Gilbert, Alan (2008) 'Bus Rapid Transit

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Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenio a Miracle Cure?

Alan Gilberta a Department of Geography, University College London, London, UK
To cite this Article Gilbert, Alan(2008) 'Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenio a Miracle Cure?', Transport Reviews, 28: 4, 439
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Transport Reviews, Vol. 28, No. 4, 439467, July 2008
Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenio a Miracle Cure?
ALAN GILBERT
Department of Geography, University College London, London, UK
Taylor and Francis TTRV_A_278602.sgm
(Received 6 March 2007; revised 24 September 2007; accepted 2 November 2007)

agilbert@geog.ucl.ac.uk 0144-1647 Original Taylor 2007 0 00 Prof. 000002007 AlanGilbert &Article Francis (print)/1464-5327 (online) Transport 10.1080/01441640701785733 Reviews
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ABSTRACT Successful mass transit solutions are rare in poor cities. When they appear they are lauded across the globe and too often copied uncritically. The latest exemplar of such best practice is the Transmilenio rapid bus system in Bogot. The article describes its main characteristics and applauds the improvements that it has already brought to urban transport in Bogot. Naturally, the system is not without its flaws and these need to be drawn to the attention of those who might copy the Bogot example. This is particularly important at the present time when the jewel of Bogot has come under surprisingly strong local criticism over its cost, its ownership structure, its decreasing effectiveness and, fundamentally, because it has failed to solve the transport chaos of Bogot. There is a real danger that Transmilenio will stagnate as its popularity declines and as demands for a metro increase. Given the strengths of the system that would be something of a disaster and, most certainly, not in the interests of the poor.
Introduction Transport is a critical element in determining the quality of peoples lives, plays a significant role in urban politics and influences both the pace of economic growth and the distribution of the benefits from that growth. In poor cities, a key mode of transport is the humble bus, both because car ownership rates are low and because few poor cities have metro systems.1 Unfortunately, few public bus companies in poor cities have ever operated very well and their mismanagement leads to inefficiency, service unreliability, crossed vehicles, passenger discomfort and underused equipment (Vasconcellos, 2001, p. 130). Private bus provision, especially when it is poorly regulated, does little better, as evidence from Delhi, India (Tiwari, 2002; Pucher et al., 2005) and Santiago, Chile, reveals (Figueroa, 1990, 1996; Estache and Gmez-Lobo, 2005). These failings mean that bus ridership is often in relative decline, with more and more people either resorting to private transportation or using their feet (Wright and Fulton, 2005, p. 697). In the absence of good public transport, and with per capita incomes rising, more people are opting to travel in their own vehicles. However, as experience in
Correspondence Address: Alan Gilbert, Department of Geography, University College London, Pearson Building, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK. Email: agilbert@geog.ucl.ac.uk
0144-1647 print/1464-5327 online/08/040439-29 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/01441640701785733
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most developed countries shows the private car offers little in the way of longterm answers. Rather, as Kennedy et al. (2005, p. 394) argues, more cars on the roads produce increasingly dysfunctional cities, involving ever-increasing congestion, loss of quality of life, and, most likely as a result, decreasing economic productivity and competitiveness. Rising car ownership has produced similar problems in Latin America: during rush hour, every traveller by car causes eleven times more congestion than a bus passenger (Bull, 2003, p. 13).2 The solution in virtually every city across the world is often thought to be a modern metro. Unfortunately, the cost of construction is almost always beyond the means of any city in low- and middle-income countries, something that the metros political supporters all too frequently deny. In any case, metro lines cover only a limited geographical area, a particularly problematic issue in cities which spread outwards in most directions. Metros are best suited to compact or linear cities where passenger flows are directed along particular corridors (e.g. Caracas or Medelln) and even there only a minority of the population can use the system. If neither private car ownership nor the metro is a viable option, the most obvious answer is an improved and more efficient bus system. Currently, one of the favoured systems is bus rapid transit (BRT) or dedicated busways. Such systems can accommodate substantial passenger flows and are also relatively cheap to build (Wright, n.d.).3 According to the World Bank (2002, p. xiv) exclusive busways in developing countries have proved to be capable, except in very high traffic volume corridors, of performance nearly equivalent to rail-based systems but at much lower cost. The pioneer BRT system commenced in Curitiba in 1963, although dedicated bus lanes were not operating until 1974 (Rabinovitch and Leitman, 1996; Ardila-Gmez, 2004; Friberg, n.d.; Wright, n.d.). This much praised system has since been copied, to one degree or another, in a number of Latin American cities, including Quito, Porto Alegre and So Paulo, and was clearly the inspiration behind the new Transmilenio bus system in Bogot (Gmez, 2004). Like the system in Curitiba, Transmilenio is a good example of what Estache and Gmez-Lobo (2005, p. 139) call a hybrid model: one in which the public and private sectors share responsibilities for the delivery of the service. They suggest that this model avoids the chaos often unleashed by market competition with only limited state regulation. It also reduces the incompetence manifest by so many public bus companies. So successful are busways, it seems, that they are now sweeping across the world (Diaz and Schneck, 2000; World Bank, 2002; Vasconcellos, 2005; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Wikipedia, 2007; Wright, n.d.). The Latin American busway . has inspired the imaginations of transport planners world-wide and is quickly becoming an option of choice. From North America to Europe to Oceania, the busway will most likely be coming to a neighbourhood near you very soon. (Wright, 2001, p. 21) The aim of this article is to provide a partial evaluation of Transmilenios first six years of operation. This is important insofar as so many imitative systems are being based on that citys experience, prompted in part because the team that developed the system has been touring the world offering their advice. While independent studies of Transmilenios operation exist, they are relatively few in number and most are either limited in their coverage or are based on only a
Bus Rapid Transit 441 couple of years of operation (Montezuma, 2003, 2005; Ardila-Gmez, 2004, 2005; Echeverry et al., 2005; UN-CID, 2005; Hidalgo et al., 2007). And, although I am a great admirer of the new system, the Bogot experience has not been without its problems. Indeed, recently it has come under a great deal of local criticism, and in the last year there have been frequent reports that the number of passengers using the system has fallen because some of its former passengers have switched back to old-style buses (see below). Rising criticism has also been levelled at the system because fares have increased, relative both to wages and to the cost of travelling on other kinds of buses, and because certain aspects of the third-phase expansion have proved controversial.4 This criticism was a significant issue in the selection campaign for mayor.5 As such, it seems an appropriate moment to consider both the virtues and the problems that face Transmilenio. First, who uses the system and how does it impact the general interests of poor people? The social impact of Transmilenio needs to be studied because public transport is critical to the welfare of the urban poor and a crucial element in any poverty-oriented city development strategy (World Bank, 2002, p. 106). Does Transmilenio satisfy Vasconcellos (2001, p. 300) criterion of a satisfactory alternative transport strategy, which aims at equity as the prime objective, provided a minimum efficiency, socially accorded, is ensured? Second, does the system provide a flexible framework within which the less poor as well as the very poor can use public transport with confidence and comfort (World Bank, 2002, p. xiv). This question is significant because unless the better off can be lured away from their cars, automobile dependency will grow and the private car will block the roads of Bogot in the same way as it does in so many other cities across the globe (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999; Gorham, 2002; Whitelegg and Haq, 2003; Shoup, 2005). Third, does Bogots experience support the argument of World Bank (2002, p. xiv) that giving priority to public transport in the use of road space makes public transport faster and more financially viable? Have travel times improved and has the system proved as financially viable as its defenders claim? Finally, and most importantly, what does Transmilenio reveal about the need for complementary transport policies? What other measures are required to ensure that the BRT systems function properly? How robust is the operation of busways to external pressures: political, economic and social? In short, to what extent is the operation of even the best designed BRT system in danger of being undermined by the external environment and the citys population losing the benefits generated by its investment? This article is based on information collected as part of a research project on urban governance in Bogot.6 The project is centrally concerned with the extent to which better urban governance has brought benefits to the poor of the city (Gilbert, 2006). Since Transmilenio is regarded as one of the showpiece achievements of the improved government performance in that city since 1993, examination of the new bus system formed an important ingredient in the research project. The data used in this article come from a range of sources. Transmilenio SA (the public controller and regulator of the system) provided data on passenger numbers and their social composition, fare levels and the financial position of the company. Different members of staff explained how the system functioned and the various problems that the company faced. The annual surveys of Bogot Como Vamos (including some data purchased specially by the author) provided information on how the public viewed the effectiveness of the Transmilenio system and how its image has
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changed over time.7 These surveys also provided data on perceptions of the system by social class. Numerous interviews with planners, operators and politicians in the city in 2005 and 2007 provided further insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the system. Because of the sensitivity of the local population to transport issues, articles on Transmilenio appear in the press virtually every day. As such, the many articles, editorials and invited columns provided a vital source of information.8 Finally, because Transmilenio and the traffic problems of the city featured prominently in the mayoral campaign of 2007, the author was able to attend several of the debates between the candidates who were concerned with this issue.9 Any evaluation of a complicated public transport system is bound to be partial and this is particularly true for a system like Transmilenio that is still at an early stage of development. Since only 84 km of what is eventually intended to be a system of 387 km were actually in operation September 2007, this article can only be regarded as a preliminary assessment of the systems effectiveness. What it attempts to measure is the impact that such a partial system has already had on transport in the city, whether any faults that have developed are the responsibility of the designers or operators of Transmilenio, and to what extent any difficulties are a consequence of the general political and urban environment in which the system is forced to operate.
