G.R No.

164815, September 3, 2009 Valeroso vs Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines Ponente: Nachura, J ** A letter Appeal of petitioner, praying that the decision rendered be set aside and he be acquitted of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. FACTS: Senior Inspector Jerry C. Valeroso, herein petitioner was arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. He was arrested at the boarding house of his children, where the arresting officers also found the subject firearm and ammunition after ransacking the locked cabinet. With that discovery, petitioner was charged with Illegal Possession of firearm and ammunition. The Regional Trial Court Branch 97 Quezon City convicted Valeroso as guilty of charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum, to 6 years as maximum. Petitioner filed his appeal at CA and the latter affirmed the RTCs decision but lowered the minimum term of indeterminate penalty to 4 years and 2 months. Subsquently, he filed for petition for review at Supreme Court wherein, the SC affirmed in full the CAs decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which has been denied with finality by SC. Thus, a Letter-Appeal was filed by Valeroso focusing on his breached unconstitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. ** The right against unreasonable searches and seizure is under Article III, section 2 of the 1987 constitution** ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition infringes the constitutional rights of the petitioner. RULING: The search made was illegal in violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of the said right is inadmissible in evidence against him. Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify the indifference to the basic principles of government. A warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right; peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. ANALYSIS (Optional, as this is my own analysis ) Lex Prospicit Non Respicit (The law looks forward not backward) The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of second motion for reconsideration, while a second motion for reconsideration as a general rule is a prohibited pleading. However, in De guzman vs Sandiganbayan and Astorga vs People the SC entertained their second motion and set aside

their earlier decisions. The lack of subsequent decisions abandoning the earlier rulings by the Supreme Court moved the SC to adopt and apply the same rulings in the case at bar.

CONCLUSION: Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision and set aside and petitioner is acquitted of Illegal Possession of firearm and ammunition.

PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. G.R. No. 181556 FACTS: Alleged by Central Bank of the Philippines (now BSP) that Intercity Bank is on bankruptcy state; thus , former filed a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the said bank befor the RTC of Makati. RTC assigned PDIC as liquidator. Relying on RA 9302 Section 12: Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the preferences established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the proper court, reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of receivership/liquidation proceedings and collect payment therefore from available assets. After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank. (emphasis supplied) PDIC filed Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings Praying 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. for:

The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses incurred and/or advanced by herein petitioner, PDIC, in the amount of P3,795,096.05; The provision of P700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this distribution and the winding-up of the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.; The write-off of assets in the total amount of P8,270,789.99, as set forth in par. 2.1 hereof; The write-off of liabilities in the total amount of P1,562,185.35, as set forth in par. 8 hereof; The Final Project of Distribution of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank as set forth in Annex Q hereof; Authorizing petitioner to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated in the project of distribution for creditors who shall have a period of three (3) years from date of last notice within which to claim payment therefor. After the lapse of said period, unclaimed payments shall be escheated to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with Rule 91 of the Rules of Court; Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable laws, rules and regulations after the lapse of one (1) year from the approval of the instant Motion.

7.

RTC Makati granted motion except 5 and 6.

PDIC appealed; petition was dismissed by Appellate Court

ISSUE: WON Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.

RULING: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

ANALYSIS: A perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary: Section 28. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. (emphasis supplied) Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, Article 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.

ARMANDO BARCELLANO vs DOLORES BAAS G.R. No. 165287 September 14, 2011

NATURE: Appeal for certiorari FACTS: 1. Respondent Baas is an heir of Bartolome Baas who owns in fee simple Lot 4485, PLS-722-D situated in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is the property of Vicente Medina , covered by Original Certificate of Title No. VH-9094, with an area of 1,877 square meters.

2. Medina sold the property to Armando Barcellano for P60, 000.00. The heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the property but a deed of sale executed between the parties. Also, the Baas heirs failed to tender the P60, 000.00 redemption amounts to Medina.

3. The heirs went to the office of the Barangay Council to settle the dispute, Barcellano agreed to sell the property but on the higher price and the parties could not agree on the price resulted the lupon to issued Certification to file action.

4. Dolores Baas filed an action for Legal Redemption before the Regional Trial Court

5. The trial court dismissed the complaint of the Bans for their failure to comply with the condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem

6. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of lower court and granted the heirs to redeem the property.

7. Barcellano question the ruling of the court of appeals and filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE:
1. WON written notice is necessary in case of actual notice of the sale of property.

2. WON The right of legal pre-emption or redemption is exercised

HELD: The Appeal is DENIED

The written notice of sale is mandatory. Actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.

