Proceedings ESAV'11

Proceedings of the
TYRRHENIAN INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS

ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE OF AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLES
September 12 14, 2011 - CAPRI, Italy
Organised by
CNIT
Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Telecomunicazioni
AVV
Associazione Vito Volterra
UNIVERSIT DEGLI STUDI DI ROMA
TOR VERGATA
ii
Edited by
Gaspare Galati
Tor Vergata University, Roma
Piet van Genderen
Delft University of Technology / IRCTR, Delft, The Netherlands
Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft and Vehicles 2011 Workshop Proceedings
Published by Centro Vito Volterra Tor Vergata University
ISBN: 978-88-903482-3-5
Copyright
Associazione Vito Volterra 2011

Materials contained in the Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft and Vehicles 2011 Workshop Proceedings are
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iii
Preface
Theneedforincreasingsafetyandefficiencylevelsintheairtransportsystemrequiresmoderncontroland
traffic management (ATM) systems for aircraft in air and in ground operations, as well as for service
vehicles on the airport surface. The related Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS)
infrastructures call for enhanced positioning and identification techniques such as Multilateration (MLAT)
andWideAreaMLAT(WAM),automaticdependentsurveillancebroadcast(ADSB),automaticlocationof
vehiclesandmanagement(AVMS).Thistypeofenhancedsurveillanceinfrastructureisspatiallydistributed
(i.e. with many receiving or transmitting/receiving stations) and logically distributed (i.e. with local and
central processing and with fusion of different information sources, including the traditional primary and
secondaryradar).
In this frame, new system architectures and new algorithms for integrity monitoring and for multisensor
datafusionarerequired.
Securityanddefencesystemsusesimilaralgorithmsforpassivelocatingoftargetsbasedonmeasurements
of Time of Arrival (TOA) and its differences (TDOA) as well as of Doppler frequency and its differences
(FDOA),possiblycombinedwithangular/directionmeasurements(AOA/DOA).
The emerging dual use concept for surveillance and identification systems and the intrinsic
commonalities of location algorithms in the different applications did suggest to include the pertaining
itemsintheWorkshopstopics.
Theseenhancedsurveillancesystemsareconsideredintheirmanyfacets:
x ADSBimplementation,services,equipageandapplications
x ADSBatairports
x WideAreaMultilateration
x MultilaterationatAirports
x Radartechnologyforairportsurveillance
x PSRandSSRtechnologyforAirTrafficSurveillance
x GNSSapplicationstoAirTrafficManagement
x Safetyissues,solutionsandstandards
x Interoperabilitybetweencommercial,militaryandGeneralAviation
x Integrationofunmannedaircraftsystems(UAS)
x Dualuseapplications(security,defence)
x SystemsandSubsystems:Architectures,Newconcepts
x Passivelocationbasedontime,Doppler,angleMeasurements
x Sensordatafusion
x Technologies(hardware,firmware,software)
x Environmentalaspects(includingradiopropagation)
x TestingandFieldAnalysis,IntegrityMonitoring
x ImplementationplansandOperationalresults
Thisworkshopisaimedtocoverallofthesefacets,atvariouslevelsofdetail.Wetrustthatitwillprovidea
true flavour of the current developments and trends, and therefore serve the best interests of the
operationalandscientificcommunities.
Gaspare Galati Piet van Genderen
iv
Members of the Technical Program Committee
SimonAtkinson,RokeManorResearchLtdU.K.
JuanVicenteBalbastreTejedor,TechnicalUniversityValencia
CristianoBaldoni,ENAVItaly
JuanBesada,TechnicalUniversityMadrid
JochenBredemeyer,FlightCalibrationServicesGermany
RonaldBruno,ITTUSA
StevenCampbell,MITLincolnLab
EnzoDalleMese,UniversityofPisaItaly
PatrizioDeMarco,SelexS.I.Italy
SergiodiGirolamo,ThalesAleniaSpaceItaly
PietroFinocchio,AFCEAItaly
MicheleFiorini,IETItaly
PeterForm,TechnicalUnivewrsityBraunschweigh
GaspareGalati,TorVergataUniversityRomeItaly
FulvioGini,UniversityofPisaItaly
RalfHeidger,DFSGermany
AdamKawalec,MilitaryUniversityofTechnologyWarsawPoland
DirkKugler,DLRGermany
MauroLeonardi,TorVergataUniversityRomeItaly
IanLevitt,FAAUSA
KonstantinLukin,IREKharkovUkraine
PravasMahapatra,IndianInstituteofScienceBangalore
MichelMoruzzis,ThalesFrance
DanielMuller,ThalesAirSystemsFrance
BenitoPalumbo,PrivateExpertConsultantItaly
GabrielePavan,TorVergataUniversityRomeItaly
GiorgioPerrotta,SpaceSystemsItaly
NicolasPetrochilos,UniversityofReimsFrance
DanielaPistoia,ElettronicaS.p.A.Italy
ChristosRekkas,Eurocontrol
HermannRohling,Techn.UniversityHamburgHarburg
JohnScardina,FAAUSA
FaustoSimoni,ENAVItaly
RobertoSorrentino,PerugiaUniversityandEUMA
DanielStamm,Skyguide
LorenzPeterSchmidt,UniversitaetErlangenNuernbergGermany
VojtechStejskal,ERABeyondRadarPardubiceCzeckRepublic
FilippoTomasello,EASACologne
PietvanGenderen,TechnicalUniversityDelft
CarloVertua,ThalesItalia
FelixYanovski,UniversityofKiev
AlexYarovoy,TechnicalUniversityDelftIRCTR,TheNetherlands
MaurizioZacchei,ENAVItaly
v
LIST OF SESSIONS
1 - SESAR 1
Chair: C. Baldoni
Co-chair: R. Heidger
2 - REGULATORY AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS 33
Chair: P. Finocchio
Co-chair: C. Rekkas
3 - HIGH RESOLUTION RADAR TECHNIQUES 59
Chair: J. Besada
Co-chair: D. Kgler
4 - NON-COOPERATIVE LOCATION 87
Chair: D. Pistoia
Co-chair: A. Kawalec
5 - NON-COOPERATIVE PASSIVE COHERENT LOCATION AND
MULTISTATIC PRIMARY SURVEILLANCE RADARLOCATION 117
Chair: D. Muller
Co-chair: V. Stejskal
6 - NEWCONCEPTS AND TOOLS 139
Chair: G. Pavan
Co-chair: A. Mahapatra
7 - MULTILATERATION AND ADS-B (1) 165
Chair: S. Di Girolamo
Co-chair: S. Atkinson
8 - MULTILATERATION AND ADS-B (2) 195
Chair: S. Atkinson
Co-chair: S. Di Girolamo
INTERACTIVE SESSION 223
Chair: P. van Genderen
Co-chair: M. Leonardi
vi
vii
Focused Session 1
SESAR
Chair:C.BaldoniCochair:R.Heidger
Theframeofthissessionistheprovisionofsurveillance,navigationandseparationinahighly
integratedgroundbasedandairbornefutureATMSystemaimedatgreener,moreefficient,more
costeffectiveandallsafeairtransportoperations.
Fromidentificationofrequirementstotheoperationalvalidation
ofanintegratedsolution 2
Claudio Vaccaro, Gabriella Duca - SICTA, Italy
AnewconceptforATMServiceSupervisionforthenewSESAR
EnterpriseArchitecture 9
Gabriella Carrozza - SESM s.c.a.r.l., Italy
Stephen Straub - Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS), Germany
Hakim Souami - THALES Air Systems, France
ADSBIntegrationintheSESARsurfacesurveillancearchitecture 13
Andrs Soto, Pedro Merino, Jorge Valle - Indra Sistemas S.A., Spain
Futuremobilesatellitecommunication 19
Pierpaolo Tavernise - THALES Alenia Space, Italy
OptimisingRunwayThroughputthroughWakeVortexDetection,
PredictionandDecisionSupportTools 27
Frdric Barbaresco, Philippe Juge, Mathieu Klein, Yves Ricci,
Jean-Yves Schneider, Jean-Franois Moneuse - THALES Air Systems, France
Session 2
Regulatory and Operational Aspects
Chair:P.FinocchioCochair:C.Rekkas
ADSBandWAMdeploymentinEurope 35
Christos Rekkas - Eurocontrol, Belgium
U.S.ActivitiesinADSBSystemsImplementation 41
Paul Douglas Arbuckle - US Federal Aviation Administration, USA
DetectandavoidforUnmannedAircraftSystemsin
thetotalsystemapproach 47
Filippo Tomasello - EASA, Italy
David Haddon - EASA, Germany
viii
NorthSeaHelicopterADSB/MLatPilotProjectFindings 53
Paul Thomas - Bristow Helicopters, United Kingdom
Session 3
High Resolution Radar Techniques
Chair:J.BesadaCochair:D.Kgler
LAOTSE,anApproachforForeignObjectDetection
bymultimodalnetted2D/3DSensors 61
Sebastian Hantscher, Helmut Essen, Paul Warok Ruediger Zimmermann,
Martin Schrder, Rainer Sommer, Stefan Lang - Fraunhofer FHR, Germany
Marek Schikora, Klaus Wild, Wolfgang Koch - Fraunhofer FKIE, Germany
MillimeterwaveRadarforRunwayDebrisDetection 65
Helmut Essen, Frank P. Lorenz, Sebastian Hantscher, Paul Warok,
Ruediger Zimmermann, Martin Schrder - Fraunhofer FHR, Germany
Wolfgang Koch, Marek Schikora, G. Luedtke,
Klaus Wild - Fraunhofer FKIE, Germany
OFDMWaveformsforaFullyPolarimetricWeatherRadar 69
Oleg A. Krasnov, Zongbo Wang, R. Firat Tigrek,
Piet van Genderen - Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands
Polarimetryappliedtoavionicweatherradar:improvementon
meteorologicalphenomenadetectionandclassification 73
Alberto Lupidi, Christian Moscardini, Fabrizio Berizzi - University of Pisa, Italy
Andrea Garzelli - University of Siena, Italy
Fabrizio Cuccoli - CNIT, Italy
Marcello Bernab - SELEX Galileo S.p.A., Italy
PrinciplesofUtilizationofPolarizationInvariantParametersfor
ClassificationandRecognitionofDistributedRadarObjects
PartI.Simplestmodelofadistributedobjectpaper 79
Victor N. Tatarinov, Sergey V. Tatarinov
Tomsk University of Control Systems and Radioelectronics, Russian Federation
PartII.Multipointmodelandcorrelationtheory 83
Tomsk University of Control Systems and Radioelectronics, Russian Federation
ix
Focused Session 4
Non-cooperative location
Chair:D.PistoiaCochair:A.Kawalec
Scopeofthesessionistocollectstateoftheartresultsrelatedtotheproblemoflocationofnon
cooperativetargets.Particularemphasiswillbegiventoallthosepapersaddressingpassive
techniques,bothstandaloneandintegratinginformationfromactivesensors.
Processingofsignalsrelatedtothemeasurementofradiofrequencyand/orIR/VIS/UVsignatureare
ofinterest.Papersshowingresultsfromtrialswillhavepriority.
Enhancingsensitivityforemittergeolocation 89
Gran Tengstrand, Viktor Andersson,
Peter Hultman - SAAB Electronic Defence Systems, Sweden
Dario Benvenuti - ELETTRONICA, Italy
Jean-Franois Grandin, Luc Bosser - THALES Systmes Aroports, France
Brje Andersson, Anders Johansson - Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden
NewsolutiontoenhancethesecurityinAirTrafficControl 95
Enrico Anniballi, Roberta Cardinali - SESM s.c.a.r.l., Italy
SolvingtheDataLinkbottleneckforMPEGLocation 101
Jean-Franois Grandin, Luc Bosser - THALES Systmes Aroports, France
Gran Tengstrand, Viktor Andersson,
Peter Hultman - SAAB Electronic Defence Systems, Sweden
Brje Andersson, Anders Johansson - Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden
ParasiticDopplereffectinpassivelocation 107
Aninairpassiveacousticsurveillancesystemforairtrafficcontrol111
Domenico Donisi, Marco Bonamente - D'Appolonia S.p.A., Italy
Vincenzo Quaranta, Salvatore Ameduri - CIRA, Italy
Focused Session 5
Non-cooperative Passive Coherent Location and
Multistatic Primary Surveillance Radarlocation
Chair:D.MullerCochair:V.Stejskal
ThesessionisaimedtodiscusstheprogressofPassiveCoherentLocationandotherindependent
noncooperativesurveillancetechniquesbasedonradar,likemultistaticprimaryradar.
OnboardPCLsystemsforairborneplatformprotection119
Krzysztof S. Kulpa, Mateusz Malanowski,
Piotr Samczyski, Jacek Misiurewicz - Warsaw University of Technology, Poland
Maciej Smolarczyk - Telecommunications Research Institute, Poland
x
FMBasedPassiveCoherentRadar.
Fromdetectionstotracks 123
Radek Plek, Vojtch Stejskal, Martin Pelant,
Martin Vojek - ERA Beyond Radar, Czech Republic
HighRangeResolutionMultichannelDVBTPassiveRadar:
AerialTargetDetections 129
Dario Petri, Amerigo Capria - CNIT, Italy
Michele Conti, Fabrizio Berizzi,
Marco Martorella, Enzo Dalle Mese - University of Pisa, Italy
RangeOnlyMultistaticTrackinginClutter 133
Darko Muicki, Taek Lyul Song - Hanyang University, Republic of Korea
Session 6
New Concepts and Tools
Chair:G.PavanCochair:A.Mahapatra
TrackerQualityMonitoringbyNonDedicatedCalibrationFlights 141
Matthias Hess, Ralf Heidger - Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS), Germany
Jochen Bredemeyer - FCS Flight Calibration Service GmbH, Germany
TheTransponderDataRecorder:firstimplementationandapplications 147
Gaspare Galati, Mauro Leonardi, Emilio G. Piracci - Tor Vergata University, Italy
Soumem Samanta - National Institute of Technology, India
ADSB/MLATsurveillancesystemfromHighAltitudePlatformSystems 153
Mauro Leonardi, Silvio Spinelli, Gaspare Galati - Tor Vergata University, Italy
SpacebasedADSBAsmallstepfortechnologyagiantleapforATM? 159
Adam Parkinson - Helios, United Kingdom
Focused Session 7
Multilateration and ADS-B (1)
Chair:S.DiGirolamoCochair:S.Atkinson
AimofthesessionisatechnicaldiscussionontheadvantagesandlimitationsofseparateWAMand
ADSBsystemsandthebenefitsandtechnicalchallengesofdatafusionincombinedsystems.
StrategiestoDesignandDeployModeSMultilaterationSystems 167
Ivan A. Mantilla-G, Juan V. Balbastre-T,
Elas de los Reyes - Universidad Politcnica de Valencia, Spain
Mauro Leonardi, Gaspare Galati - Tor Vergata University, Italy
xi
CorrectionofsystematicerrorsinWideAreaMultilateration 173
Jorge Abbud, Gonzalo de Miguel,
Juan Besada - Universidad Politcnica de Madrid, Spain
Multilaterationsystemtimesynchronizationvia
overdeterminationofTDOAmeasurements 179
Martin Pelant, Vojtch Stejskal - ERA Beyond Radar, Czech Republic
ImprovementofMultilateration(MLAT)AccuracyandConvergence
forAirportSurveillance 185
Elas de los Reyes - Universidad Politcnica de Valencia, Spain
Mauro Leonardi, Gaspare Galati - Tor Vergata University, Italy
AssessingthesafetyofWAMoveranonradarsurveillancearea 191
James Hanson, Ben Stanley - Helios, United Kingdom
Focused Session 8
Multilateration and ADS-B (2)
Chair:S.AtkinsonCochair:S.DiGirolamo
AimofthesessionisatechnicaldiscussionontheadvantagesandlimitationsofseparateWAMand
ADSBsystemsandthebenefitsandtechnicalchallengesofdatafusionincombinedsystems.
ImplementationofADSBSystems
BenefitsandConsiderations 197
Abraham Barsheshat - Sensis Corporation, USA
InvestigationofMeasurementCharacteristicsof
MLAT/WAMandADSB 203
Klaus Pourvoyeur, Adolf Mathias,
Ralf Heidger - Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS), Germany
RealTimePerformanceMonitoringandNoise
AnalysisinanoperationalWAMSystem 207
Alexander Pawlitzki, Holger Neufeldt - THALES Air Systems GmbH, Germany
ADSBviaIridiumNEXTsatellites 213
Paolo Noschese, Silvia Porfili,
Sergio Di Girolamo - THALES Alenia Space, Italy
xii
IndependentSurveillanceBroadcastADSBReceivers
withDOAEstimation 219
Christoph Reck, Lorenz-P. Schmidt
Max S. Reuther - University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany
Alexander Jasch - TU Braunschweig, Germany
INTERACTIVE
SESSION
Chair:P.vanGenderenCochair:M.Leonardi
SBASAvailabilityImprovementBasedonthe
ModifiedRadarTechniques 225
Boriana Vassileva
Institute for Information and Communication Technologies, Bulgaria
Boris Vassilev - Technical University of Sofia, Bulgaria
SmartconcatenationofCorrelativeDirectionFindingand
Superresolutiontechniques 231
Libero Dinoi, Marco Guerriero, Gianpiero Panci - Elettronica SpA, Italy
DevelopmentofHighPerformanceWAMSystem 237
Hiromi Miyazaki, Tadashi Koga, Eisuke Ueda,
Yasuyuki Kakubari, Shirou Nihei - Electronic Navigation Research Institute, Japan
MachineReadableEncodingStandardSpecificationsinATC 241
Adolf Mathias, Matthias Hess - Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS), Germany
ExperimentalADSBbasedsurveillance 247
Juan A. Besada, Gonzalo de Miguel
Ana M. Bernardos, Jos R. Casar - Universidad Politcnica de Madrid, Spain
ADSBHILSTestforCollisionAvoidanceofSmartUAV 253
Changsun Yoo, Am Cho, Bumjin Park
Youngshin Kang - Korea Aerospace Research Institute, Republic of Korea
Sangwook Shim, Ilhyung Lee - Korea Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology, Republic of Korea
xiii
Ageneticalgorithmandlocalsearchfortheautomated
calculationofdilutionofprecisionofmodeS
multilaterationsystemsatairports 259
Ruy F.Ruiz-Mojica, Ivan A. Mantilla-Gaviria,
Emilio J. Gmez-Prez, Juan V. Balbastre-Tejedor,
Elias de Los Reyes-Dav - Universidad Politcnica de Valencia, Spain
MultiApproachStrategyforMultiSensorData
FusionEnhancement 265
Carlo A. Vertua, Luca Saini - THALES, Italy
Olivier Baud, Nicolas Honor, Peter E. Lawrence - THALES, France
AutomaticIdentificationofProcessStepsin
MultilaterationData 271
Stefanie Helm - German Aerospace Center (DLR), Germany
LISTOFAUTHORS 277
SESAR
Fromidentificationofrequirementstotheoperational
validationofanintegratedsolution
Session1.1page3
AnewconceptforATMServiceSupervision
forthenewSESAREnterpriseArchitecture
Session1.2page9
ADSBIntegrationintheSESARsurface
surveillancearchitecture
Session1.3page13
Futuremobilesatellitecommunication
Session1.4page19
OptimisingRunwayThroughputthroughWake
VortexDetection,PredictionandDecisionSupportTools
Session1.5page27
Proceedings of ESAV'11 - September 12 - 14 Capri, Italy 1
From identification of requirements to the operational

validation of an integrated solution
Approach and issues to design an effective Human Machine Interface for air traffic
controller working position in SESAR
Claudio Vaccaro
SICTA
Sistemi Innovativi per il Controllo del Traffico Aereo
Operational Concept and Studies
Naples - ITALY
cvaccaro@sicta.it
Gabriella Duca
SICTA
LEAS University Federico II
Naples - ITALY
duca@unina.it
Abstract - Design, development and implementation of advanced
technological systems is the challenging business experienced by
industry engineers in every day professional life. The increased
complexity of such systems and the huge amount of information
to be managed makes the challenge even more hard. The new
European Air Traffic Management System under development in
the framework of the SESAR Programme represents one of these
complex system of systems where a number of different
stakeholders distributed worldwide are required to interact with.
A primary actor taking safety-critical decision in the ATM is the
Air Traffic Controller. Thus, the availability of timely and clear
information allowing the Human to take the best decision any
time in any condition is vital. That means, in turn, the Human
Machine Interface (HMI) of the Air Traffic Controller Working
Position (ATCo CWP) plays a very essential and strategic role.
The paper intends to explain how SESAR project P05.09
Usability Requirements and Human Factors Issues for the
Controller Working Position is going to address the
requirements definition process and planning pre-operational
validation activity for the SESAR CWP HMI.
Keywords-component; SESAR; ATM; CWP; HMI; Human-
Machine Interface; Human Factors; Safety
I. INTRODUCTION
The mission of SESAR is to develop a modernized air
traffic management system for Europe, which will prevent
crippling congestion of the European sky, enhance the
performance of Air Traffic Management (ATM) and reduce the
environmental impact of air transport.
SESAR concept relies on new cross-cutting paradigms with
expected changes in actors role, new way of sharing
responsibility between concerned stakeholders and also
dynamically allocating functions between human operators and
system. As a basic principle, in SESAR concept Human is
considered central to the operation in the future European
ATM system environment and still being the ultimate decision-
maker. On the other hand, latest progress on emerging
technology, new tools and automation are expected to facilitate
human day-to-day duties. Last, not least, Safety is one of the
key performance targets in SESAR, with the objective to
improve safety performance by a factor of ten while air traffic
is expected to triple. And very finally, there are a number of
relevant issues to solve in addressing local specific user needs
within a single wide European perspective programme.
This is the very high level scenario where SESAR
engineers have been moving to design and evaluate an
effective CWP HMI, taking into account a broad amount of
constraints at various levels to achieve the goal. Relevant
aspects of the intended approach and expected issues are
outlined in this paper.
II. REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION PROCESS
Several Operational Concept elements, with associated
Operational Improvements, have been considered for
operational implementation within the SESAR timeframe.
Related research and development issues are addressed by
relevant projects under the overall coordination of the SESAR
Joint Undertaking (SJU). To facilitate the harmonization within
the programme, development of such concepts is performed
following particular guidelines derived in a first instance from
the EUROCAE ED78A/RTCA DO-264 Guidelines for
approval of the provision and use of Air Traffic Services
supported by data communications [1]. Additionally, the need
of ensuring consistency in the requirements production is
accomplished by means of structured documentation based on
ad-hoc layout templates/tools and exchanged through
commonly accessible shared requirements repository. All this
implies any SESAR stakeholders is able to write unambiguous
requirements that will be consistently understood and
referenced with unique identifier in the whole programme, thus
ensuring cross-reference and traceability issues.
Operators
Requirements
Business
Requirements
Operational need
Requirements
Operational
Requirements
Prototypes
Requirements
System
Requirements
Solution
Requirements
BRR
OCD
CONOPS
AIRM
DOD
ISRM
ADD
TS
TS
ICD
OSED
SPR
INTEROP
Need
Solution
Prototyping
ADD
Procedure
An operational scenario will be then represented by
integrating & merging requirements coming from different
projects investigating those operational concepts interacting
within that Operational Package/Sub-Package. As a
consequence, harmonization and consolidation of requirements
are necessary to ensure both technical cohesion and
unambiguous understanding of role and responsibility of each
concerned actor.
Figure 1. Operational Requirements in a SESAR Project
For that reason, the SESAR Work Programme is structured
around a set of Operational Packages and Sub-Packages [3]. A
third grouping Operational Focus Area (OFA) - based on
common operational focus and linked to the Operational Sub-
Package, was defined to ensure dependencies are respected
leading to coherent and integrated validation activities and
associated results.
Figure 2. Operationa Packages, sub-packages and Focus Areas
However, some OFA are of transversal nature and the
controller HMI is surely one this. That means, the project
P05.09 is from one side a project of those contributing to the
iCWP En-Route and TMA OFA, but on the other hand it is
linked to most/all other packages to ensure the conceptual
consistency of operational requirements and validation strategy
fro the CWP HMI.
The main objectives of 05.09 project are indeed:
Effective definition of Controller Working Position
User Requirements to allow a proper design of the En-
Route and TMA Controller Working Position,
including the related Human-Machine Interface
Assess, through extensive validation campaigns, that
the controller is safely capable of managing, operating
and interacting with the complex SESAR ATM system
In the end of the process, the expected result is aimed to
have one consistent, integrated, HMI across all E-Route and
TMA services.
In detail, the project 5.9 will be gathering Requirements
(Operational, Safety & Performance, Interoperability, Human
Factors) from other operational projects/packages/sub-
packages. Requirements which may have a need to be
considered from the controller HMI perspective are then
grouped and harmonized for prioritization to be iteratively
refined also by means of a number of mock-ups. HMI solutions
meeting those Requirements will then assessed in extensive
validation campaigns through pre-industrial prototypes
developed by mirror technical projects (namely P10.10.03).
Figure 3. Information displayed on controller HMI
Practices, principles and assumptions of the SESAR
validation strategy are expanded and detailed further in order to
derive a iCWP HMI detailed validation strategy and plan thus
ensuring that the exercises are both locally and globally
consistent. The validation of the integrated CWP HMI will be
performed from an operational, human factors and safety
perspective for each of the three operational steps identified in
the SESAR Concept Story Board (Step 1 Time based
operations (2013), Step 2 Trajectory based operations (2017)
and Step 3 Performance based operations (2020)).
The intended project validation strategy is building on a
iterative-incremental approach based on the following steps:
4 Proceedings of ESAV'11 - September 12 - 14 Capri, Italy
Production of an initial set of iCWP HMI operational,
SPR and human factors requirements supported by
description of detailed use cases
On the basis of those initial requirements, early
validation activities (V2) will be planned and executed
by extensive use of mock-ups
The concept under assessment is refined and then
further validated by means of Real Time Human in the
loop validation exercises based on early release of
iCWP prototypes provided by P10.10.03
Following iterative refinements and assessments, the
ultimate stage of the validation activity will be
performed using the final release of iCWP industrial
prototypes released by the P10.10.03
Finally, taking in due account both validation results
and latest available OSEDs, a consolidated set of
iCWP HMI requirements will be delivered, thus
closing the feedback loop.
III. REQUIREMENTS VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION
PROCESS
A. The V&V perspective in the SESAR project P05.09
Validation is an iterative process by which the fitness for
purpose of a new system or operational concept being
developed is established. This focuses on proving that the
concept is fit for purpose and aiming to answer the question
are we building the right system?
Verification provides proof that technology components
are feasible and can be safely and economically implemented,
so verification can be defined in the same manner to validation,
focusing on technology and aiming to answer the question;
are we building the system right?
As SESAR focus is on operational implementation,
validation and verification processes will be focused on
preparing for implementation, working close to actual
operations and concentrating on reducing time to market of
procedures, technology and early identification of quick
wins.
Taking into account the ICAO Based Key Performance
Areas and associated SESAR key Performance Indicators,
iCWP HMI validation and verification activities shall
concentrate on the
Operational Usability & other Human Factors issues:
demonstrate how all services can be easily provided
and friendly managed, that the iCWP HMI is usable
and accepted by air traffic controllers (end-users) with
no negative safety/human workload effects;
Technical Feasibility: demonstrate that a product or
system is properly designed, is ready to be
operationally and technically implemented and that
transition issues are well understood and managed;
Safety: the end-user of SESAR ATM system
(controller) shall be capable of safely interact with the
system without reducing current level of Safety.
The HMI validation approach shall be based on both
objective and subjective measures of controllers performance.
Details for Safety and Human Factors issues are provided
below. It is anticipated that the validation against user needs
will be performed in a pre-operational environment, fully
representative of both operational and technical constraints, by
means of pre-industrial prototypes developed on the purpose.
The use of realistic operational environment as validation
scenarios as well as industrial prototypes to assess the concept
are of utmost importance on the way of the final deployment
and decommissioning of the system into operation.
B. High level validation objectives of the iCWP HMI
1) Human Factors
The design and subsequent development of the new ATM
system interface shall address human factors issues
encompassing the use of new working methods, operational
procedures and technology. Operational Usability & other
Human Factors issues affecting SESAR iCWP HMI will be
assessed to demonstrate the iCWP HMI is usable and
ultimately accepted by air traffic controllers (end-users) with
no negative safety/human workload effects.
Human factors issues to be analyzed shall include human-
system integration issues, roles of automation making ATM
decisions vs. human decisions, assessments of roles and
responsibility in the new team organization. The evaluation
will be carried out mainly by means of Real-Time-Human-in-
the-loop simulation where key performance indicators like
workload, situation awareness, etc. are carefully observed and,
wherever possible, measured. As an example concerning
Trajectory management tools, a specific set of validation
exercises may include HF aspects and HMI design issues like:
how to manage and revise a RBT (Multi Sector
Planner, data-link functions, synchronization of data-
link and voice);
situational awareness in trajectory management
operations;
smoothing flows of traffic and de-conflicting flights
(multi-sector/multi-unit environment, based on new
roles for tactical and planning controllers);
ASAS spacing and ASAS cooperative separation
management (fallback options, visualization of new
ACAS modes and functionality, ASAS operations in
segregated airspace and in a mixed separation mode
environment);
evaluation of the effectiveness of safety nets (impact
on the mental image, capacity for providing separation,
information overload, presentation of warnings);
automated assistance to the controller (conflict
identification, early detection of potential conflicts;
monitoring aids, providing conflict resolutions, system
monitoring of trajectories/route deviation).
2) Safety
Any changes to operational systems need to be assessed for
their safety relevance. Systematic safety assessment is the basis
for providing assurance that the new or modified air traffic
management system is safe for its intended operational
objectives and environment. The iCWP HMI Safety
assessment intended to be carried out within the project 5.9 will
address the three types of system components: people,
procedure and equipment. Safety analysis will be conducted
and documented to ensure that due consideration is given to all
engineering and operational aspects. Selected risk mitigation
means shall be validated in both nominal and non-nominal
conditions. The results and conclusions of the safety
assessment process shall be documented and this
documentation maintained throughout the life of the
programme to support building of the overall SESAR Safety
Case aimed to demonstrate the system is safe for operational
use. To assess that the iCWP HMI as finally developed is
indeed acceptably safe, Safety analysis within 05.09 is aimed
to provide safety feedback to the development process but also
detailed description of hazard identification, hazard
combination and risk evaluation.
C. Low level validation objectives of the iCWP HMI
The SESAR project 05.09 has scheduled a number of
Validation exercises aimed to feed the iterative process of
requirements refinement during all stages of project
development. In order to assure a general consistency of
exercise output, specific low level validation objectives have
been elicited to assess:
impact of iCWP design on controller workload
distribution over the shift
impact of iCWP on controller workload distribution
between sector team members
the extent on which iCWP supports controllers in
recovery / contingency situations
the extent on which the iCWP support controllers in
building and retain a short term traffic picture
the extent on which the iCWP support controllers in
building and retain a medium/long term traffic picture
provision of adequate awareness to controller about
the enabled/disabled status of automated functions
readability and meaningfulness of textual information
displayed by the iCWP
readability and meaningfulness of graphic objects,
symbols and visual representations in the iCWP
consistency and completeness of data displayed by
iCWP
timeliness and prioritization of data displayed by
iCWP
adequacy of information/data sorting from the system
reachability and intuitiveness of commands on HMI
objects
adequacy of feedbacks of commands/actions on HMI
objects
adequacy of number and sequence of actions on
graphic objects needed to accomplish a control task s
adequacy of iCWP with respect to working methods
to be applied accomplishing control tasks
the extent on which iCWP reduces memory and recall
efforts
the extent on which iCWP reduces reasoning and
decision making efforts
the extent on which iCWP supports controllers trust
and confidence in the system
the extent on which the transition to iCWP might be
adverse for controllers
Afterwards, for each specific exercise, applicable objectives are
identified and related indicators and metrics are detailed.
Following table is going to illustrate metrics and indicators for
a V2 validation exercise to be held in October 2011.
Validation objective Indicators Metrics
To assess the effect of iCWP on
controller workload distribution between
teams of adjacent sectors
Workload sharing between adjacent
sectors
Difference of subjectively assessed
workload between teams of adjacent
sectors
To assess the extent on which the iCWP
support controllers in building and retain
a short term traffic picture
Self assessed situational awareness
Situational awareness level judged by the
SME
Short term situational awareness (5
minutes)
Conflicts detected by the system Number of displayed STCA alerts
To assess the extent on which the iCWP
support controllers in building and retain
a medium/long term traffic picture
Self assessed situational awareness
Situational awareness level judged by the
SME
Short term situational awareness (5
minutes)
Deviations detected by the system Number of Deviation alerts displayed
To assess if the iCWP provides adequate
awareness to controller about the
enabled/disabled status of automated
Need of checking check the status of
automated functions
Number of times the controllers check
the status of automated functions
Acceptability of automated functions Ranking of subjective appreciation of
functions control means automated functions control means
To assess if the iCWP provides adequate
awareness to controller about potential
problems in medium / long term due to its
control decisions (what if / probe mode)
error prevention
Clearances sent after a potential
problems is displayed
Number of clearances triggered by a
displayed potential problem
Coordination made after a potential
problems is displayed
Number of coordination actions triggered
by a displayed potential problem
Acceptability of display mean of
potential problems
Ranking of subjective appreciation of
automated functions control means
To assess the readability and
meaningfulness of textual information
displayed by the the iCWP
Fonts readability Ranking of subjective appreciation of
font type
font dimension
font colors
Abbreviations and acronyms clearness Ranking of subjective appreciation of
used abbreviation and acronyms
Information density (not overcrowding
or poorly textual information displayed)
quantity of textual information displayed
To assess the readability and
meaningfulness of graphic objects,
symbols and visual representations in the
iCWP
Clearness of information displayed
through symbols
information displayed by newly
introduced symbols in HMI
Appropriateness of layout of fields (and
textual information) in graphic objects
fields layout for newly introduced
symbols in HMI
Proper association between the type of
graphic object and the type of displayed
information
graphic object chosen for providing
newly (or differently) displayed
information
To assess consistency and completeness
of data displayed by iCWP
Acceptability of combination of
information coming from different
sources (the source combination doesnt
produce unwanted information noise)
sources integration
Tasks triggered after displaying of data
sourced from newly integrated source
Number of tasks triggered by
information coming from a newly
integrated source
To assess timeliness and prioritization of
data displayed by iCWP
Acceptability of time prioritization of
actions suggested by automated tools
Number of tasks carried out according
the sequence suggested by the system
prioritization proposed by the system
Acceptability of severity prioritization of
events displayed by automated tools
severity prioritization proposed by the
system
To assess the adequacy of
information/data sorting from the system
(iCWP)
Acceptability of effort spent for data
finding
Ranking of subjective appreciation
towards length of path for finding
wanted data
Consistency of status/presentation of all
graphic objects concerned by sorted
information/data
toward correlated objects presentation
(e.g. when a flight in a list is highlighted
the corresponding label is highlighted
too)
To assess the reachability and
intuitiveness of commands on HMI
objects
Acceptability of effort spent for new
objects handling
towards interaction with newly
introduced HMI objects
Presence of shortcuts for commands Ranking of subjective appreciation
towards shortcuts
Standard behaviour of HMI objects Ranking of subjective appreciation
towards HMI objects behaviour
To assess the adequacy of feedbacks of
commands/actions on HMI objects
Extent of confidence in successful
accomplishment of given commands on
new objects
towards new objects response to given
commands
To assess the adequacy of number and
sequence of actions on graphic objects
needed to accomplish control tasks
Acceptability of automated updates of
new objects/data
automated updates
Acceptability of confirmation commands
needed when using an object/field
confirmation commands needed when
using an object/field (also in terms of not
redundancy of confirmation requested)
Acceptability of actions needed for
reaching / activating the intended
graphic object
path needed for reaching / activating the
intended graphic object
To assess the adequacy of iCWP with
respect to working methods to be applied
accomplishing control tasks
Acceptability of
Electronic coordination
Deviation Alerts (Lateral and
Vertical)
SNET alerts
ASPA CPDLC
AMAN + CTA
STCA alarms
MSAW warnings
ASAS-S&M CPDLC clearances
AMAN advisories + CTA
To assess the extent on which iCWP
reduces memory and recall efforts
Time/effort needed for searching
information within the HMI (the system)
Subjective assessment of time/effort
needed for data searching
To assess the extent on which iCWP
reduces reasoning and decision making
efforts
Overall workload in a shift/session Subjective assessment of workload
Absence/reduction of traffic peaks Steady number of flight per time bit
during the shift
To assess the extent on which the
transition to iCWP might be adverse for
controllers
Time needed for training Self-assessment of errors in new objects
use
Overall acceptability of introduced
automation
Subjective appreciation towards
potentialities of single tool
Subjective appreciation towards
potentialities of all newly introduced
tools
IV. FORTHCOMING VALIDATION STEPS
Despite controllers in the loop activities have not started
yet (at the time this paper is written), the intended validation
methodology can be considered rather consolidated and
ready to be applied. At present, V&V needs (i.e. validation
platform capabilities and related measuring tools) are under
development to address Step 1 - V3 purposes. Preparatory
work is already in place and well progressing for V2 as well.
Step 1 validation exercises will be completed and fully
documented by mid-2012.
REFERENCES
[1] SJU, Requirements and V&V Data Structures and Writing
Guidelines, Edition date 01/12/2010, Edition number 01.00.00
[2] SJU, Validation and Verification Strategy, Edition date 02/06/2009,
Edition number 01.00.00
[3] SJU, Operational Focus Area Programme Guidance, Edition date
08/12/2010, Edition number 01.01.00
Claudio Vaccaro graduated in Navigation (Scienze Nautiche) in 1993,
with a specialization in Air Traffic Management and Surveillance at Istituto
Universitario Navale, Napoli (Italy), developing an experimental thesis on
Flight Mechanics. From 1994 to 1997 he had been teacher of Air Traffic
Control and Aeronautical Communications at the Aeronautical Technical
Institute in Rome. In 1997 Claudio joined SICTA, where he is currently
responsible of the Unit Operational Concept and Studies. He has a multi-
year experience in setting up and leading National and International teams
focusing on the definition and Validation of innovative Operational
Concept in the Air Traffic Management domain. At present, he is the
Project manager of SESAR P05.09 project (Usability Requirements and
Human Factors Aspects for the Controller Working Position).
Gabriella Duca is post-doc fellow at LEAS, the Laboratory of Applied and
Experimental Ergonomics of University Federico II, in Naples and
registered at CREE as European certified ergonomist (EurErg) since 2003.
She works as academic researcher and professional consultant in the field
of HF/ergonomics for safety critical contexts, focusing on user-centred
design of industrial systems, workplaces and HMIs. She has carried out
research projects in aeronautical, pharmaceutical and chemical work
environments. Currently she is HF consultant for the SESAR P05.09 work
package.
A new concept for ATM Service Supervision
for the new SESAR Enterprise
Architecture
G.Carrozza
SESM s.c.a.r.l - Via Circumvallazione Esterna di Napoli,
80014 Giugliano in Campania Naples,Italy
gcarrozza@sesm.it
H.Souami
Thales Air Systems, Parc Tertiaire SILIC, 3 Avenue Charles
Lindberg, BP 20351, 94628 RUNGIS Cedex, France
hakim.souami@thalesgroup.com
S.Straub
DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH, Am DFS
Campus 7, D-63225 Langen, Germany
stephen.straub@dfs.de
AbstractThe SESAR Definition Phase stated the need for a
service oriented approach to meet the European scope
interoperability in the ATM domain, aiming at striking out
fragmentation among systems and countries, and at providing
the holistic view of a single Pan-European ATM network whose
services must be driven by stakeholders needs. The goal of 10.1.9
(for en-route) and 12.1.9 (for airport) SESAR projects is to define
a novel supervision approach, able to tackle the challenge of such
a paradigm revolution, and to take into account the Quality of
Services and dependability constraints that this will introduce
into the next generation systems.
Keywords-component; supervision;SOA
I. MOTIVATION
The SESAR Definition Phase stated the need for a service
oriented approach to meet the ATM Target Concept, i.e. the
European scope interoperability in the ATM domain, aiming at
striking out fragmentation among systems and countries, and at
providing the holistic view of a single Pan-European ATM
network whose services must be driven by stakeholders needs.
From the development perspective, a Service Oriented
Architecture (SOA) is the best candidate for enabling the ATM
Target Concept, which will allow the orchestration of
distributed resources and capabilities, even controlled by
different ownership domains. SOA is in charge of decoupling
ATM services from the underlying technologies and systems,
as well as from the physical items to be deployed.
Information sharing and cooperation among different
systems are intended to be the pillars of the next generation of
ATM systems to achieve the ATM Target Concept. In fact, the
foreseen increase of air transport demand, which should be
three-fold by 2020 if compared to todays traffic, asks for an
improvement of existing systems and infrastructures, resource
planning and management processes, as well as of supervision
systems which have to fit the new service oriented perspective
in order to ensure the required Quality of Service (QoS) levels.
This is the goal of 10.1.9 (for en-route) and 12.1.9 (for airport)
SESAR projects aiming at defining the supervision
requirements, able to tackle the challenge of such a paradigm
shift. Dependability and availability constraints characterizing
the ATM scenario, where systems are generally distributed and
made up of several interacting components/services thus
complicating the task of system health monitoring and control,
makes crucial the task of supervision. Actually, supervision is
system management, i.e., the ability of controlling the status of
the monitored systems and of starting recovery/reconfiguration
actions to prevent or react to QoS degradations due to
anomalous and unexpected events. Also known as
dependability threats, these events i.e., faults, errors and
failures (according to the definitions in [1]), can propagate
among components and manifest at user level with
consequences that can even be fatal in terms of business
damages and human life loss. The more complex the system
the harder to detect the error and locate the real cause of a
failure, especially if it is not located in the same system
component or interface where it manifested. Diagnosis (fault
location) aims to locate the root cause (fault) of a failure, once
it has been detected, in order to undertake the most proper
recovery action. In a general perspective, supervision systems
based on diagnosis can be thought as made up of (i) a failure
detector, aiming to detect the presence of an error and to trigger
alarms, (ii) a fault locator, aiming to go back to the root cause
of the error/failure (i.e. the fault) and (iii) a recovery block,
aiming to select and trigger either automatic or manual
recovery/reconfiguration. To the state of the art, a few
proposed strategies reveal to be effective to manage a set of
interconnected, mainly homogeneous, nodes through
centralized fault detection and avoidance protocols. However,
traditional solutions proposed so far have to be rethought for
use in a Service Oriented Architecture, for which the presence
of reusable, independent, and heterogeneous services, as well
as the facility to compose them at run-time, rise new
challenging issues:
Which are the actual dependability threats (e.g. what to
claim a failure)? In the service oriented paradigm,
performance are a major concern as services have to
be delivered with a required quality level. Hence,
performance and quality metrics shall be defined to
discriminate faults;
Which information should be monitored to diagnose
the failures? Service oriented applications often comprise
several components distributed even across different
countries. For example, network monitoring may be
crucial to go back to the fault location (e.g., the failure of a
link or the crash of the remote node).
How to contain faults in face of propagation and
coupling among services? As failures can propagate
among services, failure modes may be not
independent. Complex services often come from the
composition of simpler services, hence faults located
into a single module may degenerate into larger
failures due to faults cascade and propagation. This
means that (i) failure modes of different services may
depend on each other and (ii) larger problems may
come from multiple root causes. For example, if
services get composed dynamically, it is very unlikely
to anticipate dependencies and fault propagation paths
ahead of runtime.
To the best of our knowledge, the above challenges still
represent open research needs in the field of dependable
Service Oriented Computing (SOC) systems. Since actual
systems addressing these issues have not been developed yet,
the projects aim to push the state of the art by proposing a
novel approach tailored for the SESAR next generation of
service oriented systems. A general and flexible approach is
envisaged, in which both automatic knowledge and human
experience about the system will be merged in order to enable
automatic and, if necessary, manual system recovery and
reconfiguration.
II. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
An high level architectural view of the proposed
supervision approach is sketched in Figure1. Since most of the
anomalous events (i.e., the faults) occurring within the overall
system (e.g., the crash of a remote node) propagate to the
service level interface, we assume failures to manifest in the
form of service level degradation. For this reason, a Service
Level Monitor is in charge of detecting whether service levels
got compromised or they are likely to be violated, and of
triggering alarms. To this aim quality metrics have to be
defined, along with reference values for all the provided
services, which will be managed (i.e., stored and potentially
updated) by the QoS Policy Manager. Once an alarm has been
detected, the Fault Locator has to pinpoint the root cause of the
manifested failure. Knowledge about the faults that can
actually affect the monitored service and/or system will be
coded into a fault library. Of course, it is unlikely to be
exhaustive due to the presence of runtime failures, which
cannot be predicted during preoperational phases of the system,
as well as to propagation phenomena.
Figure 1: High level supervision system architecture
For this reason, updating and feedback mechanisms aiming
to continuously increase this knowledge could be helpful. Once
the root cause has been finally pinpointed, recovery can start. If
location went through, it will be possible to start the most
proper recovery action for the particular fault that occurred.
This means a significant reduction of recovery time and costs,
e.g., it is not needed to reboot a node if the failure came from a
link fault. The real benefit of this approach is twofold:
It is general and flexible enough to be used in several
ATM configurations since knowledge organization
and management strategies do not depend on the
particular ATC/airport system configuration (rather, it
will be customizable according to customers needs);
It can be improved over time, by leveraging human
knowledge and experience. Indeed, it will allow to
enlarge the supervision knowledge by recording
recovery actions performed by human operators when
automatic recovery is not suitable. Indeed, off-line
validated recovery actions can be leveraged to feed
automatic recovery level.
III. IMPLEMENTING TECHNICAL SUPERVISION IN SESAR
In order to implement the proposed approach and to realize
a supervision system in charge of meeting actual requirements,
the identification of the services to be monitored as well as of
their QoS expectation is paramount. In the framework of
SESAR, and bearing in mind that 10.1.9 (for en-route) and
12.1.9 (for airport) projects are in charge of technical
supervision at domain level, the service orientation approach
described above can be implemented assuming that:
Services to be monitored are the ones provided by
3
rd
level projects;
QoS expectations are exposed by 3rd level
projects for each service;
Technical supervision service is going to be
provided by 10.1.9 and 12.1.9 to 3rd level projects
that will subscribe.
Going deeper into details, the implementation of such an
approach requires to clearly define what is meant by:
Services (S), i.e, its lifecycle, behavioural and
technological description, its configuration and
deployment issues. These will be defined in terms
of models and will have to take into account, for
instance, the state of a given service in a given
instant (e.g., a service can be accessible by a
consumer if it is deployed);
Providers / Consumers (P / C), in terms of which
project is in charge of providing/consuming
inputs;
SLA (Service Level Agreement), i.e., the
specification by the project providing the service
of their terms of use for making the service
available(including dependability commitments)
and the publication of these terms to potential
consumer projects;
Communication protocols (C), i.e., how to manage
the initial request for an SLA based on a published
template/offer, the granting of the request enabling
a SLA being done by Ps and Cs, the access to the
service under the agreed conditions.
Hence, 3rd level projects act as consumers of the technical
supervision services provided by 10.1.9 and 12.1.9. On the
other hand, they will play the role of P/C with respect to other
peer level projects with which they are called to interoperate.
Actions taken by the technical supervision system in the form
of recovery services (see recovery block in Figure 1) will
consist of both proactive and reactive actions, such as:
Changes in the available resources for a given
service (e.g., negotiate additional SLAs to provide
further resources to the provider);
Management of the demand on the service to
prevent any further increase in the level of service
commitments for an overloaded provider.
Restart of a failed service
These actions can in principle be taken automatically, but
human intervention may be required in some cases. For
this reason the technical supervision system will also
provide administration HMIs and decision support
facilities giving operators direct access to the service
information and monitoring data. Human operator will be
kept informed about the actions that are needed, and will
have then to decide whether and if so how to act.
In order to define what are the requirements in terms of
technical supervision exhibited by the projects, and to
support the definition of SLAs among the involved parts, a
Requirements Definition Template and the structure of the
SLA have been defined in the context of the 10.1.9 and
12.1.9 projects. These are aimed to support supervision
consumers into the definition of a customized technical
supervision service, tailored for their specific needs.
Although there does not exist an exhaustive list of services
within SESAR yet, it can be helpful to start having an
overall picture of what are the needs and the links among
several projects. Figure 2 shows the defined template for
SLA. At the time of this writing, the process of
requirements definition according to the provided template
is ongoing. Its output will bring to the definition of an
overall set of requirements, as well as to the development
of the supervision system itself. For any further details
refer to [2].
Figure 2:SLA TEMPLATE
IV. EXPECTED INFLUENCE ON ATMPERFORMANCE
The SESAR Masterplan defines a performance framework
of Key Performance Areas with clear objectives, indicators and
targets ([3]). The implementation of the supervision concept
presented here aims to bring significant contributions to the
accomplishment of the following performance goals:
Safety: the early detection of quality of service
degradation enables immediate action to avoid the
failure of safety-critical services. KPI: accident
probability per operation or flight hour (+++)
Cost Effectiveness: reduced costs due to efficient
monitoring, control and recovery of systems.
Reduced costs due to efficient monitoring, control
and recovery of systems. KPI: availability of each
supervised system (+++)
Reduced delays from system downtime reduce the
associated costs. KPI: operational costs on ATC
systems supervisory / operational costs saved due
to failures (+++) KPI: average cost per flight (+)
Capacity: timely identification and treatment of
errors prevent them to degenerate into failures that
might affect the system operation considerably.
Then, required levels will be supported with less
impact due to technical failures. KPI:
annual/daily/hourly number of IFR flights (+)
Efficiency: reduced workload for technical
personnel in terms of system operation check-up
and service quality inspection, system control and
recovery effort. This especially applies to
situations where service providing systems are
spatial separated from the user, e.g., services used
in a Remote Tower. KPI: availability of each
supervised system (+++)
Flexibility: service surveillance is independent of
the service-providing system and therefore more
flexible if systems need to be switched for
maintenance or completely replaced. KPI: number
of supervised systems/parameters (++) KPI:
average delay of delayed flights (+)
Predictability: measuring degradation of service
quality allows predicting availability/loss of
service (in some cases). KPI: time until system is
restored after a failure (+++)
Interoperability: surveillance of interdependent
operative systems enables the detection of error
propagation and, consequently, assures
interoperability of these systems. KPI: level of
ATM service seamlessness to the user (+).
V. CONCLUSIONS
The paper presents a novel and ambitious service supervision
and recovery approach, which is considered to be the coherent
approach to guarantee the required QoS of ATM Services. The
efficient and reasonable implementation of service
surveillance is best supported by providing the appropriate
framework, so that the actual implementation can concentrate
on the details of the services to be monitored. Using one
framework for all services to be monitored allows assessing
error propagation even in complex and critical situations. The
actual development of such a challenging idea is envisaged
by10.1.9 and 12.1.9 SESAR projects.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Avizienis, J.C. Laprie, B. Randell, and C. Landwehr. Basic
Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing. IEEE
Trans. on Dependable and Secure Computing, 1(1):1133, 2004.
[2] 10.1.9 Project. D02.10.01.09 requirements definition template
report. 2011.
[3] SESAR JU. Air transport framework - the performance target.
ADS-B integration in the SESAR surface
surveillance architecture
Andrs Soto, Pedro Merino, Jorge Valle
SESAR Programme. International ATM & Airports
Indra Sistemas. S.A
Torrejn de Ardoz, Madrid
asotoj@indra.es, pmjimenez@indra.es, jvalle@indra.es
Abstract Assuming the current baseline architecture of the
Surveillance Function presented in the SESAR context for the
future aerodrome ATC systems, this paper proposes different
strategies for ADS-B report integration, as being in development
and implementation in the future SESAR-compliant products to
be provided by Indra. For one of the proposed strategies, an
evaluation will be performed based on scenarios focused on
Barajas Airport.
Keywords- SESAR; architecture; surface surveillance; ADS-B;
integration;
I. INTRODUCTION
A. SESAR paradigm
The new environment based on the future SESAR
paradigm pretends to change the Air Traffic Control operator
(ATCo) decision making, nowadays more based on a reactive
behavior, into a more proactive one. Besides, the ATM Target
Concept described in the SESAR Definition Phase [1] is
developed around the 4D Trajectory concept whose aim is not
only to improve the current knowledge about the aircraft
location but also to improve the future one. The latter will
imply that conflicts can be envisaged with enough margin to
propose more efficient, cost-effective and greener solutions
than in the case in which tactical controller interventions are
needed.
B. SESAR at the airport
Other important matter about SESAR is that its ultimate
aim is to achieve the Integrated Airport Operations. This fact is
based on the extension of the 4D Trajectory management
which will include the movements around the airport.
The effect of this extension will be the advanced
knowledge about the airport movements which will be
reflected in a reduced impact of ATCo actions on the rest of the
mobiles at the airport surface ensuring a degree of strategic de-
conflicting while minimizing holding and ground queues.
Thus, it is expected that all mobile movements in the
manoeuvring area will have their own assigned route which
will be supervised by the airport Conformance Monitoring
function in order to check that they are behaving as expected.
In this situation, it is important to point out that the information
coming from the Surveillance Function is crucial as it provides
the current situational awareness picture to be compared with
the predicted airport situation.
The same happens with the Safety Nets. In this case, the
main problem is that they need very accurate surveillance
information in order to calculate the possible conflicts. A
recognized issue for the implementation of the A-SMGCS
Control function is the false alarms that interfere with
controller operations [2]. This is also related to the definition of
the A-SMGCS Implementation Levels which link the evolution
of the concept to the available procedures and technology
performances. The aim in SESAR is to consolidate A-SMGCS
Level II and then move towards level III and IV.
In order to solve these issues, there are different possible
solutions:
The introduction of new sensors such as ADS-B or
multilateration;
The improvement of the current ones;
The improvement of the data fusion.
This paper is going to focus on the first option due to the
fact that SESAR considers that the ADS-B is the cornerstone
for moving to the following A-SMGCS Levels as it provides
more accurate and frequent surveillance information than
current sensors, which improves the situational awareness
picture presented to the tower ATCo. Besides, it can easily
provide a seamless hand-over between the TMA and the Tower
control helping in track continuity.
Firstly, the paper presents the baseline architecture of the
Surface Surveillance Function which has been defined in the
SESAR framework as part of the Architecture Assessment task
of project 12.3.1 "Improved surveillance for surface
management" [3]. This architecture is described in order to
present those elements that can be of interest or affected by the
introduction of the different alternatives for integrating ADS-B
reports.
Secondly, an overview of known issues of ADS-B is
presented. The objective is to introduce the problems to be
tackled as it is envisaged that ADS-B will be the key actor of
the evolution of the airport surface surveillance.
Next, the different operational scenarios that have been
considered to integrate the ADS-B reports are detailed. The
information provided is a summary of the corresponding
technology reports developed by Indra in the framework of the
12.3.1 project.
Section V presents the results of a simulation of one of the
operational scenarios presented in the previous section. This
simulation is based on Barajas Airport where several routes
along the airport are simulated.
Lastly, the results obtained by simulation will be shown.
Thus, a precision analysis is provided in order to compare the
performance of a surveillance function based on just a SMR
sensor versus one based on ADS-B data.
II. SESAR SURFACE SURVEILLANCE ARCHITECTURE
This section provides the baseline architecture of the
Surface Surveillance Function which has been defined in the
SESAR framework. Thus, the architecture is described in detail
in [3]. However, for the sake of coherence, an overview of the
functions has been provided in order to present those elements
that can be of interest or affected by the introduction of the
different alternatives for integrating ADS-B reports. The
logical system architecture view is provided in the figure
below:
Figure 1. SESAR baseline architecture for the Surface Surveillance Function
The main internal functions identified as part of the Surface
Surveillance Function are:
External Surveillance Tracks Preprocessing: It is
the function capable of acquiring and preprocessing
External Surveillance Tracks which are the ones
coming from other collaborating Air or Surface
Surveillance Functions.
Acquisition and Data Preprocessing: It is an
intermediary in the reception of data coming from all
sensors (radar, MLAT, ADS-B, etc.). It performs the
conversion both of media and format, when
necessary, and could include coordinate
transformations, sensor systematic error (bias)
correction, measurement completion, etc.
Sensor Status Data Processing: This function is
able of acquiring and processing sensor status data,
and maintaining a sensor status list with the current
status information for each sensor feeding the
Surveillance Function.
Airport Layout Processing: This function is in
charge of interpreting the airport layout adaptation
information, merging it with potential Operational
Supervision information related to airport layout
(dynamic airport configuration information), and
providing this data to be exploited by Acquisition and
Data Preprocessing, External Surveillance Tracks
Processing and Multisensor Data Fusion functions.
Airport Flight Plan Processing: This function
exploits the information coming from correlated
Flight Plans in order to improve target identification
and to adapt Acquisition and Data Preprocessing and
Multisensor Data Fusion functions to Flight Plans.
Surveillance Environment Assessment: This
function is in charge of processing the sensor status
and quality (summarized in the sensor status list
described in previous Sensor Status Data Processing
function) and potentially deriving some additional
quality assessments of the measurement process for
each sensor (e.g. covariance matrix, probabilities of
detection, bad measurement areas, etc.) which can be
used to improve its associated sensor model.
Surveillance Environment Adaptation: This
function adapts Acquisition and Data Preprocessing
and Multisensor Data Fusion functions to
surveillance sensors status and quality. The different
sources of information are:
o Static data, from the Adaptation system;
o Dynamic data provided by Technical
Supervision systems;
o Surveillance Environment Assessment
output.
This adaptation is performed by precluding the use of
a given malfunctioning data source and also adapting
measurement assumed quality to current situation.
Multisensor Data Fusion: This function receives
measures (plots) and tracks from the Surface
Surveillance Acquisition and Data Processing
coming from all available sensors; monosensor
trackers; and potentially from cooperating
Surveillance functions (preprocessed by the External
Surveillance Tracks Preprocessing function) in order
to generate Surface Surveillance tracks, which
include an assessment of their quality, describing the
whole Surface Situational Awareness Picture. It can
also be divided into three subfunctions:
o Multitarget Multisensor Tracker;
o Sensor Calibration;
o Classification/Identification.
Output Data Server: This function is in charge of
the distribution of the Surface Situational Awareness
Picture, providing system track data to internal A-
SMGCS modules (Control, Routing or Guidance), to
Controller Working Position for air situational
awareness display elaboration or to external systems
(i.e. other external Surveillance Functions).
Data Recording: This function, which has access to
the internal status of the Surveillance Function and
makes use of the services provided by Data
Recording and Playback infrastructure, is in charge
of recording Surveillance related information.
Internal Supervision: This function is responsible
for:
o Monitoring and displaying the status of the
Surveillance Function;
o Performing the start-up, shutdown and restart
of the Surveillance Function and its
components;
o Allowing the operator to modify Variable
System Parameters (VSP) that customize
the system's technical characteristics;
o Generating alerts and displaying diagnostic
information in the event of faults in the
system;
o Exporting status, alerts, and diagnostic data
to External Supervision;
o Allowing the operator to re-configure the
systems to maintain agreed levels of service
provision as appropriate;
o Managing changes in the airport layout due
to Operational Supervisor actions.
Although not explicitly mentioned in any of the previous
descriptions, the Internal Supervision controls the behaviour of
all of them.
The focus will be place on the functions that allow adapting
to the different solutions for integrating ADS-B. These
functions are mainly the Adquisition and Data Preprocessing,
the Multisensor Data Fusion, the Surveillance Environment
Assessment and Adaptation.
III. ADS-B KNOWN ISSUES
The next sub-sections present the known issues concerning
ADS-B.
A. Equipage
For complete coverage, all potential targets have to be
equipped with ADS-B capable transponders. As the technology
has been introduced gradually, there is a transition period in
which the full benefit of pure ADS-B cannot be realized.
B. Time synchronization
This is an already known problem which it is mainly related
to airborne aircraft due to their high speed. On the surface, this
problem is not remarkable [5].
C. Coordinate transformation
Depending on the algorithms used for transforming
Latitude and Longitude into the stereographic plane centred on
the data fusion centre, some error can be introduced. It is
important to estimate whether this error is significant in order
to include it in the sensor measurement model.
D. Biases
The main bias that has to be addressed while fusing data
with ADS-B report information is the one related to the
position of the GPS antenna (assuming that the Time bias is
negligible). The position reported by the transmitting ADS-B
device is the location of the A/Vs ADS-B Position Reference
Point, if the POA (Position offset applied) field is set to one,
and the GPS antenna otherwise [6][8].
E. Transmission problems
This can be one of the biggest problems concerning the
integration of ADS-B in the airport Surveillance Function.
There are several cause which justify the disappearance of
ADS-B data [9][10], namely:
Reflections;
Occlusions by buildings and other A/V;
Frequency shared with other A/C and systems (SSR,
DME, etc).
This fact implies that sometimes the system has to deal with
the absence of ADS-B reports which can be in part solve by
coasting. However this technique implies a trade-off between
the probability of detection and the accuracy of the provided
position [9].
F. Integrity
As any secondary surveillance technology, successful
surveillance requires the cooperation of the targets. However,
pure ADS-B not only relies on a functional transponder, but
also on the integrity of the aircraft navigation system. If this
fails, the aircraft will not be able to broadcast its position, or
worse, it may broadcast invalid positions which satisfy the
CRC code which protects from undetected errors. On the other
hand, GPS is the only source of information for the aircraft
navigation system which represents a unique failure point.
However this problem will be solved once Galileo is up and
running.
Using pure ADS-B, there is no way to verify the position or
even presence of an aircraft. This is the reason why some kind
of mitigation mean has to be put in place.
Another important matter is that there are integrity
parameters which provide information concerning the reported
position integrity such as the already mentioned NIC and SIL
[4] [7]. This information has to be exploited as much as
possible by the Surveillance Function in order to keep the good
measurements and discard the not reliable ones.
Besides, continuous self-monitoring and testing enables the
timely detection of problems with the sensor, and can quickly
provoke corresponding reactions by the users of sensor data.
G. Security
It is relatively easy to broadcast fake ADS-B messages
simulating non-existent aircraft. This case is broader, but not
substantially different in risk from a classical secondary radar
transponder reporting a wrong Mode-C altitude; however since
ADS-B messages are broadcast, they are available to
everybody with the right equipment. Except for regulatory
action, there is no way to restrict the availability of aircraft
positions.
IV. ADS-B INTEGRATION AND OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS
The initial strategies to be considered are the following:
Airport surveillance based on ADS-B as primary
source of information with build-in integration
checking;
ADS-B as the primary surveillance source of
information supported by an SMR or MLAT as
the backup solution and the mean of checking the
ADS-B data integrity;
ADS-B as another source of information to be
provided to the multi-sensor data fusion.
For each of them, the modifications to the SESAR
surveillance functional architecture, the proposed algorithms,
the backup solution and the constraints due to the needed
sensor equipment will be presented.
A. ADS-B as unique source of surveillance information
Stand-alone ADS-B surveillance is envisaged for small size
aerodromes where the traffic load does not justify the
investment on a radar-based solution.
However, there are some tests that need to be done to ADS-
B data in order to check its integrity. Some of these tests are
expected to be performed by the ground station, but in some
cases they can be repeated by the surveillance function.
The ones that can be performed by the ground station are
the one related to the reception of the signal. Thus, the use of
sectorised antennas, time consistency checks and power
analyses can perform an initial filtering of the income data.
Thus, the Surveillance Function can perform different tests
in order to check if the incoming data is feasible or not. Several
of these tests might be similar to the ones performed by the
ground station, but it is important to repeat them as the ground
station might also be a failure point. Some examples are:
Position test: it analyses whether the position reported
by the ADS-B ground station is feasible considering
times and distances.
Velocity test: the airport topology constraints on
aircraft movements can be used to remove fake or
erroneous data.
Time test: it analyses the age of the measurement.
Quality indicators: can provide information about the
status of the data source and quality of measurements.
Taking into account the Surveillance Function described in
section II the following modifications have to be performed.
Acquisition and Data Preprocessing: this function
has to include the tests described above in order to
guarantee that the ADS-B data provided to the rest of
the functions are good enough to be processed. The
correction of the GPS antenna position bias has to be
implemented.
Multisensor Data Fusion: this function has to
estimate the position offset of the GPS antenna in case
necessary. The Acquisition and Data Preprocessing
will use it for correcting this bias from the new
incoming measures associated to the corresponding
target. Due to the problem related to the
disappearance of ADS-B measurement, it is
convenient to implement a tracking filter for being
able to provide coasted measurements.
Surveillance Environment Assessment: this
function should implement an online evaluation tool
in order to update the measurement model of the
ADS-B.
In this scenario there are two possibilities: to dispose of one
or several ADS-B ground stations. The second case allow to
perform a better position test as a multilateration-based
position estimate can be obtained and also crosschecks between
ground stations can be done. Concerning the first possibility,
there is no backup solution apart from the controller. In the
second one, the rest of the ground stations will provide it, so
the failure of one of them will be transparent for the
Surveillance Function.
B. ADS-B as the primary surveillance source of information
supported by other sensors
This scenario, which is an evolution of the previous one,
can be of interest for medium/high density airports where the
number of aircraft is not easy to handle without a surveillance
system. The number of movement has to be enough to justify
the investment on a radar sensor.
In this case, the surveillance function is fed by different
types of sensors which improve the robustness of the system. It
is assumed that there are several ADS-B ground stations which
are connected to an ADS-B server. The ADS-B is considered
as the primary source of surveillance information (because of
its better performances in a normal situation) and will be the
one displayed on the controllers screen. The other surveillance
sensors (SMR and MLAT) are just kept for integrity checks
and as backup solutions.
In this scenario, the same tests, which were presented in the
previous one, have to be performed as they guarantee the
integrity of ADS-B data. However, in this case the surveillance
function does not rely on just one type of sensor which gives
more confidence in the output shown to the controllers.
The upgrades to the architecture are:
Acquisition and Data Preprocessing: the same as in
the previous scenario.
Multisensor Data Fusion: It has to estimate the GPS
antenna position offset. In order to exploit the
information coming from the back up surveillance
sensors (e.g. SMR or MLAT) the Multisensor
Multitarget Tracker implemented in this case should
maintain two monosensor tracks per target, one fed by
ADS-B data and the other by the backup sensor. Thus,
the MSDF can check the coherence and integrity of
the ADS-B monosensor track using the other one.
This integrity check has to be performed before
sending the information to the controller display. If a
lost of integrity or a disappearance in ADS-B data is
detected, the system smoothly transitions to the output
of the backup solution, which is assumed to be less
accurate but more stable. So, the MSDF has to
implement the logic for performing the soft handover.
Surveillance Environment Assessment: the same as
in the previous scenario. The output of this function
can also include some directions to the MSDF
(Through the Surveillance Environment Adaptation
function) concerning the start of the handover.
In this case the backup solution is provided by the output of
the monosensor track based on the data coming from the back
up sensors (e.g. SMR or MLAT).
C. ADS-B as another source of information in a multisensor
environment
This is the most general scenario where there are several
sensors of different kinds which can be fused for improving the
output data to be sent to the controller display.
Even though this is the most common configuration that
can be found in high density airports, the trend is to move to a
scenario similar to the one described in previous section. This
will be possible once the main problems of current ADS-B data
link are solved. These problems are the dependency with GPS,
which will be solved once Galileo is up and running, and the
improvement against sudden lost of the data link. A possible
solution for the latter is to change the data link technology but
this implies a huge investment for the airlines which will only
be possible when they are fully convinced of its benefits.
However, SESAR is working in this direction.
This scenario includes several ADS-B ground stations, one
or more SMR, a MLAT system and can also include camera
systems. All these systems feed the surveillance function in the
same conditions. The weight that is given to each of them
depends on their measurement models but not in any
preference based on the sensor.
Similar to the previous scenario, several tests are performed
to check ADS-B integrity but the dependability on this sensor
is reduced as there are other sensors which are included in the
data fusion.
The proposed changes to the architecture are:
Acquisition and Data Preprocessing: the same as in
the previous scenarios.
Multisensor Data Fusion: this function has to
estimate the GPS antenna position offset. In this case
there are two clear options in order to fuse the data
coming from the sensors one is based on a centralized
architecture in which the system process directly raw
plots and the other is based on building monosensor
tracks which are then used to update a multisensor
one. Depending on the behaviour of the sensor, one
approach or the other can be used.
Surveillance Environment Assessment: the same as
in the previous scenario.
In the case of a distributed architecture (monosensor track
processing), the backup solution is provided by the output of
one of the monosensor tracks that can be computed in parallel
to the multisensor one. For a centralized architecture, the
disappearance of one of the data sources should not impact the
processing only the quality of the output.
V. RESULTS
In order to show the advantages of building the SESAR
Surveillance Function based on ADS-B data, a simulated
scenario is presented. The scenario is based on the Scenario B
which has been defined in the previous section. This scenario is
located at Barajas airport and consists of a SMR sensor and an
ADS-B server.
Figure 2. Simulated trajectories on Barajas airport
TR1
TR2
SMR1
SMR1 is located in Cartesian coordinates in the following
position (-900, -400, 80), which corresponds with the tower
located close to Terminal 1. The measurement noise is modeled
by the range standard deviation (
R
) and by the azimuth one
(
):

R
: 5m

: 0.15
In this simulation, two trajectories (TR1 and TR2) are
presented. TR1 represents an aircraft which departs from a
stand in Terminal 3 and takes off from runway 15R and TR2
represents an aircraft which departs from a stand in Terminal
4S and takes off from runway 36R.
For the sake of simplicity, some of the already presented
effects are not taken into account in order to focus on the
simulated ones and not being disturbed by the joint effects of
the rest of them. Thus, the following assumptions are
considered:
The system receives ADS-B data from an ADS-B
server, so the problem with duplicates is not
present.
The ADS-B time bias and the coordinate
transformation effect are negligible.
ADS-B data is based on GPS receiver and never in
the INS system of the aircraft.
The biases of SMR systems have been cancelled.
Thus, ADS-B is the primary surveillance source of
information which is supported by an SMR sensor (SMR1). So,
there are two independent monosensor tracks. The main one is
the one based on ADS-B and the one provided by the SMR is
the backup one. The following figure represents the RMS error
of both monosensor tracks for TR1 after performing a Monte
Carlo simulation of 100 iterations.
Figure 3. RMS error for the two sources of information (SMR and ADS-B)
Assuming that the results for TR1 are representative
enough, the integration of ADS-B will considerably improve
the quality of the output of the Surveillance Function provided
that the already known issues are conveniently addressed. In
order to achieve A-SMGCS level II, which implies the 7.5 m at
95% percentile of accuracy, the integration of ADS-B is almost
mandatory.
Besides, the output of the SMR sensor guarantees that its
performances also comply with the A-SMGCS level II
accuracy requirement, so its output can perfectly take over the
role of back up surveillance source. For those cases in which a
better performance is required, the output is improved by
including an IMM filter which exploits the airport layout at the
expense of increasing the complexity of the MSDF function.
REFERENCES
[1] SESAR Definition Phase, Deliverable 3. The ATM Target Concept,
September 2007.
[2] EUROCONTROL, Definition of A-SMGCS Implementation Levels,
November 2005.
[3] SESAR Development Phase, 12.03.01.D02. Phase1-Architecture
design, Ed. 00.01.00, January 2011.
[4] ICAO, Doc 9871 - Technical provisions for Mode S services and
extended squitter., 2008.
[5] G. de Vela et al., Integration of ADS-B surveillance data in operative
multiradar tracking processors, Information Fusion, 2008 11th
International Conference on, 2008, 1-8, 0.1109/ICIF.2008.4632309.
[6] RTCA, DO-242A, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards
for Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), June 2002.
[7] SC 186 WG-6, Proposed Revisions to ADS-B MASPS: Integrity and
Accuracy Monitoring, August 2001
[8] J.A. Besada et al., On-line sensor calibration for airport data fusion,
Radar Conference, Proceedings of the IEEE, 2004.
[9] Luca Saini et al., 1090ES ADS-B Surveillance for vehicle tracking-
Performance Results, ESAVS 2007, Bonn, Germany, March 2007.
[10] Paul Askew, NATS, Evaluation of ADS-B at Heathrow for
EUROCONTROL ADS Programme Report, June 2002.
[11] A. Smith et al., System-Wide ADS-B Back-Up and Validation,
presented at the Integrated Communications, Navigation, & Surveillance
Conference, Hyatt Regency Baltimore, Baltimore, Maryland, 2006.
[12] ICAO, Guidance Material on Issues to be Considered in ATC Multi-
sensor Fusion Processing Including the Integration of ADS-B Data,
September 2008.
[13] J.D. Powell, C. Jennings, y W. Holforty, Use of ADS-B and
perspective displays to enhance airport capacity, in Digital Avionics
Systems Conference, 2005. DASC 2005. The 24th, vol. 1, 2005, 4.D.4-
4.1-9 Vol. 1, 10.1109/DASC.2005.
[14] Campbell, S.D.; Grappel, R.D.; Flavin, J.M., Multi-sensor processing
for aircraft surveillance in mixed radar/ADS-B environments, in Digital
Communications - Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft and Vehicles,
2008. TIWDC/ESAV 2008. Tyrrhenian International Workshop on,
September 2008, 10.1109/TIWDC.2008.4649022.
Future mobile satellite communication
Project 15.2.6: The feeder link to the ESA Iris Programme
Pierpaolo Tavernise
Thales Alenia Space Italia
Via Saccomuro 24 00131 Rome - Italy
pierpaolo.tavernise@thalesaleniaspace.com
Abstract SESAR Concept of Operations set out in the SESAR
Definition Phase (2006-2008) addressed the issue of the
inadequacy of the current ATM communication link identifying
new communication technologies that will enable improved voice
and data exchanges due to the estimated increase of the flight
traffic in the future. Currently SESAR WP15 addresses the non-
avionic CNS technologies development and validation comprising
the definition of the future mobile datalink systems to serve
communication services. Within WP15, the overall objective of
the Project 15.2.6 Future mobile satellite communication is to
define the requirements for the future Satellite Communication
System developed in the ESA Iris Programme, to perform the
complementary activities of validation and to support the
standardization of the new satellite link. The present paper
describes the status of P15.2.6 on going activities.
Keywords-SESAR; satellite; ATM; communication; SATCOM;
ESA; Iris
I. INTRODUCTION
SESAR Concept of Operations [1] and the ATM Master
Plan [4], endorsed by the EU Transport Council, indicates the
following solutions to meet the new long-term communication
requirements:
increase the use of digital technology and protocols. Data
link in the future will become the primary means of
communications [2] and voice while will not be able to be
used as back back-up will remain available for emergency
communications [6],
implement terrestrial and satellite based new data links to
complement VDL2 over high-density continental areas
[4],
provide satellite communication as the primary mean over
oceanic, remote and polar areas [5],
fully integrate the terrestrial and satellite networks
realizing a dual link system [3].
The new ATM satellite data link will moreover provide the
advantage to offer complementarities to the terrestrial links in
terms of coverage and infrastructure and radio spectrum
diversity.
II. THE MULTI LINK OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
Among the SESAR WP15 (Non avionic CNS Aspects)
projects, the project P15.2.4 (Future Mobile Data Link System
Definition) is a key project aiming to lead the definition of the
future communication system meeting the future requirements
for all phases of flight.
In particular SESAR Project 15.2.4 (P15.2.4) is in charge of
the definition of the overall system aspects of the Future
Communications Infrastructure (FCI) to be developed under
the SESAR Programme.
A new specific functionality has been identified as one of
the main concepts of the FCI with the objective to provide a
robust and high availability connectivity adapted to safety
critical application services. This specific functionality is
identified as the Multilink concept. The multilink concept
should enable the seamless use of different technologies
supporting the future ATM concept.
The SESAR ATM concept introduces new ATM services
that are demanding in data exchanges (latency, capacity,
availability, ) as
o 4D Trajectories Management, CDM
o Meteo info, SWIM,
SESAR introduced initially the Dual link concept [3] as a
way to limit the impact of events such as Loss of Service. The
contemporary availability and usage of multiple new data links
in a transparent way is the object of the multilink operational
concept (ML OC) defined in the P15.2.4 [10].
The Multilink Concept is involving three new
communications links:
AeroMACS - a ground-based, high-capacity,
airport surface datalink system for the aeronautical
mobile airport communications
LDACS - a ground-based datalink system for
continental airspace in L-band for digital
aeronautical communications
SATCOM - a satellite-based datalink system for
the oceanic, remote and continental environments
SESAR P15.2.4 is focused on the overall FCI and in
particular on the LDACS. SESAR Project 15.2.6 (P15.2.6) is
focused on the activities related to the new satellite datalink
(SATCOM). Following the SESAR vision, the Future
Communication Infrastructure (FCI) will be a system of
systems integrating existing communication sub networks
(VDL2) as well as the new communications sub networks
Figure 1: SESAR FCI Multilink Concept
Currently, there are two satellite communications system for
ATM services: the INMARSAT3 and IRIDIUM systems.
However, the performance requirements in the current ICAO
satellite standards are insufficient to cover the quality of
service (QoS) requirements of the applications supporting the
future operating concept. There is therefore a need to update
the AMS(R)S SARPs with more stringent performance-based
requirements in line with the requirements of the future ATM
concept.
In the European context, it is the European Space Agency
(ESA) with the Iris Programme that is leading the satellite
system design for ATM communication in collaboration with
the Sesar Joint Undertaking and in particular with the project
P15.2.6 .
In particular the Iris programme is complemented by the
SESAR P15.2.6 project (Future mobile satellite
communication) that is defined as the direct interface of
SESAR Programme to the ESA Iris Programme.
Figure 2: SESAR P15.2.6 and ESA Iris Programme
III. ESAIRIS PROGRAMME
The ARTES Element 10, Iris Programme, is the
European Space Agencys programme in support of the
implementation of safety-of-life communications via satellite
for the future European Air Traffic Management System
(EATMS) .
On the basis of the communications needs and the
technological solutions identified through SESAR definition
phase [1][2], ESA started the Phase II.1 of the Iris programme
which aim at designing, developing, verifying and validating
the new satellite communication system for ATM services
within the framework of the SESAR Programme.
Indeed the Iris Programme is financed by ESA Member
States but its implemented in close collaboration with SESAR
Joint Undertaking.
The collaboration is highlighted by the Iris Mission
Requirements definition and the validation of the satellite
system that are in charge to SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU).
Furthermore SJU has been involved in the formal review
process of the ESA Iris projects contributing to the System
Requirements Review board with Eurocontrol, the European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Airbus and an independent
ATM Safety Board.
The design and development of the satellite
communication system for ATM implies two parallel
developments:
o the development of a new satellite communication
standard to be adopted at worldwide level, designed ad hoc
for the future ATM services being also an open standard.
o the development of a European satellite infrastructure,
which will enable the provision of the future ATM
services service in the defined coverage area.
From a technical perspective, the ESA role with the Iris
Programme covers the design of the new Communication
Standard, the design and development of the Satellite
Communication System, the procurement of the subset and the
System Verification.
The Iris Phase II.1 has started in 2009, studying two
alternative approaches for the system design:
o the design of a purpose-built system (called ANTARES)
supported by three parallel studies preparing for future
service provision (HERMES, OPERA and SIRIO studies),
o the analysis of the feasibility of adapting Inmarsats
SwiftBroadband system for provision of safety services
(THAUMAS study). This activity includes modifications
of the SBB communication system, the analysis of
required modifications to the satellite constellation, user
terminals and the ground segment.
Based on the result of the Iris Phase II.1 studies, ESA will
submit a proposal for a Satcom system solution to SJU at the
end of the 2012. The ESA proposal will include different
technical options (based on ANTARES and THAUMAS
solutions) in terms of geographical service coverage and
system capacity.
The technical options will be supported by Business Cases,
Safety Cases and Security Case.
Based on all these elements, EC and SJU will reach a
consensus on the final design option of the Satcom solution for
SESAR.
A decision by ESA Member States is forecast in 2012 to
give the go-ahead for the Phase II.2 and complete the Iris Phase
II in full alignment with the SESAR Development Phase.
At the end of Phase II, all transferable ESA Iris Programme
assets will be transferred to the future owner of the system.
A Phase III of the ESA Iris programme foresees for ESA
the only role to provide technical support to the system owner.
.
Figure 3: ESA Iris Programme logo
IV. SESAR P15.2.6 AND THE FUTURE MOBILE SATELLITE
COMMUNICATION LINK
P15.2.6 is carried out by the following SESAR Members.
Airbus, AENA, Alenia, Eurocontrol, Frequentis, Indra,
NORACON and Thales.
Thales Alenia Space Italia (one of the 4 Thales Entities
involved in the project) is in charge of the project coordination.
P15.2.6 is part of the SESAR WP 15 the Non Avionic
CNS System addressing CNS technologies development and
validation also considering their compatibility with the Military
and General Aviation user needs and constitutes, as previously
indicated, the interface of SESAR Programme to the ESA Iris
Programme.
P15.2.6 is started in April 2010 and its completion is
foreseen in 2016 (inline with the ESA Iris and P15.2.4
schedule)
P15.2.6 aims to perform the following main activities:
1. Define the Iris mission requirements identifying the
satellite link operational concepts and define the
SATCOM system interfaces with the overall SESAR
infrastructure
2. Validate the ESA Iris development from an end-to-end
point of view in collaboration with P15.2.4 for the FCI
Operational Concept
3. Supporting the standardizations process related with
satellite communication system and promoting this
aviation technical standard to regional and international
standardizations bodies.
The definition of the new datalink requirements, the data
link validation and standardization is an activity implying a
coordination not only with Iris Programme and P15.2.4 but in
addition with the other SESAR WPs working on tasks
complementary to P15.2.6 tasks. In particular links have been
identified with the P15.1.6 for the satellite spectrum
assessment, WP 9 for the Aeronautical Flexible User Terminal
definition, WP 3 for the Validation and Verification exercises
coordination, WP 10 for the ground network, WP 14 for the
SWIM application and WP 16 for the Cost Benefit Analysis.
Figure 4: The 16 WPs of the SESAR Programme
Next figure summarizes the links between the Iris Programme ,
P15.2.6 and the other SESAR Projects and WPs:
Figure 5: Links between the Iris Programme and the other
SESAR WPs.

