Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 261287; September 2002

WHAT GOES UP:
PROCLUS AGAINST ARISTOTLE ON THE FIFTH ELEMENT
Dirk Baltzly
The Athenian neoplatonist Proclus (c. 410485) is not regarded by most analytically
inclined philosophers as one of antiquitys better minds.
1
After all, the work of Proclus
with which most people are acquainted is the Elements of Theology.
2
While one might
admire its attempt at rigour in the 211 numbered propositions and their proofs, most
contemporary philosophers will find the premises in these proofs pretty unlikely.
Moreover, the resulting metaphysical edificewith its various levels of entities from
transcendent One to unqualified matteris fairly alien to our more naturalist ontologies.
I barrack for the St Kilda Football Club, so it should come as no surprise that I like to
see the rehabilitation of the downtrodden and underappreciated. In what follows, Ill argue
that some of Proclus arguments are at least as worthy of our attention as one of
Aristotles most celebrated arguments in natural philosophy. Part of what we admire about
Aristotle is the methodology and cleverness. He proceeds in a way we approve of, first
identifying the problems that arise when we survey the platitudes about a topic and then
clearing away many of these by drawing distinctions among the various senses of words.
He typically offers a theory and tries to justify it by showing that it is better than its
competitors at saving the appearances. Even when Aristotle gets to the wrong conclusion,
we still find that he does things that we regard as methodologically virtuous in the
process.
261
1
There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. A number of analytically inclined
philosophers, who are also first-rate historians, have done a great deal to rehabilitate neoplatonist
philosophy generally and to show that it is not all mystical mumbo-jumbo. These include
A.C. Lloyd (whose book, Anatomy of Neoplatonism, provided exactly thata look at the logical
principles that are consistently applied to generate neoplatonist metaphysics) and Richard Sorabji
(whose many books on ancient science extracted and explained some of the very best in the natural
philosophy of the neoplatonists). This paper is a small contribution to this ongoing project.
2
In part this is because ET provides an overview of the structure of neoplatonic metaphysics. It is
also one of the four works of Proclus for which there is a reliable English translation (Dodds
(1963)). The others are Proclus commentary on the Platonic (?) First Alcibiades (ONeill (1965)),
the commentary on Book I of Euclids Elements (Morrow (1970)) and, most importantly, the
Commentary on the Parmenides of Plato (Morrow and Dillon (1987)). Proclus other surviving
Plato commentaries have been translated into French: in Timaeum (Festugire (19668)); in Rem
Publicam (Festugire (1970)). Likewise for the massive Platonic Theology (Saffrey and Westerink
(1968)), and the shorter essays Ten Doubts on Providence (Isaac (1977)), On Fate (Isaac (1979))
and On the Existence of Evil (Isaac (1982)). The only English versions of these works are the not
entirely reliable translations of the 18th19th century Platonist Thomas Taylor. Taylors English is
pretty literal and thus a bit hard to follow unless you have a very good idea of the context. More
importantly, he was working from a corrupt text of Proclus Greek. A new English translation of
the Timaeus commentary is currently in preparation through an ARC funded project involving
Harold Tarrant, David Runia, Rick Benitez, John Bigelow and me.
In this paper, I consider Proclus arguments against Aristotle on the composition of the
heavens from the fifth element, the aether. Proclus argues for the Platonic view (Timaeus
40a) that the heavenly bodies are composed of all four elements, with fire predominating.
I think that his discussion exhibits all the methodological features that we find admirable
in Aristotles largely a priori proto-science. Proclus treatment of the question in his
commentary on Platos Timaeus also provides the fullest statement of a neoplatonic
alternative to the Aristotelian theory of the elements. As such, it forms a significant part of
a still largely underappreciated neoplatonic legacy to the history of science.
3
I. Context: the harmony of Plato and Aristotle
according to the neoplatonist schools
The neoplatonist schools of Athens and Alexandria in late antiquity had a strict linear
philosophical curriculum. The works of Aristotle were regarded as an introduction to the
higher mysteries of Platos dialogues.
4
Of the latter, the Timaeus and the Parmenides were
regarded as the most advanced lessons. The neoplatonists taught that Plato and Aristotle
were in agreement about most things, though there were divergent opinions among them
about the exact extent of this agreement.
5
The story of these hermeneutic twists and turns
has been told by others.
6
In what follows I am interested in a topic on which even the
neoplatonists saw that it was impossible to reconcile Aristotle and Plato completely. In
the Timaeus, Plato says that heavens are composed of all the elements, but with a prepon-
derance of fire. Aristotle, by contrast, claims that the heavens are composed of a fifth
element: the aether.
In his commentary on Platos Timaeus, Proclus argues against Aristotles view of the
elements generally and against the fifth element in particular. He does this by criticising
Ocellus book On Nature. Ocellus was a Pythagorean who actually pre-dated Aristotle (if
he existed at all, that is). The work On Nature, however, is a forgery of the Hellenistic
period which presents Peripatetic views as Pythagorean natural philosophy.
7
It is unclear
262 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
3
Many of Proclus contributions to natural philosophy are surveyed in Siorvanes (1996). The present
paper adds to what Sirovanes has done by specifically addressing some striking methodological
parallels between Proclus and Aristotle.
4
Westerink (1962), ch. 26. Proclus was a particularly apt pupil. He received education in
mathematics and Aristotelian logic in the neoplatonist school at Alexandria. At the age of 19, he
came to Athens where Syrianus was head of the Academy. He was regarded as so gifted that
the retired head, Plutarch, took him on as a special pupil. Cf. Marinus, Life of Proclus, ch. 10
(K.S. Guthrie and Fideler (1986)) and Diller (1957).
5
The views found among the neoplatonists are summarised in Sorabji (1990), 3. No doubt this
strikes most of us as a very strange thing to think. After all, it is clear to us that Plato and Aristotle
are in sharp disagreement about a number of matters, particularly in the area of metaphysics. The
neoplatonists, however, read both authors through the filter of a complex hermeneutic theory which
minimised or eliminated what we regard as difference of opinion. For example, Aristotles
Categories was not thought to be a work about ontology, but rather about simple significant words
in as much as they signify things (Porphyry, On Aristotles Categories 58, 58). As such, it did not
present a view about the primacy of particulars over universals that would be incompatible with
Platonism.
6
In addition to the essays in Sorabji (1990), see also Blumenthal (1996); Coulter (1976); Lamberton
(1986); Ppin and Saffrey (1987); Sheppard (1980).
7
See Thesleff (1961) and Beutler (1936). The Greek text of Occelus is available in Thesleff and an
English translation can be found in K.S. Guthrie (1987).
whether Proclus knew that the work was a forgery. Proclus rejects the Aristotelian
arguments for the composition of the heavens by aether and replies to criticisms of the
Platonic view. He concludes by offering a way of showing that the apparent difference
of opinion between Plato and Aristotle on this question can be seen as a mere matter of
terminology.
II. Aristotle on the composition of the heavens
Aristotles central argument for his view on the composition of the heavens is intertwined
with his theory of the elements and natural place. On the Heavens I.2 begins with a
division of local motion into simple and compound kinds. There are alleged to be only
three kinds of simple motion: motion upward, motion downward and motion in a circle.
Other forms of motion, he claims, are a composite of these three basic kinds. The reason
that motion upward, motion downward and circular motion are the only simple kinds is
because there are only two kinds of simple magnitude: the straight line and the circle
(Cael. 268b1720).
These simple motions are then correlated with the simple bodies. The latter are bodies
which have an innate or natural origin of motion. Though the Physics would include living
things among the class of objects that have such an internal principle of motion, in On the
Heavens Aristotle confines his attention to inanimate natural bodies and specifically the
elements. The structure of Aristotles argument is open to dispute. I take it to be best
thought of as an existence proof, followed by an inference to the best explanation.
1. There are simple bodies.
2. These simple bodies possess natural motions.
3. The natural motions of simple bodies are themselves simple.
4. A simple body has only one natural motion.
5. For every simple motion, m, there is at least one simple body whose natural
motion is m.
6. Circular motion and motion in a straight line are the only kinds of simple motion.
7. There are two simple bodies whose natural motions are upwardfire and air.
8. There are two simple bodies whose natural motions are downwardearth and
water.
9. So there exists a simple body whose natural motion is circulara fifth element in
addition to earth, air, fire and water.
10. The heavens move with a natural circular motion.
So, probably, the heavens are composed of another simple body different from the four
elementsthis body is aether.
