1

Property Management crisis in Muslim organizations

and its impact on the economic prospects of the
Muslim Ummah: The Case study of the Uganda
Muslim Supreme

By

Kasumba Yusuf
M.A. )MUK, B.A. Educ )Hons, IUIU, CEM)AKU
Lecturer, Faculty of Arts and Social Science
Islamic University in Uganda

A Draft Paper Submitted To The Department Of Business

Administration, Kulliyyah Of Economics And Management
Sience At IIUM to be presented At A Conference to be held
at IIUM in May 2007.

October 2006
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Introduction

This paper seeks to put to light a fact that is ignored by many that in management there are no
detours. Even where such detours have been created by managers, such managers had hit a
dead end. We seek to identify the underlying challenges facing Muslim organisations that
have either been mismanaged or have stagnated owing to a crisis of expectations and
mediocre application of management principles or have collapse because non-managers were
charged with management tasks. Our focus will be on the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council,
the largest national organisation managed by Muslims in Uganda. Special interest is placed
on the quest for a paradigm regarding the impact of property management in the organisation
the Ummah in Uganda.

The estimation of this impact would be futile without the application of the cause – effect
models. While it is not contestable that the UMSC is hitherto limping in a management crisis,
it is not palpable as to what variables account for this debacle. This paper serves a three-
dimensional purpose. First, it seeks to establish the root cause of the problem. Here upon the
biggest cause of the problem undoubtedly remains management deficiency. Management of
property poses a threat to the core existence of the UMSC today.
Thirdly our thesis is that the failure to effectively manage the property, personnel and
financial resources of the UMSC has yielded far-reaching consequences to the Muslim
Ummah. This has subjected the Ummah to not only a regrettable predicament but also public
ridicule. This paper also gives an insight on why many muslim organisations, that start well
end up in managerial crises.

Historical back ground

The Uganda Muslim Supreme Council was established in 1972 following more than half a
century of Muslim factionalism and marginalisation in all sectors of national life. The main
goal of the establishment of the UMSC was to provide an umbrella body that would not only
unite Muslims of Uganda, form a common voice for them but also strive to improve the
welfare of the Ummah. Its foundation though, provided a scenario of both a golden
opportunity and a missed opportunity.
The golden nature of the opportunity lay in the following areas.
 For the first time in the colonial and postcolonial Uganda, Muslims seemed to be
moving towards organic solidarity. There were now looked at as a cohesive body.
 The revolutionary manner in which the UMSC was formed revealed the revolutionary
trait of the Muslim Ummah in Uganda. It symbolised a united and strong force envied
by both its friends and adversaries.
 The formation of the UMSC meant that the Muslim community was poised for
recovery of the opportunities it had lost in the political sector during the 70 years of
colonial domination and marginalisation and a decade of post colonial political
neglect.
 The council would be a big booster to the development and general welfare of the
Muslim community.
 The fact that it was intended to eliminate religio-political factiionalism, the UMSC
had provided the Ummah with a great leap forward to rejuvenate Muslim identity and
respectability.
 Its formation had provided the community with a chance to exercise a smooth
transition from chaotic and mediocre to modern management systems.
 For the first time, Muslims had seized a chance to manage a national institution
without biased, retrogressive and suspicious supervision of non-Muslims as had been
the case before.
 Most importantly, the UMSC had by 1975 became the biggest property landlord in
the country. This owes to the enormous donations and income generating assets that
the UMSC possessed by their (See Kasumba 1995, Kasozi 1987, Kokole 1997 and
Kanyeihamba 1998).
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However, inspite of the above opportunities cum achievements, the UMSC foundation,
operation, transformation and decay symbolised a missed opportunity for the Muslims of
Uganda (Kiyimba 1990). The reflection of this missed opportunity revolves around the
notion that the performance balance sheet of the UMSC is historically skewed to liability. It
further exposes the erroneous thought of Muslims failure to manage not only their affairs but
also their resources. Two arguments will suffice to manifest this scenario as a missed
opportunity.

