Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No.

180906, October 7, 2008 Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of being members of the New Peoples Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo. Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws. Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of ones person against government intrusion. The right to security of person is freedom from fear, a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security. To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning to protect, is borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abusesoften perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

YANSON VS. DOLE Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 30, 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the September 21, 2001 Order[2] of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (public respondent), and the May 22, 2003 CA Resolution[3] which denied the motion for reconsideration. The facts are of record. On March 27, 1998, Mardy Cabigo and 40 other workers (private respondents) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-Bacolod District Office (DOLE Bacolod) a request for payroll inspection[4] of Hacienda Valentin Balabag owned by Alberta Yanson (petitioner). DOLE Bacolod conducted an inspection of petitioners establishment on May 27, 1998, and issued a Notice of Inspection Report, finding petitioner liable for the following violations of labor standard laws: 1. Underpayment of salaries and wages (workers being paid a daily rate of Ninety Pesos [P90.00] since 1997 and Seventy Five Pesos [P75.00] prior to such year); 2. 3. 4. Non-payment of 13th month pay for two (2) years; Non-payment of Social Amelioration Bonus (SAB) for two (2) years; Non-payment of employers 1/3 carabao share.*5+

and directing her to correct the same, thus: You are required to affect [sic] restitution and/or correction of the foregoing at the company or plant level within ten (10) calendar days from notice hereof. Any question of the above findings should be submitted to this Office within five (5) working days from notice hereof otherwise order of compliance shall be issued. This notice shall be posted conspicuously in the premises of the workplace, removal of which shall subject the establishment to a fine and/ or contempt proceedings. When there is a certified union, a copy of the notice shall be furnished said union.[6] In addition, DOLE Bacolod scheduled a summary investigation and issued, by registered mail, notices of hearing[7] as well as a subpoena duces tecum[8] to the parties. Petitioner did not appear in any of the scheduled hearings, or present any pleading or document.[9] In a Compliance Order[10] dated August 12, 1998, DOLE Bacolod directed petitioner to pay, within five (5) days, P9,084.00 to each of the 41 respondents or a total of P372,444.00, and to submit proof of payment thereof. It also required petitioner to correct existing violations of occupational safety and health standards.[11]

Thereafter, DOLE Bacolod issued on December 17, 1998 a Writ of Execution of its August 12, 1998 Compliance Order, viz.: NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of HAD. VALENTIN/BALABAG, MS. ALBERTA YANSON located at Brgy. Graneda or at Burgos St., Bacolod City and require the respondent to comply with the Order and pay the amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTYTWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR (P372,444.00). You are to collect the above-stated amount from the respondent and deposit the same to the Cashier of this Office for appropriate disposition to herein workers and/;or the supervision of the Office of the Regional Director. Otherwise, you are to execute this Writ by attaching the goods and chattel of the respondent not exempt from execution or in case of insufficiency thereof, against the real or immovable property. You are further ordered to collect the Execution and/or Sheriff Fee in the amount of TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN (P2,127.00) PESOS. Return this Writ to this Office within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof together with your statement in writing of the proceeding that you shall have conducted by virtue hereof.[12] On February 17, 1999, petitioner filed with DOLE Bacolod a Double Verified Special Appearance to Oppose Writ of Execution For Being a Blatant and Dangerous Violation of Due Process,*13+ claiming that she did not receive any form of communication, or participate in any proceeding relative to the subject matter of the writ of execution. Petitioner also impugned the validity of the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order subject of the writ of execution on the ground of lack of employment relationship between her and private respondents. DOLE Bacolod denied said motion in an Order[14] dated March 11, 1999. Petitioner filed with public respondent a Verified Appeal[15] and Supplement to the Verified Appeal,[16] posting therewith an appeal bond of P1,000.00 in money order and attaching thereto a Motion to be Allowed to Post Minimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of Bond.[17] Public respondent dismissed her appeal in an Order[18] dated September 21, 2001. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[19] which was denied due course and dismissed by the CA in its assailed October 30, 2002 Decision. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioners present recourse on the following grounds: I. The Honorable Court of Appeals and the Honorable Secretary of Labor, with all due respect, deprived the herein petitioner-appellant of her constitutional right not to be deprived of property without due process of law, and of free access to courts and quasi-judicial bodies by reason of poverty;

II. The Honorable Labor Secretary in his assailed Decision, with all due respect, for some rather mysterious reason or the other, dismissed the appeal with utter disregard of the fact that her Regional Director, whose orders were appealed to her were never received by the Petitioner. Said orders assessing payments against the petitioner were issued without notice received by petitioner, and enforced without giving the petitioner a chance to controvert the atrocious figures, and two years after the petitioners farm had ceased its operations; III. The Honorable Labor Secretary denied the petitioner of her right to seasonably raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction and the right [to] appeal; IV. There are very serious errors of fact and law in the assailed decision of the Honorable Labor Secretary, with all due respect; or that the assailed decision, with all due respect, is patently and blatantly contrary to law and jurisprudence.[20] The petition lacks merit. The appeal which petitioner filed with public respondent ultimately questioned the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order in which DOLE Bacolod, in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, awarded private respondents P9,084.00 each in labor standard benefits or the aggregate sum of P377,444.00.[21] For its perfection, the appeal was therefore subject to the requirements prescribed under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7730,[22] viz. Art. 128. Visitorial and Enforcement Power. - x x x (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from. (Emphasis ours) When petitioner filed her Verified Appeal and Supplement to the Verified Appeal, she posted a mere P1,000.00-appeal bond and attached a Motion to be Allowed to Post Minimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of Bond. Public respondent rejected said appeal for insufficiency of the appeal bond, viz.:

We note and stress that there is no analogous application in the Office of the Secretary of the practice in the NLRC of reducing the appeal bond; the law applicable to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment does not allow this practice. In other words, the respondents request for the reduction of the required bond cannot be allowed for lack of legal basis. Hence, for lack of the required bond, the respondents appeal was never duly perfected and must therefore be dismissed.*23+ (Emphasis ours) Citing Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,[24] the CA held that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner failed to perfect her appeal due to the insufficiency of her bond.[25 Petitioner contends that the CA and public respondent denied her the right to appeal when they rejected her P1,000.00-appeal bond. She insists that her appeal bond cannot be based on the monetary award of P372,444.00 granted by DOLE Bacolod in its August 14, 1998 Order which, having been rendered without prior notice to her, was a patent nullity and completely without effect.[26] She argues that her appeal bond should instead be based on her capacity to pay; otherwise, her right to free access to the courts as guaranteed under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution would be set to naught merely because of her diminished financial capacity Our sympathy for petitioner cannot override our fidelity to the law. In Guico, Jr. v. Hon. Quisumbing,[27] we held that the posting of the proper amount of the appeal bond under Article 128 (b) is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal from a monetary award in labor standard cases The next issue is whether petitioner was able to perfect his appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal bond must be "in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from." The records show that petitioner failed to post the required amount of the appeal bond. His appeal was therefore not perfected.[28 Just like the petitioner in the present case, the employer in Guico v. Secretary of Labor had also sought a reduction of the appeal bond due to financial losses arising from the shutdown of his business; yet, we did not temper the strict requirement of Article 128 (b) for him. The rationale behind the stringency of such requirement is that the employer-appellant may choose between a cash bond and a surety bond. Hence, limitations in his liquidity should pose no obstacle to his perfecting an appeal by posting a mere surety bond. Moreover, Article 128(b) deliberately employed the word only in reference to the requirements for perfection of an appeal in labor standards cases. Only commands a restrictive application,*29+ giving no room for modification of said requirements.

