Pelaez vs Auditor General

FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more sub-provincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaezs argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISSUE: Whether the executive orders are void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department. HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC [G.R. NO. 203766 ETC., 02 APRIL 2013 ] Facts: 1. A few weeks before the elections, the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. Commission on Elections reinterpreted Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT).2. In granting the petition of 52 party list groups and organizations which were disqualified by the Commission on Election from participating in the May 13, 2013 party list elections because they allegedly do not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector of society, the majority is of the view that the party list system includes not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. H e n c e , c o n t r a r y t o t h e A n g B a g o n g B a y a n i , t h e p a r t y l i s t s y s t e m i s n o t t h e e x c l u s i v e d o m a i n o f s e c t o r a l representatives belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors but may be participated in by non-sectoral parties as well who do not need to represent marginalized and underrepresented sector. Issue: Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of the court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 may 2013 partylist elections

Held: The Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections. However, since the court adopts in this decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the Comelec in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to all the present petitions for the Comelec to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this decision.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000 Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, includingattendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for hisconstituents to be represented.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of theHouse of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.