AFAN v.

DE GUZMAN (1960) FACTS: De Guzman filed a claim against the estate of Afan in the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the latter. The administratrix objected to the claim upon the ground that it had been filed long after the expiration of the period for the presentation of claims against the estate. De Guzman maintains that his claim should be entertained since it was filed prior to the distribution the estate. ISSUE: WON the claim of De Guzman should be entertained HELD: NO Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides: o Time within which claims shall be filed.In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claims to be filed within a time not exceeding one month. Instead of furnishing a "cause" for the extension of the reglementary period for the filing of his claim, this omission on the part of De Guzman fully justifies the denial of such extension and the order appealed from. o Failure to file a claim within the time provided therefor upon the sole ground that the claimant was negotiating with one of the heirs for payment, is not sufficient to justify extension (In Re: Estate of De Dios), and that, where a claimant knew of the death of the decedent and for four (4) or five (5) months thereafter he did nothing to present his claim, this can hardly be considered as a good excuse for such neglect (In Re: Estate of Tiangco).

ESTATE OF OLAVE v. REYES (1983) FACTS: SAMCO filed with the CFI against the administrators of the estate of Olave for collection of indebtedness allegedly of the decedent. CFI directed the administrators to secure the probate courts approval before entering into any transaction with SAMCO. However, without authority of the probate court, the parties entered into an Amicable Settlement whereby properties of the estate were conveyed to SAMCO for payment. Despite lack of approval of the probate court, CFI approved the settlement. The judicial administrators are assailing the validity of the said Amicable Settlement. ISSUE: WON the Amicable Settlement is valid HELD: NO Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; ..." The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased; and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Sec. 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court). The purpose of presentation of claims in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in the due course of the administration. It is clear that the main purpose of SAMCO in filing the civil case in the then CFI of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of land in payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate court of Manila, which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate. It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course the civil case, much less issue the questioned Order approving the Amicable Settlement.

GUTIERREZ v. BARRETO-DATU (1962) FACTS: Gutierrez commenced an ordinary civil action in the CFI against the executrix of the estate of Barreto for the recovery of the a sum of money representing the profits which he failed to realize because of the breach of the lease contract allegedly committed by the decedent. The court dismissed the action on the ground that the claim should have been prosecuted in the testate proceeding. ISSUE: WON the petitioners claim for damages is a money claim against the estate within the purview of Rule 87, Sec. 5, of the Rules of Court

HELD: YES The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract. o The claim in this case is based on contract specifically, on a breach thereof. It falls squarely under Sec. 5 of Rule 87. "Upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime, even though they were personal to the decedent in liability, the personal representative is answerable for the breach out of the assets." (Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrators). The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or administrator are those to recover real or personal property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal. Rule 88, Sec. 1. The instant suit is not one of them.

AGUAS v. LLEMOS (1962) FACTS: Salinas and spouses Guardino jointly filed an action in the CFI of Catbalogan to recover damages from Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment. Before he could answer the complaint, the defendant died. Plaintiffs amended the complaint to include the heirs of the deceased. The court dismissed the petition on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the defendant, and that the action, being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein. ISSUE: WON the action of prosper should prosper HELD: YES. However, case is already MOOT and ACADEMIC since the parties entered into an amicable settlement. Under Rule 87, Sec. 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied. o None of these includes that of the plaintiffs; for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied." Rule 88, Sec. 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. o The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property.

IMPERIAL INSURANCE v. DAVID (1984) FACTS: Felicisimo Reyes and his wife executed three indemnity agreements in favor of appellee jointly and severally. Reyes died and a special proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate was commenced by his wife. Meanwhile, judgment was rendered in the cases against the spouses Reyes as to the indemnity agreements. Since the writs of execution were returned unsatisfied, judgment was rendered against the surety bonds. Appellee made demands on the wife to pay under he surety bonds. The wife filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit. Lower court denied the Motion to Dismiss and after the trial, the court ruled against the wife. ISSUE: WON the lower court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs causes of action HELD: YES Under the law and well-settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death her liability is independent of and separate from her husbands; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili) In the case at bar, appellant signed a joint and several obligation with her husband in favor of herein appellee; as a consequence, the latter may demand from either of them the whole obligation. As distinguished from a joint obligation where each of the debtor is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt and the creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the credit, in a solidary obligation the creditor may enforce the entire obligation against one of the debtors.