Dirk Baltzly 263
This, at least, is the barest form of the argument. Aristotle attempts to buttress it in
various ways. He argues against the possibility that the heavens are moved with a forced
motion contrary to the natural motion of the simple body from which it is composed. No
force could prevail continuously and eternally against a simple bodys natural motion
(269b6; 286a20). Nor can the heavens be a composite body with a composite motion that
happens to be circular. First, the motions of composite bodies are determined by their
constituent simple bodies (269a28). Moreover, though such a composite motion is not
contrary to a things natural motion (ropo otoiv), it is nonetheless not according to its
nature (ot ko1o otoiv). But that a thing should be moved in a circular fashion continu-
ously and eternally and yet that this should fail to be according to its nature is also
absurd.
8
There is more that can be said about the details of this particular argument and its
supporting arguments. In the next section, however, I want to consider some of the general
methodological features of Aristotles treatment of the topic that make it worth our
attention. I think that there are four kinds of things that Aristotle does in his discussion of
the composition of the heavens that make it a fine example of ancient Greek natural
philosophy, even if we think that his conclusion is wrong.
A. The extension from established science
Aristotles argument connects simple magnitudes with simple motions. Simple motions, in
turn, are connected with simple bodies. The De Caelo 268b18 passage is the only place in
the corpus where Aristotle talks about simple magnitudes (eeO) orto). There are,
however, some suggestions that the circle and straight line occupy a special place in the
mathematics of Aristotles day. Aristotle tells us that the Pythagoreans distinguished the
straight and the curved (Metaph. 986a25, cf. Republic X, 602c). Apart from this, however,
we have no independent reasons offered for the claim that the straight line and the circle
are the only two simple magnitudes.
Aristotle does attempt to connect the associated premise about three simple motions
with his earlier discussion about the mathematical principles of body generally. In the first
chapter of On the Heavens, Aristotle argues that the study of nature is concerned primarily
with bodies and their motions. Moreover, it is concerned with continuous bodiesthat is,
three-dimensional solids that can be divided in respect of any of these dimensions. So the
study of nature has a subject matter distinct from the line (which is magnitude that can be
divided in one way only) or the plane (which is two-dimensional magnitude divisible in
two directions). He even invokes the Pythagorean claim that the whole world and
everything in it is summed up in the number three. All this is done in support of the first
premise in the argument abovethat there are three kinds of simple motion.
Now revolution about the centre is circular motion, while the upward motion and
downward movements are in a straight line, upward meaning motion from the centre
and downward motion towards it. All simple motion then is motion either away from
264 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
8
I take it that this is the sort of argument that Aristotle ought to be mounting at 269a33. It is not
so clear that he doesnt tangle up contrary to nature with not according to nature. See
W.K.C. Guthrie (1971), ad loc.
or towards or about the centre. This seems to be in exact accord ()kototO)kevoi
ko1o toov) with what we said above: as body found its completion in three
dimensions, so its movement completes itself in three forms (268b2026, trans.
Stocks).
9
Now, we may think that the mathematical theory with which Aristotle tries to connect
his account of simple motion is flawed. But even so, we can see that Aristotles method-
ological instincts are sound. One good way of arguing for a new theory in one domain is
to show that it is consistent with established theories in other, related domains. Indeed, if
one can show the new theory is not merely consistent with, but just what one would expect
given the older, more established theory, then so much the better.
B. Extending the role of entities or principles within ones own theory
The same relationship obtains between Aristotles argument for the fifth element here in
De Caelo and his theory of natural place generally. The idea of natural place is one that
does other work for Aristotle. For example, it allows him to explain the characteristic
motions of different compound bodies (Gen et Cor II.8) and allows him to declare void
explanatorily superfluous since natural place accounts for motion (Phys. IV.8, 214b14).
Thus, when he invokes the doctrine of simple motions to the natural places of the
elements in his argument about the composition of the heavenly bodies, he is extending
what he has reason to regard as a successful theoretical posit to a new application. By
doing this he promotes theoretical virtues such as simplicity and generality.
C. Criticising competing theories
Aristotle also argues for his own view about the composition of the heavens by attacking
competing views. One view is that it is not only the stars and planets that are composed of
fire, but also that in which they are situated. In On the Heavens II.7 Aristotle argues
against this view by claiming that the phenomena do not uniquely support the view that
the stars and planets are made of firethe heat and light of the sun and stars does not
necessitate that they are composed of fire. Thus the generalization to the case of what they
are situated in is not warranted either. Ill discuss Aristotles alternative explanation of
this heat and light below.
When we turn to the less well-known Meteorologica Aristotle argues directly against
the view that the heavens generally are made of fire. He says that if the intervals
[between the various heavenly bodies?] were full of fire and the bodies [i.e. the stars and
planets] also consisted of fire, every one of the other elements would long ago have
vanished (Meteo. I.3, 340a1). All that fire would have destroyed everything down here.
His next target seems to be a two-element view according to which the stars and
planets themselves are composed of fire, but the intervals between them are filled with air.
This view is unacceptable for similar reasons. The amount of earth and the water down
here in the sublunary sphere would be tiny in comparison with the amount of air necessary
Dirk Baltzly 265
9
Unless otherwise noted, translations from Aristotle and Plato are taken from Barnes (1984) and
Cooper (1997).
to fill the vast spaces between the stars. But when an element like water is transmuted into
air, it is not the case that an enormous amount of the latter is produced from a small
amount of the former. So if there were so much air in the intervals between the stars, the
elements would not be in proportion to one another. Aristotle thinks that this argument can
be made to work even if one denies that the elements can be transmuted into one another.
It is sufficient, he thinks, if some quantity of element A is equal in power to some quantity
of element B.
10
It is a bit unclear whether either of these arguments counts against Platos position in
the Timaeus because it is so unclear what that position actually is. At 39e40a Timaeus
says that the Demiurge tried to reproduce the forms that are contained within the paradigm
from which He is workingthe Living Being itself. In pursuit of this aim, He makes the
heavenly race of gods; winged things that dwell in the air; things that live in the water;
and things that live on dry land. Timaeus then says:
The gods He made mostly out of fire, to be the brightest and fairest to the eye (40a24,
trans. Zeyl).
It turns out that Timaeus is primarily discussing the fixed stars, though perhaps also the
planets (40b). It is less clear that he has anything at all to say about the composition of the
celestial regions in which these bodies are situated. It must be full of something, since the
Timaeus denies that there is void (58a).
Even if Platos view on this matter is unclear, Proclus and the neoplatonists take him to
hold the view that the heavens as a wholeand not merely the fixed stars and planets
are composed primarily of fire.
11
So, from their point of view, Aristotles objection ought
to seem like a serious one. Given the size of the sphere of the stars, if it is mostly fire up
there, then it is a bit of mystery why we arent all burned to a crisp.
D. Meeting obvious objections to your own theory
There is an obvious problem for Aristotles view that the heavens are composed of
aetheran element wholly unlike the other four. Surely we have very good empirical
evidence for the claim that at least one of the heavenly bodies is composed of fire, for how
else can we explain the suns heat?
Aristotle was aware of this problem and addressed it both in On the Heavens II.7 and
also in the less well-known Meterologica I.3. His solution is that the motions of the
heavenly bodies generate friction in a layer of fire-like material located below the inner
boundary of the aether. The atmosphere up to the level of the moon is not actually a
simple layer-cake of pure air and then pure fire. The place of pure fire, or even its
existence, in the Meteorologica is a bit hard to pin down.
266 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
10
Aristotle also discusses the question of the proportion of the elements in Gen et Corr. II.6. There
are some interpretive issues about the details of the argument here in the Meteorologica. These
need not concern us here, but see the discussions of Alexander Aphrodisias and John Philoponus in
their respective commentaries.
11
in Tim. II. 47,15, a passage that I will discuss in more detail below.
Immediately around earth and water are air and what we are accustomed to call fire
(o oio otv)Oeiov kototev rtp), though it is not really fire; for fire is an excess
of heat and a kind of boiling (eoi). But we must understand that of what we call air,
the part which immediately surrounds the earth is moist and hot because it is vaporous
and contains exhalations from the earth, but the part above that is hot and dry (Meteo.
I.3, 340b224, trans. Lee).
This hot and dry exhalationthe trekkoto or fire sphereis highly inflammable
and the motion of the sun is able to ignite it. When it does this, we get a flame (oto)
which is really a boiling of dry air (rveto1o )pot eoi, Meteo. I.4, 341b23). The
sun is able to do this because its motion is both rapid and relatively close to the layer of
flammable stuff. The moon, of course, is closer but moves too slowly to spark it off. The
stars are wheeling around at a tremendous rate, but they are too far away (Meteo. I.3,
341a1932). Aristotle supposes that the general idea that rapid motion produces heat gains
empirical support from the (purported) fact that lead balls are heated and sometimes even
melted when they are fired as missiles.