The foundation of this UMSC provided the Muslim Ummah with managerial, administrative
and functional unity. However from the onset of its foundation it was clear that the unity
registered was simply a form of forced unity or mechanical solidarity (Mazrui 1967). The
works of Kasozi (1987, 1997) Kaliisa (1994) Sekinalya (1994) and Batambuzi (1994) show
that this unity was only dictated by the president of Uganda. Besides the factions that were
coerced to unite were either unwilling or reluctant to do so. This later posed threats to the
administration of the organisation.

A conglomerate organisation that is born out of duress or undue persuasive amalgamation of

institutions is more likely to be prone to management cracks, sabotage, collapse or anti-
systemic performance. This is based on the fact that attachment to the conglomerate – by the
personnel - takes a gradual and evolutionary process. On the other hard detachment from old
forms of institutional identity for the now amalgamated members takes a long time to be
erased. In the context of the UMSC; this situation was reflected in two ways.
i. Some of the leaders of the old factions such as Prince Badru Kakungulu of UMC and
Yaid Mugenziasooka of AMC )Afican Muslim Community) Chose to distance
themselves from the new body. They either retired or encouraged their follower to
continue owing allegiance to the old factions (Kasumba (1995 and Kiyimba,
1990:101).
ii. Secondly old factional politics remained at play inthe election of executives, and
members of the general assembly. This later affected the management of the council.
This management loophole inflicted trepidation on three parties. The first party was the
UMSC itself. In hardly 4 years of its formation, the pioneer administration of the council had
been booted. The second party to suffer were one old factions. For they neither came back to
life, nor continued to progress (As was the case of AMC which remained only in name). The
third and most important party that was affected was the Muslim Ummah in Uganda. The
Ummah was in a crisis of expectations and looked quite helpless as the cherished and
anticipated fruits of the organisation were never reaped.

Another reflection of a missed opportunity lay in the manner in which the UMSC amassed
property and the manner in which this property was managed. At the initial stage the UMSC
management of its resources was marred by the fact that the property obtained the UMSC in
the first 5 years was quite enormous. The estate included several plots of land, factories
houses, and donations. All these assets had either been granted by government the Arab
donors or Asian Muslims who had been expelled by Idi Amin in 1972.
In addition, the enormity of this wealth not withstanding, the rate at which it was obtained
was astounding. In other words, it became incidental and abrupt wealth. The above factors
posed one fundamental problem. The Muslim managers were quite unprepared for this
volume of property. In here lies the genesis and nexus of the property management crisis in
which the UMSC is entangled to date.

The roots of management crisis

We have already hinted on the problem and partly what caused it. We now turn attention to
the explanation of situations that robbed the Muslim Ummah of the opportunity to effective
manage an institution (UMSC) that was envisaged to lead them to the promised land in
managerial, organisational and welfare sectors.

(a) Managerial and management problems

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Our argument will rotate around Philip Selkinchi’s management appeal “Let the
managers manage”
The biggest flaw in the institutionalisation and operationalisation of the UMSC has
been a management flaw. From the onset o the UMSC it was prudent to observe the
that the Council would register limited success because non-managers were allowed to
manage an institution of its magnitude. From 1972 to date the UMSC has been
managed majorly by either non-managers or bad managers. A perusal through the
qualifications of the founder executive of the Council and the subsequent administrative
teams, reveals that the majority of the top brass lacked the basic qualifications and
qualities to manage the UMSC.
This situation not only rendered the management of the UMSC ineffective but also the
“managers” incompetent. Even in isolated cases were professionals were appointed to
some positions, their input was submerged under dominant incompetent teams.
This argument falls in line with Peter Druckers thought that competent managers will
always be outwitted by incompetent managers in a weak administrative system.
A weak administrative system becomes a favourable playing field for the incompetent
to thrive. This partly explains why such incompetent managers have eclipsed the
running of the UMSC for 34 years with changes only appearing in outfit but not in
essence or level of efficiency.

However, more often than not, weak administrative systems are also fragile. In many
institutions the incompetent managers don’t thrive for long before they are exposed.
Consequently either the management collapses as individuals or collapse with the
institution altogether.
In private organisations the gestation period for incompetence is shorter compared to
public or community organisations like the UMSC. This partly explains why, even
after being exposed, the inefficient and incompetent management at the UMSC has
lingered.