Petitioner pointed out, however, that Article 223[30] of the Labor Code prescribes similar requirements for perfection of appeals to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); yet, the same has been applied with moderation in that a reduction of the appeal bond may be allowed.[31] That is correct; but then, it should be borne in mind that reduction of bond in the NLRC is expressly authorized under the Rules implementing Article 223, viz.:[32] RULE VI. APPEAL Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorneys fees. The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. (Emphasis supplied.) No similar authority is given the DOLE Secretary in Department Order No. 18-02 (Implementing Rules), Series of 2002, amending Department Order No. 7-A, Series of 1995, implementing Article 128(b), thus: Rule X-A Section 8. Appeal. - (a) The Order of the Regional Director shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Secretary within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. (b) The appeal shall be filed with the Regional Office where the case originated together with the memorandum of the appealing party. The appellee may file his answer within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the appellants memorandum. Section 9. Cash or surety bond; when required. - In case the order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a duly accredited bonding company. The bond should be in the amount equivalent to the monetary award indicated in the order. Section 10. Writ of execution. - (a) If no appeal is perfected within the reglementary period, the Regional Director shall, motu propio or upon motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution to enforce the order. In the enforcement of the writ, the assistance of the law enforcement authorities may be sought.

(b) A writ of execution may be recalled subsequent to its issuance, if it is shown that an appeal has been perfected in accordance with this rule. (Emphasis ours) Under the foregoing Implementing Rules, it is plain that public respondent has no authority to accept an appeal under a reduced bond Further applying the Implementing Rules, there is one other reason for holding that petitioner failed to perfect her appeal. It is of record that she received the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order issued by DOLE-Bacolod, as indicated in the registry return card marked Annex I.*33+ Petitioner does not question this, except to point out that the registry return card does not indicate the date she received the order. That is of no consequence, for the fact remains that petitioner was put on actual notice not only of the existence of the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order but also of the summary investigation of her establishment. It behooves her to file a timely appeal to public respondent[34] or object to the conduct of the investigation.[35] Petitioner did neither, opting instead to sit idle and wait until the following year to question the investigation and resultant order, in the guise of opposing the writ of execution through a motion dubbed Double Verified Special Appearance to Oppose 'Writ of Execution' For Being a Blatant and Dangerous Violation of Due Process.*36+ Such appeal already went beyond the ten-day period allowed under Section 8(b) of Rule X-B of the Implementing Rules In fine, the CA was correct in holding that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the appeal of petitioner due to the insufficiency of her appeal bond. Even if we delve into its substance, her appeal would still not prosper. Petitioner questions the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order on the grounds that she was never notified of the proceedings leading to its issuance, and that as early as 1997, her employment relationship with the private respondents had already been severed. We dwell only on questions of law, not purely questions of fact, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first issue which petitioner raised, that is, whether she was properly served the notices of hearing issued by DOLE-Bacolod, is purely factual.[37] The determination made by DOLE-Bacolod on this matter binds us, especially as it was not reversed by public respondent and the CA. We therefore cannot supplant its factual finding with our own,*38+ moreso that petitioners bare denial cannot outweigh the probative value of the registry return cards attached to the record which indicate that said notices were received by petitioner.[39] Anent the second issue, the records do not sustain petitioners claim. In a Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 29, 1998,[40] petitioner acknowledged under oath that she is the employer of private respondents Mardy Cabigo, et al., who are members of the union known as Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA Facts: The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at trial. Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession. Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals. Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the California robberies and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on each count. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police also arrested Stewarts wife and three other people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was interrogated on nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any of them with the crime. At

trial, Stewarts statements were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Issues: Whether statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation are admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself are necessary. Supreme Court holding: The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. As such, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The Court further held that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely. Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.

PP vs. concepcion On appeal before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01808 dated 18 May 2007 which affirmed in toto the decision dated 13 December 2005[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, convicting accused-appellants Alfredo Concepcion y Clemente and Henry Concepcion y Clemente of Violation of Section 5,[3] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Appellants, together with Hegino dela Cruz, were charged before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, with Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 under the following information: That on or about the 27th day of November, 2002, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, in conspiracy with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drugs consisting of three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets weighing 5.080 grams, 4.446 grams and 4.362 grams, respectively.[4] When arraigned, appellants and accused Dela Cruz pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[5] The prosecution presented two witnesses: Police Officer (PO2) Peter Sistemio[6] and PO2 Arlan Arojado,[7] both regular members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and assigned with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Regional Office No. 3, Bulacan Provincial Office, Barangay Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan. The version of the prosecution is as follows: Sometime in the afternoon of 26 November 2002, a confidential informant reported to Senior Police Officer (SPO)1 Buenaventura R. Lopez at the PDEA, Regional Office No. 3, Bulacan Provincial Office, Barangay Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan, that an alias Totoy was engaged in selling drugs, particularly shabu, in Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. SPO1 Lopez instructed the confidential agent to set a drug deal with alias Totoy and order ten (10) grams of shabu. The confidential informant returned and confirmed that the delivery of the 10 grams of shabu would be made in Barangay Guyong at 2:00 a.m. of 27 November 2002. A buy-bust operation was planned and a team formed. The team was composed of SPO1 Lopez as team leader; PO2 Sistemio as the poseur-buyer; and PO2 Arojado, PO2 Navarette and PO2 Kho as back-up operatives. The team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to Barangay Guyong and arrived thereat at 1:15 a.m. of 27 November 2002. PO2 Sistemio and the confidential informant alighted from their vehicle and proceeded to a waiting shed along the highway. The rest of the team positioned themselves ten to twenty meters away in their parked vehicles. At around 2:00 a.m. a violet Hyundai van with plate number XAM-592 arrived with appellants and accused Dela Cruz on board. Dela Cruz was driving, while appellant Alfredo Concepcion, a.k.a. Totoy, was seated beside him and appellant Henry was at the back. The confidential informant introduced PO2 Sistemio to Totoy who asked the latter how much shabu he

would buy. PO2 Sistemio replied he would buy two plastic packs of shabu equivalent to ten grams. Totoy answered that each pack was worth P6,000.00 and got two plastic packs from the vans compartment and gave them to PO2 Sistemio. Appellant Henry Concepcion said, Mura pa yan, direkta kasi kami.*8+ PO2 Sistemio also heard someone say, Magandang klase yang stuff na yan.*9+ After receiving the two plastic packs, PO2 Sistemio lit a cigarette, the pre-arranged signal for the other members of the buy-bust team to approach and arrest the culprits. The boodle money that PO2 Sistemio had with him was no longer given to Totoy. Upon seeing PO2 Sistemio light a cigarette, the other team members blocked the vehicle. PO2 Arojado was ordered by PO2 Sistemio to search the vans glove compartment where the former recovered a medium-sized plastic sachet. Appellants and accused Dela Cruz were apprehended and brought to the PDEA office. The two plastic sachets[10] given by appellant Alfredo Concepcion to PO2 Sistemio, and the other one[11] recovered in the glove compartment, were marked with the initials P.S. A, P.S. A-1 and A.G.A., respectively. On the same day, per request*12+ of SPO1 Lopez, these plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were sent to the PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory Office 3, Bulacan Provincial Office, Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination was conducted on the specimens, Police Inspector Nellson C. Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer, issued Chemistry Report No. D-7002002 with a conclusion that said specimens contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.[13 The testimony of SPO1 Buenaventura Lopez was dispensed with due to the admission by the defense that his testimony would merely corroborate the testimony of PO2 Arojado, and that the alleged buybust operation was coordinated through cellular phone, but the same was not duly recorded before Barangays Guyong and Poblacion per certifications issued by the Barangay Captains of said barangays.*14+ With the defenses admission of the existence, due execution and genuineness of the request for laboratory examination, the Chemistry Report and specimens submitted, the testimony of Police Inspector Nellson C. Sta. Maria was also dispensed with. After the prosecution formally offered its evidence,[15] appellants and accused Dela Cruz, with leave of court, filed their respective demurrers to evidence,[16] which the trial court denied on 1 March 2005 for lack of merit.[17] The defense presented three witnesses: (1) appellant Alfredo Concepcion; (2) Julieta dela Rosa, appellant Alfredos spouse and appellant Henrys sister-in-law; and (3) accused Hegino dela Cruz Appellant Alfredo Concepcion disclosed that appellant Henry Concepcion is his brother and accused Hegino dela Cruz is his brothers friend. He narrated that at around 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. of 26 November 2002, he was in his house at RG Nicolas, Poblacion, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, when he, together with appellant Henry Concepcion, Hegino dela Cruz, Armando Cabral and Leopoldo Igueza, was arrested by elements of the PDEA. They were about to rest when they were arrested and handcuffed. PDEA operatives, whom he later came to know when the instant case was filed, entered his house and stayed for more or less thirty minutes. They were loaded into the vehicle of accused Hegino dela Cruz. His wife

