Descartes' Impact on English Methodology

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The clock metaphor and probabilism: The impact of Descartes on English methodological thought, 165065
Laurens Laudan M.A. Ph.D.
a a
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University College, London, W.C.1 Version of record first published: 02 Jun 2006.
To cite this article: Laurens Laudan M.A. Ph.D. (1966): The clock metaphor and probabilism: The impact of Descartes on English methodological thought, 165065, Annals of Science, 22:2, 73-104 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00033796600203065
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ANNALS OF SCIENCE
A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SINCE THE RENAISSANCE
VoL. 22
June, 1966
(Published November, 1966)
No. 2
Downloaded by [Harvard College] at 15:41 23 April 2013
T H E CLOCK M E T A P H O R AND PI%OBABILISM: T H E IMPACT OF DESCAI%TES ON E N G L I S H METHODOLOGICAL T H O U G H T , 1650-65 B y LAURENS LAUI)AN, M.A., P~.D.* have never been able to come to any very satisfactory conclusions about the influence of Descartes on seventeenth-century English thought. Until very recently, it was thought that his impact was slight, significant--if at Ml--only in theology. In the last several years, however, historians of science have detected Cartesian strains in English mechanics, optics and physiology dating from the 1650s. 1 Gradually, therefore, the real and substantial role of Descartes is coming to be more fully appreciated. However, there is still one aspect of English philosophico-scientific thought where Descartes' positive impact is thought to be negligible, viz., with respect to theories of scientific method. Indeed, most historians who have dealt with the development of scientific method in Britain have written as if the seventeenth century could be understood simply as a series of footnotes to, and commentaries on, Bacon's Novum Organum. Not only is seventeenth-century English philosophy of science said to be Baconian, it is equally thought to represent a violent reaction against the a priori Cartesian model of science, with its emphasis on
HISTORIANS * D e p a r t m e n t of H i s t o r y a n d P h i l o s o p h y o f Science, U n i v e r s i t y College, L o n d o n , W.C.1. T h e a u t h o r is g r a t e f u l to t h e U.S. N a t i o n a l Science F o u n d a t i o n for financial s u p p o r t , a n d to t h e R o y a l Society o f L o n d o n for access to its a r c h i v e s a n d for p e r m i s s i o n to q u o t e f r o m m a t e r i a l of w h i c h c o p y r i g h t r e m a i n s t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e Society. 1 A m o n g t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t a c c o u n t s of C a r t e s i a n influences in B r i t a i n , see: M. Nieolson, ' T h e E a r l y Stage o f C a r t e s i a n i s m in E n g l a n d ', Studies in Philology, 1929, 26, 356-374; J .Saveson, ' D e s c a r t e s ' Influence on J o h n S m i t h , C a m b r i d g e P l a t o n i s t ', J. Hist. Ideas, 1959, ~0, 255-263; S. L a m p r e c h t , ' T h e Role of D e s c a r t e s in 17th C e n t u r y E n g l a n d ', Studies in the History of Ideas, Boulder, Colorado, 1935; E. B u r t t , Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, N e w York, 1932, passim; a n d Marie B o a s [Hall], ' T h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e Mechanical P h i l o s o p h y ', Osiris, 1952, 10, 412-541. F r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f this paper, t h e article b y Mrs. H a l l is p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e in e x h i b i t i n g D e s c a r t e s ' influence on E n g l i s h theories of m a t t e r , a t t r a c t i o n a n d p n e u m a t i c s .
Ann. of S~i.~Vol. 22, :No. 2.
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all-embracing systems. These two factors, veneration for Bacon and scorn for Descartes, are allegedly the major stimuli for English writings on method from Hobbes to Newton. But apart from its already suspicious tidiness and simplicity, this account has some profoundly disquieting features, not least of which is the fact t h a t m a n y English scientists and methodologists of this period were as vocal in their esteem for Descartes as in their idolatry for Bacon; indeed, m a n y praised Descartes more lavishly than Bacon. More significant, however, than such pompous deference, several natural philosophers suggested that their accounts of scientific method were derived from, and perfectly compatible with, Descartes' views on the subject. Unless such scientists were seriously misled, we must critically re-examine the view of modern scholars like R. F. Jones who insist that Descartes' methodological ideas had negligible impact compared with Bacon's. ~ There are, of course, well-established precedents for Jones's claim. The experimental tenor of the early Royal Society and its almost pathological aversion to hypothetical systembuilding seem to be symptoms of a latent, but well-entrenched, antiCartesianism. Furthermore, Thomas Sprat, in his influential History of the Royal Society (1667), extols the virtues of the experimental philosophy and barely mentions Descartes, except as an example of bad physics. This account is further reinforced by the lip-service which most British methodologists paid to Bacon, constantly speaking in exemplary tones of ' t h e noble Verulam ', ' o u r illustrious Lord Bacon ', etc. But despite such plausible precedents, this picture of Bacon as the sole guiding light
F o r example, J o n e s asserts t h a t ' E x p e r i m e n t M philosophy r e m a i n s a t h i n g distinct from the mechanical [and hypothetical] a n d Bacon, w h o was the chief sponsor of the former, far outweighs in i m p o r t a n c e Descartes, w h o lent his great influence to the l a t t e r . . . Needless to say, the scientific m o v e m e n t in E n g l a n d in the t h i r d q u a r t e r of the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . . w a s largely inspired b y the great Chancellor [Bacon] . . .' (Ancients and Moderns, St. Louis, 1961, p. 169). Elsewhere he notes, ' it is a m i s t a k e to thilfl~ Cartesianism inspired the scientific m o v e m e n t in E n g l a n d ' (ibid., p. 185). J o n e s even goes so far as to suggest t h a t this period in English science should be called the ' Bacon-faced generation ' (ibid., pp. 237 ft.). F. W. W e s t a w a y , a n o t h e r writer w h o denies Descartes' influence on English m e t h o d ology, asserts t h a t ' Cartesianism took b u t slight hold in E n g l a n d ' (Scientific Method: Its Philosophy and Practise, L o n d o n , 1919, p. 127). W i t h Boyle in particular, historians h a v e been too quick to a p p l y t h e :Baeonian label. Thus, Butterfield, in a long discussion of Boyle's ideas, clings tenaciously to the view t h a t Boyle w a s a d e v o u t follower of Bacon, withou~ ever hinting a b o u t a possible debt Boyle m i g h t owe to Descartes (cf. H. Butterfield, Origins of Modern Science, London, 1957, pp. 130-38). Marie Boas [Hall], t a k i n g a similar line, argues t h a t Boyle's c orpuscularism (and the m e t h o d o l o g y which sustains it) w a s n o t derived f r o m Descartes b u t was, rather, ' a n independent d e v e l o p m e n t along lines suggested b y B a c o n ' (Osiris, 1952, 10~ p. 461): Recently, however, Mrs. I-Iall has conceded t h a t ' t h o u g h it was B a c o n w h o m a i n l y inspired Boyle, he was influenced b y Descartes as well ' (Robert Boyle on l~atural Philosophy, Bloomington, I n d i a n a , 1965, 63).
The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism
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of British philosophy of science is too one-sided and seriously oversimplifies the diversity of the origins of English methodology in this period. While it is certainly true to say that such writers generally endorsed Baconian experimentalism, 8 it is not correct to think that they all accepted his inductivism as well. Many thinkers were quite sceptical about the possibility of discovering indubitable scientific principles b y any quasi-inductive process. In opposition to Bacon, they freely and enthusiastically accepted Descartes' suggestion that the scientist must be content with hypothetical principles and conjectures rather than true and valid inductions. Descartes' hypotheticalism, when blended with Baconian experimentalism, became ~ cornerstone of the methodologies of several English philosophers, especially Boyle, Glanvill and Locke. In the general enthusiasm for Bacon, however, Descartes' contributions to English methodological thought have been neither documented nor carefully assessed. This paper is not an attempt to deny Bacon's real contributions b u t seeks rather to focus attention on another equally important stimulant to English philosophy of science, Descartes. Thus, I will argue, in contrast to Jones and other writers, that many of the major British methodologists derived their philosophies of science as much from Descartes as from Bacon. I t follows, as a corollary to this, that they were neither so inductive nor so opposed to speculation as has often been suggested. I will claim that Descartes' methodology (especially that developed in the latter half of the Principles) was a fertile source for discussions of method among the English thinkers; and especially that his view of the universe as a ' mechanical engine ' or clock whoso internal parts can only be conjectured about served as an important stimulus for the English writers on method. In sum, I want to investigate the extent to which the hypothetical method of several seventeenth-century English scientists and philosophers is derived from Descartes' version of that method. Before we can understand the debt of the English hypothetiealists to Descartes, we must clarify the sense in which his methodology can be characterized as ' hypothetical '. Such emphasis has been placed on the a prioristic method, which he espouses in the Discourse on Method, that it m a y seem strange to suggest that he believed hypotheses to be indispens3 More o f t e n t h a n not, it w a s n o t e v e n Baconian e x p e r i m e n t a l i s m t h a t was a p p l a u d e d b u t s i m p l y e x p e r i m e n t a l i s m . T h e w o r k of scholars s u c h as F. R. J o h n s o n (Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England, B a l t i m o r e , 1937) m a k e s it h i g h l y d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l spirit o f E n g l i s h science c a n b e a t t r i b u t e d to B a c o n a t all. M a n y o f B a c o n ' s predecessors a n d c o n t e m p o r a r i e s (e.g. H a r v e y a n d Gilbert) were a c c o m p l i s h e d experim e n t a l i s t s long before t h e a p p e a r a n c e of t h e Novum Organum.
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able to science. ~ The m y t h t h a t Descartes was a rigid rationalist, consistently opposed to all scientific conjecture, is now so widespread that, to counter-balance it, we must begin by summarizing briefly the methodology which he develops in the Principles, and which is even formulated in embryonic form in the Regulae, the Discourse, the Meditations and the Dioptrique. We must read the Principles, as the Englishmen of his time did, without bringing to it the prejudices t h a t come from excessive pre-occupation with the a priorism of the Meditations. (Equally, we must read it without forcing it into anachronous categories such as ' rationalism ' or ' empiricism '. Such pigeon-holes, whimsical inventions of Enlightenment historians, viciously undermine any attempt to understand seventeenth-century science and philosophy.) The figures I will be discussing knew Descartes primarily through the Principles 5 and it was thus natural for them to assume t h a t he adopted a modest pose about the possibility o f certainty in science, rather than the vain and omniscient posture of the Discourse. Towards the end of the Fourth P a r t of the Principles (1644), Descartes makes a surprising confession. After trying to deduce the particular characteristics of chemical change from his first principles (i.e., matter and motion), he concedes failure. His programme for the derivation of the phenomena of chemistry and physics from a priori truths remains uncompleted. His first principles are, he admits, simply too general to permit him to deduce statements from them about the specific way particular chunks of matter behave under particular conditions. I t is not t h a t matter behaves in violation of these first principles; Descartes was too confident, and his principles too vague, for him to be forced to admit that. But the very generality of his principles made them practically useless for explaining and predicting particular events. 6 Not content with leaving anything unexplained,
4 :Historians are g r a d u a l l y b e g i n n i n g to recognize t h e i m p o r t a n c e of D e s c a r t e s ' h y p o thetical m e t h o d a n d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l role it p l a y e d in his p h i l o s o p h y of science. Especially useful in t h i s r e g a r d are G. B u e h d a h l ' s discussions in ' D e s c a r t e s ' A n t i c i p a t i o n o f a " Logic of Scientific D i s c o v e r y " ', Scientific Change (ed. A. C. Crombie), L o n d o n , 1962, pp. 399-417, a n d ' T h e l%elevance of D e s c a r t e s ' P h i l o s o p h y for M o d e r n P h i l o s o p h y of Science', Brit. J. Hist. Sci., 1963, 1~ 227-249. See also R. Blake, ' T h e Role of E x p e r i e n c e in D e s c a r t e s ' T h e o r y of M e t h o d ', in Theories of Scientific Method (ed. E. Madden), Seattle, 1960, pp. 75-103. 5 A l t h o u g h a n E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n of t h e Discourse a p p e a r e d in L o n d o n in 1649, its circulation s e e m s to h a v e b e e n quite limited. A p p a r e n t l y D e s c a r t e s ' Passions of the Soul was widely circulated in Britain, b u t since it h a s little of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l interest, we shall neglect it in o u r discussion. 6 A s he p u t it in t h e Discourse: ' B u t I m u s t confess also t h a t t h e p o w e r o f n a t u r e is so v a s t a n d ample, a n d t h e s e principles are so simple a n d general, t h a t I o b s e r v e d h a r d l y a n y p a r t i c u l a r effect c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h I could n o t a t once recognize t h a t it m i g h t be d e d u c e d f r o m t h e principles in m a n y different w a y s a n d m y g r e a t e s t difficulty is u s u a l l y to discover i n w h i c h of t h e s e w a y s t h e effect does d e p e n d on t h e m ' (l~; Descartes, Philosophical Works, t r a n s . , I-Ialdane a n d Ross, N e w York, 1931, col. i, p. 121).