12
III. Options for criticising Aristotles view
In this section I want to consider some possible avenues for rejecting Aristotles view on
the composition of the heavens. Some of these will not be open to a neoplatonist like
Proclus, because they involve calling into question aspects of Aristotles philosophy with
which the neoplatonists agree. Reviewing some of the criticisms made by Aristotles
successors also allows us to see Proclus critique in its proper historical context.
A. Natural Place
The argument of De Caelo I.2 relies heavily on the idea of the natural motions of the
simple bodies. Aristotle supposes that these motions are explained (in part at least) by the
influence of natural place and one might well have serious reservations about this latter
view. In fact, it was criticised by Aristotles successors in the Lyceum. In some instances,
this criticism was coupled with a rejection of the existence of the fifth element.
Aristotle comes close to attributing to place a power to contribute to motion. In the
context of developing aporia about place, he says:
Furthermore, the locomotions of the elementary natural bodiesnamely, fire and earth
and the likeshow not only that place is something, but also that it exerts a certain
influence (1ivo otvoiv). Each is carried to its own place, if it is not hindered, the
one up, the other down (Phys. IV.1, 208b812, trans. Hardie and Gaye).
When we think about the movement of fire upward or earth downward, it is difficult to
say whether the origin of this motion is an aspect of the nature of fire or earth, or some
Dirk Baltzly 267
12
W.K.C. Guthrie (1971) ad loc notes that this extraordinary notion seems to have been widely held
in antiquity. He cites Lucretius VI, 178; Seneca, Nat. Quest. II.57.2; Ovid, Met. II, 727; XIV, 825;
Virgil, Aen. IX, 588.
influence that is exerted by the limit or the centre of the cosmos. Within Aristotles own
school Theophrastus (c. 372288) may have rejected the idea that the natural place of the
elements exerts an influence on them. Rather, what fire and earth want in their natural
movements is to be in the right relation to one anothernot in relation to the positions in
the cosmos that we take to be their natural place.
Theophrastus too appears to have had this conception of place in his Physics when he
continues his account in the form of a puzzle and says:
Perhaps place is not an existing thing in its own right (otk eo1i koO ot1ov otoio
1i 1oro), but we speak of it because bodies have an order and position through their
natures and powers. And similarly in the case of plants and animals and in general of
non-homogeneous things, whether animate or inanimate, if they have a nature that
exhibits form. For in these too there is an order and position of parts in relation to the
whole thing (koi op 1ot1uv 1oi 1i koi Oeoi 1uv epuv eo1i rpo 1)v
ot)v otoiov). And this is why everything is said to be in its own space through
having proper order. For each part of the body would also desire and demand its space
and position (Simplic in Phys 639,1322; trans. after Sorabji (1988)).
The rejection of the causal influence of place on the motion of the elements need not
by itself undermine the argument of De Caelo I.2. One could still insist that the heavens
are not composed of any of the four elements which have a natural rectilinear motion, on
the assumption that the celestial motion is itself natural. However, the rejection of natural
place undermines the idea that there is a place where fire is naturally in a state of rest. On
Theophrastus account, fire ceases its upward motion when it gets into the right relation to
the other elements by getting on top of them. Changes in their position relative to it would
make it conceptually possible for fire to be perpetually in motionjust as the aether
allegedly is. This concession becomes important as the controversy unfolds in antiquity.
Strato of Lampsacus was Theophrastus successor as head of the Lyceum. He
disagreed with Aristotle on at least three points. First, he rejected Aristotles general
conception of the place of an object as the inner boundary of that which contains the
object (cf. Aristotle Phys. IV.4). It seems likely that he was motivated by the puzzles that
Theophrastus raised about Aristotles theory of place.
13
Next, he repudiated Aristotles
views on natural motion and accepted an Epicurean view according to which all things
tend downward by virtue of their weight.
14
This is equivalent to a rejection of the doctrine
of natural place, even when the latter is understood merely as a way of talking about the
powers of the simple bodies themselves. Finally, he apparently rejected the fifth element
and claimed that the heavens were made of fire.
15
None of our evidence indicates the
relation between these three deviations from Aristotles physical theory, but we may
speculate that it results from a wholesale rejection of the doctrine of natural place and the
views associated with it.
268 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
13
Reported by Simplicius in his Physics commentary, 645, 5 ff and discussed by Sorabji (1988) and
Sambursky (1962).
14
Simplicius, in Cael. 267, 29.
15
Reported by Stobaeus, Eclogae (ed. Wachsmuth) I. 200, 212.
This strategy for criticising Aristotles account of the composition of the heavens is not
one open to a neoplatonist like Proclus. In general, the neoplatonists did not want to reject
Aristotles notion of natural place. In fact, Iamblichus took the doctrine of place even
further than Aristotle himself did. Unlike Aristotle, Iamblichus clearly states that the place
of an object exerts a phyiscal power which holds that object together.
16
My particular
place (ioio 1oro) moves with me wherever I go and keeps the matter from which I am
composed from spreading out in an unseemly fashion.
17
So, on Iamblichus view, it is not
only the natural places of the elements that exert a causal influence on bodies, but other
places as well.
Proclus follows Iamblichus in making place or space dynamic in this sense. In
particular, he thinks that the place of the whole cosmos is an immaterial body that inter-
penetrates everything.
18
He equates it with the super-celestial light of the myth of Er in
Republic Book X. Proclus views on the nature of space are themselves novel and tightly
argued, but they have been discussed at length elsewhere. I raise the issue because of
the role that natural place plays in Aristotles argument concerning the composition of the
heavens. One strategy for rejecting that argument is to reject the whole idea of natural
place. But this is not an option for Proclus or the other neoplatonists since they accept a
version of that doctrine far stronger than Aristotles own conception.
B. Simple natural motion
Criticism within the Lyceum of the doctrine of the aether culminates with the book of
Xenarchus (2
nd
C. BC) called Against the Fifth Element. Fragments of this work are
preserved in Simplicius commentary on Aristotles De Caelo. Sambursky provides a nice
discussion of most of the fragments, but one in particular is relevant to subsequent
arguments from Proclus.
19
Xenarchus attacked the idea that the circular motion of the
heavens required a separate element different from fire.
Rectilinear motion is natural to none of the four elements when they are actual (ko1o
otoiv), but only when they are coming to be so. Something which is coming to be
does not exist unqualifiedly (otk eo1iv ortu), but is between being and not being.
. . . For this reason we do not say that the fire which moves upwards is properly called
(ktpiu) fire, but is coming to be fire; and that when it is in its proper place and has
risen above everything else and come to rest, then it will have come to be fire properly.
. . . So in the case of the simple bodies it is just false that there is simple motion. For it
has been shown that the motion is an accident not of that which is, but of that which is
coming to be. Therefore if it is necessary to assign some motion to things when they
are, and if this motion is to be simple, then it is requisite to assign them circular
motion. There are, after all, only two simple motionsrectilinear and circular. But
Dirk Baltzly 269
16
Reported by Simplicius, in Phys. 640,111
17
Simplicius connects this further development with Iamblichus (in Cat. 361,7362, 33; in Phys. 629,
812) and also with Proclus successor, Damascius (in Phys. 624,35 ff.).
18
Proclus views on space as an incorporeal body have been extensively discussed in the secondary
literature. See Sambursky (1982); Sorabji (1988); Schrenk (1989); Schrenk (1994); Siorvanes
(1996).
19
Sambursky (1962), 12232.
rectilinear motion belongs to the four elements when they are in a state of becoming
() oe er etOeio ivoevuv eo1iv) but not when they are in a state of being
(ott otk ov1uv 1uv 1eooopuv). So, it wouldnt be absurd to assign circular
motion to fire and rest to the remaining three (Simplicius, in Cael. 21, 3522,10).
In this passage Xenarchus rejects a crucial premise in Aristotles argumentthat for
each simple body there is one and only one natural motion. But he also goes further in
suggesting that at different levels of actuality, simple bodies may have different natural
motions. This is a suggestion that will loom large in Proclus treatment of the kind of fire
that composes the heavens. But Proclus does more than simply take this idea on board.
Note that Xenarchus offers no justification for the idea that fire in its fully actual state has
a circular motion, while the natural motion of the other three elements in a state of being
is, rather perversely, a state of rest. It requires a theory of the elements to motivate this
assignment of motions to them. Proclus goes beyond Xenarchus criticism in providing
such a theory.
