CRIMES INTEREST

AGAINST

PUBLIC

COUNTERFEITING

People vs. Kong Leon FACTS: Kong Leon, a goldsmith, was selling illegally fabricated USdollar coins which are already withdrawn from circulation.Several unfinished coins were found by the police in hisshop and pockets. HELD: When RPC was enacted, the Spanish text was theone approved. Thus, it controls the interpretation of provisions. Therefore, under Spanish Penal Code,fabrication of coin withdrawn from circulation is punishablebecause of (1) the harm it caused to the public when itgoes into circulation again, (2) the danger of acounterfeiter staying within the country (he maycounterfeit coins in actual circulation and (3) collectorswill be defrauded.

by them, although in fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had been altered and changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. Appellant maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of our government, the possession thereof cannot be illegal. It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and changes had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last digit in Serial No.D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No. D-716329 of Exhibit H.

ISSUE: Whether the accused counterfeiting treasury notes.

is

liable

for

MUTILATION OF COINS FORGERY

SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. L-16806 CONCEPCION, J.: FACTS:Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate part of the costs. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty which was increased to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario. It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured December 22, 1961

HELD: YES.Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read: ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. - Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library ART. 169. How forgery is committed. - The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of the following means;chanrobles virtual law library 1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and genuine document.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library 2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein. It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in

which had been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).

PEOPLE vs GALANO

FALSIFICATION
G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932

Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings account on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before the publication of the result of the examinations which, when correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela Romualdez in her current account on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps, give an explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with just the necessary points to reach the lowest passing general average. ISSUE: Whether Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were guilty of falsification of public or official documents HELD: Yes. The examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be maintained with any show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in the course of the examination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to article 300 may be committed in the following eight ways: 1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric. 2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. 3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them. 4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. 5. By altering true dates. 6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning. 7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original. 8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY VICKERS, J.: The Supreme Court designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926. The accused Estela Romualdez,private secretary of Justice Romualdez since 1921, was designated as corrector in Political Law. In the list of successful candidates there appeared the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. However, a later revision of the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the grades of 73 in Civil Law, and 64 in Remedial Law had been written on the first page of said compositions after striking out the grades of 63 in Civil Law, and 58 in Remedial Law. The investigation of this irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case. The accused Estela Romualdez, according to her own admission, made the alterations of the grades originally given by the correctors to compositions. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was not able to explain how and under what circumstances she made those alterations. The accused Luis Mabunay obtained the general average of 72.8%, according to the computation appearing on the roll originally written in the list Exhibit C-1; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of the examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and 75% be automatically raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful candidates which was published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2), which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades theretofore given by the correctors.

The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the grades in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials, without indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way attributed to the "correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only explanation of why she altered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so. If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades now in question, because when she made the changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay. The accused Estela Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the grades of her coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did not confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question. She did not attempt to explain how she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to revise the grades in question, how she happened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that had been altered by her. The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he failed in the examination in question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar examining committee recommended that not only those having the required general average of 75 per cent be admitted, but also that those who had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in the record as "an automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the committee was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein only those who had obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised the grades now in question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average required for admission to the bar. The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for what purpose

he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first list was disapproved. Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10 by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from. She said it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she could not name the person that brought the money to her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. She did not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness. The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his coaccused that he had failed. It was under those circumstances incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to present evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank. LEGAMIA v. IAC

SALUD P. BERADIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981 DE CASTRO, J.: FACTS: Salud P. Beradio, a lady-lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the COMELEC in Rosales, Pangasinan, was convicted on 4 counts of the crime of falsification of public or official documents of the 7 separate informations filed against her for making false entries in her daily time records. She was stationed as Chief of Office, Office of the Election Registrar, COMELEC holding office beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was field work, she was required to fill up and submit to the COMELEC's main office in Manila her daily time records after having been counter-signed by her provincial supervisor. The COMELEC by resolution granted her request for permission to appear as counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the