VELASQUEZ v. GEORGE (1983) FACTS: Maria Velasquez and her children appealed from the decision of the CFI of Bulacan, which dismissed their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are the widow and legitimate children of the late George whose estate is under intestate proceedings. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 5 defendant-mortgagors are officers of the Islan Associates Inc. Munoz, aside from being the treasurer-director, was also appointed and qualified as administrator of the estate of George. In life, the latter owned 64.8% of the shares of stock in the corporation. Without prior approval from the probate court and without notice to the heirs and their counsel, the defendant-mortgagors executed a Deed of First Real Estate Mortgage (DFREM) in favor of the defendantmortgagee Villanueva, covering 3 parcels of land owned by Island Association. Subsequently, a power of attorney was executed in favor of Villanueva whereby the latter was given full power and authority to cede, transfer and convey the parcels of land. A certificate of sale was executed in favor of Villanueva after she submitted the highest bids at the public Auction. ISSUE: WON the appellants have the capacity to file the complaint HELD: YES The administrator, Muoz, is the same person charged by the appellants to have voted in the board of directors without securing the proper authority from the probate court to which he is accountable as administrator. In Ramirez v. Baltazar, the Court ruled that "since the ground for the present action to annul the foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be farfetched to expect the said administrator himself to file the action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the heirs, who have an interest to assert and to protect, would bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under the exception, rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the heirs have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased."

DE LA CRUZ v. CAMON (1966) FACTS: The administrator of the estate of the Fallon and Murphy moved the court for an order to direct Camon, the lease of the whole Hacienda, to pay the estate's two-forths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario. Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his person. The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made "by mere motion by the administrator but by independent action." ISSUE: WON the demand for rentals should be made in an independent action HELD: YES The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Conceivably, the lessee may interpose defenses. Compromise, payment, statute of limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to defeat the administrator's case. o The right to collect the rentals is still in a fluid state. That right remains to be threshed out upon a full-dress trial on the merits. The money allegedly due is not property in the hands of the administrator; it is not thus within the effective control of the probate court. Neither does it come within the concept of money of the deceased "concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away", which would confer upon the court incidental prerogative to reach out its arms to get it back and, if necessary, to cite the possessor thereof in contempt. At best that money is debt to the estate not against the estate. Recovery should be by separate suit commenced by the administrator. With reason, because of the absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the lessee debtor into defending himself in the probate court. Paula vs. Escay: "When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third person." o The demand is for money due allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings.

VALERA V. INSERTO (1987) FACTS: In the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent spouses, Valera and Sarrosa, the heirs of their daughter, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose, Teresa's husband, delivered to the administrator a fishpond, belonging to the estate. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his children. The probate court viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate under Sec. 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The Court issued an Order commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question to the intestate Estate of the Spouses. ISSUE: WON the probate court has authority to decide on the title of the subject fishpond HELD: NO The rule is that a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. The same norm governs the situation in Sec. 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the issue. The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same. The Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead.

GODOY v. ORELLANO (1921) FACTS: In consideration P1,000 received by her, a document was executed by Pagilinan giving Godoy an option to buy a dredge which was alleged to be a common property of the vendor and of the Orellano siblings However, the her co-owners did not ratify the option contract. Godoy brought suit in the CFI against Pagilinan and Orellano. The defendants alleged as a special defense that the dredge in question was the property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the CFI of Manila, and under the administration of Pagilinan; and that court has never authorized the sale of the dredge. ISSUE: WON Pagilinan, as judicial administratrix, has authority to sell the dredge belonging to the estate of the deceased HELD: NO In the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is necessary to comply with the provisions of Secs. 717, 718, and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said sections prescribed the proceedings to be had before an administrator may sell property and also the conditions under which the property pertaining to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. A sale by an administrator of the personal property of the estate, without the authority of an order of court, or of a will, or under an order of court which is void for want of jurisdiction, does not confer on the purchaser a title which is available against a succeeding administrator. (Wyatt's Adm'r vs. Rambo) Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney.

ESTATE OF GAMBOA v. FLORANZA (1908) FACTS: The commissioners of the estate allowed a claim in favor of Jaucian, which was secured by a mortgage on real estate. The administrator presented a petition asked that the court appoint a day for hearing upon the question as to the preference which these creditors enjoyed. The court, without notice and hearing to the parties, ordered the sale of the property to pay the mortgage debt to Jaucian. It provided that notice of the sale should be given in a certain way. The administrator filed a report of the sale and asked that the sale be confirmed. However, no record that sale ever had been confirmed. On the contrary, it seems that the land upon which the mortgaged house stood did not belong to the estate but belonged to the widow. The appellee insists that the questions as to the preferential right of Jaucian was determined by the commissioners in their report and that report, not having been appealed from, such determination is final and conclusive. ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in ordering the sale of the property HELD: YES The code states in its Secs. 714 to 721 various conditions under which the real estate of the deceased may be sold for the payment of debts. o There is nothing in any one of these sections which indicates that the probate court has any power to order the sale of a specific piece of real estate for the purpose of paying a mortgage debt which is a lien thereon. It may be that the court would have authority to sell the property, subject to the mortgage lien, for the purpose of paying other debts of the estate. Also, the court failed to comply with Sec. 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires the administrator to present a petition asking for the sale of the real estate. After which, the court shall appoint a time and place for hearing. Such will be published and further notice will be given as it deems proper. o No attempt was made to comply with the provisions of the law. No notice whatever was given to any of the persons interested of the application for license to sell.

