Military Power, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America

Socit qubcoise de science politique
Military Power, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America Author(s): J. Patrice McSherry Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 463-488 Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Socit qubcoise de science politique Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3229578 . Accessed: 02/08/2013 14:55
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MilitaryPower, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America*
J. PATRICE McSHERRY
Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations
The transition from military to civilian rule in Latin America has thrown a searchlight upon two knotty and interrelated problems: the legacy of military repression from the era of the national security states, and the problem of still-powerful and unrepentant armed forces coexisting with new civilian governments. These intertwined problems have profound implications for the possibility of fundamental change in a region long characterized by extreme social inequality and political instability. After the Cuban revolution and its challenge to the hegemony of capitalism in the hemisphere, a series of coups brought military regimes-national security states-to power throughout Latin America. Their societies suffered, through the widespread use of state terror, gross human rights violations of unprecedented proportions from the 1960s through the 1980s. Central America still suffers systematic abuses. How new civilian regimes should deal with the military perpetrators of state terror, particularly when those forces still wielded preponderant power, became a burning issue throughout the region. In country after country, a major obstacle to unfolding democratization processes has been the military, or significant factions within the military institution. The military regimes often established laws giving the armed forces extraordinary powers, and/or appointed civilian allies to government positions, thus attempting to institutionalize permanently their power in anticipation of the eventual transition to civilian rule. At the moment of relinquishing government power, the major
* The author is indebted to Kenneth P. Erickson, John Hammond, Irving L. Markovitz, Ra6l Molina Mejia, Kenneth Sharpe and Martin Weinstein for their comments on versions of this article (although they may not recognize or agree with everything in the final product), as well as to the anonymous reviewers of this JOURNAL. J. Patrice McSherry, Research Associate, Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations, Box 530, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 33 West 42 Street, New York, New York, USA 100368099
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, XXV:3 (September/septembre 1992). Printed in Canada / Imprime au Canada
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J. PATRICE McSHERRY
demandof the militaryin virtuallyall states was for guaranteesagainst accountability-widely called impunityin the region-for humanrights crimes, a demandthatimplicitlyplaces the militaryabove the law. Thus, the new civilian regimes were faced with profound choices at the momentof transitionand beyond, choices which would shape the limits and possibilities of their societies and polities in the future. Decisions to allow impunity have far-reachingramificationsvisa-vis the possibility of implantingdemocratic values such as justice, respect for the rule of law and civilian supremacyin new regimes, and the constructing of institutions to sustain them. Moreover, the possibilities for achieving socio-economic change in the interests of the for subormajorities,or establishingmechanismsto ensureparticipation dinate classes excluded by the militaryregimes, remainthreatenedas long as politicized and undemocraticmilitary/securityforces remain above the law, protected by impunity and able to define unilaterally what is a "nationalsecuritythreat." In short, impunityis an issue that symbolizes the relationshipbetween differentsectors of the state-the elected governmentandthe coercive apparatus-as well as between the state and society. This test of power is a dialectical strugglethat has to variedin differentLatinAmericancountries,but it is no exaggeration of that of at heart the the issue strikes the say very militaryimpunity limits and possibilities of transformingthe former national security states. To paraphraseAlain Rouquie,' civilianizationof the militarystate does not necessarily mean the democratizationor demilitarization of In countries civilian as and with weak such Guatemala power. regimes, El Salvador,the militaryhas continuedto dominatethe politicalsystem throughterrorand an intact clandestinecounterinsurgencyapparatus. In Brazil, Argentina and Chile, military power is embedded in the structures of the state in various ways, despite the transition. In Uruguay, the referendumprocess demonstratedthat fear of military threatsdampenedpopulardemandsfor militaryaccountabilityand due process. In all these states, to a greateror lesser extent dependingon the strengthof the organizedforces in society andthe civiliangovernments, powerful armed forces are still a major factor defining the limits of This article attempts to show that impunitygrantedto the armed forces, and entrenched structures of the national security apparatus within the state, tend to perpetuatemilitarypower to the detrimentof democraticforces in the state and society. (Anothercrucialdeterminant of the phenomenonof restricteddemocracies in Latin America in the early 1990sis the highlyexclusionaryneo-liberaleconomic model being
1 See Alain Rouqui6, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 350.
civilian power.
Abstract. The transitionfrom militaryto civilian rule in Latin Americahas thrown a upon the legacy of militaryrepressionfrom the era of the nationalsecurity searchlight andunrepentant armedforces. These intertwined states,andthe problemof still-powerful for the possibilityof fundamental problemshaveprofound changein a region implications andpoliticalinstability. As Rouquienotes, longcharacterized by extremesocialinequality or civilianizationof the militarystate does not necessarily mean the democratization and of power.How to dealwiththe perpetrators of stateterroris a burning demilitarization controversialissue throughoutthe region. Duringthe process of transition,the major for demandof the militaryin virtuallyall stateswas for guarantees againstaccountability humanrights crimes-widely called impunityin the region-a demandthat implicitly abovethe law. Thisissue strikesat the very heartof the transformation placesthe military of nationalsecurity states and the democratization of power. Additionally,despite the transitionfrom militaryrule, structuresof the national security apparatusremainembeddedwithinthe civilianregimes.An examination of the questionof impunityandthose and persistingmiliembeddedstructuresexposes the tensions between democratization and power. tary prerogatives Resume. Le passagede l'autorit6 a l'autorit6 civile en Am6rique Latinea misen militaire evidence l'heritagede la repressionmilitaire depuis l'6poquedes ltats de s6curit6nationale et le problemepose par des forces arm6esimp6nitenteset encore puissantes. Ces sur les possibilit6sd'un chanlies pourraient problemes6troitement peser profond6ment gement fondamentaldans une region longtempscaract6riseepar une in6galit6sociale extremeet une instabilit6 de politique.Commele remarqueRouqui6,la transformation l'ttat militaireen Etat civil n'entrainepas n6cessairementla d6mocratisationou la du pouvoir.L'attitude de demilitarisation a adoptervis-a-visdes responsables de la terreur la part du gouvernementest une question brilante et tres controvers6e. Pendantle danspratiquement tous les pays, la principale demandede l'armee processusde transition, a ete d'obtenir des garantiescontre toute inculpationde crime contre les droits de l'homme-ce qui est commun6ment appele impunitedansla r6gion-demande qui place tacitement l'arm6eau-dessusdes lois. Ce problemeest au centrememe de la transformadu pouvoir.De plus, malgr6 la tion des Etatsde securit6nationaleet de la d6mocratisation transitiondu pouvoir militaireau pouvoir civil, les structuresde l'appareilde s6curit6 nationalerestentinbriqu6es dansles r6gimescivils. Un examende la questionde l'impuet les nit6et de ces structures 6troitement liees reveleles tensionsentrela d6mocratisation privilegeset le pouvoirpersistentsdes forces arm6es.