C. The fire sphere
Aristotles explanation for the suns heat was also criticised from a variety of points of
view prior to Proclus.
Aristotles theory of the comets and shooting stars involves not only the presence of
the fire sphere, but also the claim that it is carried around by the rotation of the aetherial
sphere immediately above it (Meteo. I.7, 344a913). It seems ad hoc to insist that the
heavens must be composed of something other than fire on the ground that they move
eternally in a circle if one then posits a form of fire that does exactly that.
20
Even a
dedicated Aristotelian like Alexander of Aphrodisias finds that there is a genuine problem
about the motion of the fire sphere. How shall we regard it? As a natural motion? As a
forced motion, but one that is nonetheless eternal? He writes:
What is the power that comes to be from the movement of the divine body for the body
adjacent to it which is mortal and coming to be? Is this some nature other than the
proper [nature] of each of the natural bodies which we say is a principle of motion and
of rest to that to which it belongs? (Questiones II.3, 47,3048,1, trans. Sharples
(1992).)
Alexanders own answer to this question is not one that can be stated simply. What is
important for our purposes is that the neoplatonists generally did not reject the idea of the
fire sphere itself. As we shall see, they thought that the heavenly bodies were composed of
fire, but denied that their fire had heat as an essential property. Thus they too employ the
mechanism of the fire sphere.
21
Their solution to Alexanders problem was to introduce
270 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
20
Cf. Xenarchus as reported by Simplicius in Cael. 20, 24 ff.
21
Proclus ascribes a view at least consonant with Aristotles fire sphere to Iamblichus (in Tim. I. 117,
24). The exception, as usual, is Philoponus. Not only does he emphatically reject the fifth element,
he supposes that the fire from which the heavens are composed is importantly similar to the fire
down here. This explains the suns heatnot the fire sphere (Philoponus, in Meteo. 49, 2234).
This is a claim that his orthodox, pagan opponent Simplicius clearly rejects (in Cael. 66, 3367, 5;
88, 2834; 90,1318).
another category of motion. The eternal circular motion of the fire sphere is neither natural
nor unnatural. Rather it is supernatural as befits its contact with the more divine forms of
elements in the heavens.
22
One final point about the controversy over the fire sphere is relevant for our discussion
of Proclus. There is confusion among the commentators about whether terrestrial fire or
the hot, dry exhalation of the fire sphere is (or is closer to being) elemental fire. One might
suppose that the fire in the fire sphere is closer to being elemental since Aristotle says that
it is the most inflammable (Meteo. I.4, 341b24). Another reason to suppose that the fire
up there is more elemental is the fact that terrestrial fire needs fuel. This point had
already been used by Theophrastus to call into question its status as an element, for
elements surely ought to be able to exist by themselves.
23
In any event, if we assume that the fire in the fire sphere is more elemental, then there
is a puzzle about why the fire down here is hotter than elemental fire.
24
Recall that the fire
sphere does not boil until it is ignited by the passage of the Sun. So although the portions
of it that are thus ignited may be hotter than the fire in your barbecue, on the whole the hot
and dry exhalation is not hotter than terrestrial flame. In his response to this problem,
Alexander argues that the greater degree of heat possessed by terrestrial fire is to be
explained by the greater degree of mixture with matter.
The idea that the qualities that we associate with the elements as we know them here
result from the admixture of matter turns out to be one that Proclus employs to great
effect. Nor is the idea one that is utterly unmotivated empirically. Alexander uses the
example of red hot iron which is hotter than ordinary flame. Its not that there is more
coldness mixed in with the flame than with the red hot poker. Rather, Alexander says, the
intensification [of heat] in the iron results from the solidity and unyielding [quality] of the
matter (Quaest. II.16, 62, 23, trans. Sharples (1994)). Of course, we moderns would not
describe a hot poker as a case in which fire mixed with the iron. But from the point of
view of ancient science, this seems quite a reasonable thing to say.
Having surveyed some of the objections that were raised against Aristotles doctrine of
the fifth element prior to Proclus, we are now in a position to turn to his account of the
matter and see how innovative it is.
III. Proclus dialectical development of his positive view
Aristotle characteristically develops his own position on a topic by first framing the
puzzles or aporiai that common sense raises about the topic. He then reviews earlier
theories and their shortcomings in addressing these problems. Finally he develops his own
view as one that incorporates such positive insights as have been found in the earlier
theories. Just like Aristotle, Proclus works up to his most explicit statement of his view (in
Tim. II. 42, 9 ff.) by discussing the views of predecessors. He begins by noting that there
are disagreements among them on this question. His account of the history of the question
is oddbut perhaps no odder than some of Aristotles accounts of pre-Socratic
Dirk Baltzly 271
22
Simplicius in Cael. 21, 2325.
23
Theophrastus, de Igne 49.
24
Alexander Quaestiones II.17, trans. Sharples.
philosophy.
25
The moral Proclus draws is that there are good reasons to try to preserve
both the claim that a) the whole cosmos is composed out of the four elements and yet
b) the heavens have a different substance or essence (otoio). Proclus enumerates the
possibilities and argues by elimination.
For it is necessary that either: (1) The heavens are composed of a fifth element entirely
different from the four elements, as some say, or (2) They are made of [all of] the
four elements, or (3) They are made of some particular one of the four elements, or
(4) They are made from more than one [but not all four]. Further, if they are composed
of the four elements then either (2a) they have the same form as the sub-lunary
elements or (2b) they have a different form.
But if (1) the heavens are composed of something other than the four elements, how is
it that Plato says that the entire cosmos is composed from these four (32b48)? And if
(3) it is made from just one of the four, how can he say a bit later (40a2) that the stars
are for the most part fire? And if (4) it is composed of more than one [but not all], how
will it not be imperfect or incomplete by not having all things while even the Earth and
generally the things below the moon do have all the elements? (in Tim. II. 42, 2843, 9.)
Contemporary readers may be somewhat disappointed with the arguments against
options (1) and (3). Surely, it will be said, Proclus is rightly ranked as a second-rate
philosopher because he is so prone to such superficial appeals to Platos authority. But it
is important to remember the context of the work before us. Proclus Timaeus
commentary presents lectures to a group of students who have already progressed through
most of the neoplatonic curriculum. They, presumably, have seen enough to find the fact
that Plato says x good evidence for x. In any event, Proclus does in fact provide better
arguments against (1)which is Aristotles viewas well as (3). An argument against the
view that it is composed of only one of the four elements emerges from Proclus further
consideration of (2):
But on the other hand, if (2) it is composed of all of them, how will it be that the
composite out of these that exists up above is indissoluble while composites of the four
elements here below are subject to dissolution? For it will not be indissoluble because
the four elements in the heavens have equal dominion, since if they had equal
dominion, where would the diversity [seen in the heavens] come from? Moreover, if
there were equal dominion among the elements, how is that Plato says that up there
things are for the most part fire? And if it is composed out of others, how is it that
though it is a composite it is moved with a simple motion? (in Tim. II. 43, 920.)
The argument against the view that there is equal dominion among the four elements in
the heavens can also be turned to an argument against (3)the claim that there is only one
272 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
25
See Festugire (196668) ad loc for an account of some of the difficulties with the text. The locus
classicus for criticisms of Aristotle as an expositor of his predecessors views is, of course, the
work of H.F. Cherniss.
of the four elements up there. The problem is the diversity of appearances in the heavens.
Some parts of the heavenly sphere are clearly transparent. Other parts must be solid since
they cast a shadow, as we see in eclipses. Other parts of the heavens give off light.
Proclus solution is to opt for (2b)all four of the elements are present in the heavens,
although in a different manner than they are manifested in the sublunary sphere. I will
quote at length the passage in which he announces this conclusion and the reasons for it.
The nature of the problems being such as this, the better option is to say that the whole
heaven is [composed out of] a preponderance of fire, but it includes in a causal way
(ko1 oi1iov) the powers of the other elementsfor instance, the solidity and
stability of earth; the adhesive and unifying quality of water; the tenuousness
and transparency of air. . . . One should consider that the fire there is not the same as
the fire here below the moon . . . The fire down here is genuinely enmattered and
generated and destructible. . . . But earth is up there in a causal way, being another
form of earth such as would be expected if it is connascent (ototeoOoi) with the
divine fire, having only abstract solidity (ot1o ovov eotoo 1o o1epeov), just as
the fire [up above] has luminosity [alone]. And as the [celestial] fire does not burn, so
the earth there is not denseit is the highest kind of each. The fire up there is pure and
really real. Likewise, here below is the really real earth and the wholeness of earth, but
the fire here is enmattered and exists through participation (ko1o eOeiv) just as the
earth is up there in the primary way (rpu1u). The other one is present in each in an
appropriate waywhere the pinnacle or highest kind of earth is, there is the sediment
of fire. The moon is also an indication, having a solid and dark quality, and blocking
out the light (for it is in earths nature alone to occlude things in this way); likewise for
the stars which stand in the way of our attempts to see beyond, as if making a shadow
above themselves.
