FDA Fines American Red Cross

( " ~ DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Food and Drug Administration

' ~ ~ ' -
Baltimore District Office
Central Region
6000 Metro Drive, Suite 101
Baltimore, MD 21215
Telephone: (410) 779-5455
FAX: (410) 779-5707
January 13, 2012
ADVERSE DETERMINATION LETTER
BY FACSIMILE AND CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Mr. J. Chris Hrouda
Executive Vice President
Biomedical Services
American National Red Cross
2025 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
RE: United States v. American National Red Cross, Civil Action No. 93-0949 (JGP)
Dear Mr. Hrouda:
From April through October 2010, United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigators
inspected sixteen American National Red Cross (ARC) Blood Services facilities and observed
significant violations ofthe law, regulations, and the Amended Consent Decree ofPermanent Injunction,
entered on April15, 2003 (Decree). At the conclusion of each inspection, the investigators issued
Forms FDA 483, Inspectional Observations (FDA 483), attached hereto (Attachment A). FDA is now,
pursuant to paragraph VIII ofthe Decree, notifying ARC of its determination that ARC has violated the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA regulations, and the Decree, specifically 21 U.S.C.
351(a)(2)(B), paragraphs IV.A., IV.B.l, IV.B.IO, and XIX ofthe Decree and Title 21, CFR 210-211
and 600-680.
The 2010 inspections cited herein were conducted at the following ARC facilities on the following
dates:
Badger Hawkeye Region, 4860 Sheboygan Avenue, Madison, WI, 4/5-23/10
Great Lakes Region, 1800 East Grand River Avenue, Lansing, MI, 4/5-27110
Penn Jersey Region, 700 Spring Garden Street, Philadelphia, P A, 5/24/10 - 6/4110
Connecticut Region, 209 Farmington Avenue, Farmington, CT, 5/4110- 6115/10
Detroit National Testing Laboratory, 100 Eliot Street, Detroit, MI, 5/25/10-6/16/10
Indiana-Ohio Region, 1212 East California Road, Ft. Wayne, IN, 7/12-21/10
Southwest Region, 10151 East 11th Street, Tulsa, OK, 7/26/10- 8/9110
Appalachian Region, 352 Church Avenue, SW, Roanoke, VA, 8/3-13/10
Heart ofAmerica Region, 405 West John H. Gwynn Jr. Avenue, Peoria, IL, 6/21/10- 8/18/10
Page 2- Mr. J. Chris Hrouda
Northern California Region, Fixed Collections/Distribution Site, 2731 North First Street, San Jose, CA,
917-13110
Arizona Region, Broadway Fixed Collection Site, 7139 East Broadway Blvd., Tucson, AZ, 9/7-15110
Northern Ohio Region, 3747 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH, 8/27/10- 9/23/10
Southern California Region, 100 Red Cross Circle, Pomona, CA, 8/9/10 - 9/24/10
Greater Alleghenies Region, 250 Jari Drive, Johnstown, PA, 9/7-24/10
Southeastern Michigan Region, 100 Mack Avenue, Detroit, MI, 8/24110-9/27/10
Donor and Client Support Center, 700 Spring Garden Street, Philadelphia, PA, 9/2/10- 10/29110
The Decree requires ARC to establish and properly implement appropriate quality assurance (QA) and
quality control (QC) measures. Proper QA and QC programs by blood establishments include measures
to prevent, detect, investigate, evaluate, and correct errors. The goals ofthese programs include
preventing the distribution of unsuitable blood products, and preventing the causes of recurrent
problems. The proper implementation of a strong QA program is essential to ensure the safety ofthe
nation's blood supply.
Decree paragraph IV requires ARC to "establish, implement, and continuously maintain adequate
methods, facilities, systems, and controls to ensure that ARC does not collect, manufacture, process,
pack, hold, or distribute any article ofdrug as defined in 21 U.S.C. 321(g), including any article of
blood, blood component, or other biological product as defined in 42 U.S.C. 262, that is adulterated,
within the meaning of21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B); misbranded, within the meaning of21 U.S.C. 352(a)
or 42 U.S.C. 262(b); or otherwise in violation ofthe FD&C Act, the PHSAct, and regulations
promulgated thereunder, including, but not limited to, 21 C.F.R. Parts 210-211 and Parts 600-680."
