Nietzsche and Marx are thinkers who, on a metaphysical level, have very similar views of religion, but on

a sociological level and a humanistic level (that is, in their respective conception of human nature) differ
considerably in their views on religion. Both philosophers have famous quotations attributed to them
concerning religion: Nietzsche famously proclaims “God is dead”() and Marx that “religion is the opiate
of the people.”(). Nietzsche and Marx agree most definitely on a rejection of metaphysics. Both see
religion has a human creation, rejecting any notion of a metaphysical being or consciousness having any
sort of existence. On a personal and social level, Nietzsche sees religion as a manifestation of the will to
power of either individuals or social groups on the whole. Marx, however, sees religion has a secretion of
society, and man’s condition. Marx differs from Nietzsche in that he subscribes more strongly to a
determinist philosophy (as opposed to Nietzsche’s idea of their being different strengths of will). Thus,
argues Marx, religion is a consequence of the nature of human society that same way that the drug trade
may be seen as a consequence of deprivation in certain groups resulting from a lack of money, job
opportunities etc. The three key areas of Nietzsche and Marx’s view of religion to be examined are their
concepts of metaphysics, their sociological views on religion in the state and finally their views on human
nature.

Their different views stem from their different conceptions of what philosophy basically is. A typically
Nietzschean approach is to reject everything- morality, God, truth, religion etc., especially any sort of
absolute truth, and then rebuild one’s own, personal new set of values. Marx, on the other had,
fundamentally wants philosophers to change the world. He famously said “The philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it”(), and this for Marx is the key goal of
most of his writing. Both philosophers employ similar moves in their writing to reach their ends. Both
start with a criticism (or ‘critique’ for Marx) and a rejection of accepted ideas. For Nietzsche these ideas
are anything to do with metaphysics, or anything awarded an absolute degree of verification, whereas for
Marx these ideas are essentially the contemporary European capitalist system of social organisation. After
having debunked these ideas, both want to create their own set of values. Nietzsche then, through
sociological and psychological means, comes up with the idea of the Will to Power and hence the
Übermensch, whereas Marx, through the course of his writing, establishes his theory of history and hence
Communism. So, the fundamental difference in their conceptions of philosophy is that for Marx, we must
found critique and the creation of new values on socio-economic factors, whereas for Nietzsche, it is more
to do with psychological factors, and hence their conceptions of religion, though sometimes setting at the
same conclusion, is fundamentally different.

Heidegger remarked of Nietzsche that his philosophy “is the end of metaphysics in as much as it reverts
to the very commencement of Greek thought”. Nietzsche’s position on metaphysics is that it is mostly
nonsense, and that the tradition started by Socrates and Plato is a distraction from what philosophy should
be about. Nietzsche regarded Socrates as someone who registered on the autistic spectrum and just argued
for whatever point of view caused most controversy. For this reason, Nietzsche declaimed that
“Christianity is Platonism for the masses”. Nietzsche uses an analogy with a mountain climber to outline
his view of truth. The mountain climber starts off in a village in the valley and works his way toward the
top of the mountain. The top of the mountain represents absolute truth, and is totally unreachable. What
we are left with, then, is our own personal perspectives, and the contingent, empirically verifiable truths
of the world we live in. From the mountain, we may be able to see someone being mugged, though the
truth of the matter ends there, any moral condemnation of it can come from no reality, but must be an
extension of our own values, though this moral condemnation, since essentially subjective, is also entirely
contingent, and represents no metaphysical ‘form of good’, as Plato would have it, as in Nietzsche’s view,
this doesn’t exist. An initial problem for Nietzsche comes from his style of argument, and his style of
writing. His writing style often descends into a rant or harangue, where Nietzsche forces his view on the
reader with the power of an omniscient narrator, but also that often he seems to present little in the way of
a philosophical argument, and that what he writes is opinion or conjecture, and essentially not
philosophical. The Nietzschean response would be to say that actually there is an argument, and if
Nietzsche appears emotional, it is because his rejection of values so fundamental to the reader makes it
seem so. Nietzsche’s argument against objectivity, and, by extension, metaphysical truth, comes from a
psychological perspective. Nietzsche’s argument is that philosophy is essentially personal, since it is the
creation of the writer. Since it is personal, it cannot help but reflect our own upbringing, and hence our
personal bias, hence it cannot be representative of any sort of metaphysical, or absolutely objective truth.
For example, the writer, linguist, philosopher and political activist Noam Chomsky is a self-confessed
believer in the idea of the welfare state and a critic of American capitalism, as well as other politically
‘left-wing’ views. Chomsky also grew up in traditionally very ‘left-wing’ areas of New York, the son of a
member of the International Workers of the World organisation, and also experienced racial
discrimination at the hands of the American public as well as government officials. Nietzsche would
argue that this upbringing would cause him to tend towards the beliefs he currently holds, so that when he
talks about political issues, his personal psychological details which find their origins in his upbringing,
are a huge influence on what he will see as a fitting conclusion to any problem (political or philosophical)
which he encounters.