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Descartes departed from his usual devotion to clear and distinct ideas and advocated the use of intermediate theories (less general than the first principles, but more general than the phenomena), which were sufficiently explicit to permit the explanation of individual events and which were, at the same time, compatible with, but not deducible from, the first principles. Descartes recognized t h a t all such intermediary theories were necessarily hypothetical. Because they were not clearly and distinctly perceived, it was possible t h a t they were wrong. After all, nature is describable in a wide variety of ways and the fact t h a t an explanation worked was no proof t h a t it was true. He was a sufficiently sophisticated logician to realize t h a t ' one m a y deduce some very true and certain conclusions from suppositions that are false or u n c e r t a i n ' / Descartes goes on to suggest t h a t we do not need assurances of t r u t h in such matters. I t will suffice if we can give an account of how nature might behave, not necessarily how nature does behave. After all, his was a corpuscular philosophy which sought to explain the macroscopic world in terms of sub-microscopic particles. B y definition, such particles were unobservable and so any specific properties we attribute to them (e.g., such-and-such a size, shape, and motion) can only be done tentatively and with a clear appreciation of their hypothetical character. We can, of course, be sure that they have some size, shape and motion (our first principles guarantee t h a t much), but we remain forever in doubt about the particular properties they are given, s Descartes justifies this excursion into the hypothetical by means of a metaphor which was widely exploited by later English writers who, as eorpuscularians like Descartes, wanted some rational apology for their use of hypotheses. He suggests t h a t we imagine the world on the analogy of a watch, whose face is visible but whose internal construction is forever excluded from view. In such a case, the most we can say about the mechanisms of the watch is conjectural opinion, not infallible knowledge. We canpropose mechanisms for how the internal parts of the watch might be arranged, though we can never, ex hypothesis, get inside to see if we are right. Because the watch might be constructed in any number of ways, it is sufficient if we outline some possible arrangement which would account for its external behaviour (e.g., hands moving, cuckoos calling and bells chiming). In the same way, the physicist has honoured his commitments so long as the mechanisms he proposes are compatible with the phenomena at hand. To ask for more t h a n this is to misunderstand the limitations on the physicist. The passage itself reads as follows: ' I t may be retorted to this that, although I may have imagined
R. Descartes, Oeuvres (ed. A d a m a n d Tannery), P a r i s 1897-1957, vol. ii, p. 199. s , I frankly confess t h a t concerning corporeal things, I k n o w only this: t h a t t h e y can be divided, s h a p e d a n d m o v e d in all sorts of w a y s . . . ' (ibid., vol, ix, p. 102).
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causes capable of producing effects similar to those we see, we should not conclude for t h a t reason t h a t those we see are produced b y these causes; for just as an industrious watch-maker m a y make two watches which keep time equally well and without any difference in their external appearance, yet without any similarity in the composition of their wheels, so it is certain t h a t God works in an infinity of diverse ways [each of which enables H i m to make everything appear in the world as it does, without making it possible for the h u m a n mind to know which of all these ways He has decided to use]. And I believe I shall have done enough if the causes that I have listed are such that the effects they m a y produce are similar to those we see in the world, without being informed whether there are other ways in which they are produced. '~ T h e clock a n a l o g y is n o t m e r e l y an a f t e r t h o u g h t which D e s c a r t e s t h r e w in t o illustrate his a r g u m e n t . R a t h e r , it f o r m e d an integral p a r t of his w a y of looking a t t h e world a n d t h e role he assigned to t h e corpuscular p h i l o s o p h y in explaining t h a t world. H e tells us t h a t m a c h i n e s like t h e clock served as models for developing his m e c h a n i c a l a c c o u n t of nature: ' And in this, the example of certain things made by h u m a n art was of no little assistance to me; for I recognize no difference between these machines and natural b o d i e s . . . '1 To u n d e r s t a n d t h e significance of the clock a n a l o g y a n d w h y it led D e s c a r t e s t o a d v o c a t e a h y p o t h e t i c a l m e t h o d , we m u s t look carefully a t his a c c o u n t of scientific knowledge. T h o u g h he f r e q u e n t l y speaks of deducing t h e facts of physics f r o m his first principles, n he n e v e r offers a n y d e d u c t i o n which does in f a c t e x h a u s t i v e l y or u n i q u e l y e x p l a i n some p a r t i c u l a r in t e r m s of these v e r y general principles. W e need m a n y o t h e r a s s u m p t i o n s to explain w h y o b s e r v a b l e bodies b e h a v e t h e w a y t h e y do, a n d these a s s u m p t i o n s c a n n o t all be derived f r o m t h e first principles. W h e n e v e r D e s c a r t e s a c t u a l l y tries to deduce optical a n d m e c h a n i c a l p h e n o m e n a f r o m t h e first principles, he p e r s i s t e n t l y fails a n d m u s t fall b a c k on a v a r i e t y of h y p o t h e t i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s . N o r should we b e s t a r t l e d t o find t h a t t h e m a t t e r - i n - m o t i o n p a r a d i g m is too c o m p r e s s e d to enable us to e x p l a i n p a r t i c u l a r events. A f t e r all, e v e r y b o d y has m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n , b u t only s o m e are luminous, or m a g n e t i c , or dense, or abrasive. Clearly s o m e t h i n g else is i n v o l v e d which gives m a t t e r these characteristics. W a n t i n g to a v o i d a n y notion of occult forces (because o n l y m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n t r u l y exist), Descartes finds t h a t t h e only w a y to explain such
9 Ibid., vol. ix, p. 322. The passage in square brackets only occurs in the French edition of the Principles, not the Latin. lo Ibid., vol. viii, p. 326. 11Recall Descartes' classic remark that ' As for physics I should believe myself to know nothing of it if I were only able to say how things may b% without demonstrating that they cannot be otherwise ' (ibid., vol. iii, p. 39),
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properties as light and magnetism is to assume t h a t bodies exhibiting these properties have a different sort of motion t h a n bodies which do not have these properties. 12 Despite Descartes' claim t h a t he could deduce everything in his optics from his clear and distinct ideas, he is continually forced to employ assumptions t h a t do not follow from a n y knowledge we have of the first principles. He is compelled to make additional assumptions about the constitution of moving matter. Such assumptions form an essential part of every scientific explanation. This difficulty is even clearer in the Principles where Descartes tries to explain physical and chemical change. Again, he concludes t h a t the first principles are too general to permit us to explain any event uniquely, and in saying as much, he finally comes to grips with the problem plaguing his a priori physics. In addition to the first principles, we need a set of principles of lower generality which will enable us to discover the specific mechanisms of nature. But these less general prineicles cannot be deduced from the first principles; and Descartes was certainly aware t h a t these principles of intermediate generality were not deducible from his metaphysical strictures about nature. Buchdahl has correctly noted t h a t ' I t is a scholar's legend t h a t Descartes consistently believed t h a t his physics was deducible from first principles...,13. Descartes' endorsement of the hypothetical method is most explicit in t h a t section of the Princ@les where he develops the doctrine of the three elements, which he used extensively to explain chemical and physical change. Among the assumptions of this theory is the claim t h a t matter is corpuscular and t h a t these corpuscles have a certain size, shape, and velocity. He says of these assumptions: ' we cannot determine by reason how big these pieces of matter are, how quickly they move, or what circles they describe... [this] is a thing we must learn from observation. Therefore, we are free to make any assumptions we like about them, so long as all the consequences agree with experience... '. ~
i2 I n t h e Diop~ics, for e x a m p l e , DesearSes tries to e x p l a i n different coloured r a y s o f light. H e s u g g e s t s t h a t light is c o m p o s e d of spherical corpuscles m o v i n g in s t r a i g h t lines a t infinite velocity, a n d w i t h a r o t a t i o n a l m o t i o n a b o u t t h e i r centres. Different eoloured r a y s of light are d u e to t h e differential speeds of a x i a t r o t a t i o n w h i c h t h e corpuscles c a n a s s u m e . A f a s t s p i n a p p e a r s to be red light, a m o d e r a t e s p i n a s yellow, a n d a slow s p i n a s blue. Now, D e s c a r t e s h a s s u c c e e d e d in e x p l a i n i n g t h e p h e n o m e n a of colour w i t h o u t recourse to entities e x c e p t m a t t e r - i n - m o t i o n . B u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e , he h a s b e e n forced to go b e y o n d t h e k n o w l e d g e g i v e n b y t h e first principles to h y p o t h e s i z e , w i t h n e i t h e r empirical evidence n o r a priori reasons, t h a t different a t o m s o f m a t t e r r e , a t e a t different speeds a n d t h a t s u c h r o t a t i o n is t h e c a u s e of colour. T h u s , h e d e d u c e s t h e p h e n o m e n a of colour f r o m t h e c o n j u n c t i o n of t h e first principles ' m a t t e r ' a n d ' m o t i o n ' and a n a s s u m p t i o n a b o u t differential speeds of r o t a t i o n . i3 G. J3uchdahl, in Scientific Change (ed. A. C. Crombie), L o n d o n , 1962, p. 411. 14 1%. Descartes, Oeuvres, 1897-1957, vol, ix, p, 325,
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Here again, matter and motion are too general to explain the phenomena. We must, he insists, resort to less general hypotheses about the size and configuration of matter in order to explain the world. The scientist thus resembles the skilled watch-maker of the analogy who is given a watch but cannot see its internal mechanisms. Like the watch-maker, he knows the general principles which govern his subject matter, but he is uncertain about the way t h e y exhibit themselves in any particular case. Equally like the watch-maker, the scientist can offer only conjectures about internal construction and mechanisms. The role of the first principles in physics is thus to circumscribe the range of acceptable hypotheses by excluding certain entities. Our first principles tell us, for example, not to develop a science based on the hypothesis of a void; they warn us against hypotheses couched in the teleological language of final causality; and they forbid hypotheses postulating action at a distance. Viewed in this light, corpuscular metaphysics does not dictate which physical system we adopt, but only gives us certain regulative rules. Matter and motion thus function much as Occam's razor or the assumption of nature's uniformity operate in modern science. Physical hypotheses must be compatible with such regulative principles, but they are not deducible from them. But though Descartes concedes t h a t science is necessarily hypothetical and probabilistic, he is not willing to say t h a t all hypotheses are equally good or t h a t the scientist can never be confident about his principles. He does suggest t h a t mere ad hoc hypotheses, invented to explain one particular phenomenon, are not very convincing. :But, he insists, when we put forward a hypothesis which accounts for a wide variety of phenomena successfully, we can be reasonably confident (though not certain) t h a t it is true: ' Although there exist several individual effects to which it is easy to adjust diverse causes [i.e., hypotheses], one to each, it is however not so easy to adjust one and the same [hypothesis] to several different effects, unless it be the true one from which they proceed. ,15 While insisting on the conjectural character of scientific hypotheses, Descartes was careful not to succumb to the sceptic's temptation to grant all hypotheses equal status and improbability. He clearly declared the right of the scientist to believe those hypotheses which accounted for a wide cross-section of the facts at hand: ' it is not likely t h a t t h a t from which one may deduce all the phenomena is false ,.6 Thus, a sound hypothesis is one which is both compatible with the data and with the first principles, matter and motion. On Descartes' view, the logical gap separating the first principles from the phenomena can be bridged only
1~ 1bid., vol. ii, p, 199. ~t~ 1bid,, vol. ix, p, 123.
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by hypotheses. Since compatibility rather t h a n deducibility is the relation between the first principles and the hypotheses of physics, the first principles function in the same way, vis-a-vis the hypotheses, as the facts do. Our first principles, like the data, can inform us t h a t certain hypotheses are wrong; but they cannot tell us which hypotheses are right. We can never get inside nature's clock to see if nature's mechanisms are what we think them to be. However, the clock analogy is important, not only for the considerable light it throws on Descartes' use of the method of hypothesis, but equally because it, or variants on it, were widely cited by subsequent writers who, as corpuscularians, were struggling with the same methodological problems. 17 I n particular, it was used by m a n y English writers (Boyle, Glanvill, Power and Locke) who, historians tell us, were Baconian experimentalists, uninfluenced by Descartes. It thus provides a convenient motif in terms of which to explain the development of the method of hypothesis between Descartes and Newton
B O Y L E A N D C A R T E S I A N :PROBABILISM
We now turn to consider the more general theme of this paper, namely, the impact of Descartes' hypothetical method on English writers of the following generation, is His influence can be seen most prominently in the work of Robert Boyle, who did much to fuse the Baeonian and Cartesian traditions into a coherent and sophisticated view of scientific method. Because Boyle's philosophy of science unifies major elements from both Descartes and Bacon, it must be understood in the context of the traditions which those two writers initiated. 19 In the mid-seventeenth century, Baconianism and Cartesianism signified quite different things
17 D. J. de Solla Price ( ' A u t o m a t a a n d t h e Origins of M e c h a n i s m a n d Mechanistic P h i l o s o p h y ', Technology and Culture, 1964, 5, 9-23) h a s delineated t h e f u n d a m e n t a l role t h a t clocks a n d o t h e r a u t o m a t a p l a y e d as analogies for t h e m e c h a n i c a l a n d c o r p u s c u l a r scientists. H o w e v e r , Price h a s n o t d r a w n a t t e n t i o n to t h e methodological r a m i f i c a t i o n s of t h e clock-anMogy w h i c h I i n t e n d to discuss in t h i s paper. is I m u s t m a k e it as explicit as possible t h a t t h i s p a p e r is not a n a t t e m p t to d a t e precisely t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of Cartesian ideas~into E n g l i s h science a n d p h i l o s o p h y . F o r t h a t , we s h o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e to look closely a t H o b b e s , D i g b y , Charleton, C u d w o r t h a n d More r a t h e r t h a n Boyle a n d t h e o t h e r writers I deM with. M y g e m is a r a t h e r different one, n a m e l y , to s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e are certain C a r t e s i a n s t r a i n s w h i c h l o o m large in B o y l e ' s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l writings. W h e t h e r t h e y c a m e directly f r o m D e s c a r t e s or t h r o u g h a n i n t e r m e d i a r y source is a s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n w h i c h I t o u c h only incidentally. (Cf. L. Gysi, Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth, B e r n , 1962.) 1~ p . p. W i e n e r ' s article on ~Boyle's p h i l o s o p h y of science {' T h e e x p e r i m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y of R o b e r t Boyle ', Phil. Rev., I932, 41, 594-609), one of t h e earliest on t h i s topic, m u s t be r e a d w i t h m u c h caution. W i e n e r m i s q u o t e s Boyle on two occasions (footnotes 6 a n d 22), a n d once d r a w s inferences f r o m t h e t e x t w h i c h it could n o t possibly s u p p o r t (footnote 5). H o w e v e r , W i e n e r does a capable job o f s h o w i n g B o y l e ' s c o n t e m p t for, a n d i g n o r a n c e of, ancient and m e d i e v M science.
