Outline

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CSc 466/566 Computer Security

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7 : Cryptography Public Key

Version: 2012/02/15 16:15:24 Department of Computer Science University of Arizona

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collberg@gmail.com Copyright c 2012 Christian Collberg

Christian Collberg
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Introduction

Introduction RSA Algorithm Example Correctness Security GPG Elgamal Algorithm Example Correctness Security Die-Hellman Key Exchange Die-Hellman Key Exchange Example Correctness Security Summary
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History of Public Key Cryptography

Public-key Algorithms

Denition (Public-key Algorithms) RSA Conference 2011-Opening-Giants Among Us:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mvOsb9vNIWM&feature=related

Public-key cryptographic algorithms use dierent keys for encryption and decryption. Bobs public key: PB Bobs secret key: SB EPB (M ) = C DSB (C ) = M DSB (EPB (M )) = M

Rivest, Shamir, Adleman - The RSA Algorithm Explained:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b57zGAkNKIc

Bruce Schneier - Who are Alice & Bob?:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BuUSi_QvFLY&feature=related

Adventures of Alice & Bob - Alice Gets Lost:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nULAC_g22So http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJB7a79ahGM

Introduction

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Introduction

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Public Key Protocol

Public Key Encryption Protocol. . .

Key-management is the main problem with symmetric algorithms Bob and Alice have to somehow agree on a key to use. In public key cryptosystems there are two keys, a public one used for encryption and and private one for decryption.
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Alice

Bob

Alice and Bob agree on a public key cryptosystem. Bob sends Alice his public key, or Alice gets it from a public database. Alice encrypts her plaintext using Bobs public key and sends it to Bob. Bob decrypts the message using his private key.
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plaintext

encrypt PB

ciphertext

decrypt SB

plaintext

Eve

Introduction

Introduction

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Public Key Encryption: Key Distribution

Bob SB , PB

A Hybrid Protocol
In practice, public key cryptosystems are not used to encrypt messages they are simply too slow. Instead, public key cryptosystems are used to encrypt keys for symmetric cryptosystems . These are called session keys , and are discarded once the communication session is over.
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Alice SA , PA

PA , PB

PA , PC

PB , PC PA , PD

PB , PD

Bob sends Alice his public key. Alice generates a session key K , encrypts it with Bobs public key, and sends it to Bob. Bob decrypts the message using his private key to get the session key K . Both Alice and Bob communicate by encrypting their messages using K .
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Carol SC , PC PC , PD

Dave SD , PD

Advantages : n key pairs to communicate between n parties. Disadvantages : Ciphers (RSA,. . . ) are slow; keys are large
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Introduction

Hybrid Encryption Protocol. . .

Outline
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Alice

Bob

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encrypt PB

EPB (K )

decrypt SB

encrypt K

EK (M )

decrypt K

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Introduction 9/83 RSA

Introduction RSA Algorithm Example Correctness Security GPG Elgamal Algorithm Example Correctness Security Die-Hellman Key Exchange Die-Hellman Key Exchange Example Correctness Security Summary
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RSA

RSA: Algorithm

Bob (Key generation):

Generate two large random primes p and q . Compute n = pq . Select a small odd integer e relatively prime with (n). 4 Compute (n) = (p 1)(q 1). 5 Compute d = e 1 mod (n).
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RSA is the best know public-key cryptosystem. Its security is based on the (believed) diculty of factoring large numbers. Plaintexts and ciphertexts are large numbers (1000s of bits). Encryption and decryption is done using modular exponentiation.

PB = (e , n) is Bobs RSA public key. SB = (d , n) is Bob RSA private key.

Alice (encrypt and send a message M to Bob):

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Get Bobs public key PB = (e , n). Compute C = M e mod n. Compute M = C d mod n.

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Bob (decrypt a message C received from Alice):

1

RSA

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RSA

RSA: Algorithm Notes

RSA Example: Key Generations

Select two primes: p = 47 and q = 71. Compute n = pq = 3337. Compute (n) = (p 1)(q 1) = 3220. Select e = 79. Compute d = e 1 mod (n) = 791 mod 3220 = 1019

How should we choose e ?

It doesnt matter for security; everybody could use the same e . It matters for performance: 3, 17, or 65537 are good choices.

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n is referred to as the modulus , since its the n of mod n. You can only encrypt messages M < n. Thus, to encrypt larger messages you need to break them into pieces, each < n. Throw away p , q , and (n) after the key generation stage. Encrypting and decrypting requires a single modular exponentiation.

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P = (79, 3337) is the RSA public key. S = (1019, 3337) is the RSA private key.
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RSA

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RSA

RSA Example: Encryption

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RSA Example: Decryption

Encrypt M = 6882326879666683. Break up M into 3-digit blocks: m = 688, 232, 687, 966, 668, 003
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Decrypt each block:

d m1 = c1 mod n

Note the padding at the end. Encrypt each block:

e c1 = m1 mod n

= 15701019 mod 3337 = 688

= 68879 mod 3337 = 1570 We get: c = 1570, 2756, 2091, 2276, 2423, 158

RSA

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RSA

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In-Class Exercise: Goodrich & Tamassia R-8.18

In-Class Exercise: Goodrich & Tamassia R-8.20

Alice is telling Bob that he should use a pair of the form (3, n) Show the result of encrypting M = 4 using the public key (e , n) = (3, 77) in the RSA cryptosystem. or (16385, n) as his RSA public key if he wants people to encrypt messages for him from their cell phones. As usual, n = pq , for two large primes, p and q . What is the justication for Alices advice?