and the wife of appellant Henry were present when he was arrested. They were then brought to the PDEA headquarters and were told that they had shabu. Appellant Alfredo Concepcion said he had no knowledge about the police officers allegation that he and his co-accused sold shabu to a poseur-buyer in Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. At the time of the supposed sale of shabu, he claims they were already at the PDEA headquarters. He denied he had shabu and that the police officers recovered nothing from his house. He was informed by his wife that a cell phone was missing in their house when the latter went to the PDEA headquarters. Appellant Alfredo added that upon his instruction, his wife reported his alleged arrest in his home before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangays Guyong and Poblacion.[18] Julieta dela Rosa testified that between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. of 26 November 2002, she was inside her house together with her brother-in-law (appellant Henry) and sister-in-law. Her husband, appellant Alfredo Concepcion, was outside with his friends (Armando Cabral and Leopoldo Abreza[19]) waiting for the vehicle of her other brother-in-law (Roberto Concepcion) which vehicle Alfredo would use in accompanying his friends to Manila. While she was watching television inside her house, she heard a commotion outside and when she opened a window, she saw her husband, accused Hegino dela Cruz, Armando and Leopoldo already handcuffed and being loaded into a van owned by accused Hegino. She went out and asked the person who handcuffed her husband the reason for this. She learned that the person who handcuffed her husband was a member of the PDEA. She was told to go inside the house and not to make any noise. She went inside to call her sister-in-law and when she went out again, her husband and all the others were no longer there. Julieta followed them to the office of the PDEA in Saluysoy St., Meycauayan, Bulacan. SPO1 Buenaventura Lopez told her that a case was filed against her husband because they recovered something from him which she said was not true. Thereafter, she went home and proceeded to the barangay hall of Poblacion to report that her husband and his companions were arrested without anything being recovered from them.[20] She then went to the police station of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, to check if the PDEA coordinated with them. She claims a certification[21] was issued showing that there was no coordination made by PDEA. In connection with the instant case, she and her sister-in-law, Anna Juan, who is the wife of appellant Henry Concepcion, executed a sworn statement.[22] Lastly, she explained she did not know what happened outside where her husband and his friends were apprehended. Next to take the stand for the defense was accused Hegino dela Cruz who testified that in the late afternoon of 26 November 2002, he was in his house at Lalakhan, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. While resting, someone informed him that appellant Henry Concepcion called and was renting his Hyundai van with plate number XAM-592 registered in his wifes name. He then proceeded to the house of Henry at RG Nicolas St. (formerly Calderon), Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and arrived thereat before 8:00 p.m. He parked the van in front of Henrys house. While seated at the drivers seat, he talked with Henry who told him, Luluwas kami. Henry was standing beside the van while Alfredo Concepcion was seated at the side with two companions. While he was conversing with Henry, a vehicle suddenly arrived. One of its passengers told him to alight and face the van, while the other passengers went to the house of Alfredo

Concepcion. He was frisked and was arrested without being informed of the reason therefor. He, together with appellants Concepcion, was brought to Saluysoy St., Meycauayan, Bulacan. In going to said place, they rode his van, which was driven by a PDEA member. Upon reaching the place, he called his family and came to know that the PDEA was filing a drug case against him and was told that there was shabu in the compartment of the van. He denied he had illegal drugs and that he was the only one using the van. Prior to the incident, he had not been charged with any offense in any other court. On 13 December 2005, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellants Alfredo and Henry Concepcion with, but acquitting accused Hegino dela Cruz of, the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court finds accused Alfredo Concepcion y Clemente and Henry Concepcion y Clemente GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE OF P500,000.00. Accused Hegino dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged for insufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, the Jail Warden of the Bulacan Provincial Jail is hereby DIRECTED to release accused Hegino dela Cruz from detention unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. In the service of their sentence, accused Alfredo Concepcion and Henry Concepcion who are detention prisoners shall be credited with the entire period of their preventive imprisonment. The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby forfeited in favor of the government. The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal thereof.[23] In convicting the brothers Concepcion, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of P02 Sistemio and PO2 Arojada when they positively identified appellant Alfredo Concepcion as the one from whom they bought and got the sachets of shabu. Also from their testimonies, the trial court found that appellant Henry Concepcion conspired with appellant Alfredo in trading the dangerous drugs for which they were charged. Appellant Henrys statement Mura pa yan, direkta kasi kami when he tried to persuade the poseur-buyer to accept the price of the drugs when the buy-bust transaction was taking place, convinced the trial court of his participation in the offense. The trial court further applied in favor of the PDEA agents the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. As regards accused Dela Cruz, the trial court was not convinced of his guilt. It explained that mere presence in the scene of the crime was not sufficient to convict in light of PO2 Sistemios statement that he was not certain if it was accused dela Cruz who uttered Magandang klase yang stuff na yan. On 15 December 2005, appellants Alfredo and Henry Concepcion filed a Notice of Appeal.[24] In an Order dated 3 January 2006, the trial court approved the notice of appeal and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to immediately transmit the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 20-2005.[25

In its decision dated 18 May 2007, the Court of Appeals totally agreed with the trial court. It disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed Decision dated December 13, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 78 in Criminal Case No. 3328-M-2002 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD. With costs against the accused-appellants.[26] On 31 May 2007, appellants Alfredo and Henry Concepcion filed a Notice of Appeal with manifestation were terminating the legal services of their private counsel and praying that they be represented by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).*27+ On 15 June 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the Notice of Appeal and ordered the forwarding of the records of the case to the Supreme Court. The appellate court appointed the PAO to represent the appellants.[28] With the elevation of the records to the Court and the acceptance of the appeal, the parties were required to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within thirty days from notice.[29] The parties manifested that they were not filing supplemental briefs, arguing that the relevant issues of the case had been discussed in their respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals. Accused-appellants make the following assignment of errors: THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT PATENTLY ERRED IN DEVIATING FROM THE ESTABLISHED RULE THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY BY POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BY ITSELF PREVAIL OVER THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE BUT RATHER ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE ARE SITUATIONS WHERE AN ACCUSED CAN HAVE NO OTHER DEFENSE BUT A DENIAL OF COMPLICITY IN THE OFFENSE CHARGED, AS THAT COULD BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH.[30] Appellants argue that the alleged buy-bust operation was not satisfactorily proven and was of doubtful legitimacy because of the failure of the prosecution to present and offer in evidence the physical inventory and the photograph of the evidence confiscated as required by Section 21,[31] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and that said operation was not coordinated with the PDEA.

