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Rele vant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (May 2013) This article's lead section may not adequately summarize key points of i ts contents. Please consider expanding the lead to provide an accessible overvie w of all important aspects of the article. (June 2012) For the 2009 novella by Stephen King, see Morality (novella). "Appropriate" redirects here. For the rating of activities and media o age groups, see age-appropriate. For other uses, see Appropriation tion). "Immoralist" and "Impropriety" redirect here. For the novel by Andr Immoralist. For the improvised performance company, see Impropriety Not to be confused with Mortality. according t (disambigua Gide, see The (company).

Allegory with a portrait of a Venetian senator (Allegory of the morality of eart hly things), attributed to Tintoretto, 1585 Morality (from the Latin moralitas "manner, character, proper behavior") is the differentiation of intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are "go od" (or right) and those that are "bad" (or wrong). The philosophy of morality i s ethics. A moral code is a system of morality (according to a particular philos ophy, religion, culture, etc.) and a moral is any one practice or teaching withi n a moral code. Morality may also be specifically synonymous with "goodness" or "rightness." Immorality is the active opposition to morality (i.e. opposition to that which is good or right), while amorality is variously defined as an unawar eness of, indifference toward, or disbelief in any set of moral standards or pri nciples.[1][2][3] An example of a moral code is the Golden Rule which states tha t, "One should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself."[4] Contents [hide] 1 Philosophy 1.1 Morality and ethics 1.2 Descriptive and normative 1.3 Realism and anti-realism 2 Anthropology 2.1 Tribal and territorial 2.2 In-group and out-group 2.3 Comparing cultures 3 Evolution 4 Neuroscience 4.1 Brain areas 4.2 Mirror neurons 5 Psychology 6 Morality and politics 7 Morality and religion 7.1 Positions 7.2 Empirical analyses 8 Moral codes 9 See also 10 Notes 11 References 12 Further reading 13 External links Philosophy[edit source | editbeta] Main article: Ethics This section needs additional citations for verification . Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unso urced material may be challenged and removed. (December 2011)

Morality and ethics[edit source | editbeta] Ethics (also known as moral philosophy) is that branch of philosophy which addre sses questions about morality. The word 'ethics' is "commonly used interchangeab ly with 'morality' ... and sometimes it is used more narrowly to mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group, or individual."[5] Likewise, certai n types of ethical theories, especially deontological ethics, sometimes distingu ish between 'ethics' and 'morals': "Although the morality of people and their et hics amounts to the same thing, there is a usage that restricts morality to syst ems such as that of Kant, based on notions such as duty, obligation, and princip les of conduct, reserving ethics for the more Aristotelian approach to practical reasoning, based on the notion of a virtue, and generally avoiding the separati on of 'moral' considerations from other practical considerations."[6] Although t he words are often used as synonyms, morals are beliefs based on practices or te achings regarding how people conduct themselves in personal relationships and in society, while ethics refers to a set or system of principles, or a philosophy or theory behind them. When comparing morality with ethics, the word ethics is o ften used to refer to a philosophical analysis of a particular morality, especia lly when the formal definition is applied. Descriptive and normative[edit source | editbeta] In its descriptive sense, "morality" refers to personal or cultural values, code s of conduct or social mores. It does not connote objective claims of right or w rong, but only refers to that which is considered right or wrong. Descriptive et hics is the branch of philosophy which studies morality in this sense. In its normative sense, "morality" refers to whatever (if anything) is actually right or wrong, which may be independent of the values or mores held by any part icular peoples or cultures. Normative ethics is the branch of philosophy which s tudies morality in this sense. Realism and anti-realism[edit source | editbeta] Philosophical theories on the nature and origins of morality (that is, theories of meta-ethics) are broadly divided into two classes: Moral realism is the class of theories which hold that there are true moral stat ements that report objective moral facts. For example, while they might concede that forces of social conformity significantly shape individuals' "moral" decisi ons, they deny that those cultural norms and customs define morally right behavi or. This may be the philosophical view propounded by ethical naturalists, howeve r not all moral realists accept that position (e.g. ethical non-naturalists).[7] Moral anti-realism, on the other hand, holds that moral statements either fail o r do not even attempt to report objective moral facts. Instead, they hold that m oral sentences are either categorically false claims of objective moral facts (e rror theory); claims about subjective attitudes rather than objective facts (eth ical subjectivism); or else not attempts to describe the world at all but rather something else, like an expression of an emotion or the issuance of a command ( non-cognitivism). Some forms of non-cognitivism and ethical subjectivism, while considered anti-re alist in the robust sense used here, but are considered realist in the sense syn onymous with moral universalism. For example, universal prescriptivism is a univ ersalist form of non-cognitivism which claims that morality is derived from reas oning about implied imperatives, and divine command theory and ideal observer th eory are universalist forms of ethical subjectivism which claim that morality is derived from the edicts of a god or the hypothetical decrees of a perfectly rat ional being, respectively. Anthropology[edit source | editbeta] Tribal and territorial[edit source | editbeta] Celia Green made a distinction between tribal and territorial morality.[8] She c haracterizes the latter as predominantly negative and proscriptive: it defines a person s territory, including his or her property and dependents, which is not to