RSA

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RSA

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In-Class Exercise: Stallings pp. 270-271

RSA Correctness
We have C = M e mod n

M = C d mod n.
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Generate an RSA key-pair using p = 17, q = 11, e = 7. Encrypt M = 88. Decrypt the result from 2.

To show correctness we have to show that decryption of the ciphertext actually gets the plaintext back, i.e that, for all M<n C d mod n = (M e )d mod n = M ed mod n = M

RSA

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RSA

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RSA Correctness: Case 1

From the key generation step we have d = e 1 mod (n) from which we can conclude that ed mod (n) = 1 ed = k (n) + 1 Case 1, M is relatively prime to n: C d mod n = M ed mod n = M k (n)+1 mod n = M (M (n) )k mod n = M 1k mod n = M mod n = M
RSA 21/83

RSA Correctness: Case 1. . .

M (n) mod n = 1 follows from Eulers theorem. Theorem (Euler) Let x be any positive integer thats relatively prime to the integer n > 0, then x (n) mod n = 1

RSA

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RSA Correctness: Case 2

RSA Correctness: Case 2. . .

We have that (n) = (pq ) = (p )(q ) By Eulers theorem we have that

Assume that M is not relatively prime to n, i.e. M has some factor in common with n, since M < n. There are two cases:
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M k (n) mod q = M k (p)(q) mod q = (M k (p) )(q) mod q = 1 Thus, for some integer h M k (n) = 1 + hq Multiply both sides by M M M k (n) = M (1 + hq ) M k (n)+1 = M + Mhq

M is relatively prime with q and M = ip , or M is relatively prime with p and M = iq .

We consider only the rst case, the second is similar.

RSA

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RSA

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RSA Correctness: Case 2. . .

We can now prove Case 2, for M = ip : C mod n = M = M
d ed

RSA Security

Summary:
Compute n = pq , p and q prime. Select a small odd integer e relatively prime with (n). Compute (n) = (p 1)(q 1). 4 Compute d = e 1 mod (n). 5 PB = (e , n) is Bobs RSA public key. 6 SB = (d , n) is Bob RSA private key.
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mod n mod n

k (n)+1

= (M + Mhq ) mod n = (M + (ip )hq ) mod n = (M + (ih)pq ) mod n = (M + (ih)n) mod n = (M mod n) + ((ih)n mod n) = M mod n = M

Since Alice knows Bobs PB , she knows e and n. If she can compute d from e and n, she has Bobs private key. If she knew (n) = (p 1)(q 1) she could compute d = e 1 mod (n) using Euclids algorithm. If she could factor n, shed get p and q !

RSA

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RSA

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Security of Cryptosystems by Failed Cryptanalysis

RSA Security. . .

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Propose a cryptographic scheme. If an attack is found, patch the scheme. GOTO 2. If enough time has passed The scheme is secure! How long is enough?
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If we can factor n, we can nd p and q and the scheme is broken. As far as we know, factoring is hard. We need n to be large enough, 2,048 bits.

It took 5 years to break the Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem. It took 10 years to break the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem.

RSA

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RSA

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RSA Factoring Challenge

http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2093

RSA Factoring Challenge. . .

Name : RSA640 Digits : 193 310741824 04 9 00 4 37 2 13 5 07 5 00 3 58 8 85 6 79 3 0 03 7 34 6 02 2 84 2 72 7 54 5 72 0 16 1 94 8 82 320644051 80 8 15 0 45 5 63 4 68 2 96 7 17 2 32 8 67 8 2 43 7 91 6 27 2 83 8 03 3 41 5 47 1 07 3 10 8 50 1919548529 0 07 3 37 7 2 48 2 27 8 35 2 57 4 23 8 64 5 40 1 46 9 17 3 66 0 24 7 76 5 23 4 66 0 9

Name : RSA576 Digits : 174 188198812 92 0 60 7 96 3 83 8 69 7 23 9 46 1 65 0 43 9 8 07 1 63 5 63 3 79 4 17 3 82 7 00 7 63 3 56 4 22 988859715 23 4 66 5 48 5 31 9 06 0 60 6 50 4 74 3 04 5 3 17 3 88 0 11 3 03 3 96 7 16 1 99 6 92 3 21 2 05 7340318795 50 6 56 9 96 22 1 30 5 16 87 5 93 0 76 5 02 57 0 59

On December 3, 2003, a team of researchers in Germany and several other countries reported a successful factorization of the challenge number RSA-576. The factors are

