Review: "The Islam Industry" and Scholarship: Review Article Author(s): As'ad AbuKhalil Source: Middle East Journal,

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Book

Reviews

"TheIslamIndustry" and Scholarship

Review Article by As'ad AbuKhalil

The Future of Political Islam, by GrahamE. Fuller.New York:Palgrave,2003. xix + 213 pages. Notes to p. 220. Index to p. 227. $29.95. Face to Face with Political Islam, by FranqoisBurgat.New York:I.B. Tauris,2003. xvii + 185 pages. Notes to p. 222. Index to p. 230. $55 cloth; $22.50 paper. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, by BernardLewis. New York:The ModernLibrary,2003. xxxii + 165 pages. Notes to p. 171. Index to p. 184. $29.95 cloth; $12.95 paper. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, by BernardLewis. New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002. 161 pages. Notes to p. 172. Index to p. 180. $23 cloth; $12.95 paper. Islam Unveiled:Disturbing Questions about the World'sFastest-growingFaith, by Robert Spencer. San Francisco, CA: EncounterBooks, 2002. xiii + 177 pages. Notes to p.202. Index to p. 214. $24.95. Onward Muslim Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the West, by Robert Spencer.Washington,DC: Regnery, 2003. xiii + 304 pages. Notes to p. 336. Index to p. 352. $27.95. What the Koran Really Says: Language, Text, and Commentary,by IbnWarraq. Amherst, NY: PrometheusBooks, 2002. 744 pages. Appends. to p. 782. $36. The Quest for the Historical Muhammad, ed. and trans.by Ibn Warraq. Amherst,NY: PrometheusBooks, 2000. 526 pages. Map. Gloss. to p. 534. Abbrevs.to p. 536. Dramatic personaeto p. 545. Table to p. 546. Chron.to p. 550. $37. Terror and Liberalism, by Paul Berman.New York:W.W.Norton, 2003. 216 pages. $21 cloth; $10.95 paper.

T he body of literatureon the subject of Islam by policy makers,journalists, and even tourists and travelershas overwhelmedthe market.We now have an Islam industry- a popular and political culture that encourages the productionof books, articles, and movies that deal with Islam and the Middle East. This production is closely tied (through financing and through ideological affinity) with the prevalent trends about Islam in the United States. The Islam industryfeaturesthe works of Middle East and Islam experts at US universitieswho have revived the classical Orientalistapproach,as well as of a swarm
MIDDLEEASTJOURNALVOLUME58, NO. 1, WINTER2004

MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL* 131 of untrainednewcomers whose primaryqualificationsappearto be their ideological orientationsand religious zealotry.September 11th has only increasedthe rate of production of sensationalworks that promise to reveal the true evil intentionsof Muslims and Islam. Scholarly works receive less attention;and the public seems eager to consume books and articlesthatcontainthe persistentdogmas and recycled cliches of classical Orientalism,or of the productionof the terrorismindustry. Given this disturbingtrend, one does not normally look forward to reviewing new books on Islam and Islamic fundamentalism. But TheFutureof Political Islam by Graham E. Fuller and Face to Face with Islam by FrancoisBurgatare, refreshingly,the exceptions to the rule. Both authorsare experienced scholars who are trainedin Middle East studies, and who have traveledto the region for decades. GrahamFuller,who used to work in the US intelligence community, has been warning about the consequences of US foreign policy for years, and Francois Burgat, prior to having produced the book under review, had written an outstandingstudy of Islamic movements in North Africa, I'islamisme au Maghreb(Karthala,1986). Both authorsreadand speakArabicandhave, especially Burgat, interviewed scores of Islamic activities and leaders.Fuller writes a book with analytic categories and concepts. Thus, the reader is spared the frequently-told chronological accounts of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and others, though the book could have been betterorganized so that themes and concepts do not overlap. Fuller makes many sensible points that are often left out of US policy debates, and sometimes out of academicdebates as well. Fuller reminds the reader,for example, that Islamic fundamentalismconstitutes only "a thin wedge of the overall Islamic political spectrum(p. xi). He also states that it is incorrectto "thinkof political Islam as a fixed ideology to be accepted or rejected as a whole [italics in original] (p. 45). And while he takes into his analytic consideration various underlyingcauses for the rise and potency of Islamic fundamentalism, he possibly overstates his case when he asserts: "Islampervades the daily life of Islamic society and political culture more profoundly than any other single ideological or conceptual force (p. xii). Nevertheless, recent evidence from reliable public opinion surveys of Muslim countriesbelies the claims by some Westernscholars,most notablyBernardLewis, regarding the extent to which Islam determinesthe behaviorof Muslims, or dominatestheir lives and thought.As Fuller observes, Islam itself is "nota political ideology but a religion" (p. 14), althoughit is often treatedas a mere violent political force that shapes all facets of the Fuller succeeds in trying to refutethe notion that Islam lives of all Muslims. Furthermore, is peculiar or exceptional as an activist religion, and shows that religion has intersected with political conflicts in many partsof the world (p. 78). Yet, people do not dwell on the political role of Judaism in Israel, for example, although it is politically salient in a country where some one third of voters are OrthodoxJews who are influenced by their religious beliefs. Of the many interestingideas and insights in the book, Fuller's discussion of "umma versus national identity" (pp. 19-23) is quite interesting; it shows the fluidity and malleability of people's political foci of identification. As Fuller also rightly points out, the evaluation of Islamic movements and governments varies depending on who is doing the evaluation, and where (p. 98). The Iranian regime, for example, is judged in the West by the standardsof liberal democracies,and is found to be clearly wanting and deficient. Yet, the Iranianregime can be comparedquite favorablywith the Saudi government'soppressive rule. The relative openness of the Iranian political system and the Iranianpress contrasts sharply with the closed nature of Saudi government and society. This is by no means intended to suggest that Iran is a democracy,or to underplaythe oppressivenessof Iran's rulers and their violation of human rights and exploitationof religion. The point is that people in the West do not use the of evaluationas people in the Middle East. Of course, thereare same measuresor standards