imposed by the civilian governments,with significantpressure by the banks.This aspect, howInternational MonetaryFundandinternational ever, is not the focus of this article.) Impunityperpetuatesthe political autonomyof the militaryand its abilityto act beyond the reaches of the rule of law and civilianauthority.Unless the problemis confrontedand action taken to demilitarizestate and society, and to establish a system of equaljustice,the long-range prospectsfor consolidatingdemocracyin these countries seem dim. In other words, the way a new civilian governmentdeals with the questionof impunityin all its manifestations encapsulatesthe struggle-or lack thereof-between democratization and rule by militarydictate. This article provides a sketch of the initial acts of impunityin severalcountriesat the momentof transition,as well as some of the legal and constitutional mechanisms of impunity embeddedin polities throughoutLatin America.Throughthis exercise, the extent of militarypower in each country becomes clearer, and the changingnatureof the state as a site of struggleamongclass forces and sectors begins to be revealed. civilian-military
466 The National Security States
J. PATRICE McSHERRY
The national security state is defined here as a type of authoritarian state, associated with a dependent and internationalized capitalist model of development, which was governed directly by the military as an institution.2 In the national security states, the military undertook to reshape totally society in accordance with its messianic vision of national security. Clearly, there are major differences between the Central American countries and the larger South American states, in terms of levels of economic development, types of participation in the global economy, social structure and so on. However, these states can be usefully compared in key aspects such as direct governance by the military institution, the militarization of state structures, the national security ideology held by these military institutions, and the mechanisms of impunity they imposed. Another common factor is the historic role of the US government, as the hegemonic power in the hemisphere, in the training (tactical, strategic and ideological), financing and support of these armies, particularly after the Second World War. The national security doctrine-still held by important sectors of the Latin American militaries-is an extremist ideology incorporating Latin organic and corporatist theories of the state and US counterinsurgency and cold war ideology.3 The doctrine assumed an internal
2 This is my definition, drawn from the literature, and elaborated in J. Patrice McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State: The Case of Guatemala," Socialism and Democracy 10 (1990), 121-53. Other sources in English on this type of state include: Marian Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 6-10; Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), especially the selections by Manuel Antonio Garret6n and Luciano Martins in Latin America (1989 edition); Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), and "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). This analysis highlights Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and Uruguay, although other states such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru share some similar traits. Traditional one-man dictatorships such as Duvalier's Haiti, Somoza's Nicaragua and Stroessner's Paraguay fall outside my definition of national security states. 3 Important contributions to the literature on national security doctrine include Jose Comblin, The Church and the National Security State (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1979); Guatemalan Church in Exile (IGE), Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy (Mexico City, April 1989); Saul Landau, The Dangerous Doctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People (Garden City: Doubleday, 1980); David Pion-Berlin, "The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina," Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988), 382-407; David Pion-Berlin and George A. Lopez, "Of Victims and Executioners: Argentine State Terror, 1975-1979," International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991), 35; George A. Lopez, "National Security Ideology as an Impetus to State Violence and State Terror," in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., Govern-
Military Power and Impunity in Latin America
467
situation of total war between the military guardians of the nation and expansively defined "subversion." As General Videla of Argentina once said, "a terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization."4 Democracy was regarded with suspicion at best, and as detrimental to national security; working and peasant classes were considered subversive and were primary targets for repression. As Maria Helena Moreira Alves has noted, the national security doctrine is in practice an ideology of class domination.5 Struggles by subordinate classes to better their lives and to demand socio-economic justice or political participation have been regarded as communist-inspired threats to "Western Christian civilization." The national security state was characterized by fierce anticommunism and a commitment to pursue the twin objectives of "security and development." "Development" was envisioned as economic growth, linked to foreign investment and international capital, with the aim of eliminating the breeding grounds for communism. With its extensive repressive intelligence and counterinsurgency apparatus, the national security state closed off democratic channels and seized control of political, economic and social life. Torture, disappearance and assassination were among the means used to maintain "security" and ensure "favorable investment climates" for foreign capital. The working and peasant classes were violently excluded from political life and economic influence; the left was hunted down and largely eliminated, with the exception of the guerrilla groups in El Salvador and Guatemala. In the 1960s and 1970s, the national security projects of the militaries coincided with the interests of key sectors of the agro-export classes in Central America, and the national bourgeoisies and elites linked to transnational capital in the Southern Cone, as well as US policymakers obsessed with the "communist threat." US military aid and training tended to encourage and justify military role expansion, and contributed to the all-encompassing character of the national security doctrine held by the Latin American armed forces.6 Alarmed by the
ment Violence and Repression (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 73-95; and Martin Weinstein, Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1988). 4 Quotedin Pion-Berlinand Lopez, "Of Victims and Executioners," 79.
5 Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 9.
6 A numberof analysts have stressed that militaryrole expansion (or what Alfred is a dangerouspreludeto politiciStepanhas called "new military professionalism") Politics(Princezationandmayleadto coups. See AlfredStepan,Rethinking Military ton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1988),13-15;andClaudeWelch, CivilianControlof the Military (Albany:State Universityof New YorkPress, 1976),30-34. US training, roleexpansionin the LatinAmerican especiallyafterthe Cubanrevolution,promoted ratherthanexterarmiesby focussingon internalsubversionandcounterinsurgency nal defence, and promotingcivic action programmes,'military-in-development"
468
J. PATRICE McSHERRY
Cuban revolution, and by the strengthened organizations of labour and newly politicized peasant classes throughout the region, these elites encouraged the Latin American militaries to crush the threat from below. Popular mobilization was seen as destructive, overwhelming and threatening to the survival and development of the capitalist model. The monetarist orthodoxy of the Chicago Boys, especially influential in Chile and Argentina in the 1970s, stressed that inflation and economic crisis were due to "excess demand" from subordinate classes. This image coincided with the military perception that democracy had become a dangerous threat to national security, opening the state to subversion and disorder. In the Southern Cone, export-oriented, debt-led growth strategies aimed at rapid capital accumulation replaced import-substitution policies and strengthened sectors of the upper classes linked to foreign capital; in Central America, military rule reinforced the dominance of the agro-export oligarchic elites. The US government, which believed the Latin American militaries to be the only forces capable of stabilizing the region and eliminating the "communist threat," supported (overtly or covertly) or condoned the wave of coups in these years. These military coups, which violently imposed national security states, were thus the result of a confluence of specific domestic and international interests. In Central America, the violence of recent decades is rooted in military enforcement of a particularly inequitable form of capitalist development, which marginalizes large majorities in conditions of extreme underdevelopment while allowing small minorities, mainly agro-export and transnational sectors of the bourgeoisie (and their allies in the military), to live in luxury. Military power, usually backed by the United States, supplied the coercion and control necessary to defeat perceived threats from social movements, including unions, peasant organizations and intellectuals, to the hegemony of this class structure. In the Southern Cone, organized labour was perceived as the major threat to expanded capital accumulation as the import-substitution model collapsed, and was particularly targeted for military repression.7
projects, and training in economics, fiscal planning, public administration and other civilian functions. See ibid.; Lernoux, Cry of the People, especially part two on US intervention; and Miles Wolpin, Military Indoctrination and U.S. Imperialism, Occasional Paper #13, American Institute for Marxist Studies, 1973; Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950-Present (New York: Free Press, 1977); Martin Edwin Andersen, "The Military Obstacle to Latin Democracy," Foreign Policy 73 (Winter 1988-1989), 96-113; and McSherry, The Evolution of the National Security State, for a sampling of literature on US influence on Latin American militaries. 7 See O'Donnell's classic work, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, and his "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,
469
In all these countries, "national security" meant the exclusion (political and economic) and repression of the popular sectors, whose interests were seen as threatening to the status quo. The national security states utilized the dual mechanisms of economic restructuring and coercion to terrorize and exclude the subordinate classes, demobilize and destroy organized labour and preserve the system from challenges.8 Today, as noted above, key structures of the national security apparatus remain embedded within the new civilian regimes. In some, officers involved in the repression remain in high-ranking positions.9 In most, the military institutions remain largely intact and in many cases strengthened. The significance of this situation is that restructuring of the militarized state and society continues to be hindered under civilian government; the limits of social change and participation are also defined, to a significant degree, by the threat of military reaction. The Transition to Militarized Civilian Governments In previous work, I have characterized these new civilian regimes as militarized civilian governments in order to avoid the assumption that they are as yet full democracies. This new state type is an exclusionary and constrained system, where structures of the military apparatus of repression remain intact, and significant regions of power and decisionmaking remain beyond the scope of civilians. Civilians hold office, but civilian functions and prerogatives are still subject to military approval or control. Again, each country examined here has a different balance of forces between its military and civilian sectors. Further, there are fundamental differences between the Central American states and those of the Southern Cone, where human rights violations and state terror have largely ceased with the transition. However, in all these cases the militaries have imposed "pacts of impunity" at the moment of transition to protect themselves from accountability afterward.