39807508642 4 06 4 93 7 39 7 12 55 0 05 5 03 8 64 91 1 99 0 64 3 62 34252670840 6 38 5 18 95 7 59 4 63 88 9 57 2 61 7 68 58 3 31 7 47277214610 7 43 5 30 2 53 6 22 30 7 19 7 30 4 82 24 6 32 9 14 6 95 30209711645 9 85 2 17 11 3 05 2 07 11 2 56 3 63 5 90 39 7 52 7

The factoring research team of F. Bahr, M. Boehm, J. Franke, T. Kleinjung continued its productivity with a successful factorization of the challenge number RSA-640, reported on November 2, 2005. The factors are:

1634733645 80 9 25 3 84 8 44 3 13 3 88 3 86 50 9 08 5 98 4 17 8 36 7 00 3 30 9231218111 08 5 23 8 93 3 31 00 1 04 5 08 1 51 2 12 11 8 16 7 51 1 57 9 1900871281 66 4 82 2 11 3 12 6 85 15 7 39 3 54 1 39 7 54 7 18 9 67 8 99 68 5154936666 38 5 39 0 88 0 27 10 3 80 2 10 4 49 8 95 7 19 1 26 14 6 55 7 1

The eort took approximately 30 2.2GHz-Opteron-CPU years according to the submitters, over ve months of calendar time.
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RSA

RSA Factoring Challenge. . .

Name : RSA704 Digits : 212 740375634 79 5 61 7 12 8 28 0 46 7 96 0 97 4 29 5 7 31 4 25 9 31 8 88 8 92 3 12 8 90 8 49 3 62 3 2 63 8 97 276503402 82 6 62 7 68 9 19 9 64 1 96 2 51 1 78 4 3 99 5 89 4 33 0 50 2 12 7 58 5 37 0 11 8 96 8 0 98 2 86 733173273 10 8 93 0 90 0 5 52 5 05 1 16 8 77 0 6 32 9 90 7 23 9 63 8 07 8 6 71 0 08 6 09 6 96 2 5 37 9 34 6 50 5 63 7 96 3 5 9 Name : RSA768 Digits : 232 123018668 45 3 01 1 77 5 51 3 04 9 49 5 8 38 4 96 2 72 0 77 2 85 3 56 9 59 5 33 4 7 92 1 97 3 22 4 52 1 51 7 2 640050726 36 5 75 1 87 4 52 0 21 9 97 8 6 46 9 38 9 95 6 47 4 94 2 77 4 06 3 84 5 9 25 1 92 5 57 3 26 3 03 4 5 373154826 85 0 79 1 70 2 61 2 21 4 29 1 3 46 1 67 0 42 9 21 4 31 1 60 2 22 1 2 4 0 4 79 2 74 7 37 7 94 0 80 6 6 5 351419597459 85 69 0 21 43 41 3 Name : RSA896 Digits : 270 412023436 98 6 65 9 54 3 85 5 53 1 36 5 3 32 5 75 9 48 1 79 8 11 6 99 8 44 3 2 7 9 8 28 4 54 5 56 2 64 3 38 7 6 4 455652484 26 1 98 0 98 8 70 4 23 1 61 8 4 18 7 92 6 14 2 02 4 71 8 88 6 94 9 2 5 6 0 93 1 77 6 37 5 03 3 42 1 1 3 098239748 51 5 09 4 49 0 91 0 69 1 02 6 9 86 1 03 1 86 2 70 4 11 4 88 0 86 6 9 7 0 5 64 9 02 9 03 6 53 6 58 8 6 7 4337317208 1 31 0 41 0 51 9 08 6 4 25 4 79 3 28 2 60 1 39 1 25 7 62 4 03 3 94 6 37 3 26 9 39 1 Name : RSA1024 Digits : 309 135066410 86 5 99 5 22 3 34 9 60 3 21 6 2 78 8 05 9 69 9 38 8 81 4 75 6 05 6 6 7 0 2 75 2 44 8 51 4 38 5 15 2 6 5 106048595 33 8 33 9 40 2 87 1 50 5 71 9 0 94 4 17 9 82 0 72 8 21 6 44 7 15 5 1 3 7 3 68 0 41 9 70 3 96 4 19 1 7 4 304649658 92 7 42 5 62 3 93 4 10 2 08 6 4 38 3 20 2 11 0 37 2 95 8 72 5 76 2 3 5 8 5 09 6 43 1 10 5 64 0 73 5 0 1 508187510 67 6 59 4 62 9 20 5 56 3 68 5 5 29 4 75 2 13 5 00 8 52 8 79 4 16 3 7 7 3 2 85 3 39 0 61 0 97 5 05 4 4 3 34999811150 05 69 7 72 36 8 90 92 75 6 3

RSA Factoring Challenge. . .