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from what t he y do today. Bacon was not praised (or condemned) as an inductive philosopher so much as a n experimental one. Descartes, on the other hand, was not treated as an a priorist, but rather as an advocate of the corpuscular philosophy who encouraged the use of hypotheses in science. Boyle borrowed Bacon's experimentalism and Descartes' hypothetical corpuscularism, while prudently overlooking the inductive excesses of Bacon and the rationalistic strictures of Descartes. So far as we can judge from his published works, it never occurred to Boyle t h a t the principles of science could be discovered either inductively or a priori. B y neglecting Bacon's inductivism and Descartes' rationalism, Boyle viewed the methodologies of these two authors as healthy contrasts of emphasis within a commonly-held scientific world-view. Nor should we be startled to find resemblances between the ' experimentalist ' Boyle and the ' r a t i ona l i st ' Descartes. After all and above all, t h e y were both corpuscularians. Boyle began his philosophical education with heavy doses from Descartes; ~ and, as we have seen, the Descartes of the P r i n c i p l e s was neither so a priori nor so anti-experimental
~0 Boyle's u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t s leave absolutely no d o u b t t h a t he h a d read Descartbs, and m o r e t h a n once. F r o m his earliest p a p e r s on n a t u r a l philosophy until his last ones, he m a d e repeated references to Descartes a n d the Cartesians. There is one particularly interesting passage in which, discarding his n o r m a l humility, he candidly asesses the contributions of several i m p o r t a n t s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scientific figures. His a d m i r a t i o n for Descartes is certainly undisguised: ' t t o b b e s est obseur sans agr6ment, singulier e n s e s id6es, scavant, mais peu solide, i n c o n s t a n t dans sa doctrine: car il est t a n r e s t Epicurien, t a n r e s t Peripateticien. Boile est exact dans ses observations: il n ' y a personne on l ' E u r o p e qui air enrichy la philosophic de r a n t d'experiences que luy: il raissone assez c o n s e q u e m m e n t s u r ses experiences, lesquelles apr6s t o u t ne s e n t p a s t o u j o u r s indubitables: p arce que eesprincipes ne s e n t pas t o u j o u r s e e r t a i n s . . . Gassendi, qui n ' a v o u l u passer que p o u r r e s t a u r a t e u r de la philosophic de Demoerite et d'Epieure, parle peu de son chef, il n ' a presque rien de luy, que la beaut6 du stile, p a r ou il p e u t passer p o u r u n a u t e u r admirable: p o u r le refuter dans sa physique, on n ' a besoin que des a r g u m e n s d'Aristote centre Democrito et ses disciples. Descartes est u n genie des plus extraordinaires qul air p a r u darts ces de/'niers t e m p s , d ' u n esprit fertile, et d ' u n e m e d i t a t i o n profound: L' enchainement de sa doctrine v a ~ son b u t , l'ordre e n e s t bien imaging, selon ses prineipes: et son systeme, t o u t reel6 qu'il est d'ancien et de moderne, est bien arrang6. A la verit6 il enseigne t r o p ~ douter: et ce n ' e s t pas u n A m u c h more definitive account of Boyle's scientific m e t h o d is to be found in the second c h a p t e r of M. Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception, Baltimore, 1964, esp. pp. 88-112. One should also m e n t i o n R. Westfall's useful ' U n p u b l i s h e d Boyle P a p e r s Relating to Scientific Method ', Ann. Sci., 1956, 12, 63-73 a n d 103-117; Marie Boas [Hall], 'La M~thodologie Scicntifique de R o b e r t Boyle ', Rev. Hist. Sci., 1956, 9, 105-125; a n d A. 1%. a n d M. B. Hall, ' P h i l o s o p h y and :Natural Philosophy: Boyle and Spinoza ', in Mdlanges Alexandre Koyrd (ed. I . B. Cohen a n d ~ . Taton), Paris, 1964, vol. ii, pp. 241-256. Older, b u t still useful, sources are S. Mendelssohn, Robert Boyle als Philosoph, Wiirzburg, 1902, a n d G. Sprigg, ' The Honorable R o b e r t Boyle: A Chapter in the Philosophy of Science ', Archeion,
1929, 11, 1-12.
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as we now judge him to be on the basis of his Discourse and Meditations. The Descartes of the Principles is not the proponent of systematic doubt so much as the modest inquirer after truth who admits, especially throughout the latter half of the Principles, that science is an hypothetical and conjectural enterprise which offers its followers only a probable story, not the revealed truth. Nor is it inconsistent for Boyle to draw from both Descartes and Bacon, for their methodologies, as Boyle construed them, were not contradictory. Indeed, Descartes' hypothetical m e t h o d can be viewed (and was so viewed b y Boyle) as an alternative formulation of Bacon's hypothetical Indulgence of the Understanding. 21 Any attempt to explain Boyle's methodology must, of course, begin with the fact that he was an ardent adherent of the corpuscular or mechanical philosophy. ~2 Indeed, it is his corpuscularism which conditioned his whole approach to nature and which inclined him to adopt Descartes' method of hypothesis, while simultaneously taking his experimentMism from Bacon. As an advocate of the corpuscular philosophy, and as a writer firmly in the experimental tradition, Boyle
31 :Boyle w a s n o t t h e first to s u g g e s t t h e similarity b e t w e e n B a c o n a n d Descartes. T h e a n o n y m o u s t r a n s l a t o r o f D e s c a r t e s ' Passions of the Soule, L o n d o n , 1650, insists, in a n ' a d v e r t i s m e n t ' a p p e n d e d to t h a t work, t h a t t h o u g h ' m o s t m e n conceive n o t h o w n e c e s s a r y e x p e r i m e n t s are,' D e s c a r t e s a n d B a c o n ' h a d t h e b e s t n o t i o n s , c o n c e r n i n g t h e m e t h o d to be h e l d to b r i n g t h e P h y s i c k s to t h e i r perfection '. 2~ T h e v e r y fact t h a t Boyle chose to call h i s doctrine t h e c o r p u s c u l a r p h i l o s o p h y is indicative of his filiations w i t h Descartes. Prior to Boyle, it w a s c o m m o n to d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e d i s t i n c t theoretical s y s t e m s : t h e Aristotelian, t h e C a r t e s i a n a n d t h e A t o m i c or E p i c u r e a n or G a s s e n d i a n . Boyle r i g h t l y p o i n t e d o u t t h a t s u c h a classification o b s c u r e d t h e considerable area of a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e C a r t e s i a n a n d Atoraistic p a r a d i g m s . R a t h e r t h a n call h i m s e l f a n a t o m i s t , a n d t h e r e b y side w i t h G a s s e n d i a g a i n s t D e s c a r t e s , Boyle defines a m o r e general p o s i t i o n (' t h e corpuscular p h i l o s o p h y ') w h i c h p e r m i t s h i m to consider h i m s e l f in a C a r t e s i a n t r a d i t i o n while still siding w i t h t h e A t o m i s t s on m a n y specific p o i n t s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . H e p u t s it this w a y : . . . I considered t h a t t h e A t o m i c a l a n d Cartesian h y p o t h e s e s , t h o u g h t h e y differed in s o m e m a t e r i a l p o i n t s f r o m o n e a n o t h e r , y e t in opposition to t h e P e r i p a t e t i c a n d o t h e r v u l g a r doctrines t h e y m i g h t be looked u p o n as one p h i l o s o p h y . . . [for] b o t h t h e C a r t e s i a n s a n d t h e A t o m i s t s explicate t h e s a m e p h e n o m e n a b y little bodies v a r i o u s l y figured a n d m o v e d . . . t h e i r h y p o t h e s e s m i g h t b y a p e r s o n of reconciling disposition be looked u p o n as one p h i l o s o p h y ' {Works, ed. Birch, L o n d o n , 1772, vol. i, pp. 355-356). Boyle u n r e s e r v e d l y r e g a r d s D e s c a r t e s - - m o r e even than G a s s e n d i or Bacon--as the m e c h a n i c a l cam c o r p u s c u l a r p h i l o s o p h e r par excellence : ' T h a t s t r i c t p h i l o s o p h e r D e s c a r t e s w h o h a s w i t h g r e a t w i t a n d no less a p p l a u s e a t t e m p t e d to c a r r y t h e m e c h a n i c a l l p o w e r s h i g h e r t h a n a n y of t h e m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d a p p l y it to explicate t h i n g s m e c h a n i c a l l y ' (Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ii, f. 137: cf. also Works, vol. iii, p. 558).
b e n raodele ~ des esprits n a t u r a l l e m e n t ineredules: m a i s enfin il est p l u s original q u e l e s a u t r e s . . . E n f i n Galilei e s t le p l u s agreable des m o d e r n e s , B a c o n le p l u s subtil, G a s s e n d i le p l u s s c a v a n t , H o b b e s le p l u s resveur, Boyle le plus eurieux, D e s c a r t e s le p l u s ingenieuc, V a n h e l m o n t le p l u s n a t u r a l i s t e : m a i s t r o p a t t a e h 6 a P a r a c e l s e ' {Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. xliv).
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was acutely aware of the immense gap separating the principles of corpuscularism from p a r t i c u l a r sciences such as c h e m i s t r y and physiology. T h o u g h corpuscularians often scolded Aristotle for neglecting experiment, t h e y themselves were subject to the same charge for, in general, few a t t e m p t s had been m a d e t o use the m a t t e r - i n - m o t i o n p a r a d i g m t o explain the p a r t i c u l a r facts of physics or chemistry. Boyle perceived t h a t this was a serious weakness in the mechanical p r o g r a m m e : ' But I am sorry to see cause to add to what I have been saying, that as much as we [Corpuscular philosophers] magnify the necessity of experiments in our contacts with the Peripateticks about nature, we seem not yet to be sensible of this acknowledged necessity, when we contest with the particular difficulties that frequently occur, when we ourselves are to discover the cause of her phenomena, or to imploy her productions.' 2a I f the corpuscular philosophy is to be useful to n a t u r a l philosophy, it m u s t do more t h a n propose a few vague principles which it asserts to be compatible with nature. I t m u s t use those principles and others to explain w h a t can be observed in the laboratory. I t simply is not enough to say t h a t fire boils w a t e r because the r a p i d l y m o v i n g corpuscles of fire b r e a k up w a t e r clusters and send v a p o u r to the surface. We m u s t p a y careful a t t e n t i o n to describing the p a r t i c u l a r shape and velocity of fire corpuscles, to t h e mechanisms w h e r e b y t h e y b r e a k up liquid clusters a n d to the laws of boiling. More generally, the corpuscular philosophy m u s t cease to be m e r e l y a set of ambiguous m e t a p h y s i c a l principles which are so fluid t h a t t h e y are compatible with a n y phenomenon. Boyle w a n t s to t r a n s f o r m t h e corpuscular doctrine into a sensible physical t h e o r y which makes predictions and provides explanations; in short, into a t h e o r y which approaches experience in order to learn from it and which stakes its fate, not on the philosopher's ability to weave intricate m y t h s and devise acl hoc adjustments, b u t on the scientist's ability to confirm those principles. B o y l e never seriously doubts t h a t n a t u r e is u l t i m a t e l y matter-inmotion, ~4 b u t he insists t h a t we need to go b e y o n d such cryptic formulae if we are to have a science w o r t h y of the name: ' For it is one thing to be able to shaw it possible for such and such effects to proceed from the various magnitudes, shapes, motions, and concretions of atoms, and another to be able to declare what precise and determinate figures, sizes, and motions of atoms, will suffice to make out the proposed phenomena.' 25
38 Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ix, f. 1.
34 A s T. S. K u h n p u t s it: ' N e i t h e r [Boyle's] eclecticism n o r his scepticism e x t e n d s to d o u b t s t h a t s o m e c o r p u s c u l a r m e c h a n i s m underlies e a c h inorganic p h e n o m e n o n h e investigates. ' (' R o b e r t :Boyle a n d S t r u c t u r a l C h e m i s t r y in t h e S e v e n t e e n t h C e n t u r y , ' Isis, 1952,
48, 19).
za R o b e r t Boyle, Works, 1772, vol. ii, p. 45.