ARC is also required to "take steps necessary to ensure continuous compliance with this Order, the law,
and ARC SOPs ..." and "establish, document, and continuously maintain managerial control over
training and quality assurance in all regions and laboratories." Decree paragraph IV.A.1. & 2. ARC is
also required to appoint a director of quality assurance who shall "prepare and submit quarterly quality
assurance reports in writing to ARC senior management and ARC Biomedical Services senior
management . ..that completely and accurately: (i) describe the steps that have been and will be taken,
with specific dates for implementation of each step, to establish, implement, and continuously maintain
the QAIQC program; and (ii) describe all unresolved potential system (systemic) problems, system
(systemic) problems, and trends and their corrective action status; and (iii) assess whether ARC is in
compliance with the law, ARCSOPs, and this Order." Decree paragraph IV.A.2.
1
Violations observed and/or documented during the 2010 inspections include the items listed below.
This is not intended to be an all-inclusive list ofviolations in ARC facilities.
DECREE VIOLATIONS:
Decree Violations: Inadequate Managerial Control
1. Failure to establish, implement and continuously maintain managerial control over QA in all
regions and laboratories as required by paragraph IV.A.2. The development of written procedures and
processes that are appropriately managed and implemented are essential components of an effective QA
1
Decree paragraph III.B.57 defines the QNQC program as the "written SOPs for quality assurance and quality control that ARC must establish, implement,
and continuously maintain under paragraph IV of this Order to ensure that bloodand blood components are collected, manufactured, processed, packed,
held, and distributed by ARC in accordance with the law, ARC SOPs, and this Order, and have thepurity that they purport or are represented to possess."
(The italics in the quotations from the Decree are in the original and indicate that the italicized word is defined in paragraph Ill ofthe Decree.)
Page 3 - Mr. J. Chris Hrouda
program. ARC management, however, merged certain QA functions into centralized facilities without
ensuring that the new facilities were adequately staffed to perform these functions in a timely or
effective manner.
Beginning May 2008, ARC began to consolidate certain donor management activities,
2
which were
previously performed in 35 ofits 36 regional offices, into the Donor Client Support Center (DCSC).
The DCSC is located in two facilities, one in Charlotte, North Carolina, and one in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. The consolidation began in May 2008 and was completed in March 2010. During the
consolidation, multiple internal audits and Problem Management (PM)/QA assessments were performed
at the two DCSC facilities.
3
The results ofthe internal audits and assessments and the subsequent
internal investigations indicated that the DCSC was chronically understaffed and lacked the process
controls to ensure timely and adequate performance ofthe donor management functions. In response to
the internal audits, the DCSC repeatedly promised corrective actions, some ofwhich had not been
completed or were ineffective at the time ofthe FDA inspection in September and October 2010.
During the consolidation phase, ARC had periodic senior management meetings, Quality and
Compliance Oversight Committee (QCOC) meetings, and Board of Governors meetings in which the
DCSC consolidation project was discussed.
4
Quarterly and annual QA and training reports were also
submitted to ARC's senior management.
5
The meeting minutes indicate that ARC management was
aware ofthe audit findings and the staffing and training deficiencies and that the QCOC was monitoring
the situation to determine whether the consolidation should continue as scheduled. Despite the
repeated, significant internal audit findings, the consolidation was permitted to continue with only one
delay. After the consolidation was completed in March 2010, the meeting minutes indicate that ARC
management continued to have concerns about the DCSC performance. The DCSC continued to be
understaffed and had a backlog of what ARC reported as being approximately 18,000 donor
management cases
6
that had not been process-verified as required in Work Instruction 11.3.028, Process
Verification, Version 1.1, and Forml5.4.frm015, Donor Reaction and Injury Record, Version 1.2.
Additional internal records that detail the DCSC's management control deficiencies include the
following:
2
Activities being performed at the DCSC include donor care and qualification functions, such as answering eligibility questi ons
from the donors; donor deferrals; post donation and call back activities, donor complications and complaints; receipt oftest results and entry of the results
into the NBCS software; management of follow up testing with the donor; donor reentry/reinstatement; deferral and surveillance management; managing
donor requests for test results and blood types; donor notification of reactive test results and donor counseling; and military, state, and health department
notifications. DCSC also performs client support services that include the management of blood product retrievals; consignee notification for the release of
unsuitable blood components; case investigations for possible transfusion transmitted infections, adverse reactions and bacterial contaminations; lookbacks;
and serving as the liaison for regional/divisional medical directors. DCSC' s data management functions include the management of the National Donor
Deferral Registry and the Donor File Check process. Problem management tasks for the Philadelphia DCSC are performed in Philadelphia as well as in the
Charlotte DCSC and includes the detection, investigation, evaluation, correction, and monitoring of all problems, trends, and system problems.