case before the Court of Agrarian Relations in Rosales, Pangasinan. One Raymundo Vasquez filed an administrative complaint against her for unauthorized practice of law. Beradio afterwards tendered her resignation as Election Registrar. Upon being informed of Beradios separation from service, Vasquez initiated the criminal complaints of falsification of public documents against Beradio. The separate informations allege that petitioner was absent the whole day on the days mentioned therein but to the "damage and prejudice of the National Government," she made it appear in her time records that she was not so absent from the office, when in fact she well knew that on such date or time she was in the CFI of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, appearing in her cases. ISSUE: Whether Beradio is liable. HELD: NO. At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a conviction of the offense of falsification of public or official documents, defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the requisite elements thereof must be clearly established, namely: 1) the offender makes in a document false statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false, and 4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. On the main point, assuming, however, that petitioner is under strict legal obligation to keep and submit the daily time records (petitioner is not required in this case), We are definitely inclined to the view that the alleged false entries made in the time records on the specified dates contained in the information do not constitute falsification for having been made with no malice or deliberate intent. Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner consistently did not dispute, but admitted in all candor her appearances in six (6) different ways. The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales, Pangasinan, is only two (2) meters from her own office as Election Registrar in the said municipality. She had standing authority to act as de oficio counsel given by the COMELEC evidently in furtherance of the free legal aid service program of the Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of the Government itself, 10 especially as COMELEC lawyers, before any election had been held during the regime of martial law, did not have much office work to keep them busy. This state of virtual

absence of electoral activities is what prompted COMELEC to authorize its lawyers to take active part in the free legal aid program above adverted to, if to do so would not unduly interfere with their work.

Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no criminal intent to commit the crime with which she is charged can be imputed against the petitioner. On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution belies its allegation of the wholeday absence in office as Election Registrar. Records reveal that petitioner had stayed in court for only 5, 30, 40 or 45 minutes a day for her appearances therein, at no instance exceeding 1 hour. If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the six days in question making it appear that she attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more than color of truth in the entry made. It is not shown that she did not report first to her office as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before going to the courtroom just two (2) meters away. Petitioner thus likened her appearance to going out for the usual coffee breaks. The comparison is not even apt for during the while she appeared in court, she was rendering service more, if not wholly, for the public good, than just for her own well-being as when she goes out for snack during the coffeebreak period. The court being only two (2) meters away from her office, she did not even have to go so far as when one goes out for snack. What is more, everytime she appeared in court, she surely must have made this fact officially of record in the court proceedings, something which is not done with leaving the office room for coffee breaks. In fine, the entries in petitioner's daily time records were not absolutely false. The alleged false entry may be said to have a color of truth, not a downright and willful falsehood which alone would constitute falsification as a crime. In thus preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was evidently in her belief in her belief that she was just making of record the fact that, as was her honest opinion, she was entitled to receive her full pay even for those days she appeared in court, rendering what she felt was no less a public service, being in furtherance of a public policy on free legal assistance. On this point, if one fills up his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the time so indicated therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the pay corresponding to the time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime of falsification of public document can be

ascribed to her. In the case of the herein petitioner, she was only submitting a time record she knew would be the basis for computing the pay she honestly felt she deserved for the period indicated. Indeed, the time record is required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of serving as basis for the determination of the amount of pay an employee is entitled to receive for a given period. Although the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, this Court emphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by Article 1 (now Article 3) of the Penal Code. While it is true that a time record is an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be different in the case of a public document with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is necessary for the safeguard and protection of that general interest. In the instant case, the time records have already served their purpose. They have not caused any damage to the government or third person because under the facts duly proven, petitioner may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper permission from her superiors. They may now even be condemned as having no more use to require their continued safe- keeping. Public interest has not been harmed by their contents, and continuing faith in their verity is not affected.

Pilar S. Luague.For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three treasury warrants for purposes of endorsement, appellant stands charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. [Note: The appellant was charged with three counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial document but was convicted of falsification only.] It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as in the Court of Appeals that she acted in good faith or had no criminal intent when she cashed her deceased husband's paychecks. ISSUE: whether the appellants conviction should be sustained HELD: NO In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals followed the simplistic procedure of applying literally the letter of the law, namely: there was falsification because the petitioner "signed her husband's name in indorsing the treasury warrants in question." The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That the petitioner signed her husband's name to the checks because they were delivered to her by no less than her husband's district supervisor long after the husband's death which was known to the supervisor; that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husband's last illness and his burial; and that she believed that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment for her husband's vacation and sick leave credits the money value of which exceeded the value of the checks. In the fight of these circumstances, We cannot ascribe criminal intent to the petitioner. We sustain her claim that she acted in good faith. During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial loss due to the encashment of the checks because the petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value of which exceeded the value of the three paychecks and the value of the checks was simply deducted from the money value of the leaves. This explains why the petitioner was not convicted of estafa but of falsification only. While we do not mean to imply that if there is no damage there can be no falsification, We do say that the absence of damage is an element to be considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent.