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W e m u s t f o r m u l a t e i n t e r m e d i a r y theories w h i c h are a t once less general a n d m o r e explicit t h a n m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n . L i k e D e s c a r t e s in t h e Principles, B o y l e realized t h a t t h e t y p i c a l corpuscularian doctrine is too general to p e r m i t one to explain, in detail, t h e b e h a v i o u r of m a t t e r . W e m u s t develop lower-level theories which, while c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e c o r p u s c u l a r philosophy, are n o t strictly deducible f r o m it: ' There are a great m a n y things w h i c h . . , cannot with any convenience be immediately deduced from the first and simplest principles; namely, matter and motion; but must be derived from subordinate principles; such as gravity, fermentation, springiness, magnetism, etc.' 26
I n t h e ideal case, we should seek to derive e v e r y t h i n g f r o m the first principles. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , however, t h e r e is a wide d i s c r e p a n c y b e t w e e n w h a t we hope for a n d w h a t we are p r e p a r e d t o accept:
' That we may aspire to, but must not always require or expect, such a knowledge of things, as is immediately derived from their first principles.' ~
E v e n where our e x p l a n a t i o n s are n o t d e r i v a b l e principles, t h e y m u s t be c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e m : from mechanical
' the mechanical principles are so universal, and therefore applicable to so m a n y things, that they are rather fitted to include, than necessitated to exclude, any other [subordinate] hypothesis, that is founded in nature, as far as it is so. And such hypotheses . . . will be found, as far as they have t r u t h in them, to be legitimately (though perhaps not immediately) deducible from the mechanical principles, or fairly reconcileable to them . . .' as E v e r y s u b o r d i n a t e hypothesis, in so far as it is true, is either deducible from, or at least c o m p a t i b l e with, the corpuscular philosophy. D e s c a r t e s m a d e precisely t h e same p o i n t in t h e Principles. So far as n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y is concerned, these less general h y p o t h e s e s are e v e n m o r e useful t h a n t h e concepts of m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n : ' T h e most useful notions we have in physicks . . . are not derived immediately from the first principles; but from intermediate theories, notions, and rules.' 29
~6 RoyaISoeiety, Boyle Papers, vol. ix, L 40. Elsewhere, he m a k e s t h e p o i n t this w a y : it w o u l d ' be b a c k w a r d to reject or despise all explications t h a t are n o t i m m e d i a t e l y d e d u c e d f r o m t h e shape, b i g n e s s a n d m o t i o n of a t o m s or o t h e r insensible particles of m a t t e r . . . [for t h o s e who] p r e t e n d to explicate e v e r y p h e n o m e n o n b y d e d u c i n g it f r o m t h e m e c h a n i c a l affections of a t o m s u n d e r t a k e a h a r d e r t a s k t h a n t h e y i m a g i n e ' (ibid., vol. viii, f. 166). ~7 Ibid., vol. viii, f. 184. U n d e r l i n e d in original. Cf. f o o t n o t e 65 below. 2s 1%. Boyle, Works, 1772, vol. iv, p. 72. 2~ Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ix, f. 40.
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Boyle set himself the life-long task of enunciating such 'sub-ordinate principles' and 'intermediate theories ,a0 in order to provide scientific flesh for the metaphysical skeleton of corpuscularism: ' I thought it would be no slight service, not only to the Corpuscular hypothesis, but to natural philosophy itself, if I could by good experiments, and at least probable reasons, make out that almost all sorts of particular qualities may be mechanically originated or produced.' al Having settled on such an undertaking, it was natural t h a t Boyle should give some thought to the method whereby these subordinate principles could be discovered and confirmed. It is at this stage t h a t we see a remarkable blend of Baconian and Cartesian elements. With Bacon, Boyle emphasized t h a t the proper foundation of physical knowledge was experimentation; not merely casual observation of nature, but systematic and often artificial tinkering with the physical world so as to observe it under a wide variety of circumstances. Good natural philosophers, he writes, ' consult experience both more frequently and more heedfully [than the Aristotelians]; and, not content with the phenomena that nature spontaneously affords them, they are solicitous, when they find it needful, to enlarge their experience by trials purposely devised . . .' a2 Like Bacon, he envisaged the compilation of vast histories of nature which would summarize and codify the information gleaned from experiment, sa To this end, Boyle himself wrote experimental histories of fluidity, firmness, colours, cold, air, respiration, condensation, flames, human blood, porosity, liquors, tin and fire. s4 But what are we to do with such natural histories once they are compiled? Can we use them to induce, Baconian fashion, the principles and laws of science? Boyle's answer to this question is an unequivocal ' N o '. Though a selfstyled pupil of Bacon, Boyle never, to m y knowledge, uses the term
so B o y l e e v e n s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e s u b o r d i n a t e h y p o t h e s e s m a y be t h e o n l y ones w h i c h c a n be f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d : ' T h o u g h m e n be n o t a r r i v e d a t s uc h a p i t c h of k n o w l e d g e a s t o be able to d i s c o v e r a n d s o l e m n e l y - e s t a b l i s h e d [sic] c o m p l e a t a n d general hypotheses; y e t s u b o r d i n a t e axioms a n d hypotheses.., m a y be of v a s t use b o t h i n p h i l o s o p h y a n d t o h u m a n life ' (ibid., vol. ix, 61). 81 Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ix, f. 28. s2 1%. Boyle, WorIcs, 1772, vol. v, pp. 513-514. 3a :Boyle w a s as d o g g e d as B a c o n i n p u t t i n g h i s t o r i e s of n a t u r e h i g h on hi s l i s t of p r i o r i t i e s : ' . . . we e v i d e n t l y w a n t t h a t u p o n w h i c h a t h e o r y , t o be solid a n d useful, m u s t be b u i l t ; I m e a n a n e x p e r i m e n t a l h i s t o r y . . . A n d t h i s we so w a n t , t h a t e x c e p t p e r h a p s w h a t m a t h e m a t i c i a n s h a v e done c o n c e r n i n g sounds, a n d t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s ( r a t h e r t h a n e x p e r i m e n t s ) t h a t our i l l u s t r i o u s V e r u l a m h a t h (in s ome few pages) s a i d of h e a t i n his s h o r t Essay de t"orma Calidi; I k n o w n o t a n y one q u a l i t y of w h i c h a n y a u t h o r h a s g i v e n us a n a n y t h i n g c o m p e t e n t h i s t o r y ' (ibid., vol. iii, p. 12). 3a See t h e t a b l e of c o n t e n t s to B o y l e ' s s i x - v o l u m e Works for references to t h e s e histories.
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' induction ,3~ n o r does he ever seriously consider B a c o n ' s v i e w t h a t principles will emerge in a n y m e c h a n i c a l w a y f r o m a s t u d y of nature, as So far is Boyle f r o m B a c o n ' s conception of a rigidly e x p e r i m e n t a l science t h a t he e v e n suggests t h a t a good h y p o t h e s i s is m o r e v a l u a b l e t h a n a well-conceived e x p e r i m e n t : ' And tho' perhaps few have a greater love and value for experiments than I, yet for m y part, I should think myself mere obliged to him that discovers to me some pregnant notion . . . t h a n if he imparted some fine experiment.' 87 F a r f r o m following B a c o n ' s inductive line, Boyle t a k e s a m o r e Cartesian pose. The p u r p o s e o f all this e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n , he tells us, is t o place us in a position to offer some h y p o t h e s i s as a t e n t a t i v e a c c o u n t o f the d a t a which we h a v e so a c c u m u l a t e d . T h e e x p e r i m e n t a l histories t h u s serve as the r a w m a t e r i a l for the t h e o r i s t w h o t h e n proceeds to m a k e conjectures which are t e s t e d in t e r m s of t h e i r ability to ' render an intelligible a c c o u n t o f t h e causes of t h e effects, or p h e n o m e n a p r o p o s e d [in the histories] ,.as B o y l e does n o t believe t h a t theories will arise r e a d y - m a d e f r o m the data, or t h a t the d a t a will u n i q u e l y d e t e r m i n e a n y single theory, s9 T h e d a t a are i m p o r t a n t
s5 Birch, t h e editor o f B o y l e ' s Works, records n o u s a g e o f ' i n d u c t i o n ' a m o n g t h e writings c o n t a i n e d in t h o s e v o l u m e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , B o y l e ' s u n p u b l i s h e d MSS. i n t h e l~oyal Society L i b r a r y are n o t indexed. as I do n o t m e a n to s u g g e s t b y t h i s t h a t B a c o n ' s m e t h o d o l o g y left no r o o m for t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l m e t h o d or t h a t it w a s t h e e x c l u s i v e i n v e n t i o n of D e s c a r t e s . To t h e c o n t r a r y , I believe :Bacon's ' I n d u l g e n c e of t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g or First V i n t a g e ' is a n u n e q u i v o c a l s t a t e m e n t of t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l m e t h o d . See :N[. H e s s e ' s c h a p t e r on :Bacon in A Critical History of Western Philosophy (ed. O'Connor), :New Y o r k , 1964, h e r ' H o o k c ' s D e v e l o p m e n t o f :Bacon's M e t h o d 'J Ithaca, (Actes d~ 10e Cong~'~s International d'Itistoire des Sciences), P a r i s , 1964, vol. i, p p . 265-268, a n d h e r ' H o o k e ' s :Philosophical A l g e b r a ', Isis, forthc o m i n g , for a discussion of t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l a s p e c t s of B a c o n ' s m e t h o d o l o g y . However, I t h i n k t h e m y t h of B a c o n t h e a n t i - h y p o t h e t i c a l i s t h a s t h i s m u c h t r u t h in it: t h a t B a c o n ' s h y p o t h e t i c a l I n d u l g e n c e o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g w a s conceived b y h i m as a strictly t e m p o r a r y m e a s u r e u n t i l t h e n a t u r a l histories b e c a m e sufficiently c o m p l e t e to p e r m i t t h e fool-proof m e c h a n i c a l i n d u c t i o n w h i c h B a c o n outlines in t h e Novunt Organum. B a c o n w a s a d a m a n t l y o p p o s e d to t h e view ( s u p p o r t e d b y b o t h D e s c a r t e s a n d :Boyle) t h a t science m u s t be e t e r n a l l y conjectural and uncertain. F u r t h e r m o r e , B a c o n leaves c o m p l e t e l y u n m e n t i o n e d t h e p a r t i c u l a r s of his F i r s t V i n t a g e a n d so I t h i n k it is to Descartes, r a t h e r t h a n B a c o n , t h a t Boyle t u r n e d for t h e details of his m e t h o d o l o g y . B a c o n could n e v e r h a v e accepted, as Boyle e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y did, D e s c a r t e s ' c l o c k - m a k e r a n a l o g y a n d its implications for t h e severe l i m i t a t i o n s on scientific knowledge. a7 Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ix, f. 105. Boyle ~ells u s t h a t one of t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n s of e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n is ' to sugges~ h y p o t h e s e s ' (ibid., f. 30). as 1~. Boyle, Works, 1772, vol. iv, p. 234. a~ Boyle is quite b l u n t in his criticism of t h e view t h a t e x p e r i m e n t alone will lead u s to t r u e theories. ' . . . he, t h a t establishes a t h e o r y , w h i c h he e x p e c t s shall be acquiesced in b y all succeeding t i m e s . . , m u s t n o t only h a v e a care, t h a t none of t h e p h e n o m e n a of n a t u r e , t h a t are a l r e a d y t a k e n notice of, do c o n t r a d i c t his h y p o t h e s i s a t t h e p r e s e n t [time], bug t h a t n o p h e n o m e n a , t h a t m a y be h e r e a f t e r discovered, shall do it for t h e future. ' B u t
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because without them we might accept a theory which would have been falsified if we had experimented more thoroughly. But it is the faculty of reason which constructs theories from the data; they do not spring full-blown from the histories. No matter how extensive our experimentation, science remains fundamentally hypothetical. 4 These ideas are similar, in expression as well as content, to Descartes' methodological position in the Principles and speak forcefully against those who minimize his impact on English thought in this period. But it might be argued t h a t all I have said to this point merely suggests t h a t Boyle and Descartes were both hypotheticalists, but not necessarily t h a t Boyle derived his hypothetical method from Descartes. This perhaps seems just another of those coincidences t h a t continually mislead historians of ideas. That Boyle had similar views twenty years after Descartes is, of itself, meagre proof of his debt to Descartes. I n history as well as logic, post hoc is no guarantee of propter hoc. Fortunately, however, this is not the only evidence we can cite for the claim t h a t Descartes exerted substantial influence on English methodological thought, especially Boyle's. There is a passage in Boyle's The Usefulness of Natural Philosophy (1663) which makes our case a good deal more cogent. For Boyle there takes Descartes' clock analogy and, by clumsily paraphrasing it, uses it to justify--much as Descartes d i d - - a n avowedly hypothetical and corpuscular methodology. Boyle formulates the analogy thus: ' . . . many Atomists and other Naturalists, presume to know the true and genuine causes of the things they attempt to explicate; yet very often the utmost they can attain to, in their explications, is, that the explicated phenomena may be produced after such a manner, as they deliver, but not that they really are so. For as an artificer can set all the wheels of a clock a going, as well with springs as with weights . . . . so the same effects may be produced by divers causes different from one another; and it will oftentimes be very difficult, if not impossible, for our dim
40 Boyle writes: ' i t is s o m e t i m e s c o n d u c i v e to t h e discovery of t r u t h , to p e r m i t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g to m a k e a n h y p o t h e s i s , in order to t h e explication of t h i s or t h a t difficulty, t h a t b y e x a m i n i n g h o w far t h e p h e n o m e n a are, or are not, capable of b e i n g s o l v e d b y t h a t h y p o t h e s i s , t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a y , e v e n b y its o w n errors, be i n s t r u c t e d ' (ibid., vol. i, p. 303). T h i s s t a t e m e n t , along w i t h several others, could be cited as c o u n t e r - e v i d e n c e to J o n e s ' a s s e r t i o n t h a t ' Boyle w a s influenced b y t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e characteristic of t3aeon's p h i l o s o p h y in t h i n k i n g t h a t all t h e evidence m u s t be in before a generalization s h o u l d be d r a w n ' (op. cir. f o o t n o t e 2, p. 164). Boyle clearly, a n d e v e n B a c o n dimly, perceived t h e n e c e s s i t y of m a k i n g h y p o t h e s e s a n d generalizations before all t h e evidence w a s collected.
considering ' h o w i n c o m p l e a t t h e h i s t o r y of n a t u r e we y e t h a v e is, a n d h o w difficult it is to b u i l d a n a c c u r a t e h y p o t h e s i s u p o n a n i n c o m p l e t e h i s t o r y of t h e p h e n o m e n a ', we c a n n e v e r s a y w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t o u r theories are t r u e (ibid., vol. iv, p. 59).