3
Facility Audits: 10/14-17/08 (Philadelphia), 10/14-16/08 (Charlotte), 3124-27/09 (Charlotte), 612-5/09 {Philadelphia), 12115/09-1/6/10 (Philadelphia), 10/6
22/09 (Charlotte), 4/20-22110 (Charlotte), 5/18-21110 (Charlotte); Problem Management Assessment 4/9/1 0; Quality Assurance Assessment 4/10.
4
Management Review Minutes for Collections and Donor Management: 2110/09, 5/15/09, 8nt09, 1218/09, 3/19/10, and 6/8/10; QCOC Meetings: 6127/08,
5/19/09, 8/27/09, 9124/09, 10/9/09, 10122/09, 11/13/09, 12111/09, 2/25/10, 3124/10, 4/9/ 10, 4122110, 6/11110, 6/24/10 and 8/13/10; Board ofGovernors'
Meetings: 4/23/08, 6/6/08, 3/26/09, 5127/09, 6/18/09, 7122109, 8127/09, 9/23/09, 10/5/10, 12/14/09, 1127/10, 2124/10, 3124/ 10, 4120/10, 6/9/10 and 8/25/10
5
Quarterly QA Reports: ApriVJune 2008, 2008 Annual QA Report October 2007/September 2008, October/December 2008, January/March 2009,
April/June 2009, 2009 Annual QA Report October 2008/September 2009, October/December 2009 and January/March 20I 0; Quarterly Training Reports:
April/June 2008, July/September 2008, October/December 2008, January/March 2009, April/June 2009, July/September 2009, October/December 2009 and
January/March 2010.
6
At the time ofFDA' s inspection ofthe DCSC, FDA determined that the backlog ofdonor management cases requiring process review was approximately
15,000 ( II ,531 in the Charlotte facility and 3,552 in the Philadelphia faci lity) and approximately 5,200 unreviewed DRIRs ( 4,949 in the Charlotte facility
and 306 in the Philadelphia facility).
a. Two DCSC staffing documents (July and September 2009) state that "the organization is
currently operating under the fa<;ade that the DCSC is self supportive in its QA and PM
functions... Regions routinely provide support in problem closure and quality process review, both of
which are major functions ...over 50% of all problems are closed by non-DCSC QA staff located in the
regions....any time something occurs in the field that strains the regional resources, assistance has to be
withdrawn...this can immediately cause the DCSC to become unsustainable and fall into a
backlog... another large concern is that every five weeks additional regions continue to transfer to the
DCSC. Therefore, the situation is escalating to a point where the field will not be able to support the
volume." Despite these staft1ng concerns, ARC management allowed the consolidation to continue.
b. In April 2010, the Biomedical Headquarters (BHQ)/QCOC meeting minutes indicate that the
DCSC had a backlog of approximately 18,000 donor management cases that had not been process
verified as required by ARC's Work Instruction 11.3.028, Process Verification, Version 1.1.
c. ARC's report from the April2010 DCSC problem management audit states that the root cause
ofthe repeat observation pertaining to timely problem management is, "The DCSC Problem
Management Department does not have the resources to consistently manage problems in a timely
manner."
d. The May 2010 Donor Client Service Specialist (DCSS) staffing report indicates that "without
additional staff dedicated to answering eligibility calls, the DCSS position would be understaffed. This
understaffing could create a situation of a continually growing backlog, overtime pay required, and a
decreased ability to handle natural spikes in incoming work."
e. In July 2010, ARC senior management placed the DCSC on a Compliance Improvement
Strategy (CIS) because it was determined to be a "high compliance risk" based on internal audits and
FDA 483s received since March 2009. The CIS was not fmalized until 9/29/ 10, after FDA began the
Philadelphia DCSC inspection. The final CIS states, ' 'Numbers and proficiency of staff are not
adequate to effectively execute assigned tasks and responsibilities in a compliant manner; inadequate
supervision and oversight." The CIS further states, "The Back-log Plan will provide the details ofhow
any back-log will be managed and monitored, including defined commitments for reducing the back-log
while appropriately managing new cases."