Name : RSA1536 Digits : 463 184769970 32 1 17 4 14 7 43 0 68 3 56 2 0 20 0 16 4 40 3 01 8 54 9 33 8 66 3 4 1 0 1 71 4 71 7 85 7 74 9 10 6 5 1 696711161 24 9 85 9 33 7 68 4 30 5 43 5 7 44 5 85 6 16 0 61 5 44 5 71 7 94 0 5 2 2 2 97 1 77 3 25 2 46 6 09 6 0 6 469460712 49 6 23 7 20 4 42 0 22 2 69 7 5 67 5 66 8 73 7 84 2 75 6 23 8 95 0 8 7 6 4 67 8 44 0 93 3 28 5 15 7 4 9 657884341 50 8 84 7 55 2 82 9 81 8 67 2 6 45 1 33 9 86 3 36 4 93 1 90 8 08 4 6 7 1 9 90 4 31 8 74 3 81 2 83 3 6 3 502795470 28 2 65 3 29 7 80 2 93 4 91 6 1 55 8 11 8 81 0 49 8 44 9 08 3 19 5 4 5 0 0 98 4 83 9 37 7 52 2 72 5 7 0 525785919 44 9 93 8 70 0 73 6 95 7 55 6 8 84 3 69 3 38 1 27 7 96 1 30 8 92 3 0 3 9 2 56 9 69 5 25 3 26 1 62 0 8 2 3676490316 03 6 55 1 37 14 4 79 1 39 3 23 47 1 69 5 66 9 88 06 9 Name : RSA2048 Digits : 617 251959084 75 6 57 8 93 4 94 0 27 1 83 2 4 00 4 83 9 85 7 14 2 92 8 21 2 62 0 4 0 3 2 02 7 77 7 13 7 83 6 04 3 6 6 202070759 55 5 62 6 40 1 85 2 58 8 07 8 4 40 6 91 8 29 0 64 1 24 9 51 5 08 2 1 8 9 2 98 5 59 1 49 1 76 1 84 5 0 2 808489120 07 2 84 4 99 2 68 7 39 2 80 7 2 87 7 76 7 35 9 71 4 18 3 47 2 70 2 6 1 8 9 63 7 50 1 49 7 18 2 46 9 1 1 650776133 79 8 59 0 95 7 00 0 97 3 30 4 5 97 4 88 0 84 2 84 0 17 9 74 2 91 0 0 6 4 2 45 8 69 1 81 7 19 5 11 8 7 4 612151517 26 5 46 3 22 8 22 1 68 6 99 8 7 54 9 18 2 42 2 43 3 63 7 25 9 08 5 1 4 1 8 65 4 62 0 43 5 76 7 98 4 2 3 387184774 44 7 92 0 73 9 93 4 23 6 58 4 8 23 8 24 2 81 1 98 1 63 8 15 0 10 6 7 4 8 1 04 5 16 6 03 7 73 0 60 5 6 2 016196762 56 1 33 8 44 1 43 6 03 8 33 9 0 44 1 49 5 26 3 44 3 21 9 01 1 46 5 7 5 4 4 45 4 17 8 42 4 02 0 92 4 6 1 651572335 07 7 87 0 77 4 98 1 71 2 57 7 2 46 7 96 2 92 6 38 6 35 6 37 3 28 9 9 1 2 1 54 8 31 4 38 1 67 8 99 8 8 5 0404453640 2 35 2 73 8 19 5 13 7 86 3 65 6 43 9 12 1 20 1 03 9 71 2 28 2 21 2 0 7 2 03 5 7

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RSA

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RSA Security: How to use RSA

Outline
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Two plaintexts M1 and M2 are encrypted into ciphertexts C1 and C2 . But, RSA is deterministic! If C1 = C2 then we know that M1 = M2 ! Also, side-channel attacks are possible against RSA, for example by measuring the time taken to encrypt.

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6
RSA 33/83 GPG

Introduction RSA Algorithm Example Correctness Security GPG Elgamal Algorithm Example Correctness Security Die-Hellman Key Exchange Die-Hellman Key Exchange Example Correctness Security Summary
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Software GPG

Key generation: Bob

> gpg --gen-key

gpg is a public domain implementation of pgp. Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2
http://www.gnupg.org

Please select what kind of key you want: (1) RSA and RSA (default) (2) DSA and Elgamal (3) DSA (sign only) (4) RSA (sign only) Your selection? 1 What keysize do you want? (2048) Key is valid for? (0) Key does not expire at all Real name: Bobby Email address: bobby@gmail.com Comment: recipient You need a Passphrase to protect your secret key. Enter passphrase: Bob rocks Repeat passphrase: Bob rocks
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GPG

Key generation: Alice

> gpg --gen-key Please select what kind of key you want: (1) RSA and RSA (default) (2) DSA and Elgamal (3) DSA (sign only) (4) RSA (sign only) Your selection? 1 What keysize do you want? (2048) Key is valid for? (0) Key does not expire at all Real name: Alice Email address: alice@gmail.com Comment: sender You need a Passphrase to protect your secret key. Enter passphrase: Alice is cute Repeat passphrase: Alice is cute
GPG 37/83