Figure 6: Links between P15.2.6, the Iris Programme and
the other SESAR Projects
V. SESAR P15.2.6 IRIS MISSION REQUIREMENT
DEFINITION
Following the E-OCVM [12], the SESAR reference for the
ATM Concept Validation, the level of maturity of a new
concept as the usage of a new satellite datalink for the ATM
services implies an acceptance and a commitment from all
involved stakeholders. Moreover the expectations of all the
involved stakeholders have been discovered and collected in
the Mission requirement Document.
Once the MRD is issued, ESA will translate the Mission
Requirements generated by the stakeholders into requirements
applicable to the design and development of the Satellite
Communication System performed in the Iris Programme.
These requirements will be collected in the Iris System
Requirement Document (SRD).
The satellite system design is carried out in an iterative
process between Iris design studies and SESAR P15.2.6. Based
on inputs from P15.2.6, Iris Programme will consolidate
technical requirements in an iterative process consisting of the
following steps:
1. Mission (User) Requirements capture from the SJU
and the Aviation Community,
2. Translation of Mission Requirements into System
Requirements by ESA,
3. Assessment of impact of System Requirements on the
design of the Satellite Communication System
4. feed-back on such impacts and their high-level
consequence to SJU and the Aviation Community, leading to a
possible update of the Mission Requirements and a new
iteration cycle.
The following stakeholders have been identified for the
Satellite Communication System:
the SESAR JU is responsible for the definition of the
users requirements for the overall European ATM System, for
the apportionment of technical budgets requirements among its
different communication systems (Terrestrial System, Satellite
System, Airport network) and for the definition of the
interfaces between these systems.
The EC is responsible for establishing the future
regulation for the deployment of SESAR and for the provision
of services within the SES legislation.
ESA will be responsible for the management and
coordination of the design, development and verification
activities of the satellite communication system until the
validation phase. At the end of the development phase, ESA
will transfer the assets to the system owner.
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) will
be responsible for future safety regulations for ATM, according
to the SES legislation.
Satellite and Aeronautical Manufacturing Industry
will develop the satellite system and the user terminals
Satellite Operators and Satellite Service Providers
(Satellite Communication Service Providers and
Communication Service Providers) will be in charge to
operate the satellite and provide the service to the final users of
the system (ANSPs, Airlines, General Aviation).
The Future System Owner is foreseen to be identified
at the end of the next phase of Iris Programme.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
will be involved to approve and endorse the SARPs and
required updates to the AMS(R)S Technical Manual (a new
Part)
the Aeronautical Community (ANSPs, Airspace users
and industry associations such as IATA) as final users of the
system.
Representatives of all the stakeholders have been involved
in the MRD definition.
In particular SESAR P15.2.6 MRD definition task is
carried out with the involvement of the Satellite and
Aeronautical Manufacturing Industry (Thales, Indra,
Frequentis, Airbus), a Satellite Operator and Satellite Service
Provider (Telespazio is the affiliate of Alenia Member involved
in the project), 2 ANSPs (AENA and Avinor - member of
Noracon) and Eurocontrol.
Airspace Users contribution to the P15.2.6 MRD definition
task and SESAR projects more in general is also planned to be
obtained by SJU contracts with Air France, EBAA, KLM,
Iberia, the Lufthansa Group, Novair, SAS Scandinavian
Airlines, TAP Portugal, IATA, IAOPA and ELFAA [13].
In this way SJU has reinforced the user-driven approach to
technologies and procedures development including the
Airspace Users on the analysis of the outcomes of SESAR
projects [13].
In particular EBAA and SAS will be directly involved in
the MRD review.
The involvement of EASA is obtained by Iris Programme
where EASA is involved for the Expert technical safety advice
to ESA and for the chair of the ATM SATCOM (Iris) Safety
Board (ASSB) [14].
Satellite Operators and Satellite Service Providers are
involved in the Service Operators Studies (SIRIO, OPERA,
HERMES) of the Iris Programme.
Currently the mission requirements are under definition
within P15.2.6 and the Aviation Community. The main
requirements having strong impact on the Satellite system
design are reported in the following:
o the coverage area of interest for the provision of the
SATCOM services
o the list of ATC and AOC services to be included and the
reference performances (reference are COCR [15] and the
outcomes of P15.2.4 and other SJU external studies as
AOC Study and OPTIMI)
o the validation assumptions as the foreseen infrastructure
and the timeframe
o security features and countermeasure to the impact of
interferences on the mobile link.
Figure 7: SES Airspace and European FABs are
investigated by P15.2.6 as possible coverage areas
With the Iris MRD, P15.2.6 will deliver to ESA the Iris ICD
that will define the interface between the future European
ATM Network (EATMN) with the Iris SATCOM system.
VI. SESAR P15.2.6 ESAIRIS DEVELOPMENT VALIDATION
The reference in SESAR for the validation and verification
methodology is E-OCVM [12].
Validation is intended moreover as an iterative process
providing evidence that a new system or operational concept
fits for purpose or, in other words, validation answers the
question: Are we building the right system?
Verification provides proof that technology components are
feasible and can be safely and economically implemented or, in
other words, verification answers the question: Are we
building the system right?
Verification shall be conducted in parallel with validation
in order to discover problems early and to resolve them before
costly deployment. Indeed Validation and Verification (V&V)
are not considered in isolation by the E-OCVM but are
combined.
P15.2.6 is a System project and for this reason validation is
not part on the scope of the project that will be focused on the
System verification. However P15.2.6 will support the
operational validation exercises within WP3 and/or individual
Operational projects to be identified in the near future.
The current WP3 objective is to build a comprehensive
and integrated V&V Infrastructure to fulfil the overall
validation needs for the development of the SESAR ATM
system. The resulting V&V Infrastructure should be capable of
validating from a single ATM Service up to the whole SESAR
ATM Target Concept ....[16]
WP3 will provide support to the Operational projects for
the setting up of validation activities plus the specification and
development of specific validation tools.
Main tools are the IBPs representing the Industry
Based/Pre-Operational V&V Platforms.
Main tasks of the V&V activity performed in P15.2.6 are :
o Definition of the SATCOM system test procedures and
plan
o Specification of the Test bed(s) requirements
o Definition of the test bed architecture to integrate the Iris
SATCOM component inside the SESAR IBPs validation
platform
o Support to the integration of the SATCOM test bed
platform(s) developed in the Iris Programme in the FCI
Verification Test Bed for the end to end V&V activities
o Execution of the tests and collection of the results.
The boundaries SATCOM datalink defines the boundaries
of the P15.2.6 V&V activity respect the FCI V&V. The
assumption is that the V&V task of the satellite
communication system will be carried out between the
interface between the Satellite Communication Service
Provider and the Communication Service Provider on the one
end and the interface between the Satellite Data Unit and the
on-board router of the aircraft on the other end.
This is depicted in the following scheme (from [18]):
Figure 8: Boundaries of the Satellite Communication
System V&V
A possible architecture of the FCI Test bed platform for
V&V purposes is reported in the next figure (from [17]):
Verification platform and test controler
ATN/IPS ground infrastructure
mockup (including A/G router,
G/G router, etc)
LDACS
AGDL
emulator
ATN/IPS airborne infrastructure
mockup
SATCOM
AGDL
emulator
AeroMACS
AGDL
emulator
ATC/AOC
Traffic
Generator
Figure 9: A possible FCI Test bed platform architecture to
support V&V of the SATCOM datalink from an end to
end perspective.
P15.2.4 FCI test bed will be connected to Air Ground Data
Link AGDL emulators or prototypes developed in P15.2.4
(LDACS), P15.2.6/Iris (SATCOM) and P15.2.7 (AeroMACS)
P15.2.4 FCI test bed will support V&V of the SATCOM
datalink from an end to end perspective and in particular:
Verification exercises where the FCI architecture (and
multilink management) impacts the SATCOM datalink
performances ;
Validation exercises performed with the context of
WP3 or associated operational projects, where the performance
of the FCI impacts the satcom datalink and where the FCI and
the SATCOM in particular provides the communication
channel to be connected to the SESAR IBPs.
The SATCOM test bed could be used in addition (if agreed
in the test bed requirement document) for:
Demonstrations,
Certification exercises.
VII. SUPPORTING THE STANDARDIZATIONS PROCESS
Because aviation operates on a global basis, any new ATM
solution must be supported and coordinated on a worldwide
basis. This requires ICAO standardisation and coordination
with the international stakeholders leading to support for the
new standard.
For this reason SJU under the US/EC Memorandum Of
Cooperation agreed to establish a dedicated activity
(Coordination PLAN 4.4 Data-link technology) to coordinate
FAA the development of future communication technologies,
including the supporting avionics architecture and in particular
including developments of LDACS, Aeromacs and future
SATCOM technologies.
The activities in this Coordination Plan are very much linked to
providing input to aviation standardisation groups such as
ICAO (ACP), EUROCAE, RTCA and (maybe) SAE.
Furthermore P15.2.6 supports the standardization activities
and will drive the development of the required global ICAO
standards by the involvement of its Members in a dedicated
Working Group (WG). The international aspect of satellite
system standardization are dealt in the EUROCONTROL
NEXUS WG with contributions from all interested parties in
Europe and other interested Countries such as USA and Japan:.
NEXUS WG is a subgroup of Nexsat WG and is based on
voluntary contributions. EUROCONTROL is the facilitator
(rapporteur ) of the discussions in the group [19].
NEXUS is currently working in developing a proposal for
ICAO for an update of the AMS(R)S SARPs with stringent
performance requirements and in the future will be involved in
developing a proposal for an update of the AMS(R)S Technical
Manual with the specifications of a new SATCOM technology
meeting the updated requirements.
This imply a strict coordination between the work carried out
in the Nexus WG and the Mission Requirement definition.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The main objectives of the Project 15.2.6 Future mobile
satellite communication is to define the requirements for the
future Satellite Communication System that will be developed
by ESA in the Iris Programme, to perform the technical
validation of the Iris SATCOM system, support the
standardization of the new satellite link with aviation
standardization groups such as ICAO and EUROCAE.
A new concept as the usage of a new satellite datalink for
the ATM services as part of a more general multilink
operational concept implies an acceptance and a commitment
from all the users and service providers.
P15.2.6 aims moreover to identify, define and collect the
expectations of all the involved aeronautical stakeholders in
order to feed the ESA Iris Programme with requirements that
will bring ESA to develop a system corresponding to the
Airspace Users and ANSPs expectations for the future.
Operational validation of the SATCOM system is in charge
to SESAR ANSPs Operational projects by the methodologies
and tools made available by WP3. P15.2.6 will be focused
mainly on the system verification and will support the
operational validation process. Verification activities will
consist on defining the SATCOM system test procedures and
plan, the specification of the SATCOM Test bed architecture,
the support to the integration of the SATCOM test bed in the
FCI test bed and the execution and analysis of the related tests.
The standardization activities for the new SATCOM
datalink are supported by P15.2.6 with the involvement of
P15.2.6 Members in the Nexus Group aimed to deliver to
ICAO an agreed amendment to the ICAO SATCOM SARPs
(Annex 10 Vol. 3).
First issue of Iris MRD will be provided to ESA within
2011 and will be updated in a iterative way as soon as the FCI
concepts will be consolidated.
REFERENCES
[1] SESAR The ATM Target Concept (D3), DLM-0612-001-02-00a
(approved), September 2007.(Page 11)
[2] "Technology Assessment", SESAR Definition Phase Task 2.5.x -
Milestone 3. SESAR Consortium, 2007. DLT-0612-25x-00-05. (Sec.
1.5.1).
[3] SESAR The ATM Target Concept (D3), DLM-0612-001-02-00a
(approved), September 2007.(Page 52)
[4] European Air Traffic Management Master Plan Edition 1 - 30 March
2009 (Pag. 101)
[5] SESAR Deployment sequence (D4), DLM-0706-001-02-00 (approved)
January 2008 (pag. 77)
[6] Action Plan 17: Future Communications Study Final Conclusions and
Recommendations Report, EUROCONTROL/FAA, Version 1.1,
November 2007
[7] http://telecom.esa.int/iris
[8] ESA Iris Programme Status and proposed way forward Document
produced by ESA, EC and SESAR JU Version 20 September 2010
[9] Inter-Regional Satcom Voice Ad Hoc Task Force (SATCOM ad hoc TF)
First Meeting (Paris, France, 25 to 27 January 2011) Agenda Item 4:
Review of the status of implementation and available documentation
Status Of ESA Iris Programme
[10] Project P15.2.4 DEL EWA02-T1-D1 Multilink Concept: An Operational
Perspective edition. 00.00.08 (14/02/2011)
[11] The EUROCONTROL Skyway magazine - Number 54 - Winter 2010
[12] E-OCVM European Operational Concept Validation Methodology V.3.0
2010
[13] SESAR Magazine Issue #6 June 2011
[14] EASA Requirements for Service Providers of aeronautical satellite
mobile (en-route) Communications (CSP) Issue 1.0 10.12.2010 Iris-SB-
CP-TNO-0402-ESA-C2
[15] EUROCONTROL/FAA Communications Operating Concept and
Requirements for the Future Radio System Version 2.0
[16] SESAR Revision Framework for WP03 2nd June 2010 Edition 01.01.00
[17] SESAR P15.2.4 PIR 29/04/2011 Edition 00.01.00
[18] ESA Iris Programme Validation Assumptions draft 0.1
[19] Eurocontrol Nexus Terms of Reference v1.0
(www.eurocontrol.int/nexsat/public/standard_page/NEXUS.html)
[20] ICAO Document 9869, Manual on Required Communication
Performance (RCP) First Edition -2008
Optimising Runway Throughput through Wake

Vortex Detection, Prediction and decision
support tools
Frdric Barbaresco, Philippe Juge,
Mathieu Klein , Yves Ricci & Jean-Yves Schneider,
Surface Radar, Advanced Developments Department
Thales Air Systems, Limours, France
frederic.barbaresco@thalesgroup.com
Jean-Franois Moneuse
FASNET Team Manager
Air Traffic Management Systems
Thales Air Systems, Rungis, France
Jean-franois.moneuse@thalesgroup.com
Abstract Currently at many airports, runway is the limiting
factor for the overall throughput. Among the most important
parameters are the fixed wake turbulence separation minima
expressed in time for take-off clearance and by distance for
arrivals on final approach. This wake turbulence separation
limits the arrival and departure flow on many airports in Europe
already today. Existing departure and arrival wake turbulence
separations are sometimes considered over conservative as they
do not take into account meteorological conditions likely to shift,
reduce or alleviate their circulations. This paper will present the
main aspects of a SESAR project that defines, analyses and
develops a verified wake turbulence system according to related
operational concept improvements in order to, punctually or
permanently, reduce landing and departure wake turbulence
separations and, therefore, to increase the runway throughput in
such a way that it safely absorbs arrival demand peaks and/or
reduces departure delays. This global objective will be achieved
by means of developing a wake vortex decision support system
able to deliver in real time position and strength of the wake
vortices and to predict their behavior and potential impact on
safety and capacity, taking in account actual weather information
as well as the airport specific climatological conditions, aircraft
characteristics (generated wake vortex and wake vortex
sensitivity) and airport runways layout. These functionalities will
be progressively included in the wake vortex decision support
system to be validated and deployed on airports in order to
optimize the runway throughput and reduce delays.
Keywords- airport, wake-vortex, safety, radar, lidar
I. INTRODUCTION
Aircraft creates wake vortices in different flying phases. To
avoid jeopardizing flight safety by wake vortices encounters,
time/distance separations have been conservatively increased,
thus restricting runway capacity. The concern is higher during
taking off and landing phases, as aircraft are less easy to
maneuver. These vortices usually dissipate quickly (decay due
to air turbulence or transport by cross-wind), but most airports
operate for the safest scenario, which means the interval
between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several
minutes. However, with the aid of accurate wind data and
precise measurements of Wake Vortex, more efficient intervals
can be set, particularly when weather conditions are stable.
Depending on traffic volume, these adjustments can generate
capacity gains, which have major commercial benefits.
Wake vortices are a natural by-product of lift generated by
aircraft and can be considered as two horizontal tornados
trailing behind the aircraft. A trailing aircraft exposed to the
wake vortex turbulence of a lead aircraft can experience an
induced roll moment (bank angle) that is not easily corrected
by the pilot or the autopilot. However these distances can be
safely reduced with the aid of smart planning techniques of
future Wake Vortex Decision Support Systems based on Wake
Vortex detection/monitoring and Wake Vortex Prediction
(mainly transport estimation by cross-wind), significantly
increasing airport capacity. This limiting factor will be
significantly accentuated soon with the arrival of new heavy
aircrafts: Airbus A380, stretched version of Boeing B747-8.
Radar and Lidar Sensors are low cost technologies with
highly performing complementary wake-vortex detection
capability in all weather conditions compared to others sensors
that suffer of limited one. Radar and Lidar are promising
sensors for turbulences remote sensing on airport, for all kinds
of aviation weather hazards (wake vortex, wind-shear, micro-
bursts, atmospheric turbulences) with ability to work
operationally in a collaborative way, in different severe
weather conditions like fog, rain, wind, and dry air.
II. WAKE VORTEX HAZARDS
The Wake Vortices shed by an aircraft are a natural
consequence of its lift. The wake flow behind an aircraft can
be described by near field and far field characteristics. In the
near field small vortices emerge from that vortex sheet at the
wing tips and at the edges of the landing flaps.
After roll-up the wake generally consists of two coherent
counter-rotating swirling flows, like horizontal tornadoes, of
about equal strength: the aircraft wake vortices.
Empirical laws model tangential speed in roll-up.
Classically, velocity profile (tangential speed at radius r) is
defined by :
|
|
.
|
\
|
I
=
|
.
|
\
|
B
r
f
e
r
r v 1
2
) (
0
t
u
(1)
where
0
is called circulation. This Wake Vortex Circulation

Strength (root circulation in m
2
/s) is proportional to Aircraft
mass M and gravity g, inversely proportional to air density ,
Wingspan B and Aircraft speed V [1] with 4 / s = :
( ) .V.s.B
M.g
=
0
(2)
Additional factors that induced specific dynamic of wake
vortices: Wind Shear Effect (stratification of wind), Ground
Effect (rebound), Transport by Cross-wind & Decay by
atmospheric turbulence and Crow instability
Figure 1. Wake-Vortex Dynamic & behavior
III. PROJECT PHASES OF WAKE VORTEX DECISION SUPPORT
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Wake Vortex Decision Support System Architecture will be
defined and validated during the following development
phases of P12.2.2 SESAR project:
- Phase 0
The preliminary system architecture will include wake vortex
sensors and weather sensors. During this task, a theoretical
study and a sensors benchmark campaign will be performed in
Paris CDG airport (XP0 campaign) in order to select the
needed sensors set. The recommendations on sensor
technology selection and deployment delivered by this task
will be used to refine the system architecture in the following
phases.
- Phase 1 - Time-Based Separation (TBS)
The aim is to verify the position, strength and behavior of the
wake vortices depending on headwind strength in arrivals in
order to evolve from distance based separation to time based
separation. As well, a first release of the Wake Vortex
Decision Support System prototype will be developed, which
will demonstrate this capability. This demonstration will
include an in-situ verification campaign (XP1 in CDG).
- Phase 2 - Weather Dependent Separation (WDS)
The system will be updated with all the components linked to
weather nowcast and forecast, including real-time prediction
of micro-scale terrain-induced turbulence close to the airport.
The goal is to assess in real-time the position and strength of
the wake vortices and to predict their behavior for both
departures and arrivals, in order to demonstrate the possibility
to evolve from a time based separation to a weather dependent
separation taking advantage of any favorable meteorological
conditions (e.g. crosswind). This demonstration will include
an in-situ verification campaign (XP2 in CDG). All building
blocks regarding weather monitoring will be
developed/customized.
- Phase 3 - Pair Wise Separation (PWS)
The system will be refined to reach two main goals:
Perform a first demonstration of the pair wise
separation concept. With a partial aircraft wake
vortex characteristics database provided by
P6.8.1, it will be demonstrated that the Wake
Vortex Decision Support System could
determine a dynamic pair wise separation, taking
in account the real-time weather conditions as
well as the aircraft sensitivity to wake vortex.
Demonstrate the system adaptability to other
runway layouts.
These demonstrations will be performed in platform tests and
verified in an in-situ campaign (XP3 in Frankfurt). Building
blocks related to pair wise separation (aircraft characteristics
database, algorithms) will be developed or customized.
IV. PRELIMINARY SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OF RUNWAY
WAKE VORTEX DETECTION, PREDICTION AND DECISION
SUPPORT TOOLS
The system architecture development is based on SESAR
requirements in term of safety & operational use ANSPs &
EUROCONTROL Advices & requirements will be also taken
into account.
Since no operational Wake Vortex Decision Support
System (WVDSS) are currently available, this first framework
architecture is based on existing building blocks coming from
partners.
The Wake Vortex Decision Support System (WVDSS)
receives as main external inputs:
- The information flow (from the ATC & Airport
centers) describing the current traffic and aircraft
data. This function provides the air traffic flow
situation to the WVDSS.
- The standard information related to Weather situation
(Meteo Center) as provided by National Weather
Forecast Services. The Meteorological Center
provides data from the operational weather forecast
model LM of national Weather Service (e.g.
METEO FRANCE, DWD) covering most of
Europe.
The system is in charge of elaborating Decision Aids to
support:
- the Supervisor,
- the Approach Controllers,
- the Airport Tower Controllers.
HMI towards Supervisor and controllers are considered as
outside WVDSS Architecture.
Figure 2. System Overview
Components of Runway Wake Vortex Detection,
Prediction and Decision Support Tools are the followings :
A. Local Meteorological Sensors function
A combination of sensors, which are typically weather
dependent, will be used for wind & air turbulence monitoring.
The local meteorological measurements are used for
weather nowcast and forecast, through following parameters:
- Mean wind: three wind components and wind
variability,
- Turbulence: measured as the Turbulent Kinetic
Energy (TKE) or Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) level
of the atmosphere,
- Virtual potential temperature: temperature
stratification
B. Wake Vortex Sensors function
The wake vortex measurements will be performed with two
complementary sensors, one X band radar and one 1.5 micron
Lidar. The rational is that Lidar sensor performances are
limited in adverse condition as in rainy or foggy weathers.
The ability of Radar to detect & monitor Wake Vortices in
rainy weather will complement Lidar in adverse weather
situations.
Radar and Lidar are good complementary sensors, which
can be used for turbulence remote sensing as well. They are
able to work in a collaborative way, in different weather
conditions like fog, rain, strong wind, turbulent atmosphere and
dry air.
C. Local Weather Nowcast/Forecast function
Local Weather Nowcast & Forecast function will be able to
predict atmospheric state variables within a coverage area of
e.g. 100x100 km centered on the airport with an increasing
vertical spacing from e.g. 25 to 50 m throughout the boundary
layer. Output variables are vertical profiles of horizontal and
vertical wind, virtual potential temperature, turbulent kinetic
energy (TKE) and eddy dissipation rate (EDR).
D. Wake Vortex Advisory System function
The Wake Vortex Advisory System (WVAS) will be
composed of:
- an input/output (I/O) module,
- a separation mode planner module,
- a wake vortex predictor module,
- a monitoring and alerting module
The Wake Vortex Advisory System will be able to:
- Propose the separation mode to the supervisor e.g.
ICAO or reduced separation and time applicability of
separation mode
- Process wind data including turbulence information
and system track to provide spacing (chevron position
for display purpose)
- Monitor Wake Vortices (Wake Vortex Predictor
output) against system tracks and provide Encounter
Advisories to controllers HMI for display purpose in
case of actual or predicted danger,
- Manage the wake vortex data (4D data) from Wake
Vortex Sensors function. In case of discrepancies
between wake-vortex sensors and predictor, an alert is
generated.
The Decision Support System functional architecture is
described in the following figure:
Meteo Centre
ATC & Airport
Systems
Wake Vortex Sensors
Wake Vortex Decision Support System
Local Meteo Sensors
Local Weather Nowcast
& Forecast
External Weather Observations
Aircraft Characteristics + 4D trajectory
HMI
Local
Weather
Data Cube
(Grib)
INT-ITWS-1
INT-ITWS-2
INT-LWF-1
INT-LWF-2
INT-LWFN-1
INT-ITWS-3
INT-WVAS-1
INT-WVDET-2
INT-ATCS-1
INT-WVAS-2
Supervisor
Tower
Approach
Wake Vortex Advisory
System
INT-ATCS-2
INT-WVAS-4
INT-EXT-MET
INT-WVAS-3
INT-WVDET-1
Figure 3. Decision Support System functional architecture
V. SENSORS SIMULATORS
To study best sensor parameters/modes tuning and best
sensors deployment on airport, simulators are mandatory. A
custumized 1.5 m Lidar Wake-Vortex Simulators will be
developed with UCL (Belgium). Radar Wake-Vortex
Simulator activity is relatively new and specific tasks are
actively engaged on their development: in collaboration with
UCL (Belgium).
Figure 4. Wake-Vortex Lidar Sensor Simulator (on the left) Wake-Vortex
Radar Sensor Simulator (on the right)
VI. WEATHER & ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCES MODELS
Meteo-France will develop a new advanced Weather Forecast
Model (resolution: 500 m) for airport applications :
Meteorological High-Resolution Prediction System
(MHRPS)
MHRPS development will be based on the French non-
hydrostatic AROME model. The MHRPS will be
implemented on the Meteo-France super-computer and will
assimilate not only dedicated airport sensors data but also all
the routine data coming from the European Meteorological
Infrastructure
MHRPS Requirements are the following:
- Required parameters: Horizontal and vertical wind
(U, V, W), Temperature (T), Humidity (Hu), Eddy
Dissipation Rate (EDR), Surface Pressure (PS);
- Required horizontal resolution: 500 m;
- Required coverage area: 100x100 km centered on
the airport;
- Required vertical resolution: 10 m up to 100 m, 100
m up to 1000 m, 1000 above;
- Required forecast horizon: 3 h;
- Required frequency of forecast outputs: 5;
Figure 5. Sensors Data ingestion in Weather Forecast Models
NATMIG will develop Turbulence Forecast Model (grid
resolution: 100 m). A Reynolds averaged Navier-Stokes
model (SIMRA) has been developed by NATMIG member
SINTEF in order to predict local wind and turbulence around
airports.
Forecast EDR/TKE model will be adapted for airport
infrastructure (buildings,)
Figure 6. Turbulent Kinetic Energy forcasted by NATMIG model
The MHPRS software of METEO FRANCE and the
Turbulences Calculation of NATMIG will update the
Local Weather Data Cube. The data stored in Local
Weather Data Cube are computed by MHPRS within a
volume centered on airport containing following areas of
interest for all trials XP0, XP1 and XP2:
- Airspace allowed for landing (green color),
- Airspace allowed for taking off (white color),
- Airspace where dense traffic (arrival) is expected
(blue color)
Within the volumes, the data are provided by the MHPRS for
the grid points whose characteristics are:
- Latitude: 48.6N to 49.4N with a quantum of 0.005
(160pts with an horizontal resolution of 550m)
- Longitude: 2.08N to 2.98N with a quantum of 0.005
(180pts with an horizontal resolution of 360m)
Figure 7. Area of Interests & Volumes of Weather Data Cubes
VII. DERISKING 2008 TRIALS AND SESAR XP0
CAMPAIGN AT PARIS CDG AIRPORT
In derisking phase in 2008 [3-6], THALES BOR-A radar
has been deployed at Paris CDG Airport, and co-localized
with a Eurocontrol 2 m Lidar. In a first step, antenna was
used in a staring mode for vertical exploration by exploitation
of 4 beamwidth. In the following figure, wake vortex
detection are illustrated by Doppler entropy in time/range
coordinates axes in rainy weather. After each departures on
the first nearer runways, wake vortex are monitored.
Figure 8. wake vortex roll-ups tracking from scan to scan in rainy weather
In vertical scanning mode, individual roll-up of each wake
vortex were tracked in range and elevation axes. In previous
figure, above the first nearer runway, wake vortex generated
by aircraft during departure can be observed. These detections
of wake vortex are coherent with classical behavior close to
the ground. Each roll-up from scan to scan (with one scan
every 5 seconds) can be tracked as proved by the trials. Close
to the ground, trajectory of each roll-up can finely and
accurately been followed and their strength been estimated by
circulation computation.
More recently, from mid-May to end of June 2011, first
XP0 Sensors Campaign of SESAR P12.2.2 have been done at
Paris CDG Airport with the following sensors :
Figure 9. SESAR P12.2.2 XP0 Sensors Campaign at Paris CDG Airport
Wake Vortex sensors : X band radar BOR-A (THALES),
Windcube 200S scanner Lidar (LEOSPHERE) [8-9]
Weather sensors : Windcube 70 wind profiler Lidar
(LEOSPHERE), C band weather radar (METEO
FRANCE), SODAR (METEO FRANCE), UHF Wind
Profiler radar-PCL1300 (METEO FRANCE), UHF Wind
Profiler radar-PCL1300 (DEGREA)
Figure 10. THALES Wake-Vortex X-band Radar Sensor Deployment
Figure 11. DEGREANE UHF Radar Wind Profiler Deployment
Figure 12. Meteo-France UHF Radar Wind Profiler Deployment
Figure 13. LEOSPHERE Lidar Wind Profiler Deployment
Figure 14. LEOSPHERE Wake-Vortex Lidar Deployment
Figure 15. LEOSPHERE W200 Lidar : Wind & Wake-Vortex Modes
In the following figure, Recording coordination during
Paris CDG XP0 trials to prepare XP1 are illustrated.
Meteo
Centre
ATC & Airport
Systems
Meteo
Nowcast
(Wind Profile)
Wake Vortex
Location/Strength
& short prediction
WV Radar
Data Recorder
External Weather
Observations
Aircraft Characteristics
+ 4D trajectory
Anemometers
LIDAR Wind Profiler
UHF Wind Profiler
LIDAR scanner
SODAR/RASS
Weather Radar
Local Meteo Sensors
Lidar 1.5 um
Mechanical scan
X Band Radar
Air Traffic
Data Recorder
Recorder
Recorder
Recorder
Recorder
Recorder
Meteo
Data Recorder
Recorder
WV Lidar
Data Recorder
Wake Vortex Sensors
Wake Vortex Decision Support System
Figure 16. Recordings coordination for XP0
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
P12.2.2. Project is funded by European SESAR Program :
http://www.sesarju.eu/
R&D Research Needs [7] are studied in WakeNet3-Europe
Coordination Action project, funded by FP7:
http://www.wakenet.eu/index.php?id=21
REFERENCES
[1] F. Holzlpfel & al., Analysis of wake vortex decay mechanisms in the
atmosphere, Aerospace Science & Technology, n7, pp.263-275, 2003
[2] K. Shariff,Analysis of the Radar Reflectivity of Aircraft Vortex
Wakes,J. Fluid Mech.,vol.463, pp.121-161, 2002
[3] F. Barbaresco & U. Meier, Wake Vortex X-band Radar Monitoring :
Paris-CDG airport 2008 Campaign Results & Prospectives,
International Radar Conference, Radar09, Bordeaux, October 2009
[4] F. Barbaresco, Interactions between Symmetric Cone and Information
Geometries, ETVC08 Conf., Ecole Polytechnique, Nov. 2008,
published by Springer, in LNCS, vol.5416, February 2009
[5] F.Barbaresco, Radar Monitoring of Wake Vortex :
Electromagnetic reflection of Wake Turbulence in clear air, Comptes-
rendus Physique Acadmie des Sciences, Elsevier, 2010,
http://www.wakenet.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/News%26Publications/C
RPhys_article.pdf (preprint)
[6] F.Barbaresco, Airport Radar Monitoring of Wake Vortex
in all Weather Conditions, EURAD11, EuMW, Paris, September 2010,
http://www.wakenet.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/News%26Publications/E
URAD-Wake-Vortex-Barbaresco.pdf (preprint)
[7] M. Steen, S. Schnhals, J. Polvinen, P. Drake, J.P. Cariou, A. Dolfi-
Bouteyre, F. Barbaresco, Airport Radar Monitoring of Wake Vortex
in all Weather Conditions, 9th Innovative Research Workshop &
Exhibition, EUROCONTROL E.C, France, December 7 - 9, 2010,
http://www.wakenet.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/News%26Publications/I
NO-WS2010_148_48085-1.pdf (preprint)
[8] A. Dolfi-Bouteyre, B. Augere, M. Valla, D. Goular, D. Fleury, G. Canat,
C. Planchat, T. Gaudo, C. Besson, A. Gilliot, J.-P. Cariou, O. Petilon, J.
Lawson-Daku, S. Brousmiche, S. Lugan, L. Bricteux, B. Macq,
Aircraft wake vortex study and characterization with 1.5 m fiber
Doppler lidar, Journal of Aerospace Lab, December 2009
[9] S. Schnhals, M. Steen, P. Hecker, Surveillance Systems On-Board
Aircraft: Predicting, Detecting and Tracking Wake Vortices, Proc. of
8th Innovative Research Workshop, pp.65, Dec. 2009, Eurocontrol
[10] S. Schnhals, M. Steen, P. Hecker, European Air Traffic Management
Master Plan, Edition 1, 30 March 2009, SESAR Consortium
[11] Hahn et al: "Wake Encounter Flight Control Assistance Based on
Forward-Looking Measurement Processing", AIAA Atmospheric and
Space Environments Conf., Toronto, Canada August 2010
[12] Schwarz et al: "Wake Encoutner Severity Assessment Based on
Validated Aerodynamic Interaction Models ", AIAA Atmospheric and
Space Environments Conf. AIAA 2010, Toronto, Canada August 2010
[13] Kocks et al: "An integrated Wake Vortex Visualization Concept for
existing cockpit display systems ", Proc. EIWAC2010 Conf., 2010
[14] Schoenhals et al: "Enhancing Wake Vortex Surveillance Capability
Using Innovative Fusion Approaches ", Proc. EIWAC2010 conf., 2010
[15] ATC-WAKE ATC Wake System Design and Evaluation; ATC Wake
D2_12; 31/12/2005, http://www.nlr.nl/eCache/DEF/502.html
[16] ATC-WAKE ATC Wake System Requirements; 31/12/2005
[17] CREDOS Operational and System Requirements; v 1.0; 2008/03/31
[18] SESAR 12.02.02 ID D01 Report vers.00.01.00, Preliminary System
Requirements of Runway Wake Vortex Detection, Prediction and
decision support tools, 15
th
July 2010
[19] SESAR 12.02.02 ID D02 Report vers.00.01.00, Preliminary System
Architecture of Runway Wake Vortex Detection, Prediction and
Decision Support Tools, 27
th
October 2010
Regulatoiy anu 0peiational Aspects
ADSBandWAMdeploymentinEurope
Session2.1page35
U.S.ActivitiesinADSBSystemsImplementation
Session2.2page41
DetectandavoidforUnmannedAircraftSystemsin
thetotalsystemapproach
Session2.3page47
NorthSeaHelicopterADSB/MLatPilotProjectFindings
Session2.4page53
ADS-B and WAM deployment in Europe

C. Rekkas
Directorate Network Management - EUROCONTROL
Rue de la Fuse 96, B-1130 Brussels, Belgium
christos.rekkas@eurocontrol.it
Abstract The paper provides an update on the status and
plans of the deployment of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) in
Europe. It presents the multiple deployment activities
throughout the continent as well as the achievements in areas
such as standardisation, certification, safety, trials, monitoring
etc. The deployment of ADS-B and WAM in Europe is
progressing fast. Initial operational implementations of WAM
already exist, whilst the first ADS-B operations are expected at
local sites of Non Radar Airspace in 2011. Furthermore, a
large number of European ANSPs will deploy ADS-B and
WAM systems from 2012 onwards, ensuring the availability of
ground infrastructure. Several hundreds of aircraft are
already certified for ADS-B in Non-Radar Airspace. In
parallel, the expected approval of the Single European Sky
(SES) Implementing Rule on Surveillance Performance and
Interoperability (SPI IR) by the European Commission in the
course of this year will enable the widespread aircraft equipage
for other ADS-B applications and will thus accelerate the
implementation of ADS-B ground Surveillance applications in
Europe from 2015-2017 onwards. In addition, a major
objective will be achieved in 2011 with the initial operations of
Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness (ATSAW) applications
over N. Atlantic. The significant progress achieved will enable
important benefits for the ATM Network and establish the
Surveillance foundation for the SESAR Programme, including
the deployment of future more demanding ADS-B applications.
Keywords- 1090 MHz receiver;
I. INTRODUCTION
ADS-B is a Surveillance technique that relies on aircraft
broadcasting their identity, position and other aircraft
information. This signal can be captured for Surveillance
purposes on the ground (ADS-B out) or on board other
aircraft/vehicles (ADS-B in). The latter will enable airborne
traffic situational awareness (ATSAW), spacing, separation
and self-separation applications.
Wide-area multilateration (WAM) is a Surveillance
technique that exploits the 1090 MHz transmissions
broadcast from aircraft. From these signals it can create a
track containing parameters such as aircraft identification,
position, height, etc. Active interrogation is also possible in
order to trigger transmission.
Although the manner in which WAM constructs
Surveillance data differs significantly from ADS-B, the
synergies between these two Surveillance techniques in
addition to their high performance and lower cost are
expected to bring significant operational benefits.
Consequently, hybrid WAM/ADS-B systems are widely
offered by industry and deployed by ANSPs in Europe and
worldwide, thus exploiting these synergies.
However, the optimal mix of the various
Surveillance techniques (SSR Mode S, ADS-B, WAM)
depends on the local environment, operational needs and
business case, froman overall ATM Network viewpoint.
The EUROCONTROL CASCADE Programme (part of
the Directorate Network Management), co-ordinates the
deployment of initial ADS-B applications and WAM in
Europe. The Programme covers both ground Surveillance
(i.e. ADS-B out and WAM) as well as airborne
Surveillance applications (i.e. ADS-B in/ATSAW). It
works actively to ensure global interoperability.
ADS-B and/or WAM are currently being implemented in
Europe and other areas worldwide (Asia, Australia, Canada,
USA).
II. STRATEGICANDATMNETWORK
MANAGEMENT CONTEXT
ADS-B and WAM are key enablers of the future
European ATM Network, contributing to the achievement of
the Single European Sky (SES) performance objectives,
including safety, capacity, efficiency and environmental
sustainability.
The vision for ground Surveillance, as outlined in [2],
foresees in en-route and terminal areas the combination of
ADS-B with independent Surveillance, the latter provided by
MSSR or Mode S or Wide Area Multilateration.
Furthermore, airborne ADS-B systems will be available
as enablers of the new separation modes. These airborne
applications will require changes in the avionics (ADS-B
out and ADS-B in) to process and display the air situation
picture to the pilot.
For airports, a locally optimised mix of the available
technologies, i.e. airport Multilateration, Surface Movement
Radars and ADS-B, will enable A-SMGCS systems and
integrated airport operations. This includes the availability of
Surveillance information on a moving map, using an HMI in
the cockpit and in surface vehicles.
The introduction of ADS-B in the Surveillance
infrastructure provides important features which can be
exploited by the ATM Network:
Full Network-wide Surveillance coverage
Surveillance everywhere, i.e. no gaps fromgate-to-gate
Air-to-air Surveillance possible, i.e. traffic situational
awareness picture available on board
The aircraft is integral part of the Network
Surveillance data provided directly from on-board
systems
High performance
Improved safety
Increased capacity
Cost-efficiency
Reduced cost of the Surveillance infrastructure (ADS-B
and WAM are cheaper than radar)
More efficient flight profiles (in areas where previously
surveillance was not cost-effective)
Fuel savings etc.
Environmental sustainability (CO2 reduction)
Reduced RF pollution (leading to an increased viability
of the 1090 MHz datalink)
Global Interoperability
Foundation for future SESAR ATC applications
(spacing, separation, self-separation)
The European Commission Single European Sky
Surveillance Performance and Interoperability Implementing
Rule (EC SES SPI IR) is in the last phase of consultation and
expected to be approved and published in the Official J ournal
of the European Union in the course of 2011 [3]. According
to the SPI IR, all aircraft operating IFR/GAT in Europe will
have to be compliant with Mode S Elementary Surveillance,
whilst aircraft with maximumTake-Off Mass greater than
5700kg or maximumcruising True Air Speed greater than
250kts will have to be compliant with Mode S Enhanced
Surveillance and ADS-B out. The mandate dates currently
proposed are J anuary 2015 for forward fit and December
2017 for retrofit, with further provisions for State aircraft.
This Rule will accelerate both the aircraft ADS-B
equipage and the ADS-B ground systemdeployment.
The new Surveillance techniques ADS-B and WAM,
supported by the Rule, will enable the deployment of a
rationalised (i.e. cost-efficient and spectrum efficient), high
performance and interoperable Surveillance infrastructure.
III. STANDARDISATIONANDCERTIFICATION
The ADS-B standardisation work was driven by the
Requirements Focus Group (RFG), with principal
membership from EUROCONTROL, FAA, EUROCAE,
RTCA and participation fromAustralia, Canada and J apan.
The ADS-B standardisation work is now completed for
all ADS-B out and ATSAW applications. It has delivered
the Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements
for:
ADS-B in Non Radar Airspace (ADS-B NRA) [4]
ADS-B in Radar Airspace (ADS-B RAD) [5]
ADS-B for Airport Surface Surveillance (ADS-B APT)
[6]
ATSAW In-Trail Procedure in oceanic airspace
(ATSAW ITP) [7]
ATSAW Visual Separation in Approach (ATSAW VSA)
[8]
ATSAW during Flight Operations (ATSAW AIRB) [9]
ATSAW on the Airport Surface (ATSAW SURF) [10]
In addition, the standardisation of the first spacing
application has also been completed with the delivery of the
Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements for:
Flight Deck Interval Management (ASPA-FIM) [11]
The internationally harmonized standardisation work,
including the co-ordination through ICAO, enables global
interoperability and ensures that equipped aircraft can use
their installations worldwide.
Regarding airworthiness approval, the first milestone for
ADS-B-NRA was achieved through the EASA AMC 20-24
(Acceptable Means of Compliance) material, published in
2008 [12].
On a worldwide scale, the EASA ADS-B-NRA
Airworthiness approval was applied to Australia and Canada
(Hudson-Bay). Other implementations are expected to
follow (e.g. Iceland, Portugal). In addition, ADS-B-NRA
certification is expected to also support early ADS-B in
implementations (e.g. ATSAW AIRB and ITP).
On the ground side, the Technical Specifications for the
ADS-B Ground Station in support of ADS-B NRA are
published by EUROCAE (ED-129) [13].
The next milestone of the EASA airworthiness approval
is the certification of ADS-B out avionics, to be compliant
with the European Commission SPI IR mandate. The
relevant Certification Specification material is expected to be
published by mid-2012. It will cover ADS-B as a
complement to radar, even in high-density airspace (ADS-B
RAD), the airport applications (ADS-B APT and ATSAW
SURF) and the ADS-B out requirements of ATSAW
applications .
On the airborne side, the new standard for ADS-B 1090
ES (ED-102A/DO-260B) has been published by EUROCAE
and RTCA [14]. This will supersede the existing standards
(ED-102 / DO-260 and DO-260A) and will become Means
of Compliance for the SPI IR.
The follow-up work for the Technical Specifications of
the ADS-B Ground Station in support of ADS-B out
applications (such as ADS-B RAD), which will ensure
compliance with the Implementing Rule (ED-129A) is
expected to be launched in 2011 and will get inputs from
(amongst others) relevant SESAR projects.
Regarding ADS-B in, joint work by EUROCAE and
RTCA is ongoing on the development of Aircraft
Surveillance Application (ASA) MOPS. The target date for
approval of this document (ED194/DO317A) is October
2011. The MOPS will formthe key reference for the related
EASA ADS-B in certification regulation.
Standardisation work focusing on the needs of General
Aviation in terms of ADS-B out and ADS-B in has also
started.
Regarding WAM, the Technical Specification for Wide
Area Multilateration system (ED-142) has also been
published by EUROCAE [15].
IV. VALIDATION
The validation work of CASCADE addresses the ADS-B
systems and applications, primarily through trials
transitioning to deployment. It includes the testing and
verification at infrastructure level as well as validation at
operational application level.
The CASCADE validation work seek also to make best
use of the EUROCONTROL investments e.g. the ADS-B
Validation Testbed (AVT), which is the reference platform
for the ADS-B validation work in Europe.
CRISTAL Projects
CRISTAL projects have one clear objective: to perform
trials in partnership with stakeholders in defined local
airspace of Europe (pocket areas) where the Surveillance
service can be improved and implementation is envisaged.
The partnerships with the stakeholders have accelerated the
progress fromvalidation to implementation and generated
wide stakeholder involvement.
The CRISTAL ADS-B out Ground implementation
project, which is currently ongoing by CASCADE in
partnership with 7 ANSPs, is a cornerstone of the validation
work and its clear emphasis is on ground deployment of
operational compliant ADS-B and/or WAM systems. The
project is a key complement to the airborne deployments
ongoing through the pioneer airline schemes and, more
importantly, expected through the SPI Implementing Rule.
The project covers both Non Radar Airspace and Radar
Airspace. The Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs)
which participate in this project are:
AVINOR, Norway
BULATSA, Bulgaria
DCA, Cyprus
DFS, Germany
HCAA, Greece
ISAVIA, Iceland and NAVIAIR, Denmark
The projects kicked off in the end of 2009 and will last
until 2012-2013 depending on the case.
Moreover, the CRISTAL RAD High Density project in
partnership with UK NATS is also ongoing. This project
addresses the validation of ADS-B/WAM in the airspace of
the London Terminal Control Area, which is one of the most
complex and highest density airspaces in the world. It has
also studied the future availability of aircraft-derived data
(ADS-B ADD application) on the basis of the new
standardised technology (ED102A/D0260B). Regarding the
latter point it provided recommendations for the availability
of Enhanced Surveillance data through active interrogation
by an ADS-B/WAM system.
Furthermore, the CRISTAL Dual Link Interoperability
project, in partnership with the Swedish ANSP LFV,
validates ADS-B in a dual link configuration (1090 Ext.
Squitter/VDL Mode 4), in both non-radar airspace (Kiruna)
and radar airspace (Stockholm Arlanda).
Pioneer Airline Projects
In parallel to the ground implementation related projects
presented above, two pioneer airline projects were launched:
the first pioneer project aiming at airworthiness approval for
ADS-B in Non Radar airspace was successfully completed
(with 18 airlines, more than 500 aircraft and 14 different
aircraft types), whereas a second pioneer airline project (on
ATSAW) was recently launched.
Through the ATSAW Pioneer project, the
EUROCONTROL CASCADE Programme is partnering
with airlines, ANSPs and industry in order to catalyse the
operational use of ADS-B to provide an airborne traffic
situation picture to the flight crew.
The objective of the ATSAW Pioneer airline project is to
assist airlines in equipping aircraft with certified ATSAW
equipment and participating in trial operations, later
transitioning to regular operations. The specific ATSAW
applications targeted by the project are ATSAW AIRB,
ATSAW ITP, and, at a later stage, ATSAW VSA and
ATSAW SURF. The project kicked off in the end of 2009.
Five airlines have started equipping aircraft (25 in
total) with certified ATSAW equipment and will participate
in trial operations from2011 onwards over N. Atlantic, i.e.
British Airways
Delta
Swiss International Airlines
US Airways
Virgin Atlantic
Two ANSPs are also involved in order to develop the
ground enhancements which are required for the initial
deployment of ATSAW ITP:
ISAVIA of Iceland (for the Reyjkavik FIR)
UK NATS (for the Shanwick FIR)
The ATSAW Pioneer project will mark
the first operational use of ATSAW applications and pave
the way for the deployment of other ADS-B in
applications.
V. MONITORING
The CASCADE ADS-B Monitoring Project objective is
to assess the performance of ADS-B. The performance of the
pioneer and other aircraft is monitored using ADS-B data
gathered through a network of ADS-B ground stations
deployed in Europe, as well as radar and multilateration data.
In total more than 1000 aircraft are currently monitored and
billions of reports have been analysed.
The ADS-B Monitoring Project includes the following
activities:
Monitoring the ADS-B 1090 Extended Squitter equipage
Monitoring the ADS-B data quality, for aircraft, while
airborne, using ADS-B and radar data. The analysis is based
on the comparison with respect to the corresponding
requirements specified in the standards for ADS-B (such as
[4, 5, 12]). The aircraft are monitored by the following ADS-
B 1090 Extended Squitter ground stations:
Athens (HCAA), Greece
EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre (EEC), Bretigny,
France
Langen (DFS), Germany
Schiphol (LVNL), Netherlands
Toulouse (DSNA), France
Warlingham(NATS), UK
Monitoring the ADS-B 1090 ES data quality, for aircraft
on the airport surface, using ADS-B 1090 ES and
multilateration data. The ADS-B monitoring project receives
recordings from the MLAT system of:
Charles de Gaulle airport (DSNA), France
Schiphol airport (LVNL), Netherlands
Monitoring of GNSS related data continuity expressed as
Mean Time Between Outage (MTBO). The results are
compared with the requirement of ADS-B RAD standard [5].
A database with the results of the accuracy analysis for
all aircraft participating in the project is maintained.
The results of the analysis from the pioneer aircraft show
compliance with the requirements for ADS-B NRA [12].
For a part of the pioneer aircraft, the results of, in
particular, the accuracy analysis show compliance also with
the relevant more demanding requirements of ADS-B RAD
[5].
The few ADS-B out anomalies which have been
identified from the analysis so far have been investigated and
resolved in co-operation with the airlines, airframers and
avionics industries.
Regarding the ADS-B performance of pioneer aircraft on
the airport surface, the results fromthe analysis show that:
The ADS-B position of pioneer aircraft on the airport
surface is very accurate for the analysed configurations (Fig
1).
The corresponding quality indicator is generally
underestimating the actual position quality.
Figure 1. ADS-B errors on the airport surface for various aircraft
configuration
Furthermore, a CASCADE study on the capacity of the
1090 MHz datalink in a high-density airspace (follow-up of
previous work in this area) was successfully completed, in
addition to actual RF measurements using airborne test
equipment. These will be used in standardisation work for
the ADS-B Ground station as well as for spectrum
management related activities.
VI. SAFETY
CASCADE safety work encompasses a wide range of
activities, from international standardisation to support to
local implementation.
In international ADS-B standardisation (joint
EUROCAE/RTCA standards), CASCADE ensures that
European Commission and EUROCONTROL rules and
safety methods (Regulation EC No. 2096/2005, ESARR 4,
SAME etc.) are duly taken into account.
Moreover, CASCADE leads the development of
Preliminary Safety Cases (PSCs) aimed at demonstrating that
each ADS-B application has the potential to be acceptably
safe in a typical environment.
PSCs can be largely re-used for the development of Local
Safety Cases (LSCs), and for that purpose include significant
guidance material to facilitate the work of the ANSPs.
Acr oss Posi tion Err or 95%for AMC 20-24 cert ifi ed ai rcr aft
Monitori ng per iod January 2010 March 2011
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
AcT3 AcT8 AcT7 AcT2 AcT8 AcT8 AcT3 AcT16 AcT23 AcT2 AcT3 AcT4 AcT27 AcT7 AcT28 AcT2 AcT3 AcT4 AcT16 AcT8 AcT13 AcT2
Op2 Op4 Op10 Op12 Op1 Op19 Op16 Op6 Op15
Y
ICAOaircraft type
A
C
P
E
9
5
%
(
m
e
t
e
r
s
)
XpT1 - GT2
XpT2 - GT2
XpT2 - GT3
XpT2 - GT4
XpT2 - GT5
XpT3 - GT2
XpT3 - GT4
XpT3 - GT6
The early exposure of the PSC, to the review process
conducted by representatives of national supervisory
authorities, is also expected to facilitate and accelerate the
approval process at national regulatory level.
The Preliminary Safety Cases for ADS-B NRA and
ADS-B RAD have been completed [16, 17]. The PSCs for
ADS-B APT and VSA are close to completion, expected to
be followed by the ones for the other ADS-B applications. In
parallel, work has started on the PSCs for WAM NRA and
WAM RAD.
VII. DEPLOYMENT
The ADS-B and WAM deployment in Europe is now
ongoing, following three paths:
Voluntary implementation of ADS-B sole means or with
WAM in local Non Radar airspace of Europe (pocket
areas), using currently existing (certified) equipment, from
2011 onwards
Deployment of WAM and ADS-B systems in Radar
Airspace, in which WAM is used first, followed by the use
of ADS-B out. The latter requires enhanced avionics and
is, therefore, driven by the Implementing Rule (SPI IR).
In parallel, voluntary implementation of Airborne Traffic
Situational Awareness (ATSAW) applications starts in
oceanic areas in the course of 2011.
WAM is already implemented in Armenia, Austria,
Czech Republic, Spain and UK (N. Sea).
In addition, WAM and ADS-B deployment is currently
ongoing in Germany (WAM by 2012 in Frankfurt, expected
to be followed by Munich and Berlin, which could be then
complemented by ADS-B from2015), Portugal (Azores by
2011, WAM/ADS-B), Latvia (WAM by 2011), the
Netherlands (N. Sea by 2011, WAM/ADS-B), Romania
(WAM by 2011) and possibly Sweden (Kiruna by 2011,
ADS-B only).
Other ANSPs have implementation plans with target
dates of deployment from 2012-13 onwards: Bulgaria
(WAM/ADS-B) Cyprus (ADS-B), France (overseas territory,
ADS-B), Iceland (ADS-B), Italy (ADS-B), Greece
(WAM/ADS-B), Norway (N. Sea, ADS-B), Portugal
(WAM/ADS-B), Sweden (WAM/ADS-B) and UK
(Scotland, WAM). In addition, UK NATS has included
ADS-B with WAM in their Strategy (target date for ADS-B
implementation is from2018).
Airlines have started their certification and operational
approval process for ADS-B. Several hundreds of aircraft are
already certified for ADS-B operations in Non-Radar
Airspace. More than 500 aircraft of themhave received their
EASA airworthiness certification, in the context of the
CASCADE ADS-B Pioneer airline project.
Regarding the second step, the implementation based on
the SPI Implementing Rule (mandate) covers SSR, Mode S
and ADS-B Extended Squitter [3]. This will make airborne
installations future proof, i.e. supporting all surveillance
techniques currently used or planned to be used. The
rulemaking will require full compliance with all ADS-B
out requirements in support of Ground and Airborne
Surveillance applications.
In terms of the future ADS-B avionics requirements, the
SPI IR will necessitate a transponder upgrade to
ED102A/DO260B and a direct GNSS receiver-transponder
wiring.
The first aircraft with certified avionics, compliant with
the European Commission Implementing Rule, will be
available already fromlate 2011 onwards. The number of
aircraft which will be compliant with the Rule will be
increased in the next years driven by the mandate dates.
In parallel, ADS-B in will be introduced operationally
by the pioneer airlines supported by ISAVIA and UK NATS
from 2011 onwards on a voluntary basis, driven by the
benefits to be acquired. The first applications are the
ATSAW during Flight Operations (ATSAW AIRB) and the
ATSAW In Trail Procedure (ITP) over N. Atlantic
(Shanwick FIR and Reykjavik FIR).
The issue of establishment and use of a list of aircraft that
are approved to receive an operational ADS-B service within
Europe will be investigated. The work will actively explore
synergies with similar activities worldwide and any
needs/opportunities for wider co-ordination.
VIII. CONCLUDINGREMARKS
The implementation of WAM and initial ADS-B
applications (ADS-B out and ATSAW) is ongoing in
Europe and worldwide. More ANSPs opt for a combined
deployment of WAM/ADS-B, demonstrating the synergies
of these two Surveillance techniques for specific operational
environments.
In general, the optimal mix of the various Surveillance
techniques (SSR Mode S, ADS-B, WAM) depends on the
local environment, operational needs and business case from
an overall ATM Network viewpoint. This will allow a
smooth transition path from short term (radar like)
Suveillance system in a mixed equipage environment to the
future high performance, rationalised and interoperable
Surveillance system.
The significant progress achieved will enable benefits for
the ATM Network and establish the Surveillance foundation
for the SESAR Programme work including the deployment
of the future more demanding applications.
REFERENCES
[1] Status of WAM and ADS-B implementation in Europe, C. Rekkas,
EUROCONTROL, ESAVS Conference, Berlin, 2010
[2] Strategic Guidance in Support for the Execution of the European
ATM Master Plan, EUROCONTROL, May 2009
[3] Draft Implementing Rule on Surveillance Performance and
Interoperability Requirements (SPI-IR), v3.0, 2010
[4] Safety Performance and Interoperability Requirements for ADS-B in
Non Radar Airspace (ADS-B NRA), EUROCAE ED-126 / RTCA
DO-303, 2006
[5] Safety Performance and Interoperability Requirements for ADS-B in
Radar Airspace (ADS-B RAD), EUROCAE ED-161 / RTCA DO-318,
2009
[6] Safety Performance and Interoperability Requirements for ADS-B for
Airport Surface Surveillance (ADS-B APT), EUROCAE ED-163 /
DO-321, 2010
[7] Safety Performance and Interoperability Requirements for ATSAW
In-Trail procedure in oceanic airspace (ATSAW ITP), EUROCAE
ED-159 / RTCA DO-312, 2008
Visual Separation in Approach (ATSAW VSA), EUROCAE ED-160 /
RTCA DO-314, 2008
during flight operations (ATSAW AIRB), EUROCAE ED-164 / DO-
319, 2010
[10] Safety Performance and Interoperability Requirements for ATSAW on
the Airport Surface (ATSAW SURF), EUROCAE ED-165 / RTCA
DO-322, 2010
[11] Safety Performance and Interoperability Requirements for Flight
Deck Interval Management (ASPA-FIM), EUROCAE ED-195, 2011
[12] Acceptable Means of Compliance for ADS-B NRA (AMC 20-24),
EASA, 2008
[13] Technical Specification for the ADS-B Ground Station, ED-129,
EUROCAE, 2010
[14] Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz ADS-B
and TIS-B, EUROCAE ED-102A / RTCA DO260B, 2009
[15] Technical Specification for WAM system, , EUROCAE ED-142,
October 2009
[16] Preliminary Safety Case for ADS-B NRA, EUROCONTROL, 2008
[17] Preliminary Safety Case for ADS-B RAD, EUROCONTROL, 2011
U.S. Activities in ADS-B Systems Implementation
P. Douglas Arbuckle
SBS Program / Joint Planning & Development Office
US Federal Aviation Administration
doug.arbuckle@faa.gov
AbstractThis paper summarizes current U.S. activities and
future plans in ADS-B System Implementation. The services
provided by FAA and delivery approach are described, followed
by the FAA development strategy and status. The paper
describes actions being taken by FAA to encourage ADS-B
equipage. The paper concludes with discussion of preparations
for future FAA ADS-B activities.
Keywords-ADS-B, US FAA, implementation, avionics, ATC
I. PROVIDED SERVICES &SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
delivering Surveillance and Broadcast Services (SBS) as
described in this section. SBS services are provided via a set of
FAA-specified service volumes in en route airspace, terminal
area airspace, and on airport surfaces.
A. ADS-B
Fig. 1
1
shows the ADS-B service architecture. Aircraft with
Version 2 avionics certified per FAA Advisory Circular (AC)
20-165 [1] (or an equivalent approved by FAA Aircraft
Certification) will receive ATC separation service in the U.S.
2
The U.S. is supporting two ADS-B links:
the 978 MHz Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) link
per FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C154c [2];
the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (1090ES) link per
TSO-C166b [3].
The U.S. ADS-B Final Rule will require aircraft that
operate above FL180 to broadcast on the 1090ES link [4]. The
FAA is not prescribing the choice of link for aircraft flying
below FL180; both links are supported and operators are free to
choose whichever link meets their needs. Aircraft broadcasts
go to other aircraft and to ground radio stations, where the
information is processed and displayed to controllers. Where
available, information from FAA radars is combined with
ADS-B data to support ATC separation services.
Aircraft with ADS-B-In capability directly receive aircraft
broadcasts on the same link around them, limited in range only
by line-of-sight or received signal strength. Aircraft on the
same link or aircraft capable of receiving on both links have no

1
Fig. 1 through Fig. 4 are copyright 2007, ITT Corp., and used by permission.
2
Specifically-approved aircraft equipped with Version 1 avionics are currently
receiving ADS-B-only ATC separation services in Alaska and the Gulf of
Mexico.
need to receive traffic information from the FAA-provided
service described in section I.B. Aircraft broadcasting on one
link (example: UAT) are not received by aircraft using only the
other link (example: 1090ES) and vice/versa, which justifies
the service described in I.B.
On 28 May 2010, the U.S. ADS-B Final Rule was
published, requiring ADS-B Out equipage in U.S. airspace
where a transponder is currently required, with compliance
required by 1 Jan 2020. The U.S. ADS-B Final Rule also
specifies requirements for broadcast information, including
minimum thresholds for position/velocity accuracy and
integrity [4].
Figure 1. ADS-B Service Architecture
B. ADS-Rebroadcast
Fig. 2 shows the ADS-Rebroadcast (ADS-R) service
architecture. ADS-R is a pilot advisory service that receives
data from aircraft on one link and immediately rebroadcasts it
on the other link. To conserve spectrum, the service identifies
aircraft broadcasting that they are ADS-B-In equipped as
"client" aircraft. The traffic broadcasting on the other link
within a specified radius and altitude band around each client
aircraft are then rebroadcast on the clients link via ADS-R.
Note that ADS-R services are only available when both aircraft
are within range of any ground radio station. Since ADS-B
ground stations are sited to cover current radar airspace, this
means that there will be regions of airspace (typically at lower
altitudes) without ADS-R coverage. Various avionics
manufacturers are considering the market opportunities for
ADS-B avionics with dual-link receive capability.
Figure 2. ADS-R Service Architecture
C. Traffic Information Service - Broadcast
Fig. 3 shows the Traffic Information Service - Broadcast
(TIS-B) service architecture. TIS-B is a pilot advisory service
for situation awareness, gathering data from U.S. ATC radars,
Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) systems such as those used
in Alaska/Colorado, and surface multilateration systems like
ASDE-X. This non-ADS-B surveillance information is
broadcast as a TIS-B service through ground radio stations to
participating aircraft on both links. Like ADS-R, appropriately
equipped aircraft are identified as client aircraft and non-ADS-
B traffic within a specified radius and altitude band around the
client aircraft are selected for TIS-B. Unlike ADS-R, TIS-B
messages are structured so that information about multiple
aircraft can be packaged into a single TIS-B broadcast.
Figure 3. TIS-B Service Architecture
D. Flight Information Service - Broadcast
Fig. 4 shows the Flight Information Service - Broadcast
(FIS-B) service architecture. FIS-B is a pilot advisory service
supported by the FAA that is only broadcast on the UAT link.
The FIS-B message set contains Airman's Meteorological
Information, Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) and
Unscheduled Specials, Next Generation Radar (NEXRAD)
precipitation reflectivity, Pilot Reports (urgent and routine),
Significant Meteorological Information, Terminal Area
Forecast and unscheduled Amendments, Winds and
Temperatures Aloft, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) important
to flight safety, and Status of Special Use Airspace.
The FAA is considering additional products for the FIS-B
service in the future. Products under consideration include
Echo tops, Lightning strikes, Severe Weather Forecast Alerts
and Severe Weather Watch Bulletin, Ceilings, Digital
Automated Terminal Information Service, Icing
(Current/Forecast Potential), Terminal Weather Information for
Pilots, and Turbulence.
Figure 4. FIS-B Service Architecture
E. Service Delivery Approach and Implementation Status
ITT is the prime contractor selected by the FAA under a
service contract to provide surveillance and broadcast services.
The ITT ground radio infrastructure receives/transmits
messages from either Version 1 or 2 avionics. The ITT
infrastructure also receives messages from Version 0 avionics,
but does not transmit TIS-B/ADS-R uplink messages in
Version 0 format. At a point prior to 2020, ground station
transmission of TIS-B/ADS-R/FIS-B messages in the Version
1 format will be discontinued.
As of 1 Jun 2011, 349 radio sites of over 700 planned sites
were constructed and 280 radio sites had been declared
operational by the FAA. See Fig. 5
3
for a map of the
operational radios as of 1 Jun 2011; the latest map can be found
on the FAA website [5].
Figure 5. U.S. ADS-B Implementation Status as of 1 Jun 2011

3
Fig. 5 through Fig. 7 are in the public domain. No rights reserved or
conveyed.
F. SBS Monitor
The SBS Monitor provides an FAA-developed independent
monitor of the status of the ITT ground infrastructure and
provides an assessment of ITTs performance in delivering
services to the FAA. The SBS Monitor performs or will
perform the following functions:
1) Contract Technical Performance Monitoring
Provide an independent assessment of the Technical
Performance Measures (TPMs) for the ADS-B services
delivered to FAA. These metrics nominally include the latency,
availability, and update rate of the SBS services provided by
ITT. The Contracting Officer uses the TPMs to evaluate the
quality of the SBS services provided by ITT.
2) Avionics Compliance Monitoring
Monitor aircraft ADS-B reports to measure equipage levels,
characterize duplicate/invalid International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) address issues, and evaluate compliance
with avionics performance requirements defined in Title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulation (14 CFR) 91.227.
3) Service Status Monitoring
Inform FAA Operations Control Centers, who then notify
users via NOTAMs, about of the current status of SBS services
throughout the U.S.
II. FAADEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Fig. 6 shows the overall FAA ADS-B development strategy
for 2011-2015. ATC Separation Services will be rolled out on a
facility-by-facility basis by declaring Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) at each site. Major facilities will achieve IOC
by the end of 2013, but rollout will continue at some smaller
terminal facilities until 2015, due to the need for automation
system modernization at those facilities.
ATC Surface Advisory Services refer to ADS-B services
provided by FAA at those locations where surface surveillance
systems exist, which include both the Airport Surface
Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) and the new Airport
Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) [6] that is currently
under development.
Figure 6. FAA ADS-B Development Strategy
A. ATC Separation Services
Since late 2009, the FAA has been delivering ATC
separation services to aircraft equipped with ADS-B Version 1
avionics (TSO-C154b/TSO-C166a). Between 2009 and 2010,
the following key-sites achieved IOC:
Louisville Terminal Radar Approach Control
(TRACON);
Houston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZHU) Gulf
of Mexico airspace;
Philadelphia TRACON;
airspace in the vicinity of Juneau, Alaska.
For both TRACONs, ATC separation services have been
provided using fused radar and ADS-B.
Based on this operational experience, FAA made an In-
Service Decision (ISD) for Surveillance and Broadcast
Services on 22 Sep 2010, indicating that the use of ADS-B and
Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) are operationally suitable
as surveillance sources for ATC Separation Services in the
United States. As with any complex system, there were a set of
issues raised during the testing and evaluation phase that are
being addressed going forward. These issues, documented in
ISD Action Plans, are being resolved as needed to enable
activation of ADS-B for ATC Separation Services in the initial
production sites.
The initial terminal production sites are Houston TRACON
for the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
(STARS) and New York TRACON for the Common
Automated Radar Terminal System (CARTS). The activities
that are being completed for CARTS and STARS include
updating the software baselines to support ATC terminal
separation for ADS-B-only targets (for aircraft equipped with
Version 2 avionics). End-to-end system testing is being
conducted to validate the separation standards analyses for
ADS-B-to-ADS-B and ADS-B-to-radar separation services.
The initial En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)
production site is ZHU. ZHU will implement ADS-B data
integration with ERAM in phases. The first phase will provide
ADS-B data to ERAM via a "virtual radar" interface now being
used by the ZHU En Route Host system to provide separation
services in the Gulf of Mexico airspace. In the second phase,
ERAM will be provided with ADS-B data to enable ATC
separation services using a fused ADS-B and radar picture that
will be used for additional Centers after ZHU.
By September 2012, FAA plans to integrate ADS-B
surveillance data in the Advanced Technologies and Oceanic
Procedures (ATOP) automation platform to support ATC
separation services in oceanic airspace for which the U.S. is
responsible.
B. Pilot Advisory Services
The continued deployment of Pilot Advisory Services
(broadcast of TIS-B/ADS-R and FIS-B) continues. As of
1 Jun 2011, Pilot Advisory Services were operational in the
following Service Volumes: Boston Center, New York Center,
Cleveland Center, Chicago Center, Washington Center, Atlanta
Center, Jacksonville Center, Miami Center
4
, Seattle Center,
Oakland Center, Los Angeles Center, Albuquerque Center,
Minneapolis Center, the Gulf of Mexico, Louisville surface &
terminal, Newburgh/LaGuardia/Newark/JFK/Islip terminal,
Bradley-Windsor Locks terminal, Philadelphia surface &
terminal, Pittsburgh terminal, Miami terminal, Ft Lauderdale
terminal, Gainesville terminal, Jacksonville terminal, Savannah
terminal, the Anchorage-Fairbanks en route corridor, Juneau
and the surrounding area in Southeast Alaska. The latest
updated information on FAA surveillance and broadcast
service deployment can be found on the FAA website [5].
C. Pilot Applications
The FAA is developing a number of pilot applications that
are expected to provide benefits to operators who choose to
equip their aircraft with appropriate ADS-B-In avionics which
provide the capability to receive, process, and display ADS-B
and TIS-B data from surrounding aircraft. In addition to
providing benefits directly to customers who equip, these
applications will help accelerate the understanding and
acceptance of ADS-B and provide a path to future applications.
The FAA is currently investing in development and flight
testing/trials for three applications: Flight-deck-based Interval
Management - Spacing (FIM-S), Oceanic In-Trail Procedures
(ITP), and Traffic Situation Awareness with Alerts (TSAA).
Fig. 7 shows the plans for these applications as part of the FAA
ADS-B Strategy (Fig. 6).
Figure 7. Pilot Application Development Strategy
1) In-Trail Procedures (ITP)
The objective of ITP is to increase the efficiency of long-
haul flights in non-surveillance airspace while maintaining or
enhancing the current level of safety. The concept takes
advantage of ADS-B In to display traffic on a cockpit display
of traffic information. In addition to increasing flight crew
awareness of surrounding traffic, the ITP capability will enable
climbs or descents to more optimal operational altitudes
currently blocked by traffic due to procedural separation
standards. There is an expectation that once flight crews gain
experience with the onboard ITP system and procedures, they

