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F1LEO
Zach Coughlin
Nevada Bar No: 9473 temp susp .. over this case
1471 E. 9
th
St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
DEPUFf
Aitorne), for Pro Se Appellant
denied Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
ACH COUGHLIN; )
(,\1
ppellant/Petitioner, Case No:
vs. )
'ity of Reno: ) Dept No: 8
Respondent )
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO PAY FILING FEE AND BRING
COMPLAINT INTO COMPLIANCE, OR, IN THE ALTERANTIVE, MOTION TO
ALTER, AMEND, OR VACATE 9/19/13 ORJ)ERAND FOR EFLEX ACCESS AND
PRIVILEGES
COMES NOW. Appellant. Zach Coughlin, by and through himself respectfully submits this' .
filing seeking some form of relief as to the apparent dismissal, essentially, with prejudice of
Coughlin's attempt to seek redress for a great deal of misconduct that was far from "immaterial" to
him. where it may be the case that such Order of this court on 9/19/13 is tantamount to the running of
the two year statute of limitations deadline Coughlin believes applies to any 42 USC 1983 suit,
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MOTION FOR OF TIME TO PAY FILING FE AND CORRECT COMPLAINT

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running from the 8/20/11 date of the initial of, so far, 21 incarcerations of Coughlin. The confluence
of statute of limitations concerns and motions to proceed informa pauperis was, of course, of concern
in another two matters this court is familiar with, CV11-01955, and CV11-01896. The IFP in 01896
was ultimately approved and the filing date was, ultimately, back dated to the date of Coughlins
submission of a Proposed Complaint with his IFP sufficient to preclude the running of the 90 days
from receipt (concept very much at issue in CV11-03628 incident to the WCSOs burglaries of
tenants in failing to accord tenants the 24 hours from receipt of the summary removal order in
NRS 40.253(5)(a)) of the EEOC Right to Sue Letter. Coughlin uses the qualifier, ultimately
because it took much litigating on Coughlins part to convince J udge Adams of the after his early
order assigned a filing date as of the August 2011 date of J udge Steinheimmers Order granting
Coughlins IFP (which fell outside the 90 days from right to sue territory, where such rocky terrain
led Coughlin to file what WLS sought to characterize as a duplicative suit in 01955, but which was
really just a desperate safety measure, one that Coughlin sought to avoid prejudicing the defendants
incident to his subsequent motion to consolidate the two matters, which both J udges Elliott and
Adams denied).
The 9/19/13 Order in the case at bar presents a different scenario now, where the IFP was
denied. How would the filing date for any Complaint that Coughlin is ultimately get past the filters
to the access to justice be measured? Would such be tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice (just
like the orders in 01955 and 01896 denying Coughlins Motion for Enlargement of time to effect
service of process of the complaints, where the denials of such seems to operate a running of the 90
days statute of limitations as to Coughlin claims therein where the new suits that Coughlin would
necessarily need file against such defendants would be assigned new filing date outside the 90 days
from right to sue letter window).

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Should not Coughlin be given some opportunity to bring his complaint into non NRCP 12(f)
territory, especially where the result of the 9/19/13 Order herein could ultimately effect such a harsh,
dispostive result? Does Coughlin have any opportunity to now pay the filing fee and submit a
Complaint that addresses the ills reference in such Order? Is not Coughlin to be afforded the
opportunity all other litigants have to amend his complaint once without seeking leave of court?
J udge Stiglich's 9/19/13 entered Order in CV13-01618 reads: "The court has reviewed the
proposed Complaint. It asserts federal civil rights claims and alleges jurisdiction is proper under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 (the federal civil rights statute) and that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. Section
1391(b). Though a state court may exercise jurisdiction over claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983, see Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 731 (2009) ("In our federal system of government, state
as well as federal courts have jurisdiction over suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 .... "), The
court finds Coughlin's proposed Complaint, in toto, is an immaterial matter because it, for example,
inadequately invokes this court's jurisdiction and fails to establish proper venue. Therefore, it is
hereby STRICKEN. NRCP 12(f). Further, in light of this ruling, Coughlin's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and the supplemental motion are DENIED as moot. This case is closed
Such Order put quotation marks around the word Declaration, perhaps indicating a
potential failure to countenance the very