CFI of RIZAL v. CA (1981) FACTS: Ong, the executrix of the estate of Lacson, asked the probate court for authority to sell property of the estate in order to pay the taxes other claims against the estate. Upon authorization, she sold the property to Gan Heng. The probate court approved the sale. Felix Ong filed an opposition to the approval of the sale alleging that he offered to buy the property at a higher price. The Court approved the sale and denied the claim of Felix Ong. ISSUE: WON the order of the court approving the sale was proper HELD: YES. Whether or not FELIX Ong had offered a higher value for the property is of little importance. The sale sought to be annulled is a private sale duly authorized by the probate court and not a public auction sale. An interested party in the estate of a decedent has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Felix Ong does not claim to be a creditor of the estate. Neither is he an heir of the decedent. At any rate, in a special proceeding for administration of an estate, the probate court enjoys ample discretion in determining under what conditions a particular sale would be most beneficial to all persons interested, and appellate courts are wont not to interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by it unless it be shown that there has been positive abuse of discretion. The offer of Felix Ong to buy the property at a higher price would not make the approval of the sale a grave abuse of discretion because the difference in the prices was not the only factor taken into consideration by the probate court. After all, the Deed of Sale as executed is in accordance with our order." Besides, the creditors of the estate and the heirs manifested that they have no objection to selling the property. Moreover, Felix Ong did not comply with the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 89 by submitting a bond in order to prevent the sale of the property.

JARODA v. CUSI (1969) FACTS: A special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Villa Abrille was commenced by Tan. He was appointed as administrator. Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of an amount deposited in the PNB in the name of the deceased but actually held in trust for the decedents co-owners of Juna Subdivision. The CFI granted this petition. Tan filed a petition with the court alleging that the deceased was a manager and co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and praying for approval by the court of the power of attorney executed by him appointing himself to sell the lots. The court also granted the petition. Jaroda filed petition to prevent the Tan from selling the lots. The CFI dismissed the petition. Upon petition to the Supreme Court, it issued a preliminary injunction against Tan. ISSUE: WON Orders of the CFI are valid HELD: NO The order allowing the special administrator to withdraw the bank deposits is invalid. In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a special administrator under Sec. 2 of Rule 80. Also, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore, belong prima facie to his estate. Until the contrary is shown, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate. If even to sell for valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior written notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89, such notice is applicable for disposing gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. No such notice was given, and without it the court's authority is invalid. The order approving the power of attorney executed by administrator is, likewise, void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction. The very rule, Sec. 4 of Rule 89, relied on by respondent Tan to sustain the power of attorney requires written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such notice.

BOAGA v. SOLER (1961) FACTS: A parcel of land which belonged to the estate of the Spouses Ros was sold by Garza, the administrator, upon authorization by the probate court to Soler. During the war, the records of the settlement of the estate were destroyed. Upon reconstitution of the court, Boaga was issued letters of administration. Boaga sought to annul the sales to Soler arguing that the transactions were fraudulent and made without notice to the hris of Ros of the application to sell and that they were fraudulently registered under Act 496. The lower court dismissed the action sustaining that as administrator of the estate succeeding Garza, plaintiff was estopped to file an action to annul the sales. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case HELD: YES A sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties, under Secs. 4 and 7, Rule 90, must comply with the requisites: the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an application to sell, and the notice to the heirs, are essential; and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio (Arcilla vs. David). Rule 90, Sec. 4, does not distinguish between heirs residing in and those residing outside the Philippines. Therefore, its requirements should apply regardless of the place of residence of those required to be notified. The contention that the sale was made under Sec. 2, Rule 90 (wherein notice is required only to those heirs residing in the Philippines), is not substantiated by the record. Neither the deed of sale nor the orders issued by the probate court, show whether, as required by said Sec. 2, the personal properties were insufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration. There is not even a showing, to start with, that the sale was made for the purpose of paying debts or expenses of administration, a condition which circumscribes the applicability of that section. On the face of the reamended complaint, it does not appear that the sale was one under Sec. 2 of Rule 90; and the same cannot be invoked to sustain the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff should at least have been given a chance to prove his case.