After going over the evidence on record, we find that there, indeed, was a buy-bust operation involving appellants. The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not exonerate appellants. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[32] In the instant case, we find the integrity of the drugs seized intact. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been broken. After seizure of the drugs from appellants possession, P02 Sistemio and PO2 Arojada marked them with their initials and turned them over to SPO1 Lopez who, on the same day, sent these plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory Office 3, Bulacan Provincial Office, Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination conducted on the specimens, Police Inspector Nellson C. Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer, concluded that the white crystalline substance was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. There can be no doubt that the drugs seized from appellants were the same ones examined in the crime laboratory. This statement is bolstered by the defenses admission of the existence, due execution and genuineness of the request for laboratory examination, the Chemistry Report and specimens submitted. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said: While it is true that counsel for appellants, during the cross-examination of PO2 Sistemio, questioned the latter on non-compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 regarding the immediate physical inventory and photographing of the seized dangerous drug, there is no showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu from appellants at the time of the buy-bust had not been properly preserved by the apprehending team. PO2 Sistemio explained that the seized substance contained in three properly marked plastic sachets were sent for chemical analysis to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Alejo Santos in Malolos City, Bulacan. Significantly, such an objection was not reiterated by the appellants in their Demurrer to Evidence which was focused merely on the alleged inconsistencies in the narration of the details of the buy-bust by prosecution witnesses PO2 Sistemio and PO2 Arojado, as well as non-presentation of the marked boodle money which supposedly disproves the sale.[33] Appellants argument that the buy-bust operation was not coordinated with the PDEA is specious. From the testimonies of the defense witnesses, it is clear that they all know that the buy-bust operation was conducted by the elements of the PDEA. It is thus nonsensical for the defense to argue that the operation was not coordinated with the PDEA if it was the PDEA itself that conducted the entrapment. Moreover, said argument is belied by the defenses admission that the PDEA coordinated with Barangays Guyong and Poblacion via cellphone regarding the conduct of the buy-bust operation. Appellants contention that they were not apprised of their constitutional rights upon their arrest cannot lead to their acquittal. The arresting officers alleged failure to inform them of their Miranda rights or the nature of their arrest should have been raised before arraignment. It is too late in the day for appellants to raise these alleged illegalities after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered.[34]

Appellants claim that the PDEA, aside from its supposed non-compliance with Republic Act No. 9165, failed to prove and execute certain matters that would show that a proper buy-bust operation was conducted. The alleged requirements for a proper buy-bust which the PDEA did not undertake include the following: (1) the prosecution failed to offer proof that appellants were known drug traffickers; (2) no surveillance was done to verify appellants illicit activities; (3) the serial numbers of the boodle money were not jotted down in the log/blotter book during the planning and execution of the buy-bust operation; and (4) the boodle money prepared was grossly inadequate (P6,000.00) for the price of two plastic packs of shabu equivalent to 10 grams, as one pack commands a price of P6,000.00, which fact was known by the entrapping officers. The absence of all these, appellants say, shows that they are innocent of the charge. We find their claim untenable. In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending those involved in the illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of obscurity.[35] Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.[36] Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.[37] These two elements were clearly established in this case. The records show that appellants sold and delivered the shabu to the PDEA agent posing as a poseur-buyer. The plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, which were seized and were found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, were identified and offered in evidence. There is also no question that appellants knew that what they were selling and delivering was shabu, a dangerous drug. After reviewing the evidence on record, we find the testimonies of the poseur-buyer and his back-up, as well as the dangerous drug seized from appellants, more than sufficient to prove the crime charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[38] The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[39] Finding no reason to deviate from the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we uphold their findings.

Appellants assertion that the prosecution should have offered proof showing that they are drug traffickers and are notorious in the drug trade as proof of a proper buy-bust operation, is without basis. This Court does not know of any law or jurisprudence that requires such evidence before it can be held that there was a legal buy-bust operation. Appellants likewise insist that surveillance should have been conducted to verify their illicit activities. We do not agree. Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.[40] A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.[41] Flexibility is a trait of good police work.[42] In the instant case, the entrapment or buy-bust operation was conducted without the necessity of any prior surveillance because the confidential informant, who was previously tasked by the buy-bust team leader to order dangerous drugs from appellant Alfredo Concepcion, accompanied the team to the person who was peddling the dangerous drugs. The failure of the PDEA operatives to record the boodle money will not render the buy-bust operation illegal. The recording of marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the elements for the prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. The recording or non-recording thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as long as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven.[43] In the case at bar, PO2 Sistemio, the poseur buyer and PO2 Arojado testified as to how the shabu subject of the case was seized from appellants. Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation.[44] What is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[45] The prosecution duly established both in this case. Appellants claim that the boodle money prepared by the buy-bust team was grossly insufficient. We find such claim baseless. The Court, after examining the transcript of stenographic notes containing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, did not find the exact amount of boodle money that was prepared. What is clear, though, is the fact that the boodle money was not given to appellant Alfredo Concepcion because of the apprehension that followed after the poseur-buyer signaled that the transaction had already been consummated. Appellants argument that the poseur-buyer was not able to strike a deal or a sale because one of the elements of the crime charged was wanting - payment by the poseur-buyer for the thing sold or receipt of the marked money by the seller of the dangerous drugs - is erroneous. As above-mentioned, the transaction between the poseur-buyer and appellants was already consummated. There is no rule of

law which requires that in buy-bust operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.[46] It must be emphasized that appellants were charged with selling, trading, delivering, giving away, dispatching in transit and transporting dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The charge was not limited to selling. Said section punishes not only the sale but also the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller. In the distribution of prohibited drugs, the payment of any consideration is immaterial. The mere act of distributing the prohibited drugs to others is in itself a punishable offense.[47] In the case at bar, the shabu was delivered to the poseur-buyer after appellants agreed on the price of the contraband. PO2 Sistemio, the poseur-buyer, failed to give the boodle money to appellant Alfredo as payment for the shabu. However, he satisfactorily explained why he was not able to do so. He testified that there was boodle money with him during the operation to pay for the sale of the drugs, but he was unable to utilize the same because he immediately performed the pre-arranged signal alerting the rest of the buybust team that he had received the drugs. Appellants deny the existence of the buy-bust operation and cry frame-up We are not swayed. In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellants were involved in the buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, appellants Alfredo and Henrys participation cannot be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[48] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[49] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[50] We uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. The presumption was not overcome as there was no evidence showing that PO2 Sistemio and PO2 Arojado were impelled by improper motive. The testimony of defense witness Julieta dela Rosa does not convince us. As the wife of appellant Alfredo and sister-in-law of appellant Henry, we find her not to be credible. Her testimony is suspect and unsubstantiated. In her direct testimony, she said her husband, appellant Alfredo, was outside their house with his friends.[51] However, such statement was belied by Alfredo himself who said he was inside his house when he was allegedly arrested by members of the PDEA. Such inconsistency as to where appellant Alfredo was when the alleged unlawful arrest was made, further diminishes the credibility of the defense witnesses.

Undeniably, appellants are guilty of sale and delivery of shabu, a dangerous drug. It was duly established that there was a conspiracy between them to sell and deliver dangerous drugs. An examination of the information reveals that appellants were charged with selling, trading, delivering, giving away, dispatching in transit and transporting dangerous drugs consisting of three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets weighing 5.080 grams, 4.446 grams and 4.362 grams, respectively. However, from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, only two sachets[52] were sold and delivered to the poseur-buyer. The third sachet[53] was not sold or delivered but was found by PO2 Arojado in the glove compartment of the Hyundai van. From the foregoing, it is thus clear that appellants could have been charged with possession of dangerous drugs[54] on account of the third sachet. This was not done. They cannot be convicted of possession of dangerous drugs, though proved, without being properly charged therefor. The error on the part of the public prosecutor notwithstanding, the appellants are still guilty, as charged in the information, of selling and delivering the two sachets to the poseur-buyer. We now go to the penalty to be imposed. The court a quo imposed on each of the appellants the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 which the Court of Appeals sustained. Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.[55] The statute, in prescribing the range of penalties imposable, does not concern itself with the amount of dangerous drug sold by an accused.[56] With the effectivity, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been proscribed. As a consequence, the penalty to be meted to appellants shall only be life imprisonment and fine. The penalty imposed by the court a quo being in accordance with law, and which the appellate court upheld, this Court similarly sustains the same. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01808 dated 18 May 2007 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, convicting appellants Alfredo Concepcion y Clemente and Henry Concepcion y Clemente of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