4
TIS-B and FIS-B only as of 1 Jun 2011; ADS-R will be activated by 2012
will reduce their discretionary fuel reserves, further reducing
fuel burn (and carbon emissions) and potentially allowing more
payload for cargo.
The FAA and United Airlines plan to conduct operational
evaluations of ADS-B ITP on 12 United B747-400 aircraft on
routes between the U.S. west coast and Australia beginning by
August 2011, and subsequently in other suitable oceanic
airspace managed by Oakland Center. The FAA has developed
ITP Interim Policy [7] to support certification of the ITP
functionality in various aircraft until TSO-C195a is published
and appropriate ACs are modified.
2) Flight-deck-based Interval Management
Interval Management (IM) introduces a new method for
flight crews and air traffic control to achieve a desired spacing
between aircraft in all phases of flight. The initial applications
of these operations will take place for arriving aircraft in en
route airspace to a terminal area metering fix consistent with
today's IFR procedures and criteria. Later implementations of
these operations include the possibility of having the flight
deck execute an interval management delegated separation
clearance issued by ATC.
IM operations consist of a ground capability called Ground
Interval Management - Spacing (GIM-S) to schedule/manage
the arrival traffic flow, and a flight deck capability (FIM-S) to
allow the aircraft to efficiently manage the interval assigned by
air traffic control. The FAA is implementing the requirements
for the capabilities in GIM-S via two FAA automation
programs: Time-Based Flow Management (TBFM) and
ERAM.
The FAA has several airline partners prepared to support
operational data collection and benefits measurement as the
initial FIM-S capabilities are established. The FAA supported
the efforts of a joint RTCA/EUROCAE working group to
develop the Safety, Performance and interoperability
Requirements (SPR) document for FIM-S (also known as
ASPA-IM). This effort will conclude with RTCA and
EUROCAE approval of the FIM-S SPR in the summer of
2011.
3) Traffic Situation Awareness with Alerts
Traffic Situation Awareness with Alerts (TSAA) is aimed
at improving a pilots identification of conflicting traffic by
providing onboard alerts for aircraft without Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) equipment. Such traffic
may or may not have been pointed out by air traffic control.
This alert identifies conflicting traffic, but does not provide any
resolution maneuver advice. TSAA will be tailored to operate
without excessive nuisance alerts when operated in the VFR
traffic pattern at small general aviation airports, where most
collision accidents occur. In the airport environment, the
ownship can receive an alert while still on the ground for a
projected conflict at a future point where both aircraft will be
airborne.
The FAA has recently initiated work with the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (and Avidyne as
MIT's subcontractor) to develop this application. The FAA has
engaged the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, the
General Aviation Manufacturers Association, and Helicopter
Association International stakeholders to participate with the
FAA in periodic reviews of the MIT/Avidyne work. A
proposed concept of operations was provided to a joint
RTCA/EUROCAE working group in May 2011. The goal of
this activity is to work through RTCA/EUROCAE to produce
Minimum Operational Performance Standards material for this
application by mid-2013.
4) Current ADS-B-In Standards
With the publication of TSO-C195 [8] and AC 20-172 [9],
the FAA has essentially completed avionics certification
guidance for Traffic Situation Awareness - Basic, Traffic
Situation Awareness for Visual Approach, and Airport Traffic
Situation Awareness. RTCA and EUROCAE are working to
harmonize avionics standards for these applications, plus the
ITP application, with a plan to complete this work by
December 2011. The resulting RTCA/EUROCAE harmonized
standards will serve as the basis for TSO-C195a.
III. ENCOURAGING ADS-B EQUIPAGE
A. Using ADS-B to Enhance ATC Separation Services
As a means of encouraging early ADS-B Out equipage, the
FAA is exploring opportunities to use ADS-B surveillance
coverage to improve airspace access, enable more direct
routings and more fuel-efficient altitudes, and circumvent
constrained airspace. Currently the focus is on offshore/oceanic
airspace near the coasts of the U.S. mainland and Alaska.
However, other opportunities exist in the Caribbean as well as
at low altitudes in Alaska and the mountainous regions of the
western U.S. What all of these regions have in common is
either a lack of radar coverage or relatively unreliable radar
coverage.
The FAA recently signed an agreement with JetBlue to
explore the benefits of ADS-B surveillance in offshore airspace
along the U.S. east coast. The FAA is discussing opportunities
to explore benefits in similar-type airspace with other
airlines/operators.
B. Vehicle ADS-B
The FAA is promoting ADS-B for use with vehicles on
airport surfaces to improve runway safety. Any vehicle (e.g., a
tug, fuel truck, snowplow, or rescue-and-firefighting vehicle)
can be equipped to transmit location information to controllers,
pilots, vehicle drivers, or airport operators. In the U.S., ADS-B
transmissions will only be permitted from ground vehicles that
are in the airport movement area (and subject to air traffic
control).
While not mandating vehicle ADS-B, the FAA is
encouraging airport operators to equip appropriate vehicles. In
addition to significant improvements in runway safety, airport
managers could use ADS-B information to track assets more
efficiently. This would be especially useful with rescue
vehicles in case of an accident.
The FAA has issued a draft AC for Vehicle ADS-B
Equipment [10]. The final AC, when issued, will help airport
managers understand how to determine which vehicle
transponders meet FAA performance requirements, inform the
FAA of the airport's intent to proceed with vehicle ADS-B,
request unique ICAO identifying numbers for vehicles to be
equipped, and request a transmit license.
C. 3 Nautical Mile Separation in En Route Airspace
The FAA has begun work to analyze the target level of
safety for an ADS-B application that would enable 3-nautical
mile (NM) ATC separation in domestic en route airspace
where it is currently not permitted (in the U.S., 3-NM
separation can only be applied below certain altitudes and
under certain conditions). The FAA plans to complete the
initial performance and safety assessments for this application
by September 2011.
D. Avionics Upgrades to Version 2 Avionics
The FAA is working with partners who were early adopters
of ADS-B to upgrade those avionics (Version 1) to the avionics
standards (Version 2) [2, 3] required by the U.S. ADS-B Final
Rule [4]. Specifically, these partners are UPS, US Airways,
operators in Alaska equipped with avionics under the FAA
Capstone Program, and several helicopter operators in the Gulf
of Mexico. Currently, the FAA is funding the upgrade from
Version 1 to Version 2 transponders for the UPS fleet and the
US Airways A330 fleet. As part of this effort, ACSS is one of
the first applicants to exercise the provisions of AC 20-165 [1].
In the next 2-3 years, FAA plans to engage with Alaska
operators with Capstone equipment and the Gulf of Mexico
helicopter operators to assist them in upgrading their Version 1
avionics to Version 2, so that they can comply with AC 20-165
and the U.S. ADS-B Final Rule.
IV. PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE
A. ADS-B Service Availability Prediction Tool
The ADS-B Service Availability Prediction Tool (SAPT) is
being developed pursuant to an ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) Recommendation [11]. The ARCs concern
centered on the difficulty a user would have in predicting the
expected availability of a given Global Positioning System
(GPS) accuracy/integrity performance level over a planned
route of flight.
The SAPT assumes the minimum performance
requirements for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
sensors, as required in the appropriate TSOs. The SAPT
prediction is based upon; (1) the time, route and airspace of the
planned flight; (2) ADS-B-related avionics on the subject
aircraft; and (3) the announced status of the GPS satellite
constellation.
The SAPT will be one method for an operator to assess the
availability of required ADS-B performance for a flight.
Operators also may choose to use an alternative FAA-approved
prediction tool.
B. Wide-Area Multilateration
The FAA has deployed Wide-Area Multilateration (WAM)
in Juneau, Alaska, and several airports in Colorado. The terrain
in these regions makes it impossible for air traffic controllers to
maintain radar surveillance over aircraft at lower altitudes.
Limitations to aircraft operations are compounded by bad
weather that results in flight delays and cancellations. WAM
reached IOC at Denver Center in September 2009. The WAM
system at Anchorage Center, which services Juneau, reached
IOC in January 2010.
The FAA is working with the State of Colorado to deploy a
new, integrated WAM/ADS-B system that will fall under the
FAA service contract with ITT. Currently, IOC of this system
in western Colorado is targeted for 2013. This integrated
WAM/ADS-B system will become the new standard
configuration for the future deployment of other such systems
in the U.S.
C. Surface Multipath Issue
The FAA funded multiple activities to support the
development of an SPR for the surface situation awareness
with indications and alerts (SURF-IA) application [12]. As part
of this, Honeywell and ACSS conducted demonstrations of
SURF-IA application prototypes in the Seattle area and the
Philadelphia area. These demonstrations identified
performance issues with ADS-B-In equipment being able to
consistently detect other ADS-B aircraft that were operating on
the surface movement area and within line-of-sight.
The FAA subsequently collected surface ADS-B data at
Philadelphia International Airport (PHL) from a dedicated test
event in October 2010 and determined that multipath was
interfering with the incident ADS-B signals at multiple
locations on the airport surface. As observed in the test results,
the multipath signaling phenomenon effectively creates "blind
spots" at which ADS-B aircraft could not be seen with
ADS-B-In systems.
The FAA is currently working to characterize these
multipath effects at other airports to help determine the full
extent of this problem, as well as conduct bench tests of
ADS-B-In receivers from multiple manufacturers to assess the
impact of multipath on these systems. Once the FAA has a
better understanding of this phenomenon, then FAA can
develop potential mitigations and evaluate alternatives in
consultation with the industry and other nations.
D. ADS-B-In Aviation Rulemaking Committee
The ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
recommended that the FAA, in partnership with industry,
should define a strategy for ADS-B In by 2012, ensuring the
strategy is compatible with ADS-B Out avionics [11]. The
committee further recommended that the FAA define how to
proceed with ADS-B In beyond the voluntary equipage concept
in the U.S. ADS-B Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. In
response to this recommendation, the FAA chartered an ADS-
B-In ARC on 30 June 2010, with the following requested
deliverables.
Deliverable Due Date
Task 1: ARC endorsement (or not) of continuing near-term
application development
Oct 2010
Task 2: Final ARC ADS-B-In strategy recommendations 30 Sep 2011
Task 3: Delivery of products from any activities that follow
up ADS-B-In strategy recommendations
1 Jun 2012
On 1 November 2010, the ADS-B-In ARC sent its Task 1
recommendations to the FAA. The ADS-B-In ARC
recommended a strategy where avionics standards are
developed for Flight-deck-based Interval Management
Delegated Separation (FIM-DS), but are initially used to
perform FIM-S operations until enough confidence is gained to
enable FIM-DS operations to begin. The ADS-B-In ARC is
engaged in activities to develop its Task 2 report outlining
recommendations to the FAA on an ADS-B-In development
strategy.
E. SBS Program Next Phase
In early 2012, the FAA will conduct an internal review of
the next phase of the Surveillance and Broadcast Services
program (Fiscal Years 2014-2020). Inputs to this review will
come from the ADS-B-In ARC report, results of the above
studies, prior commitments of the FAA, and the overall FAA
budget environment. During this review, senior FAA
leadership will determine what ADS-B-related work beyond
the currently planned scope will be pursued by FAA in the
2014-2020 timeframe.
REFERENCES
[1] FAA AC 20-165 (ADS-B Out Installation Guidance),
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%20
20-165.pdf
[2] FAA TSO-C154c (UAT Link),
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/0/e5a37
977fbdb786b8625768200579728/$FILE/TSO-154c.pdf
[3] FAA TSO-C166b (1090ES Link),
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/0/e7054
4d62a001f87862576820057970f/$FILE/TSO-166b.pdf
[4] U.S. ADS-B Final Rule,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2007-29305-
0289
[5] NextGen Technologies Interactive Map,
http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/flashmap
[6] Airport Surface Surveillance Capability Market Survey,
faaco.faa.gov/attachments/Airport_Surface_Surveillance_System_Mark
et_Survey_020110.doc
[7] FAA ITP Interim Policy (Certification and Flight Standards),
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/405
2aba0492da8ca86257726005dba3e/$FILE/ITP%20Interim%20Policy.pd
f
[8] FAA TSO-C195 (Aircraft Surveillance Applications),
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/0/17a0f
0ab5a874c55862577ad0052a38e/$FILE/TSO-C195.pdf
[9] FAA AC 20-172 (ADS-B In Installation Guidance),
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%20
20-172.pdf
[10] FAA DRAFT Advisory Circular for Vehicle ADS-B,
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/draft_15
0_5220_xx_ads_b.pdf
[11] Report from the ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee to the FAA,
26-Sep-2008,
http://www.airlines.org/SafetyOps/FlightOperations/Documents/ARCRe
commendationstotheADSBNPRM.pdf
[12] DO-323, Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements
Document for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport
Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF IA), available from RTCA.
Detect and avoid for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in
the total system approach
Filippo Tomasello & David Haddon
Rulemaking Directorate
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
Cologne (Germany)
filippo.tomasello@easa.europa.eu & david.haddon@easa.europa.eu
Abstract ICAO requires aircraft not to be in hazardous
proximity. Pilots shall avert collisions. In controlled airspace
separations are established by Air Traffic Control (ATC), but
pilot responsibilities remain. Present ICAO wording may not
be sufficient for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), since the
Detect and Avoid (D&A) needs quantitatively defined
parameters.
Keywords (ICAO, UAS, Detect and Avoid, Total system
approach)
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO),
aware of the progressive emergence of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) for civil use, has already set up in 2007 a
specific Study Group (UAS SG), to develop international
provisions in this field. The Study Group has already
supported the ICAO Secretariat in developing an ICAO
Circular [1] on the matter.
Therein it is clearly stated that UAS are indeed aircraft
and, as such, when involved in international civil aviation,
they are in principle subject to all the applicable standards, as
published in the Annexes to the Chicago Convention.
However, neither the Circular is a binding document, nor
the present text of the Annexes to the Chicago Convention
had been written considering both manned and unmanned
aviation. More work therefore needs to be done.
The 37th General Assembly of ICAO, in October 2010,
therefore endorsed [2] the development of a comprehensive
international regulatory framework for civil UAS. This will
culminate, possibly between 2015 and 2020, with adoption
of newly developed or amended ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs), in order to support the
safe integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace.
The work is already underway and in fact ICAO has
already amended Annex 13, in 2010, to clarify that also UAS
accidents have to be investigated. The amendment of Annex
2, which is underway, is described below, while the UAS SG
envisages proposing an ICAO UAS Manual (or a series of
Manuals), in 2013-14, to pave the way for the future
standards.
II. RULES OF THE AIR
The first SARPs to be considered are the Rules of the
Air, contained in Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention. These
were first published in September 1948 when, at least for
civil aviation, the idea of unmanned aircraft was not yet
considered relevant (although UAS ante litteram had already
been built before the First World War). Nevertheless the
Annex today applies to all aircraft (with or without a pilot on
board; i.e. manned or unmanned).
Therein ICAO requires [3] in particular that all aircraft
are not operated in such proximity to other aircraft as to
create a collision hazard.
Paragraph 3.2 in the same ICAO Annex 2 requires the
Pilot-in-Command (PiC), whether on board or remote from
the aircraft, to take action in order to best avert collisions. In
other paragraphs of same Annex the pilot (when crossing,
overtaking or similar) is required to stay well clear of other
traffic.
Furthermore Annex 2 already contains a specific
Appendix to facilitate the special authorization (ref. article
8 of the Chicago Convention) required to fly unmanned free
balloons.
In May 2011, the ICAO Secretariat, supported by the
mentioned UAS SG, has presented to the Air Navigation
Commission (ANC) a proposal for amendment of Annex 2,
essentially centred on a new Appendix, aiming at facilitating
the special authorization not only for balloons, but also for
more complex types of UAS, like aeroplanes or rotorcraft.
Such a proposal is accompanied by amendments to Annex 7
to specify that all aircraft types known today can indeed be
manned or unmanned.
In these proposals UAS are considered to be possibly
automated (i.e. no human intervention possible) or
Remotely Piloted. Only Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)
are considered eligible to cross national borders.
In general terms the proposals clarify that RPA shall be
operated (par. 3.1.9) in such a manner as to minimise hazards
to persons, property or other aircraft. This statement of
principle is important, because it shifts the emphasis from
protection of passengers on board, which is appropriate for
traditional manned aviation, to protection of third parties on
the ground or in the air, since there are no humans on board
of RPA. But of course the absence of humans on board does
not mean that there are no risks for third parties.
Airworthiness provisions, out of scope of this paper,
focus on protection of third parties on the ground. Herein the
attention is instead called on protection of third parties in the
air: i.e. other airspace users.
Minimising risks for other (manned) aircraft means to
have appropriate tools to remain well clear of other traffic
and, as last resort, to avoid collisions.
Two operational scenarios are envisaged. In Visual Line
of Sight (VLOS) the RPA, and the airspace surrounding it, is
visible from the position of the ground crew. The latter is
therefore responsible for see and avoid similarly to
manned aircraft. Neither automation is necessary on board,
nor is a quantitative definition of well clear required.
These operations, typically with RPA well below 150 Kg,
are already creeping today. Of course VLOS operations are
not only limited by visibility, but also by range (typically
400 ft of maximum height and 500 m of maximum distance
from crew) in order to take into account the perception
capabilities of the human eyes.
To go Beyond VLOS (i.e. BVLOS) it is necessary to rely
on on-board sensors and systems for detect and avoid
(D&A) as well as the capability to establish communications
with ATC, including any alternate means of communications
(in fact being the Remote Pilot Station on the ground, several
communication architectures are possible).
The majority of experts concur today that BVLOS
operations may be easier under Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) than under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). On the other
side, RPA need modern automated navigation systems on
board and so, for them, flying IFR is in principle not a major
problem.
Besides D&A, it is important to note that the proposed
amendments to Annex 2 and 7, building upon the fact that
UAS are considered aircraft, clarify that:
Each RPA needs an individual Certificate of
Airworthiness (CofA) and registration;
Each RPA operator (which is normally an
organisation, not a natural person) needs an
RPA Operator Certificate (ROC), similar to the
Air Operator Certificate (AOC) for operators of
Commercial Air Transport (CAT) using manned
aircraft;
Remote Pilots shall have a specific Licence
(RPL), the standards for which will be included
in ICAO Annex 1.
In other words, the ICAO approach is in harmony with
recital (1) of the EASA Basic Regulation [4], which invites
to consider the total system perspective when regulating
aviation safety: i.e. not only airworthiness of the machine,
but all the related safety provisions, of course starting from
licensed pilots and certified air operators.
In the aviation tradition, ICAO Annex 2 only establishes
high level principles, which then need to be more detailed at
ICAO (e.g. in other Annexes), regional (e.g. EASA rules) or
national level. It is however extremely important that Annex
2 will be amended, because this will legitimate civilian RPA
as user of the non-segregated airspace under General Air
Traffic (GAT) rules.
Should the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) of ICAO
in principle accept the proposals from the Secretariat, ICAO
Contracting States and international organisations could be
consulted in 2011. In case of favourable consultation results,
the amended SARPs could become applicable at end of
2012.
Consequently, since Annex 2 will only establish the
principle that D&A is necessary to fly BVOLS, much more
details are necessary to define a safe and feasible D&A
system.
III. THE NEED FOR QUANTIFICATION
The existing ICAO standards in Annex 2, in relation to
prevention of collisions, are often referred to as see and
avoid, although this expression is not explicitly used in said
ICAO Annex. See and avoid of course implies the
perception by a human on board and his/her judgment, based
on a qualitative assessment, which is in the capabilities of the
humans.
When the Remote Pilot is on the ground, as in the case
of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), a Detect and Avoid
(D&A) function is necessary on board in the case of BVLOS
operations. The functions could include different purposes
(e.g. downlink information for situational awareness,
maintain distance from clouds, see aerodrome visual aids,
etc.), but also downlink alerts when pilots decision would be
required to establish and maintain a safe distance.
Most probably advanced automation would be required
in case of imminent risk of collision: i.e. the RPA will
initiate the averting manoeuvre and inform the remote pilot.
The latter will have override authority. This is the case today
with on board autopilots.
In any case D&A needs quantitative parameters to be
defined. Today the majority of experts tend towards three
thresholds:
A first one, relevant for traffic avoidance,
which will alert the pilot that there is an
imminent risk of coming too close to an
intruder aircraft;
The second for collision avoidance when the
risk of collision is imminent (i.e. all other safety
barriers have failed), typically in a time horizon
of about 30 seconds; and
A collision volume which is never to be
entered, since infringing its boundaries means
that only providence could avoid collision.
The latter threshold is hence only relevant for designing
the D&A while taking into account the RPA performances
(e.g. rate of climb, descent or of turn), but not to be used in
actual operations.
For the other two, quantification is necessary, since for
any algorithm it is difficult to judge whether the RPA stays
well clear or not. The debate has not yet produced firm
numerical figures, but it has pointed out that possibly the
threshold have to be also calculated in time units: e.g.
seconds or minutes before the risk of entering the collision
volume, if no evasive manoeuvre were initiated. This implies
considering the geometry of the encounter as well as the
speed of the RPA and of the intruder.
The calculations shall also provide the range in which the
airborne sensors shall be suitable. Such a range could in
particular change significantly, whether the intruder is at
supersonic speed or not. Excluding the former case will lead
to less demanding requirements for the airborne sensors, but
most probably to operational limitations, in order to remain
segregated (or at least well separated vertically) from
supersonic traffic. Once the required range for the on-board
sensors has been defined, situational awareness (i.e. down
linking to the Remote Pilot information on the position of
traffic nearby) could be provided, even in respect of nearby
traffic which does not constitute a potential hazard of
conflict. This desirable feature could allow the Remote Pilot
to plan the trajectory of its RPA in the optimal way.
IV. THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The operational concept is hence centred on the events
that occur once the RPA trespasses the traffic avoidance or
the collision avoidance thresholds.
When the first threshold is reached, the airborne sensors
and system, via the command and control (C2) data link,
will inform the Remote Pilot. She/he has sufficient time to
plan the evasive manoeuvre. The first option could be to
reduce speed, without changing heading or altitude. In non-
segregated but non-controlled airspace (e.g. ICAO Class G)
the Remote Pilot can adjust the speed of the RPA as she/he
wishes, only constrained by the performances of the aircraft.
In controlled airspace (i.e. ICAO Classes A to E), since
flying under IFR, she/he will have to respect the last received
ATC clearance. Today most of those clearances are 3D (i.e.
towards a way point known in terms of Latitude and
Longitude to be overflow at a certain Flight Level).
Therefore, if the Remote Pilot will adjust the speed by less
than 5%, most probably no contact with ATC will be
necessary. The Pilot may however want to consult ATC,
since the latter may know the intentions of the intruder, or
because the speed adjustment could be more significant.
Only slightly reducing the speed is the best option since
it does not change the planned trajectory. Neither it leads to
greater cost (no more miles and slight reduction of fuel
consumption), not to detrimental environmental effects.
This option, changing the estimated time for over flight
of the next way point, is furthermore compatible with the
NextGen and SESAR concept for 4D trajectory
management. In fact, even if no interaction with ATC could
be necessary before adjusting speed, the on-board Flight
Management System (FMS) could thereafter recalculate the
expect 4D trajectory and down link it, not only to the
Remote Pilot, but also to the responsible ATS Unit.
Should a simple adjustment of the speed not be deemed
appropriate, the Remote Pilot could opt to maintain course
and speed, since its RPA has priority on the intruder. Time
and radio coverage allowing, coordination through ATC or
FIS could be desirable in order to confirm that the pilot of
the intruder is aware that she/he has to manoeuvre to give
priority.
If on the contrary, the RPA has to give priority, before
changing altitude a slight heading adjustment, in order to
pass behind and well clear of the intruder, could be an
option. Again, even in controlled airspace, if the change of
heading will not lead to a significant deviation from the
cleared path (e.g. an airway of defined width) no prior
authorization from ATC is required.
Finally the option of climbing or descending could also
be viable. In this case the risk of wake vortex has to be
considered. Gain if the deviation is of only 2-300 ft, it may
not be necessary to receive prior authorization from ATC.
The last case, in controlled airspace, is when the Remote
Pilot decides that a manoeuvre will infringe the last received
ATC clearance. In this case the Remote Pilot should, time
allowing, contact ATC and obtain a new clearance. Should
the Pilot feel the need to initiate immediately the manoeuvre,
she/he can take this responsibility regardless of the ATC
clearance, but, in controlled airspace, she/he should,
immediately after, inform the ATC Unit.
Once the second threshold (i.e. risk of imminent
collision) is trespassed, the RPA, like in case of ACAS on
board large manned aeroplanes, should react immediately
and initiate the escape manoeuvre regardless of any ATC
clearance. In controlled airspace, like for manned aviation,
ATC has to be informed thereafter as soon as possible.
On current large aeroplanes, when the ACAS issues a
Resolution Advisory (RA), an immediate commend by the
pilot in the cockpit is necessary to comply. However some
recent aircraft types (e.g. A-380) already have the possibility
of coupling the RA with the autopilot: in this case the aircraft
will automatically initiate the escape manoeuvre, while the
pilot retains override authority.
The authors of the present paper believe that this should
be the solution for UAS, also considering that, should a
decision by the Remote Pilot be necessary, this will follow a
transaction through the C2 data link, which means additional
time (latency), especially in case of C2 via SATCOM. But,
perhaps even more important, the continuity of the data link
is influenced by many factors (e.g. RPA attitude,
geographical position, interferences or atmospheric
phenomena) and therefore the risk that the C2 may not be
available at the time required exist.
In summary manned aircraft can fly following Visual
(VFR) or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) in controlled or non-
controlled airspace. In non controlled airspace the PiC
assumes the total responsibility of staying well clear (or
see and avoid) in relation to other traffic. In controlled
airspace, the PiCs responsibility can be partly satisfied by
Air Traffic Control (ATC) who takes the responsibility to
maintain safe separation between aircraft (at least between
those following IFR rules).
The same rules apply to UAS. However, UAS can also
operate in some unique ways for which:
The PiC (possibly supported by observers on the
ground) can see his machine and its position in
relation to other flying and ground based
objects, under Visual Meteorological Conditions
(VMC) - so called operations in Visual Line of
Sight (VLoS); or
The RPA is so distant from the crew on the
ground, that, even in day VMC, it can no longer
be seen - so called Beyond Visual Line of Sight
(BVLoS) operations.
In both cases the RPA can fly under VFR or IFR. It is
however assumed that IFR/VLoS operations have no
practical interest, while VFR/VLoS do not require any D&A
on board, since the crew on the ground can see and avoid,
like it is traditionally required in aviation.
Conversely, VFR/BVLoS operations are considered the
most demanding (e.g. need to detect and discriminate the
clouds against the background, as well as to identify features
on the ground which allow following the desired path), while
all RPA capable of flying BVLoS will be equipped with
sufficient instrument navigation capabilities (e.g. satellite
navigation).
In conclusion, present paper proposes to focus
international attention on D&A as necessary to fly in IFR
and BVLoS.
V. SCOPE OF DETECT AND AVOID
The pilot on board can see visual aids located at the
aerodrome, ground traffic or some meteorological
phenomena.
It is proposed that these additional functionalities do not
need to drive the design of the D&A, since they could be
fulfilled by other means. However, where feasible, the same
sensors required for D&A could be used for other
functionality e.g. detecting the aerodrome environment and
providing synthetic information on the aircraft position in
relation to the aerodrome manoeuvring area to the pilot
working at his/her Remote Pilot Station (RPS), which is de
facto a cockpit on the ground.
VI. THE SAFETY OBJECTIVE
Even a small RPA if colliding with a large aeroplane,
could cause a catastrophe. Most users of controlled airspace
are indeed large aeroplanes, carrying hundreds of passengers
for the purposes of Commercial Air Transport (CAT).
Currently civil aviation, in a number of cases, accepts a
level of probability for an event (or failure condition) leading
to a catastrophe, not higher than the order of 10E-9 per flight
hour [5] [6] [7] [8]. This could perhaps be a reasonable
starting point to define a safety objective in controlled
Airspace Classes A, B, C and D [9]. More substantiation of
any figure is however required.
Furthermore, using the ELoS principle and considering
that Class G non-controlled airspace is mainly populated by
small general aviation aircraft under VRR, one could also
look at the historical safety record of general aviation in
ICAO Airspace Classes F and G, indeed under VFR: i.e. see
and avoid. With the limited data available, one could argue
that therein the historically achieved level of safety, accepted
by the society, also in relation to MAC, is closer to 10E-7
than to 10E-9. Even in this case more consolidated data is
however required to substantiate any safety objective.
IFR flight is in any case not prohibited in Class G and
some States allow CAT by large aeroplanes even in this
airspace Class. IT could be perhaps be assumed that, even in
Class G, the risk of MAC between an RPA and a large
aeroplane, should not be grater than 10E-9, for each failure
condition possibly leading to this.
VII. DETECT AND AVOID IN THE TOTAL SYSTEM
APPROACH
Recital (1) of the already mentioned EASA Basic
Regulation, mentions the total system approach. In this
vision, both ATC and D&A, at least in controlled Airspace
Classes A, B and C, contribute to preventing close proximity
and MAC.
Therein the safety objective could be partially
apportioned to ATC, and not totally to the on board D&A.
Furthermore, large aeroplanes, in any airspace Class are
equipped with ACAS, which also contributes to achieve the
overall safety objective, even in non-controlled airspace.
In order to achieve this, of course the behaviour of the
D&A has to be compatible with ACAS. Since RPA flight
BVOLS will be, at least initially, be under IFR, it is assumed
that the RPA will be equipped with an ATC Transponder.
Therefore the RPA will cooperate with the ACAS on board
large aeroplanes. Although further study in this compatibility
is needed, this issue is expected to be cleared with sufficient
safety and without requiring retrofit of current fleet, which
would be not acceptable.
In the future however, an enhanced compatibility
between ACAS and D&A could perhaps be achieved taking
advantage of ADS-B.
In conclusion, not only the safety objectives (e.g. 10E-9
in relation to large aeroplanes and 10E-7 in relation to other
aircraft types) need to be substantiated and agreed, but also
their apportionment to the various components of the total
aviation system: i.e. ATC, ACAS and D&A.
VIII. WHERE THE RULES ON DETECT AND AVOID?
In the European Union (EU) the rules for ATM
performance and interoperability are developed through the
single European sky; the rules for safety through EASA. It
seems clear that D&A does not increase the capacity of the
EU airspace, while on the contrary it has a very significant
relevance in terms of safety. The future rules for it should
therefore fit into the structure of current EASA rules.
The applicable and already published EASA
airworthiness policy [10] is non exhaustive on D&A, since
the operating criteria necessary for the proper functioning of
D&A need to be defined in the context of ATM. In fact the
purpose of airworthiness is not to prevent mid-air collisions
(MAC), but to eliminate/mitigate intrinsic aircraft failures
that could lead to a crash.
Both ICAO Circular and EASA policy recognise that
D&A is a relevant issue to be solved, before civilian UAS
can be allowed to fly in non-segregated airspace.
Furthermore, EASA policy contains the principle that a civil
UAS must not increase the risk to third parties, compared
with manned aircraft of equivalent category: so called
principle of Equivalent Level of Safety (ELoS), as discussed
above in relation to the identification of possible safety
objectives.
In principle EASA rules should cover:
The obligation to be equipped with a D&A
system when flying BVLOS;
The minimum performance requirements for
the D&A equipment.
Two options could exist for the obligation to carry D&A
equipment on board: (1) amend the so called EASA-OPS
[11], or (2) amend the proposed EASA Part AUR. The
EASA-OPS address only the air operators established in the
EU and therefore potentially do not cover the totality of RPA
which could populate the airspace under the sovereignty of
the EU Member States. For this reason, EASA has proposed
Part AUR [12], which addresses any aircraft entering the
EU airspace. The initial issue of Part AUR is limited to
version 7.1 of ACAS software, but amendment is possible, in
order to mandate equipment of RPA, intended to fly
BVOLS, with D&A.
For the technical features and minimum acceptable
performances of the D&A, traditionally the US Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) publishes Technical
Standard Orders (TSO). EASA is following the same
tradition by publishing European Technical Standard Orders
(ETSO). So publishing an FAA TSO, paralleled by an EASA
ETSO for D&A could be a possibility. In any case, while the
legal tools to impose carriage could be different, since driven
by respective legal orders, the technical rules should be
harmonised as much as possible across the two side of the
Atlantic. This will undoubtedly facilitate the life of industry
and contribute not only to aviation safety, but also to free
trade in the world.
Finally, the present legal competence of EASA is limited to
civilian UAS with a mass of no less than 150 Kg. It seems
however clear that any rules for D&A will be driven by the
operational scenario (i.e. IFR/BVLOS) and not by the mass
of the RPA.
Therefore, both EASA and FAA are participating to the
work of the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned
Systems (JARUS), together with other competent aviation
authorities from Europe and beyond.
For the technical work, both FAA and EASA are working in
cooperation with industry, mainly through RTCA Sub-
Committee 204 and Eurocae Working Group 73.
A. Abbreviations and Acronyms
4D Trajectory: definition of the way points to be over
flown in terms of three geometrical coordinates, plus
time
ACAS: Airborne Collision Avoidance System
AMC: Acceptable Means of Compliance
AOC: Air Operator Certificate
ATC: Air Traffic Control
ATM: Air Traffic Management
BVLoS: Beyond Visual Line of Sight
C2: Command and Control data link
CAT: Commercial air Transport
CS: Certification Specification
D&A: Detect and Avoid
EASA: European Aviation Safety Agency
ELoS: Equivalent Level of Safety
ESARR: EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory
Requirement
ETSO: European Technical Standard Order
EU: European Union
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FIS: Flight Information Service
FL: Flight Level
FMS: Flight Management System
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organisation
IFR: Instrument Flight Rules
JARUS: Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned
Systems
MAC: Mid-Air Collision
PiC: Pilot-in-Command
RA: Resolution Advisory
ROC: RPA Operator Certificate
RPA: Remotely Piloted Aircraft
RPS: Remote Pilot Station
TSO: Technical Standard Order
UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System
UASSG: ICAO UAS Study Group
US: United States of America
VFR: Visual Flight Rules
VLoS: Visual Line of Sight
VMC: Visual Meteorological Conditions
REFERENCES
[1] ICAO Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Circular (Cir 328
AN/190), Montreal, March 2011.
[2] Report of the Techincal Commission on Agenda Item 46 (A37-WP
400), 37
th
ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, 05 October 2010.
[3] Paragraph 3.2.1 of Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention Rules of the
Air, 10
th
edition, ICAO Montreal, July 2005.
[4] Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of 20 February 2008 as amended by
Regulation (EC) No 1108/2009 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 October 2009.
[5] AMC to EASA certification specification CS 25.1309.
[6] EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirerment (ESARR) 4 Risk
Assessment and Mitigation in ATM, 1
st
edition, Bruxelles, 05 April
2001.
[7] Paragraph 2.1 in ICAO Manual on implementation of 300 m
(1000feet) Vertical Separation Minimum between Flight Level 290
and 410 inclusive (Doc 9574 AN/934), second edition, Montreal,
2002.
[8] Paragraph 6.17 in ICAO Manual on airspace planning methodolgy for
the determination of separation minima (Doc 9689 AN/953), first
edition, Montreal, 1998.
[9] Appendix 4 in Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention Air Traffic
Services, 13
th
edition, ICAO Montreal, July 2001.
[10] EASA policy statement on airworthiness certification of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) (E.Y013-01), Cologne, 25 August 2009.
[11] Opinion No 04/2011 of the European Aviation Safety Agency of 1
June 2011 for a Commission Regulation establishing Implementing
Rules for Air Operations.
[12] Opinion No 05/2010 of the European Aviation Safety Agency of 18
October 2010 for a Commission Regulation laying down common
airspace usage requirements and operating procedures
North Sea Helicopter ADS-B/MLat Pilot Project
Findings
Paul Thomas
Design Department
Bristow Helicopters
Redhill, United Kingdom
Paul.thomas@bristowgroup.com
I. INTRODUCTION
As part of a North Sea ADS-B/Multilateration Pilot Project
initiated in 2008, two aircraft were modified to participate in a
controlled trial, which culminated in a test and evaluation
programme to prove, or otherwise, if ADS-B was viable for
rotorcraft engaged in off-shore support and search and rescue
operations in the North Sea sector. Two end-to-end flight
functional tests were conducted with a Bristow Sikorsky S61N
and a CHC Sikorsky S76B helicopter. Both aircraft were
equipped with Mode S transponders providing ADS-B
extended squitter. This paper summarises the main findings of
the test and evaluation programme.
II. SCOPE
The flight functional test plan involved manoeuvres that
were within the scope of a normal operational flight regime, to
exercise several worst case scenarios including GPS
constellation aspects [1], proximity to wind turbines [2],
combinations of pitch and bank attitudes taking into account
antenna placement, all 360 headings and operating altitudes.
The purpose was to analyse the operational envelope and
identify performance limitations that may necessitate review of
the installation requirements.
The flight functional test plan addressed two main
components of the ADS-B function:
GPS satellite signal in space reception and its effects
on position determination and integrity, for inclusion in
the ADS-B message.
Reception of the transponder L-band squitter
transmissions, containing the ADS-B information.
Reception of L-band transmissions from the aircraft is
evidenced by the samples received per antenna of the
Multilateration (MLat) network. Each antenna sees the
transmissions dependent on their relative location to the
aircraft. The end-to-end function was verified, with focus on
ADS-B since this depends on the aircraft installation and
qualification/certification. MLat operates from aircraft L-band
transmissions (Mode S replies and ADS broadcasts), but no
aircraft installation requirements apply. The test results outline
the overall functional operation, including landside sub
functions, so that an overall performance and limitations
assessment is obtained. The aircraft ADS-B installations were
designed in compliance with applicable airworthiness
requirements [3]. The flights departed within 15 min of each
other to assure minimum separation and their planned route is
shown in Fig. 1.
The flight profile was as follows:
1) de Kooy/den Helder: Slow take off to verify MLat low
altitude coverage at den Helder airport
2) Cruise at 1000 ft: No specifics, regular operation
3) Descend to 200 ft: Prepare for aerial work at 200 ft
4) South West of OWEZ Meteorological Mast: A hovering
360 turn at 200 ft (turbine hub height) to exercise all antenna
angles relative to GPS reception and L-band transmissions at
minimum (0) bank angle and up to 9 pitch angle
5) West of OWEZ Turbine 12: A right hand 360 turn,
15 bank at 200 ft to exercise worst case L-band antenna
angles (top/bottom and airframe masking)
6) West of Helder: A figure of 8 normal bank angle at 300
ft to exercise left and right antenna lines of sight at normal
pitch and bank angles
7) Platform K14-FB1: A right hand orbit at minimum bank
angle and at deck height to verify the effects of the offshore
platform on GPS as well as L-band performance
8) Platform K15-FB1: A left hand orbit at minimum bank
angle and at deck height to verify the effects of the offshore
platform on GPS as well as L-band performance
9) Platform L13-FD1: Avoiding restricted areas EHD-41D,
-41A and -41E, descend to sea level, hover for 1 min at 0 kt
fwd speed, unspecific heading to verify GPS and L-band
performance at sea level altitude (typical vessel survey/rescue
operation)
10) KOLAV: Cruise at 1000 ft, no specifics, regular
operation, arrival via Mike, Hotel
11) Hotel to EHKD: Approach to land, slow approach to
verify MLat low altitude coverage at den Helder airport,
regular operation
The flight timings and durations are detailed in Table I.
Figure 1. Route plan overview
TABLE I. FLIGHT DETAILS
Aircraft
Times
HDR Departure
(Z)
HDR Arrival (Z) Total time
S76 09:53:09 11:29:51
5783 s
(96.38 min)
S61 10:08:35 12:09:26
7251 s
(120.85 min)
a
a. S61 flight included a fuel stop
III. GPS ASPECTS
Flight times were selected to coincide with the worst case
period of GPS satellite visibility to make the test result
sensitive to loss of satellite visibility. A fault detection and
exclusion (FDE) analysis was performed for den Helder airport
assuming a mask angle of 5. The FDE unavailable period
started at around 1230 during early September and lasted for
approx 14 min, linearly progressing to start around 1000 in
early October and lasting for only 4 min. Therefore, 1000 to
1200 (Z) on 11 October was selected for the flights.
IV. FLIGHT FUNCTIONAL TEST DETAILED ANALYSIS
For clarity, the most pertinent results for each of the flight
functional test phases are detailed for each aircraft type.
A. S76 Departure from den Helder
ADS-B was operational from the ground upwards, although
the on-ground returns had interruptions. MLat became
operational at 600 ft (6 min later). In general, ADS-B and
MLat positions corresponded well with hardly any scatter and
the ground track showed the taxi to take off path. Discrepancies
between ADS-B and MLat position were in the order of 10 m.
Any one antenna would enable ADS-B detection, while an
altitude of at least 600 ft was required to enable MLat.
B. S61 Departure from den Helder
Fig. 2 details the right hand departure flown at low climb rate
to observe the MLat activation point, although the climb rate
was faster than the S76. MLat became operational at 600 ft, 1
minute after the first ADS-B return was received. ADS-B and
MLat track very well, but with some scatter where MLat starts
operation. The sample rates appear to be approximately equal.
C. S76 Turn to OWEZ area
Fig. 3 shows how the S76 approached Offshore Wind park
Egmond aan Zee (OWEZ), performing a shallow turn to the
right at moderate bank angle. MLat positions were lost, while
ADS-B positions show no or few interruptions. There is no
evidence of multipath since MLat and ADS-B positions always
closely correlate. Analysis of MLat and ADS-B receiver
samples show that in 63% of cases the aircraft was seen by
only 3 antennas, which is inadequate for MLat position
determination. It was deduced that the MLat positions were
obtained from samples produced by 4 antennas; 22% of the
observations were from 4 antennas, 14% from >4. MLat
receiver data around OWEZ was analysed and showed the
aircraft turned toward the wind turbines, potentially shading its
bottom L-band antenna and resulting in two adjacent MLat
receivers northwest of the aircraft being periodically masked.
Analysis also revealed that the den Helder receiver ant 27(-28)
was the dominant receiver. Some very distant receivers picked
up ADS-B transmissions, whereas some closer receivers did
not.
D. S61 Turn to OWEZ area
Fig. 4 shows the S61 descent to 200 ft and right turn
towards the south of OWEZ. During the turn, MLat started to
scatter relative to ADS-B positions by approximately 50 m,
before being lost altogether for approximately 1.5 km along the
315 track and ADS-B samples were missed, suggesting loss of
line of sight with the MLat antennas. Again, den Helder (ant
28) was the dominant receiver and others were used to a much
lesser extent. Consequently, it can be assumed that all of these
antennas were masked.
Figure 2. S61 den Helder departure detail
S61 G-BIMU ADS-B/MLat, departure HDR detail
100 m
52.920
52.922
52.924
52.926
52.928
52.930
52.932
52.934
52.936
52.938
52.940
4.780 4.785 4.790 4.795 4.800 4.805
Longitude
L
a
titu
d
e
ADS-B positions
den Helder/de Kooy
MLat positions
100 m
10:09:31.39
Figure 3. S76 Turning to OWEZ
E. S76 Hovering turn at OWEZ
The hovering turn was performed approximately 350 m away
from the OWEZ Meteo mast. Fig. 5 shows ADS-B reports
were continuous while MLat was interrupted and scattered in
the order of 20 m, probably due to 60% of the samples being
received by only 3 antennas, 25% by 4 and the remaining small
percentages by 5 or more. Compared to the right turn to
OWEZ, it seems that MLat antennas 19(-20) and 27(-28) are
periodically masked. ADS-B is continuous, therefore, the
aircraft installation has not contributed to masking. MLat
scatter is evident throughout the manoeuvre, with evidence of a
10 m systematic error (MLat position south of the ADS-B
position). The S76 recorded Horizontal Figure of Merit
(HFOM) as between 80 and 150m with HIL down to 600-500
m. The reducing HIL suggests that the GPS constellation (per
FDE analysis) was the cause, not manoeuvring or masking. A
right turn through heading 60 to 330 was then executed,
during which HFOM deteriorated from 80 to 145 m maximum.
This isnt related to heading change or bank angle since, once
rolled out on 330, bank angle should be negligible. MLat
coverage was worse than ADS-B, most likely due to the MLat
Figure 4. S61 Turning to OWEZ
Figure 5. S76 hovering turn at OWEZ detail
receiver masking phenomenon experienced during the hovering
turn. Position was lost during westerly and south westerly
headings and attributed to aircraft right bank causing
transponder antenna masking (aircraft right bank, turning the
bottom antenna away from the receivers with the top antenna
shaded by the airframe).
F. S61 Hovering turn at OWEZ
South west of OWEZ, close to the Meteo mast, a hovering
turn was performed at wind turbine hub height of 300ft (see
Fig. 6). MLat and ADS-B were interrupted during the approach
from the East. As the hovering right turn commenced, MLat
positions return when the heading is 90 (the red arrows show
approximate heading). Scatter of 10 m builds up to 30-40 m in
some samples, but is not systematic and disappears as soon as
the aircraft gained forward speed. The only explanation for
ADS-B outlier 50 m to the south is an erratic GPS position
sample, either due to multipath or GPS constellation factors. A
right turn with forward speed and 15 bank was then
performed. Small discrepancies between ADS-B and Mlat are
not considered systematic. On the 300 track into the right turn,
1 MLat sample was received for roughly every 4 ADS-B
samples. During the turn, the sample rate was approximately
equal, but after the turn, the MLat sample rate returned to of
the ADS-B sample rate. Also some ADS-B samples were
missing, pointing to compromised visibility of MLat receivers.
Figure 6. S61 hovering turn southwest of OWEZ
S61 G-BIMU, Turn to OWEZ
0 m 500 m
52.570
52.575
52.580
52.585
52.590
52.595
52.600
52.605
52.610
4.400 4.410 4.420 4.430 4.440 4.450 4.460 4.470 4.480 4.490 4.500
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
ADS-B positions
MLat positions
OWEZ, windpark
0 m
500 m
10:21:42
S76 PH-NZS, at OWEZ - overview
Meteo Mast
52.550
52.570
52.590
52.610
52.630
52.650
4.300 4.350 4.400 4.450 4.500
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
ADS-B positions
MLat positions
OWEZ, windpark
Platforms
den Helder/de Kooy
Meteo Mast
S76 PH-NZS, hovering turn at OWEZ - detail
Meteo Mast
52.592
52.594
52.596
52.598
52.600
52.602
52.604
52.606
4.375 4.377 4.379 4.381 4.383 4.385 4.387 4.389
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
ADS-B positions
OWEZ, windpark
Meteo Mast
MLat positions
100 m
G. S76 Figure of 8
A Figure of 8 was performed at 200 ft, normal speed and
bank angle. ADS-B and MLat positions were virtually without
interruptions or scatter. There was some concurrent MLat and
ADS-B loss, possibly due to signal masking, but to a much
lesser extent than during the right hand turn. The aircraft used
equal but opposite bank angles, so the aircraft installation was
not a cause. Some brief MLat interruptions occurred that were
uncorrelated to ADS-B. MLat antenna data showed no reason
for this. HFOM deteriorated from 72m to 100m, while HIL
fluctuated between 500 and 300 m through heading 90 to 200.
HFOM deteriorated again through heading 120 to 330
recovering back to 72m as the bank reduced to zero on heading
330. The bank angle may have caused masking of one or more
GPS satellites. On the S76, the GPS antenna is located on the
tail boom with the tail rotor on the left. Thus a right bank
would seem to be the worst case. HIL fluctuations were most
pronounced during the left turn and also after rolling out on the
final heading (330). Therefore GPS constellation effects are
considered more likely than masking.
H. S61 Figure of 8
No discrepancies were noted between ADS-B and MLat.
Both showed good coverage, although a small number of MLat
samples were missed during the left hand turn (from 90-360
deg), while at the same headings in the right hand turn, ADS-B
and MLat sample rates were good.
I. S61 Fuel stop at platform Noble Hans Deul
The fuel stop at platform Noble Hans Deul provided an
opportunity to view ADS-B and MLat performance during
approach, landing and when on deck (See Fig. 7). Generally,
coverage was good, with few or no missing ADS-B reports.
MLat matches ADS-B closely, although some small systematic
discrepancy between ADS-B and MLat position of a few
meters may be observed in the hover (red arrows show heading
while hovering). MLat positions appear to scatter by a few
meters at low speed.
J. S76 Orbit around platform K14-FB1
The orbit was flown in the hover with the aircraft nose
pointing to the platform (see Fig. 8). Some regular differences
Figure 7. S61 approach, landing and departure from Noble H. Deul
Figure 8. S76, Orbit around platform K14-FB1
between ADS-B and MLat are apparent as well as a systematic
discrepancy between GPS and MLat positions. During the
orbit, all MLat positions are inside GPS positions by
approximately 10-20 m. One explanation may be that MLat
locates the transmitting L-band antenna position, while the
ADS-B content reflects GPS antenna position (no displacement
between the two being applied). On the S76 these antennas are
separated by the length of the aircraft, so, the difference should
be in the order of 10 m. The same was observed during the
hovering turn manoeuvre. As the aircraft establishes forward
flight, the difference transforms into an along-track difference,
which does not readily show. HFOM deteriorated from 72 to
145 m and HIL from 200 m to 1000 m. At the time, the
distance from the platform was ~110 m. K14 is a platform with
no tall build up, thus masking by platform structures is not an
explanation. Since the orbit was performed in the hover, the
bank angle should have been negligible. The HFOM/HIL
deterioration was observed between heading 220 to 100 so
the only possible explanation (except for the GPS signal in
space itself) is masking of the GPS antenna by the airframe.
K. S61 Orbit around platform K14-FB1
Arriving from the North (Noble H. Deul), the left-hand
orbit was flown in the hover with the aircraft nose pointed to
the platform, thus exercising all headings at zero bank and
minimum pitch (see Fig. 9). Some MLat scatter of
approximately 5-10 m was evident, but minimal systematic
discrepancy between ADS-B and MLat was observed. Some
erratic MLat positions are evident when the aircraft was due
north of the platform, but MLat positions were well inside
ADS-B (i.e. towards the platform). Separation between GPS
and L-band antennas on the S61 is approximately half that of
the S76 so the antenna displacement effect is less pronounced.
In forward flight MLat sample rate is roughly that of the
ADS-B sample rate and some ADS-B samples seem to be
missing.
L. S76 Orbits around platform K15-FB1
Several orbits were flown around platform K15-FB1, which
S61, G-BIMU, Landing/take-off Noble Hans Deul - detail
53.248
53.249
53.249
53.250
53.250
53.251
53.251
53.252
53.252
3.745 3.750 3.755 3.760 3.765 3.770
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
ADS-B positions
MLat positions
Platforms
100 m
S76 PH-NZS, LH orbit K14-FB1
100 m
53.186
53.187
53.188
53.189
53.190
53.191
53.192
53.193
3.574 3.576 3.578 3.580 3.582 3.584
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
ADS-B positions
Platforms
MLat positions
100 m
Figure 9. S61 Orbit around platform K14-FB1
differs from K14-FB1 in that it is very large with tall
structures. Fig. 10 again shows a systematic discrepancy
between MLat and ADS-B positions of 15 m. As the aircraft
transitions to forward flight, this systematic error disappears.
HFOM dropped from 55-60 m to 330 m, while HIL dropped
from 300 m to >7000 m, particularly during the 4
th
orbit in
forward flight around 80 kts with right bank applied throughout
almost all 360 headings. The distance from the platform was
around 200 m and HFOM returned to 65 m when rolling out on
a heading of approximately 100. This occurred on most
headings at distance from the platform with constant right
bank, so GPS antenna shading by the tail rotor is suspected.
M. S61 RH Orbits around platform K15-B1
Fig. 11 shows the orbits performed, first in the hover with
the aircraft nose pointed to the platform as in the K14 orbit,
followed by banked orbits at forward speed. In general the
results are excellent with no systematic discrepancies, but some
MLat scatter is again visible during hovering. ADS-B and
MLat sample rates and tracking are satisfactory, although some
samples are missing during orbits at forward speed and bank,
as indicated by the red dotted line. During turns, MLat samples
are of the ADS-B sample rate, while closer analysis reveals
approximately 20% of ADS-B samples were missing.
Figure 10. Orbits around platform K15-FB1
Figure 11. S61 Orbits around platform K15-FB1
N. S76 Sea level operation close to platform L13-FD1
With the aircraft down to approximately sea level to
simulate operations with a survey vessel, position was held for
one minute at no specific heading. ADS-B and MLat
correlation were generally good. Fig. 12 shows systematic
discrepancies between MLat and ADS-B amounting to
approximately 10 m. Aircraft heading during the hover
changed from 60 to 90, placing the L-band antenna to the east
of the GPS antenna (east is right on the plot), then turning to
120 and transitioning to forward flight (red arrows in the plot).
MLat positions show east of the ADS-B positions, confirming
the antenna relative placement theory. HFOM and HIL were
steady at 60-63 m and 260 m respectively, indicating optimum
GPS reception with no signal loss or masking.
O. S61 Sea level operation close to platform L13-FD1
This confirmed earlier observations and showed generally good
performance. Discrepancies between MLat and ADS-B are
seen in transition to forward flight west north-west of the
platform (see Fig. 13). ADS-B reports appear reasonable so
MLat scatter is assumed. Some ADS-B reports are missing and
there is a 30 m outlier (red dotted line shows the time history).
Figure 12. S76 hovering at sea level
S76 PH-NZS, ADS-B, orbits K15-FB1
100 m
53.272
53.273
53.274
53.275
53.276
53.277
53.278
53.279
53.280
3.860 3.865 3.870 3.875 3.880 3.885
Longitude
L
a
t
i
t
u
d
e
ADS-B positions
Platforms
MLat positions
100 m
Figure 13. S61 Hovering at sea level sub-detail
P. S76 Transit, return flight and arrival at den Helder
ADS-B and MLat positions were aligned during the transit
to den Helder with no scatter and virtually identical sample
rates. Increased altitude improved MLat performance. During
arrival, ADS-B and MLat corresponded well, but MLat scatter
built up to approximately 40 m during descent as MLat
reception was lost. The last MLat sample was obtained 1
minute before the final ADS-B sample. MLat position was
more scattered during arrival (~40 m) than during departure (10
m). Analysis revealed less MLat receivers were seeing the
aircraft during the first 2 minutes of departure than during the
last 2 min of arrival and different receivers were used in each
case.
Q. S61 Transit, return flight and arrival at den Helder
ADS-B and MLat positions were perfectly aligned on the
transit to den Helder with no sign of scatter and virtually
identical sample rates. Again, the increased altitude improved
MLat performance. During the final minutes of arrival, MLat
visibility reduced to the point where the geometry deteriorates,
resulting in scatter as in the case of the S76. MLat continued
down to touch down with scatter beginning at 300 ft, 1.5 min
before touch down. The den Helder ant 27 is dominant and
remains so to the end of the flight. One sample was received by
ant 6 on platform D15-FA-1, which at 193 km away is well
beyond the radio horizon. It is not clear how this antenna was
able to see the aircraft, multipath could be assumed.
V. SUMMARY
The ADS-B and MLat function operated extremely well.
ADS-B was available down to sea level with minimal
interruption, GPS multipath or masking.
MLat data was scattered at or below 500 ft, but in general,
discrepancies between MLat and ADS-B were due to the
physical locations of aircraft GPS and L-band antennas.
Only during manoeuvres adjacent to wind turbines was
ADS-B lost for an appreciable period. This was attributed to
aircraft L-band antenna masking by the wind turbines.
The S76 suffered more L-band masking, but, the S61
suffered more wind turbine masking. This may have been due
to the S76 flying lower than turbine hub height.
Longitudinal displacement of upper and lower L-band
antennas and their alternate operation mean that MLat positions
inherit scatter, which is most pronounced in lateral, hovering
flight. ADS-B returns are fixed relative to the GPS antenna.
The HIL and HFOM recordings from the S76 revealed
unexplained excursions so were attributed to tail rotor masking.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ADS-B installations on both aircraft are completely
adequate. Equipment performance is consistent with governing
TSOs, while aircraft installation aspects (antenna locations and
RF characteristics) perform to expectations.
The flights took place under worst case predicted RAIM
conditions so that the minimum number of satellites would be
visible, making any antenna masking noticeable.
There is no evidence of GPS position loss. Degraded GPS
reception close to two separate platforms was experienced
when the S76 recorded significant HIL and HFOM reduction
for approximately 60 seconds. This was attributed to satellite
masking by the airframe. It has not been possible to positively
identify which satellite(s) were masked during those periods.
L-band masking was attributed to the wind turbines, when
operating in their close vicinity and at approximate turbine hub
height.
Differences between the aircraft antenna installations were
expected to cause discernable differences in operational
performance, but this was not the case.
Multilateration and ADS-B exhibited small position
differences corresponding to the distance between aircraft GPS
and L-band antennas. For the subject helicopters these
differences are small (less than 10 m).
Compilation of specific helicopter-oriented certification
requirements in consultation with the authorities that will
satisfy the current and intended service levels for off-shore
operations is close to being finalised.
REFERENCES
[1] HPL-VPL analysis for the Northsea area, 1113 oct 10,
INTEGRICOM, P.B. Ober.
[2] Impact of Wind Turbines on WAM, Eurocontrol TRS: 08-112983-E,
Roke Manor Research Ltd, Report No: 72/09/R/148/R, May 2009
Issue 1.
[3] European Aviation Safety Agency Certification Specifications for Large
Rotorcraft CS-29 Amendment 2, 17 November 200
Bigh Resolution Rauai Techniques
LAOTSE,anApproachforForeignObjectDetection
bymultimodalnetted2D/3DSensors
Session3.1page61
MillimeterwaveRadarforRunwayDebrisDetection
Session3.2page65
OFDMWaveformsforaFullyPolarimetricWeatherRadar
Session3.3page69
Polarimetryappliedtoavionicweatherradar:
improvementonmeteorologicalphenomenadetectionandclassification
Session3.4page73
PrinciplesofUtilizationofPolarizationInvariantParametersfor
ClassificationandRecognitionofDistributedRadarObjects
PartI.Simplestmodelofadistributedobjectpaper
Session3.5page79
PartII.Multipointmodelandcorrelationtheory
Session3.6page83
LAOTSE, an Approach for Foreign Object Detection

by multimodal netted 2D / 3D Sensors
S. Hantscher, H. Essen, P. Warok, R. Zimmermann,
M. Schrder, R. Sommer, S. Lang
Fraunhofer - FHR
53343 Wachtberg, Germany
helmut.essen@fhr.fraunhofer.de
M. Schikora, K. Wild, W. Koch
Fraunhofer - FKIE
53343 Wachtberg, Germany
marek.schikora@fkie.fraunhofer.de
Abstract Globalization enforces increasing airplane traffic and
thus a growing turnover frequency. This requires a sophisticated
and time-efficient searching for sources of danger imposed by
debris, executing strong risks for airplane take-off and landings.
The project introduced in this paper facilitates and enhances the
landing strip observation effectiveness. This fully automatically
controlled system enables a faster control avoiding sources of
error induced by human observers under all weather conditions.
This system assists an increased turnover airplane frequency and
makes a cost saving airport management possible. The paper
focuses on the techniques used for the runway surveillance,
especially the radar part for stand-off object detection of debris
and a real-time 2D and 3D time-of-flight (ToF) camera system for
close-up surveillance.
Keywords millimetre wave radar, runway surveillance, time-
of-flight camera
I. INTRODUCTION
The horrible crash of the Air France Concorde on July 25
th
2000 on Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris showed the urgent
necessity of a system to be able to detect reliably debris on
runways before take-off and landing of aircrafts. At this
accident, a small metal piece lost by an aircraft, immediately
taking off before, hit one wheel of the Concorde and let it
explode. Parts of the destroyed wheel smashed into the wing
and set it on fire.
Nowadays, as suggested by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), runways are inspected manually every 6
hours. Due to the increasing traffic density on airports as well
as the short time slots between 2 successive starts, a reliable
runway surveillance with human aid alone is not possible. That
is why the security personnel at airports needs technical
decision support. Requirements for such a system are:
Continuous and covert surveillance
Automatic analysis of the scenario
Alarm in case of anomalies
Independent of weather
Time efficient runway control
Under leadership of Fraunhofer FHR, a contemporary
system is under development by a strong alliance of specialized
companies and partly funded by the German Federal State of
North-rhine-Westphalia. Substantially, the system consists of
two parts: a millimeter wave radar for the stand-off
surveillance of runways and a real-time 2D and 3D time-of-
flight camera system for close-up inspection. The information
of both systems is fused to give the optimal support to the
safety personnel on the airport. In the following, the
subsystems are described in more detail.
II. RADAR SYSTEM
The lower terahertz region is currently under exploration
for short range sensors for safety and security applications.
This is possible due to an extension of millimeter wave
components and devices up to frequencies around 300 GHz [1].
The availability of devices capable to generate a transmit
power above 10 mW allows the development of radar sensors
in this frequency region. Higher operating frequencies give
more sensitivity especially for small target objects, as the
relative roughness is bigger. The resolution may be enhanced
using a wider bandwidth, which is easier to maintain at higher
frequencies, where a wide absolute bandwidth is gained by a
narrow relative bandwidth [2]. Imaging radars for security and
safety applications allow to extract features to classify or even
identify target details of interest.
A. Netted Radar Sensors
The philosophy of the current set-up is based upon a netting
of several miniaturized millimeter wave radars, which allow to
cover the area of the runways with overlapping segments. To
miniaturize the system, the 220 GHz frequency band is used,
which allows to reduce the antenna diameter by more than a
factor of two in comparison with the more traditional
millimetre wave band of 94 GHz [3]. For operation in an
airport environment this is essential, as obstacles like the
netted sensors along the runway have to be miniaturized in
size. At the higher frequency, however, the available output
power is less, which result in the necessity to use more sensors
to cover the traffic area. On the other hand this geometry has
the advantage to see possible threat objects from different
aspect angles, enhancing the possibility for classification and
reducing the false alarm ratio.
A demonstrator is developed as a proof of principle, which
shows the potential of the envisaged sensor system and is a
first step towards a commercialization of that system. The
specific millimetre wave hardware is described elsewhere [4]
in full detail.
B. System Philosophy
Using the available 220-GHz-radar modules the range of
each sensor is limited to about 300 m, which allows a
coverage of km of runway. Only more than one sensor can
achieve the required coverage. The information content of
neighbouring, overlapping and in the end of all radar sensors
have to be merged and aligned using overlapping segments of
the surveyed area. Fig. 1 shows a sketch of the total sensor set-
up.
Figure 1. Demonstrator Set-Up with three Radars
The main tool to detect pieces of debris on the runway is a
change detection algorithm, which is applied to the
permanently generated radar images of the surveyed area. Any
permanent change is creating an alarm signal.
III. RADAR SENSOR DATA FUSION
The miniaturization of the antennas leads to a netted setup
of multiple radars to cover the whole runway. The detection of
threat objects is enforced by a change detection algorithm
separately for each sensor.
The geometric data fusion between all netted sensors could
be done using the position and attitude of each sensor. In this
approach the position and attitude must be exactly known, to
treat them correctly in a geometric transformation process. To
overcome this limitation the overlap regions between the
sensors can be used. The relatively high resolution of the
sensors allows to take the radar data as input for a classical
image based decision process. Adjacent radars produce images
with an overlap region. Data from these overlapping regions
are used for matching in the image plane. The first step is to
detect feature points in each radar image.
Possible feature detectors are the Harris detector [5] or the
Scale Invariant Feature (SIFT) detector [6]. These feature
points can be matched to another. With these matches an
affine transformation between two images can be computed.
This procedure can be easily scaled to an arbitrary number of
sensors. The benefit of this approach is the independence of
the sensor geometry. In comparison to the first approach only
the position and attitude of one sensor is needed to project the
detection result on the runway, while the position and attitude
of the other sensors may be unknown. The overlap region can
be also used to improve the detection results. It may occur,
that the radar cross section of a threat object is so small, that it
is not detected by the change detection. If this happens in an
overlap region, it is probable that it is detected by its adjacent
sensor. This would decrease the false alarm rate of the system
and increase its probability of detection.
IV. OPTICAL SYSTEM
A. ToF System Concept
Time of flight (ToF) camera systems, as the name suggests,
are able to measure the distance between the camera and a
reflecting point by measuring the elapsed time. Hence, ToF is
quite similar to a radar an active ranging system, that needs
an illumination source. Basically, a ToF camera emits
continuously a light signal with a constant wavelength. Mostly,
the near infrared area is used for this purpose, because it is
invisible and simultaneously not harmful for the human eye.
Figure 2. PMD CamCube from PMDTechnologies [7] consisting of camera
and illumination unit
To measure distances, the light has to be modulated
adequately. Then, it is possible to evaluate it as the modulation
of the back-scattered signal differs from that of the emitted one.
ToF cameras usually modulate their carrier signal by a
harmonic oscillation with the frequency f. Then, the phase
difference is given by
c
R
f
2
2 = (1)
whereby R denotes the distance between transmitter and
reflecting object and c is the speed of light. Transmit and
receive signal are mixed for each individual pixel of the sensor
matrix which allows the determination of the phase difference,
i.e. by sampling of the obtained correlation function at 4 time
samples with the values A
1
, A
2
, A
3
, A
4
each shifted by 90 [8]
4 2
3 1 1
tan
A A
A A
(2)
Then, the range is calculated by (1). If the modulation
frequency is stable enough, the integration time can be chosen
comparably high to improve the signal-to-noise-ratio.
However, the choice of the modulation frequency f is crucial
as it directly constraints the maximum range. Only phase
differences of 2 0 < within one period can be used for
range calculation without loss of the unambiguity. Hence, the
unambiguity range is given by
TABLE I. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE PMD CAMERA [3]
Parameter Value
Standard measurement range 0.3 m to 7 m
Repeatability (1) 3 mm
Frame rate
40 fps @ 200 x 200 pixels
Field of view 40 x 40
Illumination wavelength 870 nm
Power supply 12 V 10%
Interface USB 2.0
Operating temperature 0 to 50C
Storage temperature -20C to 85C
Figure 3. Optical image of the test objects (from top to bottom: wooden ruler,
spoon, nail file, screw driver, rubber, scissors, push pin, screws)
f
c
R
unamb
2
= (3)
Commercial ToF cameras often operate with a modulation
frequency of 20 MHz, yielding a 7.5 m long measurement area.
In order to increase this, signal processing techniques as
known from image processing for radar interferometry can be
applied to evaluate the phase information of adjacent pixels.
Such 2D phase unwrapping methods allow an unambiguous
phase determination over multiple periods [9]. Another option
would be to use multitone techniques as they are known from
automotive applications [10]. An overview about the technical
specifications is given in Table 1. The camera lens is
changeable and thus customised for different applications,
such as for automotive applications, for long range
surveillance or for medical applications (short range
surveillance).
Figure 4. Measurement of empty space (intensity plot)
Figure 5. Result (intensity plot) of various items located at the ground. The
data of the empty space had been removed.
Figure 6. 3-D image of scissors shown in the figures above
B. Measurements
The combination of radar technology and optical systems
facilitate a reliable surveillance of runways. To demonstrate
this, a ToF camera from PMD Technologies GmbH was used
to image different objects and materials on a smooth plane
(Fig. 3). To demonstrate the potential of such a ToF system, a
870 nm PMD camera comprising of about 200 x 200 pixels
was used to image different objects and materials (see Fig. 5).
To obtain detailed and undistorted images a free-space
measurement (shown in Fig. 4) has to be carried out with the
camera system, which will be subtracted from the following
measurements. This is a similar idea as for the surveillance
radar which detects objects in the change detection sense. On
the one hand, only deviations of the surface of the runway are
imaged (change detection), on the other hand, the range
increase in dependency of the perspective as well as the
intensity distribution of the illumination spot on the ground can
be removed. The result (intensity image) is depicted in Fig. 6.
Different objects made of different materials have been
imaged. The objects can be identified easily by their shape.
This allows a reliable evaluation of the threat on the runways
by the airport personnel which can decide, whether a removal
is mandatory or not as in the case of a non-dangerous item like
a piece of paper. As described in the section above, ToF
cameras are able to measure objects three-dimensional. To
illustrate this, the scissors from the test set-up in Fig. 3 have
been selected exemplarily. Fig. 6 shows the result. The height
information is coded by the red colour. The bars as well as
blades are depicted in a clear way, such that the item can be
identified as scissors. The range deviation could be
compensated successfully as the object is imaged on a constant
ground height. It should be mentioned that both measurements
can also be carried out under foggy or rainy conditions making
the system very attractive for a non-stop operation.
V. CONCLUSION
An innovative solution for runway surveillance and debris
reconnaissance was proposed. Radar sensors as well as optical
three dimensional sensors were fused to get as much
information as possible and to achieve a high and reliable
detection rate. The system supports the airport personnel
responsible for the safety of aircrafts on runways during take-
off and landing by giving an alarm in the case of a dangerous
item on the runway. The radar system monitors the runway in
change detection mode and gives the fused information to the
optical system that images the item in more detail. Test
measurements showed the feasibility of this technique by
using a ToF camera. Both, the intensity plot as well as the 3D
range image enabled a clear identification of the objects.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Tessmann, A. Leuther, M. Kuri, H. Massler, M. Riessle, H. Essen, S.
Stanko, R. Sommer, M. Zink, R. Stibal, W. Reinert, M. Schlechtweg,
220 GHz Low-Noise Amplifier Modules for Radiometric Imaging
Applications, Proceedings of the 1st European Microwave Integrated
Circuits Conference, pp. 137-140, Sept. 2006.
[2] H. Essen, A. Wahlen, R. Sommer, G. Konrad, M. Schlechtweg, A.
Tessmann, Very high bandwidthmillimetre-wave radar, Electronics
Letters. Vol. 41, No. 22, Oct. 2005, pp. 1247 1249
[3] P.D.L. Beasley, G. Binns, R.D. Hodges,R.J. BAdley, Tarsier, a
millimetre wave radar for airport runway debris detection, Radar
Conference, 2004. EURAD. First European Radar Conference, 2004,
Amsterdam, pp. 261 264
[4] H. Essen, F. Lorenz, S. Hantscher, P. Warok, R. Zimmermann, M.
Schrder, W. Koch, M. Schikora, K. Wild, Millimeterwave Radar for
Runway Debris Detection; Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft and
Vehicles, Capri, Italien, Sept: 2011
[5] C. Harris and M. Stephens, "A combined corner and edge detector".
Proceedings of the 4th Alvey Vision Conference 1998: pages 147-151.
[6] D.G. Lowe, Distinctive Image Features from Scale-Invariant
Keypoints, International Journal of Computer Vision, 60, 2, pp. 91-110,
2004. Millimeter Wave Radar for Runway Debris Detection, to be
published, ESAV 2011, Capri, Sep. 2011
[7] www.pmdtec.com
[8] T. Ringbeck, C. Schaller, M. Profittlich, Kameras fr die dritte
Dimension, Optik & Photonik, no. 3, October 2009 [in German
language]
[9] T. Ringbeck, B. Hagebeuker, Dreidimensionale Objekterfassung in
Echtzeit, AVN, no. 7, July 2007 [in German language]
[10] N. Fatihi, S. Hantscher, J. Rubart, C. Krebs, D. Nler, H. Essen
Imaging Permittivity Measurements for Automated Material
Inspection, Progress in Electromagnetics Research Symposium, March
2011
Millimeterwave Radar for Runway Debris Detection
H. Essen, F. Lorenz, S. Hantscher, P. Warok, R.
Zimmermann, M. Schrder
Fraunhofer - FHR
D- 53343 Wachtberg, Germany
helmut.essen@fhr.fraunhofer.de
W. Koch, M. Schikora, G. Luedtke, K. Wild
Fraunhofer - FKIE
D-53343 Wachtberg, Germany
marek.schikora@fkie.fraunhofer.de
AbstractFor foreign object detection on runways highly
sensitive radar sensors give the opportunity to detect even very
small objects, metallic and non-metallic, also under adverse
weather conditions. As it is desirable for airport applications to
install only small but robust installations along the traffic areas,
millimeter wave radars offer the opportunity of small antenna
apertures and miniaturized system hardware. A 220-GHz radar
was developed, which is capable to serve this application if
several of these are netted to cover the whole traffic area.
Although under fortunate conditions the radar allows a
classification or even an identification of the debris, the complete
system design incorporates 3-D PMD-cameras for assistance in
the identification process, if the environmental conditions allow
for this. The latter part of the system is described in a separate
paper [3].
Keywords- FOD; mmW-radar; high resolution; netted sensors
I. INTRODUCTION
The detection and classification of runway debris is a major
concern for airport operation, as related flight delays and
accident claims as well as aircraft repairs are very costly. In
forthcoming years traffic on airports will even increase and
thus the demand on maintaining an adequate safety level. For
safe airport operation it is necessary, that the runways and
taxiways are permanently in an undisturbed condition.
Following the recommendations of the ICAO, the
inspection of runways is done at a period of 6 hours, visually
by security personnel at the time being. This procedure is
costly and may be subject to human failure and is also highly
dependent on weather and daylight conditions. Especially at
adverse weather the visual inspection cannot guarantee the
detection of small metallic particles like screws. Moreover the
traffic density on airports has been considerably increasing,
and a secure inspection between consecutive take-offs and
landings by human visual inspection is not possible.
A few automatic or semi-automatic systems have been
proposed or are in use at some airports to serve this purpose
[1]. Video surveillance is one of the proposals, but suffers
from obscuration by bad weather. Radar sensors, which are
capable to be operated under all weather conditions [2] are
also taken under consideration.
The radar proposed in this contribution is operating at
millimeterwaves with high bandwidth to achieve a very good
range resolution. The 220 GHz band is used, which in
comparison to lower frequencies allows considerably smaller
antennas with high directivity and thus a miniaturization of the
complete set-up. Further a wider bandwidth and thus a higher
ranger resolution can be accommodated at higher frequencies.
As output power at this frequency band is limited, a netted
approach, using several radars along the traffic area, is
proposed.
II. 220-GHZ LAOTSE RADAR CONCEPT
A. System Concept
The LAOTSE [3] concept is based upon a net of
miniaturized 220-GHz radar modules, which are positioned
along the traffic areas. This netted approach is necessary as the
output power of each radar is not sufficient to cover the whole
traffic area, and additionally the probability of false alarms is
considerably reduced for areas, which are monitored from
different aspects. The total LAOTSE system is additionally
using distributed PMD cameras, which are focussed to objects,
which have been detected by the radar [4] and which are also
part of the sensor net.
B. Radar Geometry
Tests of an experimental LAOTSE system, with a limited
number of sensors are conducted on the Cologne-Bonn
Konrad-Adenauer Airport.
Figure 1. Photo of Cologne-Bonn Airport with LAOTSE Site, old Runway
(below) and Cross-Wind Runway
The first LAOTSE radar module is mounted at a slightly
elevated position near to the crossing of the old runway and
the cross-wind runway to be able to overlook a certain area.
The project is financed by the Ministry for Innovation, Science and Tech-
nology of the German Federal State of North-Rhine Westphalia under the
ZIEL2 Programme of the European Fund for Regional Development (EFRE)
LAOTSE
Test site
Fig. 1 shows the situation, Fig. 2 demonstrates the geometry.
Fig. 3 shows the illumination by the antenna beam.
Figure 2. Typical Geometry for Radar above Runway
Figure 3. Illumination of Traffic Area by one Radar Module
To miniaturize the system, the 220 GHz frequency band is
used, which allows to reduce the antenna diameter by more
than a factor of two. This is essential for operation in an
airport environment, where obstacles like the netted sensors
along the runway have to be avoided. This approach, however,
demands for a wider net of sensors to cover the complete
runway area. For complete demonstration of LAOTSE
performance a second sensor will be installed along the old
runway to maintain an overlapping survey region.
In the following, the approach for a single radar module is
described.
C. 220-GHz Sensor Front-End
The system concept is based on a design, which was
already realized at 94 GHz [5]. The radar FM-CW front-end
uses miniaturized, monolithically integrated components in
GaAs technique [6]. To be capable to cover a bigger range,
like 200 m, coherency of the signal is most essential.
The classical FM-CW approach uses a reference signal,
which is derived from a voltage controlled oscillator (VCO),
which generally is not stable enough to maintain the necessary
coherency over a range > 200 m. This is due to the fact, that
for tuning of the oscillator the Q-factor of the resonator must
not be too high, which may lead to an uncontrolled frequency
drift. The drift can be so high, that during the transmit-receive
cycle the phase of the transmit signal has been changing so
much, that the mixing between reference- and receive- signal
does not result in a sharp frequency response but to a widening
of the receive signal. This widening increases with range and
at a certain range limit no resolution can be achieved. As this
concept does not allow, to achieve a sufficient range, a
concept as sketched in the block diagram of Fig. 3 was
developed. The output frequency is shifted to 105 GHz instead
of 94 GHz and a subsequent doubling results in an operating
frequency around 210 GHz.
Figure 4. Block Diagram of 220-GHz Front-End
All system frequencies are generated or derived from a
stable crystal oscillator. A dielectric, resonator stabilized
oscillator (DRO) generates the reference frequency of 17.2
GHz upon which the radar waveform, a linear FM-chirp with a
bandwidth of 220 MHz 380 MHz is mixed. A multiplication
by a factor of 6 leads to a basic millimetre wave frequency
band of 104.52 GHz 105.48 GHz. After amplification this
signal is split into the transmit branch and the local oscillator
branch. The latter is used for downconversion of the receive
signal using a subharmonic mixer. The transmit signal is
derived by doubling to result in a frequency band of 209.04
GHz 210.96 GHz, a total bandwidth of 1.92 GHz, equivalent
to a range resolution of about 8 cm.
The RF front-end is quite compact and avoids long
waveguide connections. Fig. 5 shows a photo.
Figure 5. Photo of LAOTSE 220-GHz Front-End
The complete radar RF part is mounted within the primary
focus of the Antenna. IF and DC connections to the data
RADAR
acquisition and control box are maintained by rotary joints
leading through the centre of the antenna pedestal.
For the first experiments a self contained steering and data
acquision box was developed, which is capable to operate one
single LAOTSE sensor, to store the measured radar and
distribute all relevant data into the sensor network.
For the operational system only a miniaturized data-
interface box will be assigned to each radar sensor. An FPGA
based processing electronics will deduce high resolution range
profiles by applying an FFT algorithm , which contain the
information on RCS and position of debris objects, and which
serve as a basis for further netted processing and the change
detection algorithm.
D. Antenna and Pedestal
As the FM-CW principle is used for the LAOTSE radar,
special care has to be taken for a good isolation between
receiver and transmitter, which is essential for a good dynamic
range of the system. For an optimum performance, separated
antennas were used. To allow a wide operation bandwidth,
which is necessary for a high range resolution, offset feed
antennas were used. To avoid long waveguides serving the two
antenna feeds, a design as shown in Fig. 6 was used.
Figure 6. Sketch of Antenna Assembly and Photo of Radar upon Pedestal
Each radar module is mounted upon an antenna pedestal
capable to survey 360 angular region in azimuth and + 20 in
elevation. During operation the elevation is fixed according to
the geometrical conditions. Fig. 6 shows also a photo of a radar
module on its pedestal.
III. TEST MEASUREMENTS
A. ISAR Measurements on small Objects
To test the sensitivity of the system and to evaluate the
range under which small items can be detected, measurements
with an assembly of 25 different small objects on a turntable at
a range of about 200 m were conducted. The objects were
turned over 360, and the measured data were evaluated using
an Inverse Synthetic Aperture (ISAR) algorithm, which, in
contrary to the final LAOTSE algorithm gives a synthetic radar
image of each object. Tab. 1 gives a catalogue of the measured
objects.
TAB. 1
CATALOGUE OF MEASURED ITEMS
Objects
Tools Metal Pieces dielectric Pieces
pliers Wire bundle plastic 100mm x
40mm x35 mm
screw driver screw M8x60 plastic tray 2 shelf
folding ruler metal bar 30mm
x30mm x 30mm
plastic tray 3 shelf
file wheel d = 75mm wood pieces
100mm x 40mm x
20mm
saw antenna fixing stone
paint brush metal plate 200
mm x 15 mm
cable channel
(plastic)
Fig. 7 shows a photo of the assembly of parts on the
turntable.
Figure 7. Photo of Sample Pieces on Turntable
Before the measurements, the system was calibrated by
means of a trihedral corner reflector, which was positioned in
the middle of the turntable. This allows a thorough phase
calibration, which is necessary for the ISAR process and at the
end allows to assign a distinct radar cross section to each item
on the turntable.
Figure 8. Accumulated ISAR Image for 360 Aspect Angle Range
The evaluation was done using different radar bandwidths
ranging from 2 GHz to 8 GHz, which corresponds to a
resolution of about 2 cm to 8 cm. Fig. 8 shows an ISAR image
accumulated over the full 360 aspect angle range, which
means, that each objects was measured from all sides, and
which is more related to the approach of netted sensors, which
also allow to see an object from considerably different aspect
angles.
More realistic for the result for a single scanning radar
sensor is an evaluation, where only a limited fraction of aspect
angles is evaluated. Fig. 9 shows an image related to that of
Fig. 8 with an evaluation aspect range of only 10.
Figure 9. ISAR Image for 10 Aspect Angle Range
The evaluation showed, that all small items could be
detected and imaged independent of aspect angle. Only for dry
wooden blocks this did not apply, as they could be seen only
at those angles, where they were facing the radar. If they were
only a little bit humid, they were also visible for all aspect
angles. Resolution does not play an important role, the
detectability is not influenced for a resolution range between 2
and 8 cm. It can be concluded, that for an operational system a
resolution of about 10 cm is fully sufficient.
B. Test Measurements with the LAOTSE Radar
While for the test measurements, described above, the radar
was fixed and the objects were turning to be visible for all
aspect angles, further tests were conducted with the
operational geometry of a scanning radar. By chance the
weather was very bad with low visibility during the
measurements. Fig. 10 shows a photo of the measurement
scene. Fig. 11 shows the result of a sector scan. Clearly the
fence surrounding the terrain can be identified by its very
strong radar echo (red) and the returns of some small items in
front of the fence.
Figure 10. Photo of Test Scenario
Figure 11. Radar Image for Sector Scan over Scene shown in Figure 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Radar modules at a frequency of 220 GHz were developed
as elements for a netted set-up along traffic ways on airports. It
was demonstrated, that also under adverse weather conditions
small objects, metallic and non-metallic could be detected.
Further research is done on sensor data fusion among several
radar modules and additional 3-D IR cameras [4] using
photonic mixer devices technology. This topic is highlighted in
a separate paper.
REFERENCES
[1] P.D.L. Beasley, G. Binns, R.D. Hodges,R.J. BAdley, Tarsier, a
millimetre wave radar for airport runway debris detection, Radar
Conference, 2004. EURAD. First European Radar Conference, 2004,
Amsterdam, pp. 261 - 264
[2] I. J. Patterson, Foreign Object Debris (FOD) Research, International
Airport Revue, Issue 2, 2008
[3] H. Essen, G. Luedtke, P. Warok, W. Koch, M. Schikora, K. Wild,
Millimeterwave Radar Network for Foreign Object Detection, 2
nd
Intl.
Workshop on Cognitive Information Processing (CIP), Elba, June 14
16, 2010
[4] T. Ringbeck, A 3D Time of Flight Camera for Object Detection,
Optical 3-D Measurement Techniques 09-12. 07. 2007, ETH Zurich
[5] H. Essen, A. Wahlen, R. Sommer, G. Konrad, M. Schlechtweg, A.
Tessmann, Very high bandwidthmillimetre-wave radar, Electronics
Letters. Vol. 41, No. 22, Oct. 2005, pp. 1247 1249
[6] A. Tessmann et al. 220 GHz Low-Noise Amplifier Modules for
Radiometric Imaging Applications, Proceedings of the 1st European
Microwave Integrated Circuits Conference, pp. 137-140, Sept. 2006.
OFDM Waveforms for a Fully Polarimetric Weather
Radar
O.A. Krasnov, Z. Wang, R.F. Tigrek, P. van Genderen
Delft University of Technology
International Research Centre for Telecommunications and Radar (IRCTR)/ MTSRadar
Delft, The Netherlands
AbstractRetrieval of cloud parameters in weather radar
benefits from polarimetric measurements. Most polarimetric
radars measure the full back scatter matrix (BSM) using a few
alternating polarized sounding signals. Using specially encoded
orthogonal OFDM signals however, the BSM can be measured in
a single simultaneous transmission of two orthogonally polarized
signals. Based on a set of parameters for weather radar, the
properties of such a signal are explored and its merit as a useful
capability is shown.
Keywords; weather radar; polarimetry; OFDM; coded
waveforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Weather radar is an important source of information for air
traffic control and, in general, for meteorological services and
research of the environment. For retrieval of parameters on the
water content of clouds, it is important the measure the full
backscatter matrix (BSM) of clouds, with a highly detailed
analysis of the Doppler shifts. Currently, various radars are
capable of measuring the BSM, but the waveforms used consist
of transmitting sounding signals in two orthogonal basis
directions alternatingly. So in order to measure the full BSM
two consecutive transmissions are needed. By consequence,
some time has passed in between the two transmissions and
due to the decorrelation of the echoes of the hydrometeors the
quality of the parameter retrieval is somewhat compromised.
The research addressed in this paper explores orthogonal
signals, such that the sounding signals in the two orthogonal
basis directions can be transmitted at the same time, so that the
BSM can be measured using a single though complicated -
transmission. Also in [1] the measurement of the BSM using
orthogonal signals has been addressed.
IRCTR has developed a radar platform called PARSAX
(Polarimetric Agile Radar in S- and X-band; currently the radar
is being set to work in S-band) supporting to do such analyses
with a variety of waveforms [2]. In [3] and [4] the problem of
simultaneous transmission of orthogonal signals has been
addressed using various modes of Frequency Modulated
Continuous Wave (FMCW) modulation. The current paper
explores a particular pulse coded waveform, Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM). It will be
demonstrated that such waveforms can be used, albeit with a
number of constraints.
The paper is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 will
detail the OFDM sounding signal both in a generic way and in
the specific coding that is used for the benefit of the isolation of
the two orthogonal components. Chapter 3 discusses a set of
parameters applicable to this type of weather radar. Chapter 4
addresses the effects of Doppler shift. Doppler shift is a
parameter that is of vital relevance for the retrieval of the cloud
parameters. However, in OFDM is the major cause of loss of
orthogonality. Chapter 5 concludes the paper.
II. SIGNAL DESCRIPTION
OFDM is a waveform that is widely used in communication
[5]. It is being considered for application in radar only recently
[6], inspired by the availability of signal generators due to the
application in communication. The signal is composed of a
number of carriers at a mutual, constant spacing that is the
inverse of the signals duration. The complex baseband
description is:
( ) ( )
( )
1
0
2 0
0
N
k
k
s t a exp j tk / f t T
s t
=
= <
=
, elsewhere
(1)
where N is the number of carriers,
k
a
is the complex
amplitude of carrier k (also called the code of the carrier) and
f is the frequency spacing between the carriers. T is the
duration of the signal, 1 T f = .
All carriers composing this signal are mutual orthogonal, as
can also be seen from Fig.1 representing a detail in the power
spectral density of an OFDM signal.
Usually the duration T of the signal is quite long and
therefore some type of pulse compression is applied in order to
achieve an appropriate range resolution. Given the nature of the
OFDM signal, the most widely known procedure is to
transform the received signal to the frequency domain and
multiply the carriers with the complex conjugate of the Fourier
transformed transmitted signal. Then after this multiplication
the time domain range profile is generated by the inverse
Fourier transform. The level of the sidelobes in this range
profile can be managed by any weighting technique.
The carrier codes
k
a
can be chosen independent from each
other. They have an important impact on the signal envelope in
the time domain to the extent that the ratio between the peaks
and the average of the power is affected. Certainly, the
envelope is not constant and the transmitter cannot be driven
into saturation as it usual in radar, reason for radar engineers to
be reluctant to apply this type of waveform. Special coding
optimizes the peak to average power ratio [6, 7].
One of the comments on the Doppler sensitivity of the
OFDM signal is that as soon as the Doppler shift is no longer
very small compared to the carrier frequency spacing, the
sidelobes of the compressed signal come up rapidly and the
orthogonality is lost. When the carrier codes are random
variables, the sidelobes will ultimately be proportional to 1 N .
When on the contrary, the codes are chosen to be equal, the
loss of the sidelobes will be negligible, but the peak to average
power ratio will be equal to N , so the signal envelope will be
very spiky.
The concept of the fully polarimetric radar is based on an
approach as shown in the block schematic diagram of Fig. 2. It
is shown there that one of the two signals is exciting one of the
two polarization directions, while the other signal is exciting
the orthogonal polarization direction. Then on receive, the two
signals are separated in the pulse compression process by using
the two complex conjugated transmitted waveforms as a
reference. If no special precautions are taken, the cross
compressed signal, i.e. the signal after application of the code
of the other signal for the purpose of the compression, will be
noise-like. The resulting average signal power is called here the
isolation of the codes. An important case for achieving high
code isolation can be appreciated by comparing Figs 1a and 1b.
a. two orthogonal sets of carriers, all
having a different random code
b. two orthogonal sets of carriers,
one with odd, the other with even
carriers. All carriers have a different,
random code.
Figure 1. Power spectral density of OFDM waveforms. Subplot a shows a
regular set of OFDM carriers. Subplot b shows a set of two special cases,
having either only the odd frequencies or the even frequencies. Their code
isolation when the Dopplershift is zero is perfect.
The underlying assumptions are that in Fig1a the two
orthogonal signals show a full spectral occupancy, i.e. all
values of
k
a are non-zero, and additionally by assuming that
they are all have the same amplitude but a random phase in
[ ) 0 2 ,
. In Fig.1b the sounding signals are different to the
extent that transmitter 1 is using all carriers with even values of
k and transmitter 2 is using all carriers with odd values of k .
The output of the compression process of a signal received in
one of the two channels using the code of the other channel
consists of the code isolation. It will be illustrated later in this
paper that it is proportional to
1 N
in the first case (two fully
populated sets of carriers) and close to perfect isolation in the
second case (two disjoint sets of even and odd carriers
respectively).
According to this line of thinking, the signal used for the
experimentation for the fully polarimetric radar is defined as
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1
2
0
2 1
2 1
0
2 2 0
2 2 1 0
0
N /
H k
k
N /
V k
k
s t a exp j t k / f t T
s t a exp j t k / f t T
s t
+
=
= <
= + <
=
elsewhere

,
(2)
Here
( )
V
s t represents the sounding signal exciting the
vertical-polarization and
( )
H
s t the horizontal polarization.
Figure 2. Simplified block schematic diagram of the radar.
(the symbols refers to coding/decoding)
OFDM1 OFDM2
R
H
H
V
V
H
V
s
VH
s
HH
s
VV
s
HV
Transmitter
Receiver
An important side effect of this coding however is that the
unambiguous range is half the value of the full set of carriers.
Also, the method for reducing the peak to average power ratio
fails in this coding.
III. A SET OF PARAMETERS FOR WEATHER RADAR
In the application of weather radar as described in the
introduction, a high resolution of the speed is needed, a typical
value being
0 1
r
v . m / s ec =
. For an X-band radar, this
corresponds to a Doppler resolution of 6.6Hz and thus on a
time interval of evaluation of the phase of 0.15sec. In order to
appreciate the significance of the Doppler resolution, let us
develop a benchmark set of radar parameters compliant with
this requirement.
For the application of detailed weather measurements using
the X-band radar, the maximum range should be not less than
10km. Since in OFDM the maximum range corresponds to
2
u,max
R c f =
, and given the effect of the odd/even coding, this
translates into a frequency spacing
3
7 5 10 f . Hz < . Because
the duration of this carrier spacing is directly linked to the time
duration of the signal by
4
1 1 33 10 T f . s
= = , also the
pulse repetition frequency is an immediate consequence:
3
7 5 10 PRF . Hz = . Hence, using a Doppler filterbank, the
number of pulses to be integrated in order to arrive at the
required Doppler resolution is
3
0 15 7 5 10 1125
p
N . . = =
. The
number of carriers affects two parameters at the same time: the
bandwidth,
f
B N f = , and the sidelobes of the pulse
compression in case of too high a Doppler shift, so in case of
loss of orthogonality, SLL=1/N
f
. The range resolution of
weather radar is a compromise between sensitivity (given the
number of rain droplets per resolution volume) and detail in
finding the structure of clouds. A fair number is to assume that
it should not be lower than 3m, hence
( ) 2 50 B c R MHz = = and the corresponding number of
carriers is N
f
=6667. The correlation noise floor, which is the
mean value of the sidelobes of the pulse compression in the
case of total loss of orthogonality, then is 38 SLL dB w.r.t.
the peak value in case of full orthogonality.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF DOPPLER SHIFT
The concept of orthogonality of the various carriers in the
OFDM waveform is compromised if the carriers are shifted
due to Doppler. In communications this effect is called Inter
Carrier Interference (ICI). Effectively the impact of Doppler
a. Correlation noise b. Code Leakage
Figure 3. Comparison of the correlation noise and the code leakage of the two
full sets of carriers (solid lines) and the odd/even carriers (dashed lines).
shift depends on the ratio of the Doppler shift to the frequency
spacing between the carriers. In case of randomly coded
carriers, the pulse compression in the receiver will fully fail as
soon as the Doppler shift equals the carrier spacing.
Because of the same reason of loss of orthogonality, also
the code isolation is affected by a Doppler shift and it is getting
more reduced the higher the ratio between Doppler shift and
carrier spacing is.
In the case of fully random carrier coding, the correlation
noise floor is described by [8]:
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1 1
2
2
0 0 0 0
2
1
2
f f f f
N N N N
f
k l m n f
f
m k n l
exp j
N