In its 12/ 15110 response to the FDA 483, ARC stated, "BHQ did not effectively manage consolidation of
the donor management functions into the DCSC. BHQ managed the donor management consolidation
using existing mechanisms, including the system Quality and Compliance Oversight Committee
(QCOC) and the Field Operations Group (FOG), to provide oversight. However, in retrospect, these
mechanisms proved to be inadequate ...." The response also states that ARC "now recognizes that the
DCSC management reports were insufficient in determining a complete and accurate picture ofDCSC
performance."
Decree Violations: Inadequate QA
2. Failure to comply with paragraph IV .A.2.a., which requires that the "director ofquality
assurance shall be responsible for all ARC Biomedical Services quality assurance functions including,
but not limited to, ensuring the establishment, implementation, and continuous maintenance of
comprehensive QA/QC programs .. .. " Specifically, the BHQ and DCSC QA programs were not
adequate to ensure that all regulated donor management operations were being performed effectively at
the Philadelphia DCSC. Proper management oversight is essential to effectively implement a QA
program; without it, the causes oferrors may not be promptly corrected and unsuitable blood products
may be released. For example,
a. At the beginning ofthe September - October 2010 inspection, the DCSC had a backlog of
open cases that had not received the required review. Donor Status Change Records, Component Status
Change Records, and Component Information Forms are required to have process verification prior to
closure ofa case per ARC's Work Instruction 11.3.028, Process Verification, Version 1.1. A backlog of
3,552 cases, dating as far back as July 2009, existed at the Philadelphia DCSC facility. Additionally,
Donor Reaction/Injury Records (DRIRs) require a Medical Director (MD) review and a final quality
review. A backlog of 306 open DRIRs, dating as far back as August 2009, existed at the Philadelphia
DCSC facility. The backlogs were even larger at the Charlotte DCSC facility -- 11,531 DRIR.s requiring
process verification and 4,949 DRIRs requiring MD review and/or final quality review.
b. Quality Process Reviews have not been consistently performed by the DCSC QA staff
since the Philadelphia DCSC was created in 2008. Quality Process Reviews are required in Directive
02.2.012, Quality Process Reviews, Version 2.1 , and are to be conducted by the QA staff on an ongoing
basis to review the systems and processes being performed by the DCSC operations staff. In addition,
these reviews are to "identify process improvement opportunities, possible procedure or compliance
violations, and confirmation ofprocesses operating in a state ofcontrol." During the inspection ofthe
DCSC, FDA repeatedly requested documentation that Quality Process Reviews had been completed at
the DCSC, but no documentation was provided. ARC stated that only some ofthe reviews were
completed through December 2009 and that others were not completed due to loss of QA staff.
c. The Quarterly QA reports, required by paragraph IV.A.2.b. to be submitted in writing by the
QA director to ARC senior management and ARC Biomedical Services senior management, did not
portray the seriousness of the staffing and proficiency problems occurring in the DCSC and identified by
ARC internal audits and other internal assessments. For example, eight Quarterly QA reports were
submitted to ARC senior management and ARC Biomedical Services senior management beginning in
April 2008 through March 2010. However, it was not until the October-December 2009 report that the
"capacity for problem management" and the backlog ofopen problems were mentioned in the quarterly
QA report. In its 12/ 15/10 response to the FDA 483, ARC acknowledged that the "seriousness ofthe
DCSC issues were not clearly documented in the Red Cross Quarterly Quality Assurance reports until
the January - March 2010 report."
d. A QA Assessment ofthe DCSC was performed in October 2009 and a PM Assessment ofthe
DCSC was performed in November 2009. The reports identified staffing and workload issues due to the
continuous consolidation of more regions into the DCSC. One report identified that the QA staff in
Philadelphia had no donor management experience; some QA staff members already employed at the
DCSC for six months were not fully trained; and staff was "struggling" with a lack of support from QA
management. The reports also indicate that there had been inadequate planning and inadequate change
control associated with the consolidation of donor management functions from the regions into the DCSC.
Despite these conditions, ARC continued with the consolidation until it was completed in March 2010.