Exporting the Key

> gpg --armor --export Bobby -----BEGIN GPG PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (Darwin) mQENBE83U28BCADTVOkHpNjWzk7yEzMhiNJcmOtmUYfn4hzgYTDsP2otI0UhfJ4q EZCuPoxECIZ479k3YpBvZM2JC48Ht9j1kVnDPLCrongyRdSko0AwG7OYAyHWa7/U SeGwjZ+0MUuM3SwqHdo1/0XS3P8LABTQNXtrQf9kF8UNLIaHr1IvBcae1K44MPL6 ................................................................ EBHmAM7iiWgWI6/6qEmN46ZQEmoR86vWhQL3LQ6p/FUaBA== =FZ78 -----END GPG PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

GPG

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Encryption
We can encrypt a message using Bobbys key:
> cat message Attack at dawn > gpg --recipient bobby --armor --encrypt message > cat message.asc -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (Darwin) hQEMA97v9lbZUpHvAQf/a9QklXMiMzBWy5yyZBtNrg7FcrIqx+gXVVUXNN86tZtE RF42elwU6QwamDzfcOHqp+3zeor4Y5xN+/pL91xti6uwFOhgGrCGJq//AfUKgQyk MH2e4gR8Y1BuPm9b1c7uzXxRMMOUBBt75KquYGOBLybsP29ttD9iL/ZJl1zSPjSj El7O0Gp7PqEBotStVOtuknYW/fX0zXndU8XNllKnsnZn21Xm0rMQcFMu8Do/tF5I lRfTEcL4S9tV4vshgXhNSpTg9sZs1UZynvU2cJqyYkCtgT7TdtrK3fTa8UN+CYQv U2QRnaNtFhYwBMonFqhefNzDqeZb+P0RqOuoDllYuNJRAViJ3CLjT7kwgBgRtNfY RkGArQQmgrknW2jq/Y2GZTE8CC7pNXY8U3KYMl9hRA6U5fMp08ndFp8vowBbB2sw zjxjSY7ZeIR2uwxdLYydtW4m =B+JA -----END PGP MESSAGE----GPG 39/83

Decryption

Bobby can now decrypt the message using his private key:
> gpg --decrypt message.asc You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: "Bobby (recipient) <bobby@gmail.com>" 2048-bit RSA key, ID D95291EF, created 2012-02-12 (main key ID 9974031B) Enter passphrase: Bob rocks gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID D95291EF, created 2012-02-12 "Bobby (recipient) <bobby@gmail.com>" Attack at dawn

GPG

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The keyring

The keyring. . .

> gpg --list-keys /Users/collberg/.gnupg/pubring.gpg ---------------------------------pub 2048R/9974031B 2012-02-12 uid Bobby (recipient) <bobby@gmail.com> sub 2048R/D95291EF 2012-02-12 pub uid sub 2048R/4EC8A0CB 2012-02-12 Alice (sender) <alice@gmail.com> 2048R/B901E082 2012-02-12

> gpg --list-secret-keys /Users/collberg/.gnupg/secring.gpg ---------------------------------sec 2048R/9974031B 2012-02-12 uid Bobby (recipient) <bobby@gmail.com> ssb 2048R/D95291EF 2012-02-12 sec uid ssb 2048R/4EC8A0CB 2012-02-12 Alice (sender) <alice@gmail.com> 2048R/B901E082 2012-02-12

GPG

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GPG

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Sign and Encrypt

Bob can sign his message before sending it to Alice:
> gpg -se --recipient alice --armor message

Check Signature and Decrypt

Alice can now decrypt the message and check the signature:
> gpg --decrypt message.asc

You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: "Bobby (recipient) <bobby@gmail.com>" 2048-bit RSA key, ID 9974031B, created 2012-02-12 Enter passphrase: Bob rocks > cat message.asc -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (Darwin) hQEMA7osp1S5AeCCAQgAsSqSs+Urf0f3KHTtP7cqTwugpcJ9oUAGkw/KQ0DHIE0v ................................................................ 8XEAaCwZ8aZK1lXhqBSd/9hCm9Mup2NECihO8crVyff7NTWFyaTBeGAm10q3y46o QpIgPbcdYZqIt8e/8wPU6xlMZUStzxBKLB+Rj/Zg35ZVioYL =oiv8 -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: "Alice (sender) <alice@gmail.com>" 2048-bit RSA key, ID B901E082, created 2012-02-12 (main key ID 4EC8A0CB) Enter passphrase: Alice is cute gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID B901E082, created 2012-02-12 "Alice (sender) <alice@gmail.com>" Attack at dawn gpg: Signature made Sat Feb 11 23:10:59 2012 MST using RSA key ID 9974031B gpg: Good signature from "Bobby (recipient) <bobby@gmail.com>"
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GPG

Symmetric Encryption Only

> gpg --cipher-algo=AES --armor --symmetric message Enter passphrase: sultana Repeat passphrase: sultana > cat message.asc -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (Darwin) jA0EBwMCgZ3PBfSZxJlg0ksBBooTMLEVQ2q9HkTR5y9FIoX9nbsyohrOXeQLFlcf wtWcg+dZvlMS6D7OE3wZCeW2LX50kYcU17MUc8wnJLDAzAdRqPAgDma+sP4= =UtI4 -----END PGP MESSAGE----> gpg message.asc gpg: AES encrypted data Enter passphrase: sultana gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase > cat message Attack at dawn
GPG 45/83

