Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 4

PASEI vs Drilon Case Digest PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. DRILON G.R. NO.

L-81958 JUNE 30, 1988 FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid under the Constitution? HELD: In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is

well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not been contemplated.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for. Marcos Vs. Manglapus Case Digest Marcos Vs. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989 Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses

because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Silverio v. CA Facts: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. SilverioDee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders. On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.

Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises. Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. Issue: W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41. Held: The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed. The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead. A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of

the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to. In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.