The Transmilenio System Transmilenio began operations on 18 December 2000. Its key features are as follows:
The system is being built in stages (Figures 1 and 2) and will eventually cover 80% of urban transport needs of the city (Gmez, 2004, p. 48). Red articulated buses operate along reserved corridors, with two exclusive lanes each way on most of the routes; a feeder system takes passengers to the main stations. Each articulated bus can carry 160 passengers, 112 standing and the rest sitting. At the end of September 2007, 1029 articulated buses were operating on the 84 km of corridor routes. The red buses belong to seven modern, private companies which have contracts with the city; the green feeder buses to another eleven companies Each corridor is built along the citys major roads and construction of the bus stations, garages, bridges and other infrastructure is financed from public funds. Passengers board the buses at special stations many of which can be reached by pedestrian bridges to avoid accidents and to speed up loading. Passengers purchase travel cards before boarding. A fixed fare is charged whatever the length of the journey. Use of the feeder bus system is free, passengers being charged only when they board the articulated buses. Some buses stop at every station, while others are express services. The fares are collected by a separate private company. The system is run by a special agency of the city, called Transmilenio SA, which operated originally on a commission of 3% of the fares collected, a percentage that has risen over time and in 2006 amounted to 6.95% of the total fares.10 Transmilenio SA monitors and controls the system through a satellite tracking system and communicates with the drivers through a wireless telecommunications system.
Bus Rapid Transit 443 Table 1. The construction plan for Transmilenio
Phase I II III IV V VI VII VIII Total Source: Gmez (2004, p. 48) Corridors 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 1 25 Length (km) 42.4 42 61.3 51.3 45.6 40.9 39.6 63.5 386.6 Programme 19992002 20032004 20052009 20122015 20162019 20202023 20242027 20282031
There is no operating subsidy. The buses have to be replaced on a regular basis, approximately every ten years, although this can be extended to fifteen years if the buses have not completed an agreed mileage. The drivers are salaried employees of the bus companies.
In 2005, 19% of people questioned by Bogot Como Vamos said that their principal means of transportation was Transmilenio, in 2006 18%, and in 2007 14%. On an average working day during 2007, the system was carrying 1.3 million passengers.11 The current routes are shown in Figure 1 and the timetable for network expansion is shown in Table 1 and Figure 2.
Figure 1a. The Transmilenio network in August 2007.
How well has Transmilenio Functioned? Transmilenio has received many accolades. An Italian transport specialist has declared it to be the worlds most important urban transport project (McCormick, 2005). It was awarded the Stockholm Partnership Prize in 2002, and transport authorities from 37 different countries visited it during its first five years of operation. Ex-Mayor Pealosa and different members of his team travel the world to extol its virtues and to explain its basic functioning to other governments (Gmez, 2004, p. 77). The system has been so effective that every subsequent mayor has agreed to continue investing in the project. It has also become one of the favourite transport projects of the World Bank (Perea, 2001; World Bank, 2004), which is now helping to finance clones in several other Colombian cities: Cali, Cartagena, Medelln and Pereira (Jaramillo, 2004). Transmilenio-type projects have been set up in Beijing, Guayaquil, Len, Lima, Mexico City and Santiago (Hidalgo et al., 2007) and are being planned in a series of others.12 Colombia has also been selling articulated buses to other cities in Latin America (Dinero, 14/9/2001). Transmilenios impact on the city can only be properly understood when its operations are compared with the many failings of the traditional bus system. The bus has been the bogotanos prime mode of transport since the ending of the tram service in 1948. Most of the buses have been operated by private companies, although a state company did operate some bus and trolley services until 1991.13 The key feature of the traditional system is that the companies have never owned
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Figure 1.
The Transmilenio network in August 2007.
many of the buses operating on their routes; most of the buses belong to large numbers of small operators and individual drivers. The bus companys income depends on the number of buses affiliated to it, which can be maximized through obtaining a licence to operate the most profitable routes. The critical importance of the route licence has led to widespread suspicion of corruption and influence in the allocation of licences (Bonilla, 1997, p. 16; Ardila-Gmez, 2004; Gmez, 2004, p. 13). Too many buses operate in the city, most of which run through the city centre. This leads to congestion along the main roads, and too few buses operate along the more peripheral and less profitable routes. Having obtained its routes, the bus company finds operators to work for them. The owner pays a monthly fee to the company and is then free to maximize revenue from the route. The drivers are paid according to the number of passengers they carry which leads to competition between drivers to pick up passengers the so-called war of the centavo. The competition for passengers encourages a culture of dangerous driving, stopping to pick up passengers with little or no regard for bus stops or other road users, and long working hours, as drivers try to maximize their income. It also leads to poor bus maintenance because the operators tend to run their buses most of the day. Few experts have ever been heard to praise the bus system. A study of the UN-CID (1969, p. 106) described the route allocation system as absurd and Llewelyn Davies Associates (1974, p. 123) criticized the way that all but one of the citys 240 routes passed through the city centre. The study also noted that drivers were working 15-hour days, were employing unsafe driving practices and regretted that there were no bus stops. In 1987, the citys own development plan declared the bus system to be slow, uncomfortable, of poor quality, scarce in the poor barrios and with too many long routes that nearly all pass through the centre of the city (Alcalda/CCB, 1987). Andrade (1993) suggested that the ordinary citizen has been made into an everyday victim of a technological, management and labour model, which shows that the state cannot plan. The anarchic competition between thousands of small owners, each one with a few
Bus Rapid Transit 445 buses affiliated to a number of companies, is reflected in the 450 different routes of which 268 cross the city centre and almost none serve the poorer districts after 9.00 pm. Gmez (2004, p. 39) accused the model of being inherently exploitative: the owners of the companies exploit the bus owners, the latter exploit the drivers and the conductors exploit and maltreat the passengers.14 And, an editorial in the countrys most influential newspaper bemoaned the chaotic public transport system of the city, a headache for mayors and passengers for decades (El Tiempo, 30/11/2003). Ordinary people have long suffered from the way the system has been organized, a major problem if the JICA Study of 1996 was correct in claiming that 72% of the citys people spent more than ten years of their lives on a bus or colectivo (Semana, 14/12/1998).15 Today, the authorities claim that bogotanos spend 15% of their time getting from one side of the city to the other compared with 7% in a typical city in the world (STT webpage, 2006). For years, the basic defects of the system were never rectified because official control over bus routes gave the authorities a certain political leverage and, for some officials, seemingly a source of illicit income. In any event it was difficult to change the system because the bus operators have always wielded so much economic and political power. Today, the transport lobby employs 25 000 people in the city and generates US$2.9 million a day in fares alone (Semana, 16/9/2006). This economic clout was long ago translated into political influence: the transporters regularly finance campaigns of all political colours, which gives them control over politicians who work in their favour on any matter (Flores, 2006b). The bus companies also have the power to call a strike and block the main roads of the city, something that they have done quite frequently. Despite regular changes in its structure and leadership, the government agency in charge of managing transport in Bogot has often been accused of being either corrupt or incompetent.16 Despite this catalogue of problems, Former-Mayor Mockus was correct when he once commented that public transport in Bogot is a chaos that works.17 The bus network extends virtually everywhere and along the main routes it is rarely necessary to wait long for a bus. The results of a Gallup poll in 1998 showed that even if the 69% of bogotanos who used public transport every day disliked the delays, the insecurity, the inconvenience, the poor state of the vehicles and the unpleasantness of the drivers, they appreciated the diversity of routes and a reasonable fare (El Espectador, 23/8/1998). Arguably, Bogots transport system matched the city perfectly. Its fleet of poorly maintained buses, driven by lowly paid, semi-formal drivers was a mirror image of the citys lack of effective planning, its poverty and inequality, and the general neglect of most peoples quality of life (Beccassino, 2000, p. 19). It was organized both formally and informally and, like most aspects of life in the city, was in essence a politically mediated, market-led solution. Insofar as the government intervened, its efforts were usually ineffective, politically suspect and, sometimes, clearly corrupt. Change was badly needed. Transmilenio: The Jewel of Bogot The Transmilenio system was intended to transform public bus transport in the city and was Ex-Mayor Pealosas eventual answer to the persistent demand for a