be damaged or interfered with. Apart from these proscriptions, territorial mora lity is permissive, allowing the individual whatever behaviour does not interfer e with the territory of another. By contrast, tribal morality is prescriptive, i mposing the norms of the collective on the individual. These norms will be arbit rary, culturally dependent and flexible , whereas territorial morality aims at rule s which are universal and absolute, such as Kant s categorical imperative and Geisle r's graded absolutism. Green relates the development of territorial morality to the rise of the concept of private property, and the ascendancy of contract over status. In-group and out-group[edit source | editbeta] Some observers hold that individuals apply distinct sets of moral rules to peopl e depending on their membership of an "in-group" (the individual and those they believe to be of the same culture or race) or an "out-group" (people not entitle d to be treated according to the same rules). Some biologists, anthropologists a nd evolutionary psychologists believe this in-group/out-group discrimination has evolved because it enhances group survival. This belief has been confirmed by s imple computational models of evolution.[9] In simulations this discrimination c an result in both unexpected cooperation towards the in-group and irrational hos tility towards the out-group.[10] Gary R. Johnson and V.S. Falger have argued th at nationalism and patriotism are forms of this in-group/out-group boundary. Jon athan Haidt has noted[11] that experimental observation indicating an in-group c riterion provides one moral foundation substantially used by conservatives, but far less so by liberals. Comparing cultures[edit source | editbeta] This section requires expansion. (August 2011) Peterson and Seligman[12] approach the anthropological view looking across cultu res, geo-cultural areas and across millennia. They conclude that certain virtues have prevailed in all cultures they examined. The major virtues they identified include wisdom / knowledge; courage; humanity; justice; temperance; and transce ndence. Each of these includes several divisions. For instance humanity includes love, kindness, and social intelligence. Fons Trompenaars, author of Did the Pedestrian Die?, tested members of different cultures with various moral dilemmas. One of these was whether the driver of a car would have his friend, a passenger riding in the car, lie in order to protec t the driver from the consequences of driving too fast and hitting a pedestrian. Trompenaars found that different cultures had quite different expectations (fro m none to almost certain).[citation needed] John Newton, author of Complete Conduct Principles for the 21st Century [13] com pared the Eastern and the Western cultures about morality. As stated in Complete Conduct Principles for the 21st Century, One of the important objectives of this book is to blend harmoniously the fine souls regarding conduct in the Eastern a nd the Western cultures, to take the result as the source and then to create new er and better conduct principles to suit the human society of the new century, a nd to introduce a lot of Chinese fine conduct spirits to the Western world. It i s hoped that this helps solve lots of problems the human society of the 21st cen tury faces, including (but not limited to the Eastern and the Western cultures) what a single culture cannot. Evolution[edit source | editbeta] See also: Altruism, Evolution of morality, Evolutionary ethics The development of modern morality is a process closely tied to the Sociocultura l evolution of different peoples of humanity. Some evolutionary biologists, part icularly sociobiologists, believe that morality is a product of evolutionary for ces acting at an individual level and also at the group level through group sele ction (though to what degree this actually occurs is a controversial topic in ev