(b) Structural problems

However it is not only to the bad managers that we attribute the woes of UMSC. The
organisational morphology of the UMSC itself poses management threat to the body.
The UMSC is a unique Muslim institution. It would be plausible to manage the council
or its assets on purely Islamic principles. In a secular environment of Uganda, such
principles such as Shura, interest-free Musharaka and Mudaraba principles would be
greatly impeded (Serwanga 2002). The UMSC has used blend of Islamic and western
management principles. The problem with the UMSC organisational format is that it
has allowed its managers to consider themselves as both religious and technical
managers. This has reached a crisis level when;
(i) Religious leaders delve into technical management when they are not only
unqualified but also incompetent.
(ii) Managers invoke religious ideals in matters of technical management.
(iii) Managers revoke religious principles in a bid to apply secular technical
management.

This two worlds notion, as Lord Snow (1969) called it, provides limited situations for a
confluence of the two approaches. Very often, in the adoption of the three alternatives
above, the managers have become more ineffective. Kasozi (1987) for instance,
mentions that in many cases sheiks objected to simple financial regulations like signing
vouchers for the monies they received.

(c) Constitutional and procedural contradictions

One of the biggest loopholes exploited by bad management of UMSC has been its
constitution. The UMSC constitution bred a vacuum of clarity in procedural issues and thus
made the UMSC prone to manipulation by its leaders. While the loopholes are many, this
writer isolates two areas in which the constitution failed the management of the council.
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i. In the initial stage of the UMSC, the constitution laid weak grounds for formulation of
procedures that would encourage the placement of the right people in the right offices.
The methodology for assumption of office was archaic and the opened doors for non-
professionals to dominate a body that can only be successfully managed by professionals.
For instance no particular professional qualifications were attached to the offices of the
Treasurer, Secretary General and Housing Department.

ii. The existence of allegorical administrative procedures bred a culture of no-

accountability checks, which cost the body colossal sums of money and vast among
of property. Property and cash lost is estimated to be about 7 billion shilling
according to the 2006 Probe Report. ( Also see www.ugandaobserver.com )

iii. The constitution was lax on the tenures of office for the managers. This nurtured a
culture of resistance to change, arrogance and complacency amongst the managers.

(d) The Property mismanagement saga

According to the probe commission report into the mismanagement of the property of the
UMSC published in September 2006, it is not known how much property was owned and lost
between 1972 and 2006.(See Probe Report 2006). This points two issues. One, access to
accurate information is deliberately restricted by the top management of the UMSC. Two,
there has been gross neglect on the proper management of estate records in the council.
What is documented though, is that the UMSC owned property that would keep afloat welfare
of the Muslims in Uganda. This included 12 acres of land on which the headquarters of the
UMSC stand, 16 plots of land in the prime sectors of Kampala city, 7 factories, rental flats
and houses (www.ugandaobserver.com ) a number of mosques, schools, 1 hotel, 2 Hospitals 6
ranches Buganda (probe report 2006) and cash donated from government of Uganda and the
Arab World.
The statistical presentation of property owned by UMSC is beyond the stage of this paper.
However, our main concern is the manner in which this estate had been managed over the
years. We also concern ourselves with the causes and effects of this property mismanagement.
The management of the UMSC robbed the Muslim Ummah of the right to benefit from this
real estate in numerous perspectives.
To begin with the non-professional manner in which the property was administered was a
betrayal to the Muslim community.
• Although property was legally registered it was not put to proper custody.
• Non-professionals like Haji Jalil Kiberu Twamulabirawo were assigned the task of
managing a section that demands a high level of integrity, managerial qualities,
qualifications and skills.
• The Muslim community was kept in the dark about the property owned, property
disposed of and property sold. Transparency became elusive from the inception, of
the council to-date.
• Poor management of property stifled the possibility of adding value in respect of
enabling property to generate more property or a steady income.
• Other sources of income of the council were not used to augment the volume, quality
and user value of the estate. These included foreign donations, internal donations
(Sadaq), government funding (1972 – 75) and Zakat.
The property management crisis prompted a situation of diminishing returns to the UMSC
and the community interests. Factors that signified or exacerbated the diminishing return
include, but are not limited to:
• Failure to effectively collect rent from the property. Many tenants often defaulted
because of the connection they had with the officials of UMSC.
• The houses owned by the council degenerated because of lack of proper maintenance.
• In the 1990’s a number of properties were mortgaged and lost in a bid to offset debts
and other liabilities. For instance the housing estate at Najjanankumbi near Kampala
city was lost in such dubious circumstances. (See ‘The New Vision 23/8/2006).
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• The political protection enjoyed by the management over the years,in addition to
inner circle racketeering, explain why only 3 probe commissions have been appointed
in period of 34 years yet still only one probe commission findings have been made
public.
• In the 1970’s and 80’s and 90’s there was grossly no proper accountability for either
funds generated from the estates or external and internal donations
• Enormous swindling of funds generated from properties of the UMSC. I have argued
else where (Kasumba 1995) that owing to enormous embezzlement of funds the
UMSC was in the 1980’s literally reduced and ridiculed to mean Uganda Muslim
Stealing Company.
• The acme of the diminishing returns was in 1992 when the then Mufti Sheik
Luwemba allowed a move by government to encourage repossession of UMSC by the
alleged Asian owners. It is on record though that much of the property repossessed
had either been donated to the Muslim community by the departing Asians in 1972, or
had been compensated for by the government.