And it is clear that as these two are there on highfire and earththe things that are
intermediate between them must also be there: the primarily (rpu1u) transparent
(that is, air, like the brightest kind down here) and water (like the lightest of vapours or
something still more pure) in order that all things should be in all, but each in an
appropriate fashion (in Tim. II. 43, 2044,18 with omissions).
A. Extending the role of entities or principles within ones own theory
Proclus positive view about the composition of the heavens manifests two method-
ological virtues. First, it purports to provide an explanation of some obvious features of
the way that things appear to us. Some parts of the heavens are transparent; other parts
provide light; and yet other parts cast a shadow (as is evident in eclipses). This diversity in
appearances presents a problem for any theory that claims that there is only one element
present in the heavenswhether it be one of the familiar four or Aristotles fifth element.
However, it is unclear whether the properties of the four elements as we know them are
really adequate to explain the properties that seem to be exhibited by the heavenly bodies.
Proclus avoids this problem by supposing that the four elements come in different
gradations. This takes us on to the second methodological virtue of Proclus discussion.
Dirk Baltzly 273
It would be obvious to his audience, though not perhaps to us, that Proclus theory
invokes general principles that find employment elsewhere in his theorizing. Proclus
account of the way in which all four elements are present in the heavens appeals to his
general principle that there is a decline of entities through the various levels of procession.
The principle is articulated in Elements of Theology:
Prop. 38: In all that multiplies itself by procession, those terms which arise first are
more perfect than the second, and these than the next order, and so on throughout the
series.
Argument: For if procession is that which distinguishes product from cause, and there
is a deterioration (toeoi) in what comes second in relation to what comes first, then
the first terms in such processions are more closely connected with the causes, since
they spring directly from them; and so on throughout. But that which is closer and
more akin to the cause is more perfect or complete (for causes are more complete than
effects (Prop. 7)); and the more remote is less perfect, as it loses the likeness of the
cause (ET 38, trans. after Dodds).
In addition, the terms in such a succession can rightfully be said to be the same thing.
In describing the mechanics of procession and reversion, Proclus insists that the product is
similar to the cause (ET. 29) and even that the product remains in the cause and also
proceeds (ET. 30). Thus what comes second may rightly be described as the same thing as
the higher cause but at a lower level of actuality.
26
The connection with Proclus general metaphysics is made explicit in the vocabulary
of the passage from in Timaeum just quoted. In Elements of Theology, Proclus distin-
guishes three modes of existence or subsistence for each predicate: in a causal way (ko1
oi1iov); as that very quality (koO tropiv); and by participation (ko1o eOeiv).
This threefold distinction between ways of being or having a quality corresponds to the
ontological division between an unparticipated, transcendent Form, the participated form
and the quality in the participant.
27
So when he says that the earth that is present in the
heavens is there in a causal way while the fire here below is present by participation, he is
applying metaphysical principles that find employment elsewhere in his system to the
particular case at hand. The elements pre-exist (rpotropeiv) at the third level within
the hypostasis of Beingthat is, only a couple of doors down from the henads who
mediate between the One and all that comes after it (Platonic Theology III. 65, 22).
28
Proclus gives a brief account of the various levels at which the four elements exist in the
passage that immediately follows his solution to the question of the composition of
the heavens quoted above (in Tim. II. 44, 2447, 22). This section applies the general
274 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
26
This is, of course, a very compressed explanation of the complex account of procession in Proclus.
Cf. Lloyd (1990), chapter 4 for a more detailed, but nonetheless very accessible summary.
27
Festugire (196668) believes that in Timaeum puts the same points in somewhat different
vocabulary: ko1 oi1iov = existing primarily (rpu1u), while koO tropiv = as a whole
(koO oto1)). The shift in vocabulary would be natural since the mode koO tropiv is
correlated with the whole of parts (otov ek 1uv epuv), as well as with the status or order of
participated things (e1eoevo), cf. ET 67.
28
Siorvanes (op. cit.) catalogues the various ways in which the elements manifest themselves at
different levels within Proclus metaphysical hierarchy, pp. 2325.
principles of Proclus metaphysics of emanation to the case of the elements. He even
invokes empirical considerations in favour of this specific claim that the elements come in
a variety of gradations.
For light and flame are not the same thing, nor is flame the same thing as burning coal,
but from higher up there is a deterioration (toeoi) of fire down as far as Earth. It
proceeds from a more immaterial, purer and less corporeal condition until it gets to the
most fully enmattered and densely packed bodies. For there are even streams of fire
under the Earth, as Empedocles says at one point: beneath the surface of the earth
burn many fiery [streams] (DK, B52). Therefore we should not be amazed how it is
that the fire is not quenched even when it is in a liquid state (ev too1i). For all the
elements permeate (upei) one another, though what predominates in one thing is
different from what predominates in another (in Tim. II.8, 229, 3).
Of course, Proclus also invokes proof texts from the Orphic poems to support his
view of the decline of the elements through the various hypostases.
29
But we shouldnt let
what we would regard as methodological vices blind us to the presence of methodological
virtues. His use of the principles about deterioration and partial sameness in procession
parallels Aristotles use of the doctrine of natural place. In both cases the theorist employs
entities or principles that have other (allegedly) successful applications in his theory to the
particular problem at hand. Moreover, in both cases, these appeals are at least somewhat
connected to something that we can observein Aristotles case, fires tendency to go up
and in Proclus case, the diversity of things that are commonsensically regarded as kinds
of fire. Finally, we should note that Proclus theory of the various gradations in which the
elements exist provides him with an answer to Aristotles objection to those who make the
heavens contain a large quantity of fire. Proclus can reply that the fire up there is not like
the fire down here and it isnt hot. Thus there is no need to explain why everything down
here hasnt burned up.
IV. Proclus specific arguments against Aristotle
A. Opening moves
Proclus objections to Aristotles views on the composition of the heavens do not begin, as
one might expect, with his commentary on Timaeus 40a24the point at which Plato
says that the stars are made mostly of fire. Nor does it come up for explict discussion in
his commentary on 32b48 where he announces his own view. Rather, Aristotles view is
criticized even prior to this in the context of Proclus commentary on Timaeus 31b59. In
that lemma, Plato argues that the cosmos must be made from earth and fire since it was
generated and therefore is tangible and visible. Air and water will then be introduced as
Dirk Baltzly 275
29
Proclus and the neoplatonists use passages from the Rhapsodic Theogony in much the same way
that medieval commentators will use citations from the New or Old Testament. The justification is
that Pythagoras was instructed by Orpheus (Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 28,146). Plato, of
course, they thought of as another of the Pythagorean school. Somewhat ironically, the Orphic
Rhapsodic Theogony is a product of the Hellenistic period, though it doubtless incorporates earlier
material in the tradition.
the geometric mean terms that are needed to bind together two solids. In his commentary
on this, Proclus chooses to entertain a potential counter-example to the claim that the
presence of fire is a necessary condition of visibility.
But perhaps the marvelous Aristotle will contest our account and claim that not all
visible things are so through participation in fire, for the chorus of stars and the great
sun itself are not composed of fire even though they are visible (in Tim. II. 9,811).
Proclus response to this initial Aristotelian criticism is somewhat concessive. He
admits that there is an important difference between the fire we see here on Earth and the
fire in the heavens.
But one might respond to Aristotle by saying that enmattered fire is one thing but
immaterial fire is anotherthat is, it is immaterial because compared to the matter of
the things in the sublunary sphere it is immaterialand the one kind is perishable but
the other imperishable (in Tim II. 9,1114).