132 * MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL also Westernpolitical considerationsas well; Americanofficials seem always to pay closer attentionto humanrights violations in countriesthat are opposed to US policies, than to violations committedby client regimes. That explains why Saudi Arabiahas gotten away with its humanrights violations for decades. The fanaticaland dictatorialTalibanregime, for example, is rightly seen as a horrificallymisogynist and oppressivegovernment,which some Pashtunsnonethelessjudged as an ethnically representative governmentwhich had brought "security"to people's lives (p. 115). On the subject of Islam and democracy, Fuller is right in saying that "no religion is inherently 'compatible' with democracy"(p. 121). In fact, democracies had, and still have, to marginalize or to compartmentalize religion in orderto achieve fuller democraticsystems of government.The threemonotheistic religions have tremendousattachmentsto what they perceive as "divine"laws and some religious advocates wish to apply them in the whole of society, regardlesswhether one is a memberof the faith or whethershe/he is even religious at all. Burgat uses language that is more sweeping, sharp, and stridentthan that of Fuller. However,Burgatknows his subjectmatterexceedingly well. Armedwith his own research and familiarwith the availablescholarship,Burgatbegins by lamentingthe state of WestHe puts a high premiumon the knowlern discourseon Islam and Islamic fundamentalists. edge of the culture,religion, and language of the region under study.Burgateven finds a benefit in personally meeting Islamic fundamentalist interlocutors and noticing their "physicalappearanceand style of dress [and] the tone of their voice and the framework within which they express themselves"(p. 3). Burgatinsists, correctly,thatpersonaldirect experience is essential as a basis for empirical research of the Islamic fundamentalist phenomenon. Burgatis quite critical of Westernmedia portrayalsof Islam, althoughone can easily note that the French and British media are superiorto Americanmedia when it comes to coverage of the Middle East, or coverage of foreign affairs in general. Even the most respectedmedia outlets in the United States are not as intelligent in their coverage as are mainstreamnewspapersin the United Kingdom and France. Burgat maintainsthat with Westernmedia, "exoticism is thus guaranteed" (p. 16). But exoticism has always been a feature of some classical Orientalistliterature.The prostituteor the princess is of more interest to the Westerneye than are the majorityof women in the region. Similarly,the extremeconditions of sexism and misogyny in SaudiArabiaare often extrapolatedon the entire Middle East and the Islamic worlds. Burgat's chapter on women is a must read for anybody who has not been reading feminist literatureon, or by, women in the Middle East. He analyzes the veil without falling into the outrightjudgmental hostility common in some Westernwriting; nor can he be accused of naivete or of subscribing to that emotional and uncritical school of Islamic apologetics that dominates much of Islamic studies in the Middle East. Burgat shows women of the Middle East as they are, in their diversity,and not as a monolithic group that is helpless and eager for Westerntears of sympathy,or for US-style "warsof liberation."He identifies the tension between professional feminist-leaningwomen and the Islamic fundamentalistagenda (pp. 145-47). But he believes that the dynamics of the struggle within the "Islamistmovement"is much more likely to provide answers to the problems posed by the relationship between Islamism and modernization,than by the struggle between feminists and fundamentalists(p. 151). Burgathas a very interestingengagementwith Olivier Roy's thesis in his The Failure of Political Islam (Harvard UniversityPress, 1994), and suggests thatperhapsit was Western methodology that may have failed, and that Islamism may in fact "evolve" (p. 161). The evolution of FIS (FrontIslamiquedu Salut) in Algeria is an example on Burgat'sside, although one can enter into a debate about sincerity and motives, which no one can

MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL* 133 decisively resolve. Burgatalso discusses the phenomenonof Islamismin the context of its dealings not only with the repressivestate, but also with the secularleftist opposition.He concedes that Middle East governmentshave enjoyed almost unparalleledstability for at least three decades, but he does not see that as a result of the failure of the opposition as Yet, it is hardto disagree with Roy that much as it is the result of fierce authoritanianism. Islamism has been incapable of providing solutions to the acute social and economic problemsfaced by Muslims in the Middle East. Burgatis also correctin pointing out the deceptive and manipulativemethods of Arab governments,who legalize some fundamentalists but only to underminethe powersof rivalIslamists(e.g., Morocco).And to the West, the Arab governments wish to characterizetheir Islamic fundamentalistdissidents (or even their seculardissidents) as fans of Usama Bin Ladin no matterwhat. This facilitates Western,particularly American,toleranceif not outrightsupportfor their oppression. Fuller and Burgathave thus given readersmuch to ponderand discuss. The Future of Political Islam and Face to Face with Islam standas proof thatnot all books on the Middle Fine academicbooks written East and Islam adhereto the paradigmsof the Islam industry. by trainedand knowledgeable experts are still being published, althoughthey might not get the media notoriety,or the attentionof the public or of governmentofficials that they deserve. Yet, as mentioned at the outset, the market is saturatedwith pseudo-authoritative Middle East, many of which have been works on political Islam and on the contemporary written by "instantexperts" - scholars, journalists, and ministers who have no backgroundin Middle East or Islamic studies. Some membersof this group,like Paul Berman, may even come from the American"left."Berman,who claims to have spent time uncovering the real origins of Islamic terrorism,thus stumbles across Sayyid Qutb.' Berman andto makehis story behindMuslim terrorism, regardsSayyid Qutbas the real inspiration more palatableto Westernaudiences,links Qutbwith Europeanfascism and Nazism. This link is of course politically convenient,as all forms of war and violence arejustified when directed against fascists and Nazis. But those references to the phenomenonof "Islamic fascism"which mayhave been popularized Hitchens by formerleftistjournalistChristopher ignore a basic fact. Bin Ladin and his fellow travelershave failed to inspire "themasses," the so-called "Arabstreet."Theirrepeatedcalls for Jihadhave fallen on deaf Muslim ears. Robert Spencer,who (like Berman)does not have any backgroundin Middle East or Islamic studies, and who is active in right-wing Christiancauses, has now written two books on mattersIslamic. Spencer,much like Berman,insists that Bin Ladinis an Islamic figure who inspiresthe masses. Spenceris very good at findingquotationsfromthe Qur'an or from obscureMuslim clerics to "prove"the dangerof Islam. However,this methodcan easily be turnedagainsthim. There are in the Old and New Testamentelements that are as - as his anthology disturbingandoffensive - if not more, in the case of the Old Testament of Islam's statements. Far from adding to our knowledge or promoting understanding between peoples, cultures, and religions, this method merely encourages fanatics on all sides, not scholars, to engage in one-upmanship. Spencer states that "[w]hen modern Muslims like JaffarUmar Thalib [sic] and Usama Bin Ladin declareJihad,Muslims take them seriously...."2 In the new world of the Islam industry,all sources are treatedequally, and documentationis unnecessary.However,those who want to employ endnotes in Araof the Middle East and Islamcan now rely on daily supply bic or Persianfor their"studies" of the media's favorite source on the region nowadays, MEMRI (Middle East Media
1. Paul Berman,Terror and Liberalism(New York:W.W.Norton, 2003).

and the West America HowJihadStill Threatens Muslim Soldiers: 2. Robert Onward Spencer,
DC: Regnery,2003), p. 11. (Washington,