The year 2006 marked the explosure of the biggest property management crisis in the
UMSC. Unlike other politically oriented schismatic scandals that hit the council in the
past (see Kanyeihamba, 1998) the 2006 crisis was unique. It involved problems in
management of property which the UMSC own in trust on behalf of the Muslim
community in Uganda.
It occurred to the Muslim community that the top management of the UMSC had by
commission misappropriated property worth millions of dollars in shoddy sale. The
community construed this as a breach of trust from the UMSC management and sought
for measures that would lead to the truth. Bowing to public pressure the UMSC
appointed a commission of inquiry to probe the sale and mismanagement of the UMSC
estate. The scandal posed a host of questions and put that muslim community in a catch
twenty-two situation.

(i) First, the Ummah seemed to have lost faith in the Mufti and his management team
for misappropriation of funds.
(ii) Second, there were allegations that several properties of the Ummah had been
irregularly sold. These were not unfounded.
(iii) There was public disgust with the management style of this Mufti.
(iv) Speculation was high that other assets ( liquid and fixed) of the UMSC had been
either embezzled or misused. This had not been established.
(v) There was need to examine the intensity of the loss that the property
mismanagement had caused the council.
(vi) Influence peddling was suspected to have been at play since the Vice Chairman of
the council, Hassan Basajjabalaba, had been involved in several other dubious
business scandals. This created a feeling that the Vice Chairman’s conduct in and
outside the council tainted the image of the Muslim community.
(vii) The Ummah was apprehensive about to recover lost property.

The appointment probe commission was a response to facts and suspicion that raged on
for three years that public property was being mismanaged by individuals in the
council.
It was alleged, and rightly so, that the UMSC has sold – plots of land located within
prime areas of the city. These included plot, 23, 32, 102 and 104 on William Street, a 2
factories Brush and Envelop (sold at 78 million in 1998 after 2.3b had been sunk in
from Saudi Arabian donation). The suspicion had unfolded as a truism long before the
2006 Probe committee. The UMSC had earlier in 2003 appointed another commission
of inquiry into fraudulent sale of property by some officials at UMSC. This
commission, led by Hajj Jingo Kaaya submitted a report to UMSC but no revelations
were made public. Besides, the UMSC had also filed intention to sue its Chairman,
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Adrama, Secretary General and 5 other parties for fraud. (see draft of Civil Suit 2004,
UMSC Vs Adrama M.A and others)

(e) Political overloadship

Another blot in the face of UMSC management has been failure to disengage itself
from political overloadship of the central government. This overloadship has a history.
The UMSC’s foundation was done under the political guidance of then the then
President of Uganda Amin Daada.