G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22, 1982 PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. ABAD SANTOS, J.: Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk died at the G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital. Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants to the Superintendent of schools at Catarman Northern Samar who in turn forwarded them to the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo. A payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks. The checks werepersonally received by

CABIGAS vs PEOPLE

G.R. No.L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON anddefendantappellant. Aquino, J.: FACTS: Petitioners were all charged with malversation through falsification for allegedly using six forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He represented the Carried Construction Supply Co. in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's office, for recording. Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872. Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincial treasurer's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the bookkeeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing and for the latter's signature. From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same. Afterwards, Samson asked DonatoRosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and hardware firm and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's office.

Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine. Sendaydiego and Samson were convicted. Pending appeal, Sendaydiego died. Hence, we shall now focus on Samsons culpability. Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy. ISSUE: Is the trial correct in convicting him of falsification? HELD: Yes. After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof. The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., handcarried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers. The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger

MANUEL L. SIQUIAN vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 82197. March 13, 1989

CORTES, J.: FACTS: It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to see the accused in his house. The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be included in the budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung. The Treasurer agreed that she could report for work. One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment papers. She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused. Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds (C.S. Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila. Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her monthly salary was P120.00. She rendered services for the months of July, August, September, October, November and December 1975. She was not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the Treasurer who told her that there was no money. Because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosio, Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment papers. Thereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against

the accused. Her complaint Governor Faustino N. Dy.

is

addressed

to

It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed reenacted. Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.

In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 19751976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel for 1974-1975, was filled-up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused. As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty. HELD: YES. It is settled that in the fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur: (a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document.

 The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts. The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public document. The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed". In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial. Good faith is a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. Such defense cannot serve to exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar. Petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela was aware that there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year when the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted for failure to enact a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. In this case, the presumption that petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.

consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document. G.R. No. 43659 December 21, 1990. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents. REGALADO, J.: FACTS: Complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land registered in their names.On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds. After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and ViletaQuinto. In January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered that their property was already registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the former from the premises. A case for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed against private respondent. A motion to dismiss was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crime charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that he authorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land owned by him and his brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows: "Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present? A Yes, sir, I know. Q Could you tell us what happened to your title? A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.

Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which

Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was forelosed by the Bank?

A Yes, sir. Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank? A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to sign a document as a witness and I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said. Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you to sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land owned by you and your brother. Do you have any document to show that? x xx ATTY. DIAZ: Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you? A Yes, sir. Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose of identification, and may we request that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and the second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Court what is this? A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir. x xx Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no sufficient basis for the charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case. ISSUE: Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the private respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact. HELD: YES. The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage

not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory of petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the same. We agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below: "In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record, as regards the first ground, the court finds that the contention of the defense that the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant clearly shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant. In other words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on the following quoted answer: 'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.' Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the abovequoted testimony. He merely quoted his brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'"

G.R. No. 146731

January 13, 2004

AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and SERVANDO BERNANTE CARPIO, J.: Facts: Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification of public document. Enemecio asserted that

Bernante made it appear in his leave application that he was on forced leave from 15 May 1996 to 21 May 1996 and on vacation leave from 22 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-day prison term, from 14 May 1996 to 2 June 1996, because of his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries. Bernante was able to receive his salary during his incarceration since then CSCST-CFT Superintendent Andres T. Melencion approved Bernantes application for leave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to receive salary for that period because of his "falsified leave applications." Issue: whether Bernante should be held liable for falsification Held:No. Enemecios contentions do not deserve serious consideration. Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.24 As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his leave of absence. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making false statements in a narration of facts absent any legal obligation to disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and forced leave. LEONILA BATULANON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed LeonilaBatulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the membesa of the cooperative. During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon

falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit. Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors. On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition. Batulanon avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative. ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents. HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, par.2 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.

NIZURTADO vs SANDIGANBAYAN There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. The CA correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactionsnor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: by: Ibatulanon to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon. Galeos vs People GR No. 174730-37 February 9, 2011 Villarama, Jr., J. Facts: Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998. Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer. In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query. Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos mother, and to Rivera within the fourth degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of Riveras wife. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera. Issue: Whether the accused herein are guilty of the crime of falsification? Ruling: Yes. Art. 171.of the RPC provides: Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by the prosecution. A narration of facts is merely an account or description of the particulars of an event or occurrence. Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his SALN if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava with having knowingly used a false document under the last paragraph of Article 172. The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's license, asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him. Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get his own driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver's license No. 2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in said locality. 46 On January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said office by paying the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued official receipt No. 0605870. 47 In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt showing that at the previous year the licensee had paid for his driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve the issuance of "another form," a driver did not have to fill up an application form for the renewal of a license. The said agency would then issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the license but the driver's license itself would not be changed. 48 Thus.on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt No. 864321 49 were presented to the San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel therein issued officialreceipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not personally signed by office registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt 50 was genuine and the amount indicated therein was actually paid to and collected by the San Fernando agency. 51 The driver's license itself may not have been issued by said agency 52 but its form was likewise genuine. However, according to Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his name therein. 53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of the license Division of the Bureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, nonprofessional driver's license No. 2706887 in the name of Michael DavaTolosa "is not registered" in their index card. 54