285-318; David Pion-Berlin, "The Political Economy of State Repression in Argentina," in Michael Stohl and David Lopez, eds., The State as Terrorist (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 99-122; and Pion-Berlin and Lopez, "Of Victims and Executioners," 63-86. 8 See, for example, Juan Corradi, 'Military Government and State Terrorism in Argentina," in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds., The Politics of AntiPolitics (2nd ed.; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 335-44. 9 For examples of the persistence of these repressive structures after the transition to civilian rule, see Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos, Proceso a la Impunidad de en Aeulnrica Latiloa (Bogota: Liga Internacional por Crimenes de Lesa HumanidCad los Derechos y la Liberaci6n de los Pueblos, 1991); James Petras, "Global Transformations and the Future of Socialism in Latin America," New Political Science 18/19 (Fall/Winter 1990), 181-93; and Paulo S6rgio Pinheiro, "The Legacy of Authoritarianism: Violence and the Limits of Democratic Transitions," paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association, 1991.
470
J. PATRICE McSHERRY
In these countries, formal democratic mechanisms such as elections and civiliangovernmenthave been restored, some genuine, newly "civilianized"participatory structureshave been created, and civil and are political rights legally recognized. However, the national security doctrine is still predominantin the military institution: the type of internationalizedcapitalist model, structuresof coercion and repression, andthe military'sidea of its missionandrole are still in place. Most especially, the militarydemandsimpunity;it will not permitciviliansto hold it accountablefor its past repressiverule. The militaryremains a state within the state. In many of these countries, such as Guatemala,Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, the redemocratizationand/or liberalizationprocesses now under way were originallyformulatedby the militaryregimes, to be permittedonly after the regimeshad institutionalizedpower structures of militaryauthorityand reorganizedeconomic and social structures. Parallelmilitarycourts often serve to protect militaryoffenders from civilianjustice (a dimensionof impunitywhich is not examinedhere). In ChileandGuatemala,constitutionsrewrittenundermilitaryruleare still the legal basis for the civilian regimes. Fundamentalsocial change remainsoff limits; civilianopposition, notablyof the left, must operate withinstrictlydefined boundaries.Populardemandsforjustice and due process vis-a-vis militaryabuses areusuallydeflected or discouragedby the civilian governments. In sum, to a greater or lesser degree, the militaryregimes made concessions and withdrewfrom formalgovernance, but retainedtheirperceived historicalprerogativeto act as political arbiter.
Impunity and Its Mechanisms
Impunitymeans, literally,freedomfrompunishment.To act withimpunity means to act with the knowledgethat one is above the law. In Latin America, impunityhas come to have a specific meaningin politicaland humanrightsterms:it means that acts of repressionandabuse of power by the state againstits citizens are shieldedfromjudgmentor accountability before national law. This has taken place via military selfamnesties, various amnestylaws, pardonsgrantedby new civiliangovernments, or other mechanisms.This has occurred, moreover,despite outragedpublic mobilizationin favour of prosecution and legal penalties. The resultof impunityis invariablya renewedclimateof fear in the Citizens society, and a pervasive sense of injusticeand helplessness.10 to become resignedto the fact thatjusticeis beyondreachanddangerous demand; impunity limits the horizons of what is possible. Simulta10 See, for example, Jacobo Timerman's anguished account of President Menem's 1990 pardon of his torturers, "Fear Returns to Argentina," New YorkTimes, January 5, 1991.
471
neously, impunity engenders a bolstered sense of power within the ranks of the military, and new rationalizations for terrorist methods. In Chile, Pinochet's national security state passed a self-amnesty law in 1978 which "forgot" all crimes committed by the military after September 11, 1973-the day of the coup against Allende. Under the current civilian government, the Supreme Court upheld this amnesty. Pinochet appointed members of Congress who are still able to block executive efforts to democratize and demilitarize the Chilean state. In 1979, a "reciprocal amnesty" was passed in Brazil. This type of amnesty has been criticized by international lawyers for its equation of individual crimes against the state (which the state can pardon) with state crimes against its citizens (the state cannot pardon itself). The result of the Brazilian amnesty was to head off investigations of police and military human rights violations, which included extensive torture and disappearance."1 In March 1991, for example, a clandestine cemetery was found beneath a new forest in Sio Paulo, with 1,500 graves believed to contain the remains of disappeared political prisoners missing since the early 1970s.12 The Uruguayan case illustrates the alliance of certain military and civilian elites at the moment of transition. In 1984, Uruguayan political leaders (excluding the Blanco Party) negotiated the transition from military rule with the generals in the "Navy Club Pact." Part of the bargain was an agreement that the executive branch would not prosecute military violators of human rights. The Sanguinetti government won the first election in 1985, after leading competitors were excluded. Sanguinetti promised justice to Uruguayan society, but it soon became clear he favoured amnesty for the military. In 1986, the Colorado Party of President Sanguinetti introduced a proposal for a military amnesty. This was voted down, but soon after General Medina, the minister of defence, ordered that no military man should appear before the courts for upcoming civil cases of military human rights abuses. Hours before these court cases were to begin, Sanguinetti managed to win Congressional authorization for the so-called Ley de Caducidad, which shielded military offenders from prosecution. Polls at that time showed that 70 per cent of the public was opposed to this law.13 As outraged citizens began organizing for a popular referendum on the amnesty, the
11 See "Brasil:NuncaMais"-published in Englishas "Torture in Brazil"-an account one millionpages of militaryfiles documenting torturecentres, mutilasummarizing tion and abuse of victims and namesof prisonersand their torturers.These records were secretly photocopiedby humanrightslawyersover a periodof severalyears in Brazil.See also A. J. Langguth, HiddenTerrors Books, 1978). (New York:Pantheon 12 "Tumbaclandestinacon 1500cadaveres," El DiariolLa Prensa, March27 1991. 13 Cynthia Brown and Robert K. Goldman, "Torture, Memory and Justice," The andInternational Nation, March27, 1989,408-10; Leaguefor HumanRights(ILHR), "HumanRightsin Uruguay: WillHumanRightsViolatorsGo Free?"New YorkCity, April 1989, 5.
472
J. PATRICE McSHERRY
Uruguayan military issued dark threats about the consequences of overturning the "Impunity Law." The government-appointed Electoral Court was openly obstructive towards the referendum, arbitrarily disqualifying thousands of signatures and enacting difficult new regulations as the campaign appeared to be succeeding. The President condemned the referendum organizers for "seeking revenge" and General Medina called them "mentally ill." The referendum took place in April 1989; it was defeated (57% to 43%), thus upholding the amnesty for the military. (Significantly, the referendum won 54 per cent to 42 per cent in Montevideo, where the country's most politicized half lives.)14 A number of other legal-constitutional mechanisms of impunity were put into place by civilian regimes in the region. In 1987, El Salvador, under President Duarte and in the context of tens of thousands of civilian murders, passed a reciprocal amnesty which was widely recognized as primarily benefitting the military. In Argentina, President Alfonsin declared the Punto Final in 1986 to cut off hundreds of new cases of human rights violations, and then the Due Obedience law (which essentially exonerated all those military personnel who were "following orders") after mutinies by a faction of the military. The Due Obedience law forgave hundreds of officers accused of human rights crimes. President Menem pardoned over 200 military officers in 1989, and in December 1990 pardoned the notorious junta and military/ security leaders who had been convicted for their atrocities in the "dirty war." Among those pardoned was former General Carlos Suarez Mason, who had been extradited from the US to face trial in Argentina after a landmark case in 1987-1988. Known as "the Lord of life and death" by his victims,15 he commanded concentration camps where horrendous torture was practised.16 In Guatemala, in 1986, the military issued Decree 8-86 (a selfamnesty) four days before civilian president Cerezo took office, and after more than 20 years of military rule. Cerezo basically accepted this self-amnesty despite widespread outrage among Guatemalans. Today, the Guatemalan army continues to operate with total impunity, and with its counterinsurgency apparatus intact; disappearance, torture and murder directed against popular leaders continue to be tools of political control. In Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, the civilian governments have failed to take decisive action in cases of human rights violations and systematic abuses, thus allowing de facto impunity for their powerful military forces.
