P.D. No. 807 in fact includes personnel movement from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency. Moreover, 261(h) of B.P. No. 881, as amended, provides that it is an election offense for Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission. (Emphasis added) As the Solicitor General notes, "the word transfer or detail, as used [above], is modified by the word whatever. This indicates that any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during the election is covered by the prohibition." [16] Finally, the memorandum itself issued by petitioner to Barba on January 22, 1988 stated that the latter was being "transferred," thus:[17]Man-ikan Effective Monday, January 25, 1988, your assignment as Nursing Attendant will be transferred from RHU I Tanjay Poblacion to Barangay Sto. Nio, this Municipality. You are hereby directed to perform the duties and functions as such immediately in that area. For strict compliance.(Emphasis added) Second. Petitioner next contends that his order to transfer Barba to Barangay Sto. Nio was prompted by the lack of health service personnel therein and that this, in effect, constitutes sufficient justification for his non-compliance with 261(h).[18] The contention has no merit.

It may well be that Barangay Sto. Nio in January 1988 was in need of health service personnel. Nonetheless, this fact will not excuse the failure of petitioner to obtain prior approval from the COMELEC for the movement of personnel in his office. Indeed, appointing authorities can transfer or detail personnel as the exigencies of public service require.[19] However, during election period, as such personnel movement could be used for electioneering or even to harass subordinates who are of different political persuasion, 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, prohibits the same unless approved by the COMELEC. Third. The award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to Barba must be deleted. Under 264, par. 1 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, the only imposable penalties for the commission of any of the election offenses thereunder by an individual are Ol-dmiso imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years [which] shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is deleted. Nc-m SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Buena, J., on leave.

EN BANC

[G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60. February 17, 2003]

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite,respondent. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: In this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, petitioner Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeks the nullification of the orders of 16 March 2001[1] and 9 May 2001[2] of respondent Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, denying petitioners motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950 -00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 and motion for reconsideration, respectively. During the 11 May 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. On 8 July 1998, he filed with the COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico Poblete, Bienvenido Pobre, Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado del Rosario, Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro Paterno, Jr., for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election

Code. The complaint was supported by the separate affidavits of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities of the respondents and was docketed as E.O. Case No. 98-219. On 25 February 1999, upon the recommendation of its Law Department, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution[3] directing the filing of the necessary information against the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219 and authorizing the Director IV of the Law Department to designate a COMELEC prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the cases and to file the appropriate motion for the preventive suspension of the respondents. The Law Department filed the corresponding information against the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219 before the RTC, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. Before the trial of Criminal Case No. 7034-99 commenced, or on 2 December 1999, a complaint was filed by Innocencio Rodelas and Gerardo Macapagal with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite, for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code against the witnesses in the criminal case for vote-buying, who were the witnesses in E.O. Case No. 98219. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 1-99-1080. On 10 April 2000, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor resolved to file separate informations for vote-selling in the various branches of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, against the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The cases were docketed as (1) Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to 7949-00 and 7981-00, which were assigned to Branch 22; (2) Criminal Cases Nos. 7973-00 to 7979-00 and 7970-00, assigned to Branch 21; (3) Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, assigned to Branch 20; and (4) Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00, assigned to Branch 90. On 23 June 2000, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 appealed before the COMELEC the 10 April 2000 Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 6 July 2000, the COMELEC en banc denied the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.[4] However, upon the urgent motion to set for hearing the appeal, the COMELEC en banc resolved to defer action on the appeal and refer the same to the Law Department for comment and recommendation.[5] The Law Department of the COMELEC filed motions to suspend proceedings before Branches 20, 21, 22 and 90 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite, until the COMELEC would have resolved the appeal of the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The Presiding Judge of Branch 22 granted the motion for the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to 7949-00 and 7981-00. In its Minute Resolution No. 00-2453,[6] the COMELEC en banc, upon the recommendation of its Law Department, declared null and void the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. It held that the respondents therein are exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, [7] otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which grants immunity from criminal prosecution persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. It further directed the Law Department to file the necessary motions to dismiss the criminal cases filed against the said respondents. Pursuant to Minute Resolution No. 00-2453, the Law Department filed a motion to dismiss[8] Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 before Branch 20 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite, presided by herein respondent judge. The latter, however, denied the said motion and the motion for reconsideration. According to respondent judge, before one can be exempt from prosecution under the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, it is necessary that such person has already performed the overt act of voluntarily giving information or testifying in any official investigation or proceeding for the offense to which such information or testimony was given. It was thus premature to exempt the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 from criminal prosecution, since they have not yet testified.