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS MICHAEL T. DAVA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTG.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991 G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991 FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga LTC agency participated" in inpreparation and with having used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified. The charges therefore are found on the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any private individual who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article 171 specifically paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any act proceeding when they

ISSUE: Is there a violation of Art. 172?

HELD:Yes.Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are

pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and made use of the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so. The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. 55 Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in this case. It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license. 56 Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short a without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the legal fee then was only P15.00. 57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the commission of said crime. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license No. 2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license, he knew that it was not legally possible for him to secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for him to misrepresent to his friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even with this misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili would be able to secure a driver's license through legal means in about an hour's time. 58 The patent irregularity in obtaining driver's license No. 2706887 was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary

cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that he himself was surprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license of Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the fixer's assistance. 59 In those days, all plastic jackets emanated from the LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in the release of the license applied for. Under these circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would say that petitioner did not know that his license was a fake. 60 A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. 61 Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document. The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his possession and it was what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner used driver's license No. 2706887. The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego, 63 should be applied in his favor:The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.

We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the exception that the accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a false document. 64 His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not have acted on his own accord without the prodding of petitioner. We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in government agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who could do things fast for the right amount. He is "not necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification of official documents" and he shares his fees with "insiders." 65 Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why they proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our bureaucracy but also on our own people. While not all fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators," they nonetheless provide sources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who transact business with the government and for corruption of the gullible government employees. Their unwanted presence must be dealt with accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our government agencies the better for all of us. The decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed.

to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them sequentially with IIB2 to II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to appellant with IIB-1. Appellant was consequently arrested and brought out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the Manila City jail for interrogation. Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to the BangkoSentralngPilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager LoidaMarcega Cruz of the BangkoSentralngPilipinas examined and found the following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00 bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9) P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession and use of false bank notes under Article 168[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FLASE BANK NOTES

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO, - versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.: FACTS:Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. An informant in the person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a fake and refused

ISSUE: Whether the accused is criminally liable for the crime charged.

HELD:NO.The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. As held in People v. Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense

under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.

Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real Identity. He later admitted that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was working for the Black Mountain Mining Corporation; and that he was just checking on a claim for per diem of one of their employees who had travelled. Upon the arrival of NBI agents, Attys. Puno and Boro turned over the person of Gigantoni to the NBI. ISSUE: Whether Gigantoni was guilty of usurpation of authority HELD: No.Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority under which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS agent, by presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient. The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of ". The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function (second part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The information charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and

USURPATION
PEOPLE vs CORTEZ G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988 MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. YAP, C.J.: On May 14, 1981, as an employee of Black Mountain Mining Company, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) allegedly to conduct verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials. Upon reaching the said PAL office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the period February 1 to 3 1981. To further convince the PAL officials of his supposed mission, Gigantoni exhibited his Identification card purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS agent.Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested manifest and the used PAL tickets of one Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that of a certain Daisy Britanico, an employee of Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL premises. PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr. subsequently learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the service for gross misconduct. Atty. Puno immediately alerted the NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL office the following day. When Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, in the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security,

falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government." Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused was confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He was not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case that the information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily made available to the accused because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was charged in the information, that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable under CA 142. HELD: NO. It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed. In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons.

USING FICTITIOUS NAME

LEGAMIA v. IAC CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984 ABAD SANTOS, J.: FACTS: Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of CA No. 142, as amended. The facs appear that Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years. uring their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."

ILLEGAL USE OF UNIFORMS OR INSIGNIA

Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution.

PERJURY
G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990

REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. PARAS, J.: According to the information filed Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School and, therefore, a public employee, did then and there feloniously commit falsification of official documents, to wit: by executing and filing in the office of the Civil Service Commission of said municipality a Personal Data Sheet, CS Form No. 212(65), an official document, stating and malting it appear therein that he was a fourth year Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which document is a requirement for his reappointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the Jose Abad Santos High School and wherein the academic requirement to said Position is at least a fourth year college undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the said accused well knew that the statement is false and he did not reach the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, and consequently, by reason of said untruthful narration of facts, his appointment to the said position was approved by the Civil Service Commission. ISSUE: whether falsification HELD: no. In the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz and the earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina the crime committed under the foregoing facts, is perjury. This offense, as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. The elements of the crime of perjury are (a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. thr crime commited was

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.