Buckwalter and NRS 53.045 terrain that resulted in J udge
Adams dismissal of WLS and Elcano being reversed in the appeal of 01955 in 60302. NRCP 12(f) is
not available to strike an entire pleading or propsed Complaint. Regardless, Coughlin respectfully as
this Court to consider whether the language in its 9/19/13 Order is not overly cursory and definitive,
in a prejudicial sense, as to Coughlins opportunity to seek redress. Overly dismissive approaches to
individuals seeking redress relative to serious allegations of misconduct have a tendency to live on,
and alarm a public that demands some type of checks and balances on absolute power:

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/168532822/11-6-07-NVD-J udge-Sandoval-Order-
Dismissing-Prisoner-s-Lawsuit-Against-SBN-Holmes-WCPD-Sferrazza-D-nev-3-07-Cv-00255-3-0
http://www.scribd.com/doc/168586749/7-12-12-Order-and-Memorandum-Vacating-and-
Remanding-Dismissal-of-Complaint-in-J ones-v-Nash-Holmes-D-nev-3-11-Cv-00047-16-0
http://www.scribd.com/doc/168586746/10-16-12-Screen-Order-J ones-v-Nash-HOlmes-D-
nev-3-11-Cv-00047-19-0
Coughlin is certainly sensitive to the concerns some might voice as to the position bringing a
complaint such as that presented herein would present to a state court judge, where such are elected.
Should Coughlins case herein be filed, or otherwise provided some modality wherein Coughlin can
avoid the running of the statute of limitations on his claims, whilst securing either the funds to pay
the state court filing fee or the granting of an IFP Motion in in federal court (or, the funds to pay a
filing fee therein), Coughlin arguably (and likely would) do well to move for a change of venue to
federal court (though, by no means, is Coughlin suggesting anything but a neutral application of law
to facts would be provided by either court).
Indeed, a review of the docket in the J ones v. Nash Holmes matter indicates the the approach
taken here by this Court, seemingly similar to that of J udge Hicks in J ones, is not one Coughlin
would be entirely devoid of an opportunity to seek redress
of: http://www.scribd.com/doc/169582568/00453-Docket-J ones-v-Nash-Holmes-Nvd
Therein, the docket indicates that SCREENING ORDER GRANTING 1 Motion/Application for
Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. FURTHER ORD NDOC shall pay Clerk from inmate account. Clerk shall
send NDOC Inmate Services this Order ( Mailed to NDOC 4/7/2011; E- service to Finance on 4/7/2011 ).
FURTHER ORD that even if this action is dismissed the full filing fee shall be due. FURTHER ORD Clerk shall
DETACH and FILE the complaint #1 -1. FURTHER ORD Ps complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice for