Deleting Keys

> gpg --delete-secret-keys bobby sec 2048R/9974031B 2012-02-12 Bobby (recipient) <bobby@gmail.com> Delete this key from the keyring? (y/N) y This is a secret key! - really delete? (y/N) y > gpg --delete-keys bobby pub 2048R/9974031B 2012-02-12 Bobby (recipient) <bobby@gmail.com> Delete this key from the keyring? (y/N) y

GPG

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Generating Primes

Generating Random Numbers

Generate a prime number of the given number of bits:

> gpg --gen-prime 1 16 C4B7 > gpg --gen-prime 1 1024 D34D4347ED013242EE06811BC561C6587D75ADE33D1BEC954D648E22 9D88B5E0AF1394459FB48B135B99C8BA8C50E5331C6226CBF6D70031 4A8CC84C7B363BE7DD7BBBB29E545D199339263F5FB2E9F1B84BA9D5 05B5B79858FC6149CF09E6C56D9730C3BD1E62B378C8DFAF4233B8DC BA999A21EC9C4BF8C60AACDCBC607AC5

Generate 100 (base64 encoded) random bytes:

> gpg --armour --gen-random 0 100 e0zAVl6jbe/Dma9VF20lMgZxE1RA4S8TwNwu6KP8+o1kjdtBm2 AjKFSVsj/d3zG/9KqmNj7j6symEUZ3e0fWZaWqLBxzJuSur5sK C8omfPus2QtYJJNOgVbpJ7X9L4t1iNJtnw==

GPG

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GPG

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Print Message Digests

Goal: Read a message encrypted with gpg

> gpg --print-mds message MD5 = 36 D1 A5 12 17 CD 34 FC 04 F5 6C C4 91 39 C7 59 SHA1 = 6DA4 473A 00CE 7AB6 7B6F 884D 1E75 6633 C21A 56DB RMD160 = D1DE 4194 C0CD 3AED 30F3 38CD 68F3 800F CCF0 3B87 SHA224 = B4E94780 1AA1A9C3 418F72D8 651BA995 83284003 EBEE183A 589702EE SHA256 = B83EF405 07696578 9D4BBDA7 D7932700 5F2AE6CB A2696FDE 69694D12 AFE70E4A SHA384 = 7AC39A0C 945844F1 1316BB46 C9FC7EEA E892A178 2D20E4CA E7BE686C 1A091C8C F1BBDFD1 3D42BEA2 88AF5A4F E3705474 SHA512 = 9CA1EB88 F064CB0D 536254B2 5755919F 45564276 96CA27A0 389E4817 53F81DC2 3222488D 7D11F3DD C066B9E8 027F3870 395A2561 157DDC38 BD679D37 C2E361CC

1 2

Decrypt the message itself (OR) Determine symmetric key used to encrypt the message by other means (OR) Get recipient to help decrypt message (OR) Obtain private key of recipient.

3 4

http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-fig7.html

GPG

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GPG

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Goal: Read a message encrypted with gpg. . .

Goal: Read a message encrypted with gpg. . .

Determine symmetric key by other means: 1 Fool sender into encrypting message using public key whose private key is known (OR)
Convince sender that fake key (with known private key) is the key of the intended recipient 2 Convince sender to encrypt with more than one keythe real key of the recipient and a key whose private key is known. 3 Have the message encrypted with a dierent public key in the background, unbeknownst to the sender.
1 2 3 4 5

Decrypt the message itself: 1 Break asymmetric encryption (OR)

1 2

Brute force break asymmetric encryption (OR) Mathematically break asymmetric encryption (OR)
1 Break RSA (OR) 2 Factor RSA modulus/calculate Elgamal discrete log

Cryptanalyze asymmetric encryption (OR)

1 General cryptanalysis of RSA/Elgamal (OR) 2 Exploit weakness in RSA/Elgamal (OR) 3 Timing attack on RSA/Elgamal

Break symmetric-key encryption

Brute force break symmetric-key encryption 2 Cryptanalysis of symmetric-key encryption
1

Have the recipient sign the encrypted publc key (OR) Monitor the senders computer memory (OR) Monitor the receivers computer memory (OR) Determine key from pseudo-random number generator (OR)
Determine state of randseed during encryption (OR) Implant virus that alters the state of randseed. (OR) 3 Implant software that aects the choice of symmetric key.
1 2

6
GPG 51/83 GPG

Implant virus that that exposes public key.

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Goal: Read a message encrypted with gpg. . .

Goal: Read a message encrypted with gpg. . .

Get recipient to help decrypt message:

Obtain private key of recipient:

GPG

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GPG

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Goal: Read a message encrypted with PGP

What immediately becomes apparent from the attack tree is that breaking the RSA or IDEA encryption algorithms are not the most protable attacks against PGP. There are many ways to read someones PGP-encrypted messages without breaking the cryptography. You can capture their screen when they decrypt and read the messages (using a Trojan horse like Back Orice, a TEMPEST receiver, or a secret camera), grab their private key after they enter a passphrase (Back Orice again, or a dedicated computer virus), recover their passphrase (a keyboard snier, TEMPEST receiver, or Back Orice), or simply try to brute force their passphrase (I can assure you that it will have much less entropy than the 128-bit IDEA keys that it generates).
GPG 55/83

Goal: Read a message encrypted with PGP. . .