N
n l
exp j
N

= = = =

=

(3)
Here
d
f f = is the ratio between the Doppler shift and the
carrier spacing. This expression is valid for the fully occupied
set of carriers. A graphical representation is in Fig.3a, while in
Fig.3b the code leakage is presented as a function of the
relative Doppler shift . In these graphs also the
corresponding graphs are shows for the odd/even carriers
waveform.
These graphs demonstrate two major effects, the correlation
noise and the code leakage.
A. Effects on the correlation noise floor
The correlation noise, consisting of the range sidelobes in
the co-polar channel due to the Doppler shift, is very low for
low Doppler shift. More precisely, if the Doppler shift would
be exactly zero, the profile of the range sidelobes would
correspond to the weighting function used in the pulse
compression. Just off the zero Doppler values, the waveform
with all carriers used has a slightly lower correlation noise floor
than the odd/even carriers waveform, as a consequence of the
higher number of carriers. In all other cases, composing the
greater part of the span of Doppler values, the odd/even
waveform is superior.
B. The code leakage
Regarding the code leakage, consisting of the signal having
code 1 leaking into the other channel and there compressed
using the code 2, the odd/even waveform is superior to the
waveform with all carriers used for the Doppler shifts of
interest. Obviously, this was the reason why this waveform was
devised. Such a property is extremely important. It supports to
effectively filter away the strong echoes from stationary ground
objects, that otherwise might clutter the meteorological echoes.
It should be reminded though that at system level the total
leaked power from one channel into the other channel is not
just due to code leakage, but also due to other system
components, e.g. the antenna. A typical number for co/cross
polar antenna isolation is 25-30 dB for parabolic antennas.
Calling
A
I the antenna co/cross polar isolation and
C
I the
code isolation, preferably the inequality
max p A C t
S G I I N + < should hold (all values in dB). Here
max
S is the maximum signal that is within the linear dynamic
range of the receiver,
p
G
is the gain due to the processing, and
t
N is the level of the thermal noise. Using for instance
70
max
S dB =
with respect to thermal noise,
( ) 10 1125 30 5
p
G log . dB = =
,
30
A
I dB =
then it follows
70 5
C
I . dB < . Such a value is achieved for Doppler shifts close
to zero, but not for
0 02 150 2 25
d
f . f Hz . m / sec > =
. Thus
stationary discrete objects, also if some internal motion is
present, dont pose a problem. Hydrometeor echoes themselves
will be much weaker than the discretes and dont pose a
problem either.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Using OFDM-coded waveforms tailored to minimize
leakage of signals from one channel out of two orthogonally
polarized channels into the other one is considered to be very
promising. Such coding outperforms any other type of coding
identified so far on the figure of merit for isolation of the
codes. Apart from the straightforward coding as shown in this
paper, also other codes can be devised, always based on the
orthogonality of the carriers in the waveform. A recent
experimental result obtained using the PARSAX radar for the
simultaneous transmission of an odd/even coded pair of
OFDM-signals as in (2) is shown in Fig.4. It shows the range
profiles of each of the four elements of the BSM for a single
OFDM-sweep. The number of carriers is N=25000 and the
total bandwidth is B=50MHz. The carriers are random QPSK-
coded. The antenna is pointing at the horizon while the weather
was clear. The reflections in this example therefore only
concern ground objects. The vertical scale is adjusted to have
the highest value (actually the object concerned is a tall
chimney) at 0dB. The floor of the signal level is close to the
dynamic range of the receiver, approx. 70dB. More details are
in [8].
The limit of applicability of the coding comes from the loss
of orthogonality, as it can be caused for instance by the
Doppler effect. Waveforms like Linear Frequency Modulation
are far more tolerant to Doppler, but cannot provide the
isolation between the codes as discussed here unless the
orthogonal signals are timed in a partially overlapping order,
like proposed in [4].
An effect that has not been addressed in this paper, but that
is highly important for keeping the carriers orthogonal while
receiving echoes with an unknown delay, is the necessity to
introduce a cyclic prefix as an extension to the duration T of a
single pulse. This effect has been discussed in detail in [9]. It
doesnt invalidate the conclusions.
0 5 10 15
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
HH
range, KM
a
m
p
lit
u
d
e
,

d
B
0 5 10 15
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
VH
range, K
a
m
p
li
t
u
d
e
,

d
B
0 5 10 15
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
HV
range, KM
a
m
p
l
it
u
d
e
,

d
B
0 5 10 15
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
VV
range, KM
a
m
p
l
it
u
d
e
,

d
B
Figure 4. Rangeprofiles of the four elements of the BSM. The polarization
basis is linear, V/H
In this paper the orthogonality of codes was exploited for
the benefit of measurement of the BSM in fully polarimetric
radar. The concept of orthogonality might also be used in
different applications, for instance for the benefit of retrieving
the echoes from multiple beams generated by phased array
antennas.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Giuli, M. Fossi, L. Facheris, Radar target scattering matrix
measurement through orthogonal signals, Vol.F of the Proc. of IEE,
Vol.140, issue 4, 1993, pp233-242
[2] O.A. Krasnov, L.P. Ligthart, Z. Li, P. Lys, F. van der Zwan, The
PARSAX Full Polarimetric FMCW Radar with Dual-Orthogonal
Signals, Proc. EuRAD 2008, Oct. 2008, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
pp. 8487.
[3] G. Babur, Processing of Dual-Orthogonal CW Polarimetric
RadarSignals, PhD thesis, TU Delft, 2009.
[4] G. P. Babur, O.A. Krasnov, L. P. Ligthart, Quasi-Simultaneous
Measurements of Scattering Matrix Elements in Polarimetric Radar with
Continuous Waveforms Providing High-Level Isolation in Radar
Channels Proc. EuRAD2006, 30 Sep-2 Oct 2009, Rome, Italy, pp 1-4
[5] R. Prasad, OFDM for Wireless Communication, Artech House, 2004
[6] N. Levanon, Radar Signals, Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley&Sons, 2004
[7] M.R. Schroeder, Synthesis of Low-peak-factor Signals and Binary
Sequences with Low Autocorrelation, IEEE Tr. Information Theory,
Vol.16, No.1, January 1970, pp 85-89
[8] Z. Wang, R.F. Tigrek, O.A. Krasnov, F. van der Zwan, P. van Genderen,
A.Yarovoy, Application of I-OFDM Signals for Simultaneous
Polarimetric Measurement, Proc. EuRAD2011, 12-14 Oct 2011,
Manchester, UK
[9] R.F. Tigrek, A processing Technique for OFDM-Modulated Wideband
Radar Signals, PhD thesis, TUDelft, 2010
Polarimetry applied to avionic weather radar:
improvement on meteorological phenomena detection
and classification
Alberto Lupidi
1
, Christian Moscardini
2
, Andrea
Garzelli
3
, Fabrizio Berizzi
4
, Fabrizio Cuccoli
5
CNIT-RaSS (National Interuniversitary Consortium for
Telecommunication-national laboratory of radar and
Surveillance Systems)
Italy
{
1
a.lupidi,
2
c.moscardini,
4
f.berizzi}@iet.unipi.it
3
andrea.garzelli @dii.unisi.it
5
fabrizio.cuccoli @cnit.it
Marcello Bernab
SELEXGalileo S.p.A.
Campi Bisenzio-Italy
marcello.bernabo @selexgalileo.com
AbstractAvionic Weather Radar is an essential equipment in
aircraft. Polarimetry can improve the detection and the
classification of hydrometeors and thus the safety and the
efficiency of the flight. Here a 3D polarimetric radar simulator
for the feasibility study on avionic weather polarimetric radar is
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
In current avionic systems is impossible to distinguish the type
of precipitation, water, snow, hail. Of course, assumptions can
be done, i.e., high reflectivity in a zone where temperature is
15-20 degrees below zero is likely to indicate an hailstorm, but
we can have no precise information on type of precipitation
near and below the melting height (which also depend on
season and geographic region). About 70% of the high-
reflectivity echoes that pilots see on their radar is non-
hazardous (other than causing a decrease in visibility and
making runways wet). To determine whether or not a particu-
lar red echo is hazardous in terms of turbulence and hail and
other dangers, the pilot must first know if the atmosphere in
which he is flying is conducive to of hail and high turbulence.
It is worth noting to recall that heavy rain without turbulence is
not an issue for the safety of the flight. But even with
atmospheric knowledge, a pilot cannot say whether a particular
high-reflectivity area is hazardous. Usually, the pilot evades
that area, with an increase of costs, time and polluting
emissions due to the detour. The use of polarimetry can help
giving us more precise details on hydrometeor types [1].
For example, rain tends to have an elliptical form with
minor axis oriented vertically, resulting in HH signal to be
higher than VV signal thus having a positive high Differential
Reflectivity. On the contrary, hail, due to its tumbling motion,
appears as spherical, thus having a nearly zero Differential
Reflectivity, even at higher reflectivity (and higher hazard)
level. Classification algorithms which utilize the polarimetric
information on the three channels (HH, VV, HV/VH) can be
developed with the knowledge of Total (Z) and Differential
Reflectivity (Z
DR
) and Linear Depolarization Ratio LDR
defined as
DR HH dBZ VV dBZ
Z Z Z = (1)
VH dBZ HH dBZ
LDR Z Z = (2)
In this work we assume X-Band based system (around 9-
10 GHz) that are preferred because they have an antenna
whose dimensions are compact and compatible also for
business aircrafts. Polarimetric classification algorithms for
ground based S-C bands systems already exist and in general
there is no great difference between ground based and airborne
operation in the application of these algorithms [2], [3].
Differences arise from the technical limitations of the airborne
system, like antenna size, transmitted power and scanning
speed. Main issues for avionic weather radars in conjunction
with the use of X-band are:
1. heavy beam path attenuation and Mie scattering effects
2. ground clutter
3. wider beam width
4. data availability
In this paper we did not deal with path attenuation and ground
clutter. These problems will be addressed in future works. We
solved the problem of data availability simulating real radar
data with a physical based approach described later. Section II
describes the scenario and the mentioned approach, while in
section III and IV we show some results and conclusion
respectively.
II. ATMOSPHERIC SCENARIO AND RADAR MODEL
One of the problems in weather radar engineering is the
availability of data. Moreover, in radar meteorology, data are
available mainly in S-band (around 3 GHz) because this is the
band chosen for ground based weather radar. To simulate
realistic polarimetric radar data in X-Band, the two most
important things we need to know to compute the radar
reflectivity are:
1. the Drop Diameter Distribution (DSD) of hydrometeors
N(D) measured in m
-4
2. their polarimetric Radar Cross Section (RCS) o
H,V
(D)
measured in m
2
.
Polarimetric reflectivity is finally computed as
4
, , 5
0
( ) ( )
0.93
H V H V
Z D N D dD
o
t
=
}
, (3)
Total reflectivity is the result from summing the contributes of
hail and rain calculated separately.
For DSD calculation we adopted the Weather Research and
Forecast Model (WRF), a state-of the art NWP developed by a
consortium of research institutes including NOAA and NCAR
[4]. The WRF can also provide the temporal evolution of
parameters based on a real scenario. This NWP gives us
important parameters needed for the definition of an analytical,
physical based Drop Size Distribution (DSD):
1) Hydrometeor mixing ratio [Kg/Kg]
2) Pressure [Pa]
3) Potential temperature [K]
4) Particle Number Concentration [particles/m
3
].
Additionally WRF provides the wind field used to compute
Doppler shifts.
The DSD that we used in our computation is a Gamma
probability density function.
To compute the polarimetric RCS, we utilized a T-Matrix
method. The T-Matrix method is the fastest exact technique for
the computation of non-spherical scattering based on a direct
solution of Maxwell equations [5],[6]. Dielectric constants,
particle orientation, diameter and the relationship between
diameter and axial ratio are set as parameters to calculate the
electromagnetic scattering. Details on the generation of the 3D
reflectivity maps for every polarimetric channel can be found
in our previous work [7].
The received radar signal is then generated using a custo-
mized version of Airborne Windshear Doppler Radar
Simulation (ADWRS), extensively used by NASA in various
campaigns [8].
The simulation input values include the radar systems
parameters, the cinematic characteristics of the airborne
platform, the antenna parameters and the scanning angle
strategy. Other inputs specify the phenomenon characteristics
in term of wind field and radar reflectivity. Last two variable is
represented by a 3D data cube, described before. From both the
initial aircraft position and the initial antenna scan direction,
the simulation consists of the generation of the instantaneous
received signal. For each range bin, the amplitude and phase of
the received signal can be seen as the coherent sum of a
number of contributions that came from volumetric scattering
mechanism.
III. 3DSIMULATION RESULTS
A. Description of the simulated scenario
Simulations were performed with the transponder
characteristics summarized in Table 1. It is worth nothing that
the radar simulator can perform a full 360 scanning, but for
avionic uses we can reduce this range to 180 or less. The
aircraft is positioned in the center (0,0), heading south at 150
knots. The relatively low transmitted power is meant to
simulate the latest state-of-the-art solid-state GaAs radar
transmitters equipping civil avionic weather radars, designed to
work with such low peak power.
TABLE I. TRANSCEIVER CHARACTERISTICS
Transmitted frequency 9.353 GHz
Pulse length 1 s
PRF 6.5 kHz
Range resolution 150 m
Beamwidth 3
Transmitted power 195 Watt
Antenna Gain 33 dB
Noise figure 4 dB
An area of about 1800 km
2
in the Mediterranean Sea, close
to Barcelona, Spain, was selected, with a maximum height of
8000 m. Figure 1 shows the profiles of hydrometeor mixing
ratios obtained from WRF at altitudes of 450 m, 1000 m and
2000 m with a RGB mapping. Red indicates hail/graupel, blue
indicates rain and mixed precipitation zones are in purple.
B. Results
Figures 2 to 4 show some simulation results regarding Z
HH
,
Z
DR
and LDR, which accounts for the more or less pronounced
oscillations of hydrometeors. All these parameters are useful
for classification between liquid and solid dangerous particles.
Figure 2 shows results for the lowest altitude level, well
under the melting layer, dominated by rain. We can notice the
presence of a heavy storm characterized by strong reflectivity
echoes up to 53 dBZ, however we cannot distinguish if these
echoes are due to hail or rain. Analyzing Z
DR
, the radar
retrieves values from 1 up to 3.6 dB in the storm core. As
explained in section I, this behavior indicates a rain dominated
zone, as. Moreover, LDR level do not surpass -25 dB level,
indicating small oscillations of particles during fall, which is
another characteristics of rain. Over -15 dB values appear
usually where both Zhh and Zvh are very low, so the ratio is
similar.
Figure 3 represents an intermediate altitude where rain and
hail are heavily mixed. As expected, total reflectivity level
remains the same as before, but we can appreciate variations in
the values of Z
DR
and LDR. Z
DR
begins to decrease steadily
reaching his top at 2.8 dB, while LDR rises up to a value of -
21.2 dB. This behavior is typical of a mixed precipitation zone,
but we can still detect rain presence in near the borders of the
scanned area at (0,-20) and (-15,10) coordinates.
Where polarimetry shows its potential in detecting
dangerous area is well shown in Figure 4. Once more, total
reflectivity level remains in the 55 dBZ range, but observation
of Z
DR
and LDR supports the evidence of a hail dominated
zone. Maximum value of Z
DR
do not exceed 0.3 dB, and it even
has negative value, -0.1 dB, which can be caused, other than
the tumbling motion of hail, by the Mie scattering effects for
larger stones. LDR rise up to a value of -18/-17 dB, indicating
a very high signal power in the VH channel (see Eq. 2).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that even in an uniform reflectivity phenomenon,
in both its horizontal and vertical structure, polarimetric data
processing can provide useful information for feature
discrimination and thus to reduce risk due to solid particles
impact. Even if the beamwidth is three degrees, combining the
signal received from partially overlapping azimuthal sectors it
is possible to have information which permit to make a good
discrimination and resolve different scattering behaviour.
Further studies will be conducted to evaluate returns from very
long distances. Long ranges suffer also from heavy attenuation
which can be compensated using an additional polarimetric
variable, the Specific Differential Phase (KDP), that is also a
good estimator for rainfall rate. This accurate risk assessment
is not possible with single-polarization avionic radar, so the
only action that is taken is making long detours, even if the
phenomenon would pose no threats.
REFERENCES
[1] F. J. Yanovsky, Evolution and Prospects of Airborne Weather Radar
Functionality and Technology, 18th International Conference on
Applied Electromagnetics and Communications, 2005.
[2] V.N. Bringi, and V. Chandrasekar, Polarimetric Doppler Weather
Radar, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[3] J.M. Straka, D.S. Zrnic, and A.V. Ryzhkov, 'Bulk Hydrometeor
Classification and Quantification Using Polarimetric Radar Data:
Synthesis of Relations, J. Appl. Meteor. 39, 2000, pp. 13411372.
[4] S.E. Koch, The Use of Simulated Radar Reflectivity Fields in the
Diagnosis of Mesoscale Phenomena from High-Resolution WRF Model
Forecasts, 32nd Conference on Radar Meteorology, 2005.
[5] P.C. Waterman, Scattering by Dielectric Obstacles, Alta Frequenza
(Speciale), 1969, pp. 348352., 1969.
[6] M. Mishchenko, L.D. Travis, and A.A. Lacis, Scattering, Absorption
and Emission of Light by Small Particles, Cambridge University Press,
2
nd
ed., 2005.
[7] A. Lupidi, C. Moscardini, F. Berizzi, M. Martorella, "Simulation of X-
Band Polarimetric Weather Radar Returns based on the Weather
Research and Forecast Model", 2011 IEEE Radar Conference, Kansas
City, 2011.
[8] Britt, C., L., Kelly, C., W., Users Guide for an Airborne Doppler
Weather Radar simulation (ADWRS), Center for Aerospace
Technology, Tech. Rep. 7473/029-05S NASA, 2002.
1 (a)
1 (b)
1 (c)
Figure 1: Mixing Ratio: (a) 450 m (b) 1000 m (c) 2000 m altitude
2 (a)
2 (b)
2 (c)
Figure 2: 450 m altitude: (a) Total Reflectivity, (b) ZDR, (c) LDR
3 (a)
3 (b)
3 (c)
4 (a)
4 (b)
4 (c)
Principles of Utilization of Polarization Invariant

Parameters for Classification and Recognition of
Distributed Radar Objects
Part I. Simplest model of a distributed object
Radiodesign Department
Tomsk University of Control Systems and Radioelectronics
Tomsk, Russian Federation
v-n-tatarinov@yandex.ru
Piet van Genderen
IRCTR/MTSRadar
Delft University of Technology
p.vangenderen@tudelft.nl
AbstractThe paper is the first step towards the utilization of
polarization invariant parameters for the classification and
recognition of distributed radar objects. The simplest model of a
distributed object is analyzed using the emergence principle and
a generalization of interference laws. The experimental validation
is presented.
Keywords- emergence principle; generalized interference laws;
distributed radar objects; flight safety
I. INTRODUCTION
Research on the polarization properties of the
electromagnetic field scattered by a distributed radar object
with the aim to classify and recognize them, is closely
connected with the definition of the polarization properties of
the scattered field on the basis of the emergence principle and
with the use of possible relations between polarization
properties of the constituent parts of the complex radar object.
The research leads to the concept of generalized interference
laws. The paper presents the results of the theoretical and
experimental investigation of polarization power parameters at
the scattering of electromagnetic fields by two-point radar
objects. Such a two-point radar target is the simplest model of a
distributed object.
II. THE DEFINITION OF A COMPLEX RADAR OBJECT.
EMERGENCE PRINCIPLE
We will use the definition of a complex radar object using
the Stratton-Chu integral [1] , which allows to represent a field,
scattered by this object, as the sum of waves scattered by
elementary scatterers (bright or brilliant points),
constituting the complex object. For the case when every
elementary scatterer is characterized by its scattering matrix
( ) ; , 1, 2
ik
m
S i k =
then the complex vector of the scattered

field can be defined in the form
( )
( )
( )
0
0
1
0
exp 2
exp 2
4
N
ik
S m m
m
j kR
E S E j kX
R =
=
G G

(1)
where
m
X is distance between the center of gravity of the
object and the m
th
bright point,
0
R is the distance between the
radar and the center of gravity of the object, is the aspect
angle of the object and
0
E
G
is the complex vector of the initial

wave. It is necessary to indicate here that the expression (1)
represents the polarization properties of all individual
scatterers, which together form the large distributed radar
object. Unfortunately, the properties of a large system in
principle cannot be derived by simply adding the properties of
the elementary parts of the system. The properties of the
integral system properties appear after considering the
relations between its elements. These relations lead to the
emergence of new properties which do not exist for every
element separately. The concept of emergence is one of the
main definitions of the systems analysis [2]. So, we will try to
find the polarization properties of the electromagnetic field
scattered off a complex radar object on the basis of the
emergence principle, using the possible relations between the
polarization properties of all elementary scatterers constituting
a complex radar object. We will take into account that these
elementary scatterers cannot be resolved by radar.
III. ANGULAR DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPACE FREQUENCIES
AND STOKES PARAMETERS AT THE SCATTERING BY A
COMPLEX OBJECT
Let us consider now the dependence of the polarization
parameters of the scattered field both on the spatial
distribution of the scatterers and on their possible interactions.
We will consider the simplest complex (distributed) radar
object, consisting of two closely connected scatterers A and
B (reflecting elliptical polarizers), which cannot be resolved
by the radar. These scatterers are separated in space by a
distance l and are characterized by the scattering matrices in
the Cartesian polarization basis
1
1
2
0
0
a
S
a
=

,
1
2
2
0
0
b
S
b
=

(2)
Fig.1. The scattering geometry for the two-point radar object
We will consider coherent scattering. The geometry is shown
in the Fig. 1. Here the distances
1 2
, R R
between the scatterers
and an arbitrary point Q in the far field can be written as
2,1 0 0
0, 5 sin 0, 5 R R l R l under the condition
0
0, 5l R << . Using these expressions, we can find the Jones
vector of the scattered field for the case of the radiated signal
having a linear polarization at an inclination angle of 45 . It is
should be mentioned here that we are using the Cartesian
(linear) polarization basis both for the scattered matrices and
for the Jones vector of the scattered field.
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
2 2
exp exp 2
2 exp exp
S
a j b j
E
a j b j

+
=
+
(3)
where kl = . The angular dependence of the polarization-
energetic response functions in the form of the Stokes
parameters
0 3
, S S is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
3
;
[ ].
X X Y Y
X Y Y X
S E E E E
S i E E E E

= +
=

The expanded form of the energetic response function ( )
0
S
can be found as
( )
0 0 0
0, 5
a b
S S S = + +

( )
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
cos 2 a b a b a a b b a a b b

+ + + + +

(4)
where
( ) ( ) { } 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
Im / Re arctg a b a b a b a b

= + +

and
2 2
0 1 2
a
S a a = + ,
2 2
0 1 2
b
S b b = + . The values
0 0
,
a a
S S are the
Stokes zero-parameters of the elementary scatterers a and
b.
The polarization-angular response function ( )
3
S can be
found as
( )
3 3 3
0, 5
a b
S S S = +

+
( )
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 ( ) sin 2 a b a b a a b b a a b b

+ + + +

(5)
where
( ) ( ) { } 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
Im / Re arctg a b a b a b a b

=

and
( )
3 1 2 1 2
0.5
a
S j a a a a

= ,
( ) 3 1 2 1 2
0.5
b
S j b b b b

=

are the 3-rd
Stokes parameters of the elementary scatterers a and b.
The angular harmonic functions [ ] cos ... , and [ ] sin ... in the
expressions (4) and (5) represent the influence of the spatial
separation l on the distribution of the polarization-energetic
parameters of scattered field in the far zone. The derivative of
the full phase ( ) 2
k
kl = + ( 1, 2 k = ) of the angular
harmonic functions along the angular variable is the space
frequency:
[ ]
1 2
2
2
SP k
d l
f kl
d

= + =
(6)
Thus, the space frequency in the distributed radar object
theory equals twice the distance between the elementary
scatterers constituting the radar object, normalized to the wave
length.
Next we will analyze the amplitudes of the angular harmonic
functions [ ]
1
cos 2kl + , [ ]
2
sin 2kl + in order to assess the
impact of the polarization properties of the elementary
scatterers on the polarization-energetic parameters of the field
scattered by the complex radar object. Let us write the
polarization ratios
2 1
/
A
P a a =
and
2 1
/
B
P b b =

which are
characterizing the point radar objects A and B on the complex
plane of radar objects [3]. Using the method of the
stereographic projections, we can find the spherical distance
between the points ,
A B
S S , laying on the surface of the
Riemann sphere having unit diameter, which are connected
with the points ,
A B
P P

on the radar objects complex plane.
The coordinates of the points ,
A B
S S on the surface of the
sphere are
2 2 2 2
1 2 3
Re /(1 ); Im /(1 ); /(1 ) X P P X P P X P P = + = + = +

and the spherical distance between these points can be found
to be:
2 2
( , )
1 1
A B
S A B
A B
P P
S S
P P
= =
+ +

( )
2 2
2 2
1 1
A B A B A B
A B
P P P P P P
P P

+ +
=
+ +

(6)
where
A B
P P

is the Euclidian metric on the complex plane
of radar objects. After substitution of the polarization ratios
2 1
/
A
P a a =
and
2 1
/
B
P b b =

into the expressions (6) we can
write
( )( )
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
( )
( , )
S A B
a b a b a a b b a a b b
S S
a a b b

+ +
=
+ +

(7)
The value
( )( )
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
( ) a b a b a a b b a a b b
D
a a b b

+ +
=
+ +

(8)
0,5l 0,5l
1
R
2
R
0
R
1
S
2
S
is the so-called polarization distance between two waves (or
radar objects), having different polarizations [5]. When the
waves having coincident polarizations, (
A B
P P =

) can be
characterized by the polarization distance value 0 D = and the
waves having orthogonal polarizations ( 1/
B A
P P
=

) can be
characterized by the polarization distance value 1 D = . Thus, it
follows from (7) and (8) that
( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) a b a b a a b b a a b b D a a b b

+ + = + +

.
We can also use the so-called polarization proximity value N
that can be defined as 1 N D = . Then
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1
a b a b a a b b a a b b
N D
a a b b

+ + +
= =
+ +

(9)
The waves with coinciding polarizations (
A B
P P =

) can be
characterized by the polarization proximity value 1 N = and
the waves having orthogonal polarizations ( 1/
B A
P P
=

) can
be characterized by the polarization proximity value 0 N = .
Then we can write
( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
a b a b a a b b a a b b N a a b b

+ + + = + +

.
If we compare the amplitudes of the space harmonic
oscillations with the expressions (7) and (9), we can see that
the expressions (4) and (5) can be rewritten as
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0 1
0, 5 2 cos 2
a b a b
S S S S S N

= + + +

(10)
( ) ( )
3 3 3 0 0 2
0, 5 2 sin 2
a b a b
S S S S S D

= + + +

(11)
We can consider these expressions as generalized interference
laws [4]. It follows from the expression (10) that the
orthogonally polarized waves cannot give an interference
picture in case the polarization proximity value 0 N = .
However, the expression (11) demonstrates that in this case
the third Stokes parameter will have the maximal value of this
interference picture visibility.
It follows from expressions (10), (11) that every Stokes
parameter has some constant component, which is defined by
the respective Stokes parameters of both objects (a and b),
and space harmonics function [ ]
1
cos 2kl + , [ ]
2
sin 2kl + ,
having amplitudes
0 0
a b
S S N ,
0 0
a b
S S D and space initial
phase
k
. So, the polarization-energetic properties of complex
radar object cannot be found using only the properties of its
individual elements. The properties of the integral system
appear by taking the relations between the individual elements
into account. These relations in our case are the polarization
distance and the polarization proximity. The use of these
values leads to the emergence of new properties which did
not exist for every element separately.
We define an instantaneous visibility of the generalized
interference law as
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
2 .
A B MAX MIN
MAX MIN A B
S S S S
W N
S S S S

= =
+ +
(12)
It can be seen that the equation (12) is coinciding with the well
known expression for the Fresnel-Arago interference law
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
12
1 2
2 ,
MAX MIN
MAX MIN
I I I I
W
I I I I

= =
+ +
where
1 2
, I I are the integrated powers (energies) of the waves
and
12
is a degree of coherence. If
1 2
I I = then the visibility
of the interference law is defined by the degree of coherence
of second order.
So we can state that from a physical point of view the
parameter N can be considered as a polarization coherence
parameter, which defines the proximity of the polarization
states of elementary scatterers, and in the same way a degree
of coherence of stochastic waves is summarized. In this case
we have an instantaneous value of the polarization
coherence, while at the same time the coherence degree
12
is
the correlation value.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
POLARIZATION-ENERGETIC PROPERTIES OF
ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVES SCATTERED BY A TWO-POINT
RADAR OBJECT
A measurement campaign to investigate jointly the
generalized FresnelArago interference laws and the
polarization-energetic properties of the electromagnetic field
scattered by reflecting interferometers (man-made radar
objects consisting of two elements) was realized by the
International Research Centre for Telecommunications and
Radar of TU Delft [5]. In this paper a small part of the results
is presented and interpreted from the point of view of the
generalized FresnelArago interference laws and the
emergence principle with respect to power and polarization
harmonics ( ) ( )
0 3
, S S , corresponding to the space
frequency caused by the distributed radar object used in the
campaign.
A collection of twoelements manmade distributed radar
objects with known polarization properties of their elements
was used in the campaign. The difference between the
properties of the various elements constituting the distributed
radar objects leads to different values of the polarization
proximity or polarization distance of these elements. The
following combinations of two elements manmade
distributed radar objects were used:
1).Two empty trihedral corner reflectors ( 1; 0 N D = = );
2).Two trihedrals, where the first one was empty and the
second one was fitted with a linear polarizer consisting of a
special polarizing grid. ( 0.5; 0.5 N D = = );
3). Two trihedrals, where the first one was empty and the
second one was fitted with an elliptic polarizer consisting of a
special polarizing grid. The transmission coefficients along the
OX and OY axes are 0.5
Y X
b b = and the mutual phase shift
between the polarizers eigen axes is / 2
XY
=
( 1; 0.5;
A B
P P j = =
0.5; N = 0.5 D = ); This object is

presented in the Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Two-point radar object N3
4).Two trihedrals, where the first one was fitted with the linear
polarizer and the second was fitted with an elliptic polarizer
( 0; 0.5; 0.8; 0.2
A B
P P j N D = = = =
).
The phase centers of the trihedrals were separated by 100 cm,
while the wavelength of the radar was 3 cm. For these
parameters the space frequency and space period are
1
2 / ( ) ,
SP
f l Rad

= 0, 015
SP
T Rad = (or 0.855 ). The
mechanical construction, on which the trihedrals were
mounted, rotated with an angular step 0, 25 .
When the object includes the trihedral with the elliptic
polarizer and the empty trihedral (combination 3 ), we can find
the theoretical estimation of the polarization proximity and
distance as 0.5. N D = = In the Fig.3a,b the experimental
angular harmonics functions (generalized interference
pictures)
( ) ( )
0 3
, S S are shown. It follows from these figures
that the visibility for interference picture ( )
0
S is
0
0, 3 W
corresponding to a polarization proximity
0
0.54 N = (note
that the theoretical estimation is N=0.5). The visibility
for ( )
3
S is
3
1 W = , corresponding to a polarization distance
0.5 D = . For the system including the trihedral arranged by
the linear polarizer and empty trihedral (object N2), we can
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
Fig.3a. Generalized interference law
for the Stokes parameter ( )
0
S (object N3)
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
Fig. 3b. Generalized interference law for the Stokes parameter
( )
3
S (object N3)
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
Fig.4a Generalized interference law
0
S (object N2)
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
Fig. 4b. Generalized interference law
3
S (object N2)
find the theoretical estimation visibility values
0
0, 66; W =
3
1 W = that correspond to polarization proximity
values
0 0 3 3
0.82; 1 N W N W = = = = . In the Fig.4a,b the
angular harmonics functions ( ) ( )
0 3
, S S for this situation
are shown.
The experimental estimation based on Fig.4a,b gives us
0 3
0.85; 1 N N = what is the closely coinciding with the
theoretical estimation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The results presented demonstrated the phenomenons which
occur when electromagnetic waves are coherently scattered by
two-point radar objects. These results can be used for
preliminary classification of complex radar objects in the
flight safety problem
REFERENCES
[1] J.A.Stratton, L.J.Chu. Diffraction theory of electromagnetic waves.
Phys. Rev, v.56, pp 308- 316.
[2] F.I.Peregudov, F.P.Tarasenko. The principles of systems analysis.
Tomsk, 2001, 350 p. (In Russian)
[3] V.N. Tatarinov, S.V. Tatarinov, L.P. Ligthart. An introduction to radar
signals polarization modern theory. Tomsk State University Publ
House, 2006, vol.1 380 pp.
[4] V.N. Tatarinov, S.V. Tatarinov. A Generalization of Fresnel-Arago
Interference Laws. Proc. of Int. Conf. SoftCOM 09, Split-Hwar,
Croatia, Sept. 2009
[5] V.N. Tatarinov, S.V. Tatarinov, P. van Genderen, D.Tran, P.Usov,
J.Zijderveld. The Reports IRCTR-S-028-03 and IRCTR-S-029-04.
Principles of Utilization of Polarization Invariant
Parameters for Classification and Recognition of
Distributed Radar Objects
Part II. Multipoint model and correlation theory
Radiodesign Department
Tomsk University of Control Systems and Radioelectronics
Tomsk, Russian Federation
v-n-tatarinov@yandex.ru
Piet van Genderen
IRCTR/MTSRadar
Delft Technology University
p.vangenderen@tudelft.nl
Abstract The paper is the second step towards the utilization of
polarization invariant parameters for classification and
recognition of distributed radar objects. A the theory on the
statistical properties of the polarization parameters of the
scattered field is established and confirmed by the experimental
data
Keywords- Stokes parameters; angular distribution;
autocorrelation function; space spectra of distributed objects
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper demonstrates that the interference process of the
field scattered from multi-point random complex radar objects
(RCRO) leads to polarization-energetic speckles. The
polarization-energetic response function of an RCRO can be
considered to be a collection of space harmonics. Every space
harmonic of this collection is initiated by one pair out of many
pairs, which can be formed by the multi-points constituting the
scattering RCRO. Every space harmonic will have an
amplitude, which will be determined by the value of the
proximity (or distance) of the polarization states of the points
involved in the respective pair. The positions of the elementary
scatterers composing the RCRO are stochastic and we have a
random number of interfering pairs. The polarization proximity
of each pair also is a stochastic parameter, and thus, even when
the spatial separation between points in a pair is the same, we
will have a classical stochastic process at each change of the
aspect angle. Our approach to the problem is novel and it is
formulated like this for the first time.
II. THE POWER ANGULAR DISTRIBUTION OF THE
ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELD SCATTERED BY A DISTRIBUTED
OBJECT
Let us consider first the geometry at the scattering by one of
the scatterers of the multi-point (complex) radar object (fig.1).
For the case of coinciding linear polarizations both for
transmission and reception we can write the field scattered by
a point scatterer
I
(where
I
is the Radar Cross Section
(RCS) of this scatterer) , observed in some point Q in the far
field as
( )
0
exp 2
4
I
S I
I
j kR
E E
R

=

(1)
where
I
R is the distance between the scatterer at
I
X and the
point Q at X (ref. Fig.1) ;
0
E
and
S
E
are the initial and the

scattered field electrical vectors respectively and k is the
wavenumber,
2 k =
, being the wavelength.
Taking into account that
0 I I
R R X (2)
we can write the scattered field in the point Q in the form
( )
( )
( )
0
0
0
exp 2
exp 2
4
S I I
j kR
E E j kX
R

=

(3a)
When all scatterers are characterized by a scattering matrix
( ) ; , 1, 2
il
I
S i l =
, the complex vector of the scattered field will

be connected with the complex vector of the initial field as
( )
( )
( )
0
0
0
exp 2
exp 2
4
il
S I I
j kR
E S E j kX
R
=
G G

(3b)
Let us now consider the formation of the distribution of the
polarization-energetic parameters of the electromagnetic field
resulting from the interference process at the scattering by the
RCRO. To this end we will analyze the scattering process by
the multi-point RCRO. Without loss of generality we will
assume that the point scatterers constituting the RCRO, are
located on a line (see Fig.1).
For the example of Fig.1 we will find that the electrical vector
of the field, scattered by the 4-points complex object, observed
in a point Q located in the far field for the case of coinciding
linear polarization both for transmission and reception is:
( )
( )
( )
0 0
1 1
0
exp 2
{ exp 2
4
S
j kR E
E j kX
R

= +
( )
2 2
exp 2 j kX + +
( ) ( )
3 3 4 4
exp 2 exp 2 }. j kX j kX + +
(4)
Then we can find the instantaneous distribution of the power
of the scattered field in space as a function of the positional
angle as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
{ exp 2
S S
P E E A j kX
= = +

( ) ( )
2 2 3 3
exp 2 exp 2 j kX j kX + + +
( ) ( )
4 4 1 1
exp 2 } { exp 2 j kX j kX + +
( ) ( )
2 2 3 3
exp 2 exp 2 j kX j kX + + +
( )
4 4
1 2 3 4
exp 2 } j kX +
= + + + +

( ) ( )
1 2 12 1 3 13
2 cos 2 2 cos 2 kd kd + + +
( ) ( )
1 4 14 2 3 23
2 cos 2 2 cos 2 kd kd + + +
( ) ( )
2 4 24 3 4 34
2 cos 2 2 cos 2 kd kd + +
(5)
So, the instantaneous distribution of the power of the scattered
field in space as a function of the positional angle is formed
by the sum of the radar cross section of the elementary
scatterers (4 terms) plus 6 cosine oscillations. It can be seen
that all of these cosine terms are caused by the interference
effect between the fields scattered by all pairs of elementary
scatterers constituting the RCRO. The number of these pairs
can be found by the binomial coefficient
( )
!
! !
N
M
M
C
N M N
=
where M is the total number of points, and N is the number of

points in each combination. In our case, where 4 M = , 2 N = ,
we have
2
4
6 C = . So, the angular response function of the
complex radar object considered will include 6 space
harmonic functions as a result of the interference, summarized
in the expression (5). There the values
12 1 2 13 1 3 14 1 4
; ; ; d X X d X X d X X = = =
23 2 3 24 2 4 34 3 4
; ; d X X d X X d X X = = =
represent the spatial distance between the scattering elements
for every interfering pair. The space harmonic function
( ) cos 2
i l il
kd corresponds to the definition in [1]. In
accordance with this definition, the harmonic oscillation in
space having the shape ( ) cos 2kd is defined by the full phase
( )
2
2 2 kd d
= =
, the derivative of which is
1 2
2
SP
d d
f
d

= = . It represents the space frequency with
dimension
1
Rad

. The period 1/ / 2
SP SP
T f d = = having
the dimension [ ] Rad corresponds to this frequency.
So, the full power distribution of the field scattered by a
complex radar object, is the sum of the interference patterns
formed by a collection of elementary two-points interfering
scatterers.
Thus, we can write the random angular representation of the
scattered power, depending on the positional angle as
( ) ( )
2
1 1
2 cos 2
M C
m i l il
m
P kd
=
= +

(6)
where
2
M
C C = is number of combinations, and M is the total
number of elementary scatterers constituting the RCRO.
III. THE ANGULAR DISTRIBUTION OF THE STOKES
PARAMETERS OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELD SCATTERED
BY A DISTRIBUTED OBJECT
It was demonstrated in [1] that the angular distribution of the
Stokes parameter
0 3
and S S of the electromagnetic field
scattered by a two-point distributed object has the form
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0
3 3 3 0 0
2 cos 2 0.5 ;
2 cos 2 0.5 .
a b a b
ab
a b a b
ab
S S S S S N kl
S S S S S D kl

= + + +
= + +
(7)
It follows from expression (7) that the space harmonic
functions ( ) cos 2kl have amplitudes
0 0
a b
ab
S S N
and
0 0
a b
ab
S S D . Here the values ,
ab ab
N D are respectively
the proximity and distance of the polarization states of the
elementary scatterers of the distributed object [1, 2].
Taking this into account, we can write the angular distribution
of the Stokes parameters of the field scattered by a random
complex radar object as the sum of the generalized
interference patterns, which are formed by a collection of
elementary two-points interfering scatterers (see Fig.1):
2
X
3
X
4
X
1
X
4
R
3
R
2
R 1
R
0
R
0
Q
4
R
X
Fig. 1. The scattering geometry for multi-point radar object
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0
1 1
2 cos 2
M C
m
i l il il il
m
S S S S N kd
=
= + +

(9a)
( ) ( )
3 3 0 0
1 1
2 cos 2
M C
m
i l il il il
m
S S S S D kd
=
= + +

(9b)
where
2
M
C C = is the total number of combinations. The
amplitudes of the space harmonics and the initial space phases
of these harmonics will be stochastic values. Thus the further
analysis must be based on statistics.
IV. ATHEORETICAL DEFINITION OF THE
AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION OF THE ANGULAR
DISTRIBUTION OF THE STOKES PARAMETERS OF THE
SCATTERED FIELD. SPACE SPECTRA
Now we will develop a theoretical form of the autocorrelation
function of the angular distribution of the Stokes parameter
( )
3
S of the scattered field.
Since we would like to find the autocorrelation function (not
the covariance function!), we must eliminate a random
constant term
3
1
M
m
m
S
=
from the stochastic function ( )

3
S to
ensure a zero mean value. Taking into account that the value
3
1
M
m
m
S
=
can be a non-stationary stochastic function, the

average must be found using a sliding window. After
elimination of the non-stationary mean value and subsequent
normalization, we can write the stochastic function ( )
3
S as
( ) ( )
3
1
cos 2
C
il il il
S D kd = +

(10)
Lets suppose that the function (10) is a stationary stochastic
function. Then its autocorrelation function can be found as
( ) ( ) ( ) { }
1 2 S
B M S S = =
[ ]
1 1
cos 2
C C
N L N
N L
M D D kd
= =
= +
[ ]} cos 2 ( )
L
kd + +
(11)
Here the space harmonics amplitudes D and the space
initial phase are random values, which can be characterized
by a two-dimensional probability distribution density
( ) 2
, W D , M is the averaging operator and
1 2
= .
We will suppose that the random amplitudes and phases are
independent variables. Then the two-dimensional probability
distribution can be presented as the product of two one-
dimensional distributions:
( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 1
, W D W D W =
Using the orthogonality condition
( ) ( )
1
cos cos
0
N L
SP SP
forN L
d
forN L

=
=

we can rewrite the expression (11) as

( ) ( )
2
1
C
S N
N
B M D
=
[ ] [ ]} cos 2 cos 2 ( )
N N
kd kd + + +
(12)
Considering that the initial stochastic realization
( )
3
S
is a
function of the random variables and D , we will use for
the definition of the autocorrelation function of this realization
the expression for the mean value of a function of two random
variables:
( ) { } ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
, , , M y x x y x x W x x dx dx

=

Using this expression we can write the autocorrelation
function (12):
( ) ( ) [ ]
2
1
cos 2
C
S N N
N
B D kd

=

= +

[ ] ( ) ( ) 2
cos 2 ( ) ,
N
kd W D d D d + +
(13)
For the calculation of the double integral in (13) we will use
the condition
( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 1
, W D W D W = mentioned before.
Lets suppose also that the random phase has a uniform
probability distribution density on the interval
( ) , , i.e.
( ) 1/ 2 W = . A probability distribution density for the random
amplitude D can be preassigned, however for all cases it has
to be one-sided. Now we will transform the product of the
cosine functions and substitute it into (13) together with the
probability distributions of the random variables and D :
( ) ( )
1 2 3
1
C
S
N
B I I I
=
= + +
(14)
Lets now evaluate the integrals
1 2 3
, , I I I . The first integral
gives
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1
0
0.5
cos 2
2
N N
I D kd W D d D d
= =

( ) 0, 5 cos 2
N N
D kd = < >
(15)
where
N
D < > is the mean value of the polarization distance,
which was found by averaging over the statistical ensemble of
random values
N
D for all space harmonics having the space
frequency 2 /
N
SP N
f d = .
The second integral
2
I can be evaluated using the condition
cos
0
sin
d
and the result is

( ) ( )
2
0
0.5
cos 2 2
2
N N
D kd
+

( ) ( ) ( ) 1
cos 2 0.
N
kd W D d D d =
It can be shown that the third integral, containing the sinus
functions, is zero as well:
3
0 I = . Thus, we can write the
theoretical form of the autocorrelation function of the angular
distribution of the Stokes parameters of the scattered field as:
( ) ( )
1
cos 2
2
C
N
S N
N
D
B kd
=
< >
=
(16)
Taking into account that every term of the sum in (16) is the
autocorrelation function for an isolated space harmonic
oscillation
( ) ( ) cos 2
N N N N
S D kd = + having random
amplitude
N
D and random initial space phase
N
, i.e.
( ) ( ) cos 2
2
N
SN N
D
B kd
< >
=
(17)
it can be seen that the autocorrelation function of the
stochastic realization of the Stokes parameters is the sum of
the individual autocorrelation functions of all space harmonics
which are contributing to this stochastic realization:
( ) ( )
1
C
S SN
N
B B
=
=
(18)
Lets now develop complex radar objects averaged space
spectra using expression (18) for the autocorrelation function
of the polarization-angular response. The power spectrum in
the case of isolated space harmonics can be found as the
Fourier transform of the above the autocorrelation function
(17)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp
SP SN SP
P B j d
= =

( ) ( )
0.5 [ ]
N N
N SP SP SP SP
D = < > + +
(19)
where
2
2 2
SP SP
d
f
= = is the space frequency. The

spectral lines are located at the distances
N
SP
from the
origin of the co-ordinate system and their positions are defined
by the space frequency 2 /
N
SP N
f d = of a two-point radar
object. This space frequency depends on the spatial separation
of two reflectors distributed in the space. The intensity of the
power spectral lines is determined by the polarization distance
between the polarization states of two scatterers forming the
radar object.
The full space spectra of the stochastic polarization-angular
response, i.e. the Fourier transform of the autocorrelation
function (8) is
( ) ( ) ( )
1
0, 5 [ ]
C
N N
SP N SP SP
N
P D
=
= < > + +
(20)
So, the power spectra of the polarization angular response
function have a discrete form. It is caused by the discrete
structure of the RCRO. Besides, man-made distributed radar
objects have a finite extension. In this context we have to
emphasize that the power spectra of radar objects have a
limited character.
V. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ACF AND
SPACE SPECTRA
The experimental autocorrelation functions (ACF) and space
spectra of the stochastic polarization-angular response of a
rotated complex radar object (it is a Caterpillar vehicle, a
heavy construction machine) are shown in Fig.2 and Fig.3.
Fig.2 shows the autocorrelation function in the angular
interval 20 w.r.t. the objects board (dashed line) and the
autocorrelation function over the same interval w.r.t. the stern
of the object (solid line). The measurements in these directions
allow us to consider the difference in the radar objects space
spectral bands when it is observed in areas perpendicular to
the board (dashed line) and to the stern of the object (solid
line). It can be seen from Fig. 3 that the RCROs mean power
spectra have a two-mode form. It shows that the so-called
equivalence principle can be used on the average in order to
describe a model of a random complex radar object [3] as two
distributed scatterers in space.
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
Fig. 2. Autocorrelation functions of RCRO
stochastic polarization-angular response
-0,5
0
0,5
1
Fig.3. Mean power space spectra of RCRO
VI. CONCLUSION
The results of this paper confirm that we can consider the
formation of the polarizationpower parameters of the
electromagnetic field scattered by an RCRO as an interference
process. This fact allows us to find both the autocorrelation
function and the RCRO space power spectra of the
polarization-angular stochastic response. It gives us the
possibility for recognition and classification of distributed
radar objects.
REFERENCES
[1] V. N. Tatarinov, P. van Genderen, S. V. Tatarinov. Principles of
Utilization of Polarization Invariant Parameters for Classification and
Recognition of Distributed Radar Objects. Part 1. Simplest Model of a
Distributed Object. Proc. of the Int. Conf. ESAV2011.
[2] V.N. Tatarinov, S.V. Tatarinov, L.P. Ligthart. An introduction to radar
signals polarization modern theory. Tomsk State Univ.. Publ. House,
vol.1 2006, 380 pp. (In Russian)
[3] S.V.Tatarinov, L.P.Ligthart, V.N.Tatarinov. The use of an equivalence
principle on the average for a statement of definition of an random
complex radar object model. Proc. Of MIKON2000, Wrozlaw, Poland,
Vol 2, pp. 12-17

Noncoopeiative location
Enhancingsensitivityforemittergeolocation
Session4.1page89
NewsolutiontoenhancethesecurityinAirTrafficControl
Session4.2page95
SolvingtheDataLinkbottleneckforMPEGLocation
Session4.3page101
ParasiticDopplereffectinpassivelocation
Session4.4page107
Aninairpassiveacousticsurveillancesystemforairtrafficcontrol
Session4.5page111
Enhancing sensitivity for emitter geolocation

Gran Tengstrand, Viktor Andersson, Peter Hultman
Saab Electronic Defence Systems
Jrflla, Sweden
Jean-Franois Grandin, Luc Bosser
Thales Systemes Aeroportes
Elancourt, Cedex France
Dario Benvenuti
Elettronica
Rome, Italy
Brje Andersson, Anders Johansson
Swedish Defence Research Agency
Linkping, Sweden
Abstract Angle of arrival (AOA), time of arrival (TOA) and
frequency of arrival (FOA) can be measured for a signal from
multiple platforms. By combining such measurements it is
possible to obtain high accuracy emitter position estimates. This
requires a data link with low latency and sufficient data-rate and
synchronization of the platforms in space, time and search
pattern. Typically several of the platforms will have to make
their measurements in the radar sidelobes which requires very
high receiver sensitivity. This paper focuses on discussing how
the sensitivity can be improved using antenna gain or signal
processing.
Keywords: Multi-platform emitter geolocation(MPEG), angle of
arrival (AOA), time difference of arrival (TDOA), frequency
difference of arrival (FDOA), data link, sensitivity, electronic
support measures (ESM).
I. INTRODUCTION
Fire control radars usually are active only for short time
periods and represent severe threats to fighter aircraft. Using
electronic support measures (ESM) receivers the threat signals
can be detected and measured. It would be of a high tactical
value if these ESM receivers had the capability to obtain a high
accuracy emitter position estimate almost instantaneously.
In order to obtain accurate position estimates of radar
emitter it is crucial to have accurate position and time
synchronization among the cooperating platforms. Clocks and
platform positions can be synchronized with a theoretical
relative accuracy of the order of 10 ns and 5 m using common
view (CV) GPS (see Parkinson and Spilker [1]). Furthermore,
precision crystal and rubidium clocks are now commercially
available mitigating the requirements for precise clock
synchronization. Reference emitters with well-known positions
can also be a complement to GPS for synchronization of clocks
and platform positions.
The time of arrival (TOA) of intercepted radar pulses can
typically be measured with a precision of around 10 ns. The
phase change of a signal during a 10 ms radar illumination
typically can be measured with an accuracy of around 20
which corresponds to a frequency measurement accuracy of
around 10 Hz.
Assume that the time difference of arrival (TDOA) of a
pulse to two ESM systems can be measured with an accuracy
of the order of 15 ns which corresponds to a distance difference
of 4.5 m. Using multi-platform time difference of arrival (MP-
TDOA) with an ESM platform separation of 1 km the bearing
to the emitter then can be obtained with an accuracy of around
0.3 in the normal direction to the platform separation line.
With more than two platforms the 2D emitter position can be
estimated. An introduction to TDOA emitter geolocation can
be found in Wiley [2].
For multi-platform frequency difference of arrival (MP-
FDOA) the orientation of the line of positions (LOP) and the
accuracy is strongly dependent on the platform relative
trajectories. Assume that two ESM platforms move 1 km after
each other with a speed of 300 m/s and that the frequency
difference of arrival to the platforms can be determined with an
accuracy of around 10 Hz at 10 GHz. In the normal direction to
the line between the platforms this corresponds to a bearing
difference of 0.06. At a range of 10 km from the emitter the
range can then be estimated with an accuracy of the order of
100 m. FDOA geolocation is discussed in Wiley [2].
In order to obtain a good range estimate the measuring
ESM platforms must have a rather large separation.
Measurement of TOA and frequency on the same pulses
implies that some of the ESM platforms will perform their
measurements in the radar sidelobes which requires a very high
sensitivity. The objective of this contribution is to discuss how
such a high sensitivity can be obtained and how high accuracy
measurements still can be obtained.
In section II ESM receiver sensitivity requirements are
motivated from a scenario example. With a channelized
receiver with narrowband receiver channels a basic good
sensitivity can be obtained. The use of antennas and signal
processing in order to improve the sensitivity is discussed in
section III and section IV, respectively. Methods to measure
signal parameters for weak signals are then analyzed in section
V. The conclusions are finally summarized in section VI which
is followed by a reference list.
II. SENSITIVITY REQUIREMENTS
A modern fire control radar using pulse compression can be
expected to have an output power P
tr
= 1 kW and a mainbeam
antenna gain G
tr
= 35 dB. The effective aperture area of an
ideal isotropic antenna at a frequency f = 10 GHz is given by
A
iso
=
2
/(4) = 0.72 cm
2
. At a range R = 20 km the power
received by such an ideal isotropic antenna is then given by P
rec
= P
tr
G
tr
A
iso
/(4R
2
) = -43 dBm. The sidlobe antenna gain of a
radar can be expected to be 35 40 dB below the mainlobe
The authors acknowledge support from the European Defence Agency
(EDA), French DGA, Swedish FMV and Italian MOD which have contributed
to the funding of this study under EDA contract B-0055-IAP2-ERG.
antenna gain. In a sidelobe of the radar in our scenario example
the power level can hence be expected to be down to around
-80 dBm for an ideal isotropic antenna.
Consider a channelized receiver (see Tsui [3]) with B = 20
MHz channel bandwidth and a noise and loss factor F = 15 dB.
Then the sensitivity is given by P
min
= kTFBSNR
min
= -73 dBm.
Here kT = -174 dB(mW/Hz) is the Boltzmanns constant and a
reference temperature and SNR
min
= 13 dB is a minimal signal
to noise ratio. The boresight gain of a wideband widelobe
antenna is around 0 dBi and around -20 dBi at 90 from
boresight.
In order to detect and measure important threat radars in
their sidelobes an extra sensitivity improvement of at least
around 10 dB is required. The sensitivity can be improved by
using a directional antenna, two antennas, signal integration or
a matched filter. Different methods to detect weak signals are
also discussed in Tsui [4] and Pace [5].
III. USE OF ANTENNAS
A. Directional antennas
A wideband phased array antenna covering a frequency 3:1
ratio with 88 elements could be a suitable alternative to obtain
extra sensitivity. With an antenna element separation of /2 at
the highest frequency the antenna width would be 4. Then at
the highest frequency the beamwidth would be around 15 and
the gain would be 23 dBi. At the lowest frequency the
beamwidth and the gain would be around 45 and 13 dBi. With
a frequency coverage of 6 18 GHz such an antenna would
have an aperture width of 6.7 cm. A drawback with wideband
phased arrays is their complexity and that they have a limited
instantaneous field of view. Hence precise synchronization
between the platforms is required in order to focus the antennas
towards the threat under investigation. This does however
require some knowledge of the position of the threat,
something which may not be available.
B. Two antennas
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-90
-80
-70
[
d
B
m
]
(a) Signal power [dBm] (threshold=-77 dBm)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-90
-80
-70
[
d
B
m
]
(b) Noise power [dBm] (threshold=-77 dBm)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-90
-80
-70
[
d
B
m
]
(c) Power of signal with noise [dBm] (threshold=-77 dBm)
Time [s]
Figure 1. (a) Ideal received signal power in dBm, b) noise power in dBm,
(c) power of signal and noise.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-90
-80
-70
(a) 2-antenna mutual down-conversion (threshold=-79dBm)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-90
-80
-70
(b) 2-antenna mutual down-conversion 16-point average (threshold=-88 dBm)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-90
-80
-70
(c) 2-antenna mutual down-conversion 32-point average (threshold=-89 dBm)
Time [s]
Figure 2. (a) 2-antenna signal mutual down-conversion, (b) and (c) down-
conversion and 16- and 32-point averaging.
An alternative to a phased array is to use two separate
equally directed antennas and two separate receivers. The noise
and loss factor of a wideband receiver usually is of the order of
15 dB. Hence the internal noise in each receiver dominates the
noise in the received signals. Now let us consider the signals
from the same frequency channel for the two antennas. The
signals received from a certain emitter will then be the same
except for a constant phase difference and the two essentially
independent receiver noises. In order to detect a signal one of
the antenna signals is down-converted by the other and low-
pass filtered.
Pulsed radar signals usually have no modulation, linear
frequency modulation (LFM), binary phase shift keying
(BPSK), poly-phase coding including digital variants of LFM,
or more random complex frequency modulation like Costas
codes. The pulse width and the bandwidth of typical modulated
radar pulses can be expected to be 3 10 s and 1 10 MHz,
respectively. This means that LFM pulses have a frequency
derivative of 0.1 3 MHz/s.
In Figure 1. a set of -80 dBm pulses from a 20 MHz
receiver frequency channel is shown, the receiver noise and the
sum of the ideal signal and the noise. The three first signals
have linear frequency modulation (LFM) with bandwidths of 5
MHz, 10 MHz and 10 MHz and pulsewidths of 3 s, 5 s and
10 s. The fourth signal has a binary phase modulation with 31
subpulses with 150 ns length each. The two last pulses are
short unmodulated pulses with pulsewidths of 1 s and 0.5 s.
The noise floor reference is at -77 dBm.
In Figure 2. the down-conversion of one antenna signal
with the other is shown with 1-, 16- and 32-point averaging.
All -80 dBm signals can be easily seen above the noise
background. The noise floors are at -79 dBm, -88 dBm and -89
dBm. This corresponds to processing gains of 2 dB, 11 dB and
12 dB. The time of arrival (TOA) of the pulses can be expected
to be measured with an accuracy of around 100 ns for the case
with 16-point averaging.
If the antenna separation is short the phase of the down-
converted signal can be used for estimation of the angle of
arrival of the received signal. The major drawbacks with this
approach are that it requires twice the hardware resources and
space compared to a single channel approach and that the
sensitivity will be dependent on the direction to the threat.
IV. USE OF SIGNAL PROCESSING
A. Short-time Fourier transform ( STFT)
Signal power [dBm] after 16-point STFT (threshold=-89 dBm)
Time [s]
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y

[
M
H
z
]
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Figure 3. Signal power in dBm after a 16-point STFT.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-100
-90
-80
[
d
B
m
]
(a) Some 16-point STFT frequency channels (threshold=-89 dBm)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-100
-90
-80
[
d
B
m
]
(b) Maximum of all 16-point STFT frequency channels (threshold=-89 dBm)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-100
-90
-80
[
d
B
m
]
(c) One 16-point STFT frequency channel (threshold=-89 dBm)
Time [s]
Figure 4. (a) Some 16-point STFT frequency channels, (b) maximum of all
frequency channels, (c) one of the frequency channels.
Typical threat LFM pulses have a frequency derivative of
0.1 3 MHz/s. Hence a receiver could use a short-time
Fourier transform (STFT) with a frequency resolution of
around 1 MHz to create a time-frequency (TF) representation
of the received signal. The next step could then be to search for
patterns in this TF picture with an energy above a suitable
threshold. In Figure 3. and Figure 4. a 16-point STFT of the
noisy -80 dBm signal in Figure 1. is shown. Here we can
clearly see the time-dependent instantaneous frequencies for
the three LFM pulses. The BPSK pulse has an instantaneous
spread of its power and the short unmodulated pulses are
concentrated in frequency. The noise floor is at -89 dBm which
corresponds to a processing gain of 12 dB. The time of arrival
(TOA) of the pulses can be measured with an accuracy of
around 100 ns.
B. Signal squaring
Power of squared signal [dBm] after 16-point STFT (threshold=-86 dBm)
Time [s]
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y

[
M
H
z
]
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Figure 5. 16-point STFT of the square of the received noisy signal.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-90
-80
[
1
d
B
m
]
(a) Some channels of 16-point STFT of squared signal (threshold=-86 dBm)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-90
-80
[
d
B
m
]
(b) Maximum of all channels of 16-point STFT of squared signal (threshold=-86 dBm)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-90
-80
[
d
B
m
]
(c) One channel of 16-point STFT of squared signal (threshold=-86 dBm)
Time [s]
Figure 6. (a) Some channels of 16-point STFT of squared signal,
(b) maximum of all channels, (c) one of the channels.
Let us now consider a BPSK signal in a 20 MHz frequency
channel. By squaring the signal we obtain an unmodulated
narrowband signal with twice the original frequency. A 16-
point short-time Fourier transform (STFT) for the square of the
noise signal in Figure 1. is shown in Figure 5. A problem is
that a peak is obtained at zero frequency due to the squared
noise. This could be mitigated by instead multiplying the signal
with a copy of the signal which is delayed one or two samples
in order to decorrelate the product of the noise contributions.
This does however require temporally uncorrelated noise. In
the time-frequency picture shown in Figure 5. and in Figure 6.
the beginning and end of each pulse is easily seen. The LFM
pulses have doubled frequency ridges due to frequency folding
of the doubled frequency. The BPSK pulse has a frequency
ridge with constant frequency. Measurement of the carrier
frequency will be ambiguous in this case. The noise floor is at -
86 dBm which corresponds to a processing gain of 9 dB.
C. Correlation with a delayed signal
Costas codes can be seen as LFM pulses where subpulses
have been randomized in time. In order to detect Costas coded
pulses we have to use more general methods. Radar pulses are
often transmitted as a train of coherent equal pulses. In such a
case one can correlate the received signal with a delayed copy
of the signal. There will then be a pronounced peak for a delay
that is equal to the pulse repetition interval (PRI). With an
integration time of 1 s there will be a processing gain of
around 10 dB.
D. Matched filter method
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
-100
-90
-80
[
d
B
m
]
(a) Signal + noise correlated with first LFM signal (threshold=-96 dBm)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
-100
-90
-80
[
d
B
m
]
(b) Signal + noise correlated with second LFM signal (threshold=-100 dBm)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
-100
-90
-80
[
d
B
m
]
(c) Signal + noise correlated with third LFM signal (threshold=-100 dBm)
Time [s]
Figure 7. Correlation of the noisy received signal with ideal templates of the
first (a), second (b) and the third (c) LFM pulses.
In a typical scenario at least one of the ESM platforms is
illuminated by the radar main beam. Then the radar waveform
can be measured at a high signal to noise ratio (SNR) and the
parameters of the received pulses can be sent to the cooperating
ESM platforms. These parameters can be used to compute
pulse templates. The noisy received signal at the cooperating
ESM platforms can then be correlated with these templates and
obtain a large processing gain. This of course requires that the
pulse waveform does not change. In Figure 7. the received
noisy -80 dBm signal in Figure 1. is correlated with noise-free
copies of each of the three LFM pulses. The time of arrival
(TOA) of the pulses here can be measured with an accuracy of
around 25 ns.
E. Video filtering
If the signal to noise ratio (SNR) in the 20 MHz frequency
channel is larger than 0 dB then low-pass filtering can increase
the sensitivity. In Figure 8. 16-, 32- and 64-point averages of
the instantaneous power of the received noisy signal from a 20
MHz frequency channel from Figure 1. are shown. The five
pulses are all easily seen.
The noise floors are at -83.5 dBm, -84.5 dBm and -85 dBm
corresponding to processing gains of 6.5 dB, 7.5 dB and 8 dB.
If a pulse is detected the corresponding samples can be stored
for a while in a short-term memory.
If a pulse template is available within a few seconds then
important signal parameters can be measured with better
accuracy using cross correlation of the signal and the pulse
template.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-86
-84
-82
-80
-78
-76
[
d
B
m
]
(a) 16-point average of instantaneous power (threshold=-83.5 dBm)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-86
-84
-82
-80
-78
-76
[
d
B
m
]
(b) 32-point average of instantaneous power (threshold=-84.5 dBm)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-86
-84
-82
-80
-78
-76
[
d
B
m
]
(c) 64-point average of instantaneous power (threshold=-85 dBm)
Time [s]
Figure 8. 16-, 32- and 64-point averages of the instantaneous power.
V. SIGNAL MEASUREMENTS
If a pulse is detected by using some method then the
corresponding signal samples can be stored in a pulse memory.
Radars typically send trains of similar pulses. One can then
correlate such a set of pulses with each other. The pulses can
then be aligned in time and phase. By averaging between such
a train of aligned pulses we can obtain a pulse template with
reduced noise background. By correlating the original pulses
with the template each pulse is replaced by a narrow pulse-
compressed peak. Then time of arrival (TOA) and phase can be
determined with high accuracy. From the relative phases of the
pulses in the train high accuracy estimates of the frequency of
arrival (FOA) can be obtained. By exchanging TOA and FOA
measurement data between platforms high accuracy estimates
of the emitter positions can be obtained (see Wiley [2]).
VI. DISCUSSION
The optimal way to get high sensitivity and perform high
accuracy measurements would probably be to use a wideband
phased array antenna with a gain of 15 25 dB combined with
a channelized digital receiver with a channel bandwidth of 10
20 MHz. The drawbacks with such a solution is high
complexity, high cost and that all contributing antennas must
be pointing towards the same area of interest at the same time.
Using 16-point short-time Fourier transform (STFT) for
selected 20 MHz channels is quite a good alternative with
much less complexity. The processing gain with such a
solution is a factor of 16 which equals 12 dB if most of the
instantaneous signal power falls into one STFT channel at a
time. STFT gives a time-frequency (TF) representation of the
signal which can be used to measure pulse characteristics.
Pulses with binary phase shift keying (BPSK) with short
subpulses have a large instantaneous bandwidth and then STFT
can be less advantageous although such a pulse can often be
seen quite well anyway in the STFT channels. A signal
processing complement can be to perform a 16-point STFT on
a squared channel signal instead since the binary phase-shifts
are erased by the squaring of the signal.
Often a pulse template can be obtained from a signal library
or from a cooperating ESM platform. Then the received
channel signal can be correlated with this pulse template and
for each pulse of that type a narrow strong spike is obtained
enabling high accuracy measurements of time of arrival (TOA)
and frequency of arrival (FOA). For a 10 s pulse and a 20
MHz channel we will have a processing gain of a factor 200 or
23 dB.
A complement to the more advanced methods could be to
use 16-, 32- or 64-point averaging of the signal power in order
to obtain a substantial processing gain of 6 8 dB. The
advantage with such incoherent integration is the low
complexity of this method.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It would be very advantageous for modern fighter aircraft
to have a capability of obtaining high accuracy estimates of the
position of important threat radars after a few seconds. This is
possible by exchanging high accuracy measurements of the
time of arrival and frequency of arrival of signals to
cooperating ESM platforms. This typically requires that some
of the ESM platforms have to have sensitivity to detect and
measure the signals in the radar sidelobes. After examining a
set of possible methods we can conclude that there are several
methods that can give a sensitivity that in many important
scenarios will allow measurement also in the radar sidelobes.
REFERENCES
[1] Bradford W Parkinson, James J Spilker (Ed), Global positioning
system: Theory and applications, Volume I and II, Progress in
astronautics and aeronautics, 1996.
[2] R. G. Wiley, ELINT: The interception and analysis of radar signals,
Artech House, 2006.
[3] J. B. Y. Tsui, Digital techniques for wideband receivers, Second
edition, SciTech Publishing, 2004.
[4] James B Y Tsui, Special design topics in digital wideband receivers,
Artech House, 2009.
[5] P. E. Pace, Detecting and classifying low probability of intercept
radar, Artech House, 2009.
New solution to enhance the security in Air Traffic

Control
Enrico Anniballi
*
, Roberta Cardinali
+
SESM s.c.a.r.l.
Via Tiburtina 1238
Rome, Italy
*
eanniballi@sesm.it,
+
rcardinali@sesm.it
Abstract Conventional civil Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems
are able to detect targets and identify collaborative aircrafts in
the air space but they dont assure full coverage at low altitude,
in presence of non cooperative targets (NCTs) and aircraft A/C
with a low value of radar cross section (RCS). In the following a
new architecture to address this problem is proposed. The new
ATC architecture foresees the combined use of conventional
system, such as Primary and Secondary Radar, ADSB, etc., and
innovative systems such as a new enhanced PSR, passive and
bistatic radar network. In the following the new system
architecture will be described. The approach foresees a data
fusion center and a decision support system as a valid support for
the situation awareness. Starting from the single sensors, the
overall performance of the new ATC system are showed by a first
preliminary analysis of data fusion. This results show the
advantage of the new system respect to the conventional one
specially in absence of the PSR coverage where the current
system dont allows to address the radar blind zones problem.
Keywords: Air traffic control; Passive radar; PSR; radar blind
zone;. data fusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the recent terroristic acts, e.g. the failed attempt in
December 2009 on the flight Amsterdam-Detroit, the recent
terroristic attempt in Moscow airport in January 2011 and the
current international situation, the security concept became
very important to protect the people [2], especially in the air
transportation field, always been considered critical for this
issues. As a consequence the awareness about the possibility
of large-scale, terrorist offensive actions delivered against
civil society by means of aircrafts (A/C), that can be used
either for carrying out kinetic attacks (i.e. crashing planes
into buildings, as it happened for the 9/11 attack against the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon) or for delivering
chemical and/or biological pollutants is increasing.
Conventional Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems for civil
applications cover large airspace and are able to locate a
vehicle inside the coverage area and identify (considering A/C
as friendly) only cooperative A/C (i.e. those responding to
the interrogations from the Secondary Surveillance Radar -
SSR), but they are characterised by the following main
drawbacks [3]:
1. they do not assure the full coverage, particularly at low
altitudes, due to the presence of the so called radar blind zones
(i.e. regions where the radar coverage of the Primary
Surveillance Radar PSR - and of the SSR are almost
ineffective);
2. they are not able to fully localize non-cooperative targets
(NCTs), because the PSR only returns range and azimuth
angle and without response by the airborne transponder no
information is available concerning the A/C altitude;
3. they are not able to identify NCTs, that could be either
hostile A/C approaching a forbidden area and/or somehow
threatening the homeland security (and therefore deserving a
counteraction by the responsible for homeland security) or
friend A/C having a breakdown (and therefore requiring some
kind of help);
4. they are unable to detect A/C characterised by a low
value of radar cross section (RCS), because they are tailored
for efficiently monitoring large A/C.
II. SECURITY CONCEPT
The presented problem is addressed by the Air Guidance
and Surveillance 3D (ARGUS 3D) project
1
[1]. The overall
objective of ARGUS 3D project is to enhance the security of
European citizens, as well as of strategic assets by contrasting,
on large areas, unpredictable and unexpected terrorist threats
that can be delivered by means of small and low-flying
(manned or unmanned) A/C.
In order to achieve this general objective, ARGUS 3D
project intends to carry out research and development
activities aimed at improving the current ATC systems for
civil applications, extending their coverage and making them
able to detect, recognize and track non-cooperative targets
(NCTs).
The scientific and technical objective of ARGUS 3D project
is studying, designing and implementing an innovative, low-
cost, multi-sensor, radar-based system for 3D air guidance and
surveillance that integrates conventional surveillance systems
currently used for civil applications and two classes of non-
conventional radar systems:
1. Innovative PSR sensors, i.e. an enhanced PSR with
monopulse estimation capability in the vertical plane and
therefore able to return the altitude information for any

1
Description of work of EU-project ARGUS3D, seventh framework
programme, theme #10 security Grant agreement no.: 218041
Figure 1 ARGUS 3D architecture
detected target;
2. networks of multi-operational, high-performing passive
radar sensors [4][5], which are a special form of radar
receivers that detect and track objects by processing
reflections from non-cooperative sources of illumination
already available in the environment (e.g. commercial
broadcast and communications signals).
3.bistatic radar sensors [6] for extending range that further
allow to detect anomalies in the air space.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The innovation and the added value of ARGUS 3D consist
of the integration among new and traditional systems. Indeed
it can be seen as composed by two main blocks. The first is
related to the traditional systems (PSR, SSR ADS-B, etc.), the
second is the part related to the innovative surveillance
system. These new systems, are composed by:
a new PSR that exploiting the difference of the gain
of the radar beams of conventional multi-beam 2D PSR,
allows to obtain an estimation of the A/C altitude.
Passive radar network, which is able to detect and
track potential targets by using the transmitters of opportunity
avoiding to emit pulses and to be localized by other sensors.
Bistatic radar network, which is able to detect and
track potential targets by using the emission of cooperative or
non-cooperative primary radar.
Figure 1 shows in more detail the ARGUS 3D architecture.
The new system hasnt influence on the traditional system that
continues to work in its traditional way without affecting the
operation as it is at present. It can be considered as an added
value .It can exploit the information of traditional system
trying to obtain more information about the observed
environment. To achieve this objective all data, coming from
new and traditional systems, after signal processing and an
appropriate interface, enter in the consistency block.
Due to the variety and non-homogeneity of the different
subsystems that compose ARGUS 3D, a new data fusion
block is required in order to combine the data of new and
traditional systems. After data fusion the data are sent to the
decision support system (DSS). This module can take three
different decision according to the current situation. If there is
a cooperative target with a regular route, the data are classified
as normal situation and any alarm is triggered. If there is a
cooperative target but an anomalous situation is detected, the
data are sent to an operator that analyzes the situation and
decides, after any further checks, if there is an anomalous
situation that needs to trigger the alarm. In the worst case, i.e.
when there is a presence of non-cooperative target and
therefore also an anomalous situation (e.g. the SSR doesnt
work), the alarm is trigger automatically. Even if the inputs of
the DSS are the data coming from the various sensors (only
consistent data) it is also supported by a dynamic database that
takes into account all a priori information available about the
situation under test (e.g. assigned routes, altitude, etc.).
Moreover, a new display will be developed by ARGUS 3D
project in order to allow to the final user a more complete
situation awareness that exploits both traditional and
innovative data and the possibility to simply intervene in case
of alarm.
IV. ARGUS 3DFUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND
PERFORMANCES STUDY
The Table 1 shows the operational requirements of the
overall ARGUS 3D system in terms of desired performances.
Table 1 ARGUS 3D desired performances
In the following some preliminary results concerning the
overall ARGUS3D system performances will be showed. It is
important to highlight that the performed analysis are based on
some simplified hypothesis:
The PSR performance are evaluated considering that
the target is in the main lobe of the radar, while the
real antenna pattern is not considered;
The received antennas are omni-directional, even if
in real applications it is important to have an
antenna with a very low gain in the back lobe (the
gain in the direction of the transmitter has to be as
small as possible in order to reduce the
interference due to direct signal from the
transmitter);
The positions of the receivers do not take into
account strengths, described in the previous point,
due to the antenna pattern;
The analysis is limited to the evaluation of combined
performance of PSR and passive radar network
that exploits FM radio transmitter as transmitter of
opportunity.
The FM radio transmitter antenna is considered
omni-directional. This hypothesis is acceptable for
the azimuthal gain that is not realistic for elevation
antenna gain (the radio transmitter normally cover
only ground area).
The analysis is performed exploiting to different scenarios:
the first one is a very simple scenario with a single mountain
pick in the area, while the second one consider a
representation of the morphology of a portion of Italian
territory around the city of Rome.
The first results have been obtained by considering the first
simple scenario showed in Figure 2, in which the PSR is
highlighted with red star and a the transmitter of opportunity is
represented in green.
Figure 2 First considered scenario for the performances
analysis
The considered area is 200x200 Km large and it is
characterized by the presence of a mountain. The position of
the transmitter of opportunity is defined to be on top of the
mountain as usually happens in real cases. By considering an
isotropic antenna pattern for the transmitter, this also ensures
that all passive sensors, that will be located in the area, receive
the signal from the transmitter even if with different power.
In the following an analysis of the detection probability (Pd)
in the considered area is showed, both in presence of only the
PSR, and in presence of PSR and new passive radars.
Figure 3 ARGUS 3D performances (Pd) by considering only
PSR (RCS=1, altitude=1000m)
Figure 3 represents the probability of detection in the
considered area in the presence of only PSR coverage. The Pd
has been obtained by considering a radar cross-section (RCS)
of 1m
2
at the altitude of 1000m. As showed in the figure, the
presence of the mountain doesnt allow to assure the radar
coverage behind it and the performances decrease quickly
from a distance grater than about 130Km from the PSR.
Figure 4 Overall ARGUS 3D performances (Pd) with PSR
and passive radars (RCS=1 m
2
, altitude=1000m)
Figure 4 shows the same scenario where also the passive
radar has been included. The passive receivers are highlighted
in magenta. As expected, the performance of the single
receiver are better in the area near the transmitter due to the
higher value o the signal to noise ratio (SNR). Comparing the
Figure 4 with the previous one it is possible to see how the
area beyond the mountain respect to PSR, not covered in
Figure 3 its now covered with an high value of Pd. Instead the
area on the right is characterized from high values of Pd in the
area close to the receivers but with small value elsewhere.
Figure 5 overall ARGUS 3D performances (Pd) with PSR
and passive radars (RCS=10m
2
, altitude=1000m)
This problem could be solved by optimizing the receivers
position respect to the received SNR. In this way in the area
near the transmitters the receivers should have a higher
distance respect to the more distant area. The blue area on the
left-top of Figure 4 represent the physical occupation of the
mountain: obviously in that area, the expected Pd is zero.
Figure 5 shows the simulation results by considering the same
parameters of the previous ones, but with a RCS equal to
10m
2
. In this case the PSR covers a larger area with an high
value of Pd. By analyzing the figure it is clear that less passive
receivers are needed to have better performance. The
effectiveness of PSR guarantees high performance that hide
the effects of passive radar.
Figure 6 overall ARGUS 3D performances (Pd) with PSR
and passive radars (RCS=1 m
2
, altitude=10000m)
Figure 6 shows the overall ARGUS3D performance with a
RCS equal to 1m
2
but this time it is calculated by considering
an altitude equal to 10000m. As it possible to see, the blind
zone due to the mountain is not present for the high altitude.
However the performances of the passive receivers are worse
than Figure 4. This can be justified because the path
transmitter-target-receivers is longer at high altitude and the
received signal, and consequently the signal to noise ratio, is
smaller. The analysis follows using the system in a realistic
scenario, shown in Figure 7, that represents the area around
Rome city in Italy. In this case, the area analyzed in more
complex for the simultaneous presence of sea and mountain
that limit the PSR performance and the possibility to locate
Passive receivers.
Figure 7 Second realistic scenario for the performances
analysis
As expected, the presence of mountains creates blind zone for
the PSR at low altitude: Figure 8 shows the detection
probability of primary radar for a target with a RCS of 10 m
2
at 1000m of altitude. It is evident that beyond the mountain
picks a low altitude flying vehicle is not detectable by PSR
even if its distance is inferior to the maximum detectable
range. Instead, the presence of sea in a wide area of the
scenario from some point of view is positive because the PSR
assures a wide coverage for the absence of physical obstacles,
on the other hand the sea does not allow to install Passive
Coherent Locator (PCL) receivers if necessary.
Figure 8 ARGUS 3D performances (Pd) for realistic scenario
by considering only PSR (RCS=10 m
2
, altitude=1000m)
In order to overcome this problem it is possible to introduce
passive radar to fill the gaps of conventional ATM systems.
Figure 9 Overall ARGUS 3D performances (Pd) for realistic
scenario with PSR and passive radars (RCS=1o m
2
,
altitude=1000m)
Figure 9 shows the performance of both PSR and passive
radar network. Particularly the yellow star represent the
position of PSR, the green star the position of the transmitter
of opportunity of PCL network and the pink stars the position
of PCL receivers. It is evident that the presence of passive
radar network allows to increase the performance of ATM
system even in areas not covered by PSR. The blue areas that
remain in the figure are zones where the mountain altitude is
superior than 1000m and then it is not possible to evaluate the
performance in that areas because the space is physically
occupied by the mountain.
V. FUTURE WORKS
Future activities foreseen the optimization of the receivers
position taking into account different aspects not considered in
this analysis, as:
the antenna pattern of transmitter and receivers,
the localization of PCL receivers only in the real
blind zone PSR in the interested area
More than one transmitter in the area.
To consider also the presence of different transmitter
of opportunity, as DVB-T, DAB, etc.
The effect of blindness in the baseline between
transmitter and receiver.
Moreover, further analysis on the data accuracy will
performed in order to evaluate the added value of the
innovative architecture not only in term of coverage, but also
in term of ARGUS 3D system achievable accuracy and
resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new system concept to enhance the security
of European citizens, as well as of strategic assets by
contrasting, on large areas, unpredictable and unexpected
terrorist threats that can be delivered by means of small and
low-flying (manned or unmanned) A/C was presented. Using a
combined way of conventional system, new 3D PSR and
network of multi-operational, high-performing passive/bistatic
radar sensors, ARGUS 3D intend to improve the current ATC
systems for civil applications, extending their coverage and
making them able to detect, recognise and track non-
cooperative targets. Moreover, the presence of multiple
sensors allows to increase also the accuracy of target position.
This was proved both in a simple scenario and in a realistic
scenario that takes into account the real morphology of Italian
territory.
It has been showed as the overall performances depend by
many factors. In particular the overall P
d
decrease for small
value of RCS and for high altitude, particularly in the areas
covered only by passive radar. Basing on the performances to
be achieved, the location of the passive receivers have to be
decided by considering the received SNR. The performed
analysis can be used as preliminary instrument for the
localization of PCL receivers in under surveillance area.
The possibility to locate non-cooperative target in the PSR
blind zone allows to increase the air-space and air traffic
security and consequently the citizen security. The presented
simulations show the first preliminary results of ARGUS 3D
performances.
VII. REFERENCES
[1] Description of work of EU-project ARGUS3D,
seventh framework programme, theme #10 security
Grant agreement no.: 218041
[2] Understanding the Threat of New Terrorism
(March 2007)
[3] M. I. Skolnik, Radar Handbook, 2nd ed. McGraw-
Hill, 1990.
[4] Griffiths, H.D.; Baker, C.J., Passive coherent
location radar systems. Part 1: performance
prediction IEE Proc. Radar, Sonar and Navigation,
Volume 152, No. 3, June 2005, pp.153-159
[5] A. Lauri, F. Colone, R. Cardinali, C. Bongioanni, P.
Lombardo, Analysis and emulation of FM radio
signals for passive radar, 2007 IEEE Aerospace
Conference, Big Sky (MT), USA, 3-10 March 2007.
[6] N. J. Willis, Bistatic Radar, Artech House, 1991
h
1

n
L
1

n
h
1

n
L
Solving the Data-Link bottleneck for MPEG Location

Jean-Franois GRANDIN, Luc BOSSER
Thales Systmes Aroports
2 Avenue Gay Lussac 78851 Elancourt CEDEX FRANCE
jean-francois.grandin@fr.thalesgroup.com
Dario BENVENUTI
ELETRONICA
Via Tiburtina Valeria Km 13,700 - 00131 Roma, ITALIA
Gran TENGSTRAND, Viktor ANDERSSON,
Peter HULTMAN
SAAB
Saab EDS, SE-17588 Jrflla, Sweden
Brje ANDERSSON, Anders JOHANSSON
FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency,
P.O. Box 1165, SE-581 11 Linkping, SWEDEN
Abstract The aim of MPEG (Multi-Platforms Emitter
Geolocation) is to use several measurements Angle Of Arrival
(AOA) or Time Of Arrival/Frequency Of Arrival (TOA/FOA)
from different Electronic Support Measures (ESM) platforms to
determine an accurate emitter location. Sensors are
geographically dispersed, and to combine the information that
they acquire requires the information to be communicated to
some location(s) where the data integration process occurs. The
data link between the ESM platforms is expected to permit only
very low data rates with a high latency. This means that the
platforms can only exchange very restricted amounts of data. A
potentially optimal way to compress the information when the
measurements are noisy is to extract from the measurements an
exhaustive statistic that summarizes all the information content
at the local ESM. How to provide an exhaustive statistics for
practical measurements system in the case of information fusion
is presented. It is done either on Information Matrix form or
based on a Taylor series expansion of the measurement in time or
space.
Keywords- Multi Platforms Emitter Geolocation, Time
Difference of Arrival, Angle Of Arrival, Data Link.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of MPEG is to use several measurements from
different ESM platforms to determine an accurate emitter
location. Sensors are geographically dispersed, and to combine
the information that they acquire requires the information to be
communicated to some location(s) where the data integration
process occurs.
The data link between the ESM platforms is expected to
permit only very low data rates with a high latency. This means
that the platforms can only exchange very restricted amounts of
data. To obtain the best accuracy the platforms would need to
share all measurements that are performed for an emitter and
then use this data to calculate emitter location just as can be
done on a single platform. This would however result in too
high data rates for the data link. Another solution is that each
platform uses all of its own measurements to locally calculate
emitter location and then shares this information or a summary
of measurements instead of each separate measurement.
. A potentially optimal way to compress the
information when the measurements are noisy is to extract
from the measurements an exhaustive statistic that summarizes
all the information content at the local ESM. How to provide
an exhaustive statistics for practical measurements system in
the case of information fusion is presented. It is done either on
Information Matrix form or based on a Taylor series
expansion of the measurement in time or space.
II. MPEGLOCATION
A. SP-AOA location basics
Intercept AOA measurement over time by a moving
platform is often used for triangulation of the emitter.
Considering the following geometry:
Figure 1. MAOA Interception Geometry
Under the hypothesis of a regular measurement sampling, the
CRLB calculation gives the following EEP values:
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
sin
1 2
sin
1 2

+
=

=
N
Lh
N
Lh
s L
Figure 2. EEP caracteristics
In this equation N is the number of equivalent uncorrelated
measurements. N is also called the number of effective
The authors acknowledge the European Defence Agency,
the French DGA, the Swedish FMV and the Italian MoD,
which have contributed to the funding of this study under
EDA contract nB-0055-IAP2-ERG.
R
R

For time limited illumination (critical target)
VT
R R

measurements. It has to be limited by the correlation radius of

the error. For (h>>L), this expression can be further simplified
to:

h
N L
h
h
N
R A
12
,
1
= =
Which in full lateral ( 90 ) leads to:
=
N R
R
12
If the radar target is at 50 km distance, and a quite
advanced interferometer is used (0.3 accuracy) the best
location accuracy can only be obtained flying a long baseline
(e.g more than 150 seconds for an aircraft at 300m/s speed) as
a good angular aperture between the measurements is required.
B. M- AOA Location Basics
The MP-AOA aims at delivering an instantaneous and
accurate target location by using several Lines of Bearing
coming from N different sensors located at several positions
remote from each other. Theoretically, MP-AOA can achieve
accurate location as soon as the targets beam has illuminated
all the sensors during one scanning excursion.
Multiple platforms AOA offer a direct improvement in time-
line, and the location accuracy will then depend on the
measurement accuracy of each of the contributors and their
geometrical positions. The angular aperture and distances of
the platforms in the network will provide a result without
needing a long integration time. This is the major advantage of
MPEG over SPEG.
Figure 3. Advantage of MPEG over SPEG
If the target manage its illumination time, this will defeat SPEG
method.
III. DATA LINK REDUCTION PRINCIPLE
Sensors are geographically dispersed, and to combine the
information that they acquire requires the information to be
communicated to some location(s) where the data integration
process occurs. There are 2 possible ways to proceed:
First possibility consists in communicating
exhaustively each AOA measurement that has been
carried out.
Figure 4. Measurements Fusion
Second possibility consists in making an angular
tracking of each target, performed by each ESM
sensor. In this case, the state of the track is regularly
communicated.
Figure 5. Tracks or Information Fusion
Due to the constraints in the communications bandwidth,
in a practical multi-sensor tracking network, the sensor data
processors communicate only a subset of the data available
from each sensor, usually in the form of tracks but alternatively
in the form of information summaries.
This can also be applied to MP-TDOA location according
the following diagram:
Figure 6. AOA (Angle Of Arrival) and HOA (Hyperbole Of Arrival)
Local Angular Tracking
(2D)
3D Tracks initiation
(Deghosting)
3D Tracking
2D tracks non assigned
3D tracks 3D Tracks
Selected
2D tracks
New 3D
Tracks
Local ESM
perimeter
IV. ARCHITECTURE CHOICE
Architectures and Algorithms for Network Sensor Fusion
are presented in famous tutorial books like[1][2]. Paper [3]
gives an overview of different architectures from centralized,
hierarchical to distributed.
A central approach non only presents a saturation risks with
all the measurements transmitted but turns out " inextricable
from the point of view of the association " while a local
tracking establishes a reasonable approach reducing
considerably the difficulties of association with a loss of almost
nonexistant intrinsic performance. The general Hybrid-
architecture is the following:
Figure 7. Hybrid Architecture for ESMs passive tracking
In this architecture the 2D or 3D tracks are initialized at the
level of the passive sensors.
The association of the passive data (DOA or 2D tracks) is
treated(handled) at the level of the passive sensor, whether it is
the association of the DOA in the 2D angular tracks or the
formation of the 3D tracks from a treatment of association of
the passive 2D tracks.
The central tracker (3D tracking) has for objective to
maintain the estimation and the prediction of the 3D tracks by
taking into account the knowledge of the dynamics of targets.
This central tracker realizes no treatment of association. In the
case of fixed target this estimation and prediction is the most
simple. The updated 3D tracks must be sent back to the local
ESM to increase the quality of the local ESM association.
These 3D tracks must be also feedback towards the process of
initialization of the 3D tracks to avoid the creation of redundant
3D tracks. The process of initialisation of the 3D tracks realizes
the deghosting.
This architecture is distributed on all the observers.
V. TRACK AND INFORMATION FUSION COMPARED
A. Track Fusion
Track fusion is the best popular approach and its limitations
when used with feedback have been explained and solved in
different papers [4][5][6][7]. Above all, Track fusion is not
well suited for passive sensors where the local unobservability
problem occurs.
In track fusion sensor-level tracks are combined to form
global-level tracks that are based on data from all sensors.
If ( )
K k
P X , is the information (state, covariance) given by
sensor k. The track fusion without feedback and with
uncorrelated measurements is given by:

=
=
N
k
k k
N
k
k F
X P P X
1
1
1
1
1
and
1
1
1
=

N
k
k F
P P
(Equ.1)
In this equation
K
P has to be invertible which is not the
case in a passive system above all at the beginning of the
measurements. Even if
K
P is invertible, if it is ill-conditioned
numerical errors appear and are accumulated during successive
integration of measurements. When using track fusion, there is
the implicit requirement that the tracks and their covariance
matrices exist and are invertible. This is always the case in
radar and the track fusion has been designed at the beginning
for this type of sensor.
As integrating all the measurements from all sensors global
tracks are more accurate that sensor-level tracks. Thats why it
is relevant to feed back global tracks to the sensor-level
trackers to reduce the data association errors.
The global tracks, however, are cross correlated with the
sensor-level tracks. This track to track correlation should be
taken into account in algorithm design. The paper [4] presents
algorithm architectures and methods for dealing with the cross-
correlations of the tracks in track fusion for feeding back the
global level tracks. All these algorithms use a decorrelator in
order to remove the cross-correlation between the sensor level
tracks and the global level tracks.
But there is an alternative to this scheme which consists to
exchange Information and not tracks.
B. Information Fusion
In Information fusion sensor-level information summaries
are combined to form global-level tracks that are based on data
from all sensors.
In linear or pseudo linear cases measurements and state are
related by the following type of linear equation:
X H Z
n n
=
The optimal solution that minimizes the mean quadratic
error is given by:
( )
( )
n
T
n n
T
n n
Z H H H X
1