14 ILHR, "Human Rights in Uruguay," 6, and Shirley Christian, "In Uruguay, A Vote for Forgiveness," New York Times, April 8, 1989. 15 Katherine Bishop, "Foreign Abductors Held to be Liable in the U.S.," New York Times, August 26, 1988. 16 Aryeh Neier, "Menem's Pardons and Purges," New YorkTimes, October 2, 1989.
Military Power and Impunity in Latin America Embedded National Security Apparatuses
473
Most, if not all, of the former national security states are characterized not only by various "legal-institutional" acts of impunity but also by entrenched national security structures which persist in the newly civilianized regimes. In Brazil, members of the Servigo Nacional de Informag6es (SNI), the military intelligence service, retain extensive autonomy and power under the civilian government, although the SNI was reduced in size and renamed by President Collor. The commanders of the three armed services are ministers in the cabinet, as are the secretary general of the National Security Council, the former head of the SNI and the head of the Armed Forces General Staff. The military controls the National Defence Council. Thus, the military is able to exert a rightist influence upon all national policy, above and beyond monopolization of national security in the ideological sense described above, and including labour policy and agrarian reform.17 Pinochet's national security laws were institutionalized in Chile's 1980 Constitution and subsequent law. Congress and the courts are still stacked with right-wing Pinochet allies; the Chilean Supreme Court, which, as noted, upheld the 1978 self-amnesty of the military, is totally composed of Pinochet appointees.18 Pinochet himself issued threats regarding the 1990-1991 human rights investigation by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, appointed by President Aylwin, and all four branches of the armed forces vehemently oppose criminal sanctions for officers guilty of human rights violations.19 Pinochet and the national police have rejected any culpability for the widespread human rights crimes of the dictatorship. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission documented over 2,000 cases of dead and disappeared victims of the military; cases of torture not ending in death were not included.20 The crimes of the military state, detailed by the
NationalSecurity,and Democracy:Les17 See J. S. Fitch, "MilitaryProfessionalism, for the annualmeetingof sons fromthe LatinAmerican Experience,"paperprepared the LatinAmericanStudiesAssociation, 1989, 15, and FrancesHagopianand Scott andProspects," World PolicyJournal "Democracyin Brazil:Problems Mainwaring, (Summer1987),492, 502-07. 18 NathanielC. Nash, "Chile'sLeaderandArmySquareOffOverthe Past," New York Times, March26, 1991.Some encouraging steps to combat impunitywere taken in September1991in Chile: a court order to exhume bodies of the disappearedfrom officers clandestinecemeterieswas obtainedfor the first time, andtwo high-ranking accusedof overseeingthe assassinationsof OrlandoLetelier(Allende'sambassador to the US, killedin Washington, D.C. in 1976)and RonniMoffittwere arrested.See NathanielC. Nash, "GravesWithouta Name YieldingTheir Secrets," NewrYork Times,September19, 1991,and"ChileSeizes TwoPolicemenin LetelierCase," New YorkTimes, September24, 1991. 19 Margaret Crahan,presentationat ColumbiaUniversity,September 1990.Hereafter cited as Columbiapresentation. 20 Ibid.
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Commission's report, included systematic torture and murder; for example, prisoners were forced to watch as relatives were raped or beaten; people were strappedto metal grills and electrocuted; victims were drugged,their stomachs cut open (so they would not float), and droppedinto the sea from helicopters.21 In Argentina,far-right factions of the militaryhave carriedout four mutiniessince 1987,three againstthe Alfonsin administration and one, in December 1990,againstthe Menemadministration. The first mutinies were aimed at ending the trials of military officers for crimes in the "dirty war." Argentinais the only country where incominggoverning elites rejectedthe military'sself-amnestyand initiatedtrials for crimes againsthumanity.The revolts were quelledby loyal troops andopposed by hundredsof thousands of citizens who ralliedin Buenos Aires. Yet afterthe dust cleared, Alfonsinsubmittedto a numberof demandsof the rebels. These mutiniestaughtthe militaryextremiststhatthe use of force would bring results. The Punto Final and Due Obedience laws failed to appease key sectors of the Argentine military. As General Jorge Videla, former de facto presidentduringthe Argentinedictatorship,put it afterhe was pardoned:"I havebeen in prisonfor morethansix years, conscious that complyingwith my unjustsentence constitutedact of service ... In all my public declarationsI will only seek the vindicationof the armyand the restorationof militaryhonor."22 In short,unrepentant sectors of the military, emboldened by acts of impunity, were encouraged to seek completevindicationfor the "dirtywar," in defianceof the civilianlegal process which convicted their leaders. In spite of Menem's 1989pardons, the fourthmutinywas carriedout by supportersof an ultra-rightist leader of previous revolts, Col. Mohamed Ali Seineldin. Seineldin, reportedly linked to the Argentine AnticommunistAlliance (a death squadactive in the 1970s)once said in the ArgentineperiodicalPdgina 12, "there is no such thing as a green horse or a decent Jew."23 Recent disturbing developmentsin Argentinahintat the reconstitution and increasinginfluence of the militarynationalsecurity apparatus upon the civiliangovernment.After a mysteriousand bloody attackon the La Tabladamilitarybarracksin 1989by armed,leftist militants,an attackwhich was savagely crushedby the military,new measureswere adopted by the government which re-authorizedmilitary and intelligence involvementin domestic affairs. Some accounts have pointedto the possibility that militaryprovocateursor counterinsurgency agents
Reuters, "Chile Details Over 2000 Slayings Under Pinochet," New York Times, March 6, 1990, and Nash, "Graves Without a Name Yielding Their Secrets." 22 "El ex dictador Videla comienza a plantear exig6ncias a Menem," El DiariolLa Prensa, January 1, 1991. 23 International League for Human Rights, "Argentina: The Human Rights Record," New York City, March 1990, 32. 21
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were involved in provoking the La Tablada attack, because its consequences were to discredit human rights organizations and justify military warnings of impending national security crises.24 President Alfonsin, in January 1989, set up a National Security Council which was dominated by military officers, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State for Intelligence and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force, to advise him on "subversive threats." This was a stunning setback for a major legal achievement of earlier years: Law 23.554, which challenged the national security doctrine by redefining national defence in terms of external aggression, not internal subversion. Approximately a year later, and after widespread food riots in 1989, President Menem dismantled Alfonsin's Council by Decree 392/90. The new government decree restructured the Council, renaming it the National Defence Council, and excluded all civilians from it. The decree explicitly authorized military intervention in situations of "internal commotion." The Assistant Secretary for Human Rights resigned in protest.25 Political violence also continues in Argentina. In May 1991, for example, a well-known film maker, who publicly criticized the Menem government for betraying its electoral promises, was the next day shot eight times in the legs by mysterious assailants. A leader of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo-the group that demonstrated to protest disappearances during the military dictatorship, and which now demands information on missing children and an end to impunity for military crimes-received a wave of death threats in the spring of 1991.26 In El Savador and Guatemala, terror against the population, carried out by military and security forces both in uniform and in the guise of "death squads," continues on a daily basis despite the existence of civilian governments. In Guatemala, the military institution virtually occupies the countryside, and controls the Indian peasant population through counterinsurgency structures such as civil patrols, "model villages" and "poles of development." The G2, Guatemala's military intelligence agency, is the "brain" that orchestrates acts of state terror and repression. The G2 has historically drawn up lists of "subversives" to assassinate. In the administration of President Serrano, as of fall 1991, two G2 officers hold key posts in the office of the Chief of Staff for the Army and in the office of the President. Serrano's first minister of interior, who resigned in 1991, was also linked to G2; he was the same
24 See Joe Schneider,"Argentina: The Enigmaof La Tablada,"NACLAReporton the Americas, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1989, 9-13, and Ronaldo Munck, Latin
America: Transitions to Democracy (London: Zed Books, 1989), 103.