G.R. No. 192565

February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Brion, J.: FACTS: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping.The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. ISSUE: What court has proper jurisdiction in perjury cases? HELD: It is the court where the Certificate against Forum was subscribed and sworn to which is Makati City in this case. Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or

municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours] In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Now, it appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of their enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the property a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid. They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thus accepted by the RFC, was that of Francisco Echavez, who offered P27,826.00 for the land. Echavez paid the sum of P5,565.00 representing 20% deposit of the profferred price. Thereafter, on various dates, Ouano and/or his wife delivered sums of money to Echavez aggregating P1,725.00, obviously in payment of the balance indicated in Echavez's computation just mentioned, viz.: P500.00 on April 19, 1958, another P500.00 on April 20, and P725.00 on April 27, 1958. Receipts therefor were given by Echavez, all similarly worded to the effect that the money was being received "as part of their reimbursement for the deposit (of P5,565.00) I have made with the RFC for Lot 3-A-1 which I won in the bidding and which lot I have consented to share with Mr. Paterno J. Ouano, subject to the approval of the RFC." However, the RFC never approved the sharing agreement between Echavez and Ouano concerning Lot 3-A-1. It approved the sale of the lot to Echavez only, on May 9, 1958, on the condition that the purchase price of P27,825.00 be paid in cash. Apparently Echavez found great initial difficulty in complying with this condition. It took all of four years, and patient negotiation and diligent effort on his part, for him ultimately to acquire title to the property, which came about in December, 1963. It was pursuant to the absolute sale of December 9, 1963 just mentioned, that a Torrens title (TCT No. 10776) was issued in Echavez's name. Ouano, in his turn, tried to have DBP either accept and implement his sharing agreement with Echavez, or allow him to pay the full price of the lot in Echavez's behalf. By his own account, he sent a letter dated June 3, 1963 to the DBP, "hand carried by his wife," "requesting among others, that he be permitted to pay immediately either for his share in the aforesaid lot comprising 1,828 sq. meters at the bid price of P7.50 per sq. meter including charges, or for the whole lot;" and that he in fact

MACHINATIONS AUCTIONS

IN

PUBLIC

PATERNO J. OUANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO B. ECHAVEZ G.R. No. 40203. August 21, 1990 NARVASA, J.:

FACTS: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 square meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, identified as Philippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1. It was covered by Torrens Title No. 7618 in the name of the registered owner, Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands belonging to Francisco Echavez, private respondent herein, and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano. What will have to be resolved are the conflicting claims over this lot by the vendee thereof, Echavez, and Ouano. The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC on April 1, 1958. Actually this was the second public bidding scheduled for the property. The first in which both Ouano and Echavez participated, together with others was nullified on account of a protest by Ouano.

tried to make such payment but the Bank turned down his request. Shortly after his representation with the DBP were rebuffed more precisely on June 24, 1963, months before the deed of absolute sale was executed by the DBP in Echavez's favor Paterno J. Ouano filed suit for "specific performance and reconveyance" in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Francisco Echavez and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). In his complaint, Ouano recited substantially the facts just related, and further alleged that ". . . on June 3, 1963 plaintiffs wife and his attorney conferred with defendant . . . Echavez for the purpose of again requesting said defendant to sign a document which would be notarized and to permit plaintiff to pay for his share direct to the defendant DBP, but said defendant refused and instead informed them that there had been no agreement regarding joint bidding and joint ownership of Lot 3-A-1." The complaint was amended a few weeks later, chiefly to allege that DBP was on the point of rescinding its contract with Echavez; and that Ouano's offer to the DBP to pay in Echavez's behalf the price of the lot in full (P28,206.61), had been rejected; and that consequently, and "to show his good faith," he had consigned the amount with the Court "for and in behalf of defendant . . . Echavez."

contracts, among others, "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy," or "expressly prohibited . . . by law." Such contracts "cannot be ratified;" "the right to set up the defense of illegality (cannot) be waived;" and, Article 1410 adds, the "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence . . . (thereof) does not prescribe." Article 1411 also dictates the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed," as mandated by the provisions of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, this being obviously the provision "of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime" that Article 1411 makes "applicable to the things or the price of the contract."

ISSUE: Whether or not a felony has been committed. HELD: YES. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned. In so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only have no action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code. Article 1409 of said Code declares as "inexistent and void from the beginning" those