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reasons to discern surely, which of those several ways, whereby it is possible for nature to produce the same phenomena, she [nature] has really made use of to exhibit them.' 41 I a m n o t m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t Descartes was the first to liken n a t u r e t o a clock-like m e c h a n i s m ; on the c o n t r a r y , this was a c o m m o n m e t a p h o r a m o n g mechanistic philosophers t h r o u g h o u t the sixteenth a n d early seventeenth centuries. The fact t h a t English writers like Boyle also used the clock a n a l o g y is, of itself, no indication of their Cartesian leanings. However, Descartes was (so far as I can tell) the first to use t h e a n a l o g y to justify a h y p o t h e t i c a l view of knowledge a n d science: T h a t B o y l e a n d others used the clock a n a l o g y in precisely the way Descartes did--to buttress up a h y p o t h e t i c o - d e d u c t i v e m e t h o d o l o g y - - i s p r o b a b l y indicative of their Cartesian leanings. This clock m e t a p h o r , b o r r o w e d f r o m Descartes, p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r u c k Boyle's f a n c y ; so m u c h so t h a t he remained p e r s u a d e d for the rest of his life t h a t science could a t t a i n only probable, n o t infallible, knowledge. The l a n g u a g e in this passage is Boyle's; b u t the t h o u g h t is clearly Descartes'. B o t h insist t h a t our theories only describe the mechanisms w h e r e b y n a t u r e m i g h t conceivably p r o d u c e the effects we observe, n o t necessarily the m e c h a n i s m s which n a t u r e in fact uses. I n a n o t h e r passage which reminds us o f Descartes, Boyle p u t s t h e p o i n t this w a y : ' . . . it is a very easy mistake to conclude, that because an effect m a y be produced by such determinate causes, it must be so [produced], or actually is so.' 4~ H e shared with Descartes the belief t h a t m a t t e r and m o t i o n are the u l t i m a t e a n d true principles of physical science, a n d he insisted, again like Descartes, t h a t all subordinate principles, in t e r m s of which we explain particular events, are necessarily conjectural. While declaring himself a faithful atomist, Boyle was v e r y sceptical a b o u t the possibility of the 'Atomical H y p o t h e s i s ' ever becoming more t h a n a p r o b a b l e t h e o r y ; and, for t h a t m a t t e r , he was equally pessimistic a b o u t ever discovering a n y of the true m e c h a n i s m s of nature. 4a Like Descartes, Boyle is careful n o t to confuse verification with proof. I f a h y p o t h e s i s has a c c o u n t e d for all the p h e n o m e n a , t h e n it has d e m o n s t r a t e d its utility, b u t its validity is still an open question a n d forever remains so. W e m a y , b y chance, 41R. Boyle, Works, 1772, vol. ii, p. 4-5. Boyle actually formulates the clock analogy on several occasions, which suggests that it played a basic role in his thinking about science and method. This opinion is confirmed when Boyle says, in introducing the clock metaphor: ' To explain this a little, let us assume the often mentioned, and often to be mentioned, instance of a clock ' (Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ii, 141). 42R. ]~oyle, Works, 1772, vol. ii, p. 45. Compare this with Descartes' remark that ' one may deduce some very true and certain conclusions from suppositions that are false or uncertain ' (Oeuvres, 1897-1957, vol. ii, p. 199). 4a CL Works, 1772, vol. ii, pp. 46 ft.
Ann. of S c i . - - V o l . 22, No. 2.
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stumble on to a true hypothesis, b u t we can never p r o v e it to be so. H e likens science t o a deciphering operation in which ' men conjecturally frame several keys [i.e., hypotheses] to enable us co understand a letter written in ciphers [i.e., nature]. For though one m a y by his sagacity have fbund the right key, it will be very difficulty for him, to prove [it is the right one].' 44 A p a r t from the evidence based on similarity of language and t h e m e , there are o t h e r factors which suggest t h a t Boyle drew his h y p o t h e t i c a l m e t h o d from Descartes. J u s t as Descartes justified his h y p o t h e t i c a l m e t h o d b y a t t r i b u t i n g it to Aristotle's Meteors, 45 so does Boyle t u r n to the Stagirite to show t h a t t h e m e t h o d of hypothesis had been anticipated b y ' t h e m a s t e r of those t h a t k n o w ': ' Aristotle himself (whatever confidence he sometimes seems to express) does in his first book of Meteors ingenuously confess, that concerning many of nature's phenomena, he thinks it sufficient, that they may be so performed as he explicates them.' 46
Boyle's method then consists in this: The scientist conducts widescale experimentation to determine the ' divers effects of nature '. He n e x t suggests a hypothesis to explain w h a t has been observed. The first
*a lbid., vol. i, p. 82. Cf. also Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ix, f. 63. I n principle 205 of t h e f o u r t h b o o k of t h e Principles, D e s c a r t e s h a d similarly c o m p a r e d scientific theorizing w i t h d e c o d i n g t e c h n i q u e s : ' I f , for i n s t a n c e , a n y o n e w a n t i n g to r e a d a letter w r i t t e n in L a t i n c h a r a c t e r s n o t in t h e i r proper order, decides to r e a d B w h e r e v e r h e finds A a n d C w h e r e he finds B . . . . a n d if he in t h i s w a y finds t h e r e are certain L a t i n w o r d s c o m p o s e d of these, h e will n o t d o u b t t h a t t h e t r u e m e a n i n g is c o n t a i n e d in t h e words, a l t h o u g h he discovered this b y conjecture, a n d a l t h o u g h it is possible t h a t t h e writer did n o t a r r a n g e t h e letters in t h i s order of succession, b u t in s o m e o t h e r . . . (Oeuvres, 1897-1957, vol. ix, p. 323). Cf. also R u l e 10 o f t h e Regulaz. 4~ ' A n d lest it be s u p p o s e d t h a t Aristotle did, or w a n t e d to do, m o r e t h a n this, it m u s t be recalled t h a t h e e x p r e s s l y s a y s in t h e i~rst b o o k o f t h e Meteors, a t t h e begimaing of t h e s e v e n t h c h a p t e r , t h a t w i t h r e g a r d to t h i n g s n o t e v i d e n t to t h e senses, he t h i n k s t h a t he offers sufficient explications a n d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of t h e m , if he m e r e l y s h o w s t h a t t h e y m a y be as he e x p l a i n s t h e m ' (ibid). adl%. Boyle, Works', 1772, vol. ii, p. 45. I t is significant t h a t a n o t h e r E n g l i s h e x p o n e n t of a t o m i s m , W a l t e r Charleton, w h o similarly a d o p t e d a h y p o t h e t i c a l t h e o r y of science (our c o n j e c t u r e s tell u s h o w t h e world 'may be, r a t h e r t h a n h o w it is or m u s t be ', Physiologiea, L o n d o n , 1654, p . 128), also a p p e a l s to A r i s t o t l e ' s r e m a r k in t h e Meteors, to s u p p o r t his h y p o t h e t i c a l i s m (ibid.). I m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e a f t e r , he q u o t e s D e s c a r t e s ' Principles on t h e s a m e point. T h i s raises t h e possibility t h a t :Boyle borrowed t h e reference to A r i s t o t l e ' s Meteors f r o m C h a r l e t o n r a t h e r t h a n directly f r o m Descartes. l~owever, :Boyle s t a t e s t h a t t h e p o r t i o n o f his MSS. in w h i c h t h e reference to Aristotle occurs w a s w r i t t e n in 1651 or 1652, prior to t h e a p p e a r a n c e of C h a r l e t o n ' s Physiologiea. (Cf. n o t e 94.) A l t h o u g h Boyle m a y h a v e m i s r e m e m b e r e d t h e d a t e of composition, t h e r e is n o evidence t t i a t he h a s done so. I n d e e d , w h e r e one c a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y cheek :Boyle's m e m o r y on s u c h m a t t e r s , h e is u s u a l l y q u i t e accurate. (For a brief, b u t suggestive, a c c o u n t of t h e relations b e t w e e n :Boyle a n d Charleton, see R . K a r g o n , ' W a l t e r Charleton, R o b e r t :Boyle a n d t h e A c c e p t a n c e o f E p i c u r e a n A t o m i s m in E n g l a n d ', Isis, 1964, 55, 184-192.)
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h y p o t h e s e s should be fairly low-level generalizations a b o u t t h e ' i m m e d i a t e causes of the p h e n o m e n a '. Then, ' ascending in the scale of causes ', he arrives u l t i m a t e l y at t h e m o s t general hypotheses, which concern the ' m o r e catholick and p r i m a r y causes of things ,.47 A t each level, the scientist checks to see if the hypothesis conforms to t h e corpuseularian doctrine. I f so, he tests the hypothesis against the entries in all his tables and against the other k n o w n laws o f nature. I f it is falsified he rejects it, if not, he continues t o m a i n t a i n it. This is obviously similar to Descartes' view t h a t the i n t e r m e d i a t e h y p o t h e s e s m u s t be compatible with the first principles and with t h e p h e n o m e n a . An hypothesis is not p r o v e n true, of course, even if it is compatible w i t h all our evidence; b u t it can be asserted with more confidence as it proves itself capable of explaining more and m o r e p h e n o m e n a : ' For, the use of an hypothesis being to render an intelligible account of the causes of the effects, or phenomena proposed, without crossing the laws of nature, or other phenomena; the more numerous, and the more various the particles are, whereof some are explicable b y the assigned hypothesis, and some are agreeable to it, or, at least, not dissonant from it, the more valuable is the hypothesis, and the more likely to be true. For it is much more difficult to find an hypothesis, that is not true, which will suit with many phenomena, especially, if they be of various kinds, than but with a few.' 4s H e r e again, comparisons with Descartes are in order. Descartes had argued t h a t those principles are most likely which explain ' s e v e r a l different e f f e c t s ' r a t h e r t h a n one, a n d suggested t h a t a well-confirmed hypothesis, which explains a cross-section of nature, is p r o b a b l y true. 49 Boyle's p o i n t is substantially the same. There is y e t a n o t h e r basic methodological postulate which Boyle and Descartes b o t h accepted. This m i g h t be called the principle of the ~nulti-level identity of nature. Basically, this principle postulates t h a t the laws of n a t u r e which a p p l y to visible massive bodies also a p p l y to objects which are either too large or too small to be measured or observed.S I t was b y invoking such a principle t h a t s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scientists were able to assume t h a t the laws of visible-body mechanics applied to interactions between sub-microscopic corpuscles. I t was also in t e r m s of this principle t h a t t h e y rejected the Scholastic s t r a t a g e m of a t t r i b u t i n g
4v R. Boyle, Works, 1772, vol. ii, p. 37. 4s Ibid., vol. iv, p. 234. 49 'Although there exist several individual effects to which it is easy to a d j u s t diverse causes [i.e., hypotheses] one to each, it is however n o t so easy to a d j u s t one a n d t h e stone [hypothesis] to several different effects, unless it be t h e true one f r o m which t h e y proceed. (R. Descartes, Oeuvres, 1897-1957, vol. ii, p. 198). 50 This principle received its definitive f o r m u l a t i o n at N e w t o n ' s hands, in his t h i r d Rule of Philosophizing.
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properties to micro-entities which do not describe observable entities. Descartes formulates the principle thus: ' . . . we do m u c h b e t t e r to judge of w h a t t a k e s place in small bodies, which their minuteness alone p r e v e n t s us from perceiving, b y w h a t we see occurring in those t h a t we do perceive, t h a n , in o r d e r to e x p l a i n certain given things, to i n v e n t all sorts of novelties, t h a t h a v e no r e l a t i o n to those t h a t we perceive.' 51 Boyle, adopting homelier language, puts the principle this way: ' b o t h t h e mechanical affections of m a t t e r are to be found, a n d t h e laws of m o t i o n t a k e place, n o t only in t h e g r e a t masses, a n d t h e m i d d l e sized lumps, b u t in t h e smallest f r a g m e n t s of m a t t e r . . . A n d therefore to say, t h a t t h o u g h in n a t u r a l bodies, whose b u l k is manifest a n d t h e i r s t r u c t u r e visible, t h e m e c h a n i c a l principles m a y be usefully a d m i t t e d , [but] t h a t [they] a r c n o t to be e x t e n d e d to such p o r t i o n s o f m a t t e r , whose p a r t s a n d t e x t u r e are invisible; m a y p e r h a p s look to some, as if a m a n should allow, t h a t t h e laws o f m e c h a n i s m m a y t a k e place in a t o w n clock, b u t n o t in a p o c k e t w a t c h . ' 52 By way of recapitulation of the argument thus far, I have enumerated below the most important passages illustrating methodological similarities between Descartes and Boyle: Descartes 1. ' A n d lest it be s u p p o s e d t h a t A r i s t o t l e did, or w a n t e d to do, more t h a n this, it m u s t be recalled t h a t he expressly says in t h e first b o o k of t h e Meteors, a t t h e beginning of t h e seventh chapter, t h a t w i t h r e g a r d to things n o t e v i d e n t to t h e senses, he t h i n k s t h a t he offers sufficient explications a n d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of t h e m , if he m e r e l y shows t h a t t h e y m a y be as he explains t h e m . ' 2. ' F o r j u s t as a n i n d u s t r i o u s w a t c h - m a k e r m a y m a k e two watches which keep t i m e e q u a l l y well a n d w i t h o u t a n y difference in their e x t e r n a l a p p e a r a n c e , y e t w i t h o u t a n y s i m i l a r i t y in t h e composition of t h e i r wheels, so it is certain t h a t God w o r k s in a n infinity o f diverse w a y s . . . A n d I Boyle 1. ' Aristotle himself (whatever confidence he sometimes seems to express) does in his first b o o k o f Meteors ingenuously confess, t h a t concerning m a n y of n a t u r e ' s p h e n o m e n a , he t h i n k s it sufficient, t h a t t h e y m a y be so p e r f o r m e d as he explicates t h e m ' .