Hence, this petition, ascribing to the respondent judge grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in peremptorily denying the prosecutions motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00. This Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and required it to manifest whether it is adopting the petition.[9] In a Manifestation and Motion[10] filed with this Court, the OSG stated that it repleads the submissions contained in the petition and adopts the petition as its own. The petition is meritorious. A free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election is indispensable in a democratic society. Without it, democracy would not flourish and would be a sham. Election offenses, such as vote-buying and vote-selling, are evils which prostitute the election process. They destroy the sanctity of the votes and abet the entry of dishonest candidates into the corridors of power where they may do more harm. As the Bible says, one who is dishonest in very small matters is dishonest in great ones. One who commits dishonesty in his entry into an elective office through the prostitution of the electoral process cannot be reasonably expected to respect and adhere to the constitutional precept that a public office is a public trust, and that all government officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and exercise their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The provision of law alleged to have been violated by the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219, who are the accused in Criminal Case No. 7034-99, reads as follows: SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. - (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party. (2) Any person, association, corporation, group or community who solicits or receives, directly or indirectly, any expenditure or promise of any office or employment, public or private, for any of the foregoing considerations. (b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. - Two or more persons whether candidates or not, who come to an agreement concerning the commission of any violation of paragraph (a) of this section and decide to commit it. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the recipient or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure the successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter. Congress saw the wisdom of this proposition, and so Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph: The giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided,That any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.

However, to avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latters opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn vote-sellers who denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth. It must be stressed that the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. [11] The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same.[12] This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC.[13] In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, which was the basis of the informations for vote-selling, it, in effect, withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor. Such withdrawal of the deputation was clearly in order, considering the circumstances obtaining in these cases where those who voluntarily executed affidavits attesting to the vote-buying incident and became witnesses against the vote-buyers now stand as accused for the same acts they had earlier denounced. What the Prosecutor did was to sabotage the prosecution of the criminal case against the vote -buyers and put in serious peril the integrity of the COMELEC, which filed the said case for vote-buying. If the Prosecutor had listened to the command of prudence and good faith, he should have brought the matter to the attention of the COMELEC. Petitioner COMELEC found that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who executed affidavits and turned witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99, voluntarily admitted that they were the acceptors or recipients in the vote-buying done by the accused in said case. It was precisely because of such voluntary admission and willingness to testify that the COMELEC en banc, in its Minute Resolution No. 00-2453, declared null and void the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 and held that the respondents therein are exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Hence, it directed its Law Department to file a motion to dismiss the criminal cases which the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed in court against the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. We agree with the petitioner and hold that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who are the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Respondent judge lost sight of the fact that at the time the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 had already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying in the case docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 per petitioners Memorandum filed with this Court.[14] In a futile attempt to justify his denial of the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, respondent judge averred in his comment on the petition that nothing was mentioned in the motion to dismiss that the accused in said cases had already given information or testified in any proceeding. Besides, no record of any preliminary investigation was attached to the motion to dismiss. The petitioner merely referred to the dispositive portion of Minute Resolution No. 00-2453 without mentioning any preliminary investigation conducted by the Law Department of the COMELEC. This contention is without basis. A reading of the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 795000 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 shows that a certified true copy of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 00-2453 was attached thereto and was made an integral part thereof. The attached resolution

indicated that the accused in the cases sought to be dismissed had voluntarily given information and were willing to testify against the vote-buyers, and are therefore utilized as witnesses in the pending case for vote-buyers docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. Clearly then, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 despite COMELECs determination that the accused therein are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling pursuant to the proviso in the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated 16 March 2001 and 9 May 2001 of respondent judge in Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 before Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite, are hereby SET ASIDE, and said criminal cases are ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Callejo, Jr., J., no part.