YES. The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of legal redemption exists, and the running of the period for its exercise has not even been triggered because they have not been notified in writing of the fact of sale.

DOCTRINE: It has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation s there is only room for application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. The law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of Baas.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 176951 December 21, 2009 FACTS: The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo. Assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. By Decision, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause. ISSUE: 1. WON the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC declared Cityhood laws are valid and constitutional DOCTRINE: Ratio legist est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code," subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009.

LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC CASE DIGEST

Fact: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal

Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. Issue: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Ruling: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. Applying the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. The Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. The criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. The intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitions are hereby GRANTED

Obiasca vs. Basallote G.R. No. 176707 February 17, 2010

Facts:

On 26 May 2003, respondent Jeanne O. Basallote was appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II, of the Department of Education (DepEd), Tabaco National

High School in Albay Province by City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso. In a letter dated 4 June 2003, the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy O. Oyardo, advised School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales that the papers of the applicants for the position of Administrative Officer II of the school, including those of the respondent, were being returned; and that a school ranking should be accomplished and submitted to her office for review. In addition, Gonzales was advised that only qualified applicants should be indorsed. The respondent assumed as Administrative Officer II on 19 June 2003. Thereafter, however, she received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz, Human Resource Management Officer I, informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the CSC because of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales. The respondent sought to obtain Gonzales signature, but the latter refused to sign despite repeated requests. When the respondent informed Oyardo of the situation, she was instead advised to return to her former teaching position of Teacher I. The respondent followed the advice. In the meanwhile, on 25 August 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin O. Obiasca to the position of Administrative Officer II. The appointment was sent to and was properly attested by the CSC. The respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales, and Diaz. In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholding information from the respondent on the status of her appointment, and suspended them from the service for three months; but Diaz was absolved of any wrong doing. The respondent elevated the matter to the CSC, which granted the appeal by its 29 November 2005 resolution, approving the respondents appointment and recalling its approval of the petitioners appointment. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, claiming that the CSC thereby acted without factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment, and praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied the petition for certiorari, and upheld the respondents appointment effective immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority on 26 May 2003, considering that the respondent had accepted the appointment upon her assumption of the duties and responsibilities of the position. The CA found that the respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the position of Administrative Officer II; that due to the respondents valid appointment, no other appointment to the same position could be made without the position being first vacated; that the petitioners appointment to the position was thus void.

The CA opined that Diaz had unreasonably refused to affix her signature on the respondents PDF and to submit the respondents appointment to the CSC on the ground of non-submission of the respondents PDF, because the PDF had not been required to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC. Pet: respondent was not validly appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II because her appointment was never attested by the CSC. According to petitioner, without the CSC attestation, respondents appointment as Administrative Officer II was never completed and never vested her a permanent title. As such, respondents appointment could still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Petitioner further argues that, under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (EO) No. 292, every appointment is required to be submitted to the CSC within 30 days from the date of issuance; otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective Resp: her appointment was wrongfully not submitted by the proper persons to the CSC for attestation. The reason given by Oyardo for the non-submission of respondents appointment papers to the CSC the alleged failure of respondent to have her PDF duly signed by Gonzaleswas not a valid reason because the PDF was not even required for the attestation of respondents appointment by the CSC.

Issue: WON respondents appointment is valid Ruling: Yes Ratio: When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law should never be applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor another. As a court of law and of justice, this Court has the duty to adjudicate conflicting claims based not only on the cold provision of the law but also according to the higher principles of right and justice. Procedural: In this case, petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 before filing a petition for review in the CA. Such fatal procedural lapse on petitioners part allowed the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 to become final and executory. Hence, for all intents and purposes, the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 has become immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed Substantive: In CSC v Joson and Chavez v Ronidel, What is crucial is that, in those cases, the Court upheld the appointment despite the non-compliance with a CSC rule because (1) there were valid justifications for the lapse; (2) the non-compliance was beyond the control of the appointee and (3) the appointee was not negligent. All these reasons are present in this case, thus, there is no basis in saying that the afore-cited cases are not applicable here. Similar things merit similar treatment. Fourth, in appointing petitioner, the appointing authority effectively revoked the previous appointment of respondent and usurped the power of the CSC to withdraw or

revoke an appointment that had already been accepted by the appointee. It is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which has this power. 50 This is clearly provided in Section 9, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules: Section 9. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by the [CSC]

City of Manila vs. Laguio G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005 Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari (Prior relief sought by the petitioner is Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order) Antecedent Facts: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10 RTC ruled declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No costs. Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the ordinance 778 is unconstitutional rendering it invalid. Ruling: The SC DENIED the petition and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. Ratio: Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.103 The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void. Concededly, the challenged Ordinance we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of thewas enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary Ordinance not even under the guise of police power.has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws
For better understanding these are the premises for the decision of SC: 1. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. 43In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. 2. The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . ."48 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, 49 and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. 3. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its

accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 61 Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights62 a violation of the due process clause. 4. The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the ErmitaMalate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently." It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property.