2. ' F o r as a n artificer can set all t h e wheels of a clock a going, as well w i t h springs as w i t h weights . . . . so t h e same effects m a y be p r o d u c e d b y d i v e r s causes different from one a n o t h e r ; a n d i t will oftentimes be v e r y difficult, if n o t impossible for our dim reasons to discern surely,
~1 1~. Descartes, Oeuvres, 1897-1957, vol. ix, p. 319. 52 1%.:Boyle, Wor]cs, 1772, vol. iv, p. 72. For a more extensive discussion of the principle of multi-level identity in the seventeenth century, see my ' The Nature and Sources of Locke's Views on Hypotheses ', J. Itist. Ideas, forthcoming.

believe I shall have done enough if the causes that I have listed are such that the effects they may produce are similar to those we see in the world, without being informed whether there are other ways in which they are produced'. 3. ' A l t h o u g h t h e r e e x i s t several individual effects to which it is easy to adjust diverse causes [i.e. hypotheses], one to each, it is however not so easy to adjust one and the same [hypothesis] to several different effects unless it be the true one from which they proceed.' 4. ' One may deduce some very true and certain conclusions from suppositions that are false or uncertain.' 5. ' We do much better to judge of what takes place in small bodies, which their minuteness alone prevents us from perceiving, by what we see occurring in those that we do perceive, than, in order to explain certain given things, to invent all sorts of novelties, that have no relation to those that we perceive.'
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which of those severM ways, whereby it is possible for nature to produce the same phenomena, she has really made use of to exhibit them.'
3. ' F o r it is much more difficult, to find an hypothesis, that is not true, which will suit many phenomena, especially if they be of various kinds, than but with a
feW. ~
4. ' I t is a very easy mistake to conclude, that because an effect m a y be produced by such determinate causes, it must be so, or actually is so.' 5. ' And therefore to say, that though in natural bodies, whose bulk is manifest and their structure visible, the mechanical principles m a y be usefully admitted, [but] that [they] are not to be extended to such portions of matter, whose parts and texture are invisible; may perhaps look to some, as if a man should allow, that the laws of mechanism may take place in a town clock, but not in a pocket watch.'
The essence of B o y l e ' s h y p o t h e t i c a l m e t h o d is falsification. 5a Like b o t h B a c o n and Hooke, B o y l e insists on the i m p o r t a n c e of refuting h y p o t h e s e s r a t h e r t h a n confirming them. Like t h e m he compares scientific i n q u i r y to the reductio ad absurdum m e t h o d s of the m a t h e m a t i cians. Scientists, he writes, should t r y : '. diligently and industriously to make experiments and collect observations, without being over-forward to establish principles and axioms, believing it uneasy to erect such theories, as are capable to explicate all the phenomena of nature, before they have been able to take notice of the tenth part of those phenomena, that are to be explicated. Not
5~ I have drawn, in part, from the unpublished Boyle material brought to light by R. Westfall (o2o. cit., see footnote 19). ttowever, Westfall gives no consideration to the Cartesian origins of :Boyle's hypotheticalism, suggesting rather the similarities between Bacon and Boyle.
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Laurens L a u d a n on that I at all disallow the use of reasoning upon experiment . . . for such an absolute suspension of the exercise of reasoning were exceedingly troublesome, if not impossible. And, as in that rule of arithmetic, which is commonly called regula falsi [i.e., false position], by proceeding upon a conjecturally-supposed number, as if it were that, which we inquire after, we are wont to come to the knowledge of the true number sought for; so in physiology [i.e., natural philosophy] it is sometimes conducive to the discovery of truth, to permit the understanding to make an hypothesis, in order to the explication of this or that particular difficulty, that by examining how far the phenomena are, or are not, capable of being solved by that hypothesis, the understanding may, even by its own errors, be instructed. For it has been truly observed by a great philosopher [Bacon], that truth does more easily emerge out of error than confusion.' 54
Science, as he conceives it, is a dialectic between reason a n d sensation; the m i n d proposes theories which are t h e n subjected to the careful scrutiny of the senses. Boyle does n o t share B a c o n ' s c o n t e m p t for intellectual activities or his distrust of ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems ', t h o u g h he is quick to p o i n t o u t t h a t : ' such kind of superstructures [should be] looked upon only as temporary ones; which . . . are not entirely to be acquiesced in, as absolutely perfect, or uncapable of improving alterations.' 55 B u t so long as t h e y are preceded b y e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n and never e n u n c i a t e d with finality, theoretical systems a n d h y p o t h e s e s p l a y a central role in science. Boyle is the first to a d m i t t h a t m a n y mechanistic h y p o t h e s e s appear, on first glance, unseemly and bizarre. B u t he insists t h a t a deeper analysis will reveal their inherent value: ' Some hypotheses may be compared to those shops of drugsters and apothecaries,--where among the first things that the eye discovers, are serpents and crocodiles, and other monstrous and harmful things; whereas the inside is a repository or magazine of wholsome and useful medicines.' 56 B o y l e ' s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s the h y p o t h e t i c a l m e t h o d comes out m o s t clearly in his polemic against H o b b e s ' s scathing critique of the R o y a l Society. Itobbes, of course, believed h y p o t h e s e s to be indispensable to n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y a n d he h a d little s y m p a t h y for those in the R o y a l Society who were so obsessed with the new experimental philosophy t h a t t h e y denied a n y role to speculations or conjectures. Boyle replies to H o b b e s ' s critique b y arguing (in a vein n o t quite faithful to the t r e n c h a n t 54R. Boyle, Works, 1772, vo]. i, pp. 302-303. The latter part of this passage confirms a point we suggested earlier, viz., that Boyle conceived his hypothetical method as perfectly compatible with Bacon's Indulgence of the Understanding. In making the point, Boyle even adopts Bacon's language (' it is sometimes conducive . . . to permit the understanding to make an hypothesis . . .'). ~5Ibid., p. 303. ~6 t~oyal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ix, f. 113.
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empiricism of many members of the l~oyal Society) that the now organization is not opposed to the use of all hypotheses, b u t only to those that are not well grounded in the phenomena. Hobbes had proposed two requisites of a good hypothesis: that it be conceivable and that, if it is granted, ' the necessity of the phenomena m a y be inferred '.57 To these, Boyle adds a third and equally important condition: 'namely, that it [the hypothesis] not be inconsistent with any other truth or phenomenon of nature ,.ss Elsewhere, he formulates the same condition another way: it is sufficient to accept an hypothesis if we can demonstrate ' its fitness to solve the phenomena for which [it was] devised, without crossing any known observation or law of nature ,.59 Richard Westfall 6 and Marie Boas Hall 61 have pointed out that in Boyle's unpublished manuscripts, there is an even more explicit discussion of the characteristics of an acceptable hypothesis. Boyle writes that the requisites of a good hypothesis are (1) that it suppose nothing that is either impossible or absurd, (2) that it be self-consistent, (3) that it be sufficient to explicate the phenomena, ' a t least the chief among them ', and (4) that it be consistent with other known phenomena and ' manifest physical truth '. An excellent hypothesis, in addition to satisfying these four requirements, also (5) is the simplest hypothesis, (6) is the only hypothesis that explicates the phenomena or at least explicates them better than any other and (7) enables us to ' foretell future phenomena ,.62 What I have said here should not be interpreted to mean t h a t Boyle's methodological ideas are identicM with Descartes' or that he uncritically mimicked his predecessor. There are important differences between Descartes and Boyle which should not be glossed over. Boyle's continual insistence on extensive experimentation finds no counterpart in Descartes and he had no patience with Descartes' exclusion of final causes from cosmology. Furthermore, Boyle often ehastizes Descartes, not for constructing hypothetical systems, but for constructing them with
s7 H o b b e s ' s probabitistic account of scientific knowledge is very m u c h llke Descartes, even in language. F o r instance, t t o b b e s asserts: ' . . . he t h a t supposing some one or more motions, can derive f r o m t h e m the necessity of t h a t effect whose cause is required, has done all t h a t is to be expected from n a t u r a l reason. A n d t h o u g h he prove n o t t h a t the thing was t h u s produced, yet he proves t h a t t h u s it m a y be p r o d u c e d . . , which is as useful as if the causes themselves were k n o w n ' (English Works, ed. W. Moleswor~h, L o n d o n , 1845, vol. vii, pp. 3-4). Compare this with the latter half of t h e passage in which Descartes formulates the clock analogy. 5s R. :Boyle, Works, 1772, vol. i, p. 241. F o r a n account of H o b b e s ' s views, see E. Madden, ' T h o m a s H o b b e s a n d the Rationalistic Ideal ', in Theories of Scientific Method cal. Madden, Seattle, 1960, pp. 104-118. 5s R. Boyle, Works, 1772, vol. iv, p. 77. 50 R. Westfall, op. sit. (footnote 53), pp. 113-114. 61 M. B. Hall, Robert Boyle on Natural Philosophy, Bloomington, I n d i a n a , 1965, pp. 134135. n~ Royal Society Boyle Pa~ers, vol. ix, L 25,
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on
insufficient care. He also notes, rightly, that Descartes paid only lipservice to experimentation and spun his corpuscular philosophy largely out of his head. B u t just as the differences between the two should not be neglected, neither should their similarities, especially when they are so pronounced as they are in regard to the hypothetical method. Historians are certainly correct when they suggest that Boyle's experimentalism derives from Bacon, or at least from a tradition with which Bacon associated himself ; b u t I think they are mistaken when they suggest that Baeonian experimentalism was the whole of Boyle's methodological position and that Descartes' hypothetical and mechanical philosophy had negligible impact in comparision with Bacon's. 63 In the methodological writings of Boyle, Descartes' influence is every bit as pronounced as Bacon's. Boyle was not only aware, as most of his compatriots were, that the Cartesian system was composed of hypotheses. He also appreciated, as too few of his countrymen did, Descartes' r e a s o n s for using hypotheses. In short, he understood Descartes' claim that hypotheses were essential to science, that they were the sign of a fertile mind aware of nature's inscrutability. Although Boyle often disagreed with the specific hypotheses which Descartes formulated, he never made the l~ewtonian mistake of thinking that Cartesian hypotheticalism must be rejected because Cartesian hypotheses were rejected. Cartesian probabilism was the most reasonable methodology for a corpuscularian philosopher like Boyle to adopt, because the corpuscular programme entailed the reduction of visible phenomena to the behaviour of unobservable entities whose properties were obviously conjectural. Once one accepts the corpuscularian theory of matter, and with it the theory of knowledge which makes corpuscles unobservable in principle, then it is altogether natural to adopt a hypothetical methodology In short, the metaphysics and epistemology of the mechanical philosophyled, b y its own inner logic, to the acceptance of a certain methodology. 6a Boyle accepted the Cartesian theory of method, not because he was a Cartesian, but because he was a corpuscularian!
6a I n light of t h e a n a l y s i s w h i c h I h a v e given here, it is s u r p r i s i n g to find M. C r a n s t o n w r i t i n g t h a t ' B o y l e ' s i n d u c t i v e m e t h o d w a s essentially B a c o n i a n ' (John Locke, L o n d o n , 1957, p. 75). C r a n s t o n is w r o n g on two a c c o u n t s ; B o y l e ' s m e t h o d w a s n e i t h e r i n d u c t i v e n o r Baconian. 64 I n a recent m o n o g r a p h , i~. Harr@ h a s m a d e a similar p o i n t a b o u t t h e e o n n e x i o n s b e t w e e n s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y m e t a p h y s i c s a n d m e t h o d o l o g y , focussing especially on t h e links b e t w e e n t h e c o r p u s c u l a r p h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e doctrine of p r i m a r y - s e c o n d a r y qualities (Matter and Method, L o n d o n , 1964). H o w e v e r , as I h a v e p o i n t e d o u t elsewhere (' M e t h o d a n d t h e Mechanical P h i l o s o p h y ', History of Science, f o r t h c o m i n g ) , H a r r 6 ' s a n a l y s i s is h a n d i c a p p e d b y his a s s u m p t i o n t h a t D e s c a r t e s b a d n o t h i n g to do w i t h either t h e m e t a p h y s i c s or t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of corpuscularism,
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In a sense, Boyle borrowed the best from both worlds. Visibly impressed with the clock analogy, he sensibly appropriated Descartes' hypotheticalism, but neatly dropped the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas which regularly plagued the development of Descartes' views on method. From Bacon, he inherited a vigorous experimentalism, but was careful not to import with it the inductive and rigidly 'empiricist' philosophy which cramped Bacon's acceptance of the hypothetical method and made his endorsement of it invariably half-hearted. 65
GLA:NVILL A:ND CARTESIAN H Y P O T H E T I C A L I S M
A second English writer much impressed b y Descartes' clock-metaphor was Joseph Glanvill (1638-1680) who, in his Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661) and Scepsis Scientifica (1665), has some illuminating, if depressing, things to say about scientific method. 66 Though both volumes are declarations of war against classical and medieval philosophy, Glanvill has kind words for at least two of his predecessors, Bacon and Descartes. Like Boyle, he drew from the two authors as if they were merely different sides of the same coin. He frequently alludes to ' those great men, the Lord Bacon and Descartes ,67 and his debt to each of them will become clear as we describe his methodology.