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metro in the nations capital. Even though the countrys president wanted to build a metro in Bogot, and had agreed the funds for that purpose, the cost of construction had already led a Japanese transport study to suggest that it was a poor solution for the city (Gmez, 2004, p. 105). There is an interesting debate about whether Ex-Mayor Pealosa ever planned to build a dedicated bus system rather than a metro (see Ardila-Gmez, 2004). He frequently quotes a newspaper article that he wrote in 1985 to show that he had always believed in buses and that he knew that the country could not afford to build a metro in Bogot (Pealosa, 1985).18 He argues that in 1998 he had no alternative but to go along with that idea, given that both the Council and President Samper were convinced of the merits of a metro.19 Only when President Pastrana took office and realized that there were insufficient resources to build it, did the Mayor announce that Bogot would build Transmilenio rather than a metro (Bermdez and Carvajal, 2000; Gmez, 2004, p. 85).20 And, despite the reluctance of national officials, the agreement made between the city and Bogot to build a metro was modified only few days before Transmilenio began operations.21 Whether or not Enrique Pealosa ever intended to build a metro is now irrelevant. It is clear that a metro is far too expensive whereas the dedicated bus-lane system is able to improve public transport years before a metro could have been completely operational. The Transmilenio network will also eventually cover most of the city, something that would have been impossible with a metro. Unlike Medelln or Caracas, which are located in deep valleys and where one or two lines can serve a much larger proportion of the population, Bogot, like Mexico City or Santiago, spreads out.22 If a metro were ever to be built in Bogot, it would require a lot of lines to cover most parts of the city. The concept of Transmilenio is not original and Enrique Pealosa accepts that the true antecedent is the system in Curitiba (Gmez, 2004, p. 100). The idea is not wholly new even in Bogot, and certain elements of the new system were tried out in the 1980s, for example, the idea of dedicated bus lanes. What is clear is that Transmilenio is a vastly more ambitious scheme than anything previously tried in Bogot, or indeed in most cities of the world. Pealosas great achievement is to have built the system in three years, effectively from scratch. It ended the war of the centavo along the main corridors and along much of the feeder network, set up a new transport company structure and introduced a modern fleet of articulated buses with salaried drivers. In a city where transport plans are seldom implemented properly and where even small improvements normally take years, this was a hugely impressive achievement. At first, all but the owners and drivers of the traditional bus system seemed to approve of the new system. In the Bogot Como Vamos survey of 2001, Transmilenio received an approval rating of 4.64 (out of 5), and most people said it was saving them time. Ex-Mayor Mockus argues that Transmilenio contributed greatly to the general publics improved feeling about the city (Gilbert and Dvila, 2002; Gilbert, 2006), and Gmez (2004, p. 107) argues that Transmilenio has encouraged bogotanos to behave more considerately to one another, make them feel safer and lead them to believe that things can be transformed (Gmez, 2004, p. 107). The World Bank strongly approves of the project, and one official commented that it fulfils many of the priorities of the Bank: increasing the dignity of transport, efficiency in its routing and investment, high impact on the poor and linking the public and private sectors (Perea, 2001).
Bus Rapid Transit 447 Transmilenio has speeded up journeys along the main corridors, along Avenida Caracas, from 18 kph before Transmilenio was built to 27 kph today (Hidalgo, 2001; Ardila-Gmez, 2004; Gmez, 2005). It has cut air pollution along the troncales by as much as 40% (Echeverry et al., 2005; Dinero, 12/5/2006), although the buses still contaminate the air because of the poor quality of the diesel fuel they are forced to use. Safety along the main corridors has improved greatly: after two years, traffic collisions and pedestrian accidents decreased by 94 percent, injuries to passengers by 76 percent, and fatalities by 94 per cent (Echeverry et al., 2005, p. 171). Disabled people are also able to use Transmilenio, something that is not possible on the ordinary buses because of the difficulty of boarding the latter (Gmez, 2004, p. 116). And, the general environment along the troncales has generally improved.23 The cost of construction was considerable (see below) but compared with building a metro it was quite cheap. Critically, too, Transmilenio was built more or less to budget, and any cost overrun was tiny compared to the scandalous overexpenditure associated with the building of the Medelln metro or indeed most underground railway systems (Jaramillo, 1995; Figueroa, 1996; Rodrguez, 1998; Quevedo and Llorente, 2001; Gmez, 2004, p. 105). Mistakes were made but that is normal in any major public works project. Despite the criticisms that followed, Transmilenio is a system that works rather well.24 Criticisms of Transmilenio Although Transmilenio has been a general success, there has been mounting local criticism of how the system operates. Some of this criticism concerns teething problems, some the difficulties caused by the gradual introduction of the system and some to structural features of the system. The volume of local criticism rose when Phase II began in 2004 and become much louder as the campaign for mayor got underway during 2007 (Sarmiento, 2007). Apart from criticism of the traffic congestion caused by construction of the system (Semana, 11/10/1999, 1/12/2003), the first major complaint concerned the decay of the road surface along the bus corridors. The main arteries were paved with a kind of cement tile which, after a couple of years, began to deteriorate along Avenida Caracas, El Eje Ambiental and Autopista del Norte.25 This damage delayed the buses and cost a great deal to rectify. Criticism of the design has been directed at IDU (which managed the contract), at the Mexican company that provided the cement and at Ex-Mayor Pealosa; although there is now some recognition that local engineers knew that there might be problems with the liquid infill being used as foundation (Ardila-Gmez, 2004; Daz, 2004; Semana, 29/6/2004; El Tiempo, 19/1/2005). The problem of the tiles caused a great deal of embarrassment but in no sense can it be seen as a criticism of the structure of the system. Future corridors will simply not be built in the same way. More recently, criticism has been directed at the deteriorating condition of the bus stations (Crdenas, 2006), a problem that has been partially addressed by making the operators responsible in future for maintaining the stations for five years. A second set of complaints was prompted by the overcrowding and delays to the buses that began to develop in 2004. Passengers using the main corridor, Avenida Caracas, began to protest that the buses were turning into sardine cans. On 9 March 2004 the users of Transmilenio spontaneously walked out of the stations and sat on the busways to protest against a decrease in the level of service
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(Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 370). During peak times, some passengers had to queue to enter the stations and wait 15 minutes, rather than the normal 3 minutes, before boarding a bus. Black humour labelled the system TransmillenoTransmi-Full, and a poll in 2006 revealed that 91% of bogotanos thought that Transmilenio had capacity problems (Espejo, 2006). In May 2006, a demonstration protested against the infrequency of buses on some routes (El Tiempo, 9/5/2006, 11/5/2006, 14/5/ 2006).26 More recent surveys record lower levels of dissatisfaction, responding to the larger numbers of buses that have been operating. Nevertheless, 89% of those consulted in 2007 thought that the main weakness of Transmilenio was overcrowding (BCV, 2007, p. 37).27 Third, one of the perpetual plagues of public transport in Bogot has spread to Transmilenio as pick-pockets are now working on the buses. Three quarters of a sample in 2005 thought that Transmilenio was insecure, either because of the risk of robbery or because of the crowds (Flores, 2005).28 Although Transmilenio signed an agreement with the police to allocate 500 young police cadets and 110 officers at the entrances to the bus stations, this has only helped partially. In a recent poll, only 27% thought that Transmilenio was safe (El Tiempo, 26/2/2007). Fourth, there are increasing complaints about the competence of Transmilenio SA, the central executive agency. Some complain that the technical nature of the agency has declined since 2005, others complain that as its income has risen, it has become too bureaucratic. Flores (2006a) argues that the company now appears incapable of managing the changes that are needed to improve the service: a new driver is needed.29 This combination of problems is undoubtedly responsible for the decreasing approval ratings recorded in the annual Bogot Como Vamos surveys.30 When Transmilenio entered service, the public gave it a very high rating relative to other modes of transport and it received a 93% approval rating in 2001. A former head of Transmilenio said in an interview that she would be happy so long as the approval rating did not fall below 70%; unfortunately in by 2007 only 66% of respondents still thought the service was either good or very good (BCV, 2007) (see Table 2). That rating was towards the bottom of the range of approval for institutions in Bogot, alongside that of the normally highly unpopular Council.31 How significant is this decline in popularity? One problem with BCV polls is that although only 14% of respondents in 2007 said that they used the system, everyone in the sample was asked to comment on its effectiveness. For this reason, in 2005, I asked Bogot Como Vamos to supplement their questions in order to separate out the answers of those who used Transmilenio as their main means of transport from those who did not. Among regular users, 63% thought that it offered a good or very good service compared with only 11% who thought it was Table 2. Evaluation of modes of transport in Bogot (20012007)
Mode Transmilenio Bus/Ejecutivo Buseta Colectivo Taxi 2001 4.6 3.1 3.3 3.8 3.8 2002 4.1 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.9 2003 4.1 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.8 2004 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.5 4.1 2005 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.6 4.0 2006 3.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2007 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.5
Source: Bogot Como Vamos
Bus Rapid Transit 449 bad or very bad. Replies to another question in the 2005 survey also partially discredited the earlier negativity; 69% of all interviewees thought that the quality of life in Bogot had improved as a result of Transmilenio compared with 15% who thought it had worsened. By 2007, although the general image of Transmilenio had declined among the general public, 72% of users thought that introduction of the service had improved public transport in Bogot (BCV, 2007). As Flores (2006a) has argued: Today the traveller recognises [Transmilenios] virtues but at the same time wants a better service. Concentration of Ownership A regular concern about Transmilenio relates to its pattern of ownership. The system was intended to create a new kind of bus operator and to rid the system of the old bus system. The new companies would own and maintain their buses rather than merely sub-contract routes out to the bus operators as previously. The aim was to end the war of the centavo by establishing modern enterprises which would employ professional drivers. In the process, Transmilenio would improve road safety and end the exploitation of drivers and passengers (Gmez, 2004). Ex-Mayor Pealosa was convinced by experience in Curitiba and Quito that the private sector should own and operate the Transmilenio buses. He wanted the system to operate without an operating subsidy, something that the public bus company in Quito had failed to achieve at that time. He also had to ensure that the local bus companies in Bogot would participate in the project. He was afraid of repeating the experience of Quito where the armys tanks had had to intervene to crush a strike by the bus owners who did not want to let the new system open (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 343). A key problem was that the existing bus companies were reluctant to sign up. They did not have the capital with which to buy the new articulated buses, did not like the centralized fare-collection system and worried about the obligation on them to renew the fleet on a regular basis (Ardila-Gmez, 2004). As such, they had to be convinced that the rewards would be sufficient to compensate them for the risks that they would face in transforming the nature of their business. In overcoming these barriers Transmilenios designers implicitly favoured large investors. And, by negotiating with the bus companies rather than the bus owners, it was left to the companies to decide whether or not to include the owners. In the first stage, one new company, SI99, did include over 500 owners and Expreso del Futuro a couple of hundred, but two other companies had none (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, pp. 364365). The second-phase companies were much more inclusive insofar as the three new concessionaires have 1850 bus owners among the shareholders, including members of Apetrans and bus owners have provided between 20% and 30% of the capital (ibid., p. 367).32 However, Ardila-Gmez (2004, p. 363) fears that large capitalist investors in Expreso del Futuro and Metrobs have bought out their smaller partners. One recent report claims that Transmilenio is in the hands of a small group of nine families (Dinero, 12/5/2006). There are also suggestions that the sanitation companies have bought into the bus operating companies because of the high profitability of the system (Trujillo, 2003).33 According to a recent study conducted by Transmilenio SA, 88% of the shares in the first two phases belonged to 21% of the investors (El Tiempo, 26/5/2006).