25 ILHR, "Argentina,"12-14. 26 "Solanas ratifica que Menem 'traiciono' a sus electores," El DiariolLa Prensa,
May 23, 1991, and "Menem acusa a los nazis," El DiariolLa Prensa, May 24, 1991.
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army officer who held the post underthe militaryregimeof fundamentalist general Rios Montt, who directed genocidal exterminationcamThe current paigns against the Indian peasants in the early 1980s.27 ministerof defence also has long-standingties to G2. Today, the World Council of Churches calls Guatemala-often referredto as a "fragile democracy" in the United States-the most dangerous country in the world for human rights defenders.2 Some 200,000 innocent civilians have been murderedin Guatemalaand El Salvador since 1980; hundredsof grisly massacres of Mayan Indians have been carriedout by the Guatemalan army,includingthe massacre at Santiago Atitlan in December 1990 (one of dozens since the transition). Yet in only one recent case have officers in Guatemalaever been convicted for humanrights crimes. In El Salvador,an army colonel and lieutenantwere convicted in October 1991-a precedentin that country-for the 1989murderof six Jesuits and two women. However, the judgmenthas been criticizedby the Jesuits and others for failing to look higher in the military high commandfor those who orderedthe massacre,as well as for exonerating the seven paratrooperswho confessed to actually murderingthe victims.29In short, impunityfor those who "followed orders" was perpetuated, and impunityseeminglyremainedintactfor those at the apex of the militaryapparatus.The Lawyers Committeefor HumanRights argued that the Salvadoran military covered up the involvement of officers, and only tolerated the trial because of pressure high-ranking from the US Congressand threats of an aid cut-off.30 The obstacles to democratizationin El Salvadorcould be vividly seen in January1991duringthe first electoral campaignafter the election of the right-wing ARENA governmentthe year before. For the first time, oppositioncandidatesfrom the DemocraticConvergence,including former members of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario(progressive civilians who had aligned themselves with the revolutionary FMLN), were running.Negotiations between the governmentand the Frente FarabundoMartipara la LiberacionNacional (FMLN) were in progress.In the midstof this activity, San Salvadorradiostationsbegan broadcastinga written threatfrom two of El Salvador'sdeath squads, threateningto kill opposition leaders, intellectuals, priests and labour leaders. Excerpts of the message are worth quotingat some length, as
27 28 29 Noticias de Guatemala, February 1991. Enfoprensa, Year 9, No. 4123, February 19-25, 1991. "Jesuitas buscan a los autores intelectuales," El Diario/La Prensa, October I, 1991; Cynthia J. Arson, "Bizarre Justice in El Salvador," New YorkTimes, October 3, 1991; and "El Salvador at the Crossroads," editorial in El DiariolLa Prensa, October 4, 1991. 30 Shirley Christian, "Colonel in Jesuit Deaths in El Salvador," New York Times, September 30, 1991.
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they demonstrate the ideology of El Salvador's far-right sectors and reveal the threats to the democratization process: This country's society is divided into three classes: a superiorcreative class composed essentially of specialists and large landowners;a smallerclass that tries to imitatethis superiorclass; and an inferiorrustic class that is made up essentiallyof workers,poorpeasants,studentsandsmallbusinessmen.Another groupexists that we hold in low regardand considervery small-the dangerous intellectualclass that tries to contaminatethe above-mentioned classes... the destiny of the superiorclass is to govern and regulatethe inferiorclasses. And whatis more,it has a dutyto exploit, dispose of, conquer,andeven exterminate elements of these inferior classes when the benefits of capitalism require such.... We will shortlyresumeour conquestthat will lead to absolutepower. Whatevercourse of action is justified, whateveraction,justice is a luxurythat we cannot allow.31 The impunity which remained entrenched in El Salvador emboldened the armed forces and their affiliated death squads, limited political participation and perpetuated a climate of terror. As documented by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, death squads are usually composed of military and security forces, and in El Salvador were linked to Roberto D'Aubuisson, the lifetime president of ARENA, who died in 1992.32Significantly, impunity and the role of the military have been key issues to be resolved in the peace negotiations between the Guatemalan and Salvadoran governments and their respective insurgencies. Mechanisms for overcoming impunity and democratizing the state, established in the 1992 Salvadoran peace accords over the strong opposition of sectors of the military, remain to be implemented. In the Guatemalan negotiations, impunity has been a major obstacle to reaching an agreement on human rights. In sum, the militarized structures described above, and the mechanisms of impunity built into the state, impede attempts to control the military, as well as to democratize and demilitarize the state. In society, the ability of popular classes to struggle for better conditions and an expansion of their political and socio-economic rights is limited by fear of military retaliation, or in extreme cases by continued threats to life. Impunity protects the prerogatives of the military institution and its political autonomy; its self-defined mission is to act against perceived threats to the political and economic order. The military, shielded by impunity, continues to make the rules and define the terms for its own intervention. In all these states impunity was effected through unilateral amnesties passed by the military to forgive itself, amnesty laws passed by civilian governments, de facto situations of impunity, pardons or institutionalized "national security" constitutions and laws. There was