In the scheme of things, the choice of algorithm and the key length is probably the least important thing that aects PGPs overall security. PGP not only has to be secure, but it has to be used in an environment that leverages that security without creating any new insecurities.
http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-fig7.html

GPG

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Outline
1 2

Elgamal

3 4

6
Elgamal

Introduction RSA Algorithm Example Correctness Security GPG Elgamal Algorithm Example Correctness Security Die-Hellman Key Exchange Die-Hellman Key Exchange Example Correctness Security Summary
57/83 Elgamal

The Elgamal cryptosystem relies on the inherent diculty of calculating discrete logarithms. It is a probabilistic scheme:
a particular plaintext can be encrypted into multiple dierent ciphertexts; ciphertexts become twice the length of the plaintext.

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Elgamal: Algorithm
Bob (Key generation):
Pick a prime p . Find a generator g for Zp . 3 Pick a random number x between 1 and p 2. 4 Compute y = g x mod p . PB = (p , g , y ) is Bobs RSA public key. SB = x is Bob RSA private key.
1 2

Elgamal: Algorithm Notes

Alice must choose a dierent random number k for every message, or shell leak information. Bob doesnt need to know the random value k to decrypt. Each message has p 1 possible dierent encryptions. The division in the decryption can be avoided by use of Lagranges theorem : M = b (ax )1 mod p = b ap1x mod p

Alice (encrypt and send a message M to Bob):

Get Bobs public key PB = (p , g , y ). 2 Pick a random number k between 1 and p 2. 3 Compute the ciphertext C = (a, b ):
1

a b

= =

g k mod p My k mod p

Bob (decrypt a message C = (a, b ) received from Alice):

1
Elgamal

Compute M = b (ax )1 mod p .

59/83 Elgamal 60/83

Elgamal: Finding the generator

Elgamal Example: Key generation

Computing the generator is, in general, hard. We can make it easier by choosing a prime number with the property that we can factor p 1. Then we can test that, for each prime factor pi of p 1: g (p1)/pi mod p = 1

1 2 3 4

Pick a prime p = 13. Find a generator g = 2 for Z13 (see next slide). Pick a random number x = 7. Compute y = g x mod p = 27 mod 13 = 11. PB = (p , g , y ) = (13, 2, 11) is Bobs public key. SB = x = 7 is Bob private key.

If g is not a generator, then one of these powers will = 1.

Elgamal

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Elgamal

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Powers of Integers, Modulo 13

2 is a primitive root modulo 13 because for each integer i Z13 = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 12} theres an integer k , such that i = 2k mod 13:
a1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Elgamal

Elgamal Example: Encryption

Encrypt the plaintext message M = 3. Alice gets Bobs public key PB = (p , g , y ) = (13, 2, 11). To encrypt:
1 2

a2 1 4 9 3 12 10 10 12 3 9 4 1

a3 1 8 1 12 8 8 5 5 1 12 5 12

a4 1 3 3 9 1 9 9 1 9 3 3 1

a5 1 6 9 10 5 2 11 8 3 4 7 12

a6 1 12 1 1 12 12 12 12 1 1 12 1

a7 1 11 3 4 8 7 6 5 9 10 2 12

a8 1 9 9 3 1 3 3 1 3 9 9 1

a9 1 5 1 12 5 5 8 8 1 12 8 12

a10 1 10 3 9 12 4 4 12 9 3 10 1

a11 1 7 9 10 8 11 2 5 3 4 6 12

a12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
63/83 Elgamal

Pick a random number k = 5: Compute: a b = = g k mod p = 25 mod 13 = 6 My k mod p = 3 115 mod 13 = 8

The ciphertext C = (a, b ) = (6, 8).

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Elgamal Example: Decryption

In-Class Exercise

Bobs private key is SB = x = 7. Bob receives the ciphertext C = (a, b ) = (6, 8) from Alice. Bob computes the plaintext M : M = b (ax )1 mod p = b ap1x mod p = 8 61317 mod 13 = 8 65 mod 13 = 3
1

Pick the prime p = 13. Find the generator g = 2 for Z13 . Pick a random number x = 9. Compute y = g x mod p = 29 mod 13 = 5 PB = (p , g , y ) = (13, 2, 5) is Bobs public key. SB = x = 9 is Bob private key. Encrypt the message M = 11 using the random number k = 10. Decrypt the ciphertext from 1.

Elgamal

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Elgamal

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Elgamal Correctness
Show that M = b (ax )1 mod p decrypts. We have that a = g k mod p b = My k mod p y We get b (ax )1 mod p = (My k ) ((g k )x )1 mod p = (My k ) (g kx )1 mod p = (M ((g x )k ) (g kx )1 mod p = Mg kx (g kx )1 mod p = Mg kx g kx mod p = M mod p
Elgamal

Elgamal Security

= g x mod p

The security of the scheme depends on the hardness of solving the discrete logarithm problem. Generally believed to be hard.

