Management

Science and Research

March 2013, Volume 2, Issue 1, PP.16

Cooperation Model in Researching Credit Cost

and Proceeds of Weapon Equipment Supplier
Zhang Rong
Material management and safety engineering institute, Air Force Engineering University, Xian 710038, China
Email: zhangchubing156@sohu.com

Abstract
If good credit is the fundamental for suppliers of aviation weapon equipment having the opportunity to cooperate with military; it
is one of the most aspects to weight the relationship between credit cost and proceeds for the cooperation. The article analyzes the
relationship between credit cost and proceeds of aviation weapon equipment supplier, as well as the trustworthy and loses trust by
suppliers. Game theory is applied to research the cooperation between supplier and military. Through the modeling on the
cooperative game between suppliers of aviation weapon equipment and military, to reveal the fact that taking into account the
credit cost and cooperation realities can decline the odds of dishonesty by the suppliers such that the both cooperative sides receive
much more benefit.
Keywords: Aviation Weapon Equipment Supplier; Credit Cost; Cooperation Game; Credit Evaluation

710038

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1983-

200
07.9-2010.1

2010.3

Email: zhangchubing1
z
56@sohu.com

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