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Most politicians in the city, and even Colombias president, now accept that the system favoured the bus companies over the bus owners and that more should be done to help the main victims of Transmilenio, i.e. the small bus owners. Strikes by the transport companies and protests by university students in 2006 helped alert the authorities to the problem but criticism has become particularly fierce since Mayor Garzn came to power, partly because much of the political support and finance for his party, Polo Democrtico, came from bus companies and owners who did not participate in the first two phases of Transmilenio (Semana, 15/9/2007).34 Recently, it seems as if every influential politician agrees that something must be done to democratize ownership in the third phase of Transmilenios development (El Espectador, 30/7/2005; El Tiempo, 30/7/2005; Gutirrez, 2006; Quevedo, 2006).35 Since the owners and drivers seem to earn very little and the city continues to suffer from high rates of unemployment, many feel that it is socially irresponsible not to involve them in the new system. Some in Congress feel the same way and have been trying to guarantee that all the new Transmilenio clones have a democratic form of ownership (Jaramillo, 2004). The only dissenting voice that I have heard comes from one of the bus companies, whose managing director argues that the small drivers and owners deserve to get nothing as a result of having brought chaos to the streets of the city over so many years.36 The main question, therefore, is how to involve more owners and drivers in the ownership structure when, as Vctor Ral Martnez, the largest shareholder in the Transmilenio operating companies, points out: the small owners dont have enough money to invest and wait five years before receiving the profits (El Tiempo, 26/5/2006). One suggestion is that when buses are scrapped their owners should be given preferential shares in a new company (El Tiempo, 30/7/ 2005). This and other ideas are currently being explored (Dinero, 12/5/2006; El Tiempo, 15/6/2006; Martnez and Jimeno, 2007).37 Construction Cost and Subsidy Transmilenio was designed to run without an operating subsidy. Both the private operators and Transmilenio SA are expected to cover their costs out of their share of the revenues. Most of the operators have made a profit (see below) although the management company made a loss during the first five years.38 In practice, the system has received a degree of indirect subsidy. For example, the system does not pay for the police cadets who now guard the system nor for the heavy security arrangements that were put in place after the two bombs went off on the feeder system in 2004. Transmilenio operators, like all bus operators in the country, have also benefited from the cheap diesel they receive from the State Petrol Company.39 What is rarely mentioned in Bogot is the large subsidy that Transmilenio received up front, insofar as public funds provided the road space, the bus stations, the bridges, and the parks where the buses are kept at night. It is true that no public transport company in the world operates without a subsidy but, in many cities around the world, the extent of the overall subsidy is explicit. In Bogot, everyone is proud to argue that there is no operating subsidy and omit to mention the capital subsidy. The estimates made when planning the system calculated that the state contribution would
Bus Rapid Transit 451 Table 3. Public and private contribution to capital costs
Infrastructure Total cost Buses and Infrastructure cost (US$ (US$ fare Infrastructure cost/total Kilometres million) million) collection cost per km cost (%)
Corridor Phase I Calle 80 Caracas Autopista Norte Sub-total Phase II Las Americas Av. Suba NQS Sub-total Total
10 21 10 41.0 16.7 11.0 35.5 63.2 104.2
42.6 69 42.3 153.9 94.8 43.2 134.2 272.2 426.1
84.6 245.8 97.2 427.6 159.1 96.2 198.3 453.6 881.2
42 176.8 54.9 273.7 64.3 53 64.1 181.4 455.1
4.26 3.29 4.23 3.75 5.68 3.93 3.78 4.31 4.09
50.35 28.07 43.52 35.99 59.59 44.91 67.68 60.01 48.35
Source: CONPES (2000)
be 36% of the total cost in the first three routes, and 63% in the next ten (CONPES, 2000, p. 4) (see Table 3). Of course, the cost to the state of constructing Transmilenio was very much less than that of building a metro: the factor that eventually swayed the national governments decision in Transmilenios favour at a time when Colombia had just entered a serious economic recession (El Tiempo, 30/7/2000). One estimate is that the cost building the infrastructure for Transmilenio was US$5 million per kilometre, approximately one twentieth of the estimated cost per kilometre of the first line of the metro (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 369). Ex-Mayor Pealosa provides a higher figure of US$6.9 million per kilometre, but asserts that it is still ten times cheaper than a metro (Gmez, 2004, p. 98).40 More recent estimates suggest that the average Phase II cost was US$13.3 million, although some have estimated the cost of the NQS corridor at US$26 million per kilometre (El Tiempo, 16/1/2007, 3/2/2007). The third-phase extension along Avenida Sptima is estimated at US$22 million per kilometre (at 2007 prices) (El Tiempo, 3/2/2007), although most admit that the cost of this route is likely to be higher than that on the other routes. Of course, compared with a metro, there is no question that Transmilenio is cheap but the recent campaign for mayor threw up some strange comparative figures (El Tiempo, 3/2/2007). Samuel Moreno, who wants to build a metro, claimed that Transmilenio is not that much cheaper than a metro, which in any case will be a better investment for the city over the long term (Semana, 15/9/ 2007).41 Enrique Pealosa emphasized just how expensive a metro would be. Excess Profits? Another issue that seems to be surrounded by some mystery is the profitability of the bus operators. The four companies that were set up to run the Phase I buses were expected to earn a return of 14.17% per annum (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 302). The return had to be attractive in order to convince the old bus owners and companies to establish the modern enterprises required to operate under the
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new contracts. Ardila-Gmez (2004) describes the long and difficult process that was undertaken to convince the bus companies to participate in Transmilenio. The scheme devised offered a return on the estimated operating and capital costs of running the buses, calculated on the number of kilometres of bus journeys recorded. The formula established for Phase I was generous to the operators because of the high perceived risks, especially given that the country had entered a severe economic recession (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 290; UN-CID, 2005, p. 13). The safeguard against excessive profits was thought to be the competitive bidding process used to select the companies.42 However, in Phase I, the bidding process was somewhat contrived in the sense that the terms had been discussed extensively with potential bidders and made palatable in order to attract them into the new scheme. Big advantages were also given to local companies in the bidding process and even then only three bids were received for the first four routes. As such, it is important to consider whether the first set of contracts proved to be profitable. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the companies deposit their accounts with the Superintendency for Societies every year, there appears to be very little public discussion about the profitability of their operations.43 The only point of consensus is that the profits of these companies during Phase I were much higher than expected. UN-CID (2005, p. 38) shows that all four companies made a net profit after taxes every year between 2001 and 2003 even though the feasibility studies had suggested that they would not make money in the first five years (Dinero, 12/5/2006). In 2003, the less-than-objective head of the ordinary bus companies association referred to the millionaire profits of the Transmilenio operators (Gonzlez, 2005a), and two independent sources have estimated the annual return on revenues in Phase I at between 18% and 22% (Nieto, 2003, pp. 110111; Ardila-Gmez, 2005, p. 43).44 One representative of a bus company interviewed did not deny that operating Transmilenio buses was a good business, although he pointed out that Phase I companies did not make a profit on the feeder system. The higher than expected profits in Phase I were due to a miscalculation in the technical tariff which meant that between 2001 and 2004 the operators received 11.5% more than they expected on the number of kilometres they operated (UNCID, 2005, p. 20). Payment to the companies operating the troncales was, and continues to be, made on the basis of the number of kilometres run by their buses (the feeder system companies are paid per passenger). These payments are intended to cover the running costs and depreciation. The rate per kilometre on the troncales is based on an estimate of the average number of passengers carried by each bus every kilometre. When the number of passengers is above that number, Transmilenio tells the operators to increase the number of buses and vice versa. In principle, this means that there is always enough capacity and the operators are making only the expected level of profit. The rate in Phase I was based on the 672 000 passengers who were expected to use the three corridors but, because actual usage was much higher, payments were actually 12% higher which naturally raised the level of profits (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, pp. 362363; UN-CID, 2005, p. 26). Of course, most operators tend to express a different view and they have warned that during Phase II they run the risk of making losses of possible during Phase II, (El Tiempo, 15/11/2005).45 Certainly, the technical fare was established on the basis of 1.4 million passengers per working day, whereas the average number of passengers is currently only 1.3 million. Combined with the rapidly
Bus Rapid Transit 453 rising cost of diesel fuel, the lower number of passengers has been the main justification for raising the fare three times between January 2006 and July 2007. Transmilenio and the Shape of the City One of the age-old debates within the planning literature is about the role of landuse planning in cutting average journey times (Cameron et al., 2004; Kennedy et al., 2005) and was the logic underpinning Lauchlin Curries city-within-the city model (UN-CID, 1969; Gilbert, 1978; Alonso, 1999). One of the criticisms of Transmilenio is that it is effectively consolidating the existing shape and land use of the city, with all of its associated problems. Certainly, the citys planning department is concerned that, in Mario Noriegas words, Transmilenio is helping to stick development to the mountain rather than trying to encourage the development of new sub-centres. Ex-Mayor Pealosa sees this as a virtue and is arguing that Bogot must remain a densely populated city and points out the dangers of urban sprawl, Houston style. There is also concern that Transmilenio is disrupting urban life in and around the corridors. It is cutting off access across the trunk routes and causing a certain amount of disruption and pollution as rat runs develop. Such a fear recently led the citizens of Ciudad Salitre to oppose the development of the Calle 26 which passes close to their area. The new system, they claimed, would lead to a monumental collapse in road traffic and considerable deterioration in the roads in the districtTransmilenio buses would also pollute the air (El Tiempo, 9/6/2006). Is the System Socially Equitable? Ex-Mayor Pealosa, and the principal designer of the system, Ignacio de Gzman, have consistently argued that Transmilenio is designed to help the poor (de Gzman, 2003; Pealosa, 2003; Gmez, 2004, p. 101). This is a view shared by the World Bank in justifying the financial support that it is offering to help build clones in other Colombian cities (Gmez, 2004; World Bank, 2004). Ex-Mayor Mockus accepts this argument and claims that every social class in Bogot is using Transmilenio, which helps the harmony of the city, internal solidarity and the feeling of belonging to the city. Although both he and Pealosa believe that it is used by higher income groups, thereby helping to reduce dependence on the private car, the vast bulk of Transmilenios passengers are ordinary people. Transmilenio SA user surveys in 2006 found that 86% of the passengers came from the poorest three social groups. However, Table 4 suggests that at Table 4. Usage of Transmilenio by social class (2006)