Nietzsche specifically rejects the notion of a metaphysical ‘I’ or of human essence or nature. Nietzsche
attacks Descartes’ cogito argument. The argument put forward here, by Descartes is “I think, therefore I
exist”. Essentially, this means ‘I can doubt the existence of the table in front of me, and many other
physical things, but I cannot doubt the existence of the doubter, which is me, so I therefore exist’.
Nietzsche criticises this saying that to say ‘I think’ presupposes an ‘I’, and that essentially, Descartes’
dualist account of his ‘self’ or ‘I’ rests on a metaphysical notion of this ‘I’. Nietzsche founds this criticism
in the idea that philosophy is personal and cannot be separated from the philosopher. Hence, we come up
with a dualist, two-world view because in life we experience a non-physical world of dreams and physical
world of reality. Marx, too, rejects the notion of a metaphysical ‘I’ or ‘self’, writing that “man is no
abstract being squatting outside the world”. Marx sees what in the past has been seen as ‘human essence’
as “the world of man”, as the state and society in which man exists. Marx and Nietzsche are both
materialists, so in accounting for human nature in negative terms they are both in agreement.

This dualist idea of an ‘I’ and a physical manifestation of a ‘self’, is a central tenet of Christian thought.
Christians believe that we have a physical body, but a non-physical soul. The soul is granted to us after we
reach a certain stage of development in the womb (though this is a point of controversy within Christian
thought), and the soul progresses to an after-life once we die, whether it be heaven, hell, or purgatory. The
problem in this theory which Nietzsche and Marx exploit is the reliance on a notion of a metaphysical ‘I’
or ‘self’. Christianity asserts that it is granted to us by God, a higher, omniscient being, and Descartes
seems to assume it in his meditations. For both Marx and Nietzsche, the answer to questions about who
we are lies in psychology and physiology for Nietzsche, and economics and science for Marx.

A problem for any sort of rejection of dualism is that it results in a difficulty to account for the first person
experience which we undergo, termed qualia. In rejecting the existence of a non-physical mind, we are
left with the problem of providing a physical account of qualia. To illustrate this problem, Jackson gives
the example known as ‘Mary’s room’. The example is as follows: Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who
specialises in how the brain processes colour. She knows everything there is to know about the colour red.
She can describe in intimate detail which parts of the brain respond to an indication of the colour red.
However, she lives in a room where things are only coloured in grey, black and white and hence has seen
no red. The question Jackson posits is that when released from this room, will she know anything new
about the colour red when she first sees a fire engine or a post-box or a telephone booth. We surely have
to answer that she will learn what it is like to perceive the colour red, rather than just having factual
knowledge about it. Hence Nietzsche and Marx’s materialism seems to be unsatisfactory in accounting for
the material man, and the problem of qualia.

In On Truth and Lies, Nietzsche rejects the notion of absolute logical or mathematic truths by telling the
story of clever animals living on another planet. The animals come up with systems of categorisation for
the world around them, and eventually discover maths and logic. A few years later, a meteor hits the
planet and kills the entire species and all other life on the planet. The question Nietzsche posits is ‘whereis
the maths and logic now?’ Though it may seem strange to ask where, Nietzsche is stressing that there is
nowhere where truths such as 2-2 or 2+5=7 exist independently of our physical realm, as where could this
be. It outlines a problem for any theory which relies on some metaphysical foundation, such as religion,
which is that they fail to account for the actual whereabouts or location of anything metaphysical. Marx,
who is also a committed materialist, would agree with this on the grounds that all we have is scientific
and eco-social facts (which are contingent) about this world. Though often argued through assertion, this
reply to the arguments from qualia seems to circumvent the problem whilst leaving the ball in the dualists’
court. The dualist is left with the problem of providing an account of where and how the non-physical
parts of the ‘I’ exist, and is hence a very strong argument in favour of metaphysics. The dualists’ argument
from qualia simply points out problems with the materialists’ system, whereas Nietzsche effectively
seizes the jugular of the dualists’ argument and proposes a strong, fundamental problem for any
metaphysical theory.