The methods and the political intentions for which the organisation was founded largely
explain its failure in management orientations. Its foundation sought to achieve three
political goals. First, it was intended to partly cultivate a political constituency which
the military government lacked but needed badly (Kokole 1993). Secondly its
formation was a method of resolving politico-religious conflicts that had factionalised
the Muslim community. (Kanyehaimba (1998), Kakungulu and Kasozi (1977) and
Kiyimba 1990). Thirdly its formation seems to have been a political ploy to bring into
being a scapegoat organisation to access funding from the Arab world, which Amin
desperately wanted.

The crisis unfolds itself in the failure to professionalise Muslim leadership. What is
important here is to identify the manifestation of political intervention and its impact on
the management of Muslim affairs.
Seeds of government interference were also sown by the big donations that government
expended to the UMSC in the 1970s. A body dependent on government to grow was
likely to be vulnerable to government manipulation. What has been witnessed over the
years, is increasing government grip on Muslim management. The Amin regime hired
and fired managers at the UMSC at will and with no regard to constitutional procedure.
A case in point was in 1975 when the Mufti Sheikh Abdulrazak Matovu was fired by
the President and replaced by Sheikh Yusuf Sulaiman Matovu. (Kanyehamba 1998: 20).

Successive governments have extended this grip mainly through political halo effect,
manipulation of electoral processes and factionalising the Muslim Ummah (Kasumba
2003). The NRM government continues to interfere in the affairs of the Muslims. For
instance it has on three ocassions attempted to broker muslim unity to ensure that its
favoured persons are at the helm of UMSC administration (Kanyehamba 1998: 36.-44).
What is surprising is that some NRM leaders such as Col. Kahinda Otafiire, the
Minister for Lands (until 2006) have been implicated in racketeering in the sale of
UMSC properties. (See The New Vision 23rd August, 2006). Surprising also is the
fact that the current Government shields the persons implicated in the graft at UMSC.
(See The New Vision 12th October, 2006 ) www.newvision.co.ug .
However, we need to emphasise here that the effect of political overloadship has been
detrimental to the development of UMSC and the Muslim Ummah at large.
In a situation where leaders are appointed by government, their allegiance is owed to
government and not the Ummah.

A similar outcome has been seen in scenarios where UMSC managers have either
sought alliance with government or sought protection from government. This has
allowed such managers to enjoy the privilege of mismanaging property and affairs of
the Muslim community with impunity. In some cases, UMSC administrations have
fallen with deposed regimes.

(f) Corruption:
It is not easy to estimate how much of the UMSC funds have been misappropriated. However,
Semuju Nganda, a columnist of the Weekly Observer puts the figure to 7 Bilion Shillings
(3.83 million US Dollars). The accuracy of the figure not withstanding, the accusations and
counter accusation among UMSC leaders in the 1980’s and 1990’s reveal beyond doubt that
the institution had been turned into an enclave for corrupt managers.
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What is intriguing that the corrupt officials have participated in Muslim leadership affairs
continuously by shifting alliances.
Corruption in the UMSC is bred basically by lack of proper auditory culture. This is
precipitated by lack of transparent appraisal systems and frequent acrimonious changes in the
UMSC administration.
Besides, most of the officials at UMSC purport to work for the UMSC as a community
service and not as a career or a job that requires efficiency, honesty and effectiveness.

g) Factionalism
Religious factionalism in Uganda has also been responsible for abetting graft in the UMSC.
The Body has been manned by different factional leaders. Sometimes the Muslim community
has got polarised by parrarell UMSC administration. Due to frequent change in the
management at the UMSC, a culture of swindling funds has been rife. This owes to the fact
that, a reigning administration would never be sure of the longevity of its stay in office. This
situation breeds lack of commitment to safe guarding the property of the institution. Besides
parrarrel administration claimed legitimacy, tenants and other property users would abuse it.
Rent payment and collection becomes a problem. Generally, property management under a
factious environment can hardly yield dividends.