PANTILO VS. CANOY This administrative complaint against Judge Victor A. Canoy (Judge Canoy) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29 in Surigao City stems from a complaint filed by Gaudencio Pantilo III (Pantilo), charging Judge Canoy with several counts of gross ignorance of the law and/or procedures, grave abuse of authority, and appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct). Pantilo prays for Judge Canoys disbarment in relation to Criminal Case No. 8072 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide entitled People of the Philippines v. Leonardo Luzon Melgazo. The facts of the case, as gathered from the records, are as follows: The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim in the above-mentioned criminal case, recounts in his letter-complaint that, on September 3, 2008, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he, along with police officers Ronald C. Perocho (Perocho) and Santiago B. Lamanilao, Jr. (Lamanilao), acting as escorts of Leonardo Luzon Melgazo (Melgazo), the accused in Criminal Case No. 8072, went to the City Prosecutors Office, Surigao City, to attend the inquest proceedings.1 Later, at around 8 oclock in the evening, Pantilo was informed by Perocho that Melgazo had been released from detention.2 The following day, September 4, 2008, Pantilo went to the Surigao City Police Station to verify the information. Upon arriving there, Custodial Officer Anecito T. Undangan told him that Melgazo had indeed been released at around 6:30 p.m. on September 3, 2008, as shown in the Police Logbook of Detention Prisoners and as authorized by Chief of Police Supt. Ramer Perlito P. Perlas.3 Further, the logbook showed that Melgazo was temporarily released upon the order of Judge Canoy after he posted bail in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000), as evidenced by O.R. No. 0291794 dated September 3, 2008.4 Pantilo proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to request a copy of the Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the Surigao City Prosecutors Office.5 Puzzled, he inquired from the City Prosecutors Office the details surrounding the release of Melgazo. He learned that no Information had yet been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for the approval of the bail. Likewise, he also learned from the City Police Station that no written Order of Release had been issued but only a verbal order directing the police officers to release Melgazo from his detention cell.6 One of the police officers even said that Judge Canoy assured him that a written Order of Release would be available the following day or on September 4, 2008 after the Information is filed in Court. On September 5, 2008, Melgazo filed a Motion for the Release of his impounded vehicle as physical evidence pending the trial of the case.7 The motion was received by the Office of the Clerk of Court at 8:30 a.m. that day and was subsequently raffled in the afternoon. In the Notice of Hearing of the said motion, Melgazo prayed that it be heard on September 5, 2008 at 8:30 a.m. According to Pantilo, this clearly violated the rules which require that the other party must be served a copy of the motion at least three (3) days before the hearing. Nevertheless, Judge Canoy issued an Order dated September 5, 2008, directing Assistant City Prosecutor Robert Gonzaga (Prosecutor Gonzaga), the prosecutor-in-charge of the case, to give his comment on the

said motion within three (3) days upon receipt of the Order. Three (3) days later, Prosecutor Gonzaga submitted his comment. And despite his opposition, Judge Canoy granted Melgazos motion.8 Subsequently, Pantilo filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Canoy which was later denied. Aggrieved, Pantilo filed a letter-complaint dated November 3, 2008 before the Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Canoy with (1) gross ignorance of the law and procedures; (2) grave abuse of authority; and (3) appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct). Pantilo also prays for Judge Canoys disbarment. On January 5, 2009, the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt. Accordingly, on February 5, 2009, Judge Canoy filed his comment, arguing that the facts in this case were exceptional. In his comment, he admitted that the inquest proceedings of Melgazo before Prosecutor Gonzaga concluded around 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 2008, after which, Melgazo, with his counsel, Atty. Cacel Azarcon, went to his office to post bail for Melgazos provisional liberty.9 He noted that because of the time, most of the clerks in his office and the Office of the Clerk of Court had already gone home. Thus, it was no longer possible to process the posting of bail and all the necessary papers needed for the release of Melgazo. Bearing in mind the constitutional right of the accused to bail and coupled with the insistence of Melgazos counsel, Judge Canoy summoned Prosecutor Gonzaga and inquired about the result of the inquest proceedings. Thereupon, Prosecutor Gonzaga relayed to him that the charge against Melgazo was for Reckless Imprudence with Homicide and the recommended bail bond was thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000). However, since it was already past 5:00 p.m., Prosecutor Gonzaga claimed that he could no longer file the Information and that it would have to be filed the next day.10 Despite all this, Judge Canoy informed Prosecutor Gonzaga that he would allow Melgazo to post bail in the amount recommended. He then called Mrs. Ruth O. Suriaga (Suriaga), Clerk IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Surigao City, to accept as deposit for bail the thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000) from Melgazo.11 Likewise, he instructed Suriaga to earmark an official receipt which would have to be dated the following day or September 4, 2008. Accordingly, he summoned the escorting police officers, Perocho and Lamanilao, and verbally ordered them to release Melgazo from detention. He also said that the written order would be issued the following day.12 In his defense, Judge Canoy invokes the constitutional right of the accused to bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which does not require that a person be charged in court before he or she may apply for bail.13 To his mind, there was already "a constructive bail given that only the papers were needed to formalize it."14 It would be unreasonable and unjustifiable to further delay the release of the accused. Nevertheless, he submits that if he would be "faulted for such

act, he does humbly concede but he merely acted in accordance with what he deemed best for the moment x x x."15 As to his Order dated September 8, 2008 directing the release of the vehicle subject of the case, he contends that there was no deliberate intent to disregard rules and procedure. In fact, he points out that the prosecution was given three (3) days within which to file its comment on the motion of the accused. The grounds raised by both parties were well taken into consideration, but he found the grounds raised by Melgazo to be more reasonable and practical and, hence, he granted the motion. Similarly, he denied the motion for inhibition filed by Pantilo owing to the absence of an express imprimatur of the prosecutor handling the case. On February 9, 2009, Pantilo filed his Reply to the Comment arguing that there is no such thing as constructive bail under the rules. He adds that, while he does not dispute the accuseds right to post bail, the granting of such should be in harmony with the rules, i.e., an application or motion to that effect and a corresponding order from the court granting the motion. On October 18, 2010, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez issued his evaluation and recommendation on the case. In his evaluation, the Court Administrator found that respondent judge failed to comply with the documents required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail. Further, the Court Administrator noted that Judge Canoy also has another pending case (but filed on a later date, September 3, 2009): OCA-IPI No. 09-3254-RTJ, entitled Cristita Conjurado Vda. de Tolibas v. Judge Victor A. Canoy for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. Consequently, he recommended the following: (1) the instant complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (2) Judge Canoy be fined forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) with a stern warning that a commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. The Courts Ruling We find the evaluation and recommendations of the Court Administrator well-founded. It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail,16 more so in this case when the charge against Melgazo, Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, is a non-capital offense. However, the letter-complaint focuses on the manner of Melgazos release from detention. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court "may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held." In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with the Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114.1avvphil

In addition to a written application for bail, Rule 114 of the Rules prescribes other requirements for the release of the accused: SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail.The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. SEC. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements.All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions: (a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in form at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it; (b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or these Rules; (c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and (d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final execution. The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail. In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not deposit the amount of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. In clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy instead verbally ordered Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, to accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day. Worse, respondent judge did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Immediately upon receipt by Suriaga of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge Canoy ordered the police escorts to release Melgazo without any written order of release. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release order. As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as "constructive bail," there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of another.

In BPI v. Court of Appeals, We underscored that "procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality."17 In other words, "[r]ules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings."18 In this case, the reason of Judge Canoy is hardly persuasive enough to disregard the Rules.19 From the foregoing, the Court finds Judge Canoy guilty of a less serious charge of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9, Rule 140 for which a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not exceeding PhP 20,000 is the imposable penalty under Sec. 11(b), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. A fine of PhP 11,000 would be the appropriate penalty under the circumstances of the case. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Victor A. Canoy is found GUILTY of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. He is meted the penalty of a FINE of eleven thousand pesos (PhP 11,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

PACOY VS. CAJIGALG.R. NO. 157472September 28, 2007 FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filedin the RTC against Petitioner Jose M. Pacoy. Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counselde parte , pleaded not guilty tothe charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after thearraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directingthe trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondentregistered as having qualified the crime to Murder. Acting uponsuch Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing outthe word Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. Theaccusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of theoriginal Information for Homicide.Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that therespondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capriciousand partial manner in mandating the amendment of the chargefrom Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the lawand existing jurisprudence. The respondent judge denied theMotion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration.In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judgefound that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that disregard of rank is merely a generic mitigating circumstance which should not elevate theclassification of the crime of homicide to murder.ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretionand exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of theinformation from homicide to murder.HELD:The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offensecharged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendmentand not a substantial amendment or a substitution.Under Section 14, Rule 110 Amendment or substitution Acomplaint or information may be amended, in form or insubstance, without leave of court, at any time before the accusedenters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formalamendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of theInformation shows that the only change made was in the captionof the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and itsreplacement by the word Murder. There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in thedetermination of the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, we find thatthe amendment made in the caption and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely formal. Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formalamendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, itis necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of theaccused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information

iswhether a defense under the complaint or information, as itoriginally stood, would no longer be available after theamendment is made; and when any evidence the accused mighthave would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Sincethe facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amendedInformation are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution'stheory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudiceto the rights or defense of petitioner. While the respondent judge erroneously thought that disrespect on account of rank qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find thathe committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering theamendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment madewas only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial rightof petitioner.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no graveabuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.