=
An iterative calculation can be used by applying the
recursive process on the coefficients of matrix
( ) n
T
n n
H H Inf = and
n
T
n
Z H .
Its interesting to notice that
( ) n
T
n n
H H Inf = is the
expression of the Information matrix, whose inversion can
provide the Cramer Rao Boundary in the Gaussian case.
If ( )
K K
J I , is the information given by sensor k.
k
T
k k
H H I =

k
T
k k
Z H J =
( )
F F F
J I X
1

=
with

=
=
N
k
k F
I I
1
and
=
=
N
k
k F
J J
1
In the general case, in passive systems information matrices
exist but are often ill-conditioned and even non invertible.
Fortunately the combined information matrix becomes
invertible with good conditioning until the passive systems are
well separated in space.
To avoid the decorrelation phase the purpose is to not
communicate tracks but statistical summaries which are
independent each other. The processing is according the
following diagrams:
Figure 8. Information Fusion Processing
In the processing the global level tracks are feedback but just
for association.
For non-linear least squares systems similar arguments
shows that the solution should be generalized as in VI.
C. Comparison
As said previously, there are two opposite ways to proceed
when we deal with multi-platform case:
First one is sharing exhaustively every line of bearing
calculated after each target beam interception,
Second one is sharing summarized relevant
information about each target: average line of bearing
an associated covariance, for instance.
However, each solution presents serious drawbacks:
In the first case, we communicate a huge amount of
redundant information, without any relevant filtering
or compression. As a consequence, this method
requires high data rate communication capabilities.
In the other case, some interesting information can be
lost.
The optimal solution consists in communicating some
compressed but relevant information that offers the best trade
off between the following competing requirements:
Optimal geo-location performances (obtained when all
the measurements are available).
Minimal communication rate between platforms.
The question now is what summary to transmit?. This
question is fundamental either for track fusion or for
information fusion. It has been addressed for information
fusion in [8] and for track fusion in [9].
How to provide an exhaustive statistics for practical
measurements system in the case of information fusion will be
presented in paragraph xx. It will be done either on Information
Matrix form or based on a Taylor series expansion of the
measurement in time or space.
VI. DETAILS OF SUMMARIZATION METHOD
A. Estimators decomposition - Principle
The optimal estimation is obtained by processing the entire
amount of available measurements collected by every platform.
We can make a decomposition of this optimal estimation by
separate processing of measurements collected by each
observer, before sharing results coming from these different
observers. The overall amount of calculation is parallelized
between observers, which finally share a limited amount of
data. This data is composed of intermediate results that
participate to the final geo-location estimation.
1) Linear case
In that case, the calculation does not require any iteration
and an additive decomposition can be easily obtained. Each
observer calculates partial estimations using his own data,
before sharing these intermediate results with the other
observers.
Only a limited number of coefficients have to be exchanged
via the communication network.
2) Non Linear case
The issue of measurements compression consists in
representing accurately numerous observations by using a
limited number of coefficients, without any significant loss of
information.
Generally speaking, Taylor expansion can offer an
interesting solution to this problem in some case, as well as
Fourier Transform, for instance.
We can assess compression efficiency by comparing:
the actual observations
the observations that are re-estimated from the limited
number of coefficients that have been calculated
according to the chosen compression modeling.
d
vr
v
ESM 1
ESM 0

d
vr
v
ESM 1
ESM 0
In order to choose a relevant modeling for compressing
angular measurements, several parameters must be taken into
account (geometrical configurations of acquisitions, sensors
characterization, ).
The method is based on Taylor series Expansion of the
measurement equation:
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
2
! 1 !
....
! 2 ! 1
+
+
+
+ + +

+
+ =
n
n
n
n
a x
n
f
a x
n
a f
a x
a f
a x
a f
a f x f

For a function of several variables (3 here) it becomes:
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) .......
, , , , , ,
, , , , +
+ =
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
c z
z
z y x f
b y
y
z y x f
a x
x
z y x f
c b a f z y x f
c z
b y
a x
c z
b y
a x
c z
b y
a x
The validation of regression validity considers values of
higher order terms.
If the relative motion is MRU Expansion in time is
sufficient.
3) Application to TDOA and AOA
According to the following diagram:
The measurement equation is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
c
t r
t r t r
c
t

= =
0 1
1
State of the source at t=0 : ( ) vr v r , , ,

Relative motion is MRU:
( ) ( ) ( ) t r t v t / . sin
1

+ =
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
. . t v t vr r t r + + =
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 / 1
1
2
1
2
1
1 cos 2 t t r t t r d d t r t r + = + =
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) t r
t t r d d
t
2
1
2
1
cos 2

= <<1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
+ + =
8 2
1
1 1
1
2
2 / 1
1
t t
t r
c
t t r
c
t

This gives
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) t cr
d
t cr
t d
t cr
t d
c
t d
t
3
4
2
3 2 2
1
8 2
cos
2
sin cos
+ =

Where it is possible to neglect higher order terms

( )
0 =
=
t
t
t r
v
( )
0 =
=
t
t r
t
vr
( ) ( )
( )
4
4
3
3
2
2
0 1
8
3
cos 2 sin
2
cos 2 sin
2
sin sin
cr
d
vr v
cr
d
v vr
cr
d
r
v
c
d
t
t
t
+ +
+ =
Where it is possible to neglect higher order terms. This

leads to:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t r r t t
t
t
t
. , , . 0
1 1 0 1 1 1
+ =
+ =
=
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
=
=
+ =

cos 2 sin
2
sin sin
,
2
sin
cos ,
where
. , ,
2
1
2
1
1 1 1
v vr
r
d
r
v
r
r
d
r
t r r
c
d
t
AOA case is when d/r <<<< 1. This leads to:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
=
=
+ =
r
v
r
r
t r r
c
d
t

sin
,
cos ,
where
. , ,
1
1
1 1 1
4) Implementation
A possible implementation of the method is the following:
Robust regression on Measurements.
Analysis of Regressor variances to validate regression
o If not validated: Divise the data and iterate.
o Once validated: Transmit regression
coefficients:
First Bearing (denoised)
Last Bearing (denoised)
Number of estimated independant
bearings
Bearing rates (not fully required for
fixed emitters)
The full MP-AOA location distribution is represented
according the following figure:
Figure 9. Location Distribution Principle
VII. ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATION
The following example considers a patrol of two aircrafts
targeting an hostile aircraft which is emitted.
In the centralized case Instantaneous triangulation are
filtered.
Figure 10. Location with centralized method.
Figure 11. Location with information fusion method
Due to the information fusion method the DATA LINK rate is
reduced.
VIII. CONCLUSION
By 2010-2020 the infosphere will be very different of what
we know today. There will be manned and unmanned
platforms in air/sea/land all connected via data links. The
requirements on amount of data to exchange will increase by
several orders of magnitude. It will be of first importance to
minimize data transmission while preserving important data.
The method presented here offers a very attractive alternative
to solve the bottleneck of data transmission.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors acknowledge the European Defence Agency,
the French DGA, the Swedish FMV and the Italian MoD,
which have contributed to the funding of this study under EDA
contract nB-0055-IAP2-ERG.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Bar-Shalom, Multitarget-Multisensor tracking : Principles and
techniques , 3
ime
dition, 1995.
[2] S. Blackmann, R. Popoli, Design and analysis of modern tracking
systems , Artech House, 1999.
[3] C.Y. Chong, S. Mori, W.H. Barker and K.C. Chang, Architectures and
Algorithms for Track Association and Fusion , in IEEE AES Systems
Magazine, January 2000
[4] Olivier E.Drummond Track Fusion with Feedback SPIE vol 2759
[5] Y. Bar-Shalom, On the Track-to-Track Correlation Problem, in IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. ac-26, n2, April 1981
[6] X. Rong Li, Y. Zhu and C. Han, Unified Optimal Linear Estimation
Fusion Part I : Unified Models and Fusion Rules, in Proceedings of
2000 International Conference on Information Fusion, Paris, France,
July 2000
[7] O. Drummond, A Hybrid Sensor Fusion Algorithm Architecture and
Tracklet, in Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 3163, 1997
[8] JF Grandin, L Ratton Procd et systme de pistage et de suivi
dmetteurs patent number : N 08 01715. date 28.03.2008 Extended
to European level : Date 12.03.2009 N09154963.4
[9] Xuezhi Wang, Rob Evans, Jonathan Legg Distributed Sensor Fusion
with Network Constraints SPIE vol 5429 2004
Parasitic Doppler effect in passive location
Dario Benvenuti
Research and Advanced System Design
Elettronica SpA
Via Tiburtina Valeria, km 13.7, Rome, Italy
dario.benvenuti@elt.it
Abstract Large base interferometry is a fast and accurate
technique for passive emitter location. Experiments both in direct
and inverse configuration have been executed and in this paper
some results are presented in which the main sources of errors in
Doppler measurements are analyzed.
The observer attitude measurements need high accuracy, because
it can lead to large estimation errors. Vibrations can be a
problem in case of wings mounted antennas. The Doppler
induced by the scanning antenna phase center displacement has
been analysed as a possible source of error also in the inverse
configuration where much of the disturbances are eliminated.
Keywords--passive location; large base interferometry; parasitic
doppler
Passive location of surface emitters by an airborne observer
through the large base interferometry is much faster and more
accurate than standard triangulation and bearing-only tracking.
The principle is that the frequency difference of arrival
(FDOA) is related to the apparent angular velocity of the
emitter with respect to the observer,

( )
sin B
FDOA =
(1)
Moreover the time difference of arrival (TDOA) is related
to the direction of arrival (DOA), :

=

B
c TDOA
1
cos (2)
so with two differential measurements, FDOA and TDOA
location can be calculated:
( )
= sin
V
R (3)
where is the angle between the velocity vector and the
interferometer [1, 2].
The error analysis shows a very good behaviour of this
approach for emitter that are not pointed by the observer, and
that are not aligned with the interferometer antennas. In fact the
emitter on the observer velocity direction show a null angular
rate which in turn does not allow the range estimation, while
the angular measurement is bad conditioned around the
direction of the interferometer antennas [2].
I. EXPERIMENTAL TRIALS
A series of field test have been conducted by ELT in the
framework of a research contract with Italian MoD, with the
collaboration of Aeronautica Militare Italiana (AMI). The first
campaign was performed in 2006 with a Passive Location
Demonstrator (PLD) installed on a helicopter [2]. The
constrained baseline along with the low velocity of the
helicopter allows a reduced performance location.
A second field test has been recently carried on with the
collaboration of an aircraft. These trials were in the inverse
configuration, that is the PLD was standing on the ground and
the aircraft was emitting with his own radar. That is not a
problem because the relative motion is the physical entity that
is to be measured, provided the aircraft route and velocity is
known.
Figure 1. Localization result of a trial from [2].
The first campaign results have already been published [2]
showing the average result of about 10%, in this paper a bad
trial with a larger error will be analysed.
The aircraft campaign yielded better results as it can be
expected given the higher velocity, a larger base and better
conditions due to inverse configuration. Some trials yield a
final location accuracy on the order of 2-3%, however some
trials have still an error higher than 5% and an hypothesis about
the error will be presented.
-16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
X[km]
Y

[
k
m
]
True trajectory
Measurements
Filtering
Emitting positions
Figure 2. Localization result of a trial of the aircraft campaign.
II. SOURCE OF ERRORS IN HELICOPTER TRIALS
The main source of error in some of these trials has been
due to the helicopter attitude: in fact though the trajectory was
rectilinear and uniform some perturbations during the flight are
unavoidable and the attitude sensor may be not as accurate as
needed. Equation (3) with the contribution of own platform
rotation
P
becomes:
( )

= sin
P
V
R
(4)
where the contribution of
P
to the error is quite important [2].
Figure 3. Trial 1: platform own motion compared to LOS variation.
In figure 3 the measured yaw rate and the total estimated
are reported along with their difference and the expected line of
sight (LOS) variation. It is evident that the not perfect
cancellation of the own platform rotation is comparable to the
quantity to be measured, and in fact in this trial the localization
error has been very large (see figure 4)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Relative Time [s]

[
%
]

Localization Trial 17/07/2006, 09:31
Percentage Range Error
Figure 4. Trial 1: localization error.
Another possible source of error in operative conditions is
the antenna vibrations, especially for wing mounted antennas.
In these trials that was not the case because the antenna
structure was quite robust and rigid. Simulations have been
performed with different amount of vibrations and the results
are presented.
In Figure 5 a typical vibration spectrum is reported: the
z-component displacement is plotted as a function of frequency
and the corresponding velocity is evaluated. The main mode is
about 5 Hz with maximum displacement 30 cm, this should be
conservative for a combat aircraft; the higher modes present
less displacement but, due to higher frequency, still have a
considerable effect on velocity.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Z

[
m
]
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
5
10
15
20
f [Hz]
V

[
m
/
s
]
Figure 5. Vibrations spectrum: displacement (in blu) and velocity (in red)
The relative localization error due to vibrations is reported
in figure 6. In the left hand vibrations have been imposed as a
common mode on the two wings, while on the right they are
partially uncorrelated.
0 20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
f [Hz]
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e

e
r
r
o
r
Common mode vibrations
0 20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
f [Hz]
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e

e
r
r
o
r
Partially uncorrelated vibrations
Figure 6. Error induced by wings vibrations: (left) common mode vibration;
(right) partially uncorrelated vibrations
The effect of vibrations as a common mode on the two
antennas is just detectable and, being short time correlated, can
be averaged away. However as soon as a mismatched vibration
is set on the two wings a much higher effect arises which
severely penalizes the wing mount configuration; thus it is a
much better choice, also for the DOA estimation constraints, to
install the interferometer antennas on the aircraft fuselage than
on the wings.
III. ERRORS IN INVERSE CONFIGURATION TRIALS
In the inverse configuration the effect of platform attitude
variations is much less important and vibrations are not
present, by the way the antenna configuration is longitudinal
(fuselage mount) thus vibrations should be negligible also in
real conditions. Let's consider the following model (see figure
7) for the FDOA calculation, in which the origin of the
coordinate system coincides with the center of PLD, B is the
antennas distance along the x-axis, P(x
0
, y
0
) is the position of
the aircraft (i.e. the emitting antenna) at time t
0
, and V is the
aircraft velocity, assumed parallel to the x-axis.
Figure 7. Geometrical model for FDOA evaluation.
The FDOA is the time derivative of the following phase
difference:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
+ +
+ =
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
2 /
2 / 2
t r y Vt B x
t r y Vt B x t
(5)
where the attitude variations are summarized in the (yaw
rate) and r is the distance of the emitting antenna from the
aircraft center of mass.
In a rectilinear trajectory heading variations of as much as
1/s have been observed, causing an error in the FDOA less
than 2 %, with the geometry depicted, where x
0
= 20 km, y
0
=
1 km.
In some trials a much larger error has been observed, like in
figure 8, where the true trajectory is reported in black solid line
along with the estimated positions in red circles. Here each
measurement is achieved on a burst of 128 pulses.
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10
-10
-5
0
5
10
X[km]
Y

[
k
m
]
True trajectory
Measurements
Figure 8. Trial a/c 14: localization result.
A possible cause of error is due to the antenna phase center
displacement during the scansion: if the phase center is not
coincident with the rotation center a parasitic Doppler effect
arises. The phase center displacement can exist also for phased
array antennas, if the scan phase differences are not symmetric
with respect to the geometric center of the array.
Figure 9. Antenna phase center displacement.
In figure 9 a) a simple 2-element array is depicted with
broadside configuration: the phase center is the geometric
center. When the array is scanning, if the phases are symmetric
the phase center remains fixed. Often phases of the array
elements are all the same sign, giving rise to a displacement of
the phase center, this is particularly evident with true time
delay phased array. This effect is meaningless for the radar
itself, and can be however corrected for, while it has an effect
on the FDOA estimation.
To evaluate this effect (5) can be used again where now r is
the antenna half width and is the scan rate; for reasonable
values of the parameters (r = 0.5 m, = 2 rad/s) this yields an
error of 8% with the same geometrical setup as above.
This value certainly does not explain the large errors of
figure 8, but it must be noted that a phased array antenna can
point the beam in a pulse to pulse way, giving rise to a much
higher . That is the case of the radar used in the
experimentation, as it can be seen from the amplitude pattern
reported in figure 10: it shows the main beam and a replica
about 4 dB lower which is probably due to a second beam
position.
Unfortunately the exact working of the radar and the details
of its construction are not accessible to our analysis, but the
performed evaluation can be useful to interpret some
unexplainable results and in general to give a warning on the
subtleties that lay behind these kind of techniques.
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
-42
-41
-40
-39
-38
-37
-36
-35
-34
-33
-32
Time [s]
A
m
p

[
d
B
]
Figure 10. Pulse to pulse beam pointing of radar used in a/c trials.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper results of experimental trials of passive
localization through phase difference rate estimation are
presented. Several sources of error have been analyzed and
taken into account.
The first experimental campaign was performed by the use
of a helicopter and thus presented critical features like slow
platform velocity, perturbed straight flight and not perfect
attitude compensation.
The second campaign was performed in more controlled
conditions (inverse configuration) and with the use of a combat
aircraft; the results were surely better than the first campaign,
however still in some trials the error was surprisingly high.
An hypothesis on the aircraft radar has been done: the
phase center is conjectured to move with beam scanning, and
the effect has been evaluated with reasonable parameters
values showing a not negligible effect on localization.
Though we are not sure about the real working of the
aircraft radar the performed analysis can be useful to have an
insight on the localization techniques based on phase
estimation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I wish to thank my colleagues involved in the passive
localization topic, in particular Antonio Zaccaron for the clarity
of his suggestions, and my head Daniela Pistoia for the support.
REFERENCES
[1] X.-P. Deng, Z. Liu, W. -L. Jiang, Y. -Y. Zhou and Y. -W. Xu, Passive
location method and accuracy analysis with phase difference rate
measurements, IEE Proc. Radar, Sonar Navig., Vol. 148, No. 5,
October 2001
[2] G. Severino, A. Zaccaron and R. Ardoino, Performance of a Doppler
based direct passive location technique, ESAV 2008, Capri, 3-5
September 2008
[3] K. Becker, An efficient method of passive emitter location, IEEE
Trans. on AES, vol. 28, No. 4, October 1992.
An in-air passive acoustic surveillance system for air
traffic control
GUARDIAN project
Vincenzo Quaranta and Salvatore Ameduri
CIRA, Italian Aerospace Research Centre
Vibration & Acoustics Lab.
Via Maiorise, Capua (CE), Italy
E-mail: v.quaranta@cira.it
Domenico Donisi and Marco Bonamente
DAppolonia S.p.A.
Largo Carlo Salinari, 18/19 00142 Rome Italy
Headquarters: Via San Nazaro 19 16145 Genova Italy
E-mail: domenico.donisi@dappolonia.it
AbstractThe air traffic control inside ATZ (Aerodrome
Traffic Zone) is a key activity for airport management services
to meet increased security and a low environmental impact on
air transport systems. The GUARDIAN system aims to the
development of an acoustic system as support for airplane
traffic control in aerodrome zone.
Keywords: traffic management systems, aircraft detection
and location, acoustic devices, beam-forming algorithms
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years an increasing demand has interested
airports and the related air traffic management authorities.
The risk of collision between taking off and landing aircrafts
and between aircraft and ground vehicles due to increased air
traffic are issues that have highlighted the need to improve
airborne surveillance systems by means of real time aircraft
identification and tracking procedures in aerodrome zone.
State-of-the-art ATM (Air Traffic Management) systems for
aerodrome surveillance include especially radar technology.
On the other hand, there is currently a significant increase of
interest in the international scientific community, in the
definition of alternative acoustic systems for locating,
tracking and identification of moving acoustic sources with
particular attention to aspects of intruder aircrafts and for
monitoring the movement of ground forces. This interest
stems primarily from the fact that unlike radar detection,
acoustic detection can be performed with totally passive
sensors only by listening to the noise of the target. This
represent an obvious advantage from the environmental point
of view (no emissions of any kind), safety (no possibility of
locating the sensor in the absence of emission, inability to
drastically reduce the noise of the target), and costs (reduced
energy consumption due to lack of transmission power, lack
of critical components working at microwave, etc.). In this
paper, the preliminary results of MIUR (Italian Ministry of
University and Research) - funded GUARDIAN project are
reported. The aim of this research project is the design and
development of a novel acoustic system for the improvement
of co-operative management of ATZ (Aerodrome Traffic
Zone) control. ATZ is the air space of defined dimensions
interested by taking off and landing of aircrafts. The
proposed novel cognitive sensor offers flexibility and
adaptivity to the airport scenario while ensuring a neat
capability improvement in aircraft and ground vehicles
detection, location and tracking.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACOUSTIC SYSTEM
The GUARDIAN sensor is a multi-modal, in-air passive
acoustic device working in arrayed/sparse configuration by
means of an innovative ensemble of digital processing
stages. This system allows the detection and tracking of in
flight aircraft and in take-off or landing by means of a
passive detection and spectral analysis of airplane acoustic
emission.
Figure 1. Physical architecture of the GUARDIAN system
The system prototype consists of two planar acoustic
sensors, one rotating (Master) and one fix antenna (Slave),
based on a passive phased array of randomly distributed
microphones and a command & control unit to allow the user
to manage and visualize tracking data. Figure 1 shows the
sketch of the system.
III. PHASED ARRAY DESIGN PARAMETERS
The performance of an acoustic array is determined by its
geometry (shape, number and spatial position of
microphones), which defines the response of the array, called
Array Pattern. After fixing the geometry, the frequency and
the antenna pointing direction, the Array Pattern shows the
attenuation performed by the antenna on the acoustic waves
incident from directions other than the pointing direction.
The MSL (Maximum Side lobe Level) value, which is the
ability of the array in reducing false noise sources in
directions other than the antenna pointing one, and the
resolution, which defines the minimum angular distance at
which the array is able to separate two nearby sources in
space, can be deduced from the Array Pattern. Thus, acoustic
array performance figures are: angular resolution (-3 dB
main lobe width), MSL, maximum range and working
frequency.
IV. GUARDIAN PROCESSING CHAIN
In present section, the Data Processor architecture is
reported. Scope is to highlight the different functionalities
that can be identified as sub-blocks of the processor and to
describe their logical interconnections. Architecture
describes the logic chain of the Processor and operates first
important design choices that highly impact on resulting
performances, complexity and computational load of the
Processor. Architecture design is thus a critical phase and is
best tackled keeping resulting schema as modular and
scalable as possible. Figure 2 shows the GUARDIAN
Processor architecture which is organized in the following
sub-blocks: Data acquisition (i), Beam-forming (ii), Detector
(iii), Triangulator (iv), Tracker (v) and Classifier (vi).
Figure 2. Logical architecture of the GUARDIAN processing chain
A. Data Acquisition
Data acquisition is the first step in Data Processing. In
this phase, acoustic samples are collected in the time-domain
at each array microphone and they are made available for
further processing. The parameters relevant for this
processing step are the time acquisition window, i.e. the time
interval in which data are acquired, and the sampling
frequency. In GUARDIAN system, the time acquisition
window is equal to T = 0.2 seconds, while data sampling
frequency is set to f
s
= 48 kHz. The data acquired by the
acoustic antenna are processed with the FFT operation in
order to translate them in the frequency-domain. The data
collected in time-domain, which are in form of a [Array
Elements x Time Samples] matrix, are then converted in a
[Array Elements x Frequency Bins] matrix.
B. Beam-forming
The operation of beam-forming has the scope of
electronically forming pointing beams for listening,
searching and/or tracking purposes. The SOI (Signal Of
Interest) for this kind of application is a broadband signal.
Most of the energy contribution of aircrafts spectral signature
is in the range 500 2500 Hz. For this reason, a frequency-
domain multiple beam-forming approach is used in order to
implement the acoustic data processing. Indeed a low
computational cost is achieved by splitting the signal into its
frequency components through an FFT and applying the
beam-forming algorithm to each component. Given the
planar localization of microphones on antenna array, spatial
beams are synthesized along azimuth () and elevation ()
direction by means of beam-forming operation. Acoustic
data are processed in parallel through two different filters:
the MBMF (Matched Beam-forming) and the MVDR
(Minimum Variance Distortion less Response). This choice
is due to the fact that MBMF and MVDR [1] exhibits
different benefits. MBMF presents: (i) robustness to non
idealities, such as steering mis-matches or the mis-
positioning of array elements, (ii) low computational cost
and an high-fidelity response i.e., the acoustic shapes are
preserved for spectral analysis. On the other hand, it provides
low accuracy, low resolution and it is sensible to the
presence of interferences. Moreover acoustic classification
issues may be faced by extracting spectral information from
detected acoustic targets by implementing MBMF beam-
forming in the angle/beam of detected target by means of
MVDR algorithm. For all the mentioned reasons, to
overcome the MBMF limitations, also the MVDR algorithm
is implemented. It is an adaptive beam former which has
high accuracy and high resolution. In addition, according to
its adaptively, it is robust to scenarios which include
interferences. However, it is computational expensive and it
does not preserve the signal phases, i.e. the acoustic shape of
signals is corrupted. Moreover, it requires the knowledge of
the correlation matrix with interferences and noise; more in
practice, since this knowledge is not given, correlation
matrix must be estimated on the basis of the received signal.
Due to their different properties, MBMF and MVDR are
both performed with different aims:
- The MBMF is used for detection (its performance
depends on circumstances) and classification purposes and it
is performed on the entire band of interest (from 300 Hz to 3
kHz);
- The MVDR is used for detection purpose and it is
performed only on a reduced band in which it is expected to
find power for the aircraft (from 1 kHz to 1.5 kHz).
C. Delay and Sum Matched Beamformer
In the matched beam-forming all microphone signals are
matched and summed in phase (coherent summation). For
each looking (steering) direction time delays have to be
applied corresponding to the arrival of a plane wave on each
microphone. In the frequency domain a time delay
corresponds to phase shift and therefore a frequency domain
implementation is the simplest implementation. The DSBF
(Delay and Sum Beam-forming) in the frequency domain is
formulated as:
=
N
n
n n n f
r k
c
f
j f X w f B
1
) , ( 2 exp ) ( ) , , ( (1)
where:
B
f
is the beamformer output in the frequency
domain;
f is the frequency and k is the wave vector;
, is the bearing to look at;
n is the microphone number and N is the number of
microphones;
r
n
contains the coordinates of the n-th microphone;
w
n
the MBMF weight (tapering coefficient) of
microphone n;
tapering coefficients are based on a Hamming
(raised cosine) window;
X
n
(f) is the Fourier component of microphone n at
frequency f. X
n
(f) is derived from the microphone
time-series x
n
(t) by FFT with N
FFT
points
corresponding to integration time of t
int
= N
FFT
/Fs;
c the sound speed value;
beam-forming coefficients C
n
can be computed in a
fast way by iteration making use of the equidistant
frequency grid. In this way no complex
exponentials have to be computed: C
n
+1 = C
n
* C
since:
+
r k
c
f
j r k
c
f
j r k
c
f
j
n n
) , ( 2 exp ) , ( 2 exp ) , ( 2 exp
1

(2)
D. Minimum Variance Distortionless Response
Beamformer
The MBMF described in the previous paragraph is the
solution that maximizes the gain if the noise is uncorrelated
(and no interferences are present). The adaptive beam-
forming bases its weights on the data collected by the
microphones (thats why they are called adaptive) and
consequently are scenario dependent. It can maximize the
gain in case of presence of correlated unwanted disturbances
impinging on the array. In GUARDIAN system, the adaptive
beam-forming is implemented as an MVDR (minimum
variance distortion less response) type of beam former in the
frequency domain:
1
1
) , ( 2 exp ) ( ) , ( 2 exp ) , , (
=
T
f
r k
c
f
j f r k
c
f
j f B R
(3)
where:
r is a vector of length N with the positions of the
microphones;
T
f x f x f R ) ( ) ( ) ( = is the N*N covariance
matrix of the microphones signals around frequency
f , where the underline denotes an average.
In case of uncorrelated noise on the array, R = I and the
adaptive beam former becomes a matched beam former.
E. Detection, Triangulation and Tracking
The detector will run on the high resolution adaptive
beam-forming data and in parallel on the conventional beam
former for a more robust detection. Indeed MVDR suffers
low SNR targets but has low false alarm rate, while MBMF
may have an high false alarm rate due to side lobes.
Normally, when a target is detected in an adaptive beam, the
nearest beam of the conventional beam-forming is used for
acoustic classification. This approach reduces the false alarm
rate. This detection algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. The beam energy
2
f
B is integrated over a
selectable frequency band; typically for the GUARDIAN
system f =1000-1500 Hz. The selected band depends on the
expected signal-to-noise ratios in the band, which will
depend on aircrafts spectra, acoustic propagation, processing
again, etc.
2. The resulting data in all beams are normalized by
removing their median value or more in a more robust way
by a moving mean.
3. In latter case, the outer beams should be removed
from the further process due to edge effects of the filter.
4. Across all remaining beams, local maxima are
identified. These local maxima are defined as those beams
that have a higher energy than their two neighboring beams.
5. The local maxima are compared against a user-
defined detection threshold (DT).
6. Local maxima that exceed DT are identified as
detections.
The above 6 steps are carried out for both receivers at
each temporal snapshot, resulting in two sets of DOAs
(Direction Of Arrival) where aircrafts are detected. These
two sets of bearings are then employed to find the actual
position in Cartesian coordinates of the aircraft by means of
a standard triangulation procedure. These plots feed the
tracker which gives the aircraft track as output [2]. The track
is the ultimate product of the Processor and can be
complemented with the aircraft classification made by the
Classifier. Finally, they are sent to the User interface and
duly presented on the screen.
V. MICROPHONES DISTRIBUTION OPTIMIZATION
Due to the wide amount of optimisation parameters, (i.e.
the microphones coordinates), an heuristic genetic approach
was adopted (see flow chart in Figure 3), [3]. According to
the natural selection principle, an initial population
constituted by a certain amount of individuals, each one
characterised by a specific genetic (chromosomes) is
subjected to environmental aggressions of different type
(predators, hostile weather, diseases). The higher the
individual adaptability level, the higher the surviving chance
and the possibility of transmitting own genetic to the next
generation. This transmission occurs through the cross-over
process: each individual, on the bases of its transmission
chance, will interchange a part of the chromosomes with
another individual, thus generating a new one, potentially
better. By repeating this process (selection and cross-over)
for an adequate number of times, the average performance
(adaptability or fitness) of the population is increased.
Anyway, since the first population contains a finite number
of information and the next ones result just from a
recombination of it, the improvement possibility is in
practice confined to the specific initial chromosomes values.
Hence, to hinder the premature convergence to a local
maximum and to enrich the genetic content of a population,
another phenomenon acts together selection and cross-over:
the mutation, i.e. the random and spontaneous variation of a
small part of the genetic code of some individual. Thus,
individuals slightly different enrich the current population,
guaranteeing a wider genetic content. Aforementioned logic
was implemented for the antenna optimisation problem. Each
population is constituted by a certain amount of antennas
(individuals), differing each other for microphones abscissas
and ordinates (chromosomes). The Maximum Side Lobe
Level (MSL) in dB was assumed as fitness function: the
lower the MSL, the better the performance. Constraints were
taken into account both for the optimisation parameter
domain (microphone locations are onto the plane of the
antenna) and for the global performance of the antenna. In
practice the locations of the microphones belong to an
uniform square grid, while a cut-off level for the angular
resolution was set, thus discarding antennas with
unacceptable resolution, even exhibiting a good MSL. In
order to fully investigate the dependence of the array
performance on antenna shape and dimensions, two different
sizes of the array have been investigated, both made of 256
microphones. The smaller was a 4 x 4 square meters array,
while the larger was a 6 x 6 square meters one. First of all, a
regular grid array fulfilling the array performance was
designed. In particular, the fixed distance between adjacent
microphones has been derived by the following formula
(assuming f
max
=1250 Hz), [4] [5] [6]:

max
min
2 2 f
c
d d

(4)
while the side length D, linked to the desired resolution at
the minimum frequency of interest, has been derived from:

( )
min
3
cos
1
f
c
R
z
D

=
(5)
At low frequency, if a good resolution is required, the
combination of a large antenna diameter and a small
microphones distance causes the need for a large number of
sensors. In order to reduce the number of microphones, only
n=256 microphones positions are randomly chosen from all
possible N locations (N=3600 for the larger array, N=1600
for the smaller array, thus n << N) of the regular mesh. An
optimization process was then performed to determine a
sparse array configuration with the best possible
combination of antenna performance parameters.
In TABLE I. adopted simulation parameters in the
optimisation procedure are summarised.
TABLE I.
Algorithm settings
Parameter Smaller array (4 x 4 m) Bigger array (6 x 6 m)
Number of iterations
(populations)
217 46
Number of individuals 4000 4000
Number of chromosomes
per individual (x,y,
coordinates of 256
microphones)
512 512
Cross-over %
(chromosomes
interchange percentage)
50 50
Mutation % (percentage
of mutated individual per
population)
10 10
Optimisation constraints
Microphone on a
uniform square grid (m)
grid step: 0.1
grid dimension: 4 x 4
grid step: 0.1
grid dimension: 6 x 6
Resolution (deg): max
(elevation, azimuth)
6 4
Figure 3. Genetic algorithm flow chart.
Several optimisation processes were carried out, moving
from different initial populations. Figure 4 gives an idea of
the convergence ability of the algorithm for some of these
processes. At the end, different optimal results were
achieved, each one characterised by the minimum MSL
compatible with assumed constraints.
The optimal individuals were located onto a 2D graph
(see Figure 5 for the bigger antennas), whose axis refer to
MSL and angular resolution. In the same pictures, also
results achieved from a wide amount of random no optimised
configurations are reported, to highlight the quality of the
results obtained through the optimisation process.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Fitness function vs iteration for the 6x6 m Grid Random Array
Population number
F
i
t
n
e
s
s

f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
(
d
B
)
Max
Mean
Figure 4. Fitness function vs iteration for the 6 m square antenna.
Figure 5. 100.000 randomly generated arrays (GREEN cross) Vs.
optimized configuration (RED star) Size 6x6 m.
VI. ARRAY PERFORMANCES
Figure 6 and Figure 7 summarise optimized antennas
performance parameters (angular resolution and MSL) vs.
elevation angle of antenna pointing direction in the case of
MBMF approach. According to the theory, the angular
resolution strongly decreases with the elevation steering
angle, while MSL, mainly depending on sensors number,
does not exhibit large variations.
Figure 6. Larger antenna performance parameters
Figure 7. Smaller antenna performance parameters
The corresponding optimal microphone distribution is
depicted in Figure 8 and Figure 9.
Figure 8. Larger antenna optimal microphones distribution
Figure 9. Smaller antenna optimal microphones distribution
TABLE II. and TABLE III. summarise antennas
performance parameters for a MBMF approach. The
elevation linear resolution has been evaluated at a distance of
7 km. The range of the antenna, i.e. the maximum distance in
the steering direction at which the array can yet detect the
sound source, has been determined by considering a tonal
(with different frequencies) sound source with an SPL of 140
dB at 10 m and a tonal (at the same frequency) background
noise with an SPL of 60 dB. Only the sound attenuations due
to air absorption (frequency dependent) and spherical
divergences were considered. As reported in TABLE IV. and
in, a range of 7 km can be theoretically achieved for a sound
source with a tonal frequency of 1250 Hz and an array with
MSL of -16 dB (i.e. with 256 microphones).
TABLE II.
Steering elevation Elevation angular Elevation linear MSL
angle (deg) resolution (deg) resolution (m) @ 7km (dB)
30 2.77 338.68 -16.07
60 4.80 587.81 -16.36
GRID RANDOM ARRAY (6x6 m)
TABLE III.
Steering elevation Elevation angular Elevation linear MSL
angle (deg) resolution (deg) resolution (m) @ 7km (dB)
30 3.96 484.58 -16.79
60 7.07 868.17 -16.72
GRID RANDOM ARRAY (4x4 m)
TABLE IV.
Sound source-array Spherical divergence Air absorbing Gain over Background
distance (m) attenuation (dB) attenuation (dB) Noise (dB)
10 0.00 0.05 95.95
20 6.02 0.10 89.88
40 12.04 0.20 83.76
80 18.06 0.40 77.53
100 20.00 0.51 75.50
200 26.02 1.01 68.97
400 32.04 2.02 61.94
500 33.98 2.53 59.50
1000 40.00 5.05 50.95
2000 46.02 10.10 39.88
3000 49.54 15.15 31.31
4000 52.04 20.20 23.76
5000 53.98 25.25 16.77
6000 55.56 30.30 10.14
7000 56.90 35.35 3.75
8000 58.06 40.40 -2.46
9000 59.08 45.45 -8.53
10000 60.00 50.50 -14.50
Gain over Background Noise @ array - Tonal noise=140 dB @10 m
Array gain=16 dB - Background noise=60 dB - Air: 15 C & 70%U.R.
-10.00
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
100.00
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
Sound source-array distance (m)
G
a
i
n

V
s
.

B
a
c
k
g
r
o
u
n
d

n
o
i
s
e

(
d
B
)
500 Hz
1000 Hz
1250 Hz
2000 Hz
4000 Hz
5000 Hz
Figure 10. Array gain over background noise Vs. frequencies
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The GUARDIAN prototype system based on planar
acoustic antenna has been described, showing the results of
beam-forming technique for aircrafts detection.
The results herein illustrated proved the possibility of
using microphone arrays for air traffic control inside ATZ.
However, in order to achieve performance parameters
comparable to those of conventional radar, the use of
antennas with great diameter (tens of meters) and with a
large number of microphones (1000) is required. The use of
MEMS (Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems) digital
microphones will make antennas of this typology
economically and technically feasible.
For what concern the improvement of the array resistance
to harsh environmental operating conditions usually found at
airports (high humidity, rain, wind, low and high
temperature,), the development of innovative antenna
employing FBG (Fiber Bragg Grating) sensors will allow the
implementation of permanent outdoor stations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The product was developed within the MIUR-funded
GUARDIAN project.
REFERENCES
[1] H.L. Van Trees; Detection, Estimation, and Modulation Theory, John
Wiley & Sons, 1968
[2] Y. Bar-Shalom et al., Estimation with Applications to Tracking and
Navigation, Johon Wiley & Sons, 2001
[3] Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimisation & Machine Learning,
David E. Goldberg, 1989, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
Inc., pp. 60 88.
[4] J.J. Christensen and J. Hald, Beam-forming, Technical Review N. 1
2004, Bruel & Kjaer Sound & Vibration Measurement A/S, DK-2850
Naerum, Denmark.
[5] C.A.Balanis Antenna Theory Analysis and Design, Third Edition, a
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Publication.
[6] M. Brandstein and D. Ward, Microphone Arrays, Springer, Berlin
2001, pp. 157-177.

Noncoopeiative Passive Coheient Location anu

Nultistatic Piimaiy Suiveillance Rauailocation
OnboardPCLsystemsforairborneplatformprotection
Session5.1page119
FMBasedPassiveCoherentRadar.
Fromdetectionstotracks
Session5.2page123
HighRangeResolutionMultichannelDVBTPassiveRadar:
AerialTargetDetections
Session5.3page129
RangeOnlyMultistaticTrackinginClutter
Session5.4page133
On-boardPCL systemsfor airborneplatform

protection
Krzysztof Kulpa, Mateusz Malanowski, Piotr
Samczyski, Jacek Misiurewicz
Institute of Electronic Systems
Warsaw University of Technology
Warszawa, POLAND
kkulpa@elka.pw.edu.pl
Maciej Smolarczyk
Przemyslowy Instytut Telekomunikacji S.A.
Warszawa, POLAND
Abstr actThe paper presents the idea of application of passive
radar (PCL) on board of an airplane. The aim of the PCL system
is to provide surveillance information to the pilot (or autopilot),
to detect the targets in the surveillance space and to protect the
platform from collisions and other threats. The PCL system can
use the available emitters of opportunity, mainly DBV-T
transmitters. Other sources of illuminations, such as analogue
(FM) or digital radio (DAB) can be used as well.
Keywords: passi ve r adar, PCL, ai r sur vai l ance
I. INTRODUCTION
Thesafety of aviation is oneof themost important issuesin
thelast century. Different technologies wereused to improve
theair safety and to avoid collisions, especially at night and
during bad atmospheric conditions. Oneof themost important
technologies used for that purpose is radar technology. At the
beginning, the powerful primary surveillance ground based
radars was applied. The on-board radar systems were
expensive, very complicated andheavy, so only combat aircraft
wereequipped with active radars.
Theapplication of active transponders, replying to requests
of secondary radars and transmitting their own position
obtained fromon-board GPS receiver improved significantly
thesafety and quality of information about all users of theair
zone. However, this technique doesnot eliminatemany threats
sincenon-cooperative targets do not respond and it is difficult
to avoid collisions with such objects.
In the last decade, the rapid progress in Unmanned Air
Vehicles (UAVs) can be observed. Themanned remotecontrol
of such objects is possible only for small distances, when
optical visibility between UAV and operator is ensured. The
use of on-board optical cameras canhelp significantly, but this
technology is limited by down-link properties and fails during
bad weather conditions and low light during night-time.
The situation can be improved by adding active radars
which provide situation awareness to auto-pilots to help in
avoiding collision. The required instrumentation range of the
radar depends on the maximumrelative speed between the
targets, radar scan time and assumed reaction time of the
platform. Assuming relative speed between targets at theorder
of 600m/s, radar scan time5 s and required reaction time5 s,
theminimal radar detection range should be not smaller than
12 km (assuming 3 scans for proper target behavior
identification). The detected RCS should be at the level of -
20..-10 dBsmto detect not only aircraft but also UAVs`. This
requirement leads to radar devices with mean transmitting
power of 20..100 W with advanced antenna and signal
processing system. The extensive application of active radar
systems will lead to increase of 'electromagnetic pollution,
and while many similar radars can work in thesame band, to
serious interferenceproblem.
An alternative approach uses the passive radar concept.
Becausethepassive radar does not emit any energy, it can be
small, low-weight and with low power consumption, required
only for data acquisition and processing block. However, to
make reliable on-board passive radar, several theoretical and
engineeringproblems must be solved.

II. THE CONCEPT OF ON-BOARD PCL SYSTEM
The on-board passive radar has to receive signals fromall
available emitters of opportunity and observe the area of
interest to detect the potential threats. It requires multi-beam
adaptive antenna arraysto track illuminators and targets in the
vicinity. While passive radars are highly dependent on
emitters of opportunity, the flight-path should be planned in
such way, that proper radar coverageis available during whole
mission.
A. Sel ecti ons of i l l umi nator s of oppor tuni ty
The passive radar does not illuminate the targets but
exploitsthe commercial transmitters of opportunity, existing in
the area of interest. The transmitters should have sufficient
emission power, good transmitted signal cross-ambiguity
function and high enough frequency. Therequirements of high
transmitting power is related to the predicted detection range
described by the following relation
i
o
R T
A O T T
t
kTND
r r
S S G P
!
2 2 2
) 4 ( S
, (1)
Thework is partially sponsored by Polish Ministry of Scienceand Higher
education under grant no 5525/B/T00/2010/39. This work was partially
supported by theEuropean Union in theframework of European Social Fund
through the Warsaw University of Technology Development Programme,
realized by Center for Advanced Studies.
where
T
P is the transmitted power,
T
G is the transmitter
antenna gain,
O
S is target radar cross-section,
A
S is effective
surface of radar antenna,
T
r is transmitter-to-target distance,
R
r is the target-to-radar distance, k is Boltzmann constant,
T is the equivalent receiver temperature, N stands for total
loses,
o
D is detection threshold (usually 13 dB) and
i
t is
integration time.
The requirement of proper shape of cross-ambiguity
function is relatedto range and Doppler resolutionof theradar.
The good cross-ambiguity function means, that there exists
sharp peek of cross-ambiguity function and the side-lobes
which are small enough to make detection of small targets
possible in case of heavy clutter. The range and velocity
resolution should be comparable with modern active radars;
required accuracy in range is 10..200 m and 1..5 m/s in
velocity. Additionally, the properties of cross-ambiguity
function should be time-invariant, to ensure the required
performanceover 24h/day.
The existing PCL radars [2] are the ground base ones
exploiting FM radio emission [1, 5, 9, 10]. There exist also
several PCL radar demonstrators exploiting other emissions
such as digital terrestrial TV (DBV-T) [4, 8], digital radio
(DAB) [3, 6, 8], satelliteTV (DVB-S), analogue [7] , cellular
phone networks (GSM) [18], [19], internet links (WiFi,
WiMax) [20] and many more. The possible PCL detection
ranges using selective, 30 dB gain receiving antennas are
plotted in Fig. 1.
Figure1. Selection of emmiters of oportunity
The aforementioned requirements for airborne PCL
systems limit in practice the choice of transmitters of
opportunity to the ones with powerful digital continuous
emission. Presently there exist 2 candidates: digital terrestrial
TV DVB-T and digital radio DAB. The illumination from
satellites: digital satellite television DVB-S and global
positioning GPS have small transmitting power, thus the
receiving antenna system will be complicated and heavy,
possible to install only on big man-operated aircraft. Due to
low power densitythe practical detection rangewill be limited
to c.a. 4 kmbut coverage is very good while practically whole
land areas of the world arecovered by satelliteTV and whole
globe is covered by GPS. Moreover, thecoverage of GLONAS
and GALILE isexpanding.
The DAB emission is oneof thepotential candidates with
1.5 MHz bandwidth and related 100 mrange resolution. For
theDAB emission two bands aredesignated UHF: 174 -240
MHz (replacing TV channels 5..12) and L: 1452 1492MHz.
The first one is better suited for bigger platforms, while the
single /4 antenna element is 40 cmlong, while thesecond, not
popular at the present time, can be applied for UAV in the
future.
TheDBV-T is now under rapid development and in whole
European Union countries it will replaced analogueTV within
couple of next years. The typical frequencies are 400-800
MHz, transmitted power 10-100kW and bandwidth about 8
MHz. Therange resolution is 20..30 m, almost independent of
the contents of transmission. The velocity resolution depends
on integration timeand resolution of 1 m/s can be reached. The
single antenna elements are of size of 10-20 cm, thereforeit is
possible to construct the antenna array also on mediumsize
UAVs. To increasethepossible number of channels available
for all TV viewers, the single frequency network concept is
applied in DVB-T. All transmitters within the country
transmitting this sameprograms areusing thesamefrequency.
All transmitters are synchronized in time and frequency by
GPS signals. Thus singlereceiving channel in passive radar can
be used, while thetarget is illuminating by several transmitters.
B. PCL pr ocessi ng concept
The passive radar detect the targets by calculating the
cross-ambiguity function

i
t
t
c
Fv
j
T R
dt e
c
r
t X t X t w v r y
0
2
*
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , (
S
(2)
where
*
T
X is the reference signal, received by the beam
directed towards transmitter, ) (t X
R
is the signal from
surveillancebeam,
i
t is theintegration time, F is the carrier
frequency and ) (t w is weighting function. Thetarget bistatic
range r and velocity v areestimatedas thecoordinates of the
maximumof function given by (2). TheCartesian coordinates
of detect targets are calculated by finding the cross-section
points of at least 3 ellipsoids of bistatic distances r and focal
points placed in the transmitter and radar positions. Thus the
own platform position (e.g. from GPS) and position of all
transmitters of opportunitymust be known.
Theconcept of airborne PCL system is presented in Fig. 2.
The illuminators of opportunity are the DVB-T transmitters,
while they have sufficient transmitting power, good, time-
invariant cross-ambiguity properties and good coverage.
The required detection range is almost one order of
magnitude smaller than theoretical detection range, predicted
by formula (1) and presented in Fig. 1, so theproblemof low
elevation coverageof DVB-T is not of high importance, while
it is possible to exploit vertical side-lobes of transmitter
antenna for illumination. The single-frequency network is a
benefit, while it is possible to tunethe radar receivers only to
one frequency and obtain multi-transmitter tracking system.
The typical integration time is 0.1..1 s so tracking can reach
required accuracy within 1-5 s, and thus reaction time is sped
up by 3 times. In such case the detection range can be
shortened to c.a. 6 km. The targets location is estimated
calculating ellipsoids crossing, as stated in Fig. 2.
One of the basic problems in passive airborne radar is
cancelation of ground clutter. In ground-based PCL system
ground clutter has no Doppler spread and can be easily
canceled using adaptivelattice filter [14]. In PCL radar placed
on moving platform clutter signal has significant Doppler
spread caused by theplatformmotion. Theclutter-free region
is limited in rangeby theplatformelevation (when only direct
signal compete with the target echoes) and in Doppler by
platform velocity. Using classical Doppler spread clutter
cancelation method described in [17], not only clutter but also
thetargets of interest can be canceled.
Figure2. Theairborne PCL scenario.
The other possibility is to apply adaptive space-time
processing (STAP) to canceled theground clutter. The classical
STAP algorithms are derived for active radar, where all
sounding pulses arethesame. In PCL system theilluminating
signal is continuous and due to changes of information
contents, thetime shifted parts arenot identical. As theresults,
STAP algorithms for airborne PCL systems have to be
modified to obtain required properties.
III. EXPERIMENTA RESULTS
To gain deeper knowledge of thePCL signal properties the
set of experiments wereperformed at Radar Technology Lab at
Warsaw University of Technology(WUT). Thefirst part of the
experiments were performed using Raw Radar Signal
Simulator, simulating thescenario using FM radio and DVB-T
signals for scene illumination and 6 elements antenna array.
Thesignals fromall antennas wereamplified by selective FM
band COTS amplifiers (88-108 MHz) and directly digitized.
The digital signals were down converted to the baseband where
IQ digital decoding was perform. The IQ signals from 2
selected FM channels (100 kHz each) were recorded on the
hard drive, and processed offline.
The experiments proved that the direct use of classical
STAP do not ensure good results, while combining the
CLEAN technique [17] for direct signal cancelation with
modified STAP approach givessignificant improvement. Up to
now only FM based experiments on moving platforms, namely
on car platform[11] and on BRYZA airplane [12] werecarried
out at WUT Radar Technology Lab(Fig. 3).
Figure3. Bryza airplane (left) and theFM antenna mounted temoprarly at
theplane window (right)
The result of signal processing using combination of both
methods is presented in Fig 4. It can be seen that theresidual
clutter returns arepresent in thepicture, but also thetarget is
clearly seen.
Figure4. Detection results using CLEAN method combined with simplified
STAP amplituse (in dB scale) color coded
Theresidual clutter can mask someof theslow targets, so
further development of efficient signal processing algorithms is
required.
The experiments with DBV-T illuminators are scheduled
for summer 2011.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The paper presents the idea of Airborne Passive radar
dedicated for aircraft and UAVs platformfor air surveillance
for thepurpose to increase air safety and avoid collisions in air-
space. It can be used for men-operating platforms, but main
benefits will be to connect thePCL radar output to autopilot to
provide safety for unmanned platforms. The first trials on
passive airborne radars performed in Poland [12, 16] and
England [13] shows that this technology can be used in near
future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thanks Polish ministry of Science
and High Education for support under scientific grant
5525/B/T00/2010/39and Polish Cost Guard for cooperation.
This work was partially supported by the European Union in
the framework of European Social Fund through theWarsaw
University of Technology Development Programme, realized
by Center for Advanced Studies.
REFERENCES
[1] P. E. Howland, D. Maksimiuk, and G. Reitsma, 'FM radio based
bistaticradar, IEE Proc. Radar, Sonar and Navigation, vol. 152, no. 3,
pp. 107115, J une2005.
[2] B. D. Nordwall, ' `Silent Sentry` a new type oI radar, Aviation
Weekand SpaceTechnology, no. 30, pp. 7071, 1998.
[3] A. Guner, M. A. Temple, R.L. Claypoole Jr. 'Direct-path filtering of
DAB waveIorm Irom PCL receiver target channel, Electronics Letters,
vol. 39, Issue: 1, 9 J an. 2003, pp:118 119.
[4] D. Gould, R. Pollard, C. Sarno, and P. Tittenso, 'A multiband
passiveradar demonstrator, in Proc. International Radar Symposium
2006, Cracow, Poland, 2426 May 2006, pp. 657660.
[5] A. D. Lallo, A. Farina, R. Fulcoli, P. Genovesi, R. Lalli, andR.
Mancinelli, 'Design, development and test on real data oI an FM based
prototypical passive radar, in Proc. RadarCon, Rome, Italy, 2630 May
2008, p. CD.
[6] D. Poullin and M. Flecheux, 'Recent progress in Passive
CoherentLocation (PCL) concepts and techniques in France, in Proc.
RadarCon,Rome, Italy, 2630 May 2008, p. CD.
[7] P. E. Howland, 'Target tracking using television-based bistatic radar,
IEE Proc.-Radar, Sonar & Navig., Vol. 146, No. 3, J une1999.
[8] H. Kuschel, M. Glende, J . Heckenbach, S. Mller, J . Schell, and C.
Schumacher, 'Experimental passive radar systems using digital
illuminators (DAB/DVB), in Proc. International Radar Symposium
2007, Cologne, Germany, 57 September 2007, pp. 411417.
[9] M. Malanowski, K. Kulpa, and J . Misiurewicz, 'PaRaDe Passive
Radar Demonstrator family development at Warsaw University of
Technology, in Proc. Microwaves, Radar and Remote Sensing, Kiev,
Ukraine, 2224 September 2008, p. CDC.
[10] J. Baker, H. D. GriIIiths, and I. Papoutsis, 'Passive Coherent
Locationradar systems. Part 2:WaveIorm properties, IEE Proc. Radar,
Sonar and Navigation, vol. 152, no. 3, pp. 160168, J une2005.
[11] B. Dawidowicz and K. Kulpa, 'Experimental results Irom PCL radar on
moving platIorm, in Proc. International Radar Symposium 2008,
Wroclaw, Poland, 2123 May 2008, pp. 305308.
[12] K. Kulpa, M. Malanowski, J . Misiurewicz, M. Mordzonek, P.
Samczyski, and M. Smolarczyk, 'Airborne PCL radar: the concept and
primary results, in Proc. Military Radar 2008, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, 2729 October 2008, p. CD.
[13] J. Brown, K. Woodbridge, A. Stove, and S. Watts, 'Air target
detectionusing airborne passive bistatic radar, ELECTRONICS
LETTERS, vol. 46, no. 20, September 2010.
[14] K. Kulpa, 'Ground clutter suppression in noise radar, in Proc.
International Conference on Radar, Tuluse, France, 1822 October
2004, p. CD.
[15] M. Malanowski, G. Mazurek, K. Kulpa, and J. Misiurewicz, 'FM
basedPCL radar demonstrator, in Proc. International Radar Symposium
2007, Cologne, Germany, 57 September 2007, pp. 431435.
[16] M. Malanowski, K. Kulpa, M. Mordzonek, and P. Samczynski,
'PaRaDe reconIigurable soItware deIined passive radar, in NATO
Specialist Meeting SET-136, Lisbon, Portugal, 2325 J une2009, p. CD.
[17] K. Kulpa, 'Simple sea clutter canceller Ior noise radar, in Proc.
International Radar Symposium 2006, Cracow, Poland, 2426 May
2006, pp. 299302.
[18] U. Nickel, 'Passive radar operation with GSM base stations features
and concepts, 2nd Passive Radar FHR-PCL-focus day(s), 17-18
November 2009, Wachtberg, Germany, pp. CD
[19] P. Samczynski, K. Kulpa, M. Malanowski, P. Krysik, L. Malikowski,
,A Concept of GSM-based Passive Radar
for Vehicle Traffic Monitoring, to be published in proceedings of
MRRS-2011, 25-27 August 2011, Kiev, Ukraine.
[20] F. Colone, P. Falcone, C. Bongioanni, P. Lombardo, 'WiFi Based
Passive Bistatic Radar Ior Local Area Surveillance, 2nd Passive Radar
FHR-PCL-focus day(s), 17-18 November 2009, Wachtberg, Germany,
pp. CD
FM Based Passive Coherent Radar
From detections to tracks
Radek Plsek, Vojtch Stejskal, Martin Pelant, Martin Vojacek
Advanced programs
ERA a.s.
Prumyslova 387, Pardubice, Czech Republic
rplsek@erabeyondradar.com
Abstract This paper provides description of individual steps
leading to successful targets tracking in multichannel passive
coherent system. Emphasis is given on targets association
principle in bistatic space prior to Cartesian tracking. The angle
of arrival from antenna array as a mean of targets association
and its properties is discussed.
Keywords - Passive Coherent Location; multistatic radar;
tracking; Angel of arrival
I. INTRODUCTION
A long term experience with military Electronic Support
Measurement (ESM) systems like Tamara and recent Vera-N
was motivation for company to follow with research dedicated
to passive radars technology usually called Passive Coherent
Location (PCL). In contrary to ESM system which exploits
different kind of signal emissions generated by target, the PCL
utilizes reflected signal and therefore it is able to detect non
cooperative and quiet targets by means of bistatic Radar Cross
Section (RCS). Bistatic configuration is also very suitable for
detection of stealth targets because their primary focus is on
monostatic RCS minimalization and property of non
electromagnetic emissions which makes them undetectable.
Moreover, the PCL system can utilize wide range of
commercial used illuminators of opportunity within VHF and
UHF bands.
Figure 1 Passive Multistatic Coherent Radar (one receiver with multiple
transmitters configuration).
II. SYSTEM CONCEPT
The PCL system being under development in ERA consists
of one receiver site and it is proposed to process signal from
four transmitters of opportunity, hence the system falls in the
group of multistatic configurations (see figure 1). It works with
signals intended for commercial terrestrial radio broadcasting
in band from 88 MHz to 108 MHz, where speech or music is
frequency modulated with ca. 100 kHz bandwidth. Conception
oI so called direct sampling`, i.e. sampling without any
frequency down-conversion, is being used. Therefore, only a
very simple analogue front-end is needed which consequently
yields in maximum cross channels` coherency.
A. Analog signal processing
Figure 2 Individual elements pattern (left) and combined patterns after
applied beam forming (right).
The proposed system consists of circular antenna array with
eight horizontally placed elements. Each element is connected
into signal divider which gives arise of required number of
output signals. It is possible to slightly reduce required high
dynamic range with analogue beam forming technique.
Therefore, each adjacent elements` pair (i.e. signals coming
from adjacent dividers) is connected to passive beam-former
consisting of delay links and attenuators network. With proper
beam-former settings, the minimum of radiation pattern
derived from combined antenna elements (pair) is set to
direction of the transmitter whose signal is being processed
(see figure 2). After that, all signals are passed through filter
and ampliIier. The receiver`s analogue signal processing chain
ends with an Analogue-to-Digital Converter (ADC). All
subsequent operations on signals (radio channel selection,
filtration, etc.) are made digitally. Since the output signal
bandwidth is ca. 150 kHz, signals are decimated, and therefore,
the native sampling ADC speed is reduced from 125 MSps to
approx. 240 kSps and complex signal is generated.
B. Digital signal processing
Digital signals in complex form are moved forward to
sophisticated digital signal processing chain which is
appropriately divided into two basic blocks: Multichannel
coherent processing and Air picture acquisition (see figure 3
for more details).
Figure 3 Signal processing chain block diagram
Signal from each antenna pair is processed separately on
Graphic Processing/Central Processing Units starting with
ground clutter rejection based on adaptive filtering within using
the auto-ambiguity function of reference signal. At this stage,
the static targets (clutter) are removed from the signal and only
moving targets remain. Subsequently the matched filter is
applied i.e. Cross Ambiguity Function (CAF) is computed for
each processed signal whereas peak in CAF represent elliptical
distance and elliptical Doppler frequency shift of appropriate
target. The longer is the integration interval, the lower (hence
better) the sensitivity of the system is, however its maximal
length is limited by required refreshing rate of the system
(bellow one second typically) as well as target`s
maneuverability possibilities. It is reasonable to notice that
different kind of modulation signals (speech vs. music) lead to
different power of ambiguity function side lobes and for that
reason Sequential Target Elimination algorithm is applied
instead of widely used simple Constant False Alarm Rate
detector (CFAR) to discover possibly hidden peaks in CAF
surface.
Every single detected peak is equipped with a number of
parameters and such detections, or plots, are further processed
by Air picture acquisition block.
C. Coverage prediction
The proposed PCL system`s parameters, especially
coverage, can be roughly predicted considering
transmitter/receiver geographic location and other parameters.
Taking into account omnidirectinal radiation pattern for both
transmitting and receiving antenna together with their real
location, it is possible to obtain signal to interference (reflected
to reference signal) ratio Ior constant target`s RCS 10dBsm. It
can be seen impossibility to detect any target with such system.
On the other hand, the situation will change significantly by
addition the processing gain` concerning adaptive clutter
rejection (ca. 40 dB depends on modulation type), CAF (ca.
48 dB depends on number of samples entering each
integration) and rejection by antenna pattern`s null steering (ca.
10 dB depends on particular pair of antenna elements).
Contours of the minimum required RCS to let the target be
detectable by system with consideration of all mentioned
effects are depicted in figure 4 for two transmitters. The
decreasing system`s detection capability behind transmitter is
easily observable. Note both subplots in the figure are results of
real radiation pattern measurements and their adjustment by
beam-former.
Figure 4 Covergade predictions: minimal detectable RCS [dBsm] contours
for current antenna patterns and beam-former settings for Krasne (left) and
Cerna Hora (right) transmitters
III. DETECTIONS
The system is still under development, and therefore its
efficiency is measured by means of only one FM radio
processing at the moment. Detections across all individual
processed channels (i.e. signals from individual elements)
during ten minute record are depicted in figure 5 as an example
oI system`s capabilities. There is significantly lower number of
detected targets in channel number 8. This is given by fact, that
this signal has the same contents as reference one. The figure 6
than, contains detections from all channels joined in single
Range vs. Doppler plane. Note several detections in bistatic
range up to 260km observed.
Figure 5 Detections in individual channels (top to bottom channel 1 to
channel 8)
Figure 6 Detections from all channels in single range vs. Doppler plane
Since exact target 3D positions cannot be determined by
such system, the reIerence 'ground truth system output with
exact target positions in Cartesian space was involved into
testing.
The reIerence is taken Irom ERA`s Multilateration
Surveillance System (MSS) which is situated in area of
Pardubice in the Czech Republic. Its coverage is angularly
dependent, typically 400 km in range. Comparison between
PCL and MSS is performed in range-Doppler plane, when a
real time data from MSS system are converted from Cartesian
into this coordinate system. Each detected PCL target is then
associated with its nearest MSS target if they meets condition
of minimal range-Doppler distance. This threshold is formed
by an ellipse which center is situated at location of any MSS
target, and its semimajor axis is 3 km and semiminor axis is 10
Hz. The PCL system efficiency is than evaluated in such
manner. Target association also provides overview of detected
targets in Cartesian space (see example in figure 7).
Figure 7 PCL detections associated with MSS ground truth (transmitter
'Cerna Hora)
IV. ANGLE OF ARRIVAL
The Angle of Arrival (AoA) as a mean of targets
association from different FM channels could be derived based
on signal`s phase and amplitude conditions among individual
antenna array elements and their radiation pattern knowledge.
Let us mark vectors representing complex samples of
signals from each channel (i.e. antenna element or beam former
output) as
( where n is a number of channels

(8 for discussed system). Estimation of phase differences and
amplitude ratios is based on minimizing the sum of energy of
signals
defined as

where
are complex coefficients representing the amplitude

ratios and phase differences among channels, i.e.

, and represents the best estimate of the

input signal (signal with highest SNR is taken at first iteration).
Hence, we are minimizing two variables function according
to relation

It has been already mentioned in previous chapter, that all

possible antenna elements` couples are taken and their signals
phase and amplitude are manipulated to achieve a combined
radiation pattern with the null in the transmitter angle. This
conveys the advantage in increasing the signal-to-interference
ratio. On the other hand, it is expected that the relationship
among individual channels will not be straightforward as well
as, and due to the fact, that the phase center of each elements
pair will not remain in fixed location. To overcome this issue,
the pre-computed table of vectors k is proposed. Each table`s
item than represents one direction which the signal is received
from. Before the system is fully operational, the table is filled
with pre-computed values based on estimated antenna radiation
pattern (via 3D electromagnetic field simulator fed with
detailed antenna model) together with known beam-formers
setting. Afterwards, the table shall be corrected by values from
real measurement.
Number of table rows determines the number of segments
that the space is divided in. Almost equally distributed slices
can be established similarly to insects` eye compound
(ommatidium), by consecutive division of sphere. This is made
within use of Platonic solid, particularly decahedron, which
allows us to divide its basic 12 surfaces into arbitrary number
of sub-cells and hence obtain required angle resolution (see
figure 8).
Figure 8 Left - decahedron surface with two different angle resolutions.
Right angle resolution for different number of used ommatidia (legend
describes angular resolution in degrees with overall number of segments per
sphere behind slash)
At first, emphasis has been given to investigate the stability
behavior of phase and amplitude ratios among channels. This
provides us with an overview of expected AoA determination
efficiency. Evaluation has been made on track-by-track basis
within help of reference ground truth tracks as described in
chapter III. Only tracks with simultaneous detections in more
than three channels are utilizable, hence considered, and
differences among them analyzed for whole interval that the
target is detected by PCL and/or tracked by MSS. There is an
example of differences evaluation for particular target detected
in most of the collecting intervals from period about 240
seconds in the figure 10. Target`s track in 2D and individual
detections` signal-to-noise ratio considering all processing gain
is shown in figure 9. It can be seen, that the target is about
50 km apart from receiver in average and estimated SNR varies
from 6 dB up to 22 dB.
Figure 9 Target`s track in XY coordinates (leIt), detection`s SNR (right)
The figure 10 shows complex plane histograms of ratios
between estimated coefficients k
i
in two consecutive collecting
intervals, related to the channel number 6, which in this case is
the channel with strongest signal. Hence, the histogram for
channel 6 contains only one peak representing difference zero
(i.e. zero phase difference and equal amplitude) as a reference.
Only 7 out of 8 channels are shown, because channel nr. 8 have
the same contents as the reference one and so any targets have
been detected here. Despite of all histogram should optimally
look like channel nr.6, i.e. the variances from one collecting
interval to another would be negligible as the AoA remains
almost the same no matter what actual channel is evaluated,
some differences given by signal`s noisy behavior can be
observed.
Figure 10 Differences of complex determined komplex coefficients related to
channel nr.6 (channel nr.1 on the top to nr.7 at the bottom)
V. CONCLUCIONS
In this paper the FM based PCL system, still being under
development in ERA a.s., is described. Its prototype covers
circular antenna array with 8 dipole elements, analogue
processing chain realizing beam-forming, direct sampling
digital receiver as well as powerful processing running on
GPUs. Example of detections from single FM channel is
shown and efficiency is evaluated within help of reference
ground truth ERA`s multilateration system.
As the angle of arrival is supposed to be used for detection
association among different FM channels, its performances are
investigated. It has been shown in the last chapter, that the AoA
contribution should be utilizable in tracks forming process.
REFERENCES
[1] Slezak, L., Kvasnicka, M., Pelant, M., Vavra, J., Plsek, R. Simulation
and Evaluation of the Passive Coherent Location system. In Proceedings
of International Radar Symposium. Germany: Berlin, 2005.
[2] Plsek, R. - Stejskal, V. - Pelant, M. - Slezak, L. FM-Based Passive
Coherent Location System, Detection and Accuracy. In Proceedings of
the International Conference on Military Technologies 2009. Brno:
University of Defence, 2009. pp. 448-457. ISBN 978-80-7231-649-6.
[3] Stejskal, V. - Plsek, R. FM-Based Passive Coherent Location
Demonstrator. In Proceeding International Symposium - Enhanced
Solutions for Aircraft and Vehicle Surveillance Applications. Berlin,
March 2010.
High Range Resolution Multichannel DVB-T Passive

Radar: Aerial Target Detection
D. Petri, A. Capria
RaSS National Laboratory
CNIT (National Inter-University Consortium for
Telecommunications)
Pisa, Italy
{dario.petri, amerigo.capria}@cnit.it
M. Conti, F. Berizzi, M. Martorella, E. Dalle Mese
Department of Information Engineering
University of Pisa
Pisa, Italy
{m.conti, f.berizzi, m.martorella, e.dallemese}@iet.unipi.it
Abstract A method for improving the range resolution in
passive radar systems is to jointly use more than one
transmission channel of the same Illuminator of Opportunity
(IO). This paper specifically focuses on the exploitation of three
adjacent Digital Video Broadcasting - Terrestrial (DVB-T)
channels for achieving high range resolution profiles with a
passive radar system operating in air surveillance scenarios.
Firstly, an analysis of the ambiguity function obtained from a
multichannel DVB-T source is presented. Afterwards, the
experimental scenario is defined and a preliminary detection
result on aerial targets is shown.
Keywords- passive radar; multichannel; DVB-T; aerial
targets, air surveillance, HRRP;
I. INTRODUCTION
Passive radar systems (also referred to as Passive
Coherent Location) exploit Illuminators of Opportunity (IO)
such as radio FM, analogue and digital television
transmitters, GSM/UMTS base stations etc, in order to detect
and track targets. This system concept has a great interest for
both civilian and military scenarios mainly due to a number
of advantages with respect to active radar as low cost, low
weight and enhanced radar cross section for certain
geometries. Moreover, it does not require any dedicated
frequency band allocation and it guarantees low Probability
of Intercept (LPI) thanks to the absence of the transmitter
unit. The performances of a passive radar system mainly
depend on the transmitted power and on the characteristics of
the exploited IO as reference signal. As the range coverage
strongly depends on the transmitted power level, highly
powerful transmitters, such as broadcast FM, DAB radio and
analogue or DVB television transmitters are to be preferred.
Regarding the waveform suitability for radar purposes, the
ambiguity function provides a mathematical tool for radar
designers to identify resolution and ambiguities in both
delay-time and Doppler [1][2][3]. The exploited waveforms
can be divided in two main classes: analogue or digital
waveform. It is worth noting that the ambiguity function of
analogue sources (e.g.: FM radio or analogue TV) is
unpredictable as it is the result of a signal time-varying
structure, which typically produces a content dependent
signal bandwidth. On the contrary, digital waveforms exhibit
an ambiguity function with a thumb-tack shape and a
bandwidth that is constant in time. Furthermore, in many
countries, the analog radio and TV transmissions are
scheduled to be dismissed and to be replaced by digital ones.
Consequently, DVB-T transmitters are certainly good
candidates for passive radar purposes thanks to the high level
of radiated power and the good waveform performances in
terms of range and Doppler resolution. An ongoing research
field about passive radar systems concerns the theoretical
range resolution improvement by using multiple FM
channels [4][5] and DVB-T channels[4]. For example [4]
gives a mathematical framework to deal with equally and
not-equally spaced FM radio or DVB-T channels. In a
previous work [6], two approaches to achieve high resolution
exploiting multiple adjacent DVB-T channels of the same
transmitter have been presented. This paper analyzes the
application of these techniques to real data. Moreover,
preliminary detection results in an air surveillance scenario
will be shown. This paper is organized as follows: in section
II a comparison between single channel DVB-T ambiguity
function and multichannel DVB-T ambiguity function will
be presented and analyzed. Then, the acquisition system and
the experimental scenario are described. Finally real data
results are presented and discussed in order to evaluate the
system performance in terms of spatial resolution.
II. MULTICHANNEL DVB-T SIGNAL: AMBIGUITY
FUNCTION ANALYSIS
A multichannel DVB-T signal can be analytically
modelled as:
( ) ( )
1
2
0
c
m
N
j f t
ref m
m
s t e s t e

=

=

(1)
where N
c
is the number of channels, f
m
is the carrier
frequency for the m-th channel and ( )
m
s t is the complex
envelope of the m-th channel. Under the assumption that the
N
c
channels are equally spaced, it is possible to write f
m
as
0 f
f m + where
f
represents the channel bandwidth. If
( )
ref
s t is downconverted respect to f
0
, it is possible to write
the complex envelope of the signal as:
( ) ( )
1
2
0
c
f
N
j m t
ref m
m
s t s t e

=
=

The DVB-T multichannel ambiguity func
signal ( )
ref
s t can be written as:
2 *
1 1
2 2 ( *
0 0
1 1
2 2 *
0 0
( , ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
d
c c
f f
c c
f f
j f t
d ref ref
N N
j m t j p t
m p
m p
N N
j p j m t j
m p
m p
f s t s t e dt
s t e s t e
e s t e s t e
+

= =

+

= =

= =
=
=

Under the following assumptions:
( )
m
s t is a bandwidth-limited
bandwidth equal to 2B)
the signal bandwidth is always
channel bandwidth, 2
f
B (i.
do not overlap)
the Doppler frequency is n
respect to the signal bandwidth, f
it is possible to rewrite eq. (3) as:
( )
1
2 *
0
1
2
0
( , ) ( ) ( )
,
c
f
c
f
N
j p
d p p
p
N
j p
p d
p
f e s t s t e
e AF f

=
=
=

where ( ) ,
p d
AF f is the ambiguity funct
DVB-T channel. Under the realistic assum
auto-ambiguity function of a generic single
exhibits the same main characteristics,
simplified to:
( )
( )
(
(
1
2
0
| ( , ) | | ,
sinc
,
sinc
c
f
N
j p
d d
p
c
d c
f
f AF f e
N
AF f N
From eq.(5) it can be observed that the ran

improved by a factor of
c
N respect to the
channel usage. Moreover, the ambiguity fun
one channel represents the envelop of th
ambiguity function. The number of channe
value of
f
influence the range resolution a
level.
As a preliminary step, three adjacent D
have been acquired through a SDR (So
Radio) board, then analysed and processed t
of the DVB-T multichannel waveform
frequency is 754 MHz and the whole analys
about 24 MHz of bandwidth (Fig. 1).
(2)
ction (AF) of the
) 2
2 2
d
f d
j f t
j p t j f t
e dt
e dt

=
(3)
d signal (with
smaller than the
.e.: the channels
negligible with
f
d
<<2B
2
d
j f t
e dt
=
(4)
tion for a single
mption that the
DVB-T channel
eq.(4) can be
)
)
|
f
f
(5)
nge resolution is
e single DVB-T
nction relative to
he multichannel
els
c
N , and the
and the sidelobe
DVB-T channels
oftware Defined
to obtain the AF
m. The central
sed signal shows
Fig. 1 DVB-T mu
In this case, the ambiguit
and compared with the one
channel. Plots of the ambig
(range) and Doppler frequenc
worth noting that the range
times with respect to the sin
Doppler profile maintained th
Fig. 2 Multichannel AF from
3-D view, Range p
The ambiguity function prese
peaks due to the known st
ultichannel spectrum
ty function have been computed
e obtained for a single DVB-T
guity function along time delay
cy are represented in Fig. 2. It is
e resolution is improved by N
c
ngle DVB-T channel, while the
he same behaviour.
real data (starting from the top):
rofile, Doppler profile
ents unwanted deterministic side
tructure of the DVB-T signal,
which includes pilots, guard intervals, and the guard band
between adjacent channels. In this work a novel signal pre-
processing technique based on DVB-T reference signal
power spectral density (PSD) [7] is used to reduce these
peaks as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 Multichannel AF from real data 3-D view after reference
signal pre-processing
III. EXPERIMENTAL SET UP
The equipment that has been used in this experiment is
composed by commercial off-the-shelf low cost TV
antennas, two synchronized Ettus USRP2 board equipped
with a RF front-end tunable from 800 MHz to 2400 MHz.
The main technical specifications of the USRP2 are:
FPGA Xilinx Spartan 3-2000 EP1C12 Q240C8
Cyclone
2 High-Speed Analog to Digital Converters (ADCs)
operating at 14 bits with a sampling rate of 100
Mega-samples per seconds (100 MS/s)
2 High-Speed Digital to Analog Converters (DACs)
operating at 16 bit with a sampling rate of 400 MS/s
Gigabit Ethernet interface
The antenna used during preliminary measurements and
the experiment for the target channel is a Yagi-Uda antenna
with a receiving gain equal to 18 dB and a Half Power Beam
Width of 20 degrees in the horizontal plane. On reference
channel, a Yagi-Uda antenna with a gain of 15 dB has been
used.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiment scenario geometry is shown in Fig. 4.
Specifically, the receiver was located at the Department of
Information Engineering in Pisa and the DVB-T transmitter
was 14 km away from the receiver at 36 North-East as
indicated by the red arrow in Fig. 4. Moreover, the
surveillance antenna was pointed at 15 of azimuth and 30
of elevation. The targets of interest were airplanes taking off
from the nearby Pisa airport. Fig. 4 shows the trajectory of
the considered target. The expected Doppler frequencies for
the target in the surveillance area are shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 4 Experiment Scenario geometry and target trajectory
Fig. 5 Expected Doppler Frequencies for a target that is
moving between the two red dots of Fig. 4 trajectory
Fig. 6 presents a photo of the detected target and
summarizes the target main technical information.
British Airways Boeing 737-400
Technical information Values (metres)
Length 36.5
Wingspan 28.9
Height 11.1
Fig. 6 Main technical information of the detected target
The reference and surveillance channels have been
simultaneously acquired with the equipment presented in
section III. Then the pre-processing technique has been
applied and finally the Cross-Ambiguity Function (CAF)
relative to three adjacent DVB-T channels has been
evaluated (Fig. 7). The peak due to the target echo is clearly
visible at the 87
th
range bin (i.e.: around 1700 m for the
geometry considered in Fig. 4).
Fig. 7 CAF of the surveillance area
Moreover, a Doppler frequency value of -169 Hz is in
accordance with the expected velocity (more than 450
km/h).
Fig. 8 Target range profile for a single DVB-T channel (blue
line on the top) and for three adjacent DVB-T channels (red
line on the bottom)
In order to better evaluate the range resolution
improvement, the CAF has been calculated and compared
for one and three DVB-T channels. Particularly, Fig. 8
presents the range profile along the Doppler frequency of
the target echo (i.e.: -169 Hz). Considering the geometry in
Fig. 4, the bistatic range resolution achievable by using a
single channel is around 57 m, whereas exploiting three
adjacent channels it is around 18 m. It is worth noting as the
range resolution relative exploiting three DVB-T channels
(red line) is improved respect to the single DVB-T channel
case (blue line). As a matter of fact, the blue line range
profile shows only one main peak while two peaks are
clearly visible on the red line one. This result is actually
consistent with the target size reported in Fig. 6.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the exploitation of multiple DVB-T channels
for a passive radar system has been considered in order to
enhance the radar range resolution. A preliminary study has
been focused on the ambiguity function analysis in order to
verify the suitability of a multichannel DVB-T signal for
radar applications. The theoretical study has been supported
by preliminary measurements relative to three adjacent
DVB-T channels. Experimental results in aerial scenario
have been carried out and discussed. As a matter of fact,
high resolution DVB-T passive radar can be the first step to
perform passive radar imaging and target classification.
REFERENCES
[1] H D. Griffiths and C. J. Baker, Passive Coherent Location radar
systems. Part 1: Performance prediction. Radar, Sonar and
Navigation, IEE Proceedings, vol. 152, no. 3, pp. 124 132, 2005.
[2] .C J. Baker, H. D. Griffiths, and I. Papoutsis, Passive coherent
location radar systems. part 2: waveform properties, Radar, Sonar
and Navigation, IEE Proceedings -, vol. 152, no. 3, pp. 160168,
2005.
[3] P. E. Howland, Target tracking using television-based bistatic
radar,Radar Sonar and Navigation IEE Proceedings, vol. 146, no. 3,
pp. 166174, june 1999.
[4] Olsen, K.E.; Woodbridge, K.; , "Analysis of the performance of a
multiband passive bistatic radar processing scheme," Waveform
Diversity and Design Conference (WDD), 2010 International , vol.,
no., pp.000142-000149, 8-13 Aug. 2010
[5] Bongioanni, C.; Colone, F.; Lombardo, P.; , "Performance analysis of
a multi-frequency FM based Passive Bistatic Radar," Radar
Conference, 2008. RADAR '08. IEEE , vol., no., pp.1-6, 26-30 May
2008
[6] Conti, M.; Berizzi, F.; Petri, D.; Capria, A.; Martorella, M.; , "High
range resolution DVB-T Passive Radar," Radar Conference
(EuRAD), 2010 European , vol., no., pp.109-112, Sept. 30 2010-Oct.
1 2010
[7] M. Conti, D. Petri, A. Capria, M. Martorella, F. Berizzi, E. Dalle
Mese, "Ambiguity Function Sidelobes Mitigation in Multichannel
DVB-T Passive Bistatic Radar", accepted to International Radar
Symposium (IRS) 2011, September 7-9, 2011, Leipzig, Germany
Range Only Multistatic Tracking in Clutter
Darko Mu sicki and Taek Lyul Song
Department of Electronic Systems Engineering,
Hanyang University, Republic of Korea
Darko.Musicki@gmail.com and tsong@hanyang.ac.kr
AbstractThis paper presents an algorithm for multistatic
target tracking in clutter, using only range difference information
(neither bearing nor Doppler information are assumed available).
Presence of false tracks, Data association issues as well as the non-
linear measurement equation makes this a challenging problem.
This paper proposes a solution to this problem by using the
Gaussian Mixture Measurement likelihood - Integrated Track
Splitting algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
1
Multistatic tracking involves using non-collocated transmit-
ters and receivers to track the targets. One transmitter can
be paired with one (bistatic) or many receivers (multistatic
conguration). The receiver measures the time difference
between the signal propagated directly, and the signal reected
from the target. This setup has many practical benets, as well
as numerous challenges, and is an active area of research, a
nice overview can be found in [1].
In this paper we also assume no angle information, which
introduces a severe measurement non-linearity and also ne-
cessitates using more than one stationary receiver (sensor)
to ensure system observability. The situation is made more
complex by uncertain detections and the presence of spurious
measurements (clutter). The uncertain presence of target(s)
also increases the problem dimensionality.
The signal to clutter ratio is usually low enough so that a sig-
nicant number of clutter detections are present in each scan.
The tracks are initialized and updated using measurements,
thus both true tracks (which follow targets) and false tracks
(which do not) are initialized and updated. Furthermore, true
tracks may become false, either because the target disappears,
or the track may lose a target due to random detections and
measurement noise phenomena.
A false track discrimination procedure must be used to
recognize and eliminate (a vast majority of) false tracks, and
recognize and conrm (a vast majority of) true tracks.
One approach to track information involves using the specu-
lar phenomena [2]. At certain target to receiver geometries, the
power of received signal increases sharply. Thus, the detection
threshold is kept high until the specular detection occurs and
the track is initialized. Then the detection threshold is lowered,
but only in the vicinity of established track(s). This approach
is innovative, and robust in some environments. However it
1
This work was supported by Defense Acquisition Program Administration
and Agency for Defense Development (Republic of Korea) through Project
ADD-09-70-01-03, as collaboration with the University of Melbourne, Aus-
tralia under the contract UD090002DD
usually results in signicant delays before track is initializied
and, subsequently, conrmed. Additional measures have to
be taken to detect the event of track becoming a false track
(losing its target).
Here we propose using the Gaussian Mixture Measurement
likelihood - Integrated Track Splitting algorithm (GMM-ITS)
algorithm to handle both the false track discrimination and
target trajectory estimation, in a natural (integrated) fashion.
The GMM-ITS was introduced in [3] as a general algo-
rithm for target tracking in clutter, when (severely) non-linear
measurements are available. It approximates the trajectory
state pdf by a dynamic Gaussian mixture (in the state space).
The measurement nonlinearity is handled by projecting the
measurement likelihood from the measurement space into the
surveillance space, where it is then approximated by a Gaus-
sian Mixture (summing up to a proportionality coefcient).
Trajectory state update is then handled by using the standard
Kalman lter update operation between every pair of trajectory
state and measurement likelihood Gaussians. To facilitate the
false track discrimination, the probability of target existence
is recursively calculated in the standard manner [4], [5] using
the measurement likelihood ratio.
The track conrmation and termination operations use the
calculated probability of target existence as the track quality
measure.
This approach offers signicant benets. A standard lter
is being used; the only module that is changed between appli-
cation is the measurement likelihood projection and approxi-
mation [6][9]. The atomic operation is the standard Kalman
Filter update, which has been studied in every conceivable
detail during the last decades. On the negative side, the number
of operations (and computational requirements) is signicantly
higher than that of a single Kalman lter, but nevertheless it
is usually an order of magnitude more frugal than a Particle
Filter implementation [10].
This paper is a natural extension of [11], which limits
use of GMM-ITS to a trajectory estimation in a multistatic
environment (no data association environment and associated
false track discrimination requirements).
Models and assumptions are presented in Section II, fol-
lowed by the description of the measurement likelihood trans-
formation in Section III. The GMM-ITS tracker is briey
presented in Section IV. Simulation results in Section V
vindicate this approach, followed by the concluding remarks
in Section VI.
II. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this paper we consider two dimensional multistatic surveil-
lance scenarios. A single emitter broadcasts signal, which is
received by multiple sensors. The sensors process the signal,
perform the detection and provide detection measurements.
All measurements are processed at a fusion center. Here we
assume that each sensor receives (takes) measurements simul-
taneously, although the algorithm provides a straightforward
extension for asynchronous scanning.
A single target may or may not be present (although the
lter may be extended to the multitarget version).
The sensors also report clutter measurements, which are
assumed to follow Poisson distribution with known mea-
surement density. Thus, at each scan the tracking algorithm
receives multiple measurements from a number of sensors,
without prior knowledge on which measurement is the target
measurement.
The usual simplifying assumptions of point targets and
the innite sensor resolution are used here. The point target
(if it exists and follows a trajectory whose only dynamic
model is known) creates up to one detection per measurement
time per receiver, with probability of detection P
D
1.
The innite resolution sensor assumption translates into each
measurement has only one source; i.e. it is either the target
measurement or a clutter measurement, but not both.
The target existence event
k
at time k is modeled as a
Markov Chain [4], [5], where the propagation equals
P{
k
} = P{
k1
}, (1)
where denotes the Markov transition probability. Eq. (1) is
conditioned on the data set used so far.
Standard target trajectory propagation is assumed here
x
k
= F x
k1
+
k
(2)
where F is (known) propagation matrix, and
k
is zero mean
white Gaussian sequence not correlated with any other random
sequence, with (known) correlation matrix Q.
Target trajectory is usually expressed in Cartesian coordi-
nates, almost always with position and velocity as elements
of the trajectory state. Here we assume that exists linear pro-
jection H from the trajectory state space into the surveillance
(position) space, i.e. that Hx
k
equals the position of the target.
Each sensor receives both the direct signal from emitter, and
the signal reected by the target. The time difference between
these signals is a measurement of the difference in two lengths
the signal had to travel. Each sensor corrupts measurement
with additive measurement noise, and the target measurement
from sensor (s) at time k equals
y
(s)
k
= h
_
x
k
; x
(s)
_
+
(s)
k
(3)
with x
k
denoting the trajectory state, x
(s)
denoting sensor
trajectory state, and
(s)
k
denoting a sample of zero mean,
white Gaussian process with standard deviation
(s)
. The
measurement function is
h
_
x
k
; x
(s)
_
= a
(s)
k
b
(s)
(4)
where a
(s)
k
denotes the total distance from the emitter to
target to sensor (s), and b
(s)
denotes the direct distance from
sensor (s) to the emitter. Both the (stationary) emitter and the
(stationary) sensor positions are assumed known.
Disregarding the measurement noise and given the mea-
surement value of h(x
k
; x
(s)
), and therefore the value a
(s)
k
,
possible target positions form an ellipse where the emitter and
sensor (s) form the focal points, and with the major axis of
a
(s)
k
, and the minor axis of
_
_
a
(s)
k
_
2
_
b
(s)
_
2
. (5)
Due to the measurement noise, the line of this target position
uncertainty ellipse becomes wide. This measurement equation
is non-linear.
In addition to the signal reected by the target (and de-
tected with the probability of detection P
D
, each sensor
also receives clutter (plus amplication noise) signal, which
results in spurious detections termed the clutter measurements.
The clutter measurements are assumed to follow a Poisson
distribution parameterized by the clutter measurement density
in the measurement space. The clutter measurement density
is assumed a priori known, it can be estimated otherwise [12].
Thus, at measurement time k, receiver i receives a set
of measurements Y
k
(i) with random cardinality m
i
k
; where
Y
k,j
(i) denotes the jth measurement received by receiver i
at time k. The fusion center receives measurement sets from
all receivers, Y
k
= {Y
k
(1), . . . Y
k
(R)} where R denotes
the number of receivers. Denote by Y
k
the sequence of all
measurement sets up to and including time k.
III. MEASUREMENT LIKELIHOOD TRANSFORMATION
The likelihoods of measurement Y
k,j
(i) is approximated by a
Gaussian Mixture in the surveillance space:
p(Y
k,j
(i)|x
k
) c
j
k,i
G
g=1
j,g
k,i
N
_
z
j,g
k,i
; Hx
k
, R
j,g
k,i
_
(6)
where N(x; m, P) denotes the Gaussian pdf of variable x
with mean m and covariance P. The value of constant c
j
k,i
is
important for data association and equals
c
j
k,i
=
A
(s)
2
(s)
, (7)
where A
(s) denotes the area between