Social stratum 1 and 2 3 4 5 and 6 Transmilenio passengers (%) 38 48 11 3 Total population in that social stratum (%) 47.1 40.4 7.5 5.1 Ratio of users to population by stratum (=Col. 2/Col. 3) 80.7 119.0 146.7 58.8
Source: Passenger data provided by Transmilenio SA in August 2007 and data on distribution of population from DAPD (2004, p. 81)
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present it is middle-income groups who use the system most. Proportionate to their numbers, it is Classes 3 and 4 who are the most regular usersa fair reflection of where the corridors currently go.46 Of course, as the Transmilenio network expands, it will reach more areas of poor settlement. However, there is one unresolved problem: how to construct trunk routes into the mountain areas to the southeast of the city where a substantial proportion of the poor live. Plans are in hand to try to design a corridor with a lower specification but if this proves impossible, these areas are likely to continue to be dependent on the feeder service, increasing journey times accordingly.47 Another problem is that the next stage of expansion will develop routes along the citys most famous street, Carrera Sptima, and along the road to the airport (see Figure 2). Some argue that Sptima is too narrow to accommodate the system without substantial demolition or tunnelling. Others are concerned that this is the wrong place to expand, and early studies suggested that the next priority route ought to be further west along Avenida Boyac (El Tiempo, 15/2/2007). A corridor along the latter road would certainly reach more poor people, even if there are poor areas at the northern end of Sptima and many poor people do work along the road.48 With respect to the cost of travel, the system helps poor people in two critical ways. First, the fares are fixed whatever the length of the journey, and insofar as many of the poor live in the outskirts, most travel longer distances than the middle class.49 As such, their journeys are being subsidized by those who make short journeys, essentially the better off. Second, passengers using the feeder network, which operates mainly in poor neighbourhoods, do not have to pay; the cost is covered through purchase of the through ticket. Hence, those who only use the corridor buses are subsidizing those in the periphery (Gmez, 2004, p. 101).50 Nonetheless, there is a major problem. The fare for the combined Transmilenio journey is higher than that for a single journey on the traditional buses, and in July 2007, the difference amounted to 300 pesos or 27% during normal daytime working.51 Of course, travelling conditions on Transmilenio, crowding apart, are generally far superior to those on the old buses and still cheaper if a passenger has to make a journey on two traditional buses (Hidalgo, 2001). But, while the fares in
Figure 1b. Transmilenio : existing and phase three routes.
Figure 2.
Transmilenio: existing and phase three routes.
Bus Rapid Transit 455 international terms are derisorily low, the very low incomes most bogotanos of mean that transportation often takes a considerable share of the household budget. In July 2007, when the fare was raised to 1400 pesos (US$0.73), 20 return journeys a month cost 12.9% of the minimum wage in Bogot. Today, the combined cost of those journeys exceeds the transport subsidy that is added to the minimum wage of formal sector workers by 10%.52 The latest rise means that Transmilenio fares have risen by 27% in 30 months, a period during which the minimum wage (plus the transport subsidy) has risen by less than 14%. While it is essential that the Transmilenio system remains financially sustainable, the frequency with which the fares have recently risen is a worrying development. According to the local press, recent fare rises have led to a fall in the number of passengers as increasing numbers of people choose to use the traditional buses. Transmilenio SA deny this and their figures show that although the July 2007 fare rise led to a decline in the number of passengers to 1.08 million per day during the first week, 1.28 million passengers a day used the system the week after. For a 19-week period from the beginning of February 2007 until the middle of June, the number of journeys on an average working day was 1.26 million.53 This means that usage actually increased by 15% between 2006 and 2007. One commentator after another has argued in the press that passenger numbers are in decline and, to the irritation of Transmilenio, the newspapers have failed to publish its denials. The situation has not been helped by the frequent references made to a study by the National University which estimated that passenger numbers would decline by 150 000 for every 100 peso rise in the Transmilenio fare (UN-CID, 2005). As a result, it is regularly claimed that current passenger numbers fall 100 000 short of the projected break-even figure of 1.4 million a day (Gonzlez del Ro, 2007). While it is clear that the number of passengers using the system has not fallen, it is equally true that numbers have not risen as quickly as expected. This may be a consequence of the rise in fares, because of the overcrowding on the system or because there are so many traditional buses still in operation. The difference of 300 pesos between Transmilenio fares and those on the traditional system is widely cited as an explanation, particularly as some passengers now negotiate a discount with the drivers, particularly when they have their family in tow. Certainly, Transmilenio SA constantly complains about the unfair competition offered by the traditional system (see below), and passengers may be using the old buses for direct trips because they are now quicker than Transmilenio.54 If the number of passengers using Transmilenio has not actually declined, the number of passengers per bus kilometre fell from 5.6 in the first few weeks of operation in 2001 to 5.1 in December 2006 (El Tiempo, 25/2/2007). There are several explanations for this decline. First, the number of articulated buses in service rose from 841 in June 2006 to 1018 in July 2007, which means that the number of passengers per bus fell by 9%.55 Second, the average length of journey has increased as a result of the opening of new, lower density routes to areas like Suba.56 Third, fewer journeys are made along the new routes at weekends. No doubt these explanations are thoroughly valid but I have little doubt that recent fare rises also explain part of the decline in a key element in the formula used to determine fares on the Transmilenio system: the index of passengers per kilometre (IPK). If the IPK falls then, ceteris paribus, the fare must rise. Passenger numbers may not have fallen as the papers claim but they have not increased nearly as quickly as had been anticipated, an expectation which determined how
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many buses would be purchased. And, since the number of Transmilenio buses nominally in service has risen faster than the number of passengers, this has triggered higher fares according to the technical formula.57 If rising fares are discouraging people from using the new system, the number of passengers per bus kilometre will fall, and automatically trigger new fare rises. This could easily turn into a vicious downward circle for Transmilenio. As fares rise, more people may use the traditional system and the numbers using Transmilenio will not increase at the rate expected. The operators will insist on the higher fare that the formula dictates, and a higher fare will lead to fewer passengers using the system. The only ways to prevent this are to reduce the operating costs of Transmilenio, cut the number of rival buses (see below), or raise the fares on the traditional system. Reducing the Number of Old Buses One of the motives for setting up Transmilenio was to reduce the stock of old buses operating on the streets of Bogot. Fewer buses would reduce congestion and air pollution. For this reason, during Phase I the new companies were required to buy 2.7 old buses for every articulated bus that they wanted to run. This plan seemed to work reasonably well; the drivers were absorbed easily by some of the new companies and there was an ample supply of old buses for sale. By November 2005, some 3000 buses had been scrapped (Gonzlez, 2005b). However, Phase II upped the requirement to 7.7 buses for every articulated bus and this target has proved very difficult to reach. First, administering the replacement process has proved to be more complicated than expecteda tortuous process as one commentator describes it (Gonzlez, 2005b). The operator buying the old bus has to make sure that it has both an operating and an owners licence, that the owner does not owe fines or taxes to the city and that the bus has not been stolen or cloned. By the end of 2005, the representative of two companies was complaining that although they had bought 880 buses, the paperwork was holding up the destruction of 212 of them (El Tiempo, 12/12/2005). Second, the scrapping of the buses could only be done by one company, Diaco, and this company lacked the capacity to destroy more than 50 vehicles a week (El Tiempo, 12/12/2005). This monopoly, with an international company auditing the process, was created to guarantee that the buses were actually destroyed, but, at times, it seems to have slowed the scrapping programme. Third, during the second stage of Transmilenio, the owners of old buses realized that they had a commercial asset and started demanding more and more money for the old buses. Officially they were to be paid 20 million pesos (at the time US$8333) but they have been demanding much more. In May 2005, the owners were demanding 35 million pesos per 20-year-old bus whereas the transit authority (STT) was offering a maximum of 25 million pesos (El Tiempo, 3/5/2006).58 The effect of these problems was to delay putting articulated buses on some of the new routes. At the end of 2005, the lack of buses meant that the second section of the new NQS corridor could not open (El Tiempo, 10/11/2005, 15/11/2005).59 By August 2006, the bus operators were expected to have arranged for 3700 buses to be scrapped but had not managed more than 3000. In addition to scrapping buses in return for licences to run more articulated buses, the city authorities also wanted to cut the old routes. After Apetrans