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failure to state a claim for which rel ief may be grnted. FURTHER ORD Clerk shall enter judgment
accordingl y and close this case
Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2D.
696, 699 (9Th Cir. 1988). Certainly where Coughlins status as an attorney temporarily suspended in Nevada,
particularly where Coughlins very competence to practice law has been so impugned, in both a RPC 1.1 and
SCR 117 sense, the approach here must apply the full import of Balistreri to Coughlin case, particularly where
the NNDB quashed Coughlins subpoenas (against the RMC and its Marshals, as well as though directed to
Asst. Bar Counsel and the SBN Clerk of Court, etc) upon a Breliant violative (outside the adjudicatory
boundaries enunciated by the SBN in its 11/2/12 Motions to Quash (as the SBN knew it was bound by the
representations it made to Coughlin that he may issue his own subpoenas, despite his then temporary
suspension, and that the SBN had the authority to issue such pronouncement from the NNDB) and the RJ C
did as well in the matters on appeal in CR12-2025 (involving same arrest as the case at bar here) and in
CR13-0614, which the 2J DC still will not even accord Coughlin access to the filings therein (to say nothing of
the right to file documentsto be clear, Coughlin is referring to the refusal, so far, of the 2J DC to allow him to
even view the filings in matters wherein he is an indigent criminal defendant, such as in CR13-1332 CR13-
0552, etc., etc.).
. Signed by J udge Larry R. Hicks on 4/6/2011.
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a trial court to "strike from a
pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." In
a recent case of first impression, Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2010),
the defendant corporation, Handi-Craft, unsuccessfully invoked this Rule in an effort to obtain the
dismissal of the plaintiff corporation's damages claim. In that case, the plaintiff, Whittlestone, filed a
breach-of-contract action alleging that Handi-Craft had improperly terminated the parties' 20-year
agreement after only two years. The complaint prayed for relief in the form of lost profits and
consequential damages. In response, Handi-Craft filed a Rule 12(f) motion to strike the damages
portion of the complaint on the ground that the parties' contract expressly precluded the relief
Whittlestone sought. The district court granted Handi-Craft's motion and struck the claims.

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Holding that Rule 12(f) "does not authorize a district court to strike a claim for damages on
the ground that such damages are precluded as a matter of law," the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 971.
In reaching this decision, the court first analyzed whether Whittlestone's claim for lost profits and
consequential damages fell within any of the classifications covered by Rule 12(f), to wit, "(1) an
insufficient defense; (2) [a] redundant [matter]; (3) [an] immaterial [matter]; (4) [an] impertinent
[matter]; or (5) [a] scandalous [matter]." Id. at 97374. A claim for damages "is clearly not an
insufficient defense." Id. at 974. "Second, the claim for damages could not be redundant, as it does
not appear anywhere else in the complaint. Third, the claim for damages is not immaterial, because
whether these damages are recoverable relates directly to the plaintiff's underlying claim for relief."
Id. Fourth, the damages claim "is not impertinent, because whether these damages are recoverable
relates to the harm being alleged." Id. Fifth, the damages claim in itself could not be classified as
scandalous. Id.
In addition, by arguing that Whittlestone's damages claim should be stricken because the
recovery of such damages was precluded by the contract as a matter of law, Handi-Craft was
effectively using a Rule 12(f) motion to procure the partial dismissal of the complaint. Id. The Ninth
Circuit ruled that this maneuver was "better suited for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss] or a Rule
56 motion [for summary judgment], not a Rule 12(f) motion [to strike]." Id. If Rule 12(f) were
interpreted "in a manner that allowed litigants to use it as a means to dismiss some or all of a
pleading," redundancies would be created within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "because a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion (or a motion for summary judgment at a later stage of the proceedings) already
serves such a purpose." Id.
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), a federal court must dismiss a prisoners claim, if the
allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on

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which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(E)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the
same standard under 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint.
Further, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of
the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to
contradict them. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). When a court dismisses a complaint
under 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to
curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not
be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3D 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).Reform Act of
1995 (PLRA), a federal court must dismiss a prisoners claim, if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(E)(2).
Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under 1915
when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. Further, a finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). When a court dismisses a complaint under 1915(e), the plaintiff
should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is
clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato
v. United States, 70 F.3D 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), a federal court
must dismiss a prisoners claim, if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous

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or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(E)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under 1915 when reviewing the
adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. Further, a finding of factual frivolousness is
appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether
or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). When a court dismisses a complaint under 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given
leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the
face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United
States, 70 F.3D 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a
question of law. See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. Of America, 232 F.3D 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set
of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3D
756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the court takes as true all allegations of
material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3D 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se
complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (Per curiam).
While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must
provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
1964-65 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id., See
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Additionally, a reviewing court should begin by