Implications To Muslim Communities In Uganda

The crisis at UMSC which revolves around leadership, and property management has
enormous implications to the Muslim Ummah.
 From the ethical point of view, the Muslim leaders have lost credibility to be in
leadership or to act as custodians of the community property.
 The UMSC has remained embroiled in structural challenges for 34 years. The
management, bad, incompetent, corrupt or disgraced seems to favour the status quo.
For instance the un-professionalisation of the UMSC is a deliberate attempt to
encourage the non managers to manage the affairs of the Muslims.
 The delicate situation of the council can not visualize survival beyond their
attachment to UMSC. In other words, the UMSC has become an instrument of
livelihood to a section of Muslim leadership.
 The structural loop-holes in the UMSC have shaped a detestable organizational
behaviour. A culture of lack of accountability to the Ummah . This has also been
encouraged by low levels of donor follow-up and checks and balances to
ensure that donor funds are put to proper use.
 The Muslim Ummah has been affected by apathy. Many Muslims have lost
trace and interest in the UMSC affairs.
 The general assembly, the would-be watch dog to the excesses of the
executive rarely meets. By October 2006 the assembly had not met in a period
of 2 ½ years.
 In an administrative system where periodical appraisal systems are lacking
the incompetent will continue to sink the largest Muslim managed
organisation in Uganda to bankruptcy and decay.
 From the economic view point, the poor management of UMSC has stifled the
development of the Ummah is numerous ways. The Zaka institution which is
supposed to be the main lifeline of a Muslim community is virtually dead. The
Muslims are reluctant to pay Zaka because of accountability problems at the
UMSC. Other Muslims still pay Zaka but not to the council but to Imams they
trust or directly to the poor.

The implication of this is that development planning at National level based on Zaka
funds remains stifled
 In connection to the above, the village Imams have become increasingly
reluctant to collect Zaka. This is either because of lack of a clear Zaka
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collection programme or because of the absence of a trickle down effect from

the Headquarters of UMSC to village mosques.

 The consequent situation is that because the Imams were not transformed into
a Salariat, reluctance to collect Zaka or remit it to the UMSC headquarters has
increased.
 In addition to UMSC has found it difficult to enforce the collection,remittance
and redistribution of Zaka funds because most mosques were built and are
managed by individual groups almost independent of the council.
 The awareness of graft in the council among the Muslim Uganda has created
great discontent. The Muslim community is now threatened with a re-birth of
factional divisions a situation that is not health.
 In an attempt to clear its name, the UMSC has resorted to intimidation and
insinuation. For instance, the Mufti of Uganda Sheik Mubajje, in defending
his position alleges that the parties that have come out to criticize the
incompetence of his administration belong to a rebel group ADF (Allied
Democratic Front) which seeks to oust the government of Uganda. In addition
he has alleged that his critics recruit Muslims of Uganda into the ranks of Al
Qaeda.

 The general welfare of Muslims no doubt will remain pathetic as long as graft
reigns at the help of Muslim Leadership.
 Owing to incompetence and lack of accountability, donor funding has greatly
fizzled over the years.

Conclusion
Property management remains a challenge in both secular and religious organisations.
However, in the case of Uganda, the mismanagement of the UMSC is reflective of the
challenges facing many Muslim managed institutions.
Prima facie, property management does not strike an unsuspecting or uninformed
person as being a crucial aspect of management. Far from that, in institutional that
have assets to manage, either in trust or otherwise, property management should be a
central and pivotal aspect of institutional morphology and administration. Only
honest and competent persons should be asked to manage property. Its sensitivity is
equivalent to the sensitivity of human resource management. Only managers should
mange, especially if the organisation owes its existence to a community.
Acclimatisation should not be used as a n excuse to mismanage property held in trust.
In the Ugandan situation, bad managers have formed a cocoon that is hard to break
even after being exposed. Managers sometime usurp powers and authority that does
not fall within their realm. This is based on a management thought that no one grants
authority. And that managers grant or deprive themselves of authority because of their
management style. The situation in the UMSC is appalling. It is bound to leave the
Muslim community helpless, hopeless, hapless, weak and poor. It is therefore
imperative to do the needful. Prosecution of corrupt managers, relieving the
incompetent managers of their duties, professionalisation of the management of the
UMSC, inculcating a culture of accountability to the Ummah, renewed and steadfast
public appraisal of the performance of Muslim leaders are not only demanding now
but also require immediate attention if at all the Muslim community in Uganda is to
save what remains of the smouldering edifice called Uganda Muslim Supreme
Council.
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