134 * MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL Research Institute), which was founded by "retired"Israeli intelligence experts.3This useful for membersof congress repositoryof selective press items has become particularly duringhearings on the Middle East, for newspapers,and for those newcomers to Middle East studies who seek "damagingquotes"aboutArabs/Muslims. In present-daystudies of Islam, one can easily cite as a source for research"a writeron In Islam and the West(1993), none other than BernardLewis a Muslim bulletin board."4 or a letter cited the authorityof "a young man in a shop where I went to make a purchase"5 Times.'In post-September11thAmerica,BernardLewis, who to the editorin the New York has been accustomed to telling jokes about the Middle East, informs his audiences that jokes are permissibleas a source of public opinion orientationsbecause they are the "only authenticand uncensoredexpression of political opinion."7[In fact, public opinion surveys are conducted and published in many countriesof the region.] Lewis deserves special attention.As is well known, Lewis was brought back from retirement to advise the US government. He has visited the White House, though he refuses to confirmhaving met with PresidentGeorge W. Bush. Lewis' recent books, What WentWrong?and The Crisis of Islam, were on the best seller lists simultaneously,and his older books remainin print. But one finds a contrastbetween his historicalbooks, where he is thoroughand where his scholarshipis based on extensive researchand knowledge (e.g., his learnedbook on the emergenceof modernTurkey),and his popularbooks on the ModernMiddle East, which are woefully devoid of researchand can be quite lacking in basic knowledge about the region. In writing about contemporaryIslam, for years Lewis has been largely recycling his from where?). In this 1976 Commentaryarticle titled "The Return of Islam" ("return" piece, Lewis exhibits his adherenceto the most discreditedforms of classical Orientalist He therebyresurrectsthe dogmas by invoking such terms as "themodernWesternmind."8 notion of an epistemological distinction between "our"mind and "theirs,"as articulated by Raphael Patai in The Arab Mind (Charles Scribner, 1973), which, incidentally,went into a new printing after September 11th. For Lewis, the Muslim mind never seems to change. Every Muslim, or any Muslim, regardlessof geographyor time, is representative of any or all Muslims. Thus, a quotationfrom an obscure medieval source is sufficient to explain present-daybehavior. Lewis even tracesAbu 'Ammar's(Yasir'Arafat's)own name to early Islamic historyand to the names of the ProphetMuhammad's companions,though 'Arafathimself had explained that his name derives from the root 'amr (a reference to 'Arafat'sconstructionactivities in Kuwaitpriorto his ascension within the Palestine Liberation Organization).Because 'Arafatembraced,literally,AyatollahRuhollahKhomeini of Iranwhen he met him, Lewis finds evidence of a universalIslamic bond. When Lewis revised his book years later, he took note in passing of the deep rift that later developed between 'Arafatand Khomeini by saying simply that "laterthey partedcompany."9 The Islam of BernardLewis is an unchangingIslam. Indeed,accordingto Lewis, Islam is religion, culture, history, people, geography, law, outlook, paradigm,and, of course, texts (preferably,ancient religious texts). Muslims are dominatedexclusively by Islam. 3. See theinvestigative article on MEMRI in Guardian, August12,2002.
4. Spencer,OnwardMuslimSoldiers, p. 21.

5. See Bernard Lewis,IslamandtheWest (NewYork: Oxford University Press,1993),p. 57.

6. Lewis, Islam and the West,p. 100. 7. BernardLewis, "Timefor Toppling:the arguments against"regimechange"arebackward," The WallStreetJournal, September28, 2002. 8. So enamoredis Lewis with thatarticle,thatit also appeared in Islam and the West,p. 134. 9. Lewis, Islam and the West,p. 141.

MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL* 135 He: "ForMuslims, Islam is not merely a system of belief and worship, a compartment of life, so to speak, distinct from other compartments which are the concern of nonreligious authorities administeringnonreligious laws. It is ratherthe whole of life, and its rules include civil, criminal, and even what we would call constitutionallaw."1" The dangersof this view does not lie merely in its impact on college and public educationin the United States, where no studentof Middle East studies can escape Lewis' books. Lewis now has access to the highest circles of the US government.None otherthanVice-PresidentRichard Cheney once answereda question in public by saying: "I've talked to BernardLewis about that very subject."'1 In Lewis' two best-sellingbooks, WhatWent Wrong?and TheCrisis of Islam, the reader reads the same passages and anecdotestwice. Lewis relishes recountingthat syphilis was importedinto the Middle East from the new world.'2His discussion about Napoleon in Egypt appearsin bothbooks, almostverbatim.'3 The secondbook containscalls for (mostly military) action. In The Crisis of Islam, Lewis asserts: "the West must defend itself by whatevermeans."'4Lewis was an enthusiasticchampionof the war on Iraq.In fact, he was one of those who assured the American governmentthat Iraqis (if not all Arabs) would welcome the war on theircountry.[Vice-President Cheneyrelied on the authorityof Fouad Ajami to assertthat not only Iraqis,but all Arabs,would joyously greetAmericantroops'5 welcome them with, in KananMakiya'swords, "sweets and flowers."'6] The Crisis of Modern Islam reveals much about Lewis and the ideology of hostility that permeateshis work, especially when he deals with contemporary events of the Arab world. One is astonishedto read some of Lewis' observationson Muslim and Arab sentiments and opinions. He is deeply convinced that Muslims are "pained" by the absence of the caliphate,' as if this constitutesa serious demandor goal even for Muslim fundamentalist organizations.One does not see crowds chantingfor the restorationof the caliphate. Furthermore,Lewis treats Bin Ladin, not as the fanatic that he is, but as a respected theologian, anotherGhazzali. In other words, he takes his Islamic pronouncementstoo seriously,'8instead of treatinghis subject as the criminalthat he is. Methodologically,he insists thatterrorism by individualMuslims should be consideredIslamic terrorism, while terrorismby individualJews or Christiansis never consideredJewish or Christianterrorism. Lewis' reply to this criticismis thatwhat is uniqueaboutMuslim terrorists is thatthey are the only ones who appropriate the religious label for their actions.'9Perhapshe is right if one is to ignore some facts: thatIsraeldefines itself as a Jewish state,thatJewish settlers who operateagainst Palestiniansdo so in the name of religious conviction, that Christian

10.Lewis,IslamandtheWest, p. 4. 11. Seethetextin http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/2003/tr20030513-0182.html.

12. See BernardLewis, WhatWentWrong:Western Impactand Middle EasternResponse, New

York: Oxford University Press,2002),p. 39.

13. See Lewis, WhatWentWrong?,p. 31; and BernardLewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy Warand

Terror TheModern Unholy (NewYork: Library, 2003),p. 54.

14. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. xxxii. 15. Forthe full text of Cheney'sspeech, see http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-082602.htm. 16. Makiyausedthose wordsin pressinterviewswithAmerican journalists.See the dispatchby Inter See New in thatprediction. Press Service,March25, 2003. Makiyalaterconcededthathe was "wrong" YorkTimes,November30, 2003. 17. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. xvii. 18. See BernardLewis, "Licenseto Kill: Usamabin Ladin'sDeclarationof Jihad," ForeignAffairs, November-December 1998. 19. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 137.

136 * MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL fundamentalistswho have used violence against abortionclinics do so from a religious perspective.Perhapshe never heardof David Koresh,leader of the BranchDavidians, 82 of whom perishedin Waco,Texas in 1993, or of ReverendJim Jones, leaderof the People's Temple,who presidedover the mass suicide of his hundredsof his followers in Jonestown, Guyana in 1980, or of those Jewish terrorist organizations that are on the US State Department'slist of terroristorganizationsand states. Lewis is free in his retirementnot even to disguise his hostility to Arabs and Muslims hostility thatat least some of his readershad suspectedfor years.After all, he arguedto Dick Cheney before the war, using that dreadedcliche from Zionist and colonial history, that Arabs only understandthe language of force.20His disdain for the Palestinians is unmasked.Though he lists acts of violence by PLO groups - only the ones that are not directedagainstIsraeli soldiers - he lists not one act of Israeli violence againstPalestinians).21 To discredit the Palestinian national movement, he finds it necessary to tell yet again the story of HajjAmin Al-Husayni's visit to Nazi Germany,22 apparentlyseeking to stigmatize all Palestinians with that association. His is so disdainful of the Palestinians that he finds their opposition to Britain during the mandateperiod inexplicable because Lewis is so insistentin attributing he believes thatBritainwas, alas, opposed to Zionism.23 Arab popular antipathy to the United States to Nazi influence and inspiration that he actually maintainsthat Arabs obtained their hostility to the US from reading the likes of This is ratheramusing. Otto Spengler, FreidrichGeorg Junger,and MartinHeidegger.24 There is no evidence that the Egyptianmasses have been known to devour Sein und Zeit (which, incidentally,does not contain anti-Americanism).But even the Ba'th Party,for Lewis, has Nazi components (in fact, the Ba'th, says Lewis, is a melange of Nazism and Soviet communism).25 The powerfulre-entranceof Lewis into the public arenaafter September11thhas only encouragedthe rejuvenationof classical Orientalism.The "political"careerof Ibn Warraq (a pseudonym for a former Muslim) is a good example. Ibn Warraqis on a mission to "expose" and attack the dangers of Islam. For his efforts, he, like Lewis, received an Ibn Warraq invitationto the White House to meet with high-rankingofficials.26 probably takes his name from the courageousfree thinkerin classical Islam, Abu 'Isa Muhammad bin Harunbin Muhammad But unlike the present-dayIbnWarraq, Abu 'Isa was al-Warraq. a courageous freethinkerwho wrote refutationsof more than one religion.27 Ibn Warraq claims to subscribeto secularismand freethinking,yet he objects to Islam only and aligns himself with Christianfundamentalism, which raises questions aboutthe truethrustof his mission. Free thinking, in any religion and against all religions, should be encouraged although there is a difference between religious bigotry and enlightened freethinking. The latest two books by Ibn Warraq merely collect old writingsby classical Orientalists.28 The more rigid and biased the Orientalists, the better for Warraq.Warraqhimself has
20. See Newsweek,March31, 2003.