31 Jean Kavanagh, "Salvador Death Squads Threaten Leftist Leaders." TlheGlobe and Mail, January 14, 1991. 32 Ibid.
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little or no accountabilityto the popularmajoritiesnor democraticinput from society. As Alberto Zumaran, a Uruguayan senator, once observed, impunity insures a kind of permanentcoup by a defiant military.33Often, this situation has been facilitated by incoming civilian elites. Social Oppositionto Impunity Humanrightsorganizations andinternational lawyers, as well as victims of the militaryregimes and their families, have been among the most vocal in their condemnationof impunity. The anguish and horror of many after Menem's pardons were well expressed by Nazi-hunter SimonWiesenthal:"The Argentinegeneralscommittedthe same crimes their againsthumanitythatthe Nazis did. Giventhis I cannotunderstand and that In to claims forgiveamnesty liberty."34 response government ness arenecessaryfor nationalreconciliationandprogress,or to prevent new militarycoups, these groups arguethat only the victims have the right to forgive. Victims cannot be forcibly "reconciled" with their torturersand deprivedof any means of justice in a democraticpolity. Further, the state should not have the prerogativeto forgive its own crimesagainstits own citizens, whetheror not there has been a change of government. These critics also chargethat despite its professedintent, impunity andthe ruleof law. undermines ratherthanstrengthensdemocratization Concessions grantedto militarydemands spark new revolts and new demands.The criticsfurtherarguethatattemptsto appeaseunrepentant sectors of the militaryproduce the opposite of the claimed effect; by rewardingthe forces most dangerousto democracy,furtherabuses are DisapGroupon Enforcedor Involuntary encouraged.The UN Working Group pearancesconcurs. In bothits 1990and 1991reports,the Working noted: "Perhaps the single most importantfactor contributingto the phenomenonof disappearancesmay be that of impunity.The Working Group'sexperience over the past ten years has confirmedthe age-old adage that impunitybreeds contempt for the law."35 The victims and theirfamiliespoint to the irony of Nazi war criminals still being sought after 45 years, while they are accused of vindictiveness andurgedto forgivemilitaryofficers whose crimeswerejust as abhorrent.36 International lawyers argue that crimes against humanity
33 Editorial in The Nation, "Closing the Books," February 28, 1987. 34 "Firmenich inicia los tramites para salir del pais," El Diario/La Prensa, January 3, 1991. 35 "Report of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment/Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances," E/CN.4/1990/13, January 24, 1990. 36 Note the worldwide outrage generated by Lithuania's decision to pardon its fascist
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(extrajudicial execution, extermination, disappearance, torture) and war crimes (massacres, murdering captured prisoners) are exempt from amnesties under international law. Further, international agreements and treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Genocide and the Convention against Torture are violated by acts of impunity,37meaning that states party to these agreements are reneging upon their international obligations. Large sectors of these societies have opposed impunity for military violators of human rights. A poll in fall 1990 in Chile showed that 67 per cent of the population wanted investigations and punishment (as opposed to forgiving or forgetting) for human rights crimes.38 Public outrage was heightened as, almost weekly, mass graves of tortured cadavers, victims of Pinochet's national security state, were discovered in Chile.39 A poll taken by a Buenos Aires paper in September 1989, at the time of Menem's first pardons, showed that 62 per cent condemned amnesty for military criminals, with only 28 per cent in favour; another source cites the figure of 95 per cent opposed to the pardons.40 With Menem's December 1990 pardons the number of citizens opposed was 70 per cent; radio stations were flooded with calls protesting the measure, and all political parties except Menem's Peronist movement and its conservative allies urged citizens to join marches against the pardons.41
war criminals in September 1991. See David Binder, "U.S. Expects Lithuania Not to Erase War Crimes," New York Times, September 6, 1991, and Jonathan Alter and Michael Meyer, "An Unpardonable Amnesty," Newsweek, September 16, 1991. See, for example, Robert Goldman, "Amnesty Laws, International Law, and the American Convention on Human Rights," The Law Group Docket (Summer 1989); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Gross Human Rights Violations in International Law," California Law Review 78 (1990), 449-512; George C. Rogers, "Argentina's Obligation to Prosecute Military Officials for Torture," Columbia Human Rights Law Review 20 (1989), 259-308; and Louis Joinet, "Study on Amnesty Laws and Their Role in the Safeguard and Promotion of Human Rights," special report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, E/ CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16, June 21, 1985. Arturo Valenzuela, address at Columbia University, September 28, 1990. Hereafter cited as Columbia address. In September 1991, as bodies packed two per coffin were exhumed from clandestine cemeteries, Pinochet outraged Chileans by commenting "How economical!" and congratulating "the seekers of cadavers." He also demanded general pardons for violators of human rights, arguing it was "time to stop the party" and "not reopen the wound" ("Gobierno califica de 'crueles' comentarios de Pinochet sobre ejecutdaos politicos," El DiariolLa Prensa [September 4, 1991; "Pinochet pide indultar violadores de DH," Ed DiariolLa Prensa, September 16, 1991]). Chris Kline, "Menem Defends Amnesty," The Times of the Americas, October 4, 1989; Paul W. Zagorski gives the 95 per cent figure in the manuscript for his Democracy vs. National Security: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992). Reuters, "Argentine Defends Release of 'Dirty War' Leaders," New York Times, December 31, 1990.
37
38 39
40
41
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As noted, 70 per cent of Uruguayans opposed amnesty for military offenders in 1986. In Brazil,the leftist WorkersParty(PT)is the strongestpartyin the country; duringthe last presidentialelection, the PT's Lula (Luis da Silva)came very close to winning,with 47 per cent of the vote (31million The PT's programme includedplans to dissolve the SNI andto votes).42 subordinatethe militaryto civilian rule, as well as to challengesome of the military'sprojects and privilegesaccumulatedsince the 1964coup. The high-ranking militaryechelons lobbied hardagainst the PT before the election.43 In April 1991, the outgoing Salvadoranlegislature unanimously approved constitutional reforms hammered out in the negotiations between the FMLN and the ARENA government.These includedsignificantlimits on militarypowers and autonomy,new civiliancontrols, exclusion of the militaryfrompublic securityfunctions, and the instituIn September tion of a commissionto investigatehumanrightscrimes.44 1991, President Cristianiand the FMLN negotiators reached a broad agreementon the futureof the country which included "purification" and reductionof the armedforces.45 As noted, both the FMLN in El Salvador and the Unidad RevolucionariaNacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in Guatemalahave engaged in UN-monitored negotiations with their respective governments. Both have demandedthat the militariesbe held accountablefor crimes against humanity and war crimes. During the summer 1991 Guatemalan negotiations, popular organizations including CONthat AVIGUA, the organizationof widows, and CERJ, an organization advocates respect for the constitutionalrightsof the campesinos,held a mass demonstrationof 15,000in GuatemalaCity, demandingan end to of popularorganizations Representatives impunityand disappearances. also presented the URNG negotiators in Mexico with a petition on behalf of thousands of Guatemalansdemandingan end to impunity.46
42 Maria Helena Moreira Alves, presentation at the Graduate School, City University of New York, February 20, 1990. Hereafter cited as CUNY presentation. She called the PT the strongest party because of its millions of members and disciplined grassroots organization. Collor's victory was at least in part the result not of superior organization, but superior access to resources, particularly O Globo television, in a nation where millions of people cannot read. Election percentages from James Brooke, " Bad Times, Bold Plans for Brazil," New York Times, January 7, 1990. Moreira Alves, CUNY presentation, and James Brooke, "Brazil Will Vote with Eye on Army," New York Times, December 15, 1991. Mark A. Uhlig, "Salvadorans in Accord on Army Curbs," New YorkTimes, April 29, 1991, and AP, "Salvadoran Legislature Passes Reforms in Time," New YorkTimes, April 30, 1991. Shirley Christian, "Salvadoran Chief and Rebels Reach Broad Agreement," New York Times, September 26, 1991. NGO Coalition Against Impunity Newsletter #3, July 1991.
43 44
45 46
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Among the demands of the Guatemalan insurgents in the negotiations are elimination of all the legal and structural mechanisms of impunity and dismantling of the repressive apparatus. In sum, the demand for military accountability by important sectors of Latin American civil society reflects a profound rejection of the national security state, and the recognition that impunity perpetuates fundamental violations of justice and social inequities. In such conditions of impunity, the potential for democratization is seriously curtailed. In effect, impunity structurally impedes the struggle to change the social balance of power between the politicized coercive apparatus of the state and the majority populations. In some cases, notably in El Salvador and Guatemala, substantial sectors of society have seen civilian governments as complicit in the perpetuation of terror by the military and the exoneration of military crimes, cynically attempting to use the legitimizing function of civilian government to re-establish public confidence and provide the perception of fairness in the absence of substantive justice. In Chile, while the Aylwin government did establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the clear policy of the government was that legal penalties would not be part of the process.47 The Commission was prohibited from even publishing names of accused military criminals.48 Menem's pardons represented the apex of impunity, and provoked anguished mass demonstrations in Argentina as well as international condemnation. Conjectures on the Current Historical Moment History has demonstrated time and again in Latin America that political and economic elites invariably knock at the barracks door when they perceive their interests threatened by subordinate classes. There is hope today that the years of military terror have eliminated this tendency, even among right-wing sectors. However, the Latin American elites have had a shallow commitment to democracy when democracy begins to give voice to demands from the working and peasant classes for structural change.49 They may still turn to the military-usually the best-organized, right-wing, quasi-party, with a ready-made machinery of repression-to enforce the status quo. Or, military factions may make their own decisions to intervene-at times using the language of nationalism to justify military rule. In Venezuela in early 1992, a rebel faction of the military opposed to the neo-liberal economic programme of Presi47 Valenzuela,Columbiaaddress. 48 Crahan,Columbiapresentation. 49 A recent exampleis the case of Haiti, where PresidentJean-Bertrand Aristidewas elected by 65 per cent in early 1991,only to be overthrownby the military,with the of the elites,,in September1991.See also Evelyne HuberStephens,"Democsupport
racy in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25 (1990), 157-76.