Bus Rapid Transit 457 organized several strikes, Ex-Mayor Mockus decided to establish a fund to compensate the bus owners for the loss of their routes and vehicles.60 The fund was financed by a charge of 17 pesos on every 1000 pesos of fares collected by the bus owners (Ardila-Gmez, 2004). Unfortunately, many companies did not pass on the requisite sums to the fund. By November 2005, only 11 of the 66 bus companies had put money into the fund, which then held only 11 billion pesos rather than 90 billion pesos that should have been collected. Lawyers claimed that the Mayor had no right to charge this sum as it constitute a tax, which could only be levied by the Council (El Tiempo, 9/8/2006), and the matter had to be considered by the courts.61 Whatever the rights and wrongs of the case, it delayed the scrapping programme. By November 2005, only 8 vehicles had been scrapped with money from the fund, an insignificant figure compared to the goal of 5668 (Gonzlez, 2005b; El Tiempo, 10/11/2006)62. Over and above the problems of finding enough buses to scrap, there is the problem of new buses entering service in the city. In 1993, Ex-Mayor Castro ordered a freeze on the public transport stock in the city (Gutirrez, 2006). At that time, 16 300 buses, busetas and collectives were on the roads (El Tiempo, 14/6/ 2006). By the middle of 2006, 20 847 were operating when, according to one estimate, there should only have been 10 000 (El Tiempo, 9/8/2006). One councillor has claimed that if the 3000 buses from neighbouring Soacha are counted, then there are 12 500 pirate buses in operation (Semana, 16/9/2006)! The continued presence of old buses and the entry of so many illegal buses is explicable largely in terms of the influence of certain bus companies. In August 2006, the Council refused to hold a debate to discuss the profits of the bus companies or the excessive number of buses operating in the city (El Tiempo, 3/8/2006). One insider claimed that this showed the power of the transporters, operating through the councillors who represent them (ibid.). Fifteen attempts were made to get the debate through the Councils Government Commission, presided over by Severo Correa, someone very close to the transporter Carlos Delgado, who participated in the financing of Mayor Luis Eduardo Garzns campaign (Restrepo, 2006). Perhaps the same rationale explains the Councils extreme reluctance to discuss the Mayors efforts to reform the Secretariat of Transport (El Tiempo, 9/9/2006).63 Some bus companies have clearly been using their influence over the local administration and the Ministry of Transport to sabotage the programme to scrap old buses. Conclusion The organization of transport in Bogot has been unsatisfactory for a long time, and each of the last four mayors is to be applauded for having taken major political risks to reform it. Each has taken on some formidable opponents and risked the effect that this would have on their rating in the opinion polls. They have taken this risk because they all have accepted that transport is probably the most important and controversial issue that a mayor has to deal with. Mayor Garzn recognized this when he declared on 14 August 2006 that his best gift to Bogot for its next birthday would be to have sorted out transport (El Espectador, 15/ 8/2006). Since then he has announced his mobility plan for the city and a war against the car. There is no doubt that Transmilenio represents the jewel in the crown of recent transport reforms. It is a well-designed system that is rightly being copied by
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many other cities. It has cut congestion and pollution along the main corridors; it has also improved the quality of travelling on the buses, although rush hour travel is rather slow and not very comfortable. What is less certain is how much Transmilenio has so far helped the poor. This is a vital issue both because the poor constitute a majority of the citys population and because construction of the system is highly subsidized. Currently, while the poor make up the bulk of the passengers, it is middle-income passengers who use the system most intensively. The explanation for this is simple: Transmilenios current routes do not reach large areas of poor settlement and the fares charged are more expensive than those on the traditional system. Although future corridors will cover a much broader socio-economic cross-section of the city, the next phase of expansion does not give priority to routes that pass through poor areas, particularly the route along Calle 26.64 With respect to fares, nothing much can be done until some of the unfair competition is removed. In order to do this, a political deal has to be struck with the small-scale owners and drivers. For the first time, major questions are being asked about the future development of Transmilenio. Negotiations over the next two corridors are under way but the newly elected mayor is more interested in building a metro than in extending Transmilenio. His preference is influenced by the fact that Transmilenios image is now more than a little tarnished. This is partly because the spectacular early success of the system raised expectations and attracted large numbers of passengers. This combination put pressure on the system, both physically and psychologically. Too many people started to use some routes and when people have to wait to get on to a crowded articulated bus, it increases their journey time. The image of Transmilenio was also damaged by the somewhat problematic start of the new Phase II routes and the delays and confusion that ensued. Recent fare rises have also hit peoples pockets, and many people have continued to use the traditional bus system, particularly when a cheaper traditional bus provides a direct journey route to their destination.65 Transmilenios image has also been damaged by the rising incidence of petty crime on the buses. If you are likely to be robbed then you choose another kind of way to get to work or to the shops. But the essential difficulties facing Transmilenio have less to do with the design and operation of the system and much more to do with the deep seated issue of power in the city. Perhaps the critical problem is the difficulty that a mayor faces in curbing the power of the transport lobby. The authorities recognize that there are far too many old buses on the streets and have been trying to get many of them scrapped. However, certain traditional bus owners have countered by running large numbers of illegal buses and by failing to pass on the funds which they collect through the fare box for the purpose of compensating the owners of scrapped buses. In response, the mayor recently refused to approve a fare hike for these old buses although he soon did so. Currently, there are still far too many traditional buses in operation. Because of the unfair competition, Transmilenio is not carrying as many passengers as the current number of articulated buses can handle. Buses have remained in the garages and given that costs have increased and passenger numbers have not, the fares on Transmilenio have risen. If nothing is done to control the illegal buses and to accelerate the scrapping programme, Transmilenio may face a dangerous downward circleit will fail to attract more passengers
Bus Rapid Transit 459 from the cheaper traditional system, will have to raise fares again to maintain the systems revenue stream, which will lead to further stagnation in passenger numbers. A second problem is also linked to the demands of the transport lobby. Transmilenio was intended to transform the whole structure of the bus system. A new operating approach was needed together with a new kind of operating company. But, in order to persuade the traditional bus owners to amalgamate and form new companies, arguably too much was offered in the way of incentives, particularly in Phase I when the profits proved to be greater than had been anticipated. A modern private system should deliver profits to the operators but good regulation should ensure that the profits are not excessive. It is true that the bidding process is both competitive and transparent but that does not necessarily keep profits within reasonable bounds. Third, Transmilenio is widely praised because it runs without an operating subsidy. And, while that is largely true, a great deal of public money goes into providing the infrastructure. Unfortunately, much of the cost of building the corridors goes into providing space for private cars, taxis and traditional buses. If public policy could reduce the numbers of private vehicles operating on Bogots streets, the infrastructure cost could be cut and the number of passengers would rise. This is critically important insofar as the recent campaign for mayor focussed so much on the relative costs of building Transmilenio and a metro. For all of its undoubted virtues, Transmilenio alone cannot resolve all of the citys transport problems. Complementary changes have to be made in the rest of the sector if Transmilenio is to function properly. It cannot compete with the traditional bus system if it is subject to unfair competition from illegal buses. Nor can it do anything to reduce traffic congestion when the number of cars, taxis and buses is allowed to expand as rapidly as at present.66 Despite faster journey speeds along Transmilenio corridors, average journey speeds across the city are not improving and air pollution is equally problematic. While emissions are lower along Transmilenio routes, a recent survey by the World Bank concluded that Bogot was the third most polluted city in Latin America and that traffic caused 78% of the pollution (El Tiempo, 26/11/2005).67 The essential problem is that the power of the transport lobby seems to have survived the surgery attempted by Transmilenio. There are still far too many instances of policies being undermined by legalistic tricks, by dubious decisions of the Ministry of Transport, or by suspicious cases of poor local administration. The failure to control the growth of taxis and buses, the continued corruption and/or incompetence of the citys traffic department, the power of the bus companies and their relationship with the government (and particularly the Council), the bus and taxi lobbies ability to declare strikes, and the influence of major commercial interests to undermine really effective urban planning are all conspiring to undermine ordinary peoples lives. Earlier, I argued that transport in Bogot in the 1980s was a mirror image of the city. Today, that would be less than fair because Transmilenio and several other innovative measures like Pico y Placa and the introduction of an extensive network of bicycle lanes have changed the picture. Compared with the transport situation in many other major Latin American cities, Bogot has done well and unlike the situation in terms of employment, health or even justice, transport management is ahead of the game. Unfortunately, because of the expanding
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number of private cars and the continued power and influence of the transport lobby, progress is being delayed and future change threatened. Transmilenio may be a minor miracle but Bogots transport problems need something more than that. Perhaps this is the main lesson that other cities planning to invest in busways should learn. BRT systems are far superior to traditional bus systems and much cheaper than metros. Transmilenio-type systems really can work and should be encouraged. But unless parallel changes are made to the rest of the transport sector, real progress will be slowed and, in the worst-case scenario, vested interests may actually undermine the viability of a new BRT system. Currently, Transmilenios image in Bogot has been so tarnished that its future expansion is in genuine doubt. Much will depend on how Samuel Moreno, the winning mayoral candidate, follows through with his campaign promise to build a metro. But, even if he does proceed with this plan, he will still have to tackle the real political barriers hampering Transmilenios future success and preventing any real solution to the serious transport problems facing Bogot. Notes