65 I t is t h u s highly unjustified to j u x t a p o s e Boyle a n d Descartes as if t h e y personified, respectively, empiricism a n d rationalism. A particularly misleading instance of s u c h j u x t a p o s i t i o n is to be f o u n d in a recent essay b y A. R. a n d M. B. Hall. They write: ' I s a scientific proposition d e m o n s t r a t e d w h e n it is s h o w n to be a logical consequence of a set of intuitively certain axioms? Descartes w o u l d h a v e answered affirmatively, :Boyle negatively. I s a scientific p r o p o s i t i o n sufficiently d e m o n s t r a t e d only b y showing empirically t h a t it holds? Descartes would have answered negatively, Boyle affirmatively ' (' Philosophy a n d :Natural Philosophy: Boyle and Spinoza ', in Mdlangcs Alexandrc Koyrd, ed. I. B. Cohen a n d R. Taton, Paris, 1964, vol. ii, pp. 242-243). F r o m the evidence presented here, one could more reasonably conclude t h a t Boyle a n d Descartes would b o t h a n s w e r each of the t w o questions affirmatively. Boyle is so far f r o m being the strict empiricist the Halls suggest he is t h a t he occasionally a d o p t s a rationalism m o r e rigorous t h a n Descartes'. F o r example, he observes t h a t ' it is n o t always necessary, though it be always desirable, t h a t he, t h a t p r o p o u n d s a n h y p o t h e s i s in a s t r o n o m y , chemistry, a n a t o m y , or other p a r t of physics, be able a priori, to prove his h y p o t h e s i s to be t r u e . . . ' ( Wor]cs, 1772, vol. iv, p. 77). Cf. footnote 27 above. Elsewhere, a n d again in a m o s t ' unempirical ' vein, Boyle states t h a t ' where reason proceeds in a due m a n n e r . . . its conclusions are to be preferred to some testimonies of s e n s e ' (Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. ix, L 33). B u t it would equally be m i s t a k e n to t h i n k t h a t Boyle was altogether clear in his o w n m i n d a b o u t the precise relations b e t w e e n reason a n d experiment; for there certainly a r e times w h e n Boyle opts for the position traditionally called empiricism. At one point, in a startling anticipation of N e w t o n ' s F o u r t h Rule of Philosophizing, Boyle says ' t h a t the well c i r c m n s t a n c ' d t e s t i m o n y of sense is to be preferred to a n y h y p o t h e s i s . . .' (ibid., vol. ix, f. 31). 66 F o r a general account of Glanvill's scientific work, see M. Prior's ' J o s e p h Glanvill, Witchcraft a n d S e v e n t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Science ', Modern Philology, 1932, 80, pp. 167-193. 6v j . Glanvill, Sccpsis Scientifica (ed. Owen), London, 1885, p. 44.
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N a t u r e , writes Glanvill, is v e r y subtle a n d its m e c h a n i s m s are n o t obvious to e v e n t h e m o s t a s t u t e observer. Only v a i n a n d p o m p o u s m e n believe t h a t t h e i r h y p o t h e t i c a l scientific s y s t e m s p r o v i d e a faithful i m a g e of t h e physical world. N a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y is seriously m i s t a k e n w h e n it dictates how t h e physical world should operate. To d e n y a void or t h e e a r t h ' s r o t a t i o n because we conceive such things to be impossible is to m a k e t h e error of t h i n k i n g t h a t n a t u r e a n d its Creator are confined within t h e b o u n d s o f m a n ' s d i m reason; which is n o t o n l y absurd, b u t b l a s p h e m o u s , to t h e pious Glanvill. A t this point, Glanvill i n v o k e s D e s c a r t e s ' analogy: ' For Nature is set a going by the most subtil and hidden instruments; which it m a y have nothing obvious which resembles them. Hence judging by visible appearances, we are discouraged by supposed impossibilities which to nature are none, but within her spear [sic] of action. And therefore what shews only the outside, and sensible structure of nature; is not likely to help us in finding out the Magnalia [i.e., inner mechanisms]. 'Twere next to impossible for one, who never saw the inward wheels and motions, to make a watch upon the bare view of the circle of hours, and index: And 'tis as difficult to trace natural operations to any practical advantage, b y the sight of the cortex of sensible appearances.' 6s Sensation alone can n e v e r give us insight into t h e t r u e m e c h a n i s m s of n a t u r e ; t h e m o s t we can realistically h o p e for is p r o b a b l e a n d h y p o t h e t i c a l knowledge. Thus, t h e ' w a y of inquiry for t r u e philosophers ' is ' t o seek t r u t h in the great book of nature, and in that search to proceed with wariness and circumspection without too much forwardness in establishing maxims and positive doctrines: To propose their opinions as hypotheses, that m a y probably be true accounts, without peremptorily affirming that they are.' 60 Glanvfll leaves no d o u b t t h a t he b o r r o w e d his h y p o t h e t i c a l i s m f r o m Descartes. T o w a r d s the end of the Scepsis Scientifica, he writes: ' And though the Grand Secretary of Nature, the miraculous Descartes hath here infinitely out-done all the philosophers t h a t went before him . . . yet he intends his principles but for hypotheses, and never pretends that things are really or necessarily, as he hath supposed them: but he only claims that they may be admitted pertinently to solve the phenomena, and are convenient supposals for the use of life. Nor can any further account be expected from humanity, but how things possibly may have been made consonantly to sensible nature: but infallibly to determine how they truly were effeeted, is proper to him only that saw them in the chaos, and fashioned them out of that confused mass. For to say, the principles of nature needs be such as our philosophy makes them, is to set bounds to omnipotence, and to confine infinite power and wisdom to our shallow models.' vo
68 1bid., p. 155. This s a m e p a s s a g e occurs i n his earlier Vanity of Dogmatizing, L o n d o n , 1661, p. 180. a0 j . Glanvfll, Scepsis Scientifica, L o n d o n , 1885, p. 44. 7oIbid., pp. 182-183.
The Clock Metaphor
and
Probabillsm
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T h i s s t a t e m e n t a l o n e is sufficient t o u n d e r m i n e t h e c l a i m t h a t D e s c a r t e s ' m e t h o d o l o g y h a d n o i m p a c t o n t h e E n g l i s h w r i t e r s of t h i s g e n e r a t i o n . I t m a k e s clear t h a t D e s c a r t e s ' h y p o t h e t i c a l i s m , a n d t h e c l o c k - m a k e r a n a l o g y w h i c h s u p p o r t s it, w e r e o b v i o u s l y a t t r a c t i v e t o a s i g n i f i c a n t class of E n g l i s h m e n who, for religious or o t h e r r e a s o n s , s a w fit t o p u t s t r i c t l i m i t a t i o n s o n t h e scienti,~t's c l a i m t o t r u t h . 71 G l a n v i l l , h o w e v e r , carries his h y p o t h e t i c a l i s m f u r t h e r t h a n D e s c a r t e s ; h e d e n i e s t h a t a n y scientific p r i n c i p l e s , e v e n t h o s e of m a t t e r - i n - m o t i o n , c a n b e m o r e t h a n h y p o t h e s e s . I n t h i s , he is closer t o B o y l e t h a n D e s c a r t e s , t h o u g h one is i n c l i n e d t o d o u b t w h e t h e r e v e n B o y l e w o u l d h a v e g o n e so far d o w n t h e s e e p t i c ' s p r i m r o s e p a t h as G l a n v i l l does w h e n he a s s e r t s : ' F o r the best principles, excepting divine, a n d mathematical, are b u t hypotheses; w i t h i n which, we m a y conclude m a n y things with security from error. B u t yet the greatest certainty, a d v a n c e d from supposal, is still b u t hypothetical. So t h a t we m a y affirm, t h a t things are t h u s a n d thus, according to the principles we have espoused: B u t we strangely forget ourselves, when we plead a necessity of their being so i n n a t u r e , a n d a n impossibility of their being otherwise.' 72 G l a n v i l l t h e n is a n a v o w e d h y p o t h e t i c M i s t , m o r e c o n s i s t e n t l y so t h a n e i t h e r D e s c a r t e s or B o y l e . B u t w h i l e i n s i s t i n g t h a t all scientific p r i n c i p l e s a r e b u t c o n j e c t u r e s , h e b e l i e v e d t h a t s o m e h y p o t h e s e s are b e t t e r t h a n o t h e r s . T a k i n g B o y l e ' s line, G l a n v i l l a r g u e d t h a t s o u n d h y p o t h e s e s m u s t b e b a s e d o n e x p e r i m e n t a l h i s t o r i e s of n a t u r e . 7a To t h e R o y a l Society, h e wrote: ' . . . from y o u r promising a n d generous endeavors, we m a y hopefully expect a considerable enlargement of the history of n a t u r e , w i t h o u t which our hypotheses are b u t dreams a n d romances, a n d our science meer conjecture a n d opinion.' 7a S h a r i n g t h e g e n e r a l s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n t e m p t for a n t i q u i t y , Glanvill suggested t h a t no truly sound t h e o r y had ever been proposed b e c a u s e p h i l o s o p h e r s were n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y e x p e r i m e n t a l . 75 H e w a s ~1Even in the early pages of the Scepsis Scientifica, Glanvill is pre-occupied with the clock analogy which he makes explicit in the passage cited above. Throughout his work, the model of nature as an observable but unknowable machine floats just beneath the surface: ' We cannot profound into the hidden things of nature, nor see the first springs and wheels that set the rest a going. We view but small pieces of the universal frame, and want phenomena to make intire and secure hypotheses ' (ibid., p. 75). v2 Ibid., pp. 170 I71. ~3Glanvill indicates his sympathy for the English polemic against systems when he writes : ' if such great and instructed spirits [i.e., the members of the t~oyal Society] think we have not as yet phenomena enough to make as much as an hypothesis; much less to fix certain [i.e., indubitable] laws and prescribe methods go nature in her actings: what insolence is it then in the lesser size of mortals, who possibly know nothing but what they have gleaned from some little systeme . . . to boast infallibility of knowledge . . .' (ibid., p. li). ~4 Ibid., p. lxii. ~ 5 , . . . 'tis possible that all the hypotheses that have yet been contrived, were buil~ upon too narrow an inspection of things . . .'. (ibid., p. lxiii).
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especially scornful of Aristotle's excursions into n a t u r a l science: ' t h e Aristotelian hypotheses give us a v e r y d r y and jejune account of nature's p h e n o m e n a ,.76 On the whole, Glanvill is satisfied with almost a n y hypothesis which saves t h e appearances ; at least he criticizes only those hypotheses which are incompatible with experience. B u t if two hypotheses b o t h accord with n a t u r e equally well, he suggests t h a t we should believe the simplest of the two: ' whichever doth with more ease and congruity solve the phenomena, that shall have my vote for the most philosophick hypothesis.' 77 Glanvill was n o t only pessimistic a b o u t the possibility of finding t r u e hypotheses a b o u t unobservable mechanisms, he even d o u b t e d t h a t we could confidently discuss causal relations between observable objects. I n a passage t h a t perhaps ranks him as the s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y H u m e , he argues: ' So that we cannot conclude, anything to be the cause of another; but from its continual accompanying it: for the causality itself is insensible. But now to argue from a concomitance to a causality is not infallibly
c o n c l u s i v e . ' 78
H e goes on to insist t h a t because we c a n n o t ' infallibly assure ourselves ' of the t r u t h of even the most obvious causal relation, ' the f o u n d a t i o n of scientifical procedure is too w e a k ' to p e r m i t us to build an indubitable science upon it.' 79
HENRY POWER
T h e final figure I w a n t to consider is H e n r y Power (1623-1688), whose only claim to importance, and it ought to be a modest claim, is based on microscopical observations in his Experimental Philosophy in three boo]cs1
Containing new experiments--microscopical, mercurial, magnetical--with some deductions and probable hypotheses, raised from them in avouchment and illustration of the now famous Atomical Hypothesis (1664). s N o t
unexpectedly, the p o m p o s i t y of the title is even surpassed b y t h e t e x t . B u t t h o u g h P o w e r ranks as neither a great scientist nor a good philosopher, his v o l u m e is i m p o r t a n t in indicating just how wide-spread Descartes' clock analogy became. Like B o y l e and Glanvill, Power p a y s homage equally to the ' ever-tobe-admired Descartes T M and ' t h e learned V e r u l a m 's2. Conflating
7s I b i d . , p. 145. ~ I b i d , , p. 51. vs I b i d . , p. 166. T9 I b i d . , pp. 167-168.
so Power was a p p a r e n t l y the first English scientist to publish extensively on the microscope. I m m e d i a t e l y after his book, n u m e r o u s t r a c t s were devoted to microscopical observations. A m o n g these, H o o k e ' s l V I i c r o g r a p h i a (1665) w a s the m o s t widely read. 81 H. Power, E x p e r i m e n t a l P h i l o s o p h y . . . , London, 1664, preface.
s~ I b i d .