THE ANTECEDENTS Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local elections. The Information reads: That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, in [S]itio Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836 outside his residence during the election period, without authorization in writing from the Commission on Election[s]. The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (Code) after the Marinduque Philippine National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team was composed of Police Senior Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene, and PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number WHT-371 on the national highway, coming from the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion) opened the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not show any COMELEC authority to carry a firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one, but he opened the case when asked to do so. The checkpoint team saw the following when the case was opened: 1) one Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial number 173-56836, loaded with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing 100 bullets; 3) two pieces speed loader with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear protector. Pedro was with three other men. The checkpoint team brought all of them to the Boac police station for investigation. The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business without any authority from the Comelec. After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of the Codes Article XXII, Section 261 (q),[5] in relation to Section 264.[6] Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted.[7] The preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification*8+ and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.*9+ Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification dated September 24, 2001 that he was exempted from the gun ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion. The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro.[10]

The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos (Los Baos), representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of due process when the judge quashed the information without a hearing. Attached to Los Baos motion were two Comelec certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm ban; and (2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification of September 24, 2001 were forged. The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion.*11+ Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117,*12+ arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutors lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case. The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros arraignment date. Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated reopening.[13] He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations where either the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or where the prosecution alone moved for, the provisional dismissal of the case; in rejecting his argument that the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code[14] or Act No. 3326[15] find no application to his case as the filing of the Information against him stopped the running of the prescriptive periods so that the prescription mandated by these laws became irrelevant; and, in setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial conference, despite being barred under Section 8 of Rule 117. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION The CA initially denied Pedros petition. For accuracy, we quote the material portions of its ruling: The petition lacks merit. The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to provisional dismissals on motion of the accused. The Rule merely provides that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed, except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. Nothing in the said rule proscribes its application to dismissal on motion of the accused. Nevertheless, we find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, as there is no showing that the error was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The grave abuse of

discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must establish the following: 1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. Although the second paragraph of Section 8 states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof, without the case having been revived, such provision should be construed to mean that the dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor, as the public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeliness requirement unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the public prosecutor was served the order of dismissal dated 22 November 2001. Absent such proof, we cannot declare that the State is barred from reviving the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque provincial prosecutors receipt of the quashal order to be 2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001, and argued that based on this date, the provisional dismissal of the case became permanent on December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the CA reversed itself, ruling as follows: On 9 September 2005, we ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to a dismissal on motion of the accused. However, we did not issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition, because it was shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reopening of the case. Moreover, we stated that we cannot rule on the issue of whether or not the State is barred from reopening the case because it was not shown when the public prosecutor was served the order of dismissal. The arguments raised in the respondents motion for modification were duly passed upon in arriving at the decision dated 9 September 2005, and no new matters were raised which would warrant a reconsideration thereof.

On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to reopen the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the time the public prosecutor was served the notice of dismissal. Therefore, the state is barred from reopening the case. WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedros motion for partial reconsideration is hereby GRANTED, and respondent Ariel Los Banos motion for modification of judgment is, accordingly, DENIED. To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that there was an error of law but no grave abuse of discretion that would call for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on motion for reconsideration; it then ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision. Los Baos prays in his petition that the case be remanded to the RTC for arraignment and trial, or that a new charge sheet be filed against Pedro, or that the old information be re-filed with the RTC. He contends that under Section 6 of Rule 117, an order sustaining a motion to quash does not bar another prosecution for the same offense, unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 3(g)[16] and (i)[17] of Rule 117. Los Baos argues that the dismissal under Section 8 of Rule 117 covers only situations where both the prosecution and the accused either mutually consented or agreed to, or where the prosecution alone moved for the provisional dismissal of the case; it can also apply to instances of failure on the part of the prosecution or the offended party to object, after having been forewarned or cautioned that its case will be dismissed. It does not apply where the information was quashed. He adds that although the trial court granted the motion to quash, it did not categorically dismiss the case, either provisionally or permanently, as the judge simply ordered the return of the confiscated arms and ammunition to Pedro. The order was open-ended, and did not have the effect of provisionally dismissing the case under Section 8 of Rule 117. Los Baos also contends that the CA gravely erred when: (1) it ruled in effect that the Order dated November 22, 2001 granting the motion to quash is considered a provisional dismissal, which became permanent one year from the prosecutors receipt of the order; the order to quash the Information was based on Section 3 of Rule 117, not on Section 8 of this Rule; (2) it granted Pedros motion for reconsideration and denied Los Baos motion for modification of judgment, when Section 6 of Rule 117 clearly provides that an order granting a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. He notes that the grounds Pedro relied upon in his motion to quash are not subsections (g) or (i) of Rule 117, but its subsections (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and (h) that it contains averments which if true would constitute a legal justification. Pedros cited grounds are not the exceptions that would bar another prosecution for the same offense.[18] The dismissal of a criminal case upon the express application of the accused (under subsections [a] and [h]) is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because his application is a waiver of his constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy.

In response to all these, respondent Pedro insists and fully relies on the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 to support his position that the RTC should not have granted Los Banos motion to reopen the case. THE ISSUES The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening the case should prevail. OUR RULING We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial court for arraignment and trial. Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal a. Motion to Quash A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information.[19] The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or information. The rules governing a motion to quash are found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows: (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. b. Provisional Dismissal

On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states that: SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprison-ment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: 1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.[20] In People v. Lacson,[21] we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. c. Their Comparison An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy,[22] by the previous extinction of criminal liability,[23] by the rule on speedy trial,[24] and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused.[25] Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.

A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain. A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash - the complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and the exception stated in Section 6. Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8. This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its timebar does not apply.

Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals: First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.[26] Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal. Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information. Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are present.[27] Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration. To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal. Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of the case that the RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CAs order is legally proper. Pedros Motion to Quash The merits of the grant of the motion to quash that the RTC initially ordered is not a matter that has been ruled upon in the subsequent proceedings in the courts below, including the CA. We feel obliged to refer back to this ruling, however, to determine the exact terms of the remand of the case to the RTC that we shall order.

The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the offense was committed.[28] Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for Pedros motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (dated September 24, 2001, issued by Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department, Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel of the Comelec, granting him an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry firearms during the election period)[29] that Pedro attached to his motion to quash. This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification.[30] Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial. One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the fact that Pedro was charged of violating Section 261(q) of the Code, instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261(q); these two sections aim to penalize among others, the carrying of firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places during the election period without the authority of the Comelec. The established rule is that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information[31] Further, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,[32] we specifically recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under Section 261(q) of the Code. WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the assailed September 19, 2005 decision and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223 respectively MODIFIED and REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque for the arraignment and trial of respondent Joel R. Pedro, after reflecting in the Information the amendment introduced on Section 261(q) of the Code by Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166. SO ORDERED.