21. Lewis,TheCrisisof Islam,p. 148.

22. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, pp. 59-60.

23. Lewis,TheCrisisof Islam,p. 94. 24. Lewis,TheCrisisof Islam,p. 69. 25. Lewis,TheCrisisof Islam,p. 118.
26. See the articlein theAmericanProspect,December 17, 2001.

27. See Dominique Urvoy,Lespenseurslibresdans l'Islamclassique: L'interrogation sur la religion chezlespenseurs arabesindependents (Paris: AlbinMichel,1996).
28. See Ibn Warraq(ed) The Questfor the Historical Muhammad(Amherst,NY: Prometheus, 2002); and Ibn Warraq (ed) Whatthe KoranReally Says (Amherst,NY: Prometheus,2002).

MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL* 137 nothing original to say on the subject; he merely resuscitates the writings of those Orientalistswho have been long discredited,such as Henri Lammens and Ernest Renan, among other less discredited Orientalists.Warraqrejects mainstreamOrientalists, like W.M. Watt.He quotes Renan's famous Islam et la Science lecture approvingly:"Toliberate the Muslim from his religion is the best service that one can renderhim."29 It is now acceptableto express such views in polite company. Even the US Congresshas inserteditself into the fray, with some memberswantingto shape Middle East studies to adjust to the augmentedpowers of pro-Israeligroups and terrorism studies.And how frightfullydisturbing thata Middle East expert,Noah Feldman, who advised the US occupationapparatus in Iraq,would be quoted in the year 2003 -25 years after the first release of Orientalism- as saying that "people in the Middle East don't always act rationally,"30 or that the same expert would express his opposition to elections and democracyin Iraqfor fear that "the wrong people could get elected.' The perniciouseffects of the dominanceof the Islam industryover Islam scholarship are, or should be, manifestly clear. So is the remedy.We need to extend the insights and conclusions of scholarly studies of Islam and the Middle East into the realm of Western political and popularcultures.The chasm between the contoursof Westernpolicy debates on Islam and between the scholarlyproductionby expertson Islam and the Middle East is responsiblefor the accusationthat these experts are somewhatguilty not only of political errors,but in some cases, of ties to terrorism.This only places pressureson Westernacademics to toe the political lines of their governments.The horrific events of September 11th have increased the temptations to conform. Thankfully, Fuller and Burgat have chosen to inform, ratherthan to conform.Werethere many more works of Islam scholarship - more of the qualityof TheFutureof Political Islam and Face to Face with Islamand many fewer of the kind churned out by the Islam industry,specialists, the general public, and even US officials would be far better served. And who knows? Maybe with betterknowledge, we can expect to be sparedthose "liberationwars." As'ad AbuKhalilis Professor of Political science at CaliforniaState University, Stanislaus and VisitingProfessor at the Centerfor Middle Eastern Studies at UC, and the US: The Berkeley. He is the authormost recentlyof SaudiArabia,Wahhabiyyah, Seven Stories Press,forthcoming). CrumblingHouse of Saud (New York:

29. See Ibn Warraq (ed) The Questfor the HistoricalMuhammad, p. 19. 30. Quotedin New York Times,October7, 2003. 31. Quotedin New York Times,November29, 2003.