101
Descartes and Bacon much as Boyle and Glanvill did, Power is perfectly willing to allow hypotheses in science, so long as they 'save all the appearances ,sa and are ' confirmed and made good ,sa by several experiments, rather t h a n a single one. But without experiments, he is convinced t h a t ' o u r best philosophers will prove but empty conjecturalists, and their profoundest speculations herein, but glossed outside fallacies.' s5 Though not altogether opposed to hypotheses, Power is a good deal more optimistic than Descartes, Boyle and Glanvill were about the possibility of achieving indubitable knowledge about the physical world. Until Power's time, the hypothetical method had invariably accompanied corpuscularism~ for it seemed one could never do more t h a n conjecture about the properties of the smallest bits of matter. B u t Power gives corpuscularism a strange turn. Impressed by the microscope's ability to penetrate into the inner structure of organisms, Power suggests that by the aid of the microscope we will eventually be able to see corpuscles and determine their precise mechanisms. 's6 He envisions the erection of a ' true and permanent philosophy ' based on the microscopical canvassing of nature a n d the ' infallible demonstrations of meehanieks.' s7 Power believes t h a t the microscope thus provides the key for breaking into Descartes' universal clock and out of his hypothetiealism; for such an instrument offers us a glimpse at the internal mechanisms themselves. Power proceeds to turn the clock analogy against Descartes, suggesting t h a t though the 'system-builders' can never observe more t h a n the outer appearances, the faithful experimenter, with the help of optical instruments, will eventually learn the truth: ' For the old dogmatists and notional speculators, that onely gazed at the visible effects and last resultances of things, understood no more of nature, than a rude countreyfellow does of the internal fabrick of a watch, that only sees the index and horary circle, and perchance hears the clock and alarum strike in it; But he that will give a satisfactory account of the phenomena, must be an artificer indeed, and one wellskilled in the wheel work and internal contrivance of such anatomical engines.' ss
sa Ibid., p. 94. s4 Ibid., p. 114. s5 Ibid., preface. 8~ CL Ibid., p. 82. 8~ ibid., p. 192. 8s Ibid., p. 193. I n his E s s a y , J o h n Locke likens o u r knowledge o f sub-microscopic m e c h a n i s m s to a ' c o u n t r y m a n ' s idea ' of the ' i n w a r d contrivance of t h a t f a m o u s clock at Strasbourg, w h e r e o f he only sees the o u t w a r d figures aud m o t i o n s ' (Essay, London, 1929, iii, 6, 9). Could this be a gloss on P o w e r ' s formulation of the clock-maker analogy? F o r a discussion of Locke's general methodological position, see R. Yost, ' Locke's Rejection of H y p o t h e s e s A b o u t Sub-Microscopic E v e n t s ', J . H i s t . Ideas, 1951, 12, 111-130, a n d m y ' The N a t u r e a n d Sources of Locke's Views on H y p o t h e s e s ', loc. cir. (footnote 52).
102
Laurens Laudan
on
After Power, writers like Hooke, s9 Newton 9 and Cowley91 enlarged on this theme, suggesting quite confidently that improved instrumentation promised hope of discovering the true mechanisms of nature and conclusively establishing (or refuting) the corpuscular philosophy2 ~ As
s~ H o o k e writes: ' . . . a n d b y t h e help of microscopes, t h e r e is n o t h i n g so smaU as to escape o u r i n q u i r y . . . I t s e e m s n o t i m p r o b a b l e b u t t h a t b y t h e s e helps [viz., optical i n s t r u m e n t s ] t h e s u b t i l t y of t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of bodies, t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e i r p a r t s , t h e v a r i o u s t e x t u r e of their m a t t e r , t h e i n s t r u m e n t s a n d m a n n e r of t h e i r i n w a r d m o t i o n s , a n d all t h e possible a p p e a r a n c e s of t h i n g s , m a y c o m e to be m o r e fully d i s c o v e r e d . . . ' (MicrograpMa, L o n d o n , 1665, preface). W h a t we c a n n o t discover i~bout corpuscles b y seeing t h e m , H o o k e s u g g e s t s we c a n learn b y listening to t h e m : ' T h e r e m a y also be a possibility of discovering t h e i n t e r n a l m o t i o n s a n d a c t i o n s of bodies b y t h e s o u n d t h e y m a k e , w h o k n o w s b u t t h a t as in a w a t c h we m a y heat' t h e h e a t i n g of t h e balance, a n d t h e r u n n i n g of t h e wheels, a n d t h e s t r i k i n g of t h e h a m m e r s , a n d t h e g r a t i n g of t h e t e e t h , a n d t h e m u l t i t u d e s of o t h e r noises; w h o k n o w s , I say, b u t t h a t it m a y be possible to discover t h e m o t i o n s of t h e i n t e r n a l p a r t s of bodies, w h e t h e r a n i m a l , vegetable, or n~ineral, b y t h e s o u n d t h e y m a k e . . . ' (Posthumous Works (ed. Waller), L o n d o n , 1705, p. 39). Considering t h a t b o t h H o o k e a n d P o w e r looked to i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n to free science f r o m its h y p o t h e t i c a l i s m , it is p e r h a p s significant t h a t in t h e preface to his 2/licrographia, H o o k e m e n t i o n s P o w e r ' s Experimental Philosophy. He goes on to r e m a r k t h a t he a n d P o w e r e x a m i n e d one a n o t h e r ' s MSS. before t h e y w e n t to press. 90 I n t h e Opticks, N e w t o n e x u d e s a similar o p t i m i s m w h e n he writes t h a t ' I t is n o t impossible b u t t h a t m i c r o s c o p e s m a y a t l e n g t h be i m p r o v e d to t h e d i s c o v e r y of t h e particles of bodies on w h i c h t h e i r colours depend, if t h e y are n o t a l r e a d y in s o m e m e a s u r e a r r i v e d to t h a t degree of perfection ' (Optieks, N e w York, 1952, f o u r t h edition, p. 261). Optics, on N e w t o n ' s view, is likely to become a c o m p l e t e l y inductive, o b s e r v a t i o n a l a n d n o n - h y p o t h e t i c a l science. Cf. ~ . K a r g o n , ' N e w t o n , ]~arrow a n d t h e H y p o t h e t i c a I P h y s i c s ', ' Centaurus, 1965,11, 46-56, for a n a c c o u n t of N e w t o n ' s r e a c t i o n to C a r t e s i a n h y p o t h e t i c a l i s m . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to c o m p a r e N e w t o n ' s o p t i m i s m a b o u t seeing corpuscles w i t h C h a r l e t o n ' s r e m a r k t h a t e v e n t h e a t o m s ' of t h e largest size, or rate, are m u c h below t h e p e r c e p t i o n a n d d i s c e r m n e n t of t h e a e u t e s t optics, a n d r e m a i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e only b y t h e finer digets of r a t i o n a l conjecture ' (op. tit., p. 113). 91 I n his Ode to the Royal Society, Cowley g a v e poetic expression to P o w e r ' s optimisti6 h o p e s for t h e microscope giving u s infallible k n o w l e d g e of t h e i n n e r p a r t s of n a t u r e ' s clock: ' N a t u r e ' s g r e a t w o r k s n o d i s t a n c e c a n obscure, N o s m a l l n e s s h e r n e a r o b j e c t s c a n secure. Y o u ' v e t a u g h t t h e cmdous s i g h t to p r e s s I n t o t h e p r i v a t e s t recess Of h e r i m p e r c e p t i b l e l i t t l e n e s s . . . Y o u ' v e l e a r n e d to r e a d her s m a l l e s t h a n d , A n d well b e g u n h e r d e e p e s t sense to u n d e r s t a n d . ' (In S p r a t ' s History of the Royal Society, L o n d o n , 1667, i m m e d i a t e l y following t h e ' E p i s t l e D e d i c a t o r y '.) 9~ I f we s t r a i n t h e p o i n t a little, we c a n see influences of t h e clock a n a l o g y s t r e t c h i n g e v e n into t h e e a r l y e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I n his preface to t h e second edition of N e w t o n ' s Principia, R o g e r C o t e s - - i n a v e i n v e r y m u c h like H e n r y P o w e r - - t u r n s t h e a n a l o g y a g a i n s t t h e Cartesians. A f t e r a vigorous a t t a c k on t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l i s m of t h e Cartesians, Cotes insists t h a t ' T h e b u s i n e s s o f t r u e p h i l o s o p h y is to derive t h e n a t u r e s o f t h i n g s f r o m causes t r u l y e x i s t e n t , a n d to i n q u i r e after t h o s e laws on w h i c h t h e G r e a t Creator a c t u a l l y chose to
103
the faith in the unlimited magnifying powers of the microscope grew, English hypotheticalism waned2 3 After all, the clock anglogy is only persuasive when there is serious doubt about the possibility of perceiving nature's mechanisms. As such doubt faded, so did Descartes' influence and the method of hypothesis. Descartes thus fell victim to his own metaphor; victimized because the clock analogy, which he endorsed so enthusiastically, suggested to m a n y later writers that the inner mechanisms of nature, like those of a clock, could be directly scrutinized by careful observation and instrumentation. The demand for a science free of all hypotheses, which was widely circulated after Newton, could never have gathered such enthusiastic adherents if the hypotheticalism of Descartes, Boyle and Glanvill had not died such a quick and needless death at the hands of those who thought nature's clock had no secrets which man's instruments could not seek out and know with certainty2 4
ss A l t h o u g h m a n y scientists evidently believed the microscope pointed t h e w a y to complete observability of micro-mechanisms, there were others who, seeing the real substance of Descartes' a r g m n e n t , t o o k precisely the opposite position. J a c q u e s R o h a u l t , for instance, a r g u e d in his Trait~ de Physique, Paris, 1671, t h a t the moral to be d r a w n f r o m the n e w worlds which the microscope unfolds is n o t t h a t we are finally getting down to u l t i m a t e reality, b u t r a t h e r , t h a t n a t u r e is infinitely c o m p l e x ~ h a t each n e w stage of magnification will reveal still finer a n d more subtle processes. T h o u g h the microscope p e r m i t s u s to examine the fleas on a dog, it does not p e r m i t us to see the micro-organisms which infest t h e flea. F o r R e h a u l t , there is a potentially infinite regress to ever-smaller bits of m a t t e r which the microscope, h o w e v e r great its magnification, is powerless to exhaust. 9, Considering t h a t :Boyle, Glanvill a n d Power all used the clock analogy in publications b e t w e e n 1661 a n d 1664, one is inclined to ask w h e t h e r t h e y b o r r o w e d the analogy f r o m Descartes or f r o m one another. I h a v e been able to find little evidence which w o u l d conclusively resolve this a n t i q u a r i a n puzzle. I n point o f publication, Glanvilt's Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661) w a s issued first and this m i g h t seem to constitute a prima faeie case for Boyle a n d Power h a v i n g plagiarized it f r o m Glanvill. However, there is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence against such a view. Glanvill's editor, Owen, n o t e s t h a t his Vanity of Dogmatizing was ' so scarce as to be h a r d l y k n o w n at all exeep~ b y n a m e ' (Seepsis Seientifica, p. xvi). F u r t h e r m o r e , Boyle's Usefulness of Natural Philosophy, in which he used the clock analogy, t h o u g h published in 1663, was sent to press in ' 1660, or 1661~ a n d 1663 ' (Boyle, Works, vol. ii, p. 3) a n d Boyle claims t h a t m o s t of the first p a r t of t h a t w o r k in which the crucial passage o c c u r s - - w a s w r i t t e n t e n or twelve years earlier (1651-53). I n addition to the similarity of language b e t w e e n Boylc's a n d Descartes' formulations of the analogy (which would u n d e r m i n e the Deseartes-to-Glanvfll-to-:Boyle view), we m i g h t n o t e t h a t :Boyle n e v e r found this m o s t beautiful frame of the world, n o t those b y which he m i g h t h a v e done the same, h a d he so p l e a s e d . . . The same m o t i o n of t h e h o u r - h a n d in a clock m a y be occasioned either b y a weight h u n g or a s p r i n g s h u t u p within. B u t if a certain clock should be really m o v e d w i t h a weight, we should laugh at a m a n t h a t would suppose it m o v e d b y a s p r i n g . . . for certainty the w a y he o u g h t to h a v e taken would h a v e been actually to look into the i n w a r d p a r t s of the machine, t h a t he m i g h t find the true principle of the proposed m o t i o n ' (Principia, 4th ed., Berkeley, 1934, pp. xxvii-xxviii). Descartes' p o i n t t h a t the inner m a c h i n a t i o n s of n a t u r e the eonnexions b e t w e e n p h e n o m e n a - - a r c necessarily precluded f r o m view is a p p a r e n t l y los~ on the optimistic Cotes.
104
The Cloclc Metaphor and Probabillsm
mentions Glanvill in his published works. As for Power, he never mentions Glanvill though he continually writes of Boyle and Descartes. Since Boyle's Usefulness predates Power's Experimental History (1664), it is possible that Power got the analogy from Boyle rather than Descartes. On the other hand, Power's book received the imprimatur in 1663 (when Boyle's Usefulness was barely off the press) and its preface is dated 1661. I n light of such evidence (scanty though it is), I think it probable t h a t all three writers got the analogy directly from Descartes rather than from one another.

Descartes' Impact on English Methodology

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Descartes' Impact on English Methodology

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1929, 11, 1-12.

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