EN BANC

ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,

G.R. No. 192474 Present: CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO, REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR., Respondents. x ------------------------------------------ x DAN ERASMO, SR., Petitioner, - versus ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR. and G.R. No. 192704

HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. x ------------------------------------------ x DAN ERASMO, SR., Petitioner, - versus Promulgated: ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR., Respondent. June 26, 2012 x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION ABAD, J.: G.R. No. 193566

These cases reiterate the demarcation line between the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Facts and the Case In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began occupying the house. After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village. Dan Erasmo, Sr., respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the application.[1] After due proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos application and denied Erasmos opposition.[2] Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters of Precinct 0051F before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim (MCTC).[3] After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment on August 14, 2009, excluding Jalosjos from the list of registered voters in question. The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor. Jalosjos appealed[4] his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofPagadian City[5] which affirmed the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009. Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[6] On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his application and enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that his name was reinstated in the BarangayVeterans Villages voters list pending the resolution of the petition.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC, [7] claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint resolution, dismissing Erasmos petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.[8] While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the elections for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. He was proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.[9] Meantime, on June 2, 2010 the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before it,[10] holding that the lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the voters list of Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and Republic Act 8189[11] to vote in that place. Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA decision before this Court in G.R. 193566. Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to this Court on certiorari. In G.R. 192474, Jalosjos challenges the COMELECs finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his right to due process, citing Roces v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.[12] In G.R. 192704, Erasmo assails the COMELEC En Bancs failure to annul Jalosjos proclamation as elected Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay despite his declared ineligibility. Subsequently, the Court ordered the consolidation of the three related petitions.[13] In its comment,[14] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought the dismissal of Erasmos petitions and the grant of that of Jalosjos since all such petitions deal with the latters qualifications as proclaimed Representative of the district mentioned. The OSG claims that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, jurisdiction over this issue lies with the HRET. Threshold Issue Presented The threshold issue presented is whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the question of Jalosjos residency qualification for running for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

The Courts Ruling While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections,[15] such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.[16] The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.[17] Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election.[18] Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the proclamation of Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated rule.[19] Since the COMELEC declared him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his proclamation was void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia.[20] For Erasmo, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order based on Section 6 of Republic Act 6646. Section 6 provides: Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide. [21]

Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELECs failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.[22] WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 192474, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the respondent Commission on Elections En Bancs order dated June 3, 2010, and REINSTATES the Commissions Second Division resolution dated February 23, 2010 in SPA 09-114(DC), entitled Dan Erasmo, Sr. v. Romeo Jalosjos Jr. Further, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566 for lack of jurisdiction over the issues they raise.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC),Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 180443 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements. Common Antecedents

The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5 Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) CruzGonzales, and (3) Borje. Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life. On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation. The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. Notwithstanding Villanuevas filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9 On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.

The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18, 2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases. With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054. On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise: WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be: 1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva 2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales 3. Armi Jane R. Borje SO ORDERED. The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the Boards acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees. As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15 Precs of the Consolidated Cases In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBACs withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second, third and

fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. 18the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin. For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC. Issues The issues are the following: (a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy; (b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping; (c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act; and (d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature. Ruling The petitions are granted. A The Court has jurisdiction over the case The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court. We do not agree. An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by CruzGonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC. B Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.19 What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.20 The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice.21 Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise

identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.23Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.24 Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBACs entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBACs second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes. On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELECs basis for allowing CIBACs withdrawal of Lokins nomination. Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different. C Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.25 Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26 The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic

that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27 To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:28 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and 4. It must be reasonable. The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30 The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds. As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, 32 for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33 Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be

placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.35Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36 The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz: MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered? MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly consider the same. MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing. MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party affiliation. MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected. 37 The usage of "No" in Section 8 "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act, 38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.

Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters demand for transparency. The lawmakers exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention. D Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions. When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.391avvphi1 The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction. E Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees. No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls. Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee. We agree with Lokin. The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, 40 has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. 41 Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 42 The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,43because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provisions phraseology. The explanation does not persuade. To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered. However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations. We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.

The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down. 45 F Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law. 47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power. Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it allows the party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC was invalid, CIBACs withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELECs approval of CIBACs petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBACs substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, shou ld be struck down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action. WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus. We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections. Accordingly, we annul and set aside: (a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens Battle Against Corruptions withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and (b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives. We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a PartyList Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives. We make no pronouncements on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.