Furthermore, Nietzsche says that religion is a human phenomenon, and hence can have no existence
independent of us. This is partly influenced by the contemporary discoveries of the origins of the Gospels.
Nietzsche, being a philologer would have been interested in the origins of language, and took an interest
in this literary endeavour. He believed that through detailed analysis of the religious text, it would be
discovered that the Bible is a work of fiction. Marx would be in agreement that religion is a product of
mankind, though for different reasons to Nietzsche. Again, here, in their critique of religion, they are
similar, though when it comes to aspects of their philosophy which rely on what they themselves theorize,
they differ. Nietzsche argues that religion was actively and consciously wrought by groups in society
whereas Marx believes that it is a passive secretion of society. That religion is a product of man, however,
remains a shared conclusion.

It is important to note, however, that Christianity is not entirely in agreement amongst itself as to the
nature of that which Nietzsche and Marx claim to be metaphysical. For instance, we may take heaven to
be a metaphysical realm, but before the renaissance in Europe, a Ptolemaic view was assumed in a literal
sense. The Ptolemaic model of the universe has Earth at the centre, with the sun, moon and stars orbiting
around. Beyond the sun, moon and stars, lies heaven, as physical as you or I, and, on the opposite side of
the universe, hell, similarly physical. This was believed to exist in a physical sense, just as modern
scientists believe that Neptune lies beyond Jupiter and Saturn in our own solar system. This early
materialist view of the universe would be compatible with Nietzsche and Marx’s materialism, though it is
not the contemporary view taken by Christians in the nineteenth century. Also, the Ptolemaic view is not
satisfactory in explaining what sort of thing God is, so we would assume that he is still an abstract,
metaphysical being. On this point, Nietzsche and Marx would both categorically reject the notion of such
a being.

As for their conceptions of human nature, Nietzsche and Marx are required to move from a critical
approach to a philosophically creative approach. Both thinkers were heartily critical of their predecessors
such as Hegel, Kant, Plato and Descartes, but having criticised their metaphysics, they now need to,
especially in Nietzsche’s case, avoid the void by setting out their own set of values.

Nietzsche’s conception of man is based fundamentally on the idea of ‘will’, whereas Marx’s is based on
the twin ideas of ‘need’ and ‘ability’ or ‘faculty’ (the German kraft can be translated as either), the latter is
often and shall be hereafter termed ‘power’. Marx was a determinist, in that he viewed the world
economically and scientifically. Marx’s determinism stated that if certain parameters were in place, then a
definite outcome could be predicted. For example, if I hold a kilogramme weight and then release it (and
normal air conditions are in place, and we are on earth and gravity is in effect), then the weight will move
downwards and drop to the floor. This theory is appealing also to the materialist, as it relies on no magical
metaphysical being, but also it is empirically verifiable in that we can see the weight drop. Marx applied
his determinist principles to all aspects of his philosophy, and essentially he viewed living beings as
objects of determinist principles. That is to say that a dog, according to a Marxian, will act in a certain
way if certain parameters are in place. If he is hungry, and there is food there, and the dog’s instincts are
aroused by the meaty smell of the food, he will eat it. He viewed man as being no more special than a dog
or other living beings. For Marx, the species distinction, in determinist terms, arises from different
species’ respective powers. The dog, for example, has the ability to breathe oxygen into its lungs to
survive, as can we humans. This ability, or power, the dog has in common with humans and many other
animals. However, the dog has the ability to smell to a far greater degree of accuracy whether there is
some form of food to be found than the human, and this (for the sake of argument we can say that the dog
is the only animal with this excellent sense of smell) separates out the dog as a different species.
Furthermore, physical attributes can be seen as ways of excercising species-powers. The dog’s furry coat
enables it to stay warm. Marx also saw living beings in terms of their needs. Humans, dogs, cats and rats
all need food. However, we have different species-needs in the same way that we have species-powers.
From this perspective, Marx proceeds with an analysis of religion which essentially says that religion is a
natural (determinist) consequence of humans needs –in the context of contemporary western European
societies-, and their species-powers.