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dent Carlos Andres Perez (as well as corruption)staged a significant andthe military coup attempt.Also, recentlyin Peru,PresidentFujimori system, to establish "order" in the face of growing insurgency and socio-economic desperation. The historic propensity of the United States to intervenewhen it perceivesits hegemonythreatenedhas often reinforcedthis tendency to look for military"solutions." The United Statescontinuesto supplymilitaryaid that is far moregenerousthanaid to strengthenweak civilian institutionsin the region in many cases. Today, however, new social coalitions and forms of the state have emergedin LatinAmerica.The nationalsecuritystatesweakeneddue to a numberof complex factors on several levels, internal,domestic and international.One importantelement was that the interests of statist elites and militariesbegan to conflict with the interests of international national sectors linked to foreign capital, which demandedprivatization, more direct political control and free markets. The perception developed among domestic elites that militaryrule, having performed the function of eliminatingthe threat from below (except in Central the state, was now an obstacle to further America) and restructuring capitalistdevelopment.Militaryinstitutionstended to demandnational development (in the context of security) and control of strategic resources and industries, while free markets and privatizationsbetter suited the interests of international capital and nationalelites linked to and transnational markets Further,manymembers corporations. export of dominantclasses had come to believe that the terror and arbitrary governmentof the militarywere threateningtheir interests. They preferred more direct influence and representationin government. Moreover, in many cases the militarieswere deeply involved in runningstate enterprises;key sectors often tended to oppose drastic neo-liberal market "solutions" (with the exception of the Pinochet regimein Chile).In short,it appearsthatthe militaryinterestsin national security and development, and nationalpower, began to diverge from the requirementsof the globalization of production in international capitalism, and the interests of key elite sectors. The collapse of the communistbloc removeda majorjustification for large militaryapparatuses. In sum, the nationalsecurityprojects of the militariesno longer elites. coincided with the interests of foreign and internationalized The current form of the state in these countries seems for these reasons to reflect better the currentstage of world capitalist development, markedby the globalizationof markets, productionand finance andthe increasingmobilityof international capital. In the rapidlydeveloping global politicaleconomy, economic and technologicalfactors are now more often drivingpolitics, reversing previous tendencies where national security drove politics; massive military-industrial complexes
imposed an auto-golpe (a self-coup), abolishing the democratic political
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are becoming an economic and political burden.50 On the other hand, market forces impose their own demands. The "neo-liberal" paradigm which is predominant today depends upon low wages, minimal or nonexistent benefits and weak labour organizations; restructuring and privatizations throw thousands more out of work. All this suggests the possibility of new social conflicts, a dangerous situation when military forces, protected by impunity, may still decide (or be asked) to intervene to "maintain social peace." In sum, under the new civilian governments the same capitalist economic model and harsh neo-liberal measures, the same class structure and the same control mechanisms for "challenges from below" are maintained, but with greater legitimacy. In contrast to direct coercive rule, the invisible hand of the market and the structural power of capital camouflage naked exploitation and obscure the beneficiaries of the system.51 The hegemony of capitalism (and the US sphere of influence) are still in place without the stigma of military rule. The new civilian governments converge quite well with the USpreferred liberal model of democracy. A liberalized system allows some dissent and social unrest to be ventilated, yet, as John Peeler has noted, "Liberal democracy as a structure, in short, tends to lock the choices of policy and leadership into a relatively narrow range around what comes to be called the center of the political spectrum... liberal democracy's immobilism must be seen as defending social injustice by making it virtually impossible to bring about fundamental change."52 Yet liberal systems are clearly far preferable to dictatorships; at least for a time they have great legitimacy. Thus, the establishment of these new governments, widely welcomed after the national security states, has tended to diffuse criticism of the extreme socio-economic inequalities that still exist. The pressure from abroad to ameliorate these conditions, which appeared starkly illegitimate under military rule, has lessened with the advent of the civilian governments. As Peter Winn has noted, the greatest failure of the transition in Chile has been the reinforcement of negative social features: the maldistribution of income, wealth and power. Under Pinochet, this was perceived as illegitimate, but the democratic government has now endowed legitimacy upon ill-gotten gains and severe social inequality.53Further, civilian rightists and internationalized elites
50 Thisinsightwas expressedby Yoshihiro Business Tsurumi,Professorof International at City University of New York, in a presentationentitled "New Political and EconomicOrdersin the World,"partof the RalphBuncheInstituteSeminarSeries, on October 16, 1991. 51 See RobertHeilbroner for a cogentanalysisof capitalistdemocracy(The Natureand Logic of Capitalism[New York:W. W. Norton, 1985]). 52 JohnPeeler,LatinAmerican Democracies(ChapelHill:Universityof NorthCarolina Press, 1985), 153. 53 Paraphrased fromPeterWinn'spresentation at the LatinAmericanStudiesAssocia-
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can press their agendas more easily, knowing that the latent threat of militaryreaction inhibits potential opposition.
Prospects for Consolidation of Constitutional Rule and Democratization
In summary, militarized civilian governments are embedded with authoritarianstructures persisting from the national security states, includingmechanismsof impunity.These structuresand mechanisms reflect boththe institutionalized powerandprivilegeheld by the military vis-a-viscivil society, andits politicallyautonomousstatus. The military institutionis able to continue to act outside the scope of the rule of law and civilian control. This situationhas disturbingimplicationsfor the future of democratizationprocesses and the consolidation of civilian rule in these countries,particularly in times of economic crisis or political challenge. The prospects for consolidatingconstitutionalrule and advancing democratizationin these societies seem to involve several dimensions:(1) demilitarization; (2) establishingthe rule of law and an impartial system of justice; (3) fostering respect for human rights; and (5) increasingsocio-economic (4) increasingpoliticalparticipation; equity. Demilitarization. Unless armies are defeated in war (as was the Germanarmyin 1945,or the Nicaraguanarmyof Somoza in 1979),it is extremelyproblematicto dislodge them from power. Yet democratization in any meaningfulsense cannot be achieved without requiringthe armedforces to take their properplace undercivilian rule, removedas to what occurred frompositionsof publicauthority an institution (similar with the Churchin a previous historicalperiod). A militaryinstitution accountable to civilian authorities is a fundamental element of democracy, as is a police force that is trustworthyand protective of citizens' rights. A new militarymission, focussed on nationaldefence rather than internal security, national development or political decision-making,is part of the process of democratization. Such a changed role for Latin American militariesrequiresa rejection of the of the militarymission. nationalsecurity doctrine and a reformulation Obviously, reducingthe role of the armies in public policy makingis a challengefor all these countries,but one requiredfor democratization. Pacts and mechanismsof impunityunderminethe demilitarization the power of the militaryover society. The process by institutionalizing damage done to new governments'credibility and legitimacy by elite pacts and impunitymeasuresmay be deep. As O'Donnelland Schmitter
tion conference, Washington, D.C., April 1991. Special thanks to Diane Hawney for her notes on the panel, "Chile's Return to Democracy: The First Year," organized by Ivan Jaksic.
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have noted, impunity "risks provokingjustifiably indignantreactions which may prove more difficult to cope with than the specter of a possible coup... some horrorsare too unspeakableand too fresh."54 Unless guilty individualsare removedfrom positions of authority,and repressivestructuresare dismantled,it is difficultto be optimisticabout the prospects for consolidatingconstitutionalrule in Latin America.