1. UN-Habitat (2001) estimates that around 40% of all trips to and from work in low- and middleincome countries are by bus. In Delhi, buses cater for half of all passenger travel (Tiwari, 2002, p. 99) and in Santiago and Bogot most motorized trips are made by bus (Vasconcellos, 2001). 2. According to Perry (2000, p. 397): While a pedestrian needs 1.5 square metres to stand and 3 square metres to walk, a car requires on average 91 square metres standing, taking into account all the passageways necessary for access to parking spaces, and 914 square metres while moving at 48 kph. 3. World Bank (2002, p. 113) suggests BRT systems can carry up to 35 000 passengers an hour although Hidalgo et al. (2007, p. 11) cites figures from Bogot claiming that the Caracas corridor carries 45 000 passengers per hour. The head of Transmilenio recently claimed that the maximum carried was 42 000 per hour (El Tiempo, 3/2/2007). 4. Debate relates to the routes, particularly those along Carrera Sptima and Calle 26, about whether Mayor Garzn should have postponed the decision on Carrera Sptima and whether the city should really be building a metro. 5. A significant issue insofar as Enrique Pealosa, the former mayor who introduced the system, was a leading candidate. The election took place on 28 October 2007, and Samuel Moreno beat Pealosa by a wide margin. He will take office on 1 January 2008. 6. Particular thanks are due to the Leverhulme Trust, which financed the project, to Mara Teresa Garcs who ran the local team in Bogot and to the people who were willing to discuss transport matters with me in Bogot including: the current mayor, Luis Eduardo Garzn, and ex-Mayors Paul Bromberg, Antanas Mockus and Enrique Pealosa; planning and transport specialists Arturo Ardila, Mario Noriega, and Ricardo Montezuma; but operators Estban Gmez, Gustavo Gmez, Milena Martinez, Victor Ral Martnez and Andrs Ortiz; and Astrid Martnez and Anglica Castro and their staffs at Transmilenio S.A.. The paper also benefited from help and additional comments from Ana Mara Angel Garcs and three anonymous referees. 7. Several questions were modified in the 2005 survey. 8. Using the local press is justified in the sense that it is frequently reporting information that has been derived from local experts or from Transmilenio itself. And, when it is reporting criticisms of the system, it is a perfectly reasonable measure of the frequency and strength of local opinion. In any case, several different press sources have been used and wherever possible every statement made in the press has been checked against other sources. It should also be noted that while Transmilenio was an important issue in the 2007 campaign for mayor, debates about the system have always figured prominently in newspaper coverage of the city. 9. Presentations by Enrique Pealosa and Samuel Moreno at Club El Nogal on 27 August and 10 September 2007, respectively, presentations on mobility in the city by five mayoral candidates at the University of Rosario on 4 September 2007, and a television debate on 29 September 2007. 10. It remains an independent agency but since January 2007 reports to the new Secretariat of Mobility. Arguably this gives it less direct access to the Mayor. 11. During strikes the system has carried up to 1.6 million passengers in a day.
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12. McCormick (2005) claimed that Lima, Mexico City, Quito, Panama City had projects underway and Beijing, Dakar, Delhi, Djakarta, Johannesburg and Cape Town were showing strong signs of interest. 13. Bogots long history of running its own bus or tram company did not provide much in the way of improvement. The last of a series of public companies, EDTU, was established in 1959, partly as a means of avoiding total paralysis in the event of a strike organized by 36 private operators (Rodriguez and Nuez, 2003, p. 258). At its peak, in the 1960s, it carried around one-tenth of the citys bus passengers. Gradually, the private sector began to operate more routes and EDTU passengers fell dramatically. In 1989, the company was carrying only 4.4 million passengers a year, ten times that number when compared with a decade earlier. In 1990, it was operating only 5 of the citys 430 routes and its fares covered only three and a half months of the annual salary bill (Caicedo, 1992, p. 223). The company was described by Mayor Prieto Ocampo, in 1996, as showing all the ills bought about by mistaken and improvised management (Prieto Ocampo, 1976, p. 36). 14. For examples of the difficulties faced by the drivers, see Perea (2002). 15. The average passenger in the middle 1990s was spending 123 minutes each day on the bus (JICA et al., 1996). 16. The transport secretariat has been reorganized many times over the years, most recently in January 2007. 17. Mentioned by Paul Bromberg during interview. 18. Like others I was given a copy of the article during my first interview with him. 19. Seemingly he was still talking about the contract 100 days into his period of office (La Rebeca, 1998). 20. In recent debates with the pro-metro candidate, Samuel Moreno, Enrique Pealosa has repeated that he had little choice but to build Transmilenio, given the new presidents reluctance to approve spending on a metro. It is important to note that both Pealosa and Andrs Pastrana took office at a time of increasing economic recession. 21. Crdenas (2005, p. 191) offers a different explanation: The economic technocracy of the national government ruled out the metro and opted for Transmilenio because it was the only fiscally feasible alternative. In fact, the national government actually chose the TM solution while the city administration was still considering the metro as an option. 22. Even in Caracas, only 15% of passengers are carried on the metro and in Medelln a BRT system is being constructed to complement the metro. 23. Even if some rat runs have developed along nearby streets and some of the bridges, that were built to provide pedestrians with safe routes to and across Transmilenio, are extremely ugly. 24. And, in the light of the chaos associated with the opening of TransSantiago, it operates spectacularly well. 25. They are actually more like a tile because they are made of cement but to English speakers the tile tends to be used for roofs and walls rather than for roads and paving stones for pavements or sidewalks. 26. Some claim that these protests were organized by the bus companies, i.e. the drivers being displaced by the system or even by the FARC guerrillas. 27. The articulated buses are 17.5 metres long and 2.6 metres wide. Reducing that length by 3 metres to allow for the driver and entrances, this gives a theoretical average amount of space of 0.24 square metres per passenger if the bus is carrying a full complement of 160 passengers. In fact, the space available to the 112 standing passengers will be less than that because the seats take up proportionately more room. Similar length bendy buses in London have a maximum capacity of 140 passengers and one consulting company suggests that it is undesirable for standing passengers to have less than 0.55 square metres of space (http://www.crowddynamics.com/ Egress/Overcrowding%20on%20public%20transport.htm). According to Martinez and Jimeno (2007, p. 189) an ideal measure is more than 0.4 square metres per person, a normal measure is between 0.2 and 0.4, and below 0.2 is bad. But it is not just overcrowding on the Transmilenio buses that is a problem. During rush hours, queues are sometimes formed to enter the stations and there is frequent crowding on the stations themselves. 28. The element of danger was emphasized after two bombs were placed on the feeder system in 2004. 29. No doubt much of the criticism was associated with the 2007 mayoral campaign; Juan Carlos Flores was one of the candidates. As noted above a new Secretariat of Mobility began operating in 2007. 30. Every director of a government agency that I have consulted, including the current mayor himself, attests to taking these surveys very seriously indeed. The heads celebrate news of good ratings and worry about bad results.
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31. At the top came the Botanic Gardens with an approval rating of 97%; at the bottom, the Defender of Public Space with 50%. 32. Martnez and Jimeno (2007: 158) note that: During Phase II, bidding requirements demanded that at least 10% of the concessionary companys property be in the hands of transporters owning at least two buses. 33. A recent interviewee told me that several big investors bought share in the Phase I operators but this ceased in Phase II because of the lower profits. 34. Garzn was accused of receiving around US$100,000 million of campaign finance from a wellknown transport operator, Carlos Delgado, who is based in the neighbouring municipality of Soacha. The mayor said that the money was a loan to finance the campaign, not a gift, and returned the money but the news did take a little of the gloss off his image of political independence. Most importantly, it exemplified how the bus companies attempt to influence the authorities. 35. Ciudad Mvil SA has very few shareholders but its feeder company Conexin Mvil has 780 small owners who own 15% of the company. The latter helped them obtain the credit to buy their shares. 36. Although one of the referees believes that this is an irrelevant issue and that the only important issue is whether the system is well run. While the question of efficiency is critical, some concession to the former drivers and owners ought to be made in Bogot for both social and political reasons. It is difficult to ignore the poverty of many of the former drivers, and Transmilenio will have difficulty in operating effectively if it is being opposed by such a powerful lobby as the transporters. Wider participation in the ownership of the Transmilenio companies represents one way, but not the only way, of addressing these problems. 37. Incidentally, some drivers of the old buses are recruited by the operating companies either as drivers or as cleaners or mechanics. However, one operator is extremely reluctant to use them as drivers. 38. Although it was in surplus in 2006 and should break even now that its share of the receipts has risen from 3% to its current level of 6.95% (data from Transmilenio SA). 39. All bus companies were buying diesel from Ecopetrol in August 2005 at 4000 pesos (cUS$1.72) per gallon compared with the international price of US$2.3. Decree 2988 of 2003 ordered the phasing out of that subsidy from 1 January 2005. It is important to note however that all consumers of diesel benefit from this subsidy not just the bus companies. 40. The original estimate for building 25 corridors was U$2.94 billion, of which US$1.97 billion would be for infrastructure (CONPES, 2000, p. 4); a total cost of US$7.57 million per kilometre at 2000 prices for the whole 387.9 kilometre system or US$5.08 million per kilometre for the infrastructure alone (Table 3). Hidalgo (2007, p. 15) estimates the combined infrastructure and equipment costs at US$8.2 million per kilometre. Martnez and Jimeno (2007, p. 156) cite an estimate made by Jorge Acevedo that infrastructure costs during Phase I were US$7 million per km and reached US$25 million during Phase II. The internal rate of return calculated for the metro and for Transmilenio was extremely favourable to Transmilenio: 61% calculated by UNECLAC (Gmez, 2004, p. 101) compared with 15.8% for the metro (calculated by CONPES and cited in ArdilaGmez, 2004, p. 316). Even the World Bank does not seem to have calculated the full subsidy, although it did calculate the internal return on the investment, which again proved much higher than that on a metro. Nevertheless, the construction subsidy is certainly not insignificant. An early estimate of the cost of building 24 bus lanes across the whole city was US$2.387 billion, about the same as building a single metro line. This does not cover the cost of the road space dedicated to the bus lanes. Later estimates of the infrastructure cost of the first three bus routes lanes, 41 kilometres in length, was US$213 million. This included about US$80 million for the rehabilitation of the mixed traffic lanes adjacent to the busways but not US$38.8 million for property takings. Including them, the total cost of the civil works is approximately US$254 million (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, pp. 368369). 41. In September 2007, Enrique Pealosa was claiming that Transmilenio cost US$5 million a kilometre while Samuel Moreno was claiming US$20 million. According to the former, a metro would cost US$100 million a kilometre, and the latter, a maximum of US$50 million (El Tiempo, 5/9/2007). In January, 2007, the Minister for Transport claimed that the national government would not pay for a metro at a cost of US$200 million a kilometre (El Tiempo, 26/1/2007). 42. Bids are invited for particular routes at set fare levels and the lowest tenders win. One referee suggests that whether or not ex-post level of profits have proved to be high is irrelevant; the only significant issue is how the concessions were tendered. Most local observers would disagree and UN-CID (2005, p. 12) notes that the Phase I contracts were negotiated during an economic recession which naturally affected the operators perceptions of risk. Because the economic situation