Since we have examined it first, we can see that this rather cryptic remark prefigures
Proclus positive solution to the problem. He will argue that the heavens are composed of
all four elements with fire predominating. In this respect he is true to Platos remark at
Timaeus 40a. But the elements are like almost everything else in Proclus metaphysics
they exist in different forms or gradations of being at different levels within the
metaphysical hierarchy of neoplatonism. Thus there is also ample reason to honour
Aristotles insight that the heavens are composed of materials that are importantly
different from the things that we are acquainted with here in the sublunary sphere. This,
however, is not the only way in which Proclus solution exploits Aristotelian ideas. The
passage at II.9,1114 invokes the idea that materiality is a question of degree. Aristotles
own distinction between form and matter is also a relative one: the bronze is matter for the
statue, but bronze itself is form in relation to some further level of organization. Proclus
makes being material or enmattered a similarly relational concept. Thus he supposes that
it is not inconsistent to talk about space as an immaterial body capable of interpenetrating
all other bodies. This seems to be one end of the spectrum of materiality. At the other end,
we find the condition of the elements in the lower reaches of the Earth.
B. Criticizing competing theories
Proclus continues this line of thought by raising a puzzle for anyone who supposes that
there is some source of illumination other than fire.
And if someone were to say that the heavenly element is not fire, though it is visible
and capable of illuminating, we shall ask him from whence does the fire down here
(ev1otOo) derive this capacity?
30
For if each is such as to generate the light that
276 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
30
Philoponus also argues from the similarity of the powers of celestial and terrestrial bodies to the
conclusion that they are composed from the same elements. For there is perhaps no [quality]
observed in the things there that does not also belong to the terrestrial bodies (Against Aristotle on
the Eternity of the World fr. 59, Wildberg (1987)). However, Philoponus seems to regard the fire
that composes the heavens as the very same sort of stuff as the fire herenot as Proclus does, a
higher grade of fire.
enables perception, what reason could there be not to call each fire, though one be
without matter and the other enmattered? (I mean without matter or enmattered, as I
said before, distinguishing that kind [of matter] that stays forever in the same condition
and in its own proper form from the kind that is densest and doesnt retain forms) (in
Tim. II. 9, 2710,7).
Does this criticism tell against Aristotles theory? In some sense it should not. Aristotle
purports to explain both the heat from the Sun and the light from the stars and planets by
means of the fire sphere.
31
But one might well be sceptical about whether the explanation
works for the light of the stars, even if one was inclined to accept it for the heat of the
Sun. So Proclus might be supposing that a thoughtful Aristotle would admit that there are
other sources of light than fire. In fact, the second-century commentator, Alexander of
Aphrodisias, took this to be Aristotles view.
32
Invoking De Anima 418b1113, Alexander
claims that divine things themselves are an alternative to fire as a source of light.
Whoever the intended target isAristotle or heterodox Aristoteliansthe character of
the objection is interesting. Proclus implies that anyone who supposes that there is such an
alternative source of illumination multiplies theoretical entities beyond necessity. Proclus
himself avoids the problems associated with positing two different kinds of things with the
power to illuminate by opting instead to distinguish gradations within a single kind of
thingthe kind of fire here in the sublunary is a source of both heat and light, while the
purer gradation of fire above is a source of light only. As we noted in the previous section,
this is a specific application of a general strategy for explaining plurality and difference in
terms of procession and deterioration.
C. Meeting objections to your own view (1)
In the following passage, Proclus comes to grips with the specifics of Aristotles argument
in De Caelo I.2
Suppose Aristotle had heard what we have said and urged the following objection: how
is it that if there is fire in the heavens they are moved in a circle and not in a straight
line? We would have to respond to him by invoking Plotinus view that every simple
body, when it is in its proper place, either remains motionless or is moved in a circle
lest it depart from its proper place. For if it is moved in another fashion, it will either
no longer be in its own place or else it is not yet in its proper place (in Tim. II. 11,
2531).
The passage in Plotinus to which Proclus refers is Ennead II.2, On the movement of
heaven. Careful examination will show that Proclus is doing more than simply adopting a
response that Plotinus offers.
Dirk Baltzly 277
31
De Caelo II.7, 289b2021: The warmth and the light which proceed from them are caused by the
friction set up in the air by their motion.
32
Alexanders view is discussed by Simplicius in his De Caelo commentary at 442, 412. Ian
Mueller is translating this part of Simplicius commentary for Sorabjis Ancient Commentators on
Aristotle series. I am grateful to him and to Bob Sharples for their advice on this passage.
Why then does fire not stay still when it has come to heaven? It is, is it not, because the
nature of fire is to be in motion () otoi 1u rtpi ev kik)oei). So if it does not
move in a circle, going on in a straight line will dissipate it; so it must move in a circle.
But this is the doing of providence; rather, it is something in it which comes from
providence, so that if it comes to heaven it moves in a circle of its own accord (e
ot1ot). It seeks to go on in a straight line, but has no longer any place to go; for it has
no place beyond itself; this is the last. So it runs in the space it occupies and is its own
place; it came there not in order to stay still but to move. The centre of a circle
naturally stays still, but if the outside circumference stayed still it would be a big centre
(II.2.1, 2333, trans. Armstrong (1966)).
Plotinus discussion relies on the assumption that it is the nature of fire to be in motion.
But there is no argument in Plotinus for this assumption. Proclus, however, will provide a
theory of the elements that justifies this claim. Moreover, there are aspects of Plotinus
discussion that seem inconsistent. It is hard to tell whether the circular motion of the fire
in the heavens is an intrinsic feature of the fireas he suggests when he says that it moves
of its own accordor a result of the fact that it has run out of room to move in a straight
line.
33
Finally, the remark about the stationary circumference constituting a big centre just
seems misguided. Even if it were stationary, the circumference is not a single point, and
therefore is not a point equidistant from every point on the circumference. Plotinus may
have something less literal in mind, but taken at face value, the remark makes no sense.
Proclus may have taken some inspiration from this passage of Plotinus, or he may
simply refer to Plotinus since the neoplatonists generally like to appeal to previous
authorities in their commentaries. But he develops a position that adapts the idea of
essentially moving fire to an Aristotelian framework of natural place:
Since the heavenly realm is fiery of necessity, then if it moves, it moves in a circle.
Likewise for the earth: if it were moved, it would be moved in a circle in order that it
should not abandon its place in the middle. Whenever fire is carried upward, it is
carried upward because it was in an alien place; and the clod of earth is carried
downward for the same reason. Generally speaking, the movement of the elements in a
straight line results from their being in a position that is contrary to their natures. So it
is simply a mistake to say that when fire is moved straight up it is moved in
accordance with nature. For it is particularly in accordance with nature when it
occupies its proper place. But whenever it is carried to its proper place, it is so because
where it was earlier was contrary to its nature. When this is demonstrated it is then
obvious how it is that the heavenly fire, since it is moved, moves in a circleand so
there is no problem for Platos teaching on this point (in Tim II.11, 3112,12).
278 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
33
One suspects that Plotinus view is that the circular motion of the celestial fire is not intrinsic. It is
at least not explanatorily ultimate in Plotinus short essay. The circular movement of the fire in the
heavens is in response to the presence of Soul. If Soul stopped the fire too would stop (II.2.1,
445). Does this mean that the circular motion of fire is forced? If so, then this raises problems if
one accepts Aristotles premise that no forced motion can be eternal. Perhaps Plotinus would adopt
Alexanders position that the motion of the heavens is due to both Soul and also the nature of what
constitutes them. Cf. Simplicius, in Cael. 387, 519.
Clearly, there are also some affinities between this passage and Xenarchus claim that
when fire exists it moves in a circleit is only when it is in the process of becoming that it
moves in a straight line.
34
Proclus, however, adapts this line of argument to a revised
version of Aristotles own idea of natural place as a cause of natural motion. Moreover,
Proclus will confront the question of the difference between the natural motion of earth
and that of fire. Fire, when it is in its proper place, moves in a circle. What about earth? If
its motion in its natural place is different from that of fire, what explains this fact?
Nothing in either Plotinus or Xenarchus speaks to this question.
Note that Proclus says in the passage just quoted that if the Earth were moved in its
proper place, it would be moved in a circle (eirep ekivei1o, ktktu ov ekiv)O)).
There were different traditions on how to interpret Plato at Timaeus 40b9. On one reading,
Plato implies that the Earth turns on its axis. On another, there is no such implication.
35
Proclus is among those who do not accept the idea that Plato made the material Earth
rotate on its axis.
36
He is able to appeal to one of the three defining properties of the
element earth (which predominates here on Earth) in order to justify this claim. Fire, on
the other hand, is essentially such as to be in motion. In the next section we will examine
his theory of the elements and their essential properties.
D. Meeting objections to your own view (2)
Proclus initial response to Aristotles argument against the compostion of the heavens
from fire needs to be buttressed with a general theory of the elements. He needs some
justification for the claim that fire is essentially in motion and earth is essentially at rest.