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identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual
allegations. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, acourt should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. Finally, all or part of a
complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoners claims lack an arguable
basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.G.,
Claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest
which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.G., Fantastic
or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); See also McKeever v.
Block, 932 F.2D 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). Allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (Per curiam); see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 901 F.2D 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). All or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be
dismissed sua sponte, however, if the prisoners claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.G. Claims against defendants
who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest that clearly does not exist), as
well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.G. Fantastic or delusional scenarios). See
Neitzke, 490 U.S. At 327-28; see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2D 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of
the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to

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contradict them. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). When a court dismisses a complaint
under 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to
curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not
be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3D 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Collateral estoppels ought apply to preclude any subsequent allegations that Coughlins
Proposed Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or that it was frivolous
or vexatious in light of the failure of the instant 9/19/13 Order to make such a ruling or finding,
where it only indicates that The court finds Coughlin's proposed Complaint, in toto, is an immaterial
matter where this court indicated that such inadequately invokes this court's jurisdiction and fails
to establish proper venue. Immaterial and frivolous are entirely different characterizations with
distinct legal treatments accorded to such. However, the pro se nature of Coughlins Complaint
augers for an approach that either excuses such as venue is rather manifest in and of itself, and this
courts own order cites to authority for invoking this courts jurisdiction, or that is more in line with
the approach taken in the following: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-
00703/pdf/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00703-0.pdf
Also, please see: http://assets.wne.edu/161/13_note_Civil_Pr.pdf
What Constitutes Commencement of Action 1. In General Topic Summary Correlation Table
References 226. When leave of the court requested; proceeding in forma pauperis West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Limitation of Actions 118(1) The statute of limitations is
suspended while a court considers a motion for leave to file the case.[1] Thus, for statute of limita-
tions purposes, a complaint in an action in which leave to proceed in forma pauperis is requested is
generally deemed to have been filed on the day the motion is received by the clerk, or on the date the
complaint was lodged.[2] There is also authority that the statute is suspended while the court deter-
mines whether to grant or deny the petition to proceed in forma pauperis, but resumes running when
the plaintiff receives notification that it was denied.[3] Caution: The general rule tolling the statute of
limitations during the pendency of an application to proceed in forma pauperis does not apply to de-
fendants not named in the original complaint.[4] [FN1] White v. Cooper, 55 F. Supp. 2D 848 (N.D. Ill.
1999). [FN2] McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3D 188, 34 Fed. R. Serv. 3D 1617 (3d Cir.
1996); Mwabira-Simera v. Howard University, 692 F. Supp. 2D 65, 257 Ed. Law Rep. 212 (D.D.C.
2010); Pollock v. Rashid, 117 Ohio App. 3D 361, 690 N.E.2D 903 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1996)
(relates back to when a prisoner unsuccessfully sought to file the complaint along with a motion to
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proceed in forma pauperis. which the clerk had refused to accept without payment o1'a filing fee).
[FN3] Humphries v. csacs West. Inc .. 343 F. Supp. 2D 670. 29 AL.R. Fed. 2D 739 (N.D. Ill. 2004 .
[FN4] White v. Cooper, 55 F. Supp. 2D 848 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
. http://www.scribd.com/docI16974083411-26-12-0204-063341-Cv11-01 896-Mtn-to-Set-Aside-
Resubmitted-Again-Mtn-lo-Set-Asidc-Decree
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 2398.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
L------:
J
/ II! /L,/1
Zach C oughli, ppellant/Petitoner c! e

Attorney for Pro Amendment Right To Counsel
)-r-
ZACHARY DBA , .
. ZACHARY. COUGHLIN'S MEMORV-FOAM
PH. ,NO. 775-338-8118 .
931 FOREST ST.
RENO, NV . 89509-2704
t . Pay ; , .. e':
,-Order of .r,'
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:ifJOTION ,OR ENL)I,RGEr1ENT OF TH1E TO Pl',Y "ILING FEE !l,ND CORFECT COI1PLr,JNT