DRACULAN VS. DONATO Kahilingan ng mga taga-usig na Piskal Provincial at Pangapat na Katulong na Piskal ng Lalawigan ng Isabela na pawalan ng bisa ang kautusan na may petsang Marso 25, 1976 ni Hukom Procoro J. Donato ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ang nasabing lalawigan na nagpasiya na hindi maaaring tanggapin bilang katibayan (evidence) laban sa isang nasasakdal na nagngangalang Jaime Gumpal sa kasalanang asesinato (sadyang pagpatay ng tao) ang salaysay (statement) nito na nilagdaan sa harap ni Constable Jaime Senin, isang tagapagsiyasat ng Philippine Constabulary, at naglalaman ng pag-amin ng kasalanang ipinaparatang sa kaniya. Ibinatay ni Hukom Donato ang nasabing kautusan sa palagay na ang pagamin na iyon ni Gumpal ay nangyari sa paraang labag sa Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas. Lumalabas sa rekord na noong Pebrero 21, 1974, si Jaime Gumpal ay isinakdal sa Hukumang nabanggit sa kasalanang pagpatay sa isang taong nagngangalang Florentino Arranzazo. Pagkadakip sa kaniya ng mga maykapangyarihan, siya ay piniit sa 116th P.C. Headquarters sa Santiago, Isabela. Samantalang siya ay nasa piitan, siniyasat siya ng mga tagapagsiyasat ng Konstabularya. Sa isang yugto ng pagsisiyasat, noong Disyembre 4, 1973, si Gumpal ay lumagda sa isang salaysay (statement) na ang pangbungad na sinasabi ay ang sumusunod: Ang taong tinatanong ay pinagsabihan tungkol sa kanyang mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas, at ipinaliwanag sa kanya na siya ay hindi maaaring pilitin na magbigay ng ano mang deklarasyon kung kanyang pipiliin. Ipinaliwanag din sa kanya ang tungkol sa imbestigasyon na ito na ang ano mang sasabihin niya dito ay maaaring gamitin laban sa kanya. ... Ang salaysay na ito ay tinatakang "Exhibit D". Pagkaraan ng ilang araw, o kaya noong ika-3 ng Pebrero, 1974, lumagda rin siya sa isa pang salaysay (sa wikang Ingles naman) na ang pangbukas na pangungusap ay ganito. The Affiant was apprised of his constitutional rights and explained to him the nature of this investigation, warned him that anything he may state herein may be used for or against him in any Court proceedings, he was also advise that he has the right to legal assistance and/or Counsel de oficio before answering questions profounded to him. ... Sa pangalawang salaysay na ito na mimwkahang "Exhibit C", inamin ni Gumpal na siya nga ang pumatay kay Arranzazo. At napatunayan pa ng Piskal sa harap ng hukuman na ang kabiyak na gunting na kaniyang t sa pagpatay na iyon na sang-ayon sa kaniya ay kanyang itinago, ay natagpuan ng mga tagapagsiyasat sa pook na kanyang pinagtaguan sa Calabayan, Angadanan, Isabela. Itong "Exhibit C" na ito ang hindi tinanggap ni Hukom Donato bilang katibayan sa paglilitis kay Gumpal (Ang kabuuan ng "Exhibit C" na nasa wikang Ingles ay kalakip bilang Annex A ng kapasiyahang ito upang maunawaan ng lahat ang mga pangyayari na Aming pinagsasaligan.) Ayon kay Hukom Donato, batay sa Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, upang ang ano mang salaysay ng isang nasasakdal ay tanggapin ng hukuman na katibayan laban sa kanya, dapat na patunayan muna ng Piskal na bago ito ginawa ay napabatid at naipaliwanag na sa kanya na siya ay mayroon karapatan, sang-ayon

sa Saligang Batas, sa Artikulo IV, Seksyon 20 nito, na magsawalang- kibo (to remain silent). Ang seksyong nabanggit ay nag-uutos ng ganito: SEK 20. Hindi dapat pilitin ang isang tao na tumestigo laban sa sarili. Ang sino mang tao na sinisiyasat dahil sa paglabag ay dapat magkaroon ng karapatang magsawalang-kibo, magkaroon ng abogado, at niapatalastasan ng gayong karapatan. Hindi siya dapat gamitan ng puwersa, dahas, pagbabanta, pananakot, o ano pa mang paraan na sisira sa kanyang malayang pagpapasiya. Hindi dapat tanggapin ang ano mang pagtatapat na nakuha na labag sa seksiyong ito. At sapagka't sa pinag-uusapan ditong salaysay, Exhibit C, ay walang maliwanag na babala, ayon kay Hukom Donato, tungkol sa karapatarig ito, magiging labag sa Saligang Batas kung ito ay tatanggaping katibayan (evidence) laban kay Gumpal. Sa kabilang dako, idinadaing naman ng Piskal at ng Solicitor General na ang ginawang iyon ni Hukom Donato ay hindi wasto o walang batayan sa batas, kung kaya't hinihiling nila na iyon ay pawalan ng bisa Sang-ayon sa Solicitor General ang tagapagsiyasat na kumuha ng mga salaysay ni Gumpal, si Constable Senin ay nagsalaysay sa harap ng hukuman at sinabi na : Q Are you f with the provisions of Section 20, of Article 4 of the Constitution?

A Yes, sir. Q Having known the provisions of the Constitution particularly Section 20, Article 4 of the New Constitution, will you tell the Honorable Court what procedure or steps did you take in correction with the jnvestigation of the accused Jaime Gumpal during the investigation on February 3, 1974? A Before I took the statement of Jaime Gumpal on February 3, 1974 I apprised him of his rights of Section 20, Article 4. I told him that he has the right to secure his counsel. I even confronted him that whatever he may state in this statement in his favor or against him and the court of justice. I mentioned that in the affidavit. The same warning. Q After apprising him of his constitutional rights and warning him what did Jaime Gumpal say if any? A He gave his statement voluntarily, sir. (pp. 10-11, t.s.n., June 6, 1974; emphasis supplied).

At dahil sa sinabing ito ni Constable Senin ipinapalagay ng Solicitor General na sapagka't naipaliwanag na ng tagapagsiyasat kay Gumpal na ano mang sasabihin niya o isasagot niya sa mga tanong ay maaaring gamitin laban sa kaniya, ang babalang ito ay sapat nang pagtupad sa mga ipinag-uutos ng Saligang Batas. Sa ibang salita, sang-ayon sa Solicitor General ang karapatan ng isang mamamayan na magsawalangkibo (to remain silent) ay sakop o napapaloob na sa kaniyang karapatan na hindi siya maaaring pilitin na maging saksi ng laban sa kaniyang sarili. Samakatuwid, ayon sa Solicitor General, kapag ang isang sinisiyasat ay napaliwanagan na ano mang isasagot niya sa mga itatanong sa kaniya ay maaaring gamitin laban sa kaniya at hindi siya pilitin maging saksi laban sa kaniyang sarili, para na ring siya ay binabalaan na siya ay mayroong karapatang magsawalang-kibo. Ibinabatay niya ang y na ito sa doktrina ng Korte Supreme na rin na nagsasabi na:

We here limit Ourselves to a discussion of this right to counsel and to be informed of such right, because that is the only principal issue in these cast, and that is the only new right given to an a ed by the New Constitution, with respect to extra-judicial confessions. Under the Old Constitution, there was already the provision that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself (Art. III, Sec. 1 [8]; this right included the right to silent [U.S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 3431); and confessions obtained through force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other which vitiates the free will were already declared inadmissible against an accused person in a number of our decision to which we shall refer in the couse of this opinion, although they were raised into the category of constitutional mandate under Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution. (Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4, 11.) Bukod dito, ipinasasaalang-alanga ng Solicitor General ang mga pangbungad na babala sa Exhibit D, iyong salaysay ni Gumpal na may petsa Diciembre 3, 1974. Kagaya ng mababasa sa nasabing Exhibit D, doon ay maliwanag na sinasabi na sa "taong tinatanong ... (ay) ipinaliwanag sa kaniya na siya ay hindi maaaring pilitin na magbigay ng ano mang deklarasyon kung kanyang pipiliin. Ipaliliwanag din sa kanya ang tungkol sa imbestigasyon na ito na ang ano mang sasabihin niya dito ay maaaring gamitin laban sa kanya ..." Ang ibig sabihin ay sapagkat sapagka't noong unang pagkakataong si Gumpal ay kinunan ng salaysay ay ipinalam na sa kanya ang mga nauukol na karapatan niya, hindi kaialangan o kalabisan ang gayong paliwanag ay ulitin pa sa kanya noong muli siyang magsalaysay noong Pebrero 3, 1974. Inaari Naming tumpak ang panindigang ito ng mga Piskal at ng Solicitor General Totoo nga na dapat laging igalang at pairalin ang mga karapatan ng mga mamamayan na nasasaad sa Saligang Batas, sapagka't ang mga karapatang iyan ay siyang nagbibigay ng kabuluhan at dangal sa buhay ng tao. Ang minimithing kalayaan at kaligayahan ng bawat mamamayan ay hindi maaaring maging tunay at ganap habang ang alin man sa mga karapatang iyan ay ipinagkakait sa kanya. Sa katunayan, walang bayan at pamahalaan maaaring magtagumpay at umunlad nang hindi gumagalang sa mga karapatan ng mga yan. At sa buong ang pinakamahalagang simulain sinusunod ng lahat ng bansa ay ang pagpipitagan at, pagsasanggalang sa mga karapatang pantao (human rights). Subali't, una, sa usaping Aming pinapasiyahang ito, hindi maaaring sabihin na ang sumiyasat kay Gumpal at kumuha ng kaniyang salaysay na pinaglalabanan dito ay hindi tumupad sa ipinag-uutos ng Saligang Batas, sapagka't batay sa mga pangyayaring naipaliwanag na sa itaas, Kami ay naniniwala na ang mga babalang ipinabatid kay Gumpal ni Constable Jaime Senin nang siya ay kinunan ng salaysay ay sapat na upang maunawaan niya bago siya nagbigay ng naturang salaysay na siya ay mayroon ngang karapatang magsawalang-kibo, bagaman ito ay hindi niya ginamit. Pangalawa, ang mga karapatan ng mga mamamayan na natatala sa Saligang Batas (sa Bill of Rights) ay hindi mga paraan upang ang isang tunay na may pagkakasala na labag sa batas ay makaligtas sa nararapat na pagdurusa. Ang tunay na layunin ng mga tadhanang iyon ng Saligang Batas ay walang iba kungdi tiyakin na sinumang nililiitis ay magkaroon ng sapat na pagkakataon at paraan na maipagtanggol ang sarili, bukod sa pagbabawal ng pagtanggap ng katibayan (evidence) laban sa kaniya na bunga ng pagpipilit, dahas at iba pang paraang labag sa kaniyang kalooban.

Alinsunod sa mga paliwanag na ito, Aming pinawawalan ng bisa ang kautusan ni Hukom Donato na Idinadaing sa kahilingan ng mga Piskal at Aming ipinag-uutos na ang salaysay ni Gumpal na may tatak "Exhibit C", ay maaaring tanggaping katibayan sa pagpapatuloy ng litis laban sa kanya. Nguni't ang kapasiyahang ito ay hindi nangangahulugan na si Gumpal ay hinahatulan na Namin na may pagkakasala. Ang bagay na iyan ay ang Hukumang Unang Dulugan ang dapat na unang magpasiya pagkatapos ng paglilitis sa kaniya. Wala nang magbabayad pa ng kostas ng usaping ito. Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur. ANNEX "A" SWORN STATEMENT OF JAIME GUMPAL Y CADAYAN TAKEN BY CIC JAIME C. SENIN AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 116th PC COMPANY, SAN. TIAGO, ISABELA IN THE PRESENCE OF TSGT HONN COLSION WHICH WAS TAKEN IN TAGALOG DIALECT THAT AFFIANT COULD FULLY UNDERSTAND AND TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH THIS 3rd DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1974. The affiant was apprised of his constitutional rights and explained to him the nature of this investigation, warned him that anything he may state herein may be used for or against him in any Court proceedings, he was also advised that he has the right to secure legal assistance and/or Counsel de Officio before answering questions propounded to him, and after having him sworn to an oath, affiant testifies as follows: QUESTION: Do you swear to give your voluntary statement and to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this investigation? ANSWER: Yes, sir. Q Will you state your name, age and other personal circumstances?

A JAIME GUMPAL Y CADAUAN, 20 years old, single, student at the Isabela State College of Agriculture, Echague, Isabela and resident of Barrio Carulay same town. Q Do you know why you are here at the headquarters of the 116th PC Company here at Santiago, Isabela? A Q A I am presently detained here sir for being a suspect in the Rifling of a tricycle driver sir. Since when have you been detained this headquarters? Since November 28, 197 3 up to the present, Sir.

Q Do you remember if you have given any statement in connection with your being a suspect in the killing of a tricycle driver?

Yes, sir, I have already executed an affidavit at this head- quarters?

Q Did you confess in your previous statement that you were the one who perpetrated the killing? A Q I denied sir. Why did you deny, are you not really the one who killed said tricycle driver?

A At first I denied sir, because my bail bond is not yet ready but in fact I was really the one who killed said tricycle driver. Q When you say that you were the one who killed said tricycle driver, why is it that it is only now that you revealed? A Because my uncle-in-law, whose nickname is Rudy, who is the husband of my auntie Terry Ibarra, reported to this Headquarters and revealed my secret sir and besides my bail bond is already ready. Q A What is your secret that your uncle Rudy revealed, if you know? He revealed that I was the one who killed the tricycle driver sir.

Q Do you know how did your Uncle Rudy came to know that you were the one who killed the tricycle driver? A Q He may probably learned from my father sir. Do you mean to say your father knows that you were really the one who did the killing?

A Yes, my father knows sir, because I revealed to him at the time he fetched me up at the house of my Auntie at Calabayan Angadanan, Isabela. Q A Q A Q Could you explain why you killed the tricycle driver? Because he refused to bring me to Echague, Isabela and I was drunk at that time? What weapon did you use in killing the tricycle driver? Scissor sir. I used only one part of the pair of a scissor. Where did you put said weapon that you used?

A I burned it under the ground near the toilet at Calabayan Angadanan, Isabela in the residence of my Auntie Andrea Cadauan. Q What time approximately when you killed the tricycle driver?

A Q A Q

More or less 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 26, 1973. How did you kill said tricycle driver? I stabbed him once in his stomach sir. How did you stab said tricycle driver?

A I stabbed him by the use of my left hand sir. He was then driving the tricycle while I was inside the sidecar. Q A Q What did you do just after stabbing the tricycle drivers? I immediately run away, air. Where did you proceed?

A I proceeded northward by passing through ricefield then I went directly to Carulay, Echague, Isabela and I spent the whole night in our house then early in the morning I proceeded to my boarding house at Silauan Norte, Echague, Isabela; then I finally proceeded to the house of my Auntie Andrea at Calabayan Angadanan, Isabela. Q What is your attire when this incident happened particularly when you stabbed the tricycle driver? A Blue pants, white polo shirt and a pair of slippers.

Q In your previous statement, you stated that on the same night when the killing of tricycle driver transpired, you slept in the house of your Auntie Pacing Carreon at Santiago, Isabela, is it true? A It is not true, sir because in fact I did not go to the house of my Auntie Pacing that same night.

Q Do you know if anybody have ever seen you at the time you fled from the scene of the crime at Carulay, Echague, Isabela? A Yes, sir. I could remember that I had asked a group of about eight (8) persons at Quezon, San Isidro, Isabela where is the house of Remedios Batarao who is a relative of my mother. Q A Do You have something more to add in your statement? No more sir.

Q Are You willing to sign your statement under oath, without being coerced, harm, intimidated nor promise of any reward? A Yes, sir.

SALONGA vs PAO Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines. The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible. On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co -accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today. Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case 2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.

The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further deliberations. Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution. 2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that: The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to the Presidents legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution). In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.