Nietzsche’s conception of human nature rests on his theory of the ‘will to power’. In the same way that
Marx sees humans in relation to their surroundings and fellow humans, Nietzsche says that the
fundamental force which shapes our nature is one which governs the nature of the relationships we make
with other people. Simply put, the theory of the ‘will to power’ says that all relationships between humans
are governed by a power struggle. A point of similarity here is that later, Marx began more and more to
see every sort of relationship in history as a struggle, but in terms of class. Nietzsche’s theory here is that
all action taken in the course of any relationship is one which will either advance or preserve our power
status. For example, in politics, Margaret Thatcher’s relationship with Ted Heath in the 1970s can be seen
to have been governed by a power struggle. Thatcher relied on Heath’s support to win the ballot to stand
as candidate for the Finchley by-election and then, several years later, ousted him as Conservative party
leader, abandoning any pretence of friendship. Nietzsche would argue that Thatcher’s reason for
befriending Heath in the first place was only to gain more political power, and this is demonstrated by her
abandonment of Heath later in her career when she no longer needed him. Furthermore, Nietzsche says
that the will to power may not always be obvious, but it is always there. For example, a seemingly selfless
act such as giving to charity leaves the donor with, at the very least, a feeling of moral superiority.
Nietzsche says that the feeling of moral superiority is not just a feeling however, as the nature of our
society, especially in religion, is to award high respect, and therefore power, to those who are famous for
doing good deeds. This seems to be satisfactory in explaining how the saints gained such high standing in
Christianity. They did good deeds, according to the Bible, and hence people respected them. Such was
their respect that they gained immense power.

The difference between Marx and Nietzsche here is striking, and it originates from the very core of their
philosophies. Nietzsche analyses people in psychological terms, looking at what motivates people, where
as Marx looks at people in determinist, scientific and economic terms, looking at what constitutes us, and
from then what motivates action. A further difference here is that Marx would reject the notion of free
will as a metaphysical construct. Nietzsche also rejects the idea, though also wants to retain the possibility
of free will, but just not as a black and white absolute. He proposes that ‘will’ may be seen on a sliding
scale in terms of strength. Marx argues that in certain conditions people will act in a certain way, whereas
Nietzsche says that in certain conditions, some people will act accordingly, but others will have a stronger
will and will overcome the circumstances. For example, massive debts may cause people to go bankrupt
and become depressed and Marx would say that this is inevitable. Nietzsche, on the other hand would say
that most people will do as Marx predicts, but some will have the strength of will to do anything possible
and avoid bankruptcy.

An immediate problem for Marx posed by Christians is that they would argue that God made them in
their own image, and furthermore, God gave humans reasoning power. For both Marx and Nietzsche, the
idea that humans are a meta-species of a higher order to other animals is nonsense. Both see humans as a
sort of animal, but perhaps with a considerably more advanced cognitive faculty. Furthermore, Kant
argues that reason is the route to metaphysical enlightenment and the discovery of moral truth. Nietzsche
seems best suited to come to Marx’s defence here as he would employ a scientific argument developed
from Darwin’s theory of evolution and natural selection. Marx and Nietzsche would be in agreement that
man is just another sort of animal, Nietzsche would give the Darwinian argument that man has evolved
over time and it has been a case of the survival of the best suited to their circumstances.

A problem for Nietzsche is that he starts to sound similar to the philosophers he criticises early in Beyond
Good and Evil. He criticises the stoics for seeing the world in the image of their own philosophy, and
indeed other theories besides. For example, a Marxist will start to view history through a Marxist’s eyes
and see elements of class struggle as more important than others, and hence start to see history solely in
terms of class struggle. Similarly, Nietzsche’s will to power is something which to most people is a new
idea, but once they are told about it, it starts to become obvious that we can find evidence which suggests
every relationship is based on a power struggle. For example, Tom visits his mother in hospital as she is
terminally ill and is unlikely to return home. Tom wants to maximise the remaining time with his mother
because he loves her and likes spending time with her. Nietzsche would argue that Tom is spending time
with his mother because it would be hugely detrimental to the influence he wields within his family, as his
moral credibility would be ruined if he never visited his mother; hence he is acting out of the principle of
preserving his personal power. However, it seems more likely that Tom could be visiting out of love of his
mother, and a wish to spend time with her before she dies. Nietzsche does not seem to accept that love
may be an emotion in itself, rather than just a means to an end which is simply a will to power. A
Christian would utterly deny the theory of the ‘will to power’, saying that God acts solely out of love and
goodness, and people can do as well, though they have free will. Therefore, the Christians’ position is
fundamentally different to Nietzsche’s but also Marx’s, as Marx would argue that free will simply doesn’t
exist.

Karl Popper also advanced a criticism of Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ by claiming that we can never have
an unfalsifiable theory which is correct. With a finite amount of socio-scientific data, we cannot account
for every situation possible, as this is an infinite number of situations. Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ is
necessarily unfalsifiable, as it depends on the whole of humanity following it for it to hold together. The
theory states that every human relationship is based on a power struggle, hence accounting for infinite
situations based on finite data.

Marx and Nietzsche’s conception of the state and society is an important contextualisation of both of their
philosophies and critiques of religion, as it is in the makeup of society that they found their accounts for
the origin of religion. It is also the foundation for Nietzsche’s account of the history of morality, and
Marx’s eventual arrival at his theory of history.