He first attacks Aristotles theory of the elements and then articulates his own alternative.
Aristotles theory of the elements assigns two powers to each of the four elements.
However, it is worthwhile to consider Proclus arguments against one power theories as
a prelude to his attack on Aristotle because he develops the same themes throughout.
Some of those who provide physical theories grant a single power to each of the
elements: they give to fire heat, but to air coolness, to water dampness, but to earth
dryness. These theorists entirely stray from the truth. First because they destroy the
possibility of an orderly cosmos. For on the assumption that the elements have entirely
contrary powers, then unless there were something common between them, it would be
impossible for them to be harmonised with one another.
37
Next, the people who give
this kind of theory make the things that are most contrary right next to one another
Dirk Baltzly 279
34
Simplicius in Cael. 20, 24 ff and 40, 2022.
35
The various options are surveyed by Cornford (1957), 12034.
36
in Tim. III. 13344. For an excellent discussion of the Earths motion in Proclus, see Siorvanes
(1996), 3014. Siorvanes notes that there is a sense in which Proclus also endorses the view that
the Earth has axial rotation. Like every other heavenly body, the Earth has a soul and an intellect.
Souls have a variety of vehicles, depending on how deeply enmeshed they are with matter. We
humans, for instance, have three different shellsthe material body; the pneumatic or spiritual
body; and, at the furthest remove from gross matter, an astral or aetherial body. The Earth has the
highest form of vehicle: an astral or aetherial body. This kind of body is extremely tenuous,
luminous and seems to be related to the very highest form of fire found in the celestial region.
Though the Earths material body is stationary at the centre of the cosmos, its astral body revolves
(in Tim. III. 135,1420).
37
Cf. Aristotle Gen et Corr 330a3033.
the hot (fire) to the cold (air) and the wet (water) to the dry (earth). But it is necessary
to make things that conflict further away than things that are less alien to one another.
For such is the nature of opposites (in Tim. II. 37,1726).
In the next few lines Proclus describes Aristotles theory, but assigns his views to
Ocellus the Pythagorean. The reason for this is that there was a forgery from the
Hellenistic period allegedly by the pre-Socratic Pythagorean Ocellus which describes,
among other Peripatetic views, Aristotles theory of the elements. To appreciate Proclus
objection, it may be helpful to represent this theory in a chart:
Fire Hot + Dry
Air Hot + Moist
Water Cold + Moist
Earth Cold + Dry
Proclus first notes that such a theory gives a common power to some pairs of elements.
In this respect it makes better sense than the previous one. But by having at most one
common power and one different one, the Aristotelian/Ocellus theory is also unable to
explain the existence of an orderly cosmos:
[T]hey no more give them association than separation, but rather they have in equal
measure preached their conflict and harmony. But what sort of cosmos will result from
this? What sort of order will they have, since they are both most alien to one another
and not coordinate and at the same time most akin to one another and arranged
together? For they are in equal measure at war and at peace, and both establish and
dissolve communion in equal fashion. But if this communion is similarly destroyed and
implanted, the universe will no more be than not be (otoev ottov eo1oi ) otk
eo1oi 1o rov). (in Tim. II. 38,716.)
38
Next Proclus turns to Aristotles arrangement of the elements. Note that the natural
place of fire and that of earth are most distant from one another. But when we consider the
powers characteristic of the elements, earth is more opposed to air than it is to fire. After
all, it shares one power with firebeing drybut it shares no common power with hot
and moist air. Proclus concludes that this theory errs in making each extreme term more
opposed to some intermediate than it is to the opposite extreme. In all other cases, where
we have things in the same genus, the extremes are more opposed to one another than they
are to the intermediates. And, he adds, even if one were to reject the application of that
general principle to the specific case at hand, there would still be a puzzle about the
natural motions of earth and fire. By Aristotles lights, the natural motions of these two
elements are opposites: upward and downward. But how could it be that nature has
assigned them opposite motions and natural places farthest from one another if they arent
280 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
38
Proclus here uses a perfectly standard Platonic pattern of inference. If x is both F in some respect
and not-F in some other respect, then x is no more F than not F. Cf. Rep. 479b and Makin (1993).
by their very nature maximally opposed (in Tim. II. 38,1731)? Finally, Proclus alleges
that Aristotles own arguments require that fire and earth be contraries:
Aristotle also makes it clear that earth is contrary to fire, for, since he also wishes to
show how it is that it is necessary for there to be more than a single kind of body, he
says something like the following: but if there is earth it is also necessary that there
should be fire since if one of a pair of opposites exists by nature the other also exists by
nature.
39
So it turns out that Aristotle was not able to show that the elements are many
in any other way than by saying that fire is contrary to earth (in Tim. II. 39, 714).
D. Proclus own theory and the extension of mathematics
Proclus theory of the elements assigns three powers or properties to each element. The
assignment is based on Platos remarks about the elements in the Timaeus, especially at
56a. Plato notes that fire is more readily moved than the other elements and that it is such
as to cut things because of the sharpness of its pyramidal shape. It ranks first in fineness or
tenuousness and for this reason has permeated all things (58b). Taking his cue from this,
Proclus proposes the following correlation between powers and elements:
Fire tenuousness or smallness of
particles (ter1oepeio)
sharpness
40
(ot1))
easy mobility
(etkiv)oio)
(pyramid)
41
Air tenuousness or smallness of
particles
bluntness
(ott1))
easy mobility (octahedron)
Water density or thickness of
parts (rotepeio)
bluntness easy mobility (icosahedron)
Earth density or thickness of
particles
bluntness difficult to move
42
otokiv)oio
(cube)
Proclus justifies his three-power theory in this way:
[The powers are assigned this way] in order that each element may have in common
two powers with what is alongside it, but one difference, just as was shown in the case
of mathematical [solids] where the sides of the middle terms were derived from each of
the extreme terms [31, 27]. It is also assigned this way so that earth is arranged in an
opposite manner to fire with respect to all its powers, and so that the extreme terms
(fire and earth) have two middle terms and so do the ones that are next to one another
(i.e. air and water). The middles in the first case are solids themselves (i.e. the air and
Dirk Baltzly 281
39
As Festugire (196668) notes, this exact text is not to be found in any of the works of Aristotle
that we possess. He suggest that perhaps Proclus paraphrases Gen et Cor 330a48.
40
In particular of the acute angles in the pyramid-shaped fire particles in Timaeus 56d, 61e.
41
I have listed the regular solids that Plato assigns to each of the four elements, though Proclus does
not discuss them at this point in his commentary. I discuss the relevance of these shapes to the
powers of the elements in what follows.
42
Sometimes Proclus actually says immobility, okiv)oio. This too is a contrary of sorts to what is
easily moved.
water are middle terms between fire and earth), but in the second case the middle terms
are the powers that air and water have in common (i.e. bluntness and easy mobility)
(II. 39, 2440, 2).
The discussion of middle terms refers to Platos argument for the claim that the world
is composed of four elements (Timaeus 32a). Timaeus argues that since the Demiurge
wanted to make the cosmos both visible and tangible, it was necessary that there should be
both fire and earth in it. But, he says, there must also be two other elements in it if the fire
and earth are going to be combined through the best kind of bondthat of proportion or
analogia. Between planes a single middle term is sufficient to create proportion. But the
cosmos is three-dimensional, so we must have two middle terms.
For whenever of three numbers which are either solids or squares the middle term
between any two of them is such that what the first term is to it, it is the last, and
conversely, what the last term is to the middle, it is to the first, then, since the middle
term turns out to be both first and last, and the last and the first likewise turn out to be
middle terms, they will all of necessity turn out to have the same relationship to one
another, and, given this, will all be unified (Timaeus 31c532a7, trans. Zeyl).
Both Plato and Proclus speak of plane and solid numbers. This terminology evolved
from the Pythagorean practice of representing numbers spatially. A plane number is one
with two factors, corresponding to the sides of the gnomon by means of which it might be
represented. Thus Euclid vii, df. 16:
[W]hen two numbers multiplied together produce a third, the number so produced is
called plane (erireoo), and the numbers which were multiplied are called its sides
(rtetpoi).
So, for example, 6 is a plane number whose sides are two and three. A number that is
the product of three factors is called solid (o1epeo, Euc. vii, df. 17). Square numbers
are a species of plane numbers where the sides are equal. Naturally, the length of the side
corresponds to the square root of the number (df. 18). Oblong (rpo)k) or
e1epo)k)) numbers are those where the sides are not equal. 8 and 27 are examples of
cubic numbers and can be thought of as cubes with equal sides corresponding to their cube
roots (Euclid vii, df. 19).