NATURE OF CASE: Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner regarding the Congress two reps in the JBC FACTS: History of JBCs creation: o Both Malolos and 1935 Constitution vested the power of appointing members of thew Judiciary to the President o In the 1973 Constitution, this power is vested to the president due to the fusion of legislative and executive powers o The 1987 Constitution, seeing the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President, constituted the JBC which consists of Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. From the moment of JBCs creation, the Congress would send alternate representatives to the JBC for equal opportunity and representation to the body. Change in JBCs composition: o 1994: both houses of Congress has representative with vote each o 2000 and 2001: in the En Banc meeting on those dates, it was decided to allow both the representatives with one vote each Respondents Escudero and Tupas are part of the JBC representing the Congress when this provision was contended ISSUES: 1. WON Article 8, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? 2. WON having two representatives from each house of Congress with one vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution? RULING: 1. NO. The use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is clear and leaves no room for any other construction. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. o Ratio Reasoning: maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. 2. No. The Congress is treated as co-equals of the Executive and the Judiciary. In line with this, each of the three government branches is to assign the same weight of each when it comes to voting in the JBC: one for executive, one for h=judiciary, and one for congress.

However, even though it was declared Unconstitutional does not mean all its actions are held void. Actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. o Ratio Reasoning: the co-equalness of the three branches of the government DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED; JBC was enjoined to reconstitute to accommodate only one representative of Congress.

G.R. No. 189755

July 4, 2012

EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner, vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent. SERENO, J.: FACTS: The point of controversy revolved on the water facility in Happy Glen Loop HOA, Inc,. Marcelo , successor-in-interest of the original developer sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 (where a deep well and overhead tank is situated for over 30 years) to Hermogenes Liwag (husband of Petitioner) Petitioner Emeteria demanded the HOA to remove the overhead water tanks from the subject parcel of land. Respondent Association filed before the HLURB an action for specific performance; confirmation, maintenance and donation of water facilities; annulment of sale; and cancellation of TCT No. 350099 against T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation (the owner and developer of the Subdivision), petitioner Emeteria, and the other surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The case reached up to the level of CA; however, the petitioner being not satisfied and felt aggrieved, filed the herein Petition for review.

ISSUES: 1) Does HLRUB has jurisdiction over the petitioners demand? 2) WON an easement for water facility exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision? 3) Is the sale of the subject parcel of land valid? RULING: The Court affirmed the ruling of the Supreme Court. 1) Yes. HLURB has jurisdiction over the petitioners demand. (Basis: P.D. 957) 2) The easement for water facility on Lot 11, Block 5 exists. For more than 30 years, the facility was continuously used as the residents sole source of water. Thus, it is continuous and apparent and was acquired through prescription. It is also considered as open space based on the definition stipulated in P.D. 1216. 3) No. the sale of subject parcel of land is not valid. The law expressly provides that open spaces in subdivisions are reserved for public use and are beyond the commerce of man. As such, these open spaces are not susceptible of private ownership and appropriation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 100454 are hereby AFFIRMED. Doctrine: EJUSDEM GENERIS states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.

PD 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. The court resorts to statutory construction to determine whether these areas fall under "other similar facilities and amenities." Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D. 1216, the court finds that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Thus, the phrase "other similar facilities and amenities" should be interpreted in like manner. Further, the location of the water facility in the Subdivision must form part of the area reserved for open space. VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO, Petitioner vs. The People of the Philippines, respondents FACTS: On July 10, 1996, petitioner in a case was arrested for kidnapping with ransom. During the arrest, the police officers informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition. A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended. On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months. On petition for review, we affirmed in full the CA decision. The Motion for Reconsideration of Valeroso was denied with finality on June 30, 2008. Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal imploring this Court to once more take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. ISSUE: (1)Is the search and seizure conducted by Police Officers constitutional? (2) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866 which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. HELD: (1) No. Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him. (2) YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity). Valeroso is not a habitual criminal. Doctrine: Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws). GR 164815 February 22, 2008