Establishing the rule of law and an impartial system of jus-
tice. Since impunityimplicitlyplaces certainpowerfulgroupsin society above the law, attemptsto establishdue process and equalityunderthe law are seriouslyundermined. If the foundationof democracyis justice, and impartially equally applied, impunity corrupts that foundation. members of First, society suffer extreme insecurity when identified criminals are at large,especiallyin the context of persistingacts military of terror(for example, in CentralAmerica).Second, if victims of abuse have no recourseto justice, a stratumof second-classcitizens develops. Official disregardfor the fundamentalrights of the victims and their relatives continues as painfully under civilian government as under militaryrule. This process intensifies the social divisions in society, where the torturersare "more equal" than their victims. Some human rightsactivists arguethat, even if majoritieswere to supportamnesties, these would still violate democraticprinciplesregardingthe protection of the rightsof minorities.A doublestandardof justice emerges, which militatesagainstthe fosteringof a sense of citizenshipandequalityunder the law. the extent of organizedterrorunderthe nationalsecuAdditionally, rity states meant that society sufferedas a whole. Failure to sanction those responsibleperpetuatesa climateof fear andmay set into motiona chain reaction of processes which underminethe rule of law. Victims and relatives are afraid to come forward;dissent and opposition are stifled;judges are afraidto act and implementthe law for fear of retaliation; the state avoids responsibilityfor the past and loses legitimacy in the present. The effect upon society is corrosive, promotingcynicism and disrespect for civilian governmentand law. Whilethe process of establishingthe rule of law andaccountability is obviously sensitive and difficult, it is a necessary element for democratic consolidation.Truthand justice are recognized by most human componentsof this process. Thisis not to say rightsgroupsas inseparable the leniency or even eventualpardonscannot be options. However, the process of civilianjustice should be allowed to complete its course, unimpededby the nationalsecurity apparatus;amnesties and pardons of impunityfor the used to avoidthejudicialprocessbecomeinstruments powerful.
54 O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 30.
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thatacts of sendsthe messageto extremistsin the militaries Impunity it communicates state terrorwill be eventuallyforgiven,even rewarded; tacitacceptanceof military the civiliangovernmethods.Simultaneously, ment risks its chances to democratizepower and begin to bring the militaryunderciviliancontrol. Finally,by failingto alignitself with the aspirationsof a mobilized citizenry, a civilian governmentalienates a with the most undemocrucialsocial base, and strikesan unholybargain cratic sectors.
Fostering respect for human rights. A daunting task for new civil-
ian governmentsstruggling to democratizeis to establisha politicalculture of respect for humanrights and humandignity, especially among those responsibleto enforce the law. Democratization requiresthe milito discardits notion that massive violationsof human tary in particular rightsare justifiablein the name of nationalsecurity. are significant becausethey helpto create Struggles againstimpunity a high social consciousnessabouthumanrightsandjustice; they provide an important politicalconstituencyfor effortsto builda system based on due processandthe ruleof law. Achievingciviliancontrolof the military, respect for humanrights and the renunciationof the nationalsecurity which will only occur throughsocial strugdoctrineare transformations gle. Historically in Latin America, movements of politicized sectors theirrightshavebeen necessaryto open the politicalsystems demanding effortin Uruguayand the partial and keep them open.55 The referendum process of truthandjustice exemplifiedby the trials in Argentina,both of civil society, are good examples accomplisheddue to the mobilization movements. and democratizing of such consciousness-raising AugustoVarasarguesthatthe humanrightsquestionis centralto the process of bringingthe militaryunder civilian control in newly democratizingsocieties.56Sanctions by civilians to hold militaryviolators to accountstrikeat the heartof the military'spoliticizedrole morethanany other effort, such as reductionof troops. Civilianrejectionof military relationsanda state terroris a crucialsignalof transformed civil-military nationalsecuritydoctrine,whichassertsthe clearrejectionof the military right.As Varasnotes, sanctions primacyof the state above any individual also weaken the military'scapacityto establishpoliticalcoalitionswith civiliansectors, or to overthrowciviliangovernmentswhen the military deems it necessary. and influence in decisions expansion of citizens' politicalparticipation that affect theirlives. However, impunitymay weaken such attemptsto Hite notedin in new civilianregimes.As Katherine broadenparticipation has declined in Chile markedlysince the 1991, political participation
55 56 Stephens, "Democracy in Latin America," 169. Augusto Varas, "Democratization and Military Reform in Argentina," in Augusto Varas, ed., Democracy Under Siege (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 47-64.
Greater political participation. Democratization also implies the
487
transition to civilian rule. She quoted Chilean social psychologist Elizabeth Lira, who argues that there is a great fear of participation because Chileans still associate politics with death, torture and disappearance, loss ofjobs and exploitation.57Impunity is an important factor in this climate of fear, for the same military that commanded massive repression still holds substantial power today. Greater socio-economic equity. The question of impunity is also a central element in the struggle for social justice. Clearly, the struggle for democratization includes a socio-economic dimension which threatens entrenched class interests (and often, the dictates of the IMF). The 1991 Haitian coup graphically demonstrated that even elected governments which attempt to voice the interests of the majorities are violently opposed by elite classes and the military institution. Yet the marginalization and human misery of large proportions of the populations in these countries warn of new social conflicts. The current socio-economic order in Latin America, according to one source, has resulted in the deaths of 700,000 persons annually from hunger and malnutrition.58In Guatemala, nine out of ten families live in squalid conditions, with no money for housing or medicine; in Brazil and Guatemala, military police and death squads routinely murder impoverished street children; in Argentina, one third of the population is below the poverty line; in El Salvador, half the children under five are malnourished; in Peru and elsewhere, cholera is sweeping the population for the first time in a century; in Chile, wages remain below the 1970 level. The "lost decade" of the 1980s threw hundreds of thousands into deepening poverty. Such a situation does not bode well for democratization. The rights of those who struggled against the dictatorships-for justice and for protection from the ravages of neo-liberal capitalism-are still being denied. If social conflicts cannot be peacefully resolved through the political system another cycle of repression may be triggered, especially if powerful military institutions continue to act autonomously, beyond the reach of civilian control. In short, the possibilities for social mobilization and structural socio-economic change in favour of the majorities are confined by still-powerful militaries (together with other factors such as macro-economic conditions in today's global economy and the strictures of the IMF). None of these dimensions of democratization will likely be achieved without substantive international support. The US government has a particular responsibility, after its history of intervention and support for repressive armies and "dirty wars" in the hemisphere. While
57 Katherine RobertsHite, presentation in panelentitled"Chile:Afterthe Transition," organized by KennethP. Erickson for the annual meeting of the New England Councilon Latin AmericanStudies, October 1991. 58 "En AmericaLatina muerende hambre700,000 personaspor aio," El DiariolLa Prensa, October7, 1990.
488
J. PATRICE McSHERRY
the US government has supported elections, it remains to be seen whether the deeper development of democratization, in those dimensions outlined above, will enjoy the blessings of the United States. Concluding Remarks The argument for absolving or forgetting military crimes in the interests of reconciliation is based upon an assumption of ends and means: the end of stable democracy and social peace is said to depend on the means of impunity. Yet the end of any process is born within and shaped by the means employed. Mechanisms of impunity foster attitudes and structures antithetical to democracy and, as this article has tried to show, fortify those forces least committed to democratization. The unsatisfied public demand for justice thus has moral, legal, socio-economic and political reverberations in all the former national security states. The phenomenon of impunity tends to institutionalize the power and political autonomy of the military institutions and perpetuate the skewed balance of power between the military apparatus and civil society. Embedded authoritarian structures of the national security state restrict the possibilities for substantive change in these societies. In short, the effort to eliminate impunity and these embedded structures is an important element of the struggle for state-society transformation on a number of levels in these countries, with profound implications for democratization.

Military Power, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America

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Socit qubcoise de science politique

MilitaryPower, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America*

Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations

466 The National Security States

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

Greater political participation. Democratization also implies the

Military Power and Impunity in Latin America

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