Marx, in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right Introduction outlines how he views religion to have
originated. This point relies heavily on his determinist worldview and hence we can know that he will see
religion as an unavoidable consequence of situation in which society finds itself. He argues against the
idea that religion is an innate part of all of us, but a creation of society on the whole. As a society, it is a
system of illusion, and hence “religious suffering is... the expression of real suffering” (). Marx’s claim is
essentially that the social conditions, or rather the condition of mankind which requires the illusion of
religion. Marx famously declaimed that religion is “the opiate of the masses”(), but this is not an utter
condemnation. Marx finds sympathy in his writings for those who require religion. He rejects the atheist
call to abandon religion propounded by the likes of Feuerbach and (in modern times) Dawkins. As far as
Marx sees it, the choice of whether or not to be religious does not lie with the people, as it is a natural
consequence of their condition. Hence, the call to abandon religion is a call to abandon the condition
which creates religion. For example, if I leave a piece of bread in a warm, moist environment for several
days, it will start to grow mould. This is inevitable due to the conditions I have placed it in. Religion,
according to Marx, is just the same (though not in a derogatory sense) as the mould. The conditions are
right, and religion simply is inevitable.

Nietzsche, however, true to his philosophy of the ‘will to power’ and his weak-determinism, views
religion as more of an actively constructed system of values with a clear purpose in mind. In On the
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche shows society to be divisible into two groups – the dominant and the
subjugated. The dominant group are smaller than the subjugated group, but are more able to dominate due
to superior physical strength, intellect and ability. The subjugated are the herd, and they are responsible
for the creation of religion. Nietzsche says that the subjugated group created religion and ‘religicised’ a
section of the dominant group so as to divide them. Hence the system of medieval Europe developed.
Among the ruling elite are two kinds- the military commanders and political rulers- the kings, stadholders
and emperors, and the religious elite- the pope, the bishops and other high-ranking clergy members. The
herd created religion so as to have moral control, via the religious elite, of the military and political elite.
However, during the course of history, according to Nietzsche, the religious elite found independence of
the herd, and a tripartite system was founded. The state was legitimized by the Church, so the Church had
some measure of restraint on the actions of the kings etc., and the herd were still subjugated, but appeased
as the Church acted according to religious morals, which are the morals of the herd. A first problem for
Nietzsche here is that the idea is based upon the ‘will to power’, and hence shares its weaknesses. Any
Nietzschean response would be in defence of the ‘will to power’.
Marx and Nietzsche would also therefore disagree over the nature of the state and religion. This can be
seen as a result of Marx’s determinism, and Nietzsche’s rejection of strong determinism. Nietzsche’s ideas
seem stronger as they rely less on a structuralist approach, and more on a balance between individualist
and structuralist. Marx’s determinist view of society is also very passive. He seems to think that society
will simply weave its course wherever the mean needs of the day will take it, failing to account for
individual action. Conversely, Nietzsche's account seems to rely too much on the idea of a collective
consciousness of the subjugated group. Any such group who carried out a plan would have to be
extremely well organised and focused. If we accept that it wasn’t a conscious move, then we revert more
to Marxism, so a balance between the Nietzschean and Marxist views seems most appropriate, if
Nietzsche is correct.

In conclusion, Marx and Nietzsche are fairly close, within the philosophical scope, in discussing religion.
They come closest when criticising the metaphysics of religion, though their accounts are not proof from
criticism. They differ slightly more when providing an account for human nature and the nature of the
state or society. This difference stems from Marx’s commitment to determinism, and Nietzsche’s reliance
on his psychological analysis and focus on the strengths of the individual. I find Marx’s views more
attractive, as Nietzsche’s handling of religion is tainted by his Pastor father’s early, painful death and his
subsequent hatred of Christianity. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s devotion to the ‘will to power’ and other of
his theories seems to almost raise such ideas to the level of Plato’s metaphysical forms. In fact, Nietszche
and Marx’s standpoint on metaphysics, that there is no such thing, is in itself a metaphysical standpoint.
In fact, any cognitive entity or perfect ideal, such as the ‘will to power’, or Marx’s theory of history, can
be seen as simply a replacement for metaphysical ideals. Though Nietzsche invites us to reject him, the
communist ideas of Marx have been pedestalised throughout history and often seem to have taken place
in lieu of religion, in the form of the statues of Lenin in the USSR and the monuments to Castro in Cuba.
So grand and ornate are their theories that we find it easy to do this to them, just as people find it easy to
do the same with God and religion.