improved markedly after the formula had been agreed, this reduced the actual level of risk and allowed the companies to make higher than anticipated profits. In any case, tendering processes are not foolproof because they can be manipulated by bidders to avoid real competition (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 360; Echeverry et al., 2005, p. 182). As such, Transmilenio should be checking the profitability of the operators before tendering begins for each phase of the programme. If profits are too low, as with the Phase II feeder contracts, then the formula needs to be made more generous. If these are too high, as with the Phase I corridor contracts, then the formula should be made less generous. This is precisely what happened with the contracts offered for the Phase II corridor routes. Ardila-Gmez (2005) notes that it is difficult to find figures on the level of profits. Although CID (2005, p. 38) provides a series of lower figures, none exceed 17%. Transmilenio SA claim that four companies providing feeder services have been making losses and may give up their franchises unless they are helped. Indeed, I have since been informed that negotiations took place during October 2007 which increased the sum paid per passenger by one-third. However, another interviewee could not understand how feeder companies could make a loss given what he considered to be a reasonable payment per bus. One answer is that the companies carry more passengers than they are paid for because people get on the feeder buses and get off before the bus arrives at the interchange where the passenger numbers are calculated (Martnez and Jimeno, 2007: 163). However, one interviewee could not understand how they could make a loss given what he considered to be a reasonable payment per bus. Of course, Transmilenio is much equitable than the traditional system insofar as it helps women and the disabled. A Gallup poll in 1998 found that 83% of women used public transport compared with only 54% of men, so any improvements in speed and convenience through the new system will benefit women more than men (El Espectador, 23/8/1998). The term middle-income fails to indicate just how poor many of those people are. A possible alternative is to replicate the MetroCable system used in Medellna system of cable cars that links the slums on the high slopes to the metro. Construction of the route along Sptima was put on hold by Mayor Garzn during 2007 and incoming Mayor Moreno does not seem inclined to reactivate it. There is also opposition to building Calle 26 towards the airport, mainly on grounds that it will generate too few passengers. EIDHB (2006, p. 60) estimate that people living in the poorest settlements in Bogot have the longest average journey times (Ciudad Bolvar: 11.3 km, Usme: 15.0 km and Bosa: 11.9 km). Interviews with two officials of Transmilenio. Bogots bus fares are determined according to the nature and age of the bus. In July 2007 Transmilenio fares rose to 1400 pesos, ordinary colectivo fares to 1200 pesos and buses and busetas older than six years remained at 1000 pesos. Subsequently, the cheapest fares were raised to 1100 pesos. According to El Tiempo (26/2/2007), the fare would have risen to 1700 pesos but for a subsidy on the price of diesel that the national government conceded to the bus companies. EIDHB (2006, p. 55) estimates that, in 2004, the poorest stratum spent 19.1% of their household budget on transport and communications, stratum 2 16.9% and stratum 3, 15.5%. They also claim that the average Bogot home spent 14.2% on transport and communications in 2004 compared with 7.7% in 1980s. I calculated the figure for this 19-week period as it omitted major holidays. The comparative figure for the same 19-week period of 2006 was 1.1 million passengers a day. Local transport expert, Daro Hidalgo, is reported to have argued that the difference in fares between Transmilenio and the ordinary buses encourages people to use the latter (El Tiempo, 19/ 7/2007). Usage is likely to increase further as many of the old buses are carrying very few passengers and because so many routes are still being operated, the traditional buses often eliminate the need to change buses as is necessary with some Transmilenio routes. BCV (2007) surprisingly shows that the old buses are now more popular than Transmilenio because they are more direct, the service friendlier and most passengers can find a seat. Figures kindly provided by Anglica Castro. The average journey distance during morning rush hour rose from 11.7 to 12.9 kilometres. Since the number of passengers using the buses determines how many buses actually leave the garages, companies may not operate all of their buses. One interviewee claimed that the cost of an old bus had doubled since the District had begun to purchase some buses directly, another that the TM companies now had to pay $80 millions. In Phase II, the companies had to buy 7.7 buses for every articulated bus, which increased their investment costs considerably. An articulated bus costs approximately US$200,000. To put a feeder bus into operation requires the scrapping of two old buses. A temporary solution was to borrow buses from Pereira whose own system had not begun operations.
43. 44. 45.
46.
47. 48.
49. 50. 51.
52.
53. 54.
55. 56. 57. 58.
59.
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60. Decree 115 of 2003. 61. The Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca annulled the decree on 28 April 2005. 62. I understand that in November 2007 the fund contained 100 million pesos but only 27 buses had been scrapped. 63. Although they did finally approve it towards the end of 2006. 64. Construction of the troncal along Carrera Sptima has been temporarily postponed, Mayor Garzn having decided to leave the decision to his successor. 65. Perhaps this is why Mayor Garzn and his Secretary of Mobility have recently been discussing the desirability of an operating subsidy (El Tiempo, 20/8/2007). 66. Gmez (2004, pp. 1819) estimates that the number of cars using Bogots roads is increasing annually at 10% while Montezuma (2005) thinks that the growth is nearer to 7% per annum. Either way, with the number of buses and taxis also growing rapidly, it is no surprise that the roads cannot cope. 67. The poor quality of the diesel coming from the national petrol company is a major contributory factor but the contamination from the old buses is an important source of pollution and the long traffic jams are another. The fact that some bus companies do not pay the fines that are imposed on them does not help control pollution.
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Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenio a Miracle Cure?

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01441640701785733 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01441640701785733

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Transport Reviews, Vol. 28, No. 4, 439467, July 2008

Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenio a Miracle Cure?

(Received 6 March 2007; revised 24 September 2007; accepted 2 November 2007)

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The Transmilenio network in August 2007.

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Source: Bogot Como Vamos

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10 21 10 41.0 16.7 11.0 35.5 63.2 104.2

42.6 69 42.3 153.9 94.8 43.2 134.2 272.2 426.1

84.6 245.8 97.2 427.6 159.1 96.2 198.3 453.6 881.2

42 176.8 54.9 273.7 64.3 53 64.1 181.4 455.1

4.26 3.29 4.23 3.75 5.68 3.93 3.78 4.31 4.09

50.35 28.07 43.52 35.99 59.59 44.91 67.68 60.01 48.35

Source: CONPES (2000)

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Transmilenio: existing and phase three routes.

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Bus Rapid Transit 461

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Bus Rapid Transit 463

43. 44. 45.

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Bus Rapid Transit 465

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Bus Rapid Transit 467

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