(s)
ellipses. Treat-
ing the Gaussian Mixture components as mutually exclusive
and exhaustive events, we obtain
G
g=1
j,g
k,i
= 1,
j,g
k,i
> 0 (8)
constraint.
To obtain the Gaussian Mixture presentation of measure-
ment likelihood in the surveillance space, the area between
(s)
ellipses is divided into component ellipses, where each
component ellipse is a footprint of one measurement Gaussian
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
5000
0
5000
receiver 2
receiver 3
receiver 1
target
emitter
Figure 1. Simulation scenario.
Mixture component, as presented on Figure 1. The process of
obtaining (6) are presented in [11].
The likelihood of each measurement received by each
receiver is converted into a (separate) Gaussian Mixture.
IV. GMM-ITS
Track state at time k is hybrid, as it consists of a binary random
variable (target existence) denoted by
k
and a continuous
random variable (trajectory state) x
k
:
P{
k
, x
k
} = P{
k
}p(x
k
|
k
), (9)
where trajectory state x
k
is only dened given the target exis-
tence event
k
. Trajectory state pdf is initialized and updated
by nonlinear measurement(s). Therefore, the trajectory state
pdf is non-Gaussian, and is approximated here by a Gaussian
Mixture; for example prior pdf at time k approximation is
p
_
x
k
|
k
, Y
k1
_
= (10)
Ck
c=1
c
N
_
x
k
; x
(c)
k|k1
, P
(c)
k|k1
_
where c denotes track component, or index of the track
component, depending on the context, and
Ck
c=1
c
= 1,
c
> 0. (11)
The advantage of using Gaussian Mixtures for both mea-
surement likelihood presentation and for the track state pdf
presentation, is that we may replace non-linear operations by
a number of simple Kalman lter updates.
The GMM-ITS recursion cycle at time k starts with
the posterior state at time k 1, P{
k1
|Y
k1
} and
p(x
k1
|
k1
, Y
k1
) and consists of
track prediction,
measurement component selection and likelihood calcu-
lation,
track update,
track component management, and
track output.
The measurement component selection and likelihood calcu-
lation, the track update and track component management
are performed sequentially on each measurement set Y
k
(i),
where the updated track state using the measurement sets
Y
k
(1) . . . Y
k
(i1) serves as the prior track state with respect
to the measurement set Y
k
(i) update. Thus, for the rest of this
section, due care has to be exercised when using P{
k
|Y
k1
},
C
k
,
c
, x
(c)
k|k1
and P
(c)
k|k1
, as they are the propagated values
only when using Y
k
(1), otherwise they are the track state after
Y
k
(1) . . . Y
k
(i 1) have been applied.
The probability of target existence serves as the track quality
measure and is used for false track discrimination. When (and
if) the probability of target existence rises above a predeter-
mined conrmation threshold, the track is assumed true, is
conrmed, and the information is forwarded to the operators
or the higher level of information fusion. When the probability
of target existence falls below a predetermined termination
threshold, the track is declared false and terminated.
A. Track Prediction
Track prediction propagates track state pdf from time k 1 to
time k,
p
_
x
k
|Y
k1
_
=
Ck
c=1
c
N
_
x
k
; x
(c)
k|k1
, P
(c)
k|k1
_
(12)
Relative probability
c
of each component c does not change
when propagating and each track component propagates indi-
vidually as per standard Kalman Filter prediction,and
_
x
(c)
k|k1
, P
(c)
k|k1
_
= (13)
KF
P
_
x
(c)
k1|k1
, P
(c)
k1|k1
, F, Q
_
.
The probability of target existence propagates by
P{
k
|Y
k1
} = P{
k1
|Y
k1
} (14)
B. Selection and Likelihood Calculation
Each track component c at time k selects a subset of mea-
surement components for update. The selection procedure will
not be detailed here, sufce it to say that it is described in
many references [13][15], and will not be detailed here. Each
component selects measurement components with signicant
mutual likelihoods.
The likelihood of a selected measurement Y
k,j
(i) compo-
nent g, with respect to the track component c is
p
j,g,c
k,i
=
c
j
k,i
P
G
N
_
z
j,g
k,i
; H x
(c)
k|k1
, S
j,g,c
k,i
_
(15)
where P
G
is the gating probability and
S
j,g,c
k,i
= HP
(c)
k|k1
H
T
+R
j,g
k,i
. (16)
The likelihood of a measurement Y
k,j
(i) component g which
is not selected by the track component c, and with respect
to the track component c is p
j,g,c
k,i
= 0. The likelihood of
measurement Y
k,j
(i) with respect to track component c is
p
j,c
k,i
=
G
g=1
j,g
k,i
p
j,g,c
k,i
, (17)
and the likelihood of measurement Y
k,j
(i) with respect to track
is
p
j
k,i
=
Ck
c=1
c
p
j,c
k,i
. (18)
C. Track Update
Track measurement likelihood ratio of measurement set Y
k
(i)
is
k,i
= 1 P
D
P
G
+ P
D
P
G
m
i
k
j=1
p
j
k,i
. (19)
Updated probability of target existence equals
P{
k
|Y
k
} =

k,i
P{
k
|Y
k1
}
1 (1
k,i
)P{
k
|Y
k1
}
. (20)
During the track update, each existing track component
is replaced by a number of new track components. Each
pair of track component c and a measurement component g
(of measurement Y
k,j
(i) forms a new component, given that
track component c selects measurement component g. Denote
by c
+
new component formed by track component c and
measurement component g, then the updated track state pdf is
approximated by
p
_
x
k
|Y
k
_
=
Ck+1
c
+
=1
c
+N
_
x
k
; x
(c
+
)
k|k
, P
(c
+
)
k|k
_
(21)
where relative component probability
c
+ is
c
+ = P
D
P
G
k,i
p
j,g,c
k,i
, (22)
or, when the component is associated with the null measure-
ment
c
+ =
c
1 P
D
P
G
k,i
. (23)
which satisfy constraint
Ck+1
c
+
c
+ = 1. (24)
Mean x
(c
+
)
k|k
and covariance P
(c
+
)
k|k
of new component c
+
are
obtained by simple Kalman lter update of track component
c by measurement component g
_
x
(c
+
)
k|k
, P
(c
+
)
k|k
_
= (25)
KF
U
_
x
(c)
k|k1
, P
(c)
k|k1
, z
j,g
k,i
, R
j,g
k,i
, H
_
,
where KF
U
denotes the Kalman lter update operation. For
the association with the null measurement,
_
x
(c
+
)
k|k
, P
(c
+
)
k|k
_
=
_
x
(c)
k|k1
, P
(c)
k|k1
_
. (26)
D. Track Component Management
As presented in this section, the number of track compo-
nents grows exponentially in time. To prevent the saturation
of available computational resources, some track component
management has to be implemented [16]. Proposed algorithm
is an instance of track splitting algorithm [3], [5], [17], [18],
and all track splitting track component management methods
can also be used here.
These techniques include track component pruning, where
components with small relative probabilities are removed,
track component subtree pruning, where whole subtrees of
components are removed based on track component relative
probabilities [13]. Finally, one can merge close track com-
ponents, where denition of close differs between various
proposals [19][21].
E. Track Output
As the track trajectory estimate, the authors use the trajectory
state mean x
k|k
and covariance P
k|k
, dened as the mean and
covariance of a posteriori track state pdf at time k
x
k|k
=
c
+
c
+ x
(c
+
)
k|k
(27)
P
k|k
=
c
+
c
+
_
P
(c
+
)
k|k
+ x
(c
+
)
k|k
_
x
(c
+
)
k|k
_
T
_
(28)
x
k|k
x
T
k|k
V. SIMULATIONS
Simulations have been used to verify proposed algorithm. A
simple scenario is shown in Figure 1. Three sensors generate
multistatic range only target measurements with the probabil-
ity of detection P
D
= 0.9. At each scan each sensor generates
a random number of clutter measurements, on the average each
sensor generates 3 clutter measurements per scan.
Multistatic measurements are taken once per 10 seconds,
and total simulated time is 1000 s. Each simulation scenario
is repeated 500 times with independent measurements.
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
time
c
o
n
f
i
r
m
e
d

t
r
u
e
Figure 2. True track conrmation rate
Tracks are initialized using all measurements, and the
tracks are propagated as proposed in this paper. False track
discrimination has been applied using the probability of target
existence as the track quality measure. No false tracks were
conrmed, and the true track success rate is depicted on
Figure 2.
Tracking results depend on the geometry of the situation
which is the current research area. Another area is the adaptive
choice of sensors to be used, the resource allocation problem.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper illustrates use of the GMM-ITS algorithm when
tracking a single target in clutter, using the highly-nonlinear
multistatic measurements without bearings information.
The initial results are highly encouraging, and the research
continues in various practical aspects of the application.
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[13] S. Blackman and R. Popoli, Design and Analysis of Modern Tracking
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[14] Y. Bar-Shalom and E. Tse, Tracking in a cluttered environment with
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[15] Y. Bar-Shalom, K. Chang, and H. Blom, Multitarget Multisensor Track-
ing. Artech House, 1990, vol. 1, ch. Automatic track formation in
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[16] S. Blackman, Multiple-target tracking with radar applications. Artech
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[17] T. Kurien, Multitarget Multisensor Tracking, Y. Bar-Shalom, Ed. Artech
House, 1990, vol. 1.
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[19] R. A. Singer, R. G. Sea, and K. Housewright, Derivation and evaluation
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New Concepts anu Tools
TrackerQualityMonitoringbyNonDedicatedCalibrationFlights
Session6.1page141
TheTransponderDataRecorder:firstimplementationandapplications
Session6.2page147
ADSB/MLATsurveillancesystemfromHighAltitudePlatformSystems
Session6.3page153
SpacebasedADSBAsmallstepfortechnologyagiantleapforATM?
Session6.4page159
Tracker Quality Monitoring by Non-Dedicated

Calibration Flights
Matthias Hess, Ralf Heidger
TM/SP
Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS)
Langen, GERMANY
{matthias.hess | ralf.heidger} @ dfs.de
Jochen Bredemeyer
FCS Flight Calibration Service GmbH
Braunschweig, GERMANY
brd @ flightcalibration.de
Abstract Sensor and tracking quality analysis is a key factor in
the quality assurance in surveillance for Air Traffic Control
(ATC) at an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) like the
DFS. In this paper we present a collaboration infrastructure that
allows automatic tracker quality analysis by using results of
regular ferry and mission flights conducted for inspection of
navigation aids. The goal of this infrastructure is to allow the two
companies Flight Calibration Service GmbH (FCS) and Deutsche
Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS) to combine their respective expertise
in an efficient manner.
Flight Calibration, Tracker Evaluation
I. INTRODUCTION
The quality of a tracking system can be estimated in several
ways which should be combined for a thorough analysis:
x Evaluation against synthetically created scenarios
x Evaluation against reconstructed trajectories
x Evaluation against calibrations flights
When employing synthetic scenarios, one generates artificial
sensor data on which the tracker operates. Usually the true
trajectory is perfectly known, but the simulated sensor data do
not necessarily reflect real behavior. The tracker is evaluated
against this simulated trajectory. At DFS the AFS simulator
[1], [12] is such a tool to create tracker testing scenarios.
In order to evaluate the tracker against traffic of
opportunity, an offline approach is quite common. A trajectory
is reconstructed from recorded real world sensor data with
algorithms, that are potentially more precise but take more time
than online tracking algorithms ([5] or [6], for instance), which
prohibits their use in a tracking system. This approach is taken
by the well-established SASS-C program developed by
EUROCONTROL [3].
Derived from the second method is the so called quasi-
online quality control used in a program suite developed by
DFS [10], [2]. Here a less time consuming algorithm is used
for the reconstruction that allows tracker quality analysis in a
timely fashion rather than the offline method of SASS-C.
A third and more expensive method is using calibration
flights. These give a reference trajectory of unparalleled
precision in an opportunity traffic scenario, but have spatial
and temporal limits.
All these approaches are deployed at DFS but the focus is
put on the third approach.
Radar flight inspection for civil facilities is nowadays
usually not performed periodically, there may be only a single
flight inspection after deployment. In contrast to dedicated
radar flight trials as depicted in ICAO DOC 8071 (Part III) [1],
this new approach makes use of the position data collected
during ferry and mission flights performed for flight inspection
of terrestrial navigation aids. This is a task to be performed on
a regular basis according to ICAO DOC 8071 (Part I) [1].
II. OVERVIEW
In order to accomplish a flight calibration data based
tracker evaluation, several steps are required:
x Conducting a calibration flight
x Preprocessing the collected raw data
x Collecting corresponding tracker data
x Analyzing tracker data with respect to the flight path
data
The key for the kind of tracker evaluations that we will
describe in this paper is bringing together the calibration flight
position data and the tracker data. The former is provided by
FCS as a by-product of their calibration flights and tracker data
is recorded at DFS. As DFS is doing the tracker evaluation and
has the respective data already ready at their hands, a data
exchange server between FCS and DFS was setup to provide
DFS with the flight path data.
The different stages are schematically presented in figure 1.
Figure 1. Principal data flow in a flight calibration data based tracker
analysis.
In section III we focus on the calibration flights and the
processing of the resulting data, i.e. steps 1 and 2. In section IV
we describe in a more detailed fashion the tracker evaluation.
Finally, to show how we employ the presented infrastructure,
we present an evaluation based on opportunity traffic with
corresponding calibration flight data in section V.
III. CALIBRATION FLIGHTS
Under normal operations, a single FCS flight inspection
aircraft spends more than 25 hours a week on ferry and mission
flights. This mission requires that the flight inspection system
(FIS) has a reference position estimate significantly more
accurate than that of the facility under inspection. The
implemented position estimation technique integrates
differential global navigation satellite systems (DGNSS, space-
based, ground-based correction) and an inertial navigation
system (INS). A total uncertainty in positioning of < 1 m in the
horizontal plane is normally achieved.
Furthermore, the attitude vector (roll, pitch, bank angle) is
available which helps to identify critical turning maneuvers.
These potentially block line-of-sight transmissions from the
aircraIt`s SSR antenna to the ground sensor, resulting in a
degraded slant range or monopulse estimation of a certain
beam dwell.
Position data is generated and recorded always when
airborne, so there is a huge dataset of 25 flight hours available
by the end of the week when one crew returns to their home
base.
Flight inspection missions of the two FCS aircraft cover,
among others, dense areas as Frankfurt, Munich, Vienna and
Zurich terminal manoeuvering area (TMA) within coverage of
at least one Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) and two mid-
range radars (SREM).
The mission traffic serves as a valuable source to obtain the
necessary data basis to check the radar tracker results against a
reliable, known target. There is no ordinary traffic used but two
dedicated targets having a high precision position vector with
timestamps against the GPS second-of-week.
The two FCS measurement aircraft with callsigns
'D-CFMD and 'D-CFME can be easily identified through
their Mode S technical addresses which is delivered from a
Mode S sensor monoradar service message (ASTERIX
CAT034).
A continuous validation of the multi-sensor tracker results
allows a long-term quality assurance with no additional flight
costs incurred.
IV. TRACKER QUALITY ANALYSIS
As mentioned above there are several ways to measure the
quality of a tracking system - once one has defined the
respective measures. For the purposes of this paper tracking
quality can roughly be divided into two main areas, track
detection and tracking accuracy. A track detection analysis
(TDA) tries to measure how well the tracker finds real targets
and can distinguish them from false ones. It also answers
questions about the ability of the tracker to follow the target
throughout its flight.
On the other hand, a track accuracy analysis (TAA) is
concerned with the precision of the tracker output, i.e. how
closely the tracker follows a target.
We use calibration flights for tracker quality analysis for
the purposes of this paper. Here the reference trajectory is
given by high-precision FIS data collected aboard a calibration
aircraft. These data are usually much more precise than
ordinary sensor data. Hence, the basis for tracker evaluation is
much more sound. The drawbacks of this method are the costs
for calibration flights and their restricted data set, spatially as
well as temporally. These flights can cover a certain area of
interest and for a limited period of time only.
But for very exact tracker evaluation there is no other
reference data being more accurate: These data are obtained in
a real-world scenario (rather than a synthetic scenario) and
have unique precision.
A. Tracking Quality
Tracking quality can be roughly divided into two domains,
TDA and TAA. The former indicates the ability of a tracking
system to reliably detect any real target and to distinguish it
from erroneous sensor signals. The latter measures the
accuracy with which a system follows real targets.
Commonly used measures for TAA are deviations of the
tracking signal from the true trajectory across and along its
path.
B. Accuracy Analysis
Two of the most commonly used quality measures for
tracking systems are the across trajectory and along trajectory
deviations. Since it is of interest to have as few quality
measures as necessary, one combines the deviations during the
time of the trajectory into a single root mean square (rms)
value.
Calibration Flight
Flight Position Data
Data Exchange
Server
Track Data
Tracker
Analysis
F
C
S
D
F
S
If we have a quantity that depends on time then the
rms value of that quantity is defined as follows:

where
and
are the start and end time over which is

defined and
denotes the duration of . For our

analysis we use the across and along deviations,
and
,
respectively. Trajectories can be modeled as mappings

from time into state space
that is
spanned by position , velocity and acceleration .
Here we neglect the acceleration and consider the
velocity to be equal to the first time derivative of the position
. So we can reduce a trajectory to a mapping from time to
position:

and we can set

So we obtain for
and
the
distances across and along two trajectories
and
the
following expressions:
and
where denotes the Euclidean norm of a quantity .

And finally, we define
and
to be the rms values of
and
respectively. For data in the

WGS84 frame [13], the Euclidean distance must be replaced by
a numeric approximation of the true distance on the spheroid.
V. LIVE EXAMPLE
This section finally shows how the flight calibration and the
tracker evaluation work together. We present how the chain
links from collecting flight position data to an actual tracker
evaluation work together.
For the tracker evaluation we use the Analysis Working
Position (AWP) developed at DFS [10] together with an
extension of the Batch Estimator (BE), an analysis module for
the AWP that was presented in an earlier paper [2]. Figure 2
shows the course of one of the calibration flights that was used
in our analysis within the AWP. The data of that flight were
collected for a different purpose but as a by-product they could
be used for a tracker evaluation.
Figure 2. Data of an actual calibration flight shown in the AWP that is used
for analysis purposes.
We show in figure 3 a detailed comparison of the
calibration flight data and the actual tracking output. Most of
the time the tracker does not deviate significantly from the
reference trajectory.
Figure 3. Comparison of the tracker output (green dots) and the reference
trajectory obtained from the calibration flight. The indicated deviation is about
0.13 nm.
As described in section II there are two different data
sources that are combined together for the final evaluation:
Data recorded during a calibration flight and sensor and
tracking data of an ATC system that covers the time and
location frame spanned by the calibration flight, i.e that
contains data for the whole calibration flight.
In order to demonstrate the potential of our analysis system,
we have chosen not to take data from an operational tracking
system, but from a system that is not tuned optimally.
Additionally we do not use all sensor data that is available.
This forces the tracker to produce errors that can be detected by
our automated evaluation.
A. Data Collection
The calibration flight data is collected on-board during the
flight. The data is processed and put on a server. At DFS this
server is checked regularly for data updates and newly arrived
data are downloaded and processed.
If a new data set is available, the corresponding sensor and
tracking data are retrieved from an archive at DFS. These data
are then merged together to form the basis of the tracker
evaluation.
B. Data Association
The time bases of these data will be different. The
calibration flight is based on GPS time and the ATC system is
fixed to UTC. So these time bases have to be adjusted as a first
step in merging them together. The next step is data
association. Data of the calibration flight must be correlated
with the corresponding tracker output. Only then is an
evaluation meaningful.
So far we use only a few correlation steps: Firstly, we
identify the 24 bit Mode S address of the calibration aircraft.
This data is unique and stored in the position data file. From
the tracker recording we extract the corresponding track
numbers, if sensors with Mode S capabilities are available and
cover the calibration flight. Then data from regions without
Mode S coverage are correlated based on these track numbers.
There can be several track numbers for the calibration flight if
the tracker fails to detect a continuous track. In a final step we
correlate tracking data to the reference trajectory by statistical
and geometric measures.
The calibration data contain, amongst other, the standard
deviation of the position and velocity. So it is possible to use
statistical distance measures if the tracker output contains the
specific data, too. This is not guaranteed because
EUROCONTROLs ASTERIX standard does not require these
data to be present in tracker output. If these data are not
available we use simple geometric distances for correlation.
C. Automated Analysis
The associated data obtained in the association step is used
to calculate several measures that provide indication of the
quality of the tracker. Ideally the quality would be indicated by
one or few numbers only, like the rms of across and along
distances. For a thorough understanding of the tracking
behavior this is usually not sufficient, so we calculate more
values in our automated analysis.
Our TAA analysis for this calibration flight gives an overall
rms value for the deviations of 333.6 m across and 315.9 m
along, respectively. Although not very good for operational
systems these values are acceptable. Surprisingly the value for
the along deviation is about the same as the value for the across
deviation. One would expect this to be much smaller as large
along deviations usually indicate a problem related to time. So
further investigations into the reasons for this behavior is
required.
There is another automatically calculated quantity at our
disposal, the histogram of deviations across and along. Figure 4
shows those histograms. As expected there are many small
deviations, indicating that the tracker usually performs well,
but there are too many large deviations which add to the rms
distance values.
Figure 4. Non-normalized histogram of deviations across and along. We
have chosen a logarithmic scale in order to see the small frequencies properly.
When we plot the deviations over the trajectory time
(figure 5) it is easily seen that there are few spots with very
large deviations. This gives hints for manual inspection.
Figure 5. Deviation plotted over the time of the trajectory. Remarkably,
there are a few spots with very large deviations. These are caused by track
drops and the fact that the tracks are interpolated in the calculation of rms
values.
Manual Analysis
At first glance an automated analysis is a good indicator for
the tracker working properly. So if, for instance, the rms values
are always well below a certain level, no further analysis would
have been required. But in case of unexpected peaks, an
automated analysis can give valuable hints but cannot in
general obtain the reasons for erroneous behaviour of the
tracker. So those cases require a manual intervention.
The automated analysis already identified hot spots in the
deviation. An indication of why the tracker shows these large
deviations can be obtained through figure 6. Here the
correlation between flight altitude and deviation is shown. For
low altitudes the tracker shows large deviations.
Figure 6. Correlation between altitude and devaition. For low altitudes the
deviation becomes excessively large.
Through the time of day one can identify the situation that
caused these deviations:
Figure 7. Tracker output vs reference trajectory at the time of day where
there are the hottest spots. This figure shows a part of the calibration flight
close to an airport. The largest deviations are found near the airport.
Obviously the tracker drops the track and continues it at
another location (figure 7). This is usually caused by an
insufficient sensor plot supply. So for certain parts there are no
tracks. Note again, that these errors have been induced
deliberately and do not reflect the operational performance of
the tracker.
The lack of sensor plots for that area is confirmed by
inspection of the corresponding data set. So we are able to
explain the tracking behavior. The airport is not covered
adequately by the chosen sensor set.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we have presented a method that automatically
combines data from calibration flights with data from ATC
sensors and tracking systems in order to conduct a tracker
evaluation. We have shown the feasibility of the presented
approach with real data from both sources, the calibration flight
data and sensor data from opportunity traffic. In order to force
the tracker to show erroneous behavior, we have inhibited
some sensors and mistuned the tracker. We then showed a
detailed analysis that identified some of the problems that lead
to the erroneous tracker behavior.
From that analysis the limitations of automated tracker tests
become obvious. The results of such tests should not be taken
for granted, even if the quality numbers indicate proper work.
To find the cause of erroneous behavior, automated tests can be
helpful in providing hints on where to look more thoroughly.
A combinatorial analysis of different diagrams from an
automated test, e.g. the deviation and altitude along the time of
trajectory, is very valuable in identifying poor performance.
The next version of SASS-C (version 7) is supposed to
handle comparisons between different tracking sources, too.
We installed that version and converted the calibration flight
data to ASTERIX CAT062, as the exchange format for
tracking output. Effectively we created a second tracker from
the calibration flight data and used that in SASS-C as reference
trajectory. We then tried to analyze the above situation with
SASS-C. Unfortunately, we were not able to use the whole data
set of one and a half hour of German sensor data to obtain
meaningful results. The reason is probably the still-beta status
of that SASS-C version.
Our future development aims at providing and
implementing more statistical measures, that furthers facilitates
a complete analysis of tracking behavior. We have seen that
correlations of basic measures (like the aforementioned
deviation and altitude over trajectory time) play an important
role in such an analysis. We will transfer these ideas to the
batch estimator where the calibration flight reference trajectory
is replaced by reconstructed trajectories. We will also focus on
the TDA which has been left out in this paper completely.
We also hope that further manual analysis of our tracker
will result in more experience to improve the algorithms which
then lead to a higher degree of automation in tracker
evaluations.
REFERENCES
[1] ICAO Document 8071 - Manual on Testing of Radio Navigation Aids,
Volume III (Testing of Surveillance Radar Systems), First Edition 1998.
[2] Matthias He, Ralf Heidger, "Trajectory Reconstruction for OTQC in
the Phoenix Analysis Working Position", in Enhanced Surveillance of
Aircraft and Vehicles (ESAV) Proceedings (2010), Berlin, Germany.
[3] Yvan Zeebroek, ' SASS-C V6.7 User Manual, SASS-C-UM-MAN-30,
ed. 1.90, Eurocontrol, Brussels, 2010
[4] Jess Garca, Juan A. Besada, Andrs Soto and Gonzalo de Miguel:
'Opportunity Trajectory Reconstruction Techniques for Evaluation of
ATC Systems, International Journal of Microwave and Wireless
Technologies (2009), 1 : 231-238.
[5] Jess Garca, Andres Soto, Gonzalo de Miguel, Juan Besada, Paula
Tarrio: 'Trajectory reconstruction techniques for evaluation of ATC
systems, in Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft and Vehicles (ESAV)
Proceedings (2008), Island of CAPRI, Italy, 198-203.
[6] Juan Besada, Gonzalo de Miguel, Andrs Soto, Ana Bernardos:
'Algorithms for Opportunity Target Reconstruction, in Enhanced
Surveillance of Aircraft and Vehicles (ESAV) Proceedings (2008),
Island of CAPRI, Italy, 212-217.
[7] Radoslav Natchev, Ralf Heidger: 'Trajectory computation for tracker
evaluation and linkage processing, in Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft
and Vehicles (ESAV) Proceedings (2008), Island of CAPRI, Italy, 192-
197.
[8] Ralf Heidger, Kai Engels: 'An Infrastructure for Online Tracking
Quality Control, in Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft and Vehicles
(ESAV) Proceedings (2008), Island of CAPRI, Italy, 218-224
[9] Ralf Heidger: 'The PHOENIX White Paper. V. 3.0., DFS Langen
2011.
[10] Ralf Heidger, Ha Son Nguyen: 'An analysis working position for radar
data processing quality control, in Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft
and Vehicles (ESAV) Proceedings (2007), Bonn, Germany.
[11] Ralf Heidger, Thomas Klenner, Roland Mallwitz: 'The PHOENIX
Multi-Radar Tracker System for Air Traffic Control Applications, in:
Air Traffic Control Quarterly. Vol. 12, Number 3, 2004, pp. 193-222.
[12] Roland Mallwitz: 'DFS Approach on Tracking System Performance
Analysis to determine ATC separation minima, in International Radar
Symposium (IRS 2005), Conference Proceedings, DGON, Bonn,
Germany.
[13] Department of Defense World Geodetic System 1984, Its Definition and
Relationships With Local Geodetic Systems, NIMA Technical Report
TR8350.2, Third Edition, 4 July 1997
The Transponder Data Recorder: first implementation
and applications
G. Galati
1
, M. Leonardi
1
, E. G. Piracci
1
, N. Petrochilos
2
, S. Samanta
3
1
DISP and Vito Volterra Centre
Tor Vergata University, Via del Politecnico, 1 00133 Rome, Italy
{galati, leonardi, piracci }@disp.uniroma2.it
2
University of Reims, France
3
B. Tech, Electronics and Communication Engineering
National Institute of Technology, Durgapur, India
soumen11.ece@gmail.com
Abstr actThe Tr ansponder Data Recor der is an exper imental
1090 MHz signal acquisition system designed by the Radar and
Navigation gr oup at Tor Ver gata Univer sity to r ecor d the
signals in the Secondar y Sur veillance Radar band, center ed at
1090 MHz. The peculiar ity of the r eceiver is that it is based on
five r eceiving chains (4 linear chains with lar ge dynamic r ange
and one with a logar ithmic r eceiver ) connected to a wideband
linear ar r ay antenna. The TDR was developed in or der to
analyze the channel tr affic and to test the new signal
pr ocessing algor ithms, in the r esear ch fr ame on multilater ation
(MLAT) and Automatic Dependent Sur veillance (ADS-B), with
r eal signals.
Keywor ds- Mode S, Mul ti l ater ati on, si gnal pr ocessi ng
I. INTRODUCTION
Today the 1090 MHz channel, exploited first by the
military IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) systems and then
by the secondary surveillance radar (SSR) [1], is widely used
for air traffic (but also in airport for vehicular traffic)
surveillance. In this context there are many applications that
use the 1090 MHz signals. Some of these, such as ADS-B
and Multilateration, are becoming increasingly important
within the air traffic control, and may integrate or, in some
cases, replace the SSR radar stations. For these reasons the
integrity and the efficiency of these systems have become
very important. In a typical high-density airspace, an
increasing number of transponders (airborne or vehicular)
transmit signals at 1090 MHz, either as replies to the SSR
stations (conventional and Mode S), or spontaneously
('Squitter'). Also in the future the burden of the channel may
be increased by the TIS-B stations, which provide
information on non-ADS-B aircraft using Mode S signals. In
order to reduce the effects of receiving superimposed signals
from different sources, we studied signal processing
algorithms, useful to discriminate and separate overlapping
sources; some of these algorithms need a multichannel
receiver and an antenna array [2]. Hence the need for a 1090
MHz signals acquisition system with appropriate
characteristics, useful to evaluate the efficiency of the
separation algorithms using the received signals, and also to
compute traffic analysis and statistics. This paper presents a
description of this system, called TDR (Transponder Data
Recorder), complying with ICAO and RTCA requirements
[3],[4]. It has been designed and developed by the Radar and
Navigation group, RadarLab, at Tor Vergata University.
Based on the RadarLab requirements, the array antenna has
been designed, realized and tested by the Microwave
Laboratory at the University of Calabria, Rende (CS), Italy.
The design of the antenna, the analogue front-end and the
digital section as well as the results from the first use of
TDR, with the analysis of the 1090 MHz channel around the
experimental area (i.e. the Tor Vergata University area) are
presented. Moreover we analyze the signals density and
present the statistics of each signals type (conventional,
Mode S), and finally the statistics of overlapping signals.
Finally, we present the results of tests of the preliminary
application of the separation algorithms on the recorded
signals and the proposal for future work and conclusions.
II. TDR DESIGN
The research requirements have driven the design of the
TDR. In order to use decoding algorithms based on array
processing [6], the selected type of the antenna is a uniform
linear array, with 6 elements. The analog part is composed
by four receiving chains, connected to the four central
elements of the array, and one logarithmic receiver
connected to a side element of the array (the other side
element is connected to a 50 Ohmload). The logarithmic
channel is to be used for (a) Reply detection, (b) Evaluation
of compliance of the pulse. The digital section must sample
the channels with a shared clock, and it has to reach high
sampling rate (up to 100 MS/s) to performthe better phase
estimation between the channels.
A. Antenna
Figure 1. Photograph of the six elements array

The antenna was developed by Universit della Calabria,
Microwave Lab [5]. It is a six patch elements on a stratified
dielectric support. A half wavelength spacing between the
elements and a linear vertical polarization have been chosen.
The antenna has a pattern of each array element wide enough
in both directions in order to cover the air traffic and the
surface traffic, and it is possible to obtain a bandwidth of 30
MHz, needed to maintain the fidelity in signal analysis.
B. Analog front-end
The analog section has a dynamic range of 70 dB , figure
3 shows a schematic of the TDR analog section with the four
linear receiving chains and the logarithmic receiver. The
low-noise amplifier (LNA) permits a good noise figure (0,8
dB) and a total gain of 60 dB. The RF filters are Surface
Acoustic Wave type (SAW), with a bandpass of 50 MHz.
The IF (Intermediate Frequency) is 21.5 MHz and the output
of the IF section is filtered with a band-pass filter and a DC-
block. The variable attenuator (in steps from0 dB to 16 dB)
is useful to shift the dynamic range in order to use the TDR
in an aeroportual area, or in a wide area.
Figure 2. TDR blcok scheme
Figure 3. linear and LOG channel - analog section
The signal at 1065 MHz, used for the frequency down-
conversion in the mixer, is generated by a PLL that use a 10
MHz clock as a reference. The reference clock is obtained by
an internal quartz oscillator, otherwise it should be taken by
the digital section, obtaining a clock sharing between the
analog and digital section. The logarithmic receiver has an
RF input linear dynamic range of 60 dB, and it is preceded,
as for the linear chains, by the filtering and LNA stage and
by the variable attenuator. The analog section also provides a
1090 MHz signal for test and calibration purpose.
C. Digital section
The digital section for the whole systemprovides a high
sampling rate, up to 100 Msamples/s with a 14 bit resolution.
To acquire the linear channel directly at IF the sampling
frequency is set at 100 Msamples/s. It is based on the NI PXI
1082 controller. There are three acquisition cards by National
Instruments (NI PXI 5122), with two analog input channels
each. Figure 3 shows the NI digital section front view: on the
left there is the input/output controller, on the right there are
the three acquisition devices, each with two analog input and
the trigger input.
Figure 4. NI PXI digital section
The digital section share a common clock reference that
should be used as phase locked loop (PLL) reference for the
analog section. The embedded work suite permits the
development of acquisition software.
III. 1090MHZ CHANNEL ANALISYS
The first TDR implementation is a prototype version
composed by a one channel receiver. The receiving chain is
splitted before the IF down-conversion to get the LOG
channel. Figure 5 shows the front panel of the TDR
prototype, figure 6 shows the receiver block scheme.
Figure 5. TDR prototype front panel view
Figure 6. TDR prototype block scheme
Using the TDR prototype, connected to one element of
the antenna, it was possible to record the data stream(at 10
Msamples/s) to perform a channel traffic analysis. The
results allow traffic statistics related to the area around the
installation site. The antenna was positioned in Tor Vergata
University on the Engineering Faculty building roof, as
shown in figure 7. The location is near Rome, close to
Ciampino airport and 30 Kmaway fromthe International
airport of Fiumicino.
Figure 7. TDR antenna location
The recording session was developed on Thursday 14
th
April
2011 at 01 p.m.. Up to 10 data streams of 1 s was recorded
time continuously. The starting time of each acquisition was
chosen random in order to avoid a synchronization with the
traffic due to ground radar interrogations. An analysis of the
received signals power, considering the receiving chain gain,
the antenna gain and the transmitting power, permits to
obtain the range distribution of aircraft, which transmitted
the received signals. Figure 8 show that a large part of the
received signals was transmitted froma range between 40
80 km.
Figure 8. Aircraft range distribution
Besides a traffic analysis was done, using a software
developed at RadarLab, capable to detect and decode SSR
replies using ICAO and RTCA compliance algorithms. The
analysis was useful to count the number of conventional and
mode S messages for each data stream, and also to compute
the number of overlapping signals.
Table I shows the result of this analysis on the recorded
signal segments:
TABLE I. SIGNALS SEGMENTS STATISTICS
Received SSR r eplies
Str eam
No.
# conventi onal # Mode S
# gar bl ed
Mode S
1 859 128 5
2 1155 130 12
3 717 62 6
4 790 99 7
5 1143 92 8
6 990 95 13
7 1236 76 7
8 1695 116 16
9 921 86 4
10 756 57 3
mean 1026
94
(8%)
8
(8.5%) of
Mode S
Fromtable I, the percentage of Mode S signals over all
the received signals is 8%. A percentage of 8.5% of the
Mode S replies are affected by interference with other
signals. To better understand these results, it is possible to
note that the probability to receive a 1090 squitter (ES) free
of interferences using an omni-directional receiver, is
estimated by a poissonian model with (FRUIT rate) equal
to the inverse of the average number of received messages
per time [6]:
(0) exp
ES ES
P t O
=0.93
where t
ES
= 120 s, = 1026 s
-1
. Hence the estimated
probability to receive garbled Mode S signals is 7%, the
value being close to the experimental rate. An exhaustive
measurements campaign, at different time each day, permits
to evaluate the channel traffic density near Rome. This
earlier result shows that although the FRUIT rate is low, the
probability to receive interfered mode S signals is not
negligible.
IV. PASA APPLICATION WITH TDR DATA
Using the TDR prototype it is also possible also to test
the processing algorithm for overlapping signals
discrimination described in [6], where PASA algorithmis
proposed for a blind source separation using one channel
data. Figure 9 shows a recorded signal with two overlapping
Mode S short signals (IF signal by linear channel), with
different amplitude: a typical input for PASA algorithm. The
signals used for PASA evaluation were sampled at 100
Msamples/s, in order to have more samples to be used for the
Fiumicino
air por t
TDR antenna
Ciampino
air por t
5km
2,7Nm
de-garbling algorithm. PASA method permits to perform
overlapping sources separation exploiting the signals
diversity. The array processing methods PA and EPA
presented in [2], permits the sources separation exploiting the
signals direction of arrival as signals diversity, using an array
antenna and a multi-channel receiver. PASA method is based
on a signal vector reshaping useful to reorganize the acquired
signal samples into a matrix. The idea is to apply PA or EPA
onto the reshaped matrix exploiting as signals diversity, not
the direction of arrival (that is not recoverable using a single
antenna), but the signals frequency. Applying PA or EPA to
the data matrix, the mixing matrix and its mixing vectors are
estimated. The beamformers of each source is obtained by
the pseudo-inverse of the mixing matrix. Applying the data
matrix on the beamformers two sub-matrix are computed:
one containing the first source, the other containing the
second source. To recover the separated signals an inverse
re-shaping is applied on the two sub-matrix obtaining the
signal vectors.
Figure 9. Two Mode S signals mixing (IF linear channel signal)
Figure 10 shows the results of the application of PASA
on the signal shown in figure 9. In this case two overlapping
Mode S signals was received, the time delay between the
signals is approximately of 46 s, and the power of the
second source is less than the first (i.e. it was emitted by a
further aircraft than the other). The application of PASA
permitted to recover the original two signals, as shown in
figure 10 where the envelope of the signals is depicted. The
blue line is the first mode S signal, the red one is the second
mode S signal. The separated signals are affected by an
irregular pulses power behaviors.
Figure 10. Sources signals de-garbled (Envelope signal)
In order to reconstruct the replies, a final stage with a
bandpass filter (B=10 MHz) centered at the TDR IF
frequency (21.5 MHz), followed by a threshold comparator
with 2 levels quantization is used. Figure 11 shows the
output of the final stage delivering the reconstructed replies.
Figure 11. Reconstructed replies
These preliminary results are also confirmed by an
application of PASA algorithm with another overlapping
signal recorded by TDR. In figure 12 it is possible to see the
IF sampled signal and in figure 13 and 14 the degarbled and
reconstructed signals respectively.
20 40 60 80 100 120
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
Ps
V
Linear channel
Figure 12. Two Mode S signals mixing (IF linear channel signal)
20 40 60 80 100 120
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
x 10
-3
Ps
V
de-garbled replies
Figure 13. Sources signals de-garbled (Envelope signal)
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
sample
first reply
These results with real data confirms the trials done in [6]
and puts the basis for an extensive acquisition campaign
useful to measure the effective performance of the algorithm
in a real environment.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
second reply
sample
Figure 14. Reconstructed replies
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The transponder data receiver (TDR) is a multi-channel
system useful to receive, record and process 1090 MHz
signals fromairborne and vehicular transponders (Mode S
and conventional). It is composed by a six patch elements
array antenna, connected to the 4 linear channel and to a
logarithmic receiver. The digital section is based on NI
technologies. The TDR systemwas designed in the research
frame on the ADS-B/MLAT to develop and test new signal
processing algorithm, and to analyze the 1090 MHz channel
traffic. Actually a prototype system based on a single
channel receiver is operative at Tor Vergata University. The
prototype is composed by a single RF channel divided into a
linear channel, directly sampled at the IF of 21.5 MHz, and
into a logarithmic channel used as signal detector. The
prototype permits to obtain a first channel traffic analysis and
the evaluation of PASA algorithm, useful for mixed signal
separation using a mono-channel receiver. The first results
are encouraging to continue the studies and are helpful for
the final TDR version design and implementation.
REFERENCES
[1] M. C. Stevens, Secondary Surveillance Radar Artech House 1988
[2] N.Petrochilos, G. Galati, and E. Piracci, Application of array
processing to receiving stations of multilateration systems based on
SSR signals, IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic
Systems, Vol. 45 n.3 pp. 965-982, J uly 2009
[3] ICAO Annex 10 to the convention on international civil aviation, Vol.
IV, 1998
[4] DO260A, RTCA MOPS for 1090 Extended squitter ADS-B and TIS-
B
[5] G. Di Massa, S. Costanzo, A. Borgia, I. Venneri, G. Galati, M.
Leonardi, E.G. Piracci, Multiple sources discriminationa by array
processing,Proceedings of EuCAP11, Rome 11-15 April 2011
[6] E.G. Piracci, N. Petrochilos, G. Galati, 1090 ES receiving capacity
improvement using ADS-B ground receivers with signals
discrimination capability, in proceedings of ESAVS10, Berlin,
Germany 16-17 March 2010
ADS-B/MLAT surveillance system from High

Altitude Platform Systems
Mauro Leonardi
#1
, Silvio Spinelli
#2
, Gaspare Galati
#3
#
Tor Vergata University
Via del Politecnico 1,00131 Rome, Italy
1
leonardi@disp.uniroma2.it,
2
spinellisilvio86@gmail.com,
3
galati@disp.uniroma2.it
AbstractIn this work the potential usage of ADS-B and Wide
Area Multilateration (WAM) Surveillance with High Altitude
Platform Systems (HAPS) is considered. The paper investigates
the possible conguration of the system, the link budget, the ge-
ometry and the limitation due to the random access to the channel
by the Mode S Signals (capacity). The surveillance performance
of the proposed architecture in a Wide Area Multilateration
context is evaluated by both simulation and statistical analysis
(Cramer Rao Lower Bound).
Index Termslocation, air trafc control, multilateration, HAP
I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic Dependent Surveillance -Broadcast (ADS-B) or
Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) independent surveillance
are becoming of widespread use in modern Air Trafc Man-
agement system. These systems use the SSR Mode S channel
and the messages emitted from the airplanes to localize and
identify the cooperating targets in their coverage area [1]. In
the rst case (ADS-B) the positions of the airplanes (targets),
obtained from the on-board navigation subsystem (usually
GPS based), are included in the message, in the second one
the target positions are obtained by the system, receiving
the same message at different receiving stations, in differ-
ent locations, and then computing an hyperbolic localization
algorithm. These kind of systems have various advantages
compared with the classical radar surveillance but they have
also some disadvantages related to, for example, the correct
positioning of the various receivers or the coverage of each
station that could be reduced by blockage from obstacles.
Another problem is due to the use a non directional antenna
in the receiving station. This means that SSR signals from
different directions may overlap in time resulting in reduced
detection and/or decoding performance.
In ESAVS 2010 the DLR-Institute of Space System pro-
posed the ADS-B surveillance from satellites and one fea-
sibility trial was done using a very low cost stratospheric
balloon [2]. That paper clearly shows that there is the basis
to a possible deployment of a ying Mode S surveillance
systems. In this paper we propose an alternative to the satellite
implementation that is the use of HAPS.
HAPS is proposed because the use of a satellite for low
cost ADS-B payload may be not recommended, due to: (a)
unfavorable link budget due to very large distances between
the ADS-B receivers and the aircraft, order of one thousand
Figure 1. System architecture. The Mode S signal is received from HAPS
and then transmitted to the Central Processing Facility and delivered to the
ATC Surveillance System.
kilometers; (b) presence of a large numbers of targets in the
main beam of the receiving antenna, exacerbating the problem
of overlapping replies/squitters.
Besides, HAPS are becoming more and more attractive,
as shown by the number of scientic researches about this
type of platform for telecommunication applications [3] [4] [5]
and HAPS Mode S surveillance solution has clear advantages
with respect to the ground deployment of the classical system,
namely:
opportunity to ensure the surveillance in regions where
stations cant be installed (Oceans, deserts, etc..);
opportunity to ensure the surveillance in the valleys of
mountain regions, where coverage by ground stations is
difcult;
lower sensitivity of the station to natural disasters (earth-
quakes, hurricanes, etc..)
better robustness with respect to intentional interferences
and Jamming;
and also some advantages with respect to the satellite solution:
possibility to guarantee the surveillance of small region
of the world;
short time to deploy the system;
lower costs.
The disadvantages introduced HAPS Mode S surveillance are:
lower life cycle;
higher cost of implementation.
In Figure 1 the proposed architecture for a generic ADS-
B/MLAT stratospheric deployment is shown. This architecture
allows, depending on the number of HAPS, the deployment of
mixed systems with different possibilities, i.e.: the possibility
to improve an already existing MLAT/WAM system with one
or more HAPS, the possibility to create an HAPS only
WAM system or, nally, to create a simple ying-net of ADS-
B receivers. This architecture concerns 4 levels of service: the
aircraft is equipped with an ADS-B transponder that computes
the aircraft position using the GNSS system and then transmits
this information in broadcast; the HAP stations (between 17
and 22 km of altitude), receive these information and after
adding the time stamp, the identication number of the station
and the position of the station send the message to the ground
Central processing Station (CPS). In this station the message
can be decoded and the surveillance of the trafc is performed.
If at least four receiving stations (HAP or terrestrial) are
deployed, the Multilateration algorithm can also be performed
on Mode S replies and Squitters.
The feasibility aspects, i.e.: weight and dimension of the
payload, geometry (related to signal reception and blockage),
link budget and region of coverage of these solution will
be analyzed in the following sections. Finally the channel
capacity, related to the number of fruits in the coverage area
will be considered.
The performance of possible HAPS Mode S systems is
reported in the last section with some simulations and trials.
II. GEOMETRY AND COVERAGE FOR SATELLITE ADS-B
Before considering the HAP system a brief analysis of ADS-
B receiver on satellite as secondary application (i.e. piggy-
back payload that must have reduced power consumption,
weight and volume to be carried on a satellite designed for
another application) will be done.
Considering the study proposed in [2] the Iridium NEXT
Satellites can be used as test bed for satellite ADS-B receiver.
This constellation is composed of 66 satellites on 11 orbital
planes (with an inclination of 86.4). The satellite altitude is
780 km. To assure a global coverage each satellite must have
an adequate footprint that call for an antenna beam width 2
m
of about 124. Considering Figure 2 is possible to calculate
all the parameters to describe the coverage of the system, and
the parameter useful to manage the datalink (i.e. the elevation
of the satellite and the distance).
Calling the coverage area S, the minimum elevation angle
m
, the maximum distance D
M
and imposing
m
equal to
62 is possible nd all the other parameters (considering also
the Earth radius R
E
= 6378 km and Satellite altitude of H =
780 km). In particular, dening L = R
E
+ H, the following
equations can be written:
L = D
M
cos(
m
) +R
E
cos(
m
) (1)
D
2
M
= L
2
+R
2
E
2R
E
Lcos(
m
) (2)
and is possible to compute
m
and
m
:
m
= arcos
L D
M
cos(
m
)
R
E
(3)
Figure 2. System geometry for a Satellite ADS-B receiver.
m
=

2

m

m
(4)
The coverage area S and the coverage radius for each satellite
can be calculated by the following equations:
S = 2R
2
E
(1 cos(
m
)) (5)
D = 2R
E
m
(6)
All the resulting geometry information are summarized in
Table I .
H[km] D
M
[km] m m S [km
2
] D [km]
780 2503.31 7.72 20.27 15838703.965 4514.2283
Table I
COVERAGE PARAMETERS FOR AN IRIDIUM SATELLITE WITH AN ANTENNA
BEAMWIDTH OF 124.
For this coverage it is necessary to verify if the transmitted
signal from the airplanes arrive at the satellite receiver with
enough power to be decoded (i.e. greater then the receiver
sensibility) and also optimize the radiation pattern of the
antenna. It is possible to calculate the satellite antenna pattern
from the Friis equation[6]:
P
rx
= P
tx
+G
tx
L
tx
L
at
A
fs
(
m
)+G
rx
(
m
)L
rx
[dB]
(7)
where P
rx
is the receiver sensitivity, P
tx
is the transmitted
power of the transponder (Class A3 transponder, i.e. 21 dBW),
L
tx
e L
rx
, are the transmitting and receiving losses, L
at
is the
propagation loss and A
fs
is the free-space attenuation.
Ptx Prx Ltx Gtx Lat Lrx
21 dBW -120 dBW 3 dB 0 dBi 3 dB 3 dB
Table II
PARAMETERS FOR LINK-BUDGET COMPUTATION.
Given the parameters in Table II, considering a target at
the maximum distance D
M
(
m
) is possible to compute the
free-space attenuation:
A
fs
= 10log
4D
M
(
m
)
2
[dB] (8)
and the the Antenna gain directly from the equation 7.
In Figure 3 a vertical (azimuth) cut of the pattern is
represented.
Figure 3. Ideal vertical section of the radiation pattern of a full coverage
Iridium ADS-B antenna.
This kind of radiation pattern cannot be generated with a
small and simple antenna. This means that the ADS-B payload
must be more complex (multichannel receiver and multibeam
antenna), at least as complex as in the primary application of
the satellite (for example, the antenna should be very near,
in dimensions, to the Iridium antenna, i.e. composed by 3
panels of about 180 cm X 90 cm). It may be concluded that
global coverage by ADS-B on satellites may bring to too
large and too complicated systems, with an unfavorable cost
effectiveness.
III. HAP PAYLOAD DESCRIPTION
Considering the architectures of the system given in Figure
1 is possible to dene the HAPs payload for the 1090ES
channel as described in Figure 4. The payload receives the
Mode S signals and ADS-B report, decodes it and sends the
information decoded to the CPS. The payload must add infor-
mation to every Mode S reply received about Time Of Arrival
(TOA) of the message and the platform precise position. So,
the platform has a GPS/GNSS receiver. It is important to verify
if this payload respects the requirements to y on an HAP (in
term of weight, volume and power consumption). Therefore a
brief analysis of the needed hardware with COTS components
was done; the results are reported in Table III.
Considering that a typical Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS) or a typical airship for stratospheric y can carry a
payload of 50 kg and can supply a power of kW, the ADS-
B/Multilateration receiver, with its weight of less than 5 Kg
Component Weigh Size Power
[kg] [cm
3
] [W]
Antenna 0.1086 8.20 10 3 = 246 0
1090 MHz
Mode S 0.7 3.8 17.4 12.4 = 841.46 2.8
Receiver
Process and 0.13 9 9.6 2 = 172.8 6
Control unit
GPS antenna 0.111 8.73 5.59 3.2 = 156.16 1
GPS Receiver 0.54 9.5 4.2 16.8 = 670.32 1.7
Estimate Weight, 1.59 2087 11.5
size and power
Table III
POWER CONSUMPTION, WEIGHT AND VOLUME OF A COTS ADS-B
RECEIVING SYSTEM.
Figure 4. HAP ADS-B Payload diagram
and a power consummation smaller then 3 W can be a sec-
ondary payload for an HAP mission (i.e. Telecommunication
or Satellite Navigation augmentation [7]).
IV. COVEREGE OF THE HAP
The real coverage of the HAP system must be also eval-
uated. This is essentially limited from: (a) geometry; (b)
capacity of the channel and (c) the power, i.e the link budget.
Concerning the geometry and the coverage, it is possible to
use the formulas for the satellite application, section II, while
considering an altitude of 20 km for the HAP. The results are
reported in Table IV.
H D
M
m m m S D
[km] [km] [] [] [] [km
2
] [km]
20 505.48 0 4.53 85.8203 798038 1008.02
20 195.54 5 1.74 83.3 118494 388.43
Table IV
PARAMETERS FOR THE MAXIMUM GEOMETRICAL COVERAGE
ACHIEVABLE WITH THE USE OF AN HAP (m = 0 AND m = 5.
Considering that the airplane can be at 10 km of altitude
the real coverage of an HAP can be also larger: for an airplane
ying at 10 km of altitude the maximum distance from the
HAP in line of sight is 862.25 km, this means that only one
HAP can cover the European core.
The capacity of the channel depends essentially on the
trafc scenario and on the ability of the receiver to decode
superimposed replies. Here, the trafc scenarios proposed
in the CASCADE Program from EUROCONTROL [8] is
considered to exploit the problem of system capacity. The
CASCADE program considers the following scenario: a Mode
S receiver in Bruxelles at an altitude of 3300 feet and a
coverage area with a radius of R
max
= 300NM with three
scenarios for the fruit densities:
1) high interference (
max,1
= 105000 fruits per second)
2) reduced Radar infrastructures (
max,2
= 55000 fruits
per second)
3) medium interference (
max,3
= 50000 fruits per second)
4) low interference (
max,4
= 27500 fruits per second).
If an uniformly distributed trafc in the coverage area and an
arrival process of the fruits Poisson distributed are considered
[9], it is possible to write:
p(n) =
(T)
n
n!
e
T
(9)
in which p(n) is the probability of receiving n replies in the
time interval T (length of the Mode S reply), for a xed
number of fruits per second . When n is larger than one
it means that one or more fruits arrive before the end of the
reply, i. e. interference condition. Not all the tranponders in
the coverage area will interfere with a reply but only the reply
that have enough power to produce a Signal to Interference
Ratio (SIR) smaller then a given value. For this reason only the
message coming from airplanes which have a distance from
the receiver between 0 and R+r are considered, where R is
the distance of the interfered airplane and the receiver and r
is such that the received power of the interfering reply is no
less than 3dB below the received power of the interfered reply.
This means that it is assumed that a signal to interference ratio
greater than 3 dB can be managed. In Figure 5 the probability
of receiving a non interfered signal from a transponder at a
given distance R using a standard receiver is reported; we have
assumed the previous hypothesis and that the number of fruits
() is computed by using the effective radius of the interfering
area:
i
=
(R + r)
2
(R
max
)
2

max,i
(10)
It is possible also to consider an enhanced receiver that
has the capability to decode the message also in the case
of interference conditions, as described in [9]. In particular,
calling t
p
the Mode S preamble duration and t
ES
the Mode
S reply duration the following events can be considered:
A:(0 interfering signals in [0 t
ES
]);
B:(0 interfering signals in [t
p
t
ES
]);
C:(1 interfering signals in [t
p
t
ES
]);
F:(0 interfering signals in [0 t
p
]);
and for this enhanced receiver we can say that we do not have
interference if:
P
free
= P(B C|F) =
P((B C)F)
P(F)
=
P(BF) +P(CF)
P(F)
=
P(A) +P(C)P(F)
P(F)
=
P(A)
P(F)
+P(C)
(11)
Table V
COVERAGE LIMIT DUE TO THE DIFFERENT RECEIVER CAPABILITY
(STANDARD (*), ENHANCED RECEIVER FOR ONE (), TWO (), THREE (),
INTERFERING SIGNALS).
this means that if only the preamble is free of interference
and the data-block has zero or one superimposed signals, the
message can be considered free of interference because the
interference can be managed and solved [9]. In the same
manner also the interference with 2 or 3 replies can be
modeled. Table V shows the resulting coverage area (due to
the capacity of the channel) for different scenarios.
Figure 5. Probability of receiving one long squitter without interference.
In the Table V it is possible to see that the capacity of
the channel (i.e. the number of aircraft in the coverage of the
sensor) is the most important factor that limits the systems
performance, only using enhanced receiver is possible to
achieve a coverage area range of 136 NM for a single reply
(P
D
= 0.9) or 232 NM for 9 replies (at least 1 reply every 10
seconds).
The last system parameter to be investigated is the link
budget. Staring from the Friis equation, it is possible to change
the coverage area choosing the appropriate antenna for the
receiving station.
In gure 6 the ideal vertical section of the radiation pattern
of an HAP ADS-B antenna (from 20 Km of altitude) is shown,
it is computed with the same formulas used for computing the
satellite ideal radiation pattern.
Different types of antenna have been analyzed from a 20
Km high HAPS, in particular:
Dipole antenna;
Vertical array of 4 dipoles with about 8 dBi of maximum
gain that allows 60 NM of coverage;
Vertical array of 6 dipoles with about 9 dBi of maximum
gain that allows about 120 NM of coverage.
Figure 6. Ideal vertical section of the radiation pattern of a ideal HAP ADS-B
antenna.
In table VI the coverage due to the antenna conguration
are reported and the considered capacity scenario are also
compared with the antenna coverage. It is possible to see that
existing congurations for HAP application in high trafc or
low trafc condition match also with the proposed antennas.
V. INNSBRUCK WAM - SIMULATION TRIALS
To understand the capability of an HAP ADS-B receiver
some simulations were done. In particular the real Innsbruck
WAM system was supposed to be enhanced with an HAP
platform. The actual Innsbruck WAM system consists of 9
stations (Figure 7): 3 transmitting and receiving station, 5
receiving -only, and one reference transponder (Patscherkofel
station) [10]. Considering the position of all the sensors (Table
VII) we add an HAP (204 km of altitude) at coordinates:
(4716N, 1123E).
It is possible to understand the performance of these systems
(with or without the HAP receiver) using the Cramer Rao
Table VI
PROPOSED ANTENNA FOR THE CONSIDERED TRAFFIC SCENARIOS.
A:{DIPOLE, AVIONIC ANTENNA}, B:{4 OR 6 ARRAY OF DIPOLES)}.
Position Latitude Longitude Altitude [m]
Patscherkofel 4712
31.4
1127
36.7
2245
Flughafen 4715
28.2
1121
9.8
616
Hafelekar 4718
46.4
1123
10.3
2336
Rangger K op 4714
37.4
1110
51.9
1910
Tulferer Berg 4715
11.6
1133
20.9
1360
Hecher 4719
15.7
1144
30.8
1895
Kanzelkehre 4724
34.6
1147
15.1
1006
Telfs 4718
11.9
1104
23.1
605
Gschwandtkopf 4718
49.3
1110
39.5
1459
Table VII
WAM INNSBRUCK- STATIONS COORDINATES [10].
Figure 7. Innsbruck WAM real layout and taking off path.
Figure 8. Comparison of CRLB for a taking off airplane in the Innsbruck
scenario with or without one HAP over the airport.
Lower Bound (CRLB) method described in [11], considering
a TOA accuracy of:
TDOA,i
() = max
1
B
2SNR
, 1
[meters] (12)
Where B is the receiver bandwidth supposed equal to 20 MHz
and SNR the signal-to-noise ratio.
The CRLB was computed along the taking off path reported
in Figure 7 and the lower bound for Vertical (
2
z
) and 3D
error (
2
x
+
2
y
+
2
z
) are reported in Figure 8.
Figure 8 clearly shows the benets introduced by using
the HAP over the airport. The height of the HAP allows
improvement of the Dilution Of Precision (DOP) and therefore
of the system accuracy (e.g. 3D position error below 5 meters
until 40 Km of coverage). This kind improvement cannot be
obtained with any type of ground stations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper shows that it is possible to develop a low cost
ADS-B Mode S receiver to be installed in a HAP with a very
simple antenna and receiver. The problem of the coverage of
this kind of station was discussed and different solution have
been proposed for high density and medium density trafc. A
coverage radius greater than 140 NM (limited by the capacity
of the channel) can be achieved with all the advantages due to
the fact that we have a ying receiver station. The advantages
of having a ying station is very clear when the station is a part
of Multilateration system (Local or Wide area), in this case
the performance increases a lot with respect to the classical
deployment due to the high decrease in the value of the vertical
DOP, as shown with simulation for the Innsbruck WAM
system. The aim of the paper was to study the possibility
to develop a small, not heavy and cheap system to be used
as a piggy-back system over the primary application of the
HAP (telecommunication or satellite navigation applications)
but the results call for a study for the development of a more
complex system with a multibeam antenna that can manage
more than one independent coverage area (this is possible
because the maximum geometrical coverage is about 500 NM)
with an ad hoc designed platform with a big array antenna and
a multichannel receiver.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Leonardi, G. Galati, P. Magaro, and V. Paciucci, Wide area surveil-
lance using ssr mode s multilateration: advantages and limitations, in
European Radar Conference, 2005, Parigi, 6-7 october 2005, p. 225.
[2] T. Delovski, L.-C. Hauer, and J. Behrens, Ads-b high altitude measure-
ments in non radar airspace. ESAVS 2010 proceedings, 16-17 march,
2010, berlin, pp. 1-5.
[3] A. Arag` on-Zavala, J. L. Cuevas-Ru`z, and J. A. Delgado-Pen`n, High-
Altitude Platforms for Wireless Communications. John Wiley and Sons,
2008, pp. 1, 16-33, 155-157.
[4] R. Miura and M. Suzuki, Preliminary Flight Test Program on Telecom
and Broadcasting Using High Altitude Platform Stations. Wireless
Personal Communication 24, 2003, pp.341-361.
[5] D. Grace, K. Katzis, D. Pearce, and P. Mitchell, Low-latency mac-layer
handoff for a high-altitude platform delivering broadband communica-
tions. The Radio Science Bulletin No 332, March 2010.
[6] H.T.Fris, A note on a simbol trasmission formula, May 1946, vol.34,
pp.254-256.
[7] F. Dovis, L. L. Presti, and P. Mulassano, Support infrastructures based
on high altitude platforms for navigation satellite systems, Wireless
Communications, IEEE, vol. 12, no. 5, p. 106, october 2005.
[8] 1090 MHz Capacity Study-Final Report, Cascade program Std., July
2006, edition 2.6, pp.13-25, 32-34, 46-54.
[9] E.G.Piracci, N.Petrochilos, and G.Galati, 1090 es receiving capacity
improvement using ads-b ground receivers with signals discrimination
capability. ESAV08 Proceedings, 3-5 September 2008, pp. 17.
[10] Wieser, Wolfmayr, Langhans, Cernin, and Scheiinger, Wide area
multilateration at terminal area innsbruck, in Wide Area Multilateration
Workshop, Eurocontrol, Bruxelles, June 2007.
[11] G. Galati, M. Leonardi, and M. Tosti, Multilateration (local and
wide area) as a distributed sensor system: Lower bounds of accuracy.
Amsterdam: EuRad 2008 Conference, 30-31 October 2008.
Space-based ADS-B
A small step for technology a giant leap for ATM?
Adam Parkinson
Senior Consultant
Helios
Farnborough, UK
adam.parkinson@askhelios.com
Abstract - This paper investigates the feasibility and merits of a
space-based ADS-B system. The primary concept that will be
investigated is the reception of ADS-B transmissions from
aircraft in oceanic airspace using satellites and the subsequent
relay of the data to end-users on the ground.
Keywords: ADS-B, space systems, new concepts, applications,
oceanic, requirements)
I. THE CHALLENGES FACING AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
There are several significant challenges facing Air Traffic
Management (ATM) today. These can be summarized as the
need for increased capacity to cope with traffic growth whilst
at the same time reducing delays. Across Europe these
challenges are being strategically addressed through two
initiatives. The Single European Sky (SES) is concerned with
providing the necessary legislative framework while the SES
ATM Research (SESAR) Programme is concerned with the
modernization and interoperability of ATM infrastructure
across Europe. In particular SESAR has the following
performance targets:
Accommodate a 3 times increase in movements whilst
reducing delay.
Improve safety by a factor of 10.
Enable a 10% reduction in environmental effects per
flight.
Reduce ATM unit cost to airspace users by at least
50%.
II. THE ROLE OF ADS-B
For SESAR and NextGen (the US equivalent), Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is one of the most
important underlying technologies in the plan to transform
ATM from the current radar-based surveillance to Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) surveillance. ADS-B is
defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) as a surveillance application transmitting parameters,
such as position, track and ground speed, via a broadcast mode
data link, and at specified intervals, for utilization by any air
and/or ground users requiring it. The ADS-B reports are sent
periodically by the aircraft with no intervention from the
ground function and ADS-B reports may be received by any
suitable receiving equipment in range of the transmitting
aircraft. The data transmitted is derived from the aircraft
systems themselves and in this sense ADS-B is known as a
dependent surveillance technology. The transmitting aircraft
does not know which, if any, recipients are receiving and
processing the position reports as they are not acknowledged.
The concept with ADS-B is that position reports are
transmitted so frequently that the loss of a small number of
position reports is not operationally significant.
ADS-B does not require a specific data link however
throughout the rest of this paper when referring to ADS-B we
mean the transmission of Extended Squitter messages
transmitted over the 1090MHz channel 1090ES. The 1090MHz
channel is the downlink channel for Secondary Surveillance
Radar (SSR) replies from aircraft and the Extended Squitter
messages are compatible with the Mode S radar data link
formats. Amongst other data items Extended Squitter messages
contain aircraft position information derived from GNSS.
The potential benefits of ADS-B are [1]:
Faster data update rate than that typically available
with radar.
Lower cost ground infrastructure compared to radar.
Surveillance data can be directly received in the
aircraft cockpit increasing situational awareness.
Position accuracy is potentially higher than radar and is
not range dependent.
It can display both airborne and ground traffic.
It can potentially enable new applications and
operational procedures resulting in more efficient flight
profiles and reduced emissions e.g. allows 5 NM of
separation in Non-Radar Airspace (NRA) compared to
current procedural separation.
However, in order to realize the full benefits from ADS-B
aircraft must be equipped and plans for mandates in both
Europe and the US are illustrating the difficulty in achieving
universal equipage and the need to ensure that once fitted the
avionics are fully utilized. The mandates are currently being
put in place in the US and Europe for 1090ES ADS-B (dates
2015-2020) and 1090ES ADS-B is already widely implemented
on commercial traffic. In addition ADS-B is being deployed
world-wide in places like Australia, Canada, Thailand,
Jamaica, United Arab Emirates and South Korea.
Other potential issues related to ADS-B include [2]:
Incorrectly coded 24-bit (technical) aircraft address
used to uniquely identify aircraft.
Dependent on GNSS for surveillance and navigation,
and GNSS position potentially leads to oscillating
position quality.
May need addition surveillance cover provide by
independent surveillance technology to provide a
separation service in current radar airspace.
III. SURVEILLANCE OF REMOTER REGIONS
A. The oceancic problem
Traditionally surveillance has been performed by
monitoring on the ground signals received from aircraft,
requiring ground infrastructure to do so. However, in oceanic
or remote regions it may not be practically possible to install
ground infrastructure even with ADS-B.
For long periods of time in oceanic airspace, aircraft are
unable to communicate directly with controllers and are
therefore issued with strategic clearances between exit and
entry points to what is know as procedural airspace. Because of
the lack of communication and surveillance information,
aircraft in oceanic airspace are required to maintain large
separation distances/times, typically 10 minutes longitudinally
and 60NM laterally, in order to maintain safety standards [3].
This procedural separation has the undesired effect of limiting
airspace capacity and also the flexibility of aircraft to fly
efficient routes.
The question therefore arises how can we make use of the
ADS-B surveillance data already being transmitted by aircraft
to improve oceanic operations?
B. Current oceanic operations and technical solutions
Aircraft with different speeds on the same track in oceanic
airspace will gradually get closer or further apart. It is
imperative to monitor this change of spacing closely for loss of
separation. Pilots are therefore required to report their position
verbally at regular intervals along the route, for example at
each waypoint or every 45 minutes which ever is shorter [3].
Typically this is using High Frequency (HF) or satellite
communications.
However, the advent of data link communications has
already removed the need for voice reporting and enabled
higher rates of position reporting in oceanic regions for suitably
equipped aircraft. This type of position reporting is known as
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Contract (ADS-C). It is
based on setting up a point-to-point communications contract
between the aircraft and the ground where position reports are
acknowledged and are either made at an agreed regular rate, are
event driven or are made on demand.
The only operational implementation of ADS-C in oceanic
airspace is the Future Air Navigation System (FANS) 1/A
equipment on Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Nearly all long haul
aircraft are now equipped with FANS 1/A. FANS 1/A makes
use of the Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting
System (ACARS) and sub-networks used by many aircraft to
communicate aircraft information to the Airline Operations
Centre (AOC).
The increased monitoring provided by FANS 1/A ADS-C
services potentially enable the following benefits in oceanic
airspace [4]:
reduced separation (typically 30NM longitudinally and
laterally);
more direct routes;
more optimal climb and descend profiles;
increased access to cruise altitudes or closer to optimal;
reduced controller and pilot workload;
increased level of safety.
However, it is unlikely that ADS-C data will ever be used
operationally to provide a radar-like separation service in
oceanic airspace. The application of ADS-C based separations
would require extensive evaluations and agreements with
adjacent Area Control Centers (ACC) [4].
C. Future oceanic operations and technical solutions
A potential future ADS-B enabled application for oceanic
airspace is the In-Trail Procedure (ITP). It was originally
envisaged that this could be provided by ADS-C. However, it
was decided that this was an impractical solution, and that any
airborne surveillance application used in the oceanic airspace
should be feasible without ground surveillance [5]. Therefore,
the application is now either Airborne Traffic Situational
Awareness (ATSA) with similar procedural limits to today or
Airborne Separation (ASEP) with new airborne separation
standards (yet to be defined).
ATSA-ITP has some of the most noticeable benefits for a
relatively small investment and is therefore likely to be one of
the first airborne applications to be implemented. Although
originally a spacing application, ATSA-ITP has now been re-
classified as situational awareness. The ATSA-ITP allows
pilots to identify the relative position of other aircraft, and pass
this information to the controller to clear the aircraft for a
procedural climb. Due to the higher accuracy of surveillance
information available to the controller (and flight crew) via the
ADS-B reports, lower procedural limits can be applied during
the duration of the climb, assuming some geometric
constraints. Since the separation limits are lower, there is
effectively more airspace within which the aircraft can climb,
thus maximizing the fuel efficiency for the given traffic density
[5].
ATSA or ASEP applications may also enable additional
procedures which are not possible with just ADS-C, such as
passing maneuvers, to be implemented in procedural oceanic
airspace.
IV. SATELLITE ADS-B
A. Why do satelite ADS-B?
One of the aims of SESAR is to develop a global
interoperable ATM system. ADS-B is a significant contributor
to a future ATM system capable of providing high accuracy,
high update rate position reports with a low cost ground
infrastructure. Satellites also play a key role in enabling global
communications services and high accuracy positioning and
navigation through GNSS. Given that aircraft will be equipped
for ADS-B operation over continental regions it is only natural
to investigate the feasibility of receiving the ADS-B position
reports via satellite to provide cost-effective surveillance
coverage in remote regions without current surveillance
infrastructure. The potential benefits are the improved
monitoring of aircraft in remote areas to increase safety and
enabling subsequent changes to current procedures to make
more efficient use of the airspace.
B. Assessment of a potential implementation
A key question to answer is whether satellite ADS-B is
feasible, or under what conditions is it feasible? To help us
answer this question we postulate a possible satellite ADS-B
implementation and assess its potential performance
characteristics.
The analysis consists of an ADS-B receiver installed on a
satellite in a sun synchronous orbit at an altitude of 670km
receiving ADS-B reports at 10 locations in the North Atlantic
oceanic region. The assumptions used in the analysis are
summarized in Table I. A visual representation of the scenario
is presented in Fig. 1 where the red crosses represent the 10
analysis points, the blue triangles are aircraft and the purple
circles are radar locations [6].
C. Assessment results and analysis
The 1090MHz interference received by the satellite ADS-B
receiver at each of the test points was analyzed using a
1090MHz interference model developed by Helios on behalf of
Eurocontrol. From the analysis the following observations were
noted:
The highest interference levels are recorded at test
points that either have the highest traffic densities or
are within range of radar interrogations.
The level of TCAS interference is generally low as the
test point locations are primarily in areas of low or
medium traffic density and the probability of an
aircraft being close enough to generate TCAS
transmissions is low.
The level of Mode A/C SSR interference is low as
most test points are out of range of SSR radars.
TABLE I. ANALYSIS SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS
Scenario element Description
Aircraft
Predicted 2015 oceanic and core Europe traffic
levels based on actual Eurocontrol CFMU data
and STATFOR growth predocitions
Mode S equipage 100%
Extended Squitter
equipage
100% of Mode S
equipped aircraft
TCAS equipage 80%
Aircraft Mode S
transponder
Short Squitter
trasnmission rte
1Hz
Extended Squitter
transmissions rate
6.2Hz
Transmission power 57dBm
Antenna pattern
Omni-directional
with 0dB gain
Radar
Predicted Mode S and SSR radar installations
in Europe in 2015 based on information
gathered from Eurocotnrol and European
ANSPs
Number of civil SSR 20
Number of military
SSR
340
Number of civil
Mode S
160
Number of military
Mode S
45
Satellite
ADS-B receiver installed on a satellite in a sun
synchronous orbit at an altitude of 670km
Antenna horn size 5mm
Antenna peak gain 9.6dB
Antenna beamwidth -3dB
Antenna pattern
shape
Elliptical with semi-
major aperture of 25
degrees and semi-
minor aperture of
22.5 degrees
Cable losses 0dB
Minimum signal
level for detection
-92dBm
Figure 1. Satellite ADS-B analysis scenario
The figures below show the detailed analysis of a high
interference test point in the mid-Atlantic which contains 32
aircraft within the satellite spot beam. Fig. 2 shows the
frequency and type of messages received on 1090MHz split
into four 90 degree sectors while Fig. 3 shows the cumulative
total of messages against the received power [6]. Fig. 4
presents results from a similar analysis to predict interference
levels on the ground and in the air in mainland Europe [7].
The interference at the satellite ADS-B receiver is much
lower than that expected at an ADS-B ground station in
mainland Europe. An ADS-B ground station needs to be able
to decode wanted Extended Squitters from aircraft in its
operational range in the presence of unwanted transmissions or
transmissions from aircraft outside of its operational range.
However, the majority of signals received at the satellite will
be Extended Squitters which we want to decode. The Extended
Squitters also come from aircraft which are at similar distances
from the satellite and are therefore likely to have similar
received signal powers. Therefore it is highly likely that any
overlap between the received transmissions will lead to
garbling of the Extended Squitter.
Using the assumption that any overlap between received
messages would lead to garbling, and an interference model
developed as part of the Eurocontrol ADS-B Coverage
Analysis and Planning Tool (CAPT), we further analyzed the
potential Update Probability (UP) for receiving ADS-B
position updates [8]. Assuming a 2Hz transmission rate for
Extended Squitters containing position data the satellite ADS-
B receiver could support up to 160 aircraft in the spot beam in
an oceanic region whilst still achieving a 95% probability of
update within 5 seconds. However, it should be noted that this
figure is likely to decrease dramatically as aircraft within the
spot beam fall within radar cover and interference levels
increase.
Mode S inteference in each of four 90 degree sectors
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 2 3 4
Subsector
F
R
U
I
T

(
H
z
)
Mode S TCAS replies
extended squitters
Short squitters
All-call ModeS (own)
All-call ModeS (other)
Roll-call ModeS (other)
Figure 2. Detailed analusis of interference in mid-Atlantic
Cumulative 1090MHz interference
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
-97 -92 -87 -82 -77
Received Signal Level (dBm)
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

M
e
s
s
a
g
e
s

p
e
r

s
e
c
o
n
d
Mode A/C
Short Mode S
Extended Squitter
Total Mode S
Figure 3. Cumulative interference against receieved signal level
Results from study predicting interference levels at
Brussels in 2015
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
Ground test point (0km) Airborne test point (10km)
F
R
U
I
T

(
H
z
)
Mode A/C TCAS
Mode A/C
Short Squitters
Mode S All Call
Mode S TCAS
Extended Squitter
Roll Call Mode S
Figure 4. Predicted levels of 1090MHz interference in mainland Europe
Considering the onward transmission of the ADS-B data
received by the satellite there are two methods:
Bent-pipe where the data received by the satellite is
forwarded on to the ground with amplification and a
shift to the downlink channel frequency.
Regenerative where the data is decoded by the satellite
and then and re-encoded onto the downlink signal.
Table II provides a comparison of these two methods for
the onward transmission of the received ADS-B data against
the likely ADS-B data rate requirements. Considering this
analysis and the analysis above the initial conclusion is that
from a technical point of view it is feasible to receive ADS-B
data using a satellite.
TABLE II. COMPARISON OF TWO METHODS FOR ONWARD
TRANSMISSION OF ADS-B DATA
1090Mhz ES
Bent-pipe Regenerative
Channel
bandwidth
2.6Mhz (-3dB
point)
Typcially 10s
of MHz for
Ka/Ku band [9]
Typcially 10s of
MHz for Ka/Ku
band [9]
Data rate
22/111 Kpbs
required for
decode of
Extended
Squitters from
32/160 aircraft
Typically 1000s
Kbps per sub-
channel [9]
Typically 1000s
Kbps per sub-
channel [9]
Latency ~0.5 seconds
Up to 2 seconds
[10]
Pros
Shorter latencies
Offers ability ro
post process
signal on ground
for better decode
performance
More efficient
use of downlink
bandwidth
Time of
applicability of
ADS-B report
can be adjusted
for latency of
satellite link
Cons
Time of
applicability of
ADS-B report
ignores latency
of satellite link
Less efficient
use of downlink
bandwidth
Longer latencies
D. Other satellite ADS-B initiatives
The feasibility and potential benefits of tracking aircraft
(and ships) via satellites are now being more and more widely
recognized. There are several other recent initiatives
investigating the feasibility of providing satellite tracking
services and these are summarized below identifying any
further lessons that can be learned.
The SESAR project OPTIMI is currently investigating
technical solutions including the potential for satellite services
to improve monitoring and position tracking of aircraft while in
remote or oceanic areas. In particular this is to support Search
and Rescue operations and accident investigation in these
remote areas. The project aims to deliver recommendations that
can be implemented in 2011. ESA has also recently launched
an invitation to tender to procure an ADS-B payload for the
reception and processing of ADS-B signals on a satellite in-
orbit demonstration mission.
This year the satellite service provider Globalstar has
signed an agreement with ADS-B Technologies in order to
develop a system allowing ADS-B equipped aircraft in remote
and oceanic regions to relay information to the ground and
other aircraft using the Globalstar network of satellites and
ground stations. The proposed Globalstar service is based on a
constellation of low-earth-orbit satellites using a bent-pipe
architecture which they claim will provide near-real-time data
relay.
The Satellite service provider Iridium also announced this
year that they plan on monitoring ADS-B transmissions using
their next generation of 66 communication satellites. Their
current generation of satellites is currently being certified to
provide aviation safety services requiring the satellites meet
defined levels of robustness, reliability and latency. The next
generation of satellites will be fully operational by 2017
providing global coverage. The main technical challenge being
investigated is the need to blank out ADS-B reports received
from high density areas as these could saturate the ADS-B
receiver.
Similar initiatives exist, and in many cases are further
advanced, in the maritime domain for tracking ships using
satellites and AIS - the maritime equivalent of ADS-B.
Originally designed as a terrestrial system, there are now AIS
receivers installed on satellites decoding AIS transmissions
from ships. The Canadian company ExactEarth is already
offering a commercial space-based AIS service using two
microsatellites. It also has plans to launch two more
microsatellites this year that will enable post-processing of the
received AIS data on the ground to improve probability of
detection performance. However, the requirements for the use
of the AIS data may be different from the potential use of
ADS-B data. The dynamics of a ship are very different to
aircraft and AIS data is not used for providing separation
services or collision avoidance. Satellite AIS data is often fused
with other remote imaging data and the primary applications
under investigation are homeland security, search and rescue
and environmental monitoring. Current performance targets are
of the order 80% probability detection and update rates in the
order of minutes or even hours rather than seconds. Experience
from current test or operational AIS satellites also indicate that
probability of detection performance can be variable [11].
V. CONCLUSIONS
The assessment of a potential implementation of satellite
ADS-B demonstrates the feasibility of decoding ADS-B
messages with a high update probability via an ADS-B receiver
installed on a satellite. The assessment also provides evidence
that satellite ADS-B can successfully provide aircraft position
updates to controllers at update rates similar to radar, and much
higher than ADS-C, even considering oceanic traffic growth
well beyond 2015. However, it is noted that this conclusion
only holds true when the aircraft are out of the range of SSR
radars. When aircraft are within radar coverage (e.g. close to
shore) the interference environment experienced by the satellite
will increase dramatically and detection performance will drop.
It is unlikely satellite ADS-B will ever enable surveillance
separations in oceanic airspace that are currently achievable in
Radar (RAD) airspace because for safety reasons a second
layer of surveillance cover would be required that is
sufficiently different from ADS-B. However, satellite ADS-B,
particular when combined with ADS-B ATSA or ASEP
applications may:
Provide a cost-effective means of monitoring from the
ground ATSA and ASEP enabled maneuvers in
oceanic airspace (such as passing) providing increased
safety.
Enable more efficient flight procedures such as those
enabled by ADS-B ground stations installed in Non-
Radar Airspace (NRA).
The ADS-B-NRA application is designed to enhance the
following ICAO air traffic services:
1) ATC service and flight information service principally
for:
ATC separation services, including the possible
reduction of separation minima;
transfer of responsibility for control;
ATC clearances;
flight information services;
flight crew guidance for flight operations in ADS-B
only surveillance airspace.
2) Alerting services, principally for:
notification of rescue coordination centers;
plotting of aircraft in a state of emergency or when
deviating from intended track (e.g. because of bad
weather).
However, the following critical differences between the
application of satellite ADS-B in the oceanic region and ADS-
B-NRA should be noted:
the increased latency of ADS-B reports received by a
satellite compared to a ground station;
the lack of real-time voice (or data) communications in
oceanic airspace compared to NRA.
In terms of implementation timescales it is likely that initial
ADS-B satellite services may be available around the time of
the European ADS-B mandate in 2015. The maritime domain
is leading the way in that it already has commercially available
satellite tracking services and satellite service providers have
identified that a similar business opportunity may exist in
aviation.
However, a word of caution: initial maritime applications
appear to be focused on homeland security and environmental
monitoring applications. If satellite ADS-B is to be used to
improve the efficiency of oceanic operations through new
procedures and reduced separations its actual performance in
terms of probability detection, update rates, latency etc. must
be demonstrated through live trials. Decisions on optimum spot
sizes and the total number of satellites required to give
sufficient satellite coverage also need to be made. Furthermore,
if the satellite ADS-B concept is to be developed within the
aviation community a rigorous cost-benefit analysis is required
to ensure that additional benefits enabled by satellite ADS-B
are cost-effective compared to other technical solutions.
REFERENCES
[1] W. Richards, K. OBrien, D. Miller, New air traffic surveillance
technology, Boeing aero quarterly, quarter 2 2010, unpublished.
[2] B. Stanley, S. Kelly, Helios new surveillance technologies, Helios 2009,
unpublished.
[3] Joint North Atlantic airspace standard operating procedures, August 25
2006, unpublished.
[4] Guidance material on SISTAL FANS-1/A implementation on SAL
airspace, unpublished
[5] B. Stanley, S. Kelly, Helios ADS-B training course, 2008, unpublished.
[6] A. Parkinson, P1175 ADS-B satellite 1090MHz scenario simulation
technical note, version 0.2, September 2009, unpublished.
[7] R. McDonald, CASCADE programme 1090MHz interference study
final report, version 2.3, July 2006, unpublished
[8] A. Parkinson, P895 CAPTv2 software requirements specification
(algorithms), version 0.k, December 2010, unpublished.
[9] M. Bever, J. Freitag, S. Linsky, J. Myers, R. Nuber, J. Prieto Jr., E.
Wiswell, Fast-packet vs. circuit switch and bent pipe satellite network
architectures, Fourth Ka-Band Utilization Conference Venice, Italy,
November 1998
[10] O. Gupta, Global augmentation of ADS-B using Iridium NEXT hosted
payloads, February 2011, unpublished.
[11] F. te Hennepe, R Rinaldo, A. Ginesi, C. Tobehn, M. Wieser,
. Helleren, Feasibility of an European constellation for space-based
detection of AIS signals, European symposium on satellite-AIS,
December 2010.