= M

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Elgamal

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Outline
1 2

Key Exchange

3 4

Introduction RSA Algorithm Example Correctness Security GPG Elgamal Algorithm Example Correctness Security Die-Hellman Key Exchange Die-Hellman Key Exchange Example Correctness Security Summary
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A key exchange protocol (or key agreement protocol ) is a way for parties to share a secret (such as a symmetric key) over an insecure channel. With an active adversary (who can modify messages) we cant reliably share a secret. With a passive adversary (who can only eavesdrop on messages) we can share a secret. A passive adversary is said to be honest but curious .

Die-Hellman Key Exchange

Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Die-Hellman Key Exchange

Die-Hellman: Algorithm
1

All parties (set-up):

1 2

Pick p , a prime number. Pick g , a generator for Zp . Pick a random x Zp , x > 0. Compute X = g x mod p . Send X to Bob. Pick a random y Zp , x > 0. Compute Y = g y mod p . Send Y to Alice

Alice :
1 2

A classic key exchange protocol. Based on modular exponentiation . The secret K1 = K2 shared by Alice and Bob at the end of the protocol would typically be a shared symmetric key.

3 3 1 2

Bob :

3 4 5
Die-Hellman Key Exchange 71/83

Alice computes the secret: K1 = Y x mod p . Bob computes the secret: K2 = X y mod p .
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Die-Hellman Key Exchange

Example

In-Class Exercise

1 2 3

Pick p = 13, a prime number. Pick g = 2, a generator for Z13 . Alice :

Pick a random x = 3. 2 Compute X = g x mod p = 23 mod 13 = 8.
1

Let p = 19. Let g = 10. Let Alices secret x = 7. Let Bobs secret y = 15.
1 2

Bob :
1 2

Pick a random y = 7. Compute Y = g y mod p = 27 mod 13 = 11.

Compute K1 . Compute K2 .

5 6 7

Alice computes: K1 = Bob computes: K2 = K1 = K2 = 5.

Yx

mod p = mod p =

113

mod 13 = 5.

Xy

87

mod 13 = 5.

Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Die-Hellman Correctness

Die-Hellman Correctness. . .
Alice has

Alice has computed X = g x mod p

K1 = Y x mod p = (g y )x mod p = (g x )y mod p = X y mod p Bob has K2 = X y mod p = (g x )y mod p = X y mod p K1 = K2 . K1 = Y x mod p .

Bob has computed Y = g y mod p

K2 = X y mod p .

Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Die-Hellman Security

Die-Hellman: Man-In-The-Middle attack

Alice :
1

The security of the scheme depends on the hardness of solving the discrete logarithm problem. Generally believed to be hard. Die-Hellman Property :
Given p, X = g x , Y = g y computing K = g xy mod p is thought to be hard.

Send X = g X mod p to Bob.

Eve :
Intercept X = g x mod p from Alice. Pick a number t in Zp . 3 Send T = g t mod p to Bob.
1 2

Bob :
1

Send Y = g y mod p to Alice

Eve :
Intercept Y = g y mod p from Bob. Pick a number s in Zp . 3 Send S = g s mod p to Alice.
1 2

Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Die-Hellman: Man-In-The-Middle attack. . .

Die-Hellman: Man-In-The-Middle attack. . .

7 8 5

Alice : Send C = EK1 (M ) to Bob Eve :

Intercept C . Decrypt:M = DK1 (C ) Re-encrypt:C = EK2 (M ) 4 Send C to Bob
1 2 3

Alice and Eve :

1

Compute K1 = g xS mod p Compute K2 = g yT mod p

9 10

Bob and Eve :

1

Bob : Send C = EK2 (M ) to Alice Eve :

Intercept C . Decrypt:M = DK2 (C ) 3 Re-encrypt:C = EK1 (M ) 4 Send C to Alice.
1 2

Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Die-Hellman Key Exchange

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Outline
1 2

Readings and References

3 4

6
Summary

Introduction RSA Algorithm Example Correctness Security GPG Elgamal Algorithm Example Correctness Security Die-Hellman Key Exchange Die-Hellman Key Exchange Example Correctness Security Summary
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Chapter 8.1.1-8.1.5 in Introduction to Computer Security, by Goodrich and Tamassia.

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Acknowledgments
Additional material and exercises have also been collected from these sources:
1

Igor Crk and Scott Baker, 620Fall 2003Basic Cryptography. Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography. Peeger and Peeger, Security in Computing. William Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security. Bruce Schneier, Attack Trees, Dr. Dobbs Journal December 1999, http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.html . Barthe, Gr egoire, Beguelin, Hedin, Heraud, Olmedo, Veriable Security of Cryptographic Schemes, http://www.irisa.fr/celtique/blazy/seminar/20110204.pdf .
http://homes.cerias.purdue.edu/~crisn/courses/cs355_Fall_2008/lect18.pdf 83/83

2 3 4 5

7
Summary