Platos meaning in this passage has been the subject of debate. The translation either
solids (cubes?) or squares is a bit of interpolation from Platos stark ei1e okuv ei1e
otvoeuv. Heath argued that Plato intended to restrict the theorem to squares and
cubes.
43
If a
2
and b
2
are two square numbers, then a
2
: ab = ab : b
2
. But in the case of two
cubes a
3
and b
3
, a
3
: a
2
b = a
2
b : ab
2
= ab
2
: b
3
. This was thought by Heath and later
Cornford to be the force of Platos subsequent remark that between two planes a single
medium is sufficient, but between cubes two middle terms are needed. Both these
theorems are proved in Euclid (viii, 11 and 12).
282 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
43
Heath (1921), 297. See also Cornford (1957), 4352.
The matter is complicated because the same thing holds for similar planes and solids
(Euc. viii, 18 and 19). Planes and solids are similar when their sides are in proportion
(Euc. vii, df. 21). That is to say, if a b and c d are similar plane numbers, then a : c = b
: d. The same applies for the case of similar solid numbers. In this case, as length is to
length, so breadth is to breadth and height is to height.
44
Naturally squares and cubes are
all similar since their sides are exactly the same.
Throughout his discussion, Proclus assumes that Plato is here discussing the wider
category of similar planes and solids (II. 29,18 ff.). He provides a recipe for finding the
two terms that stand in continuous geometric proportion between similar solids. The
method can be easily illustrated in the case of cubes. Take two cubic numbers like 8 and
27. We want to construct a series of middle terms that will give us the geometric
proportion or analogia that Plato thinks is the perfect bond. In this sequence there will be
one middle term that is closer to 8 and one that is closer to 278, x, y, 27. Proclus
instructs us to determine the value of x by taking two sides from the closer extreme and
one side from the further extreme, i.e. 2 2 3 or 12. For y, we take two sides from 27,
but only one from 8, i.e. 3 3 2 or 18 (in Tim. II. 31, 2032, 2). These values give you a
series in which each term exceeds the next by one and a half times. Thus it satisfies
Platos condition for the perfect bond.
The procedure that Proclus gives us works in the case of similar solids that are not
cubes too. Take two merely similar solids like 12 (2 2 3) and 96 (4 4 6). (These
solids are similar since the length, breadth and height are all in the ratio 2:1.) The hitch
is that you can follow Proclus recipe for taking sides from each and generate numbers
that wont be in continuous geometric proportion. So, 16 and 72 each take two sides or
factors from the extreme closest to them and one from the extreme further away. But 12,
16, 72, 96 isnt a continuous geometrical proportion. Of course, Proclus recipe will also
cook up 24 and 48 which do.
Proclus argues that these features of solid numbers are manifested at the level of the
solid bodies that are the elements.
Suppose fire is tenuous, sharp and easily moved. . . . Therefore, since earth is the
contrary to fire, it will have the contrary powers: density, bluntness and immobility.
And surely we see all these things manifested in earth. This is a case of things that are
in conflict and moreover are solids and specifically similar solidsfor their sides and
powers will be in proportion; for as the dense is to the tenuous, the blunt is to the sharp
and the immobile is to that which is easily moved. But similar solids are the ones
whose sides and powers are in proportionor if you wish to put it in the physical
manner of speaking (ei ottei otoiku teeiv), similar bodies are the ones
where the powers that constitute those bodies are in proportion (in Tim. II.
39,1940, 2).
As in the case of the factors in similar solid numbers, the sides of the elements stand
in the same relation to one another. Each of the three powers that defines fire and earth are
opposites. This is the physical reflection of the mathematical requirement that similar
Dirk Baltzly 283
44
Theon of Smyrna, 37, 4.
solid numbers should have sides that are proportional.
45
As in the case of the continuous
geometric proportion between solid numbers, there are possible combinations of three
powers that are not represented in Proclus table of the four elements. Thus there is a
potential alternative to air that is dense which combines the tenuousness and sharpness of
fire with the immobility of earth. Another alternative form of air would combine the
sharpness and easy mobility of fire with the density of earth. Siorvanes claims that Proclus
supposes that there are actually no such elements because the shapes of the octahedron
and icosahedron assigned to air and water respectively rule out any of the triple combina-
tions of powers other than those that Proclus uses.
46
Among the methodological virtues that we noted in Aristotles discussion of the
composition of the heavens was that he tries to show that his theory extends the scope of
an established mathematical idea. In this respect, we can cite his claim that there are three
simple motions (up, down and in a circle) because there are three dimensions and, in
addition, two simple magnitudes: the line and the circle (Cael. 268b1826). Proclus
theory of the elements shows a similarindeed, a much more complex and convincing!
extension of the principles of mathematics into his physical theory. This theory of the
elements helps to justify his claim that fire is essentially such as to be in motion while
earth is essentially stationary. This, in turn, makes his response to Aristotles argument
about the natural motion of the heavenly bodies more convincing than the similar
responses of Xenarchus and Plotinus.
V. Conclusion: reconciling Aristotle with Plato
At the outset we noted that the neoplatonists generally like to portray Plato and Aristotle
as in agreement about most things. After these criticisms of Aristotles theory of the
elements and the composition of the heavens from the aether, Proclus finds a verbal
formula for showing that, deep down, Aristotle really agrees with Plato after all.
It is permissible to say both that there are four unmixed elements of everything, and
also that there are fivetaking, on the one hand, the whole heaven as one thing, on the
other taking the complete elements which are encompassed within the terrestrial
region. But the five elements are said to be elements of the cosmos, surely on account
of the fact that the cosmos has been constituted from them, while the four elements
count as the elements of each of these [five]. For the heavens are composed out of the
284 What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element
45
Proclus typically marks the way in which a thing is manifested at different levels of being by using
adverbs like otoiku or oO)o1iku (II. 20,19). One could just as easily translate in the
physical mode or in the mathematical mode.
46
Siorvanes (1996), 228. The difference between bluntness and sharpness corresponds to the facts
about whether the angles in the assigned solid figures are acute or obtuse. Siorvanes says that
tenuity or grossness (density) correspond to the size factor (p. 259, n. 40). Moreover, he thinks
that the facts about mobility depend upon the kind of triangle that the Platonic scheme uses to
compose the faces of the solids. (The cubes of earth have faces composed of half-squares, having
sides in the ratio 1, 1, 2, but the others are composed of half-equilateral triangles.) Thus only earth
can have the property of being not easily moved. My only reservation about this is the dependence
of tenuousness or density upon the size factor. If the half-equilaterials come in a variety of sizes,
as Cornford thought, then there could be air particles smaller than a given fire particle, in spite of
the fact that the former is composed of many more parts than the latter.
four, as is the realm of generation. Therefore, the heavens are a fifth substance
(otoio) besides these four elements, since it is a combination from the simple
elements (otik1o ov1o ek 1uv ortuv). For in the heavens the elements are not
the same [as they are here] but are rather the highest forms (oi okpo1)1e) of them
. . . (in Tim. II. 49,1929).
So if Aristotle means only to call attention to the fact that the heavenly bodies are very
different from the elements that we are acquainted with down here, then he will be in
agreement with both Plato (II. 49, 30) and the truth (50, 2). But having made this
concession, Proclus again emphasises the fact that not all fire is alike and repeats the
importance of appealing to all four elements to explain the diversity that appears in the
sky above us.
Therefore we shall neither grant that all earth is heavy, nor that all fire is light, but
instead we may admit that perhaps the sublunary grades of these elements are such as
this, but the earth and fire in the heavens exist in a different manner (1porov e1epov
eo1iv). For the solidity and stability up there are derived from earth. Accordingly each
of the spheres is moved in respect of the whole of itself. But the light and the ease of
movement [enjoyed by the heavenly spheres] are derived from fire; the connective
capacity (1o otvek1ikov) and transparency are due to air; and the level and smooth
character is due to water (in Tim. 50, 522).
Proclus is polite and the fig leaf that he offers Aristotle is perhaps big enough to do the
job. But there can be no doubt that Proclus disagrees. In the context of his lectures on the
Timaeusthe equivalent within the neoplatonic school of the advanced post-graduate
seminarhe is relatively open about saying so. What I have tried to show is that the
grounds for his disagreement are better than some might expect from him and that they
deserve fuller recognition as one of the high points of ancient Greek natural philosophy.
47
Monash University Received: March 2001
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