Nultilateiation anu ABSB 1
StrategiestoDesignandDeployModeSMultilaterationSystems

Session7.1page167
CorrectionofsystematicerrorsinWideAreaMultilateration
Session7.2page173
Multilaterationsystemtimesynchronizationviaoverdetermination
ofTDOAmeasurements
Session7.3page179
ImprovementofMultilateration(MLAT)AccuracyandConvergence
forAirportSurveillance
Session7.4page185
AssessingthesafetyofWAMoveranonradarsurveillancearea
Session7.5page191
Strategies to Design and Deploy Mode-S

Multilateration Systems
Elas de los Reyes
Instituto ITACA
Universidad Politcnica de Valencia
Valencia, Spain
{imantilla, jbalbast}@itaca.upv.es, ereyes@dcom.upv.es
Mauro Leonardi, Gaspare Galati
Radar and Navigation Laboratory
Rome, Italy
{leonardi, galati}@disp.uniroma2.it
AbstractIn this paper, we study and develop some strategies to
design and deploy Mode-S multilateration systems. These
strategies are based on metaheuristic optimization techniques,
like Genetic Algorithm (GA) and are intended to obtain useful
parameters for an optimal system configuration that provides
acceptable performance levels. Furthermore, these strategies are
able to evaluate and improve previous system designs.
Parameters such as the number of stations, the system geometry,
the kind of measurements to be used and system accuracy are
obtained taking into account requirements such as the line of
sight, the probability of detection and the accuracy levels.
Keywords- multilateration; air traffic control; optimization;
metaheuristic methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multilateration Systems (MLAT Systems) are a powerful
option for the surveillance function of air traffic control. These
systems are intended to inform air traffic controllers of the
location and identification of aircraft (taxiing, taking off /
landing, approach or enroute) or vehicles equipped with an
operational SSR transponder [1]. To perform these functions, a
number of ground stations (at least three for 2D or four for 3D),
with capabilities to measure some characteristics of the Mode-
S signals, emitted by the transponders (e.g. Time of Arrival -
TOA-, Round Trip Delay -RTD- or Angle of Arrival AOA-),
are placed in some strategic locations around the airport or the
area to be covered and connected with a Central Processing
Subsystem (CPS).
The accuracy of position estimation in MLAT systems
basically depends on the stations positions [2-5]. To design and
deploy these systems, one should consider multiple factors
such as the Line of Sight (LoS) of each station, the probability
of detection, the accuracy, the redundancy, etc., and they
deploy all the stations, to obtain the maximum possible system
coverage, respecting all the regulatory standards (e.g. those
described in [1]) and the many constraints imposed by the
particular site. In many cases, choosing the number of stations
and their locations to meet all the requirements is not an
obvious task and the system designer has to do several designs,
by trial and error, before obtaining a satisfactory spatial
distribution of the stations.
A first application of the metaheuristic optimization
techniques, to design multilateration systems, was presented in
ESAVS 2010. That work [6] proposes the use of Genetic
Algorithms to obtain an optimal distribution (system geometry)
of a given number of MLAT ground stations only taking into
account the line of sight and the Dilution Of Precision (DOP).
In [6] only Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) measurements
have been considered. However, there are other relevant
parameters that should be taken into account in order to obtain
a more realistic design. Another important aspect is that the
DOP only reflects the errors due to the spatial distribution of
the stations, regardless of other important sources of errors
(e.g. errors due to propagation effects, which are site-
dependent, instrumental errors due to time stamp, etc.).
This paper presents an evolution of the previous work [6]
with the introduction of more relevant parameters and a more
rigorous formulation to evaluate the system accuracy (the
Cramr-Rao Lower Bound -CRLB- analysis described in [2]).
The possible implementation of the system with other kind of
measurements, like RTD or AOA, is also evaluated. Moreover,
the strategies developed herein are able to evaluate, validate
and improve previous systems designs.
II. GENERAL PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION
The strategies developed in this work are based on the
design of a new standard MLAT system (e.g., with only Time
Difference of Arrival -TDOA- measurements) or of its
improved version (e.g., with the combination of TDOA/RTD
or TDOA/AOA). In this work, the system design is obtained by
calculating the minimum number of stations and their locations
(sites coordinates), that maximize the line of sight coverage
and system accuracy. These calculations are performed under
some regulatory constraints [1] or by those that are intrinsic to
the airport layout, e.g. there are forbidden areas (clearances) or
the available sites are restricted to some specific areas. In all
cases these constraints can be modified to satisfy some
particularities of the design.
The procedure proposed here is also useful to analyze if any
previous design is the optimum solution for a given resources
or whether it could be improved by some feasible but not
obvious position changes of the stations.
Mr. Ivan A. Mantilla-G has been supported by a FPU scholarship
(AP2008-03300) from the Spanish Ministry of Education.
Figure 1. General design procedure.
Unlike the previous work described in [6], where the search
space (the set of available station sites) is composed by the
entire airport area (i.e., a relative continuous space), in this
work, due to real constraints like power supply, sites
availability, etc., we have limited that search space only to a set
of P sites. The latter allows obtaining more realistic designs.
The complexity of this problem, for a number of
stations
(with
<P) can be evaluated by,

(1)
Equation (1) provides the number of possible combinations
given the size of the discrete search space P and the number of
stations to be deployed
. The procedure used in this work is

based on that one proposed in [6] but, here several aspects for
each step have been modified and added. The updated
procedure is shown in Fig. 1. This procedure is composed of
three steps, namely, Initialization, System Design Evaluation
and Genetic Algorithms. In the following the updated and new
aspects are described.
In the first step (Initialization) all the problem
characteristics are defined. In the scenario definition the P-set
of possible sites, to locate the stations, is selected and some
areas of interest (areas to calculate the system parameters -
basically LoS and theoretical accuracy-) are defined. Then, the
initial stations sites (normally by a random selection) and all
the variables are initialized. The variables can be classified as
requirements or restrictions. The requirements are the number
of stations (or a range of minimum and maximum number), the
horizontal accuracy and the System Probability of Detection
(SPoD) [1]. All of these are input data to the problem. On the
other hand, the restrictions are the LoS redundancy, which is
the minimum number of stations that must cover a point, in the
coverage area, in order to satisfy the requirement of SPoD and
the minimum spatial separation
between the ith and jth

station. In this work, we calculate the restriction of LoS
redundancy based on the manufacturer data about the PoD of
each station. The SPoD, for a given point j, can be calculated as
follows,

(2)
where PoD is the probability of detection of one station and it
should be provided by the manufacturer and,
is the number
of stations that cover the jth point. In (2) it is assumed that at
least four stations are needed to calculate the position. By (2) it
can be estimated the minimum number of stations that make
equal or greater than the corresponding requirement

for the SPoD. This minimum value is taken as the LoS
redundancy restriction. Moreover, this value also depends on
the performance of the location algorithm used and in any case
it can be modified (normally increased). However, in the
remaining of this work, we assume that the LoS redundancy
calculated by the evaluation of (2) also satisfies the location
algorithms performance.
In the second step (System Design Evaluation), the quality
of the partial design is evaluated. For this, the line of sight and
the system accuracy are calculated and these values are
introduced to a fitness function which assigns a suitable score
and thus quantifies the system quality, regarding to the
requirements and restrictions as defined in the first step.
The line of sight calculation is performed only in those
points within the areas of interest and the system accuracy is
obtained by the CRLB analysis [2] only in those points that
satisfy the requirement of LoS redundancy. In this work, the
CRLB formulation takes into account also the propagation
effects, the instrumental errors, synchronization errors and the
analog-to-digital converter sample period and resolution [2].
Unlike to the work presented in [6] which calculates the DOP
for arrays of stations, here the CRLB for each point is
calculated with all the stations with LoS for that point.
The quality of system design is evaluated and quantified by
a fitness function (cost function) that takes into account the set
of design requirements, i.e. the technical and economic aspects.
The technical aspects are related with satisfying the
requirements and restrictions and the economic aspects are
related with the number of stations used. This last aspect is
useful to those simulations which seek to optimize the number
of stations. The fitness function is particular to each problem
but, in a general sense the function proposed in this work takes
the following form,

(3)
where cond is the total number of requirements and
restrictions,
is the cost of the ith requirement or restriction

and
is a weight factor that controls the importance of
on
the design. The corresponding values of
and the functions to

obtain
, for each application, are shown in the next section.

Finally, in the third step (Genetic Algorithm -GA-), a
genetic algorithm is used to iterate and to modify the partial
solution which will be evaluated by the iterative procedure
Figure 2. Barcelona airport layout.
described in Fig. 1. The genetic algorithm used in this work is
basically the same used in [6]. Therefore, it is not the aim of
this work to describe that algorithm. The only difference is
that, due to the discretization of the search space to P possible
options, here, an individual consists of an
-array of integer
numbers, where the value of the ith array position represents
the index of the selected site for the ith station. Instead, in [6]
each individual is composed by the set of (x,y) coordinates of
the stations. Moreover, it is worth to say that the information
contained in a specific individual position can change and
depends on the parameters to be optimized in the design. This
particularity is commented in the next section.
III. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
To validate the strategies proposed in this work three
different simulations have been carried out over the layout of
Barcelona (Spain) Airport. The common objective for all the
simulations is to obtain a MLAT system which cover the three
runways, the taxiways and the apron centrelines, given a set of
requirements and restrictions. The first simulation consists in
the design of a MLAT system with a fixed number of Time
Difference of Arrival (TDOA) stations. The second one
consists in the design of a MLAT system with a variable
number of stations. In this simulation, the objective is to find a
design that satisfies all the requirements and restrictions by
using the possible minimum number of TDOA stations. The
last simulation consists in the design of a MLAT system with a
fixed number of TDOA and AOA stations. Fig. 2 shows the
Barcelona airport layout and the P-set of available sites for the
simulations. For these simulations P=41.
For all the simulations, the antenna station height (mast
length) has been assumed to be equal to 2 m and the
calculations for LoS and CRLB are performed for a spatial grid
of 5m 5m. This spatial grid is also in concordance with the
Digital Terrain Model (DTM) used to calculate the LoS. The
Genetic Algorithms (GA) parameters for all the simulations are
those described in [6].
A. MLAT System with a Fixed Number of TDOA Stations
The first scenario shows the first and the standard strategy
proposed herein. It consists in the design of a MLAT system
for a given set of requirements and restrictions. The
requirements for this particular simulation are based on those
described in [1], which are basically: Horizontal accuracy must
be within 3.75 m and the System Probability of Detection must
be better than 99.9%. The number of stations to use in this
design is twelve and they measure only the TDOA parameter.
The restriction of LoS redundancy, using a station probability
of detection of PoD=97%, provided by a quick evaluation of
(2) is 7 and the minimum spatial separation is
= 400 m.
For this scenario, an individual is an array of 121 size,
where the ith position represents the index of the possible
position for the ith station and it can be written as
, where
and
are elements of the search

space, i.e., the P-set of available sites shown in Fig. 2. The
fitness function for this scenario takes the following form,

(4)
where
is a function which quantifies the requirement of

total coverage for a partial solution
at time t, i.e., the

percentage of points that are covered for more than LoS
redundancy stations within a horizontal accuracy better than
the corresponding value stipulated in the requirements and,
is a function which quantifies the restriction of minimum

spatial separation between two stations for a partial solution
at time t. These two functions can be calculated as follows,

(5)
and

(6)
Finally, the value of the weight factors depends on the
importance given to each requirement or restriction on the
design; they can be chosen by the designer. Here, we have used
=0.95 and
=0.05. The only condition that they must

satisfy is that the sum of these must be equal to 1. The function
in (6) penalizes those solutions with stations close to each other
a distance smaller than
. However, there exists the

possibility to obtain solutions with two (or more than two)
stations in the same site. These particular situations are
penalized directly in (4) instead in (6). In this way the final
expression for the fitness function takes the following form,

(7)
where
.
Fig. 3 shows the horizontal accuracy for this scenario and
how the interested airport areas are covered with the assumed
requirements. From the theory [2], [4-5] it is well known that a
correct system geometry, to obtain high accuracy levels, is to
set the stations in a polygon enclosing the interest area. In Fig.
3 it can be observed that the proposed procedure provides a
solution that is in the line of this theoretical aspect. Finally,
Fig. 4 shows the procedure convergence. In this scenario, the
Figure 3. Horizontal accuracy for the design with a fixed number of
TDOA stations.
Figure 4. GA convergence for the design with a fixed number of TDOA
stations.
number of possible combinations, provided by (1), is
7.898710
9
and a relative good solution is obtained within 50
iterations, which means only 500 problem evaluations.
However, it is advisable to expend more iterations (up to 200)
because the random component of the GA allows to the
procedure the exploration of new values in the search space. In
any case the total number of problem evaluations is much
smaller than that value provided by (1).
B. MLAT System with a Variable Number of Stations
The second scenario consists in the design of a MLAT
system with a variable number of TDOA stations. In this kind
of scenario, the objective is not only to calculate the stations
sites but it is also to calculate a relative minimum number of
stations that satisfy all of the assumed requirements and
restrictions. All requirements and restrictions for this problem
are those described for the first problem. Moreover, for this
problem it is necessary to stipulate a range for the number of
stations. For this work, we have used a range of
.
For this scenario, an individual is an array of variable
length, where the first position sets the length of this. It can be
written as
, where
is the number of
stations calculated at time t. The fitness function for this
scenario takes the following form,

(8)
where
and
is a function that quantifies the importance given to

the requirement of number of stations. This function is
expressed as follows,

min
max
min
(9)
Finally, the weight factors values used for this problem are
=0.85,
=0.05 and
=0.1.
Fig. 5 shows the results for the horizontal accuracy. Also in
this scenario, all the areas of interest are covered satisfying all
requirements and restrictions. The important aspect in this
scenario is that the minimum number of stations calculated is
11, it is, one less station than in the first scenario. This kind of
simulation is useful to know an approximate minimum number
of stations that meets the requirements and restrictions.
However, due to the random component of the GA it is
advisable to run the procedure, for this scenario, once or twice
more, just to validate the calculated minimum number. Finally,
Fig. 6 shows the procedure convergence for this scenario, for
this scenario a good solution is found after 150 iterations. It can
be understood because the complexity of this problem (number
of possible combinations) is much greater than that of the first
scenario.
C. MLAT System with a Fixed Number of TDOA/AOA
stations
This scenario consists in the design of an improved MLAT
system with a fixed number of TDOA/AOA stations.
Normally, the AOA measurement capabilities are added to
improve the horizontal accuracy in surface movement
applications [2]. For this scenario the requirements and
restrictions are those described for the first problem and the
AOA measurements capabilities are added only to the station
number 1 (the AOA measurements error is assumed to be 10
-3
rad).
For this scenario, an individual is represented as in the first
scenario, i.e., as an array of 121 size
. The
difference lies in that, for this scenario, the pertaining LoS
coverage of the station number 1 is relatively more important
than those of the remaining stations. This particular aspect is
introduced in the fitness function as follows,

(10)
where
and
is a function that quantifies the relative LoS coverage

of the station number 1 and it can be calculated as follows,
Figure 6. GA convergence for the design with a variable number of
TDOA stations.
Figure 7. Horiztonal accuracy for the design with a fixed number of
TDOA/AOA stations.
Figure 8. GA convergence for the design with a fixed number of
TDOA/AOA stations.
Figure 5. Horizontal accuracy for the design with a variable number of
TDOA stations.

(11)
Finally, the weight factors values used for this problem are
=0.9,
=0.05 and
=0.05.
Fig. 7 shows the horizontal accuracy for this scenario. The
complexity of this problem is basically of the same order than
that of the first one but, here the CRLB calculation has been
carried out by taking into account the accuracy improvement
provided by the TDOA/AOA station [2]. The final site for this
station is shown in Fig. 7 as the diamond. Also for this kind of
scenario it is advisable to run the procedure once or twice
more. Similarly to the first problem, here a good solution is
found after 50 iterations (see Fig. 8).
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, a set of practical and useful strategies to
design and deploy Mode-S Multilateration systems has been
presented. These strategies are based on the use of genetic
algorithms along with the well-known CRLB analysis. A
general procedure to use these strategies is also proposed and it
is useful to design new MLAT systems but also to validate
whether a previous system design could be the optimum
solution regarding to a set of available resources.
Three kinds of scenarios have been presented. The first one
is able to design new MLAT systems with a fixed number of
TDOA stations but also to validate whether a final design
(clearly before the implementation) can be improved by
feasible but not obvious sites changes. The second one
provides a strategy to obtain a minimum number of stations
which satisfy all the stipulated requirements and restrictions.
The third scenario is proposed to design improved MLAT
systems, i.e., by using other type of measurements like AOA or
RTD. For this third scenario, an example with a MLAT system
using TDOA/AOA stations has been presented but, the use
with other measurements combinations is straightforward.
Finally, it is worth to say that also these strategies can be used
together in order to obtain more reliable results, e.g., firstly the
second scenario can be used to obtain a possible minimum
number of stations that meets all the requirements and
restrictions and then, by means of the first scenario, obtain the
optimum sites or just to validate that set obtained with the
second scenario.
The use of new requirements or restrictions is also possible
only by modifying the corresponding cost function and their
weight factors.
REFERENCES
[1] "Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Mode S
Multilateration Systems for Use in Advanced Surface Movement
Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS)," EUROCAE, 2003.
[2] G. Galati, M. Leonardi, and M. Tosti, "Multilateration (Local and Wide
area) as a distributed sensor system: Lower bounds of accuracy," in
European Radar Conference, EuRAD, Amsterdam, 30-31 Oct. 2008, pp.
196-199.
[3] H. B. Lee, "Accuracy Limitations of Hyperbolic Multilateration
System," IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic System, vol.
AES-11, January 1975.
[4] N. Levanon, "Lowest GDOP in 2-D scenarios," IEE Proc. Radar, Sonar
Navig., vol. 147, pp. 149-155, June 2000.
[5] D. J. Torrieri, "Statistical Theory of Passive Location Systems," IEEE
Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic System, vol. AES-20, pp.
183-198, March 1984.
[6] I. A. Mantilla-G, R. F. Ruiz, J. V. Balbastre-T, and E. d. l. Reyes,
"Application of Metaheuristic Optimization Techniques to
Multilateration System Deployment," in Enhanced Solutions for Aircraft
and Vehicle Surveillance Applications, ESAVS 2010, German Institute of
Navigation (DGON), Berlin, Germany, 16-17 March 2010, p. Session
2B/3.
Correction of systematic errors in
Wide Area Multilateration
Jorge M. Abbud, Gonzalo de Miguel, Juan Besada
GPDS-SSR
Universidad Politcnica de Madrid
Madrid, Spain
jorge.jose.abbud.momma@gmail.com, gonzalo@grpss.ssr.upm.es, besada@grpss.ssr.upm.es
AbstractThis work presents a method to estimate and correct
slow time-dependent position errors due to non perfect ground
station synchronization and tropospheric propagation. It uses
opportunity traffic emissions, i.e. signals transmitted from the
aircrafts within the coverage zone. This method is used to
overcome the difficulty of installing reference beacons
simultaneously visible by all the base stations in a given Wide
Area Multilateration (WAM) system.
Keywords- Wide Area Multilateration; Air Traffic Control;
ADS-B estimation
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the performance improvements of multilateration
systems, their application range has been extended from short-
range applications (airport surveillance) to medium-range
surveillance, such as surveillance in Terminal Maneuvering
Areas (TMA) [1]. This system has been called Wide Area
Multilateration system (WAM). Under this positive
performance evolution, WAM becomes a firm candidate to
replace secondary radars in the surveillance network for Air
Traffic Control (ATC) [2].
Multilateration determines the aircrafts position by
using the time of arrival (TOA) of the signal travelling from
the aircraft itself to a network of fixed receivers (base
stations). If the signal is properly coded, it is easy to associate
the TOAs relative to one single transmission in the different
base stations. This is the typical case in ATC, where RF
emissions (ADS-B or TCAS) are used. This way, when the
system has the complete set of TOAs in all ground stations,
the aircraft position can be determined. The trend in the future
ATC surveillance is to use ADS-B as the main source of
aircraft positioning. But it is still necessary to have a
collaborative backup system in order to enhance surveillance
integrity [2]. A promising solution is the use of ADS-B ground
stations as WAM base stations. Each base station will send the
measured TOA together with the ADS-B information to the
ATC control center. Multilateration is performed by
processing the TOAs [2].
The accuracy of the multilateration position is determined
by the errors in the TOA estimates. From a data processing
perspective, these errors can be grouped into three main
categories [2]: white noise, synchronization issue among
ground stations and propagation effects. The first two are
present in any multilateration scenario, although white noise
effects in the position determination are not critical for the S/N
values usually managed in these systems. On the other hand,
although propagation error has not been taken into account for
short-range applications, given the distance between base
stations in WAM scenarios (up to 20 or 30NM [1]) this source
of error has to be considered. This is required in order to
preserve the accuracy from suffering degradation along the
coverage area (i.e. a low Dilution of Precision).
This characteristic rules out the calibration philosophy to
reduce both synchronization and propagation errors, since
installing fixed beacons in Line-Of-Sight with all base stations
is costly, if not impossible, for large baseline separations.
Also, the propagation error has a hard dependence with
aircraft altitude. This way, calibrations for on-ground targets
are not valid for flying aircrafts.
In order to solve the synchronization issue between
stations, GPS-based methods could be used, but these would
not reduce propagation errors. Furthermore, a backup
synchronization subsystem would be necessary in order to
mitigate hypothetical failures of GPS.
Therefore, one solution to this problem is to add a
processing subsystem which corrects synchronization and
propagation errors simultaneously, by analyzing the signals
transmitted by all aircrafts currently present within the WAM
coverage (opportunity traffic).
In a recent paper, authors have studied the possibility of
performing calibration using opportunity traffic for WAM
systems [5]. Figure 1 presents the block diagram of the
proposed calibration mechanism. TOAs measured in each
station are associated and sent to the central processor which
computes the position. This can be either a master station in
the multilateration system or a remote station fusing the
information of many sensors (this can be the case for ADS-B
technology [3]). The first operation is to apply calibration
corrections to pseudoranges (for synchronization issues and
propagation). Then, target coordinates are determined as if the
calibration was perfect, modeling the propagation error as a
polynomial depending on distance. The output of this block is
delivered as a position determined by WAM system. In order
to compensate for slow time variations in the real propagation
and calibration conditions, the system has an open-loop
The work has been financed by Spanish Science and Technology Office
under projects TEC-2008-06732 y TIN-2008-06742.
control system that modifies the estimated propagation
constants, maintaining the system calibrated.
The system selects the targets located at a determined
flight level and spread around the coverage area. Then, the
system determines their position, as well as the calibration
constants, triggering the iterative algorithm from the target
coordinates delivered by WAM system and the calibration
constants at the output of the averaging filter. Calibration
constants are averaged in order to reduce their variance. Once
filtered, they are used for the correction of future
pseudoranges.
The position determination is done using the proposed
mechanism in [6]. It uses an iterative algorithm with the
linearized multilateration equation [7]. This algorithm needs an
initial position which is determined using the closed form
algorithm of [8]. The system can be implemented in TOA form
(determining time of emission, cT
e
) or in TDOA form
(eliminating cT
e
). If cT
e
is not necessary, the TDOA form is
more accurate due to the complete ignorance about the time of
emission in WAM. This is the approach assumed in this work.
The same method applies to the determination of calibration
constants plus position.
Averaging
Computation of
calibration
constants
Selection of
calibration
targets
cTi
cT
im
, K
m
(x,y,z, cTe) TOD Calibration
K
Position
determination
(DTOA or TOA)
TODs
Figure 1. Block diagram of calibration mechanism using opportunity traffic.
This approach uses a linear model for propagation error
and a constant error to represent the synchronization error of
each base station. Linear propagation models are appropriate
for medium distances (around 75-100 km). For longer
distances, calibrations based on linear models do not have the
required performance. This paper will extend the method
proposed in [5] by including second-order propagation models.
The inclusion of a polynomial model to correct the
synchronization error in each base station will be studied as
well.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 states the
problem of position determination with WAM including
propagation and clock synchronization errors. Section 3
compares the accuracy of the system using opportunity traffic
when propagation effects are modelled through first or second-
order model (with respect to distance). Finally, section 4
analyzes the accuracy degradation due to the clock drifts,
followed by a mitigation method proposal.
II. CHARACTERISATION OF SLOWLY-VARIANT ERRORS IN
WAM SYSTEMS
The aircraft position is determined by means of the time
difference of arrival (TDOA) of the signal at the different base
stations. As a first step, a method based on hyperbolic location
as described in [9] can be used. Additionally, in the presence of
error, a gradient method starting from the solution of the
previous treatment will be used in order to refine the location
[7].
Each base station in the scenario measures the TOA of the
signal received from the target aircraft. The TOA of the signal
traveling from the j-th aircraft located in (x
j
,y
j
,z
j
) to the i-th
base station located in (x
i
,y
i
,z
i
) can be represented by the
following expression:
( ) ( ) ( )
i i e
j
i
j
i
j
i
j
i i
j
i
n T T P
c
z z y y x x
c
TOA
+ + + +
+ + = =
1
1 2 2 2
(1)
Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
i i e
j
i ij i
j
i
n T T P
c
R
c
TOA + + + + = =
1 1
(2)
where R
ij
stands for the Euclidean distance between the i-th
station and j-th aircraft, P
i
j
represents the propagation error,
T
e
represents the signal emission time, T
i
is the synchronism
error, and n
i
the white noise random error.
In order to eliminate the signal emission time uncertainty,
the aircraft position will be assessed based on the Time
Difference of Arrival (TDOA). This means that all available
TOAs for a single emission are referenced to the TOA on one
of the base stations. Thus, the TOA equation system is now
replaced by a TDOA equation-system, with one less unknown,
as well as one less equation:
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
m i m i
j
m
j
i
mj ij
j
i
j
m
j
i
j
m i
n n T T P P
c
R R
c
TDOA
+ + +
= = =
1
1
,

(3)
where the reference base station is the m-th station.
Let us now characterize the propagation error P
i
j
. It is the
uniform vertical gradient of atmospheric refractive index that
bends the signal propagation trajectory and changes the
velocity of light, delaying its arrival to the base station. Figure
2 represents this propagation error with respect to the slant
range for aircrafts flying at altitudes between 6000m and
14000m AMSL, using the expressions defined in [10]. The
base station is considered to be at sea level.
Figure 2. Systematic error (range bias) due to radio wave propagation for a
standard atmosphere.
Two relevant characteristics can be observed concerning
this propagation error. First, a second degree polynomial seems
to be a good fit for modeling the range bias with respect to the
distance. Actually, even a linear approximation can prove to be
sufficient for short distances [5]. Second, the coefficients of the
polynomial depend on the aircraft altitude. The last observation
forces to estimate different propagation models as a function of
aircraft height. The system divides the height in different layers
(with 1-2 km of thickness). For each altitude layer, the system
performs an independent propagation calibration based on the
aircrafts inside it.
Taking into account the previous observations, equation
(2) can be approximated substituting propagation error by a
first-order or second-order model versus Euclidean range:
( )
i i e ij i
j
i
n T T R K
c
TOA + + + + = 1
1
(4)
( ) [ ]
i i e ij ij i
j
i
n T T R K R K
c
TOA + + + + + =
2
2 1
1
1
(5)
The method to estimate parameters for both models will be
described in section 3.
Now we shall characterize the clock drift occurring in the
base stations. In this study, we consider that since the signal
emissions are quasi-periodic, a Time Interval Error (TIE)
model of a local clock will be used based on the philosophy of
[11]. It consists of a polynomial model projecting ahead on a
horizon of N points from the starting point with the k-th
degree Taylor expansion:
( ) ( ) T n w
p
T n
n T
k
p
p p
p i
,
!
0
1 _
=
+ = (6)
where n is the sample number, T is the time step,
( ) [ ] k p
p p
, 0 , 0
1 1

+ +
the initial states of the clock and
w
1
(n,T) is a clock noise with known properties. For large
values of n, the polynomial component dominates over
w
1
(n,T). Thus, in this study, we shall characterize this local
clock with a second-order polynomial without considering
w
1
(n,T). Expression (6) now becomes:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
2 , 1 , 0 ,
0
2
1
0 0 T n nT nT T
i i i i
+ + = (7)
This way, TDOA between stations i-th and m-th for a
signal transmitted at time t=nT for the j-th aircraft under
coverage can now be written in the following ways:
( ) ( ) [ ( )( )
( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m i m i mj ij
mj ij
j
i
j
m i
n n nT T nT T R R K
R R K
c
nT TDOA nT
+ + +
+ = =
2 2
2
1 ,
1
1
(8)
On the right side, we are now in a position to set a system
of TDOA equations in order to determine the aircraft position.
On the other hand, the number of unknowns has increased due
to the characterization of propagation effects and relative
synchronization errors. Therefore, the solution of the system
shall not only contain the aircraft coordinates, but also the
constants relative to both propagation error and clock drift.
In order to avoid an indeterminate system of non-linear
equations, a set of new independent equations must be
obtained. For this purpose, the opportunity traffic method will
be used.
III. CORRECTION OF THE SYSTEMATIC ERROR DUE TO
PROPAGATION
This section focuses solely on the propagation effects and
the technique used to solve the equation system without
considering clock drifts (synchronization error is considered
constant with time).
Since the calibration constants must be determined together
with coordinates (three spatial coordinates plus emission time
for each aircraft, two propagation constants and one
synchronization constant for each base station minus one for
the reference station), there is a need to process jointly the
TDOA of M (N/(N-4)) aircrafts for the linear propagation
error model to obtain the sufficient number of equations. It is
necessary that the number of base stations, N, is greater than 4,
the minimum number of pseudo-ranges required to determine
spatial coordinates and emission time. The pseudo-ranges of
the extra stations are used as equation to determine the
additional unknowns of the calibration models. When using the
parabolic propagation error model, the minimum number of
aircrafts under coverage shall be M (N+1)/(N-4).
A larger amount of jointly-processed aircrafts yield a
stronger degree of over-determination, providing therefore
higher stability in the estimates. The drawback is that larger
sparse matrices and larger amount of data shall be handled.
The non-linear equation system allowing the simultaneous
determination of calibration constants as well as the location of
the aircrafts is as follows (noise terms are not included for the
sake of clarity):
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 1
1
0 0
...
0 1
1
0 0
...
0 1
1
0 0
...
0 1
1
0 0
1
2
1
2
2 1 1
1 ,
21
2
1
2
2 2 1 2 1
2 1 , 2
1
2
11
2
1 2 11 1 1
1 1
1 ,
21
2
11
2
21 2 11 21 1
1
2
1
1 , 2
N j Nj j Nj
j
N
j
N
j j j j
j j
N N N
N N
R R K R R K
c
TDOA
R R K R R K
c
TDOA
R R K R R K
c
TDOA
R R K R R K
c
TDOA
+ + +
=
+ + +
=
+ + +
=
+ + +
=
(9)
where
21
(0)=
2
(0)-
1
(0), denoted
21
within the remaining
part of this paper represent the difference between
synchronization errors in two base stations. Note that it is
sufficient to determine the difference between synchronization
errors since the measured magnitude is the TDOA. So, in a
scenario involving N stations and M aircrafts, the amount of
TDOA equations is M(N-1).
One way to solve this system is by using a gradient method
[7][8], setting the initial value around the intersection of the
hyperboloids. The initial condition is determined as indicated
in figure 1. Iteration using the linearized system shall be
performed until the convergence criteria based on the accuracy
requirements have been met.
The vector composed by the unknowns is as follows:
[
]
T
N
M M M
K K c c
z y x z y x z y x
2 1 1 , 1 , 2
2 2 2 1 1 1
, , ,...,
, , , ,..., , , , , ,

= x
(10)
(x
j
,y
j
,z
j
) being the position of the j-th aircraft, c
i,1
being the
synchronization errors between the clocks of stations 1 and i,
and K
1
, K
2
the coefficients relative to degrees 1 and 2 modeling
the propagation error effect.
The system in (9) can be solved using the following
iteration:
k k k
x x x + =
1
(11)
The initial value
0
x must be set around the true solution.
This is done using previous estimations of calibration constants
and the position determined for each aircraft by the WAM
system before calibration process.
For each iteration process, an estimation of the TDOAs is
performed using the estimates of vector
1 k
x . The error
between the measured values and its estimates is defined as
follows:
( )
1
=
k k
x f (12)
where f is the set of TDOA estimates. As an example,
) (
1 ,
k j
i
f x is defined in expression (13) below:
( ) ( )( ) [ ( )]
k k
j
k
j i
k k
j
k
j i
k k j
i
i
R R K R R K
c
f
1 ,
2
, 1
2
, 2 , 1 , 1 1 ,
1
1
+ + + = x
(13)
The differential increment is obtained by solving the first
derivative terms of the linearized version of system (9). Thus,
expression (12) can also be written as:
k k k
x A = (14)
where
k
A is the gradient matrix of system (9) at the k-th
iteration. Matrix A is obtained using the following expressions:
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
=
2
,1
s
N ,1
s
N ,1
s
N
2
4,1 4,1 4,1
2
3,1 3,1 3,1
2
2,1 2,1 2,1
R R 1 0 0
0
R R 0 0 0
R R 0 1 0
R R 0 0 1
A
"
# # " # # #
"
"
"
(15)
where:
(
(
(
(
(
=
A/C
N
i,1 i,1 i,1
i,1
2
i,1 i,1
i,1 i,1
1
i,1
i,1
0 0
0 0
0 0
"
# " # #
"
"
[ ] 0 0 0 =
i,1
0
[ ] [ ]
T T
0 0 0 ; 1 1 1 " " = = 0 1
[ ]
T
i j j i i i
R R R R R R R R
A/C A/C
N N
i,1 R
, 1 , , 1 , 2 , 1 2 , 1 , 1 1 ,
... , , , = "
[ ]
T
i j j i i i
R R R R R R R R
2
, 1
2
,
2
, 1
2
,
2
2 , 1
2
2 ,
2
1 , 1
2
1 ,
... , ... , ,
A/C A/C
N N
2
i,1 R =
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
T
b
i
b
j
b
j
ij
b
i j
b
i
b
j
b
j
ij
b
i j
b
i
b
j
b
j
ij
b
i j
j
i
z z K
R
z z
R
z z
K
y y K
R
y y
R
y y
K
x x K
R
x x
R
x x
f
K
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.
|
\
|
+
|
|
.
|
\
|
+
+
|
|
.
|
\
|
+
+
|
|
.
|
\
|
+
= =
1 2
1
1
1
1 2
1
1
1
1 2
1
1
1
1 ,
2 1
2 1
2 1
j
i,1
Since system (14) is usually over-determined, it must be
solved using the minimum mean square error (MMSE)
expression:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
k k
T
k k k
T
k k
S A A S A x =

1
1
1
(16)
where S
k
is the TDOA covariance matrix and can be estimated
from the S/N in each receiver.
In order to assess the performance of the opportunity traffic
method, a hypothetical WAM scenario is simulated. The
system here considered is composed by six stations, located in
the corners of a square (side: 100 Km) and two in the middle of
two vertical sides. The station altitudes are arbitrary, but near
sea level (this implies a poor performance in aircraft altitude
determination). Six aircrafts are considered for the calibration
process, all of them outside the square delimited by base
stations 1 to 4 with a height of 10 Km ((x Km,y Km): (-150,60)
(100,90) (80,-40) (-120,-70) (20,80) (-30,-110)).
Figures 3 to 6 display the mean and standard deviation of
the WAM location error for pseudo-range error standard
deviation values ranging between 1 and 10m. The results have
been obtained using Monte Carlo experiments, averaging
sufficient independent solutions to turn the simulation variance
negligible. Results displayed in figures 3 and 4 have been
obtained using the linear model for propagation error, whereas
figures 5 and 6 show the results obtained using the parabolic
model.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
Standard deviation of pseudorange error (m)
M
e
a
n

v
a
l
u
e

o
f

W
A
M

l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n

e
r
r
o
r

i
n

X
Y

(
m
)
A/C 1
A/C 2
A/C 3
A/C 4
A/C 5
A/C 6
Figure 3. Mean of WAM position error using the order 1 estimation of the
propagation error.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d

d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

W
A
M

l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n

e
r
r
o
r

i
n

X
Y

(
m
)
A/C 1
A/C 2
A/C 3
A/C 4
A/C 5
A/C 6
Figure 4. Standard deviation of WAM position error using the order 1
estimation of the propagation error.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
M
e
a
n

v
a
l
u
e

o
f

W
A
M

l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n

e
r
r
o
r

i
n

X
Y

(
m
)
A/C 1
A/C 2
A/C 3
A/C 4
A/C 5
A/C 6
Figure 5. Mean of WAM position error using the order 2 estimation of the
propagation error.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d

d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

W
A
M

l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n

e
r
r
o
r

i
n

X
Y

(
m
)
A/C 1
A/C 2
A/C 3
A/C 4
A/C 5
A/C 6
Figure 6. Standard deviation of WAM position error using the order 2
estimation of the propagation error.
Concerning the performance in the X-Y plane, results show
that the parabolic model sacrifices the variance of the location
error on behalf of its mean value.
IV. CLOCK DRIFT EFFECT ON POSITION ACCURACY
This section covers the assessment of the dual correction
opportunity traffic method, since it considers the propagation
effects, as well as the drifts suffered by the clocks placed on
each base station. Expression (6) suggests that the TOA
measurement induced by this drift varies over time. Figure 7
shows how the errors increase rapidly in a biased way.
Therefore, the TDOA estimates generated by the algorithm
must consider the behavior of each local clock (more precisely,
the difference between drifts).
Consequently, the iterative algorithm presented in section 3
is to be used once again, in order to refine the target location.
Since two new unknowns shall be taken into account for each
equation of the TDOA system, necessary expansions are to be
made in expressions (9) to (16) in order to accommodate the
TDOA measurements gathered at different instants.
Besides, the scenario described in section 3 has been
upgraded, as local oscillators are modeled with a second-order
polynomial along the time axis. The experiments have been
carried out considering clock parameters typically used in base
stations (e.g. atomic clocks, with the following coefficients for
(6): 10
-10
, 310
-11
, 10
-13
).
Figure 8 show how the two-step approach based on the
opportunity traffic method is capable of bounding the mean
error with a small increase in standard deviation.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
M
e
a
n
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
W
A
M

l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
e
r
r
o
r
(
m
)
Time elapsed (s)
1
st
A/C - Xaxis
1
st
A/C - Yaxis
2
nd
A/C - Xaxis
2
nd
A/C - Yaxis
3
rd
A/C - X axis
3
rd
A/C - Yaxis
4
th
A/C - X axis
4
th
A/C - Yaxis
Figure 7. Mean of WAM position error obtained without considering clock
drift.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Time (s)
M
e
a
n

o
f

W
A
M

l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n

e
r
r
o
r

(
m
)
A/C 1
A/C 2
A/C 3
A/C 4
A/C 5
A/C 6
Figure 8. Mean value of horizontal position error with the two-step approach.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a collaborative backup system that
enhances ATC surveillance integrity. Its cost is relatively low
since this system reuses the ADS-B ground stations.
This system is able to mitigate the impact of the
propagation effects, as well as the impact of the clock drift
effects for a limited period of time without using calibration
stations. Cases in point are scenarios leading to temporary GPS
unavailability, such as spoofing, insufficient number of
acquired satellites or even a failure in the GPS receiver aboard
the aircraft.
REFERENCES
[1] W.H.L.Neven, T.J. Quilter, R. Weedon, R. A. Hogendoorn, Wide Area
Multilateration, Report on EATMP TRS 131/04. Version 1.1 - National
Lucht en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium, August 2005.
[2] SESAR Definition Phase Deliverable 3: the ATM target concept,
SESAR Consortium, September, 2007.
[3] EUROCONTROL standard document for surveillance data exchange.
Part 12: Category 21, ADS-B messages, EUROCONTROL, ed 1.1
September 2008.
[4] M. J. Leeson, Error Analysis for a Wide Area Multilateration
System,QinetiQ/C&IS/ADC/520896/7/19, 2006.
[5] G. de Miguel, J. Besada, J. Garca, Correction of propagation errors in
Wide Area Multilateration systems, European Radar Conference 2009
(EuRad 2009), Rome (Italy), September 2009.
[6] G. Galati, M. Leonardi, P. Magar, V. Paciucci, Wide Area
Surveillance using SSR Mode S Multilateration: advantages and
limitations, European Radar Conference 2005, EURAD 2005.
[7] W. H. Foy, Position-Location Solutions by Taylor-Series Estimation,
IEEE Trans. on Aer. and Elec. Syst., Vol. AES-12, No. 2, pp. 187-194,
March 1976.
[8] G. Strang, K. Borre, Linear Algebra, Geodesy, and GPS, Wellesley-
Cambridge Press, 1997.
[9] Y.T.Chan, and K.C.Ho, A simple and efficient estimator for hyperbolic
location, IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, Vol. 42, No. 8, pp.
1905-1915, August 1994.
[10] D. K. Barton, Radar System Analysis and Modeling, Artech House,
2005.
[11] Y. S. Shmaliy, An unbiased FIR filter for TIE model of a local clock in
applications to GPS-based timekeeping, IEEE Transactions on
Ultrasonics, Ferroelectrics, and Frequency Control, UFFC-53, pp. 862-
870, 2006.
Multilateration system time synchronization via over-
determination of TDOA measurements
Martin Pelant
Advanced Programs
ERA a.s.
Pardubice, Czech Republic
mpelant@erabeyondradar.com
Vojtch Stejskal
Advanced Programs
ERA a.s.
Pardubice, Czech Republic
vstejskal@erabeyondradar.com
Abstract Sensors of any multilateration system have to be
precisely synchronized to achieve accurate position estimation
IURP WDUJHWV 7DOA measurements. The GPS common view
principle is frequently implemented in Distributed Time systems
and on the other hand additional delays with one time reference
in Central Time system. Such systems, however, may not operate
effectively if the reference time is not available. This paper
provides description together with test results of clock
synchronization estimated using position over-determination
principles applied to TDOA measurements of well-tracked
targets in WAM system (Brno, Ostrava and simulated joint
system operated by Czech ANS) with a height of about 5 km and
higher. Clock correction factors or delays can then be applied to
sensor clock signals, providing accurate tracking of targets such
as aircraft, even in the event of GPS failure or jamming.
Keywords - Multilateration, TDOA measurements, time
synchronization, over-determination principle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) systems use for
their sensors` synchronization a Distributed Time (DT) or
Central Time (CT) principle. This means implementation of a
time reference into side stations when using Distributed Time
which is usually in form of GPS Common View equipment.
Such a system requires only minor levels of systematic time
error corrections on a Central Processing Station (CPS).
Incoming pulse trains are already time stamped (TOA) on each
sensor. On the other hand, Central Time uses only one time
reference implemented at the CPS. TOA stamping is performed
at the CPS to which are all trains forwarded.
Both time synchronization principles are more or less
affected by systematic errors of Time Difference of Arrival
(TDOA) measurements. The main challenge in WAM system
design and deployment is its systematic error reduction (e.g.
systematic errors of additional time delays in CT system)
which can be called calibration. The principle of
synchronization/calibration is based on the assumption that all
targets are tracked in real 3D space, and the fact that the vector
of primary, linearly independent, TOA measurements of the
signal belonging to the target may have dimension greater than
three (rather than a real 3D space). The theoretical maximum
dimension of TDOA measurements vector is equal to the
number of stations reduced by one.
A special case occurs when any time reference is missing
(i.e. GPS in DT). It this case, the system can be
synchronized/calibrated only from one source respectively
from real traffic TDOA measurements with targets of unknown
position. There exist two different means of calibration:
- Time calibration from over determined TDOA
measurements with known behavior in height.
Minimal operational requirements are 4 stations
and one independent source with known height
(this can be also ground beacon).
- Time calibration from over determined TDOA
measurements of targets with unknown position.
Minimal system requirement is 5 stations.
This paper will show results of the second method of time
synchronization/calibration. The systematic time errors (of
additional delays) together with position accuracy (covariance
matrix) and current estimate of clock deviations (TDOA
deviations) can be then estimated.
II. OVER-DETERMINATION PRINCIPLE
In operation, the method uses the previously reported known
position, for example, the position prior to the GPS failure,
and/or the ADS-B signal, Mode-S or Barometric height
reported by mode-C transponder. This position data may be
only an approximate location of the aircraft, since the data may
not be accurate, or the aircraft has moved since reporting the
last position. The position of the aircraft is then calculated a
number of times using the TDOA measured from a number of
stations forming target`s track, preferably five or more, even
though the clocks of the different stations may be slightly out
of sync.
To calculate an initial position in three dimensions, at least
four reporting stations are required. Or, if altitude is known
(barometric reporting from a Mode-C transponder, for
example) only three reporting stations may be needed to
determine position. In either event, the over-determination
technique calculates aircraft position based on different groups
of receivers within the overall set. Thus, in the simplest
example for a group of four sensors, S1, S2, S3, and S4, the
position of an aircraft or other object may be determined by
using time-stamp signals from different groups of three
sensors. For example, a first position may be determined from
S1, S2, S3 sensors, a second position from S1, S2, S4 sensors,
a third position from S1, S3, S4 sensors, a fourth position from
S2, S3, S4 sensors. Thus, a number of different position values
(and thus track values) can be readily calculated.
By merging this position data together, discrepancies in
reporting station clock signal values can then be calculated, by
determining, iteratively, the clock corrections necessary be
applied to make all the position values corresponding one to
another. The same technique can be used in three dimensions
using five or more sensors, gathered into groups of four. In the
test data presented further, more than 5 sensors were used, with
results plotted relatively to the one sensor S1 (whose plot
would show a straight line).
Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating the system of the
present invention for calibration of TOA/TDOA measurements
of dimension 4 or higher. The block diagram illustrates the
iterative process (X axis) over time (Y axis). A number of
primary measurements are made, using different groups of
sensors, as previously discussed. These positions are then
converted to Cartesian 3-D coordinates, and when compared to
other such measurements, a clock deviation estimate is made.
From these clock deviation estimates, additional delays or
corrections to clocks are made, using a Kalman filter, and the
process is repeated. With each iteration, the positioning data
becomes more coherent, and the clock values are brought into
sync using the correction factors.
Figure 1. Block diagram illustrating calibration via over-determination of
TOA/TDOA measurements of dimension 4 or higher.
The Primary Measurements are computed as follows: Any
TDOA measurements with dimensions equal or higher than
four may be used in this example. The following processing
can be speed up if the primary measurements are supplemented
by corresponding approximate target`s position in 3D which
can be taken from the prior target tracking process. This will
omit analytical conversion from the three selected TDOA
measurements into Cartesian 3D. Analytical conversion
provides only an approximate position estimate which serves as
initial condition for iterative computation of real 3D position,
exploiting a whole vector of primary measurements.
Conversion from hyperbolic to Cartesian 3D space is made
as follows. An approximate or initial target`s position in 3D
can be computed from primary TDOA measurements via
analytical conversion or can be updated through primary
measurement (dimension 4 or more) associated with an
existing tracked target. This block computes the most probable
target position (from TDOA) in 3D space according to whole
vector of primary measurements and its regular covariance
matrix defining position accuracy. Afterwards, it computes the
difference between the most probable target position in 3D
(estimated in previous steps and converted back to hyperbolic
space) and entering primary TDOA measurements (from whole
set of primary measurement vectors). This difference is
estimate of inferior clock deviations (additional delays) with
singular covariance matrix. The difference, including the
probability matrix, can be computed with an assumption that
dimensions of primary TDOA measurements (in hyperbolic
space) are higher than dimensions of 3D (Cartesian), i.e., 3D
space is subspace of primary measurement (hyperbolic) space.
The system is thus over-determined (redundant).
The Clock Deviation Estimate is calculated as follows.
Coalescence of one-minute consequent differences, mentioned
above, between measured and the most probable target`s
position in hyperbolic space are made, i.e., the corrections of
the clocks` additional delays are estimated. Every measurement
may vary in dimension and it is necessary to have one unified
measurement, to which all measurements are transformed. All
differences are accumulated into one multidimensional value
with Gaussian distribution Additional delay errors (reference
clocks` deviations at stations) are assumed to be constant
during this one-minute period. Note that coalescent estimates
of differences may comprise the final calibration output in
some applications, depending on the desired accuracy level and
the amount of initial discrepancy in the clock values among
stations.
Correction of Additional Delays and the Kalman filter
operate as follows. Update (or correction) of additional delays
(reference clock errors) uses Kalman filter feature, which
allows the system to model the error trend of an additional
delay (error of clock synchronization). Clock errors are then
filtered.
These delay values may be applied to the sensor clock
values (time stamps) as received at a central station, where
time-stamped data values are received from a number of
stations to perform TDOA calculations to determine aircraft
position. Alternatively, these time delay values may be
transmitted to sensor stations to correct or update sensor clock
signals. In either event, the position signals may be continually
over-determined in order to verify that the clock signals remain
accurate over time and to update or revise the clock correction
factors.
In this manner, a WAM system can be kept in operation
even without a centrally synchronized clock signal, though the
means of over-determination techniques. Such a system and
method is important, as modern aircraft tracking systems are
switching over to an ADS-B type system, where GPS position
signals are self-reported by aircraft to determine aircraft
positions in a controlled airspace. If GPS signals go offline or
are jammed, position of aircraft would be difficult to
determine, unless legacy radar systems were still employed.
Wide Area Multilateration offers a backup solution to ADS-B,
but may also be dependent on a GPS clock signal for
synchronization purposes. The presented principle allows an
WAM system to operate in the absence of a central
synchronized clock signal, thus providing an effective
redundant backup to ADS-B systems.
III. MEASUREMENTS
The real traffic from two WAM systems, namely Brno and
Ostrava, were taken for the purpose of synchronization
algorithm design and evaluation. The Brno as well as Ostrava
system includes 7 stations. The synchronization method was
then evaluated on basis of a Kalman filter which estimates
clock deviations from over-determined TDOA measurements
at stations 2-7 from the reference clock at station 1. For
evaluation purposes, a random number generator generates
'real mutual deviations oI clocks on each station which tends
to slowly diverge without any synchronization, which
corresponds to the real clock behavior. The Kalman filter
contains a state vector (current estimate of clock deviations),
including its accuracy (covariance matrix) computed from
measurements. The difference between "real" clock deviation
(from the clock at station 1) and estimated deviations produced
by synchronization measurements, which can be found in the
status vector, is the key result description. That difference
corresponds to systematic errors from primary WAM TDOA
measurements and affects all tracked targets.
Note that stations that are close in position to other stations
are synchronized much more accurately than other pairs. This
effect is caused by the small weight of TDOA coordinates from
the base between stations in the calculation of the target
position, when a relatively large change in 3D position of the
target causes only a small change in TDOA coordinates.
Fig. 2 is a series of graphs illustrating systematic errors of
TDOA measurements on sensors 2-7, relative to sensor 1 (not
shown) of WAM Brno during the worst time period for
synchronization (e.g., least amount of traffic) estimated by the
over-determination method, where the Y-axis represents clock
deviation in nanoseconds, and the X-axis represents time in
minutes. The graphs of fig. 2 illustrate the systematic errors of
primary WAM TDOA measurements where clock
synchronization on each station is based only on real traffic
conditions. The graph elements represent progress of
systematic errors and the continuous solid portion "lock up"
corresponds to the theoretical limit of 99% percentile. These
errors can be interpreted as error for a fixed station after
application of the over-determination method. Thus, output
data from a fixed station will be affected by this error during
given time interval.
Figure 2. Systematic errors of over-determined TDOA measurements on
each of WAM Brno stations (related to 1. reference station which isn`t
shown).
Referring to fig. 2, one can see the TDOA measurement
error dependency on traffic density at any given time. The
weak synchronization during night traffic from a worst time
period for synchronization by the over-determination method is
between 600th and 660th minute (from 08/30/2010, 1 AM until
08/30/2010, 2AM). Fig. 3 shows this particular traffic interval.
The dark trajectories represent lower altitude targets (aircraft)
while the lighter trajectories represent higher altitude targets.
Only the lighter (higher altitude) trajectories were used for
sync, as accuracy in obtaining sync from lower level targets is
far more difficult, if not impossible, in some situations.
Figure 3. Traffic during the worst time period for synchronization by over-
determination method (from 30.8.2010, 1am until 30.8.2010, 2am). Only red
trajectories were used for sync.
Fig. 4 is a graph illustrating the target altitudes showed in
fig. 3, over time, during the worst hour of system operation
during the test, in terms of synchronization. Again, the dark
lines represent lower altitude targets (aircraft) while the lighter
lines represent higher altitude targets. As illustrated in fig. 3,
only targets with an altitude of 4800 meters and above were
used for generating sync using over-determination.
Figure 4. Targets` altitudes during the worst time period Ior synchronization
by over-determination method (from 30.8.2010, 1am until 30.8.2010, 2am).
Only red trajectories above 4800m were used for sync.
Above described synchronization by over-determination for
Brno WAM system was performed also for related Ostrava
WAM system. Traffic situation was recorded on both systems
simultaneously thus multiple targets appeared in both systems
during their over flight. The Ostrava system test was chosen
due to different siting and traffic conditions. It provides also
possibility to perform test on artificial joint system Morava
(partly overlapping Brno with Ostrava system) which results
will be showed further.
Fig. 5 presents systematic errors in ns of over-determined
TDOA measurements for Ostrava system in similar manner as
fig.2 for Brno system. The increasing error trend can be seen
again during night hours` week traIIic. The 99% error 'lock
up curve is not higher than 10 ns which comply with MLAT
requirements.
each of WAM Ostrava stations (related to 1. reference station which isn`t
shown).
As previosly mentioned, the test data recorded for both
systems can be used to simulate traffic in joint, wider, WAM
system called Morava. Morava name is chosen on base of
geographical relation between these two regions and their
location in Moravian part of Czech Republic, see fig.6.
Figure 6. Situation map of WAM systems Brno and Ostrava.
Fig. 7 represents graphs illustrating systematic errors of
TDOA measurements on all Brno and Ostrava stations 2-14,
relative to station 1 of WAM Brno. The simulation length was
shortened to 7 hours according to high amount of input data
which are representing again the worst time period for
synchronization (night traffic). The progress of systematic
errors increases with decreasing air traffic and vice versa
decreases with increasing traffic. The main difference in
comparison with stand alone systems is in maximal value of
99 percentile which doesn`t exceed 2 ns even during the
weakest traffic conditions. This result implies previously
mentioned dependency between synchronization error and
number of sparsely separated stations.
each of WAM Morava stations, i.e. all Brno and Ostrava stations (related to 1.
reference station which isn`t shown).
Figure 8. Traffic interval with common targets for Ostrava and Brno system.
Only red trajectories were used for sync.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
It was presented and proved on real data that any Wide
Area Multilateration system can by synchronized by over-
determination method in situation when any kind of clock
reference is lost (GPS, beacon, Mode-C). It is required that
such a system will satisfy basic prerequisites of sparse sensor
distribution and amount of at least five sensor. Test on two
WAM systems, namely Brno and Ostrava proved capability of
synchronization from targets when 99% of all synchronization
error, deviations from reference station, didn`t exceed 10 ns for
system with 7 stations. This property is moreover valid for low
air traffic during night. Once these two systems are artificially
merged into one system, the 99 % percentile margin is even
lower and doesn`t exceed 2 ns.
Any multilateration system can provide by above presented
synchronization method from flying targets sufficient
performance in case of time reference lost for necessary
amount of time during which all airplanes can land safely and
any additional surveillance system can be involved.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Pelant, 'Estimate of Systematic Errors of A Passive Surveillance
System (PSS) According to Emitters with Unknown Position, at
German Radar Symposium GRS 2002, Bonn, Germany, 03-04
September 2002.
[2] M. Pelant et al, Provisional U.S. Patent Ser. No. 61/474,350 for: "Time
Synchronization via Over-determined Measurements".
Improvement of Multilateration (MLAT) Accuracy

and Convergence for Airport Surveillance
Ivan A. Mantilla-G., Juan V. Balbastre-T.,
Elas de los Reyes
Instituto ITACA
Universidad Politcnica de Valencia
Valencia, Spain
{imantilla, jbalbast}@itaca.upv.es, ereyes@dcom.upv.es
Mauro Leonardi, Gaspare Galati
Radar and Navigation Laboratory
Rome, Italy
{leonardi, galati}@disp.uniroma2.it
Abstract In this paper, we study, evaluate and develop the use
of regularization methods to solve the location problem in
multilateration systems using Mode-S signals. The Tikhonov
method has been implemented as a first application to solve the
classical system of hyperbolic equations in multilateration
systems. Some simulations are obtained and the results are
compared with those obtained by the well established Taylor
linearization and with the Cramr-Rao Lower Bound analysis.
Significant improvements are found for the application of
Tikhonov method.
Keywords-multilateration; regularization methods; localization;
air traffic control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Mode-S Multilateration systems are a feasible
option to be used in the Air Traffic Control (ATC)
technological infrastructures, so much so that the European
Organization for the Safety or Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL) published in its report 7KH $70
6XUYHLOODQFH6WUDWHJ\IRU(&$& [1] that these systems will be
one of three pillars of the ground based surveillance
infrastructure for 2020. These systems exploit the SSR Mode-S
(and Mode A/C) signals in order to calculate the position of
aircrafts and vehicles in the coverage area. They perform the
localization by solving a system of hyperbolic equations based
on TDOA technique; the pertaining algorithms run at real time
in a CPS (Central Processor System) [2].
In some scenarios, it is common to find a typical problem
for the system of hyperbolic equations to be solved; i.e., the
coefficient matrix has a very large condition number [3]. This
problem is defined in the literature as an ill-conditioned
problem and the consequence of this is that, when the system
of equation is solved, the solution is not correct or it has a big
error regarding to the exact solution. The mathematical
interpretation of this problem goes back to the three conditions
of Jacques Hadamard [4], namely, the solution exists, the
solution is unique and the solution depends continuously on the
data. If at least one of these conditions is not satisfied the
problem becomes ill-conditioned. On the other hand, the
effects of this problem in the multilateration systems accuracy
have been highlighted in [5-6].
Some ill-conditioned problems can be also found in other
fields as image processing [7], electromagnetic scattering [8] or
geophysics [9]. In these fields, this problem has been solved by
applying a group of methods called regularization methods.
These methods basically convert the ill-conditioned problem in
a well-conditioned problem where the three Hadamard`s
conditions are satisfied. In this paper, the authors study and
apply one of these methods to solve the ill-conditioned
problem in multilateration systems.
It is important to emphasize that no specific reference in the
literature has been found on this topic, with the remarkable
exception of that published in [10], which is an application for
passive location system with angle of arrival measurements.
II. LOCATION PROBLEM IN MODE-S MULTILATERATION
In Mode-S multilateration (MLAT) systems, a number of
ground stations (at least three for 2D or four for 3D) are placed
in some strategic locations around the airport or the area to be
covered. The system uses the Mode-S transmission and
asynchronous transponder (Mode-S) replies as well as the
responses to interrogations elicited by the MLAT system.
Then, the signal is sent to a CPS (Central Processing Station)
where the transponder position is calculated. This calculation is
based on the Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) principle,
where the intersections of multiples hyperbolas (or
hyperboloids), which have been created with the relative time
differences, are computed. Each of these hyperbolas follows
the expression shown in (1).

(1)
where c is the velocity of light, (x,y,z) the unknown target
position (aircraft position) and (x
i
,y
i
,z
i
) is the known position of
the ith station (i=1 denotes the reference station). Linearizing
(1) by Taylor series expansion [11-12] is the most accepted
strategy to solve an inverse problem with the hyperbolic
equations, in order to estimate the target position. In the current
literature, the solution of this inverse problem has been
presented as an iterative procedure in the sense of the Least-
Squares (LS) [11-12]. Denoting the unknown target position as

and comprising the system measurements (for a

Mr. Ivan A. Mantilla-G has been supported by a FPU scholarship
(AP2008-03300) from the Spanish Ministry of Education.
number of
ground stations) in a
vector
, the final formulation of that method

can be summarized as follows,
(2)
where ; is the
Jacobian matrix of
the
hyperbolic equations (1),
is the starting point

required for this method,
and
is a
vector comprising the TDOA (see (1))

quantities evaluated at the partial solution
. Finally,
because this method is based on an iterative procedure, K is the
number of refinement iterations.
The solution provided by (2) is the minimum residual norm
solution and the matrices product
is known as the
pseudoinverse matrix
[3]. For some scenarios, due to the

system geometry, to the measurements noise and to the starting
point quality, this inverse problem is ill-conditioned and
therefore, the solution obtained by (2) is not correct or diverges
with very large errors. The numerical reason is because the
pseudoinverse matrix does not satisIy the three Hadamard`s
conditions [3-4].
On the other hand, one feasible option to avoid the above
problem is to use a horizontal projected version of the Taylor-
series expansion method and solve it with the pseudoinverse
matrix. This option, although the corresponding coefficient
matrix is initially well-conditioned, has the disadvantage that it
adds a spatial bias due to the projection from 3D to 2D in the
coefficient matrix but not in the measurements. As it will be
shown in the results, this option normally is more useful for
surface movements surveillance.
In this paper, we use the Tikhonov regularization [13]
method to solve the iterative procedure of Taylor-series
expansion and to avoid those errors due to the ill-conditioned
problem.
III. SOLUTION OF LOCATION PROBLEM IN MODE-S
MULTILATERATION BY TIKHONOV REGULARIZATION
This method was originally and independently derived by
Phillips [14] and Tikhonov [13] and it has been used to solve
the ill-conditioned problems in an important number of
applications in engineering and science. The main idea of this
method is to incorporate a priori information about the size and
smoothness of the final solution. This a priori information is in
the form of semi-norm. Generally, Tikhonov regularization
leads to minimize a function that takes the following form,
aigmin
(3)
where is the exact coefficient matrix for the inverse problem,
is called regularization parameter and is called
regularization matrix. The regularization parameter controls
the importance given to the regularization term
.
Using the Tikhonov regularization concept, the likelihood
function [12] for the Mode-S location problem can be
expressed as follows,

(4)
where is the covariance matrix of the TDOA
measurements noise and det denotes the determinant operator.
The maximum likelihood solution of (4) is that
which
minimizes the following function,

(5)
Solving (5) by Taylor-series expansion, the estimation for
the unknown target position in the Tikhonov sense takes the
following form,

(6)
where
is known in the literature as the regularized inverse

matrix of Tikhonov [13] and it is defined as follows,

(7)
It is worth to say that, due to the fact that the covariance
matrix , for real applications, is often not known because
it depends on the true target position, in practice it is common
remove it from (7), assuming an identity matrix.
The choice of regularization parameter and regularization
matrix is the most critical aspect to make a correct use of the
procedure described above. Firstly, the choice of the
regularization matrix is directly connected with the statistics of
the target position vector . If the components of are
assumed to be non-random and uncorrelated, a standard choice
of the regularization matrix is
, where
is a
identity matrix.
On the other hand, the choice of the regularization
parameter value is not as straightforward as the choice of
regularization matrix. In the literature there exist a considerable
number of methods and procedures to calculate/estimate an
approximated regularization parameter value. These methods
provide good results for a variety of applications (e.g. image
processing, biologic computer, remote sensing, electromagnetic
scattering, etc.) and they are basically based on the solution of
an optimization problem, i.e., find a parameter that satisfies
some equalities [15] or find a parameter that minimizes some
special functions [16-18]. However, it is worth to say that, due
to nature of these methods, they introduce a significant
computational load and therefore the computation time can be
not acceptable for real time location in Mode-S Multilateration.
In this work, we evaluate the problem for several
regularization parameters values (no more than three) and then
we choose as true solution the one which corresponds with the
minimum residual error. This option is feasible for this
application because the typical size of the coefficients matrices
(Jacobian matrix) is normally smaller than .
In general, the residual error for an inverse problem is
given by,
Figure 1. Linate airport system layout.
Figure 2. Horizontal accuracy for Linate airport. Each point in the
abscissa corresponds to a point in the simulated path.

(8)
Remembering that for Taylor-series expansion method, the
matrix is an approximation of an exact coefficient matrix,
then (8) could not be a correct value for the residual error
regarding to the true target position . Therefore, in this work,
we propose to calculate the residual error by replacing the
regularized solution
in the non-linear TDOA function (1),

instead in the matrix , as follows,

(9)
where the vector
is given by,

(10)
IV. RESULTS
Preliminary results are shown to validate the improvement
of the system accuracy and its convergence by applying the
Tikhonov method in the iterative procedure of Taylor-series
expansion. Two scenarios have been simulated; the first one is
the operating system of Linate Airport (Milan, Italy) and the
second one is a multilateration system which is well described
and studied by Cramr-Rao Lower Bound -CRLB- analysis in
[6].
For each scenario, the horizontal (2D) R.M.S error
(obtained via Monte-Carlo simulation with 100 trials), the
theoretical accuracy provided by the CRLB [6], the bias of the
estimator and the spatial convergence are calculated.
A. Linate Airport System
The Linate airport system is composed of eight ground
stations. For this scenario we have simulated a path of surface
movement around the airport. The system layout and simulated
path are shown in Fig. 1.
For this scenario, the starting point for the Taylor-series
expansion method has been assumed to be a fixed point over
the airport and it is shown as the star in Fig. 1. For this scenario
it has been found that using only one regularization parameter
value ( ) is enough to obtain satisfactory results.
Fig. 2 shows the horizontal R.M.S error for the horizontal
projection of Taylor-series expansion method and the non-
projected (3D) version solved by the pseudoinverse matrix. It
also shows the non-projected (full version) Taylor-series
expansion method solved by Tikhonov regularization and the
corresponding CRLB analysis.
Initially, the CRLB analysis predicts a good accuracy over
the entire path, presenting only a few peaks around the points
40 and 50, where the horizontal accuracy is slightly larger than
7 meters. However, for the non-projected Taylor (circles), it
can be seen how the ill-conditioned problem avoids the
convergence of the method solved by the pseudoinverse
matrix, i.e., the R.M.S error tends to infinity in the most of the
points. On the other hand, the horizontal projected version
obtains acceptable accuracy levels but the effect of the spatial
bias is present, for this scenario, in most of the points (more for
those points within the 30 and 120). Finally, it is evident how
the solution obtained by applying Tikhonov regularization
improves both the ill-conditioned problem, which is directly
related with the system accuracy and convergence and the
spatial bias added for the projected version.
Fig. 3 shows the bias of the estimator for the projected
version of Taylor as solved by the pseudoinverse and that one
corresponding to the full version of Taylor as solved by the
Tikhonov regularization. In this figure it can be noted the
improvement, regarding to the spatial bias of the horizontal
projection of Taylor-series method, added by using the
Tikhonov regularization. This aspect is very important when
using tracking algorithms (which are present in all the Air
Traffic Control -ATC- systems) because they can improve the
R.M.S error of the location algorithm but not the bias. In this
way, it is clear to see how Tikhonov method also helps to the
tracking algorithms to reach more accurate tracks.
Figure 3. Horizontal bias of the estimator for Linate airport. Each point
in the abscissa corresponds to a point in the simulated path.
Figure 4. Spatial convergence for one trial.
Figure 5. Layout of the MLAT system for a takeoff line. Figure 6. Horizontal accuracy over the takeoff line.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the spatial convergence for a specific
Monte-Carlo trial. In this figure it can be observed how the
solution by Tikhonov regularization allows the Taylor-series
expansion to ensure the convergence to the true point.
B. MLAT System for a Takeoff Line
This system is composed for four stations and it is well
analyzed in [6]. The layout of the simulated scenario is shown
in Fig. 5.
For this scenario, the starting point for the Taylor-series
expansion method has been obtained by means of the closed
form algorithm described in [19]. This algorithm is based on
spherical intersections and it does not need a starting point but,
as it is shown in the results, it is also affected for the ill-
conditioning of the problem due to the system geometry. The
horizontal coordinates of the starting point (x,y) are taken from
the closed form algorithm and the vertical coordinate (z) is
simulated as the barometric altitude, i.e., with a bias of 40m
regarding to the real target height. Also for this scenario it has
been found that only using one regularization parameter value
( ) is enough to obtain satisfactory results.
The amount of ill-conditioning of this scenario is
significantly greater than that of the first scenario. It is because
the number of stations here (four) is much smaller than the first
one (eight). This effect can be noted in the CRLB analysis
shown in Fig. 6 since the theoretical accuracy diverges for
points within 0 and 5 km and for those around 20 km. On the
other hand, due to the fact that for this scenario, the target
height is increasing with the distance, the vertical separation of
this with the plane of the ground stations considerably affect
the accuracy provided by the horizontal projection of Taylor-
series method (crosses) and the spatial bias added by this is
considerably large for points beyond 15 km.
Due to the ill-conditioning, it can be observed that, for this
scenario, the accuracy levels provided by the full version of
Taylor, using the pseudoinverse matrix, diverges far from the
theoretical accuracy values (CRLB) for points within 0-5 km
and 15-20 km. In contrast, the closed form algorithm presents a
more stable accuracy but it is also affected by system geometry
(Dilution of Precision -DOP-). Finally, it is evident the
significant improvement, of the system accuracy, obtained by
applying Tikhonov regularization. The accuracy for this option
is stable for the whole of takeoff line and it is not larger than 25
Figure 7. Horizontal bias of the estimator over the takeoff line. Figure 8. Spatial convergence for one trial over the takeoff line.
meters. It is worth to say that this solution is below the CRLB
values because also the CRLB is affected by the ill-
conditioning of the problem, specifically that part due to the
system geometry.
Fig. 7 shows the bias estimator for the solutions obtained
by the closed form algorithm and by the full version of Taylor-
series using both pseudoinverse matrix and Tikhonov
regularization. Firstly, it can be noted that for a few points
close to 10 km and 15 km, the bias of the solution obtained by
pseudoinverse is smaller (nor more than 1 m) than that of
Tikhonov method. It can be explained because in the case of
well-conditioned problems the pseudoinverse matrix is the
solution with minimum norm [3] and in contrast Tikhonov
always adds certain amount of bias [13]. The important aspect
is that, if the correct regularization parameter value is chosen,
this amount of bias can be neglected regarding to the rest of the
options to improve the problem (i.e., the horizontal projection
of Taylor-series method). Moreover, due to the ill-conditioned
problem, for the rest of the points, the bias added by
pseudoinverse matrix solution is infinity and for most of the
points the bias added by the closed form algorithm has been
found greater than that of Tikhonov regularization.
Finally, Fig. 8 shows the spatial convergence for a specific
Monte-Carlo trial; in this figure it can be noted how the
regularization of the location problem ensures the convergence
also for this scenario.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The implementation of Tikhonov regularization to solve the
inverse problem of Taylor-series expansion, for location in
Multilateration systems, has been described and evaluated. The
theoretical aspects of the method with a practical strategy to
calculate the regularization parameter have been described.
For the scenarios simulated here, significant improvements,
for the system accuracy and convergence, have been found
with the implementation of Tikhonov regularization. For both
scenarios, it was found that the regularization of the location
problem significantly mitigates the ill-conditioning due to the
system geometry, i.e., those points where the CRLB analysis
predicts poor accuracy levels; to the measurements noise, i.e.,
those points where the CRLB predicts good accuracy levels but
the solution obtained by the pseudoinverse matrix diverges;
and also due to the quality of the starting point for Taylor-
series expansion method.
For both scenarios it was found that a regularization
parameter value of was enough to obtain satisfactory
results but, it is worth to say that in the situations where the
problem is better conditioned, it is necessary to use, at least,
one or two more values smaller than , i.e., the smaller
the amount of ill-conditioning the smaller should be .
The regularization of the location problem is more useful
for those situations where the vertical separation between the
ground stations and the target is quite small or for those
situations with a small number of stations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors are grateful to Thales Italia S.p.A. (Eng. R.
Scaroni) who supplied the geometry of the Multilateration
system in Linate (Milan, Italy) airport.
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Assessing the safety of WAM over
a non-radar surveillance area
James Hanson
Helios
James.Hanson@askhelios.com
Ben Stanley
Helios
Ben.Stanley@askhelios.com
This paper discusses potential issues and solutions for developing
an argument that Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) is acceptably
safe as a sole means of surveillance in normal and failure-based
operations. Using a practical example it discusses techniques to
analyse and characterise the behaviour of a distributed receiver and
interrogator system. It will also investigate the challenges to gather
appropriate evidence, and how they can potentially be overcome.
Keywords: Safety; WAM; multilateration; distributed system;
remote sites
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the standards and guidelines currently promulgated
by ICAO, EASA and EUROCONTROL, a safety case must
accompany the introduction of a new surveillance system such
as WAM (Wide Area Multilateration). This requires a
proactive approach to understanding risk and applying
appropriate controls - i.e. the system being placed into
operation must be proven in theory, and subsequently in
practice, to meet an acceptable level of safety.
It is important that attention is paid to all aspects of the
behaviour of the new WAM system; acceptable safety should
be shown when WAM is working as designed, when it has a
critical failure (e.g. CPS failure), and when it has no critical
failure but, through gradual system degradation, increases risk
(e.g. small corruption of position plotted).
The defining case from a risk-based perspective tends to be
that of undetected corruption; the gradual degradation of
position away from the true value or undetected loss (or failure
lack of initiation) of a track. In other words, it is this system
failure which has the greatest risk, with the combination of
probability of occurrence and severity of credible effects,
taking account of all potential mitigations. Whichever way this
is caused at an individual component (or function) level, it
needs to be identified and mitigated.
A further focus of the analysis can be found in the
calculation of expected failure rates for the provision of
surveillance information based on individual components or
functions. With the distributed nature of WAM, this is not as
straightforward a solution as for other technologies, as it needs
to take account of local geometries (i.e. the level of redundancy
across the airspace at all altitudes under surveillance-based
control) and the availability of communications and power to
each remote site.
This paper therefore discusses potential methods for
carrying out a safety case for the installation and operation of a
Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) system across an area in
which no surveillance has previously been available i.e. a
non-radar airspace (NRA) environment. It is not intended to be
comprehensive, but sets out some thoughts on which it is
hoped others will build.
II. KEY PROPERTIES OF WAM
Wide Area Multilateration is a surveillance technique for
monitoring the position of aircraft with ground-based sensors.
As with Secondary Surveillance Radars (SSR) it is a
cooperative independent technique. The benefits of WAM over
radar are typically the lower cost of the receivers and improved
accuracy.
A series of ground stations receive the same signal from an
aircraft and use the time difference of arrival (TDOA) from
each sensor to determine hyperboloids. When plotted from a
sufficient number of receivers, these hyperboloids intersect to
determine the precise 3D position of the aircraft. This is
transmitted as an ASTERIX message (using Category 20 [2]
for the target reports and Category 19 [1] for status messages).
The position can be further augmented by ranging techniques
in which an approximation is made of the time taken for a
signal to reach an individual ground station. Integrity of the
system can be checked through reference transponders. The
reference transponders transmit from a fixed location known to
the central processing system and can potentially be used to
alert to system inaccuracies.
III. MAKING A SAFETY CLAIM
Before putting into service a WAM system, it is necessary
to demonstrate that the system will be acceptably safe by
design and in operation. This entails the development of a
safety argument that shows how a target level of safety will be
achieved by the new system in operation. In practice this
involves analyzing the system in two conditions:
a) When everything is working as designed; and
b) When failures have occurred.
The safety claim is made only once it can be shown that the
normal and failed performances of the system are both
within tolerable limits.
In terms of performance, a set of reference values have
been derived by EUROCONTROL, ostensibly to be independent
of the surveillance source (eg the draft Surveillance
Performance and Interoperability Implementing Rule). These
references values are able to relate certain probabilities of
position error (e.g. Y metres at 95% confidence) to the
separation minima through the use of a mixture of
mathematical analysis and experiential evidence. The latter
uses the argument that if radars have been able to provide
position accuracy to a certain level, and can support e.g. 5NM
separation, then that level of position accuracy is acceptably
safe for nominal operations.
The parameters can be simulated and analysed in
operational implementation using tools such as
EUROCONTROLs SASS-C (Surveillance Analysis Support
System for ATC Centre) [3] and its derivative CAPT
(Coverage Analysis and Planning Tool) [4]. Both tools are
evolving to handle radar, ADS-B and Multilateration data.
One of the concerns with this approach is that the
probability of error values for WAM at other points on the
curve (e.g. 98%, 99.5%) may not exactly correspond to the
radar error distribution model. At the time of writing,
EUROCONTROL and others in Europe are currently responding
to this issue through the derivation of surveillance separation
error curves, allowing any value to be determined theoretically
then tested (or monitored) in practice, and giving a greater
degree of confidence in the ability of the WAM system to
support a given separation minima (see ED-161 for an example
of this approach for ADS-B [6]).
It should be noted that in the absence of CAPT (or other
tools), the manufacturers models of coverage should be
extensively validated through use of flight trials and targets of
opportunity. Note the need to look at different flight levels (i.e.
the base of coverage) in this process, and also to consider
carefully the level of redundancy in the distributed sensors. If a
certain performance is required at 2000ft across a wide
coverage area (met by 4 receivers and 2 interrogators viewing
the airspace), typically greater redundancy will be seen at
higher flight levels and therefore the effect of an error in any
one of these remote units is minimised.
The driving hazards in a WAM surveillance system
typically relate to undetected loss or corruption of aircraft
position (assuming the system detects all aircraft within the
service volume when working as designed) which, as with any
surveillance safety case, would be determined as part of a
hazard identification workshop with controllers. Using current
safety methodology [5], the next step in the safety case is to
examine the failures of the end-to-end surveillance system that
could lead to the hazard. This is important in the design and
deployment of WAM, as the failure rates of multiple
components need to be correlated to understand the failure rate
at different points in the service volume. This is not a trivial
task in a non-radar environment where no radars exist to
interrogate aircraft and the WAM system must actively
interrogate to ensure sufficient replies are received to plot the
aircraft position. Over a large area this then means a complex
distribution and geometrical spread of installed receivers and
interrogators, each one having a specified:
failure rate (Mean Time Between Failure);
repair rate (Mean Time To Repair, dependent on not
only the maintenance contracts but also the location in
the country e.g. a WAM receiver station mounted on
an oil rig may take longer to repair in the event of
failure than one nearby a busy aerodrome);
communications availability (from the remote site to
the central processor for WAM);
power, particularly for environments where a link to a
National Grid is not available;
From these parameters, it can be seen that an understanding
of the failure rate for different parts of the airspace (e.g. low
altitude, high altitude) can assist in determining the
communications and power performance to be required, which
can be especially important when these are delivered by third
party suppliers and service level agreements need to be signed.
The communications in particular has the potential to add
unnecessary cost if a broad-brush stringent assumption is made
instead of an analysis based on operational need carried out.
In addition to the varying reliability of ground components
of the system, there is also the aircraft to take into account. For
example the reliability of the transponder including the
information it is transmitting (with associated human error
rates) as well as its trigger level, and overall mean time
between failures.
IV. AN APPROACH TO DETERMINING EXPECTED FAILURE
RATES FOR A DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM
As well as taking into account the different failure rates of
individual sites it is also necessary to consider the distributed
network of possible sites that could potentially be used in any
position derivation. One approach is to consider the airspace as
a patchwork of different probabilities where the likelihood of
position determination in each patch is determined by:
The number of interrogators in view
The number of receivers in view
The reliability of each receiver/interrogator
Analysing the failure rate of each receiver/interrogator
should take into account the factors identified in the previous
section to yield the different failure rates within each patch.
Mathematical analysis of the combinations of failures within
each patch can then provide a reasonable estimate of the failure
rate of an interrogator and receiver within the patch. Coverage
maps (which, as mentioned earlier, would require validation by
eg flight tests) can then be used to identify the number of
receivers and interrogators available to provide a position (ie
avoid the hazard from occurring).
In the following simplified example, the distribution of
receivers (Rx) and transmitters (Tx) is indicated by the orange
(Rx) and blue (Tx) markers. The distribution is not intended to
represent a recommended siting of receivers and interrogators,
but solely acts as an illustration of the approach:

Rx
Tx
Figure 1
The simplified receiver coverage pattern might therefore
look as follows, where a deeper colour indicates a greater
overlap between receivers:
Figure 2
The transmitter pattern may conversely look as follows:
Figure 3
Combining these two patterns together provides an overall
coverage within the surveillance volume as follows:
Figure 4
Where the different colours indicate the number of
receivers and transmitters in view:
>3 Rx 2 Tx
>3 Rx 1 Tx
2 Rx 1 Tx
1 Rx 1 Tx
3 Rx 0 Tx
2 Rx 0 Tx
1 Rx 0 Tx
>3 Rx 2 Tx
>3 Rx 1 Tx
2 Rx 1 Tx
1 Rx 1 Tx
3 Rx 0 Tx
2 Rx 0 Tx
1 Rx 0 Tx
Table 1
This can then be used to calculate the probability of
position being lost, corrupted or un-initiated in a particular area
of airspace due there being an insufficient number of receivers
or transmitters. The defined surveillance volume should ensure
that the necessary number of receivers and transmitters are
always in view to support the safety objective. This will
depend upon the availability of each receiver and transmitter
but as the combinations used to derive position are so
numerous it may be better to take either a conservative
assumption and assume that each receivers or transmitters has
the reliability of the most unreliable receiver/transmitter or to
mathematically analyse the various combinations to arrive at
more accurate reliability for receivers/transmitters in that
patch of airspace.
V. VALIDATING THE FAILURE RATE AND PERFORMANCE
Having assessed the expected performance and safety
values of the implemented system from a theoretical
perspective, the next stage is to validate the operational
practice and ensure the safety case remains valid. In particular
this should include flight trials and where possible
confirmation, through monitoring, of the contributing sensors
to position reports.
In addition, integrity monitoring, can be used to provide
confidence during operation as a technical mitigation to any tail
errors in the position distribution. The distribution of WAM
errors is still being defined but may well be different to the
normal distribution assumed for radar (see below)
99.9% 99.9%
Figure 5
Integrity monitoring allows detection of the tails of this
type of distribution using reference transponders or additional
receivers (when in view), with the resultant mitigation that the
hazard is detected and leads to a lower severity effect. Four
receivers are needed to detect position and additional receivers
will provide further integrity checks, that when combined with
a means of monitoring the contributing sensors can ensure
detection and potential elimination of erroneous receivers.
Monitoring of the ASTERIX Category 19 status messages
provide further insight and can usefully supplement integrity
monitoring techniques.
VI. OPERATIONAL AND BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS
From both an operational and business perspective it is
important to explore the safety case fully. An overly redundant
system means extra cost with little added benefit. Insufficient
redundancy on the other hand may lead to a reduced
surveillance volume due to issues at low level or at the
boundaries of the volume. The usual response to the latter issue
is a need to re-procure additional receivers or interrogators,
with an obvious impact on the investment case.
In the event that receivers/interrogators do fail, the
continuity of operations is often an important consideration,
particularly for a WAM system placed over a wide area with
centralised processing. One mitigation could be to sectorise the
airspace taking into account the coverage of the receivers. This
may then limit the impact of that failure to a smaller area. For
example the base altitude of a sector might be defined at a
particular height beyond which there is increased redundancy.
Airspace below that sector could revert to uncontrolled
airspace in the event of a failure and the controller might only
use surveillance below that sector to detect airspace
infringements, whereas there would still be sufficient
redundancy in the sector above to support a surveillance
service. It is also worth considering the traffic volumes in each
sector as lower volume sectors could be allocated a different
proportion of the overall safety objective (depending on
whether or not traffic volumes have been taken into account in
determining hazard severity, in which case they mustnt be
double-counted as a mitigation)
VII. CONCLUSION
A safety case must accompany the introduction of WAM to
prove in theory, and subsequently in practice, that it meets an
acceptable level of safety. As shown above, it also has a role in
enabling the best possible trade-off between the operational
requirements (particularly integrity and continuity) and the cost
(redundancy). The defining hazard tends to be that of
undetected corruption or undetected loss (or lack of initiation)
and it needs to be identified and mitigated.
With the distributed nature of WAM, determining expected
failure rates is not straightforward and the number of
interrogators/receivers in view as well as their reliability should
be considered. This will be helped by tools being developed by
EUROCONTROL, along with the manufacturer models. However,
these do not currently include a full mathematical treatment of
the expected failure rates taking account of all aspects.
This paper is not intended to be comprehensive, but
nevertheless sets out some thoughts on potential methods for
carrying out a safety case for the installation and operation of
WAM in a NRA environment. Particular consideration is given
to airspace as a patchwork of failure rates that should be
validated and monitored. The implications of such analyses on
operational and business aspects are also considered.
VIII. REFERENCES
[1] EUROCONTROL STANDARD DOCUMENT FOR SURVEILLANCE
DATA EXCHANGE, Part 18 : Category 019, Multilateration System
Status Messages. Edition 1.3, December 2010
[2] EUROCONTROL STANDARD DOCUMENT FOR SURVEILLANCE
DATA EXCHANGE Part 14 : Category 020, Multilateration Target
Reports, Edition 1.8, December 2010
[3] http://www.eurocontrol.int/sass/public/subsite_homepage/homepage.htm
l
[4] http://www.eurocontrol.int/sass/public/standard_page/CAPT.html
[5] http://www.eurocontrol.int/safety/public/standard_page/samtf.html
[6] ED-161 Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements
Document for ADS-B-RAD Application, September 2009

Nultilateiation anu ABSB
ImplementationofADSBSystems
BenefitsandConsiderations
Session8.1page197
InvestigationofMeasurementCharacteristics
ofMLAT/WAMandADSB
Session8.2page203
RealTimePerformanceMonitoringandNoise
AnalysisinanoperationalWAMSystem
Session8.3page207
ADSBviaIridiumNEXTsatellites
Session8.4page213
IndependentSurveillanceBroadcast
ADSBReceiverswithDOAEstimation
Session8.5page219
Implementation of ADS-B Systems -

Benefits and Considerations
Abraham A. Barsheshat
Senior System Engineer
Sensis Corporation
5717 Enterprise Parkway, East Syracuse NY, USA
avi@sensis.com
Abstract-- Increasingly, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) is being used around the world as an
alternative to Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR).
Implementing ADS-B based surveillance provides many benefits
to Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and commercial
aviation. This includes reduced separation and increased
capacity; reduced acquisition and life cycle costs; reduced fuel
costs and reduced carbon emissions. Additionally, ADS-B
reduces the need for maintaining and/or upgrading aging radar
infrastructure. This paper describes the NAV CANADA
implementation of ADS-B surveillance Over Hudson Bay, the key
considerations for implementing these systems and the benefits
that were achieved.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Operational Need
The ADS-B deployment in Hudson Bay was the first phase
of NAV CANADAs multi-phase deployment plan for ADS-B
surveillance, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 NAV CANADAs Phased ADS-B Deployment
Hudson Bay covers an area of over 250,000 nm
2
with little
or no communications or surveillance. Some radar coverage
existed over the periphery of the Bay (shown by the green
contour in Figure 3). About 35,000 flights a year use this
airspace (see Figure 2). The majority of these flights link
Europe and North America, while many transit to Asia,
including those using polar tracks. Aircraft traversing the area
required procedural separation (80 nm 10 minutes), which
limited the air traffic capacity over the Bay. NAV CANADAs
goal was to improve air traffic operations over Hudson Bay by
providing 5 NM separation services over the entire area. This
would provide more opportunities to use preferred routes,
would increase traffic capacity and would result in significant
fuel savings and emission reductions for operators. 5 NM
separation services required radar-like surveillance capabilities
as well as full communications with aircraft.
Figure 2 Hudson Bay Airspace
B. Possible Solutions
Multiple surveillance solutions were envisioned:
a) Radar: an analysis showed that four Secondary
Surveillance Radars (SSR) would be required, at a cost
of $10M to $18M per radar site. When adding
maintenance costs and installation complexity, it was
determined that radar was not an economical solution.
b) Wide Area Multilateration (WAM): a coverage
analysis determined that up to 22 sites would be
required for WAM. This was determined not feasible
because of the lack of sufficient infrastructure, weather
limitations and environmental concerns (such as
protected lands).
c) ADS-B: ADS-B was a technology that was gaining
acceptance among Air Navigation Service Providers
(ANSPs) back in 2006. Air Services Australia was
deploying ADS-B for Upper Airspace Surveillance and
the FAA has plans for NAS wide ADS-B surveillance.
The biggest concern was the degree of equipage. IATA
was a big supporter of ADS-B as it saw Hudson Bay as
an opportunity to accelerate ADS-B equipage among
its members. It was determined that the anticipated
equipage growth would be sufficient to support
surveillance services.
NAV CANADA determined that ADS-B was the most cost
effective solution. The business case showed that significant
fuel and CO
2
emissions savings could be achieved by
operators. The decision was made to implement an ADS-B
surveillance system augmented by a long range
communications system:
The ADS-B surveillance system would consist of five
ground station sites installed along Hudson Bay.
The long range communications system would include
high power (300 watts vs. 50 watts) VHF radios
combined with directional antennas to provide longer
range. The equipment would be installed at three of the
ADS-B sites.
The selected ADS-B sites and resulting ADS-B coverage
are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Surveillance Coverage over Hudson Bay
The ADS-B program was executed on a fast schedule:
Fall 2006: Request for Proposal
Spring 2007: Contract award. The surveillance system
was awarded to Sensis Corporation and the
communications system to Park Air Systems.
SummerFall 2007: System delivery and installation
Winter 2007: Start of operational evaluation
Summer-Fall 2008: Acceptance testing and safety
exemption approval
January 2009: System goes operational
The ADS-B implementation required significant changes to
ATC automation and operations, as well as a comprehensive
acceptance testing and safety assessment process.
II. ADS-B SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The implementation of the NAV CANADA ADS-B system
comprised multiple facets: (1) installation of a ground
surveillance and communications system; (2) modifications to
the ATC automation system; (3) modification to ATC
operations.
A. ADS-B Ground Surveillance System
The ADS-B ground based surveillance network is shown in
Figure 4. This network consisted of remote ground stations and
central processing equipment.
Figure 4 ADS-B Ground Surveillance System
1) Remote Ground Stations:
Each of the five ADS-B sites incorporates redundant
ADS-B Ground Stations (GS), a RF Site Monitor and
satellite communications (Satcom) equipment. Each GS is
equipped with a high gain DME antenna that provides a
detection range of up to 250 NM. The GS receives and
decodes Mode S Extended Squitter (ES) messages from
DO-260 or DO-260A equipped aircraft and transmits the
decoded messages to a central processor over Satcom. GS
redundancy is necessary to provide the required
availability due to the remoteness and inaccessibility of the
sites for most of the year.
Each GS is equipped with a GPS receiver with
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM)
capability. The GPS receiver reports a Horizontal
Protection Limit (HPL) value that represents the integrity
of the GPS solution and can be used to assess the health of
the GPS constellation by the automation system. ADS-B
reports can be discarded in case of poor HPL.
Each ADS-B site includes a RF Site Monitor that is
used for end to end system test. The Site Monitor transmits
a known message once a second. Lack of message
reception triggers a fault in the ADS-B ground system.
The Site Monitor also emulates a radar parrot for the ATC
automation system.
2) Central Processing System (CPS):
The CPS is comprised of redundant Target Processors
(TP), networking equipment and communications
equipment. The TP converts raw Mode S ES messages
into ADS-B track reports in accordance with DO-260 and
DO-260A. The TP combines target detections received
from multiple ground stations into a single output stream.
The TP incorporates several mechanisms to eliminate false
targets. The TP can also detect and report targets with
duplicate ICAO 24 bit Mode S address.
A key NAV CANADA requirement was to make the
ADS-B data radar like in order to facilitate the
integration of ADS-B into the ATC displays. To that end,
the TP reports ADS-B tracks by emulating a rotating radar
centered at each ground station location. ADS-B tracks are
reported in an Extended ASTERIX Category 48 that was
created specifically for NAV CANADA. The Extended
CAT048 contains target position and identity as well as
ADS-B integrity fields such as NUCp (DO-260) or
NIC/NAC/SIL (DO-260-A). The standard CAT021 format
is also supported but is not currently used by NAV
CANADA.
B. Integration of ADS-B into ATC Automation
ADS-B integration into ATC involved several aspects:
1) Radar Emulation: The ATC systems were modified to
accept the new Extended ASTERIX CAT048 ADS-B
reports emulating a radar rotation.
2) ADS-B Identification: All NAV CANADA ATC
systems relied on Mode A code (four digit identity
code used by Secondary Surveillance Radars) for
target identification and radar track to flight plan
correlation, but Mode A code is not yet available from
most ADS-B equipped transponders. Mode A code
transmission is optional for DO-260 compliant
transponders and is required for DO-260A or DO-
260B compliant transponders, however DO-260 still
constitutes the majority of ADS-B equipage. All ATC
systems needed to be modified to use the ICAO
Aircraft Identification (ACID) as the target identifier
and for association to flight plan.
Note that this requirement adds a small increase to a
pilots workload: the pilot must ensure that the flight
identification entered into the aircraft avionics matches
the flight identification on the ICAO Flight Plan (Field
7) in order for the track to be correctly associated to the
flight plan on the ATC display. Guidance for proper
entry of flight identification has been issued to
operators [1].
3) Avionics Qualification/Eligibility Enforcement:
Multiple checks are performed to qualify a target for
ADS-B services:
a) A notification of ADS-B capability must be filed
in the flight plan for an aircraft requesting ADS-B
services (Field 18 set to RMK/ADS-B).
b) Aircraft avionics must be certified for ADS-B and
must be pre-registered with NAV CANADA [2].
This requires the aircraft to be equipped with a
TSO C-129a GNSS receiver and a Mode S
transponder with Extended Squitter capability. The
ICAO 24 bit Mode S addresses of eligible
transponders are entered in an ADS-B Eligibility
List (AEL) maintained in the ATC system. Targets
that are not on the AEL are deemed not eligible for
ADS-B services.
c) Only targets with a NUCp integrity value greater
or equal 5 (or NIC for DO260-A/B aircraft) are
validated as ADS-B. This corresponds to a 0.5 NM
(914 m) containment radius. This exceeds the
integrity requirement defined in RTCA DO-303
(or EUROCAE ED-126) [3], which requires a
NUCp >=4 for 5 NM separation. It is also worth
noting that the GPS performance over Hudson Bay
in terms of number of satellites and position
accuracy support the RAIM capabilities that are
necessary to achieve the required integrity level.
The GPS position accuracy that can be achieved
over Hudson Bay is depicted in Figure 5:
PDOP over Hudson Bay < 3
SPS 95% User Range Error = 13 m
Position Error (95%) = PDOP x 13m = 39m
Figure 5 GPS Accuracy over Hudson Bay
4) Additional changes included handling of mixed
SSR/ADS-B traffic, modifications to conflict probes
for ADS-B and addition of new ADS-B symbology on
the ATC display.
5) A new phraseology was also introduced for the ADS-B
airspace. The generic surveillance term is used
instead of radar. As an example, RADAR
SERVICE TERMINATED was changed to
SURVEILLANCE SERVICE TERMINATED [1].
The integration of ADS-B surveillance data into the ATC
system is summarized in Figure 6.
Figure 6 ADS-B Handling in ATC System
III. REMOTE EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
The installation of the remote ADS-B and communications
equipment required careful planning because of the remote
nature of the sites and the limited time window due to the
extreme weather conditions during most of the year.
Installation planning was done one year in advance. All the
required equipment was pre-assembled and tested at MAV
CANADAs Engineering Workshop facility prior to shipment.
Existing shelters were used for all Hudson Bay sites. The five
ADS-B sites were installed in a 13 week period during the
summer of 2007. For each site, shelter equipment installation
was completed in about two days and antenna installation took
up to seven days. Antennas took longer because of the high
gain 1090 MHz antenna size and weight (3.4 m and 27 kg) and
tower height (15 m tall). All sites used the community satellite
earth link for remote communications. A typical indoor
redundant ground station installation is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7 Indoor Ground Station Installation
The ADS-B equipment has been showed to be highly
reliable. No periodic or preventive maintenance is required
once the ADS-B equipment is in operation. Failures that are
consistent with the equipments Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF) have been observed, however these failures did not
caused a loss of service because of the fully redundant site
design. Failed equipment is repaired or replaced during the
summer season.
A typical Hudson Bay ADS-B site during the winter season
is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8 Hudson Bay ADS-B Site in winter
IV. ACCEPTANCE AND CERTIFICATION
NAV CANADA conducted an extensive safety assessment
and site acceptance testing program for the Hudson Bay ADS-
B system.
The safety assessment was conducted in accordance with
NAV CANADAs Safety Management Process. The goal was
to obtain an exemption to Canadian Air Regulation 821, which
identifies radar as the sole source of surveillance for
application of non visual separation standard. The assessment
was completed in two phases: (1) Generic analysis on potential
for technology to meet en-route separation standard; (2)
Application in Hudson Bay based on traffic density and
complexity.
1) Generic assessment: This included radar to ADS-B
comparison and drew on the Australian Safety Case for
the Australian Upper Airspace ADS-B program. 20
hazards were identified and mitigated. All hazards
could be mitigated to support 5 NM separation
standard.
2) Hudson Bay specific assessment: This assessment
followed the safety objectives defined in RTCA DO-
303 (or EUROCAE ED-126) for the ADS-B Non
Radar Airspace (NRA) [3]. The assessment
accommodated both DO-260 and DO-260A avionics.
It proposed to pre qualify avionics for ADS-B
eligibility and identified a ten month operational test
and evaluation period. Over 35 hazards were identified
and mitigated.
The safety assessment was a two year long process which
resulted in receiving the ADS-B exemption to Canadian air
regulations in September 2008.
A full week of flight trials was conducted over Hudson Bay
including over 20 flight-hours, using test aircraft equipped with
WAAS and DO-260A transponders. WAAS data was used as
the primary reference. In addition, over two weeks of Target of
Opportunity (TOO) data were collected and analyzed. Multiple
coverage areas were tested, including radar only areas, ADS-B
only areas and overlapping coverage areas. No issues were
found when comparing ADS-B to radar. NAV CANADAs
performance requirements were met or exceeded, as shown in
Table I.
TABLE I. ADS-BPERFORMANCE
Parameter Results
Range 250 nm
Update Rate Less than 5 seconds
Probability of Update Better than 98%
V. OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
The Hudson Bay ADS-B system became operational for 5
NM separation services beginning in January 2009. Today, 30
airlines with over 800 ADS-B eligible aircraft operate over
Hudson Bay. This represents a 50-60% ADS-B equipage ratio.
Priority handling is applied to ADS-B equipped aircraft
between FL350 and FL400. Additional improvements to air
traffic flow management are planned, starting in October 2011:
Non-eligible aircraft that are flight planned between
FL350 and FL400 will file and fly on fixed route
structures, and
ADS-B eligible aircraft will be permitted to continue to
file and fly random (aka preferred or dynamic)
routings.
These changes will increase air traffic management
flexibility to accommodate eligible customers requested
tracks, altitudes, speeds and re-routing requests within the
ADS-B surveillance service volume, resulting in additional
cost savings for customers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that ADS-B is a cost effective
surveillance technology that can provide significant benefits to
ANSPs and airlines. A successful outcome requires careful
planning that affects all aspects of ATC operations. NAV
CANADA has estimated that the ADS-B implementation will
save $195 million in fuel and will reduce CO2 emissions by
436,000 metric tonnes by 2016.
Sensis and NAV CANADA were awarded the Janes
Environment Award at the 2010 ATC Global Exhibition and
Conference in recognition of the Hudson Bay deployment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author wishes to thank NAV CANADA for providing
invaluable information about the NAV CANADA ADS-B
operations. Special thanks to Mr. Dave Ferris, Mr. Mike
Botting, Mr. Bill Crawley, Mr. Jeff Cochrane, Mr. Marty Tate,
Mr. Will Lynch and Mr. Israel Legault. The author would also
like to thank Dr. Michael Raulli from Sensis Corporation for
contributing his ADS-B technical expertise to this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] NAV CANADA ADS-B Information Brochure,
http://www.navcanada.ca/ContentDefinitionFiles/Services/ANSProgram
s/ADS-B/ADS_B_Brochure_EN.pdf
[2] NAV CANADA ADS-B Registration Form,
http://www.navcanada.ca/ContentDefinitionFiles/Services/ANSProgram
s/ADS-B/Registration_Form_EN.doc
[3] Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for
the ADS-B Non Radar Airspace (NRA) Application, RTCA/DO-303,
December 13 2006.
.
Abstract For several decades rotating sensors have been

employed as the workhorse for air traffic surveillance purposes.
Therefore, their measurement characteristic is widely
understood. With the adoption of ADS-B and MLAT / WAM,
experiences gained from rotating sensors are no longer valid in
all aspects. This contribution investigates the specific error
characteristics of these new types of sensor technologies. The
goal is to obtain a deeper understanding what specific
characteristics must be expected fromthese new sensor types.
Index Terms Multi-sensor data-fusion (MSDF), air traffic
control (ATC), multilateration (MLAT), wide area MLAT
(WAM), ADS-B.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the integration of new sensor technologies in the
already existing sensor environment it is of utmost
importance to understand the specific characteristics of each
sensor, how they interact with each other, and how they
interact with systems like a multi-sensor tracker and data
distribution components.
Rotating sensors show well-known and largely understood
measurement characteristics like a similar time delay
between consecutive measurements. Furthermore, the
position biases are very similar for adjacent plots.
The mechanical beam steering enables a significant
antenna gain which has a positive impact on the probability
of detection (POD), the probability of false alarm, the
resistance to garbling, and many other properties related to
the high signal to noise ratio (SNR) of rotating radars.
In general, the quality assessment of sensors is a
challenging task, because the true position of an object is
usually unknown, especially if opportunity traffic is applied
for evaluation purposes. However, if new sensors are
deployed in an area which is already covered by well-
understood sensors, one has the unique opportunity to use
the existing framework as a reference while preventing any
feedback to the tracking process. To this end, the raw data of
ADS-B, MLAT and WAM is compared to raw and tracked
data of rotating radars. A discussion on the implementation
of multi-target tracker of air traffic control applications is
given in [1].
The minimally required infrastructure for ADS-B is a
single antenna. For MLAT / WAM a synchronized network
of several remote units is required. Typically, such MLAT /
WAM receiver units also have ADS-B capabilities.
II. AWP
To analyze the performance of any kind of sensor,
elaborated tools are required to support an operator. The
Analysis Working Position (AWP) is an in-house DFS
development [2] and can be considered as a necessary
complement to the well known SASS-C from Eurocontrol. It
puts DFS in a unique position to be able to rapidly adapt to a
changing sensor environment.
This analysis tool offers a variety of filtering options and
allows for the detection of potentially interesting situations
in opportunity traffic. A complete picture on the system
performance is basically achieved by a mix between
statistical analysis and visual inspection. A snapshot of the
AWP is given in Fig. 1. The main window is used for plot
and track display purposes. In the lower left a track statistic
overview is given. The filter dialog window is shown in the
upper right and the replay tool in the lower right.
A. Statistical Analysis of MLAT / WAM and ADS-B
In order to determine the statistical properties of a sensor
like accuracy and POD the plot measurements have to be
compared to a reference trajectory. In a multi-sensor
environment such a reference trajectory can be computed
without utilizing the data under observation to get rid of a
correlation between the sensor data under investigation and
Fig. 1 Snapshot of the AWP with its filter dialog, a distinctly
powerful and versatile feature of the AWP.
Investigation of Measurement Characteristics of
MLAT / WAM and ADS-B
Klaus Pourvoyeur, Adolf Mathias, Ralf Heidger
DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH
TM/SP, Systemhaus,
Am DFS Campus 7, 63225 Langen, Germany
phone: +(49) 6103 707 4446, fax: +(49) 6103 707 2595, email: klaus.pourvoyeur@dfs.de
plot & track display AWP filter dialog
track statistic overview offline tracker
the reference trajectory. In a single-sensor environment, the
trajectory is necessarily based on the same data due to the
lack of other available data [3], [4].
Due to electromagnetic interferences, the accuracy as well
as the POD of an MLAT / WAM or ADS-B system depends
on the traffic amount present in the region of interest. In case
only a limited amount of aircrafts are under surveillance, the
probability of detection as well as the probability of false
alarm is significantly better compared to high traffic
situation within the sensor area of interest. A similar effect
can be observed for the plot accuracy.
The data amount depends on the time of day as well as on
the season in the year. During summer time the air traffic
amount is, at the same time of day, usually higher than in
winter time. Therefore, the essential influence of the current
traffic situation has to be taken into account during
evaluations of requirement compliance, e.g. at site
acceptance tests.
B. Visual Inspection of MLAT / WAM and ADS-B
Compared to a statistical analysis, the main drawback of
visual inspection of data is its lack of completeness. On the
other hand, an experienced inspector is capable to detect
unknown characteristic within the sensor data.
Potentially interesting candidates for visual inspection are
plots which lack specific attributes such as like Mode-A
code, Mode-C barometric altitude, Mode-S address and
aircraft identification.
Furthermore, plots which are not associated by a tracker
but are located in close proximity to already established
tracks are promising candidates for detailed analysis by the
user. Such an analysis requires a close coupling between the
tracker and the analysis tool. Also, plots without a
corresponding track must be considered as false
measurements and are of particular interest.
Additionally, tools like the online tracking quality control
(OTQC) integrated within the AWP offer the possibility to
detect potentially interesting situations like track splits or
double tracks. It shall be noted that duplicate Mode S
addresses are often related to the erroneous dissemination of
Mode S information onto a Mode A/C only track.
III. WAMERROR CHARACTERISTICS
In contrast to a rotating sensor that measures the round
trip delay of the interrogation and the transponder reply, for
an MLAT sensor only a reply on itself is required from the
transponder. Of course this reply has to be received by
several synchronized remote units on different locations in
order to perform the multilateration calculation process. A
sketch of the MLAT / WAM measurement principle is
shown in Fig. 2.
A. Omnidirectional Receiving Characteristic
A common approach for MLAT / WAM systems is to
equip each remote unit (RU) with an omnidirectional
antenna, or at least a wide antenna beam, which results in
significant structural disadvantages in comparison to a
rotating sensor. Due to the lower antenna gain the signal to
noise ratio (SNR) is much smaller. Furthermore, a single
Fig. 2 Basic MLAT / WAM measurement principle.
antenna receiver is much more vulnerable to garbling
because the signals received by the RUs are not limited to a
specific direction. A receiver array for a MLAT remote unit
overcomes these drawbacks at the expense of a more
complex receiver infrastructure. It should also be noted that
such an antenna array needs a relative large amount of space.
Especially for WAM systems this may result in mounting
problems if a multi-purpose antenna tower is utilized.
B. Mode of Flight
Due to the omnidirectional reception characteristics of
MLAT RUs the mode of flight has an influence on the
quality of the position solution.
Airliners are always equipped with two antennas, one
located at the top of the aircraft, one at the bottom side. The
antenna which receives the interrogation signal with the
higher power sends the transponder reply. Hence for an
airliner flying a curve only one side of the aircraft has a
good electromagnetic path. RUs on the other side have a
structural impairment for detecting the signals covered by
noise.
Even if the WAM system is able to interrogate actively,
this structural problem cannot be overcome. Therefore for a
WAM system it is expected that a curve flight shows a
noticeably reduced position accuracy in comparison to a
straight flight.
C. Active vs. Passive Interrogation
To keep the electromagnetic interferences as low as
possible, a WAM system may calculate a position solution
using only transponder replies initiated by other
interrogators. For example, the Frankfurt area is well known
to show very large electromagnetic interferences. For such
an area a passive interrogation is a suitable countermeasure.
Due to the circumstances that the position estimation is
only based on already present signals, a temporal equidistant
position solution may no longer be provided by the
measurements itself. If the already present interrogation rate
of the aircrafts is too low, the system has to initiate
transponder interrogation by itself. Only for active
interrogation, the round trip delay can be measured directly.
A sketch showing active vs. passive interrogation is given in
Fig. 3
D. Position Estimation Technique
From an error propagation point of view, the difference
between calculating a complete 3D position and only
calculating a 2D position using the barometric height as
additional source of information is grave. Therefore it is
Fig. 3 Utilizing different information for calculating a WAM /
MALT position solution.
recommendable to use the barometric height of the aircraft
in order to reduce the 3D position estimation problem to a
2D problem. The impact on the error propagation is not only
given for the variance of the position, it also counts for the
bias propagation. A sketch showing the different MLAT
principles is given in Fig. 3. A detailed discussion on the
error propagation for bias and variance is given in [5].
E. DOP Only for Biased Position
The dilution of precision (DOP) is a well known concept
to characterize the covariance matrix of an MLAT position
solution by a single scalar value. A significant drawback of
this concept is the error propagation for the variance which
is only calculated for the estimated but not for the true
position, which is of course generally not known to the
system. Hence the DOP values tend to be far too optimistic
especially if the geometrical circumstances are extremely
bad. A sketch of these circumstances is given in Fig. 4.
F. Field of Coverage and Local Position Bias
The position solution of an MLAT system can be
deteriorated by a disturbed detection at a single RU.
Especially if the aircraft is close to the ground, the geometry
becomes worse. Hence, to achieve a good coverage on low
altitudes a large number of widely spread remote units is
required.
In the border region of the area of coverage it is expected
that the performance of the WAM / MLAT system is lower
compared to the inner region of the field of coverage.
Therefore the sensor area of interest of an MLAT system
always has to be limited to its core region; otherwise a
catastrophic fusion [6] may occur. It should be noted that a
remote unit alone is not capable to determine whether the
transponder reply is within the area of coverage of a sensor.
Fig. 4 DOP for biased position.
Fig. 5 Basic ADS-B measurement principle.
G. Update Rates
WAM systems typically have update rates of 1 Hz up to
4Hz. For MLAT systems the update rate can be as high as
10Hz. Conventional interacting multiple model (IMM) state
estimators are not able to deal with such high update rates
because their model transition process is hampered by the
badly observable small effects of target maneuver changes
during short time intervals. In [7] - [10] it was shown that
the DFS Phoenix tracker is capable of processing such high
update rates without a degradation of the IMM model
switching process.
H. Mode-S vs. Mode-A/C
For a Mode A/C interrogation only the radar knows which
register was interrogated. From the transponder reply itself,
barometric height and SSR code cannot be distinguished.
Due to the lack of a unique transponder reply identification
by means of the 24 Bit address, the WAM system may
calculate a false position based on the replies of several
aircraft if no adequate counter measures are implemented by
the system itself.
IV. ADS-B ERROR CHARACTERISTICS
For ADS-B, the position information is directly
broadcasted by the aircraft. Hence, only a single receiving
unit is required to receive the broadcasted message. A sketch
of the basic ADS-B measurement principle is given in Fig. 5.
A. Reception time stamp
If ADS-B is broadcasted in the conventional Mode-S
frames, as normally used by radars, the ADS-B message can
only be time-stamped with the time of reception, but not
with the point in time at which this message is valid.
According to the ADS-B standard, the broadcasted ADS-B
position may have an age between 0 sec and 0.6 sec.
Without compensation, this error results in a velocity
dependent bias on the position estimate and additional
uncertainty on the velocity estimate. It should be noted that
even if the mean value of this time error is compensated by a
tracking system and not by the transponder itself, the
covariance representing the inaccuracy of the ADS-B
position report is increased.
B. ADS-B Validated
A single ADS-B remote unit equipped with an
omnidirectional antenna is not capable to determine whether
the received report originated from a true target or was
generated with the intention of spoofing the sensor.
If more than one RU receives the ADS-B message and if
these RUs are synchronized, this redundancy can be
exploited to validate the ADS-B message with some
certainty. This validation can even be done if the number of
RUs is not sufficient to calculate an independent position
solution based on MLAT principles. Also, an antenna array
at a single RU may be suitable to give a rough position
validation of the ADS-B report.
C. NUC Values for Ground Tracks
The navigation uncertainty category (NUC) values
provided by ADS-B are known to be trustworthy for
airborne targets. For aircraft on the ground, two types of
erroneous behavior have been observed: first, the NUC
value may change to the correct value when the aircraft
becomes airborne, second, the ADS-B position may jump to
the accurate position. It shall be noted that NUC values on
ground can only be 0 or 7 but nothing in between. Therefore
NUC values on the ground have to be interpreted differently.
D. Ground Bit not Reliable for Aircraft
An aircrafts mode of flight is determined by a switch
mounted on the nose wheel. Like any mechanical system, it
may fail to estimate the correct airborne status of the aircraft.
Therefore, a simple suppression of targets based on this
status bit has to be avoided under any circumstances. It
should be noted that the ground bit for vehicles is very
reliable because it is preprogrammed into the transponder
and not based on a mechanical switch. Furthermore, there
are different types of ground bits for ASTERIX category 21
on one hand and categories 20 and 48 on the other(flight
status). These ground bit types can be mapped onto category
62 individually. However if category 20 has been previously
converted to category 10 (as is customary for some
multilateration systems) it is no longer possible to
distinguish between the two types of ground bits.
E. Types of 24 Bit Addresses
In addition to the 24 bit ICAO addresses, ADS-B is able
to transmit other types of 24 bit addresses. Although it is
required that aircrafts shall only transmit ICAO addresses, it
occurs that aircraft indicate an address of different origin in
their ADS-B report which, of course, does not comply with
current regulations.
For large airports where a huge number of vehicles are
equipped with ADS-B transponders, it is likely that non-
ICAO 24 bit addresses are employed, in order to avoid
registration fees and possible conflicts with aircraft
addresses. It is of course essential that a tracker does not
confuse these different types of 24 bits addresses. It should
also be noted that the current version of ASTERIX category
62 is not able to represent the different types of 24 bit
addresses that can be transmitted by ADS-B.
V. CONCLUSION
In this contribution the different measurement
characteristics of MLAT as well as ASD-B were discussed.
It was emphasized where their basic behaviour deviates from
the well-known performance of rotating sensors. Another
intention of this contribution was to act as a basic guideline
for air navigation service providers (ANSPs) as and sensor
manufacturers for designing proper test cases.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Heidger and A. Mathias, Multiradar Tracking in PHOENIX and
its Extension to Fusion with ADS-B and Multilateration, in Proc.
European Radar Conference (EURad 2008), Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, Oct. 29-31, 2008.
[2] B. Euler, R. Heidger, et al. PHOENIX AWP Benutzerhandbuch.
Version 1.3, Langen: DFS, 2009.
[3] R. Heidger, The PHOENIX White Paper. Version 3.0, Langen: DFS,
2011.
[4] B. Euler, R. Heidger, et al. PHOENIX Systemhandbuch. Version 3.8,
Langen: DFS, 2009.
[5] K. Pourvoyeur, A. Stelzer, and G. Stelzhammer, Error Estimation for
Reliable Fault Detection of a TDOA Local Positioning System, in
Proc. Enhanced Surveillance of Aircraft and Vehicles (ESAV08),
Island of Capri, Italy, Sept. 35, 2008.
[6] H. B. Mitchell, Multi-Sensor Data Fusion. Berlin: Springer, 2007.
[7] H.A.P. Blom and Y. Bar-Shalom, The Interacting Multiple Model
Algorithm for Systems with Markovian Switching Coefficients. IEEE
Trans. Automatic Control, vol. 33, no. 8, Aug. 1988.
[8] A. Mathias and R. Heidger, Design of an Interactive Multiple Model
Kalman Filter (IMMKF) in PHOENIX, in Proc. Enhanced
Surveillance of Aircraft and Vehicles (ESAVS 2007), Bonn,
Germany, March 6-7, 2007.
[9] H. Binzel, K. Engels, R. Heidger, A. Mathias, C. Klmper, A. Pfeil,
R. Cadete, and P. Santos, An IMMKF implementation in the
PHOENIX multi-radar tracking system for the Portuguese airspace.
Air Traffic Control Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1, 2008.
[10] A. Mathias and K. Pourvoyeur, Enhanced IMM Model Switching
using Residual Accumulation, in Proc. Enhanced Surveillance of
Aircraft and Vehicles (ESAVS 2010), Berlin, Germany, March 16-17,
2010.
Real Time Performance Monitoring and Noise
Analysis in an operational WAM System
Alexander Pawlitzki, Holger Neufeldt
Thales Air Systems GmbH
Korntal-Muenchingen, Germany
alexander.pawlitzki@thalesgroup.com, holger.neufeldt@thalesgroup.com
Abstract Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) systems are
complex systems and suffer from several typse of interference
that vary over time. To ensure reliable operation and high data
quality, a continuous verification approach is needed. The typical
quality metrics in Asterix Cat 20 data are not fully sufficient to
determine the operational capability of a WAM system. Different
parameters are needed additionally to characterise system
performance. This approach also allows detecting small changes
and degradations of the system over time that may not only be
caused by system intrinsic effects, but also by external evolution,
like RF environment, different traffic patterns and equipment
mix, or different surveillance infrastructure.
This paper shows crucial low level parameters and their real time
evaluation within the operational system like
x propagation path effects (especially for low level
targets)
x probability of telegram reception and error rate
x interrogation efficiency
x accuracy and outlier rate of timing measurements
x system synchronisation monitoring
x measurement and track noise characterisation
x comparison against other metrics (e.g. ADS-B and the
side effects thereof)
x aircraft transponder anomaly monitoring
Based on these analyses, optimized data output strategies are
proposed how to convey the maximum amount of information
into Asterix reports for further processing. A more detailed
definition of some fields will become necessary, especially when
the MLAT data is fed into a sensor data fusion.
Keywords: Multilateration, WAM, Noise Analysis, Realtime
Performance Monitoring
I. INTRODUCTION
Wide Area Multilateration, or, WAM systems, especially
when targeting nationwide systems, consist of tens to probably
a hundred independent sensors. All of them form a complex
mesh network that delivers aircraft surveillance data. While
the probability of equipment failure is certainly increasing with
quantity, such a distributed system improves its robustness
with an increasing number of ground stations so that individual
equipment failures can be tolerated (also referred to n-1
case). The impact of a single failure cannot be determined
using an overall performance assessment , notably as the
system is designed to tolerate individual failres. Instead,
detailed impact analysis and individual performance
measurements are required.
Every single sensor of a WAM system is subject to
environmental effects and has an individual RF environment;
all of them are not constant over time. While installing a Thales
WAM system under contract by DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung
around Frankfurt, Germany, many of these aspects where
investigated. This system also referred to as Precision
Approach Monitor Frankfurt (PAM FRA) provides WAM and
ADS-B coverage from Frankfurt airport ground, via CTR and
TMA to upper airspace in a volume enclosed in a horizontal
rectangle of 128 NM x 80 NM around Frankfurt airport,
Germany as illustrated in Figure 1.
Frankfurt/Main Airport
Frankfurt/Hahn Airport
Frankfurt/Main Airport
Frankfurt/Hahn Airport
Figure 1: Horizontal coverage outline of PAM FRA system
Frankfurt is generally recognized as a very busy airspace,
particularly also with respect to 1090 MHz radio load.
The Thales system composed of some 30 ground stations
deployed at suitable sites around the coverage area, has to cope
with Mode S and Mode A/C equipped traffic consisting of a
changing mixture of general aviation, military and commercial
aviation.
The following sections discuss an approach to system
verification that combines classical performance assessment
methods with real time monitoring of special system
parameters.
II. STANDARD APPROACH
The classical way to assess WAM system performance is to
either perform a series of dedicated test flights (which can be a
lengthy exercise, particular in a complex coverage
environment) or use opportunity traffic provided there are other
surveillance systems with similar coverage (e.g. radar
airspace). The latter method was chosen for the PAM FRA
system.
In any case, standard evaluations verify parameters like
Probability of Detection (PD), Probability of Code Detection
(PCD), Horizontal Position Accuracy (HPA), averaged over
the observation period. The performance parameters are
calculated typically by post processing operational system
output data (e.g. Asterix category 020 target reports) using
suitable external tools (e.g. Eurocontrol SASS-C, DFS
Phoenix/AWP, Clairus PerformanceView, Thales
TPtool/DART, etc.).
An example of a SASS-C WAM PD evaluation for a 1s
update period in the Frankfurt coverage volume based on
untracked plot output is shown in Figure 2. It should be noted,
that the typical WAM target report timing using untracked
plots cannot be equidistant in time due to the asynchronous
characteristic of the WAM principle thus creating difficulties
for some evaluation tools. Downstream client systems (e.g.
multisensor trackers) typically cope with such timing and
certainly prefer untracked input instead of pretracked target
reports.
Figure 2: Sample PD coverage of the Frankfurt area in range vs. azimuth and
altitude vs. range representation captured using Eurocontrols SASS-C tool
suite.
In order to visualise the data basis of evaluation, trajectory
displays and altitude distribution as illustrated in Figure 3 and
Figure 4 are often used.
There are, however, considerable effects correlated to
traffic density (which varies over day and night, but shows also
yearly effects and weather dependant effects due to a changing
number of GA targets). These variations affect performance
and cannot be captured in single measurements. Most of the
standard metrics like probability of detection (PD) or
horizontal position accuracy (HPA) are typically averaged over
a certain traffic scenario and are thus almost not sensitive for
slight changes.
Figure 3:Traffic density seen by the Frankfurt WAM system over a 3 hour
period. The rectangle outlines the required coverage area (zoomed on the
right).These assessments provide interesting insight into system performance
as seen by the operational user and are thus vital for performance verification.
(source: Eurocontrol)
Typically, WAM characterisations are done by post
processing so that the results are not available and are not
tracked in real time during system operation. In fact, the only
real time monitoring in most installations is based on verifying
the stationary position accuracy of test transponders. This is
certainly a useful but not comprehensive metric, not
representing performance throughout the entire coverage area.
Position accuracy is typically calculated as Root Mean
Square (RMS) value. This value of RMS can be misleading as
it is not defined in an environment which contains different
noise types and outliers. Depending on the filter and
calculation method, this value changes considerably while the
overall quality of the data remains the same.
Figure 4: Trajectory altitude distribution during a 1 hour sample of the PAM
FRA coverage volume rendered by Clairus PerformanceView
Looking at high level performance parameters thus
provides some insight into the operational performance of the
system as a whole, but does not allow assessing system
reaction to varying environmental conditions, nor does it allow
understanding root causes of certain reactions. More detail and
different parameters are therefore needed.
III. ASSESSMENT USING REALTIME MONITORING METHODS
A WAM system operator needs confidence, that the system
is able to deliver its specified performance at any time, and he
needs to be notified, as soon as this is no longer the case for
whatever reason.
Notably detecting slowly evolving, slight degradations
before they become relevant for performance is an important
strategy to ensure continuous reliability of such complex
systems.
During the installation of the PAM FRA system, new
techniques were tested that measure these effects at different
test points throughout the processing chain. This allows
characterising the whole data flow and check efficiency rates at
major processing steps and also to monitor those values under
different scenarios. It can be seen, that the different stages in
the processing have different sensitivities to the environmental
effects. Special attention was given to obtain all this
information from measurements and signals that are used
anyhow for system operation, so that no additional loading of
the RF environment occurs.
A. Reception Efficiency Measurements based on
Synchronisation
The basis of these measurements was the redundant
synchronisation concept combining GPS-based timing with an
RF-based time beacon transmitter network. The latter is an
evolution of the reference transmitter concept known from
other installations; instead of transmitting transponder-like
signals by dedicated reference transponders, signals with a
dedicated and special payload were used. These are transmitted
by receive/transmit ground stations that are also used to
selectively interrogate targets.
In addition to the usual identification information the time
beacon messages also contain transmission timestamps,
sequence numbers, and status data of the respective
transmitting node, so that they can be decoded by the receiving
node without the need of an additional data link. The receivers
can even belong to other, adjacent WAM systems.
Each node is able to decode these time beacon signals on its
own and gain information in real time about reception
efficiency (packet loss and packet error rate), synchronity
(comparing its own system clock to a multitude of remote time
keepers), and, propagation effects (by analysing the
synchronisation noise) as depicted in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Additional corrections can then be performed on the level of
the central processing station.
It was found, that reception noise was never purely
Gaussian. Instead, it was a composite of several noise types
with different properties. Typically, if was found:
x Gaussian noise caused by statistical measurement error
x Flicker or wander effects caused by slowly drifting
(synchronisation, thermal effects, propagation effects)
x Outliers, caused by undetected garbling of RF signals
(strongly correlated with RF environment loading)
x Constant offsets, ideally removable by careful
calibration
Analysing these different noise types, the environment and
its changes can be seen and the processing logic is then able to
take these effects into account.
Figure 5: Raw measurements (single shot) of node synchronisation difference
vs. time of day. It is clearly visible, that the measurement noise between day
and night is different; the number and distribution of outliers also varies.
Since the measured signal was a Mode S DF18 telegram, the same noise is
present in datagrams received from aircraft. Long term monitoring is then able
to reveal trends in system performance.
In the above proposed approach, reception efficiency can be
directly measured the at each site and at various signal power
levels. The possible contribution of this node can be
determined permanently in real time.
Figure 6: Measurement noise (red dots) and signal power (green dots) for a
time beacon signal. The plot shows clearly day-night variations (the portion
during the night with lower traffic density shows less measurement noise), but
also strong signal power variations due to weather effects (winter ducting).
In addition to these reception efficiency measurements
based on time beacon signals, the results of GPS-based
synchronisation can be used as well for analysis: GPS
sometimes suffers from multipath due to non optimal antenna
location. This effect can be monitored in the station directly as
shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8.
Figure 7: Good GPS synchronisation noise measured for Gedern VORTAC
site Above GPS sync error signal (Scale: y-axis 10ns/unit, x-axis: 1day/unit).
This site provides a nearly optimum signature due to a good GPS antenna
location mounted to the side of a fibre glass mast.
Figure 8: Strong GPS synchronisation noise measured for Feldberg site.
(Same scale Figure 7, top: GPS sync error signal, antenna installation below).
This site provides a noisy signature due to heavy multipath effects (GPS
antenna mounted at the sife of a metal transmission tower)
B. Interrogation efficiency Measurements
Once reception efficiency is determined, interrogation
efficiency is another important parameter to characterize a
WAM system.
All interrogations of targets can be evaluated to built up
interrogation efficiency statistics. They do not only show the
general ability to interrogate targets, but also if single targets
do not behave nominally or if the interrogation efficiency is
temporarily or permanently lower than expected. All this
affects the reliability of a WAM system, even if the root causes
can be outside the system itself.
Interrogation efficiency is analysed statistically but can be
visualized as well as illustrated in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Single Transmitter Interrogation efficiency of GICB extractions
around Frankfort for low flying aircraft (below 5000 ft MSL). Green dots are
localized positions, red crosses are successful GICB extractions. Most of the
green traces are aircraft below the coverage limit; in this area, airspace C
EDDF is underflown by GA traffic with 1500 ft MSL max. By maintaining
such data, a low boundary of the coverage volume can be monitored its
change can be evaluated versus traffic and time.
C. Noise Analysis of ADS-B Targets of opportunity
Another real time monitoring can be performed against
ADS-B opportunity targets. This is not only a useful reference
if no other surveillance means (e.g. radar) are available. ADS-
B can under certain conditions be used as a position reference
with much higher accuracy and update rate than radar.
Since WAM and ADS-B have different types of intrinsic
errors, the comparison has to be made carefully. By separating
both errors, a cross verification is possible and bias values,
which are not measurable by processing the own data alone,
can be estimated.
The following examples are taken from an ADS-B vs.
WAM verification campaign jointly done by Eurocontrol and
DFS and determine position deviation.
An attempt was made to compare ADS-B positions taken
from certified ADS-B equipped aircraft against WAM position
results. Due to expected issues with ADS-B position reporting
latency, the position statistics was done separately along track
(Figure 10) and across track (Figure 11). The result did not show
the WAM position measurement noise but a mixture of other
effects.
Figure 10: Noise distribution of the along track error WAM vs. ADS-B
without ADS-B latency compensation calculated using SASS-C. Span of x-
axis is 150 meters. Clearly this is a non-Gaussian distribution, which points to
effects beyond simple measurement noise. Finally we see here ADS-B latency
variation of the transponders; the noise here is not the WAM noise. (source:
DFS)
Figure 11: Noise distribution of the across track error WAM vs. ADS-B
calculated using SASS-C. This signature shows a granularity effect, which is
the modelling/ calculation resolution inside SASS-C. Scale (full x-axis) is 150
meters. (source: DFS)
Due to this limitations, another tool was chosen
(Eurocontrol: D. Lambers / J. Steinleitner) to better model
transponder latency and get rid of SASS-C granularity issues.
The results are presented in Figure 12 and Figure 13.
Figure 12: Noise distribution of the along track error WAM vs. ADS-B
including ADS-B latency compensation. This fits better to a Gaussian
distribution (same scale as before), but it is obvious, that some non-Gaussian
effects are still remaining. After some analysis, it turned out, that a
deterministic shift in the time tagging was overlaying the measurement.
(source: DFS)
Figure 13: Noise distribution of the across track error WAM vs. ADS-B. This
is nearly a Gaussian shape; so the underlying noise seems to be measurement
noise physically we see the WAM system here. The RMS here is well below
10 meters. (source: DFS)
As a conclusion of this exercise, it is important to note that
using tools with systematic limitatons (granularity) or using
references with systematic errors prevent the analysis from
seeing the WAM performance itself. Looking at the
distribution functions gives a hint, if additional error sources
have to be considered.
IV. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS IN ASTERIX CATEGORY 020
The WAM processing chain typically outputs Asterix Cat
20 target reports. These contain many data items but lack
sufficient detail of measurement characteristics for downstream
client systems (e.g. multisensor tracker) to better consider the
quality of individual reports.
It is therefore proposed similar to the existing ADS-B
metrics to embed more information into Cat 20 reports like:
x Track noise (current measurements within the track)
x Noise values in current observation interval
x Confidence values (not all measurements have equal
weight)
x Separation between noise and uncertainty
With these additions in place, multisensor tracking of
WAM data can be significantly enhanced.
V. CONCLUSION
In addition to the directly operationally relevant
performance parameters that are typically evaluated during
system acceptance testing, other measurement parameters can
provide useful insight in system behaviour under changing
environmental conditions. These have the potential to detect
trends and issues before performance is actually affected and
can thus serve both as early warnings and as root cause analysis
for observations.
Additional data items as part of the standard target report
message would make available the statistical properties of each
measurement for downstream client systems and thus improve
the overall system performance.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to express their gratitude to
D.Lambers/J.Steinleitner/S.Adamopoulos (Eurocontrol) and
S.Stanzel (DFS) for the great support analysing WAM and
ADS-B tracks.
ADS-B via Iridium NEXT satellites
Paolo Noschese, Silvia Porfili, Sergio Di Girolamo
Thales Alenia Space Italia SpA, Rome, Italy
Abstract - Iridium NEXT will replace Iridiums current
satellite constellation, ensuring continuity of the first generation
of global mobile satellite services. Iridium NEXT constellation
will consist of 66 cross-linked, LEO satellites in six orbital
planes intersecting over the North and South Poles. Each
Iridium Next satellite will integrate a secondary payload. This
paper is based on the feasibility study to embark a dedicated
ADS-B secondary payload, on board half or all satellites.
Keywords: ADS-B communication, IRIDIUM NEXT, ATM
Satcom .
I. INTRODUCTION
The constellation deployment will be completed between
beginning 2015 up to mid 2017, when the Iridium NEXT
constellation will be fully operational. Iridium NEXT is
designed to accommodate secondary payloads and provisions
according to specific constraints in terms of volume,
consumption, dissipation and electrical interfaces.
The system here presented is based on the acquisition by
the Satellite of the ADS-B aircraft signals, namely the 1090
Mode S Extended Squitter, without any change on the
aircraft equipment.
II. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Today, the existing ADS-B traffic receiver type AS680-
GS (see figure below) perform the ground reception (de-
garbling) of the ADS-B signal.
Figure 1. ADS-B ground receiver Thales ATM type AS680-GS
In order to cancel interference induced by other 1090 ES
signal (TCAS, response to Mode S radar request, ), it
appears as necessary to perform the initial ADS-B reception
from the payload. This induces to spatialise the ADS_B
receiver functions.
The Spatialisation of the ADS-B receiver function
implies a trade-off analysis between Payload and GES
(Ground Earth Station):
Trade-off have to be performed in order to
determine the best distribution of ADS-B
receiver functions @ the payload architecture,
Satellite => GES data link.
The Iridium NEXT Constellation is constituted by 66
satellites at 780 Km altitude, in 6 orbit planes of 11
spacecraft each, with 86.4 inclination.
Figure 2. ADS-B conical coverage definition, up to 63 off-nadir (TAS-F
source).
The baseline link budget hypotheses require for the on
board satellite antenna a gain ranging from 2dBi (@ 0
elevation, i.e. the edge of coverage) to -3dBi (@ 63
elevation, i.e. Nadir direction towards the Earth center).
III. MISSION ANALYSIS
First step of the study consisted in the definition of
mission and system requirements. Then the mission analysis
has been carried on, by simulating the trajectories of both
Iridium NEXT satellites and aeronautical users. A set of
representative scenarios has been predefined for the mission
analysis. In particular,
Four constellation configurations have been envisaged,
in order to explore the possibility to embark the ADS-B
payload on board the IRIDIUM satellites:
o Full Constellation: considering all 66 satellites;
o Half Constellation: two different sub-sets of
the IRIDIUM constellation have been
simulated with the ADS-B payload on 33
satellites:
N1 (All six IRIDIUM planes have
satellites equipped with ADS-B
payload unit);
N2 (Plane A, E and C satellites are
equipped with the ADS-B payload
unit).
For each of these IRIDIUM configurations, four
different aeronautical routes have been analyzed (Fig.
3) in order to cover the most important and critical
situations for the European Civil Aviation Fleet:
o the North Atlantic Route (Case A),
o the South America to/from Europe Atlantic
Route (Case B),
o the Europe to/from South of Africa Route
(Case C)
o The Europe to/from Far East via Remote North
Polar route (Case D).
Figure 3. Selected Air routes to perform ADS-B mission analysis
The expected coverage to be developed by the ADS-B
antenna on board to the Iridium satellite shall be a conical
pattern type with a field of view up to 63 off- nadir max
(Fig. 2). In order to verify if the on board satellite antenna
can comply with the stringent link budget constraints and
with the payload performance requirements in terms of
aircraft-to-satellite loss of contact time (i.e. outages), three
different options for satellite elevation angles () have been
simulated:
Full coverage (0 63),
Medium coverage (13 63),
Reduced coverage (26 59).
In addition, the performance in the four routes have been
simulated against three timing constrains: the total Aircraft to
Satellite Contact Time shall not be interrupted more than 15
minutes, 10 minutes or down to 1 minute. Clearly, the best
performing IRIDIUM configuration is the FULL capability
with all satellites equipped with an ADS-B payload, at the
cost of having to equip 66 satellites with the ADS-B payload.
Following table show the results for the IRIDIUM
configuration N2 which presents the most promising
performance with only half IRIDIUM constellation equipped
with ADS-B payload in all three options for satellite
elevation angle ranges.
TABLE I. HALF IRIDIUMCONSTELLATION N2 PERFORMANCE
Case A Case B Case C Case D
Coverage Time [%] 99,5 81,62 83,35 99,99
Visible Satellites 5 3 2 6
Outages @1 minute 1 20 15 0
Outages @10 minutes 0 3 5 0
F
u
l
l

C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e

Coverage Time [%] 99,01 81,1 82,74 99,54
M
e
d
.

C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e

Coverage Time [%] 57,88 40,68 44,2 78,79
R
e
d
.

C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e

Furthermore, in order to support the above results, the
analysis has been extended worldwide. Two major results are
presented in the following figures for N2 configuration (in
case of medium coverage angles) in terms of:
Coverage rate (i.e. the ration of time with at least one
satellite in view);
Maximum Revisit Time (i.e. the gap of time between
any of two satellites in view).
In accordance with the performance obtained with the
pre-selected Air Routes.
Figure 4. Coverage Rate with Half IRIDIUM constellation N2 for aircraft
position worldwide (medium coverage)
Figure 5. Maximum Revisit Time with Half IRIDIUM constellation N2
for aircraft position worldwide (medium coverage)
Final considerations on the three simulated IRIDIUM
configurations are summarised hereafter:
Full IRIDIUM constellation is the best performing
configuration that has been analysed in this report. On
the other hand the number of needed ADS-B payloads is
maximised with evident cost issues.
Half IRIDIUM constellation N2 is potentially the best
performing half constellation configuration that has been
analysed in this report.
Half IRIDIUM constellation N1 performance results
would lead to conclude that the benefits of this
configuration are quite limited with respect N2
configuration also bearing in mind that at least six
launches are needed to complete the ADS-B N1
configuration (as the 33 satellites occupy all the 6
IRIDIUM planes).
Now, for the selected IRIDIUM configurations, some
additional considerations are provided to explore potential
risk of saturation of the space receiver. For our purposes, the
processing of ADS-B over high-density terrestrial area must
be possible with Instantaneous Aircraft number over 1000
aircraft (this value has been considered as the maximum
number of possible aircraft to be processed by one reception
channel).
With the average number of simultaneously available
satellites over the entire coverage interval for the set of
ADS-B configurations (Figure 6 shows the result for N2
case), and by considering the estimated the PIAC
1
value
(Peak Instantaneous Aircraft Count) over ECAC (European
Civil Aviation Conference) Area in 2025 (i.e. 8119, taken as
input from ANTARES Project), the risk of saturation of the
reception channel is identified.

Figure 6. Selected Average number of Satellites simultaneously available
over the coverage interval for IRIDIUM full constellation (Full coverage)
Additionally, by considering the possibility to have a
multi-beam antenna design (at the cost of processing in
parallel all received beams, i.e. one reception beam = one
ADS-B processing channel), as described in following
section, a substantial minimisation of the risk to overload
the reception channel is introduced when tracking more than
1000 aircraft in the same beam.
Accordingly, following table summarises the results
obtained by considering such a multi-beam antenna design
for ADS-B payload, in terms of PIAC vs. Number of
available satellites, for the three constellations in case of full
and medium coverage.
TABLE II. MINIMISATION OF THE SATURATION RISK WITH A FOUR
ELEMENT PHASED ARRAY ANTENNA (4 OR 8 BEAMS)
PIAC vs. Number of available satellites
with 4 or 8 beam Phased array antenna
IRIDIUM ADS-B configuration Full coverage
(4/8 beams)
Medium coverage
(4/8 beams)
Full IRIDIUM constellation 1015/508 1015/508
Half IRIDIUM constellation N1 2030/1015 2030/1015
Half IRIDIUM constellation N2 2030/1015 2030/1015
IV. ANTENNA DESIGN
The following antenna typologies have been analyzed in
full wave (3D EM CAD Model), with the aim to guarantee
the link between Iridium S/C and any Aircraft captured in the
conical field of view of the ADS-B antenna:
Single element, i.e. Quadrihelix;
7-element array antenna.
4-element array antenna;
Accordingly, the antenna patterns have been shaped, as
much as possible, in order to cover with the highest gain
possible the required mission conical field of view, without
overcoming the stringent requirement relative to the
maximum volume allowable on the IRIDIUM satellite as
shown in following Fig. 7.
1. PIAC estimation from ANTARES is available for four future
potential scenarios: Scenario A (High Air Traffic Growth), B and C
(Medium Growth), D (Low Growth). The PIAC value from Scenario A is
used for the analysis in order to assess a worst case for saturation.
Figure 7. Iridium S/C, ADS-B antenna max volume allowable
A. Quadrihelix antenna
Three Quadrihelix antennas configurations (A, B
and C) have been analyzed. The antennas have been
accurately designed in order to achieve a shaped pattern
(Fig. 8) with its maximum in side the medium coverage
angle range. However, in order to achieve a reasonable gain
for the mission, the antenna length is such that it violates the
maximum allowable height of 300 mm.
Figure 8. Antenna patterns relative to A, B, C quadrihelix antenna
configurations
B. 7-element array antenna
6 elements run over the periphery of a circular ground plane
with a diameter of 400mm while a 7
th
is located at the centre
of the ground plane. For this antenna configuration, the
crossed dipole antenna has resulted in being the best
performer.
Figure 9. 7-element array antenna Full Wave Analysis
However, this solution is quite demanding in terms of
mass, complexity and cost. A good compromise between
cost and benefit would be the 4-element option, as described
in the following sub-section.
Figure 10. Crossed-dipoles 7-element array pattern
C. 4-element array antenna
A 4-element array with a ground plane of 400 mm of
diameter has been designed with the aim to mitigate as
much as possible the following important criticalities:
mass;
overall array losses;
array complexity together with its beam forming
network;
use as much as possible of flown and proven
technology in order to reduce the development cost;
Based on the above analysis, the preferred baseline
configuration is the 4-element array with a circular ground
plane with a diameter of 400 mm that does not exceed the
stringent max allowable volume. The proposed antenna
configuration allows a very efficient and compact feeding
MAX Volume allowable:
400mm (L) x 700mm
(deep) x 300mm(H)
network with an expected overall loss less than 0.2 dB. In
addition, the antenna allows the use of a flown and proven
technology developed in the frame of previous domestic
Space programs (Sicral, S1B). A full wave analysis is
highlighted in the figure below with the antenna layout and
the antenna surface currents generated by a dedicated set of
elements excitations.
Figure 11. 4-element array antenna Full Wave Analysis
The achieved antenna pattern based on 4-element helix
array is here there after shown.
Figure 12. 4-element array pattern
As follows, a preliminary hypothesis of phased array has
been also addressed with the aim to provide a suitable
solution vs. the receiver saturation in case more than 1000
Aircraft are beating at the same time at the RX front end. In
order to make the solution as simple as possible, the same 4
el. Array developed to generate the required conical pattern
between 13 and 63 off Nadir has been used to characterize
the phased array.
The proposed phased array shall be considered
constituted in general by three main sections:
Radiative section;
Active section, in which the required MMIC LNA,
Phase shifters and attenuators will be included;
Power dividers in Alumina Substrate (Al
2
O
3
) / BFN.
The antenna dimensions without the active and beam
forming sections are:
Antenna diameter: 400 mm;
Antenna height: 100 mm, BFN and Active Section not
included.
Accordingly, two possible antenna configurations are
envisaged:
1. Config. 1: One single input port, with a single
steerable beam, activated via a dedicated Telemetry and
Telecommand section;
2. Config. 2: N input ports, with N possible steerable
beams sequentially activated by means of a dedicated
switching matrix.
The intercepted area due to the crossing beam is required
to evaluate the captured traffic aircraft capability vs. the
receiver front end channel saturation. Two possible scenarios
have been provided, respectively with 4 and 8 possible
beams.
For both configurations (Fig. 13 and 14), following
comments are applicable:
In order to highlight the performance in steering of the
proposed phased array, the crossing patterns area at -3, -
6 and at -9 dB are shown.
The reds circles in the graphs represent the off nadir
conical coverage limits, respectively at 13 and 63.
The legends below describe the peak levels and the
contour levels.
Figure 13. Phased array, configuration with 8 beams
Figure 14. Phased array, configuration with 4 beams
V. CONCLUSIONS
ADS-B payload feasibility analysis on board the
IRIDIUM next generation constellation has been assessed.
Potential scenarios have been simulated and accordingly a
preliminary payload design has been proposed. The overall
resulting performance shows promising solutions that could
be further investigated and refined both at mission and at
payload level.
REFERENCES
[1] RTCA DO 260B: Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) for 1090MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)).
[2] RTCA DO 242A: Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards
(MAPS) for Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B).
[3] Silvia Porfili, Thales Alenia Space Italia, ADS-B hosted payload
feasibility study for IRIDIUM NG Mission Analysis, ref. TASI-
BSNAVC-TN-ADS-B-016-10, 28-Jan-2011.
[4] Paolo Noschese. Thales Alenia Space Italia, Host payload for the
Iridium S/C Constellation, ADS-B Antenna Technical Note, ref.
TASI-BSNAVC-PRP-ADS-B-001-11, 17-Jan-2011.
[5] TN on Traffic Analysis, ANTARES ESA Project, ANTAR-B1-OS-
TNO-0033-TAI
Independent Surveillance Broadcast ADS-B
Receivers with DOA Estimation
C. Reck
#1
, M. S. Reuther
#
, A. Jasch

, and L.-P. Schmidt
#
#
Chair for High Frequency Technology, University of ErlangenNuremberg
Cauerstrae 9, 91058 Erlangen, Germany
1
christoph@lhft.eei.uni-erlangen.de
Institute of Flight Guidance, TU Braunschweig

Hermann-Blenk-Str. 27, 38108 Braunschweig, Germany
AbstractOn the one hand air trafc control (ATC) insti-
tutions consider to use ADS-B for its low cost and simplicity
of ground station hardware. Aircraft positions transmitted via
ADS-B are on the other hand in some cases error prone. In the
proposed approach, direction of arrival (DOA) estimation is used
to verify ADS-B airborne positions. The potential positioning
error of ADS-B is thereby evaluated by comparing DOA estimates
to DOA calculated from ADS-B references. To proof the accuracy
of the applied DOA estimation sensor, an additional measurement
campaign using a dedicated measurement aircraft has been
conducted.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-
B) is an amelioration to the Secondary Surveillance Radar
(SSR) in Mode S. Unlike the regular SSR system, which
broadcasts radio telegrams mainly on prior request by ground
stations, ADS-B uses spontaneous transponder broadcasts on
the Aloha-Protocol. Offering more information than just al-
titude and identication, ADS-B also transmits the carrying
aircrafts position as it is gathered by its onboard navigation
system.
Additionally, ground speed, heading and many other infor-
mation is provided. As the number of aircraft equipped with
ADS-B is rising (currently 65% of Mode S equipped aircraft
[1]), the system becomes increasingly attractive to feed air
trafc control displays.
According to eld studies [2], the most part of ADS-B
transponders are broadcasting reliable positioning information,
where positions root mean squared error (RMSE) is following
a Rayleigh distribution with a mean value of around 250 m.
This would on the one hand mean an acceptable error for
monitoring en route trafc. On the other hand, there are some
transponders that produce much larger errors. One possible
problem leading to those large errors is improper wiring of
the ADS-B transponder with the onboard navigation system.
This is one of the reasons why ADS-B is not considered
reliable enough for ATC. The situation changes if the ADS-B
ground station has the capability to cross-check the transmitted
position with an independent measurement. One possibility for
this would be a time difference of arrival based approach. The
drawback of this method is the need for a whole system of
geographically distributed ADS-B receivers.
The proposed verication method by a single direction of
Fig. 1. Verication of ADS-B position by a DOA sensor
arrival (DOA) estimation sensor like shown in Fig. 1 is more
attractive in this case skipping the need for linking with other
ground stations.
In our previous work [3] [4], subspace based DOA estima-
tion by multichannel receivers showed reliable estimates. In
this contribution, the possible interaction of such a DOA sen-
sor with an included ADS-B receiver is discussed. Therefore
results gathered by eld tests using ADS-B as well as by a
dedicated measurement aircraft are compared.
II. DIRECTION OF ARRIVAL ESTIMATION
The principle of DOA estimation can be visualized by
assuming a plane wave (fareld assumption) impinging on an
array of antennas like shown in Fig. 2. We restrict the antenna
array to a Uniform Linear Array (ULA) with half wavelength
spacing to avoid ambiguities. The signals received from the
four antennas show a characteristic phase offset between
neighboring channels according to the impinging angle.
Ideally, this phase offset is equal between all neighboring
channels. If the receiving channels provide complex signal
detection by application of IQ-mixers, the resulting phase
properties in between the channels can be used to estimate
the DOA of the impinging signal. The receivers include
A/D-conversion to allow digital signal processing and the
application of subspace based DOA estimation.
The performance of multiple subspace based DOA estimation
approaches in SSR scenarios has been investigated in our
previous work [4]. By application of calibration methods
based on Eigenstructure analysis [5] the performances of all
Fig. 2. Reception of a plain wave by a Uniform Linear Array (ULA) of
antennas
Fig. 3. DOA estimation sensor with planar antenna array
ESPRIT and MUSIC variants become very similar. It thus
is sufcient to evaluate the results gathered by NC Unitary
ESPRIT [6].
III. ANTENNA ARRAY AND RECEIVER
The antenna array used for the eld tests is a half
wavelength spaced 8 element planar ULA (see Fig. 3). Two
antennas on each side are terminated by 50 to homogenize
the single antenna characteristics. Those elements are needed
even in case of Eigenstructure based calibration because of
fringe effects due to the nite array length.
Each of the four remaining elements is connected to a de-
dicated analog receiver frontend. The resulting IF signals are
fed to a four channel, 50 MHz, 8Bit digitizer card. Signal
processing is carried out in the digital domain on a PC.
The whole system is water-cooled, integrated in a weather
resistant portable aluminium box and can be conveniently
controlled by wireless LAN.
IV. MEASUREMENTS
A. Scenario
In the following, two measurement campaigns are evaluated.
One was conducted on the roof of a six story university build-
ing, using ADS-B telegrams to compute a DOA reference.
A total of 26000 ADS-B airborne position telegrams were
recorded within 8 hours. Airborne positions decoded from
the ADS-B replies are plotted in Fig. 4(a), showing the angle
and distance distribution of the positions relative to the DOA
sensor. Due to the 8-Bit A/D-converter the dynamic of the
receiver is limited to around 48 dB. Still transponders at a
20
20
40
40
60
60
80
80
100
100
120
120
140
140
160
160
180
180
200 km
200 km 0
180
45
90
135
Nuremberg
LHFT Radar
Ingolstadt
Augsburg
Munich
Regensburg
Pilsen
Latitude
L
o
n
g
i
t
u
d
e
Reference pos.
Sensor pos.
Sensor normal
47.5 48 48.5 49 49.5 50 50.5 51
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
(a) ADS-B reference
10
10
20
20
30
30
40
40
50
50 km
45
90
135
Radar
Eltersh.
W urzburg
Latitude
L
o
n
g
i
t
u
d
e
Reference pos.
Sensor pos.
Sensor norm.
49 49.1 49.2 49.3 49.4 49.5 49.6 49.7 49.8
8.8
9
9.2
9.4
9.6
9.8
10
10.2
10.4
10.6
10.8
(b) Cessna F172 track
Fig. 4. Reference positions of the two measurement campaigns
distance of up to 200 km were received.
A small selected part of 33 telegrams (Airborne Position Code
TYPE 13) is singled out and applied to calibrate the
DOA sensor in the angular range from 45
to 135
based
on Eigenstructure analysis.
The second measurement campaign was carried out at Adolf
W urth Airport, Schw abisch Hall, Germany. To evaluate the
accuracy of the constructed DOA sensor, a dedicated reference
aircraft (see Fig. 5) is used. This measurement aircraft is
owned and operated by the Institute of Flight Guidance, TU
Braunschweig. It is equipped with a Novatel OEM IV receiver
and an iMAR iVRU-FC Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU).
In the rst step of post processing the recorded GPS data is
improved by differential corrections. In a following step the
GPS data and the data provided by the inertial measurement
unit are merged, taking the lever arms between GPS antenna
Fig. 5. Measurement aircraft (TU Braunschweig): Cessna F172 Skyhawk
TYPE
R
M
S
E
[
10 12 14 16 18
10
1
10
0
10
1
Fig. 6. DOA estimation RMSE versus TYPE-number
and IMU into account. The resulting reference track provides
an accuracy in the sub-meter range.
The gathered reference positions shown in Fig. 4(b) are not
ideally distributed over the angular range and the covered
distance is smaller than with the ADS-B campaign. The ight
track consists mainly of several aerodrome circlings aroundthe
airport and then part of the aircraft track back to Braunschweig
until connection is lost. The comparably small range is due to
the low transponder power (70 W).
Nevertheless, 1170 Mode S telegrams were recorded and
related to the aircraft position based on its time stamps. Again
33 telegrams were used for Eigenstructure calibration in the
angular range from 45
to 135
.
B. Results
The database of recorded ADS-B airborne position tele-
grams were transmitted by a large mixture of different
transponders. Not all of those transponders provide reliable
positioning information. The standard for ADS-B [7] denes
a number of reliability classes encoded in the airborne position
TYPE code. With each of those classes a dedicated contain-
ment radius around the transmitted position is dened in which
the real position needs to be located with a percentage of 95%.
The database of recorded ADS-B telegrams contains
TYPE [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18]. The database is now
sorted for TYPE-numbers and the RMSE of the differences
between reference angles and DOA estimates is plotted versus
the according TYPE in Fig. 6. The RMSE remains about
equal and below 1
with all TYPE-numbers save TYPE

[17, 18], where the RMSE ascends to more than 3
. As a
correlation of low accuracy class and DOA RMSE is evident,
those telegrams should not be trusted.
Distance [km]
R
M
S
E
[
All TYPE
Only TYPE 13
50 100 150
10
1
10
0
10
1
Fig. 7. DOA estimation RMSE versus distance with and without TYPE-
number ltering
DOA [
]
E
r
r
o
r
[
|Error|
RMSE
10 45 90 135 170
10
1
10
0
10
1
(a) Error vs. DOA
Error [
]
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
-10 -5 0 5 10
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
(b) Histogram
Fig. 8. DOA difference of ADS-B reference and DOA estimation sensor
As DOA error according to horizontal positioning error de-
creases with increasing distance, the resulting RMSE should
decrease over distance too. Thus, the database is sorted for
distance by bins of 30 km and the resulting RMSE of each
bin is plotted versus the according distance in Fig. 7. As an-
ticipated a clear decrease of RMSEis observed with increasing
distance when the whole database is regarded. If all telegrams
with TYPE > 13 (a total of 16000 telegrams remain) are
excluded, the decrease in RMSE with increasing distance is
much lower. At a distance of 135 km both curves meet, at an
RMSE of 0.63
.
Using this selected database with TYPE > 13, an error
plot versus impinging angle can be computed like shown in
Fig. 8(a). By restricting the angular range by 45
to 135
, the
histogram shown in Fig. 8(b) visualizes the according error
distribution. The RMSE in this angular range computes to
0.9
. The results gathered by using the measurement aircraft

are shown in Fig. 9. Regarding the RMSE values versus DOA
a slightly smaller error is observed. Computing the RMSE
from 45
to 135
produces a value of 0.66
by evaluating
616 reference positions in this range.
V. CONCLUSION
To show the potential of ADS-B receivers with DOA esti-
mation function, two measurement campaigns were conducted.
By evaluating a large number of ADS-B airborne positions
and comparing the resulting reference DOAs with estimated
DOAs, a clear correlation between accuracy class and DOA
error was found. Depending on the aircraft distance, a cross
check between DOA estimate and ADS-B position can thus
DOA [
]
E
r
r
o
r
[
|Error|
RMSE
10 45 90 135 170
10
1
10
0
10
1
(a) Error vs. DOA
Error [
]
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
-10 -5 0 5 10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
(b) Histogram
Fig. 9. DOA difference of differential GPS reference and DOA estimation
sensor
gather valuable information regarding ADS-B reliability.
By a dedicated reference aircraft the potential of the con-
structed DOA sensor to resolve DOA down to a RMSE of
0.66
has been proven.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank A. Pawlitzki of Thales ATM
and the ATC crew of Airport Schw abisch Hall for supporting
our measurement campaign. This work has been funded by
iAd GmbH and Federal Ministry of Education and Research,
Germany.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Rekkas and M. Rees, Towards adsb implementation in europe, in
ESAV 08, 2008.
[2] V. Cedrini, C. Zacchei, and V. Zampognaro, Ads-b 1090es implementa-
tion: the cristal-med project, in ESAV 08, 2008.
[3] C. Reck, U. Berold, and L.-P. Schmidt, High Precision DOA Estimation
of SSR Transponder Signals, in IEEE International Conference on
Wireless Technology and Systems, 2010.
[4] , Robust doa estimation of ssr signals for aircraft positioning, in
IEEE Radio Wireless Week, 2011.
[5] C. Reck, U. Berold, J. Schuer, and L.-P. Schmidt, Direction of Arrival
Sensor Calibration based on ADSB Airborne Position Telegrams, in
European Radar Conference, 2009.
[6] M. Haardt and F. Roemer, Enhancements of Unitary Esprit for Non-
Circular Sources, in IEEEInternational Conference on Acoustics, Speech
and Signal Processing, 2004.
[7] DO-260A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz
Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-
B) and Trafc Information Services - Broadcast (TIS-B), RTCA, Inc.,
Tech. Rep., 2003.
LIST OF AUTHORS
A
AbbudJorge
AmeduriSalvatore
AnderssonViktor
AnderssonBrje
AnniballiEnrico
ArbucklePaulDouglas
UniversidadPolitcnicadeMadrid,Spain
CIRA,Italy
SAABElectronicDefenceSystems,Sweden
SwedishDefenceResearchAgency,Sweden
SESMs.c.a.r.l.,Italy
USFederalAviationAdministration,USA
173
111
89, 101
89, 101
95
41
BalbastreTejedorV.Juan
BarbarescoFrdric
BarsheshatAbraham
BaudOlivier
BenvenutiDario
BerizziFabrizio
BernabMarcello
BernardosM.Ana
BesadaA.Juan
BonamenteMarco
BosserLuc
BredemeyerJochen
UniversidadPolitcnicadeValencia,Spain
THALESAirSystems,France
SENSISCorporation,USA
THALES,France
ELETTRONICA,Italy
UniversityofPisa,Italy
SELEXGalileoS.p.A.,Italy
GPDS,UniversidadPolitcnicadeMadrid,Spain
D'AppoloniaS.p.A.,Italy
THALESSystmesAroports,France
FCSFlightCalibrationServiceGmbH,Germany
167, 185, 259
27
197
265
89, 107
73, 129
73
247
173, 247
111
89, 101
141
CapriaAmerigo CNIT,Italy 129

CardinaliRoberta SESMs.c.a.r.l.,Italy 95
CarrozzaGabriella SESMs.c.a.r.l.,Italy 9
CasarR.Jos
ChoAm
ContiMichele
CuccoliFabrizio
KoreaAerospaceResearchInstit.,RepublicofKorea
CNIT,Italy
247
253
129
73

D

DalleMeseEnzo
delosReyesDavElas
deMiguelGonzalo
DiGirolamoSergio
DinoiLibero
DonisiDomenico
DucaGabriella
THALESAleniaSpaceItaly
ELETTRONICA,Italy
D'AppoloniaS.p.A.,Italy
SICTA,Italy
129
167, 185, 259
173, 247
213
231
111
2
Essen Helmut FraunhoferFHR,Germany 61, 65
G

GalatiGaspare TorVergataUniversity,Italy 147, 153, 167, 185
GarzelliAndrea
GmezPrezJ.Emilio
GrandinJeanFranois
GuerrieroMarco
UniversityofSiena,Italy
Univers.PolitcnicadeValencia,Spain
THALESSystmesAroports,France
ELETTRONICA,Italy
73
259
89, 101
231
HaddonDavid
HansonJames
HantscherSebastian
HeidgerRalf
HelmStefanie
HessMatthias
HonorNicolas
HultmanPeter
EASA,Germany
Helios,UnitedKingdom
FraunhoferFHR,Germany
DFSDeutscheFlugsicherungGmbH,Germany
GermanAerospaceCenter(DLR),Germany
DeutscheFlugsicherungGmbH(DFS),Germany
THALES,France
47
191
65
141, 203
271
141, 241
265
89
JaschAlexander
JohanssonAnders
JugePhilippe
TUBraunschweig,Germany
SwedishDefenceResearchAgency,Sweden
219
89, 101
27

K

KakubariYasuyuki
KangYoungshin
KleinMathieu
KochWolfgang
KogaTadashi
KrasnovA.Oleg
KulpaS.Krzysztof
ElectronicNavigationResearchInstitute,Japan
KoreaAerospaceResearchInstitute,Rep.Korea
FraunhoferFKIE,Germany
DelftUniversityofTechnology,TheNetherlands
WarsawUniversityofTechnology,Poland
237
253
27
61, 65
237
69
119
LangStefan
LawrenceE.Peter
LeeIlhyung
LeonardiMauro
LorenzP.Frank
LuedtkeG.
LupidiAlberto
LyulSongTaek
THALES,France
AdvancedInst.ofScienceandTech.,Korea
TorVergataUniversity,Italy
HanyangUniversity,RepublicofKorea
61
265
253
147, 153, 167, 185
65
65
73
133
MalanowskiMateusz
MantillaGaviriaA.Ivan
MartorellaMarco
MathiasAdolf
MerinoPedro
MisiurewiczJacek
MiyazakiHiromi
MoneuseJeanFranois
MoscardiniChristian
MuickiDarko
INDRASistemasS.A.,Spain
HanyangUniversity,RepublicofKorea
119
167, 185, 259
129
203, 241
13
119
237
27
73
133
NeufeldtHolger
NiheiShirou
NoschesePaolo
THALESAirSystemsGmbH,Germany
207
237
213

P

PanciGianpiero
ParkBumjin
ParkinsonAdam
PawlitzkiAlexander
PelantMartin
PetriDario
PetrochilosNicolas
PiracciEmilioG.
PlekRadek
PorfiliSilvia
PourvoyeurKlaus
ELETTRONICA,Italy
KoreaAerospaceResearchInstitute,Rep.Korea
THALESAirSystemsGmbH,Germany
ERABeyondRadar,CzechRepublic
CNIT,Italy
UniversityofReimsFrance
231
253
159
207
179
129
147
147
123
213
203
Q
QuarantaVincenzo
CIRA,Italy
111
R

ReckChristoph
RekkasChristos
ReutherS.Max
RicciYves
RuizMojicaF.Ruy
UniversityofErlangenNuremberg,Germany
EUROCONTROLBelgium
219
35
219
27
259
S

SainiLuca
SamantaSoumem
SamczyskiPiotr
SchikoraMarek
SchmidtLorenzP.
SchneiderJeanYves
SchrderMartin
ShimSangwook
SmolarczykMaciej
SommerRainer
SotoAndrs
SouamiHakim
SpinelliSilvio
StanleyBen
StejskalVojtch
StraubStephen
THALES, Italy
NationalInstituteofTechnology,India
AdvancedInst.ofScienceandTech.,Korea
TelecommunicationsResearchInstitute,Poland
265
147
119
65
219
27
61, 65
253
119
61
13
153
191
123, 179
9
T

TatarinovN.Victor
TatarinovV.Sergey
TavernisePierpaolo
TengstrandGran
ThomasPaul
TigrekR.Firat
TomaselloFilippo
TomskUniv.ofControlSyst.andRad.Russian
TomskUniv.ofControlSyst.andRad.Russian
THALESAleniaSpace, Italy
BristowHelicopters,UnitedKingdom
EASA,Italy
79, 83
79, 83
19
89, 101
53
69
47
U
UedaEisuke ElectronicNavigationResearchInstitute,Japan 237
V
VaccaroClaudio SICTA,Italy 2
ValleJorge
vanGenderenPiet
VassilevBoris
VassilevaBoriana
VertuaCarlo
VojekMartin
TechnicalUniversityofSofia,Bulgaria
Inst.forInformationandCom.Tech,Bulgaria
THALES, Italy
13
69, 79, 83
225
225
265
123
W
WangZongbo
WarokPaul
WildKlaus
69
61, 65
61, 65
Y
YooChangsun KoreaAerospaceResearchInstitute,Rep.Korea 253
Z
ZimmermannRuediger FraunhoferFHR,Germany 61, 65

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Proceedings of the

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