olutionary theory). Some sociobiologists contend that the set of behaviors that constitute morality evolved largely because they provided possible survival and/ or reproductive benefits (i.e. increased evolutionary success). Humans consequen tly evolved "pro-social" emotions, such as feelings of empathy or guilt, in resp onse to these moral behaviors. Conversely, it has been argued by other biologist s that the humans developed truly moral, altruistic instincts.[14] On this understanding, moralities are sets of self-perpetuating and ideologicall y-driven behaviors which encourage human cooperation. Biologists contend that al l social animals, from ants to elephants, have modified their behaviors, by rest raining immediate selfishness in order to improve their evolutionary fitness. Hu man morality, though sophisticated and complex relative to other animals, is ess entially a natural phenomenon that evolved to restrict excessive individualism t hat could undermine a group's cohesion and thereby reducing the individuals' fit ness.[15] On this view, moral codes are ultimately founded on emotional instinct s and intuitions that were selected for in the past because they aided survival and reproduction (inclusive fitness). Examples: the maternal bond is selected fo r because it improves the survival of offspring; the Westermarck effect, where c lose proximity during early years reduces mutual sexual attraction, underpins ta boos against incest because it decreases the likelihood of genetically risky beh aviour such as inbreeding. The phenomenon of 'reciprocity' in nature is seen by evolutionary biologists as one way to begin to understand human morality. Its function is typically to ensu re a reliable supply of essential resources, especially for animals living in a habitat where food quantity or quality fluctuates unpredictably. For example, so me vampire bats fail to feed on prey some nights while others manage to consume a surplus. Bats that did eat will then regurgitate part of their blood meal to s ave a conspecific from starvation. Since these animals live in close-knit groups over many years, an individual can count on other group members to return the f avor on nights when it goes hungry (Wilkinson, 1984) Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pie rce (2009) have argued that morality is a suite of behavioral capacities likely shared by all mammals living in complex social groups (e.g., wolves, coyotes, el ephants, dolphins, rats, chimpanzees). They define morality as "a suite of inter related other-regarding behaviors that cultivate and regulate complex interactio ns within social groups." This suite of behaviors includes empathy, reciprocity, altruism, cooperation, and a sense of fairness.[16] In related work, it has bee n convincingly demonstrated that chimpanzees show empathy for each other in a wi de variety of contexts.[17] They also possess the ability to engage in deception , and a level of social 'politics'[18] prototypical of our own tendencies for go ssip and reputation management. Christopher Boehm (1982)[19] has hypothesized that the incremental development o f moral complexity throughout hominid evolution was due to the increasing need t o avoid disputes and injuries in moving to open savanna and developing stone wea pons. Other theories are that increasing complexity was simply a correlate of in creasing group size and brain size, and in particular the development of theory of mind abilities. Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion suggested that our morali ty is a result of our biological evolutionary history and that the Moral Zeitgei st helps describe how morality evolves from biological and cultural origins and evolves with time within a culture. A British poll found that the most important moral points among young people wer e looking after ones family and putting others before yourself.[20] Neuroscience[edit source | editbeta] The brain areas that are consistently involved when humans reason about moral is sues have been investigated by a quantitative large-scale meta-analysis of the b rain activity changes reported in the moral neuroscience literature.[21] In fact , the neural network underlying moral decisions overlapped with the network pert

aining to representing others' intentions (i.e., theory of mind) and the network pertaining to representing others' (vicariously experienced) emotional states ( i.e., empathy). This supports the notion that moral reasoning is related to both seeing things from other persons points of view and to grasping others feelings. These results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decision s is probably domain-global (i.e., there might be no such things as a "moral mod ule" in the human brain) and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective s ub-systems.[21] Brain areas[edit source | editbeta] The explicit making of moral right and wrong judgments coincides with activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) while intuitive reactions to situa tions containing implicit moral issues activates the temporoparietal junction ar ea.[22] Stimulation of the VMPC by transcranial magnetic stimulation has been sh own to inhibit the ability of human subjects to take into account intent when fo rming a moral judgment.[23] Similarly VMPC-impaired persons will judge an action purely on its outcome and are unable to take into account the intent of that ac tion.[24] Mirror neurons[edit source | editbeta] Main article: Mirror neurons Mirror neurons are neurons in the brain that fire when another person is observe d doing a certain action. The neurons fire in imitation of the action being obse rved, causing the same muscles to act minutely in the observer as are acting gro ssly in the person actually performing the action. Research on mirror neurons, s ince their discovery in 1996,[25] suggests that they may have a role to play not only in action understanding, but also in emotion sharing empathy. Cognitive ne uro-scientist Jean Decety thinks that the ability to recognize and vicariously e xperience what another individual is undergoing was a key step forward in the ev olution of social behavior, and ultimately, morality.[26] The inability to feel empathy is one of the defining characteristics of psychopathy, and this would ap pear to lend support to Decety's view.[27][28] Psychology[edit source | editbeta] See also: Kohlberg's stages of moral development and Jean Piaget#Education and d evelopment of morality Kohlberg Model of Moral Development In modern moral psychology, morality is considered to change through personal de velopment. A number of psychologists have produced theories on the development o f morals, usually going through stages of different morals. Lawrence Kohlberg, J ean Piaget, and Elliot Turiel have cognitive-developmental approaches to moral d evelopment; to these theorists morality forms in a series of constructive stages or domains. Social psychologists such as Martin Hoffman and Jonathan Haidt emph asize social and emotional development based on biology, such as empathy. Moral identity theorists, such as William Damon and Mordechai Nisan, see moral commitm ent as arising from the development of a self-identity that is defined by moral purposes: this moral self-identity leads to a sense of responsibility to pursue such purposes. Of historical interest in psychology are the theories of psychoan alysts such as Sigmund Freud, who believe that moral development is the product of aspects of the super-ego as guilt-shame avoidance. Even though we have a sense of responsibility to pursue moral purposes, we still , at least occasionally, engage in immoral behaviour. Such behaviours jeopardize our moral self-image; however, when we engage in immoral behaviours we still fe el as though we are moral individuals. Moral self-licensing attempts to explain this phenomenon and proposes that self-image security increases our likelihood t o engage in immoral behaviour. When our moral self-image is threatened, we can g ain confidence from our past moral behaviour. The more confident we are, the les s we will worry about our future behaviour which actually increases the likeliho

od that we will engage in immoral behaviours.[29][30] Monin and Miller (2001)[29] examined the moral self-licensing effect and found t hat when participants established credentials as non-prejudiced persons, they we re more willing to express politically inc