The QA and PM assessment reports were then issued to ARC senior management in April2010.
e. In multiple Board of Governors Committee meeting notes, ARC' s QA (through the
QCOC) stated that it was closely monitoring all corrective actions related to internal DCSC audit
observations and ensuring that staffing levels were adequate to continue merging the regions' donor
management functions into the DCSC. FDA reviewed numerous problems opened as a result ofthe
internal audit findings and observed that corrective actions were not developed and/or implemented
promptly. However, the merging ofregions into the DCSC continued. For example, FDA' s review of
ARC' s internal audits ofthe DCSC problem management function found the following deviations from
the Decree and the Problem Management Standard Operating Procedure (PM SOP)
7
:
i. ARC's October 2008 audit ofthe Philadelphia and Charlotte DCSC facilities cited
untimely problem management. In response, the DCSC opened Exception E-0455175 (Issue I
00 17862-FC) (discovered 10/22/08 and closed on 3/31110) and determined root causes that
included inadequate staffing levels, inexperienced staff, inadequate training, and a lack of
tracking mechanisms to ensure timely problem management. The corrective action plan
included hiring and training additional staff, developing tracking queries for the DCSC, and
establishing a group to manage post donation information problems. QA approved the corrective
action plan on 2/3/ 10 and implementation is documented as having been completed on 2/4/10
and 3/23/10. Issue I-0017862-FC states that the effectiveness check would be performed under
Exception E-0680169 (Issue I-0017441-FC). ARC took approximately 17 months (from
10/22/08 to 3/23/ 1 0) to approve and implement a corrective action to address untimely problem
management at the DCSC.
ii. ARC' s June 2009 audit ofthe Philadelphia DCSC facility cited untimely
management ofproblems. The audit report indicated that staff had been hired and that all
moderate and major risk problems were being managed in Charlotte because Philadelphia was
not fully staffed. It further stated that the DCSC continued to have a backlog ofproblems. In
response, the DCSC opened Exception E-0595168 (Issue I-0015324-FC) (discovered 6/5/09) and
determined that root causes included inadequate monitoring processes, lack ofstaffing
proficiency, and a heavy workload. QA approved the corrective action plan on 8/24/09 after two
corrective action plan extensions. The corrective action plan was not fully implemented until
2/24/ 10. The final effectiveness check had not been completed as of 10/11/10, approximately 16
months after discovery ofthe problem, and the problem remained open.
111. ARC' s January 2010 audit ofthe Philadelphia DCSC facility cited untimely
management ofproblems. The DCSC response referred to previously developed corrective
action plans documented in Issue I-0017862-FC (the corrective action plan for the October 2008
audit) and Issue I-0017441-FC (the corrective action plan for the October 2009 audit). The root
cause described in the DCSC response was a lack ofresources to consistently manage problems
in a timely manner. The corrective action plan included hiring staff, including a problem
management manager, and establishing a separate post donation information problem group.
iv. ARC's March 2009 audit ofthe Charlotte DCSC facility cited untimely
management ofproblems. The auditor reported a backlog of more than 200 minor, moderate,
and major risk problems. In response, the DCSC opened Exception E-0551794 (Issue I
0013588-FC) (discovered 3/27/09, closed 5/4/ 10) and determined that the root causes included
inadequate staffmg, noting that only two staff members had experience with moderate and major
The two DCSC facilities have overlapping problem management responsibilities; therefore, BHQ audit observations and corrective actions affected both
locat ions. For example, one audit report states that all moderate and major problems were being managed in Charlotte because Philadelphia was not fully
staffed. QA management also stated that al l post donation information problems are managed by staff in Philadelphia.
7
risk problems and a lack ofoversight by the DCSC. The corrective action plan included training
more staff to handle moderate and major risk problems, assigning oversight responsibilities, and
tracking the age of problems. QA approved the corrective action plan on 4/29/09. Issue 1
0013588-FC documented the corrective action plan as implemented between 4/30/09 and
7/30/09. The sustained effectiveness check was not completed until 4/ 16/10, more than a year
after discovery ofthe problem. ARC deemed the corrective action plan effective at that time.
v. ARC's October 2009 audit of the Charlotte DCSC facility cited untimely
management of problems. The DCSC opened Exception E-0680 169 (Issue I -0017 441-FC)
(discovered 1 0/23/09, closed 6/111 0) and documented the root causes as lack ofan adequate
tracking mechanism, problems not always being assif:,7Jled as they were discovered, and the
outsourcing of problem management cases due to staffing levels. The proposed corrective action
plan included developing tracking mechanisms and hiring QA and problem management staff by
12/ 1/09. QA approved the corrective action plan on 11/30/09. One tracking mechanism was
implemented on 10/26/09 and a second was implemented on 1/29/10. Staff positions were
opened on 1/29/1 0. The effectiveness check was completed on 5/3/ 10 and the problem closed
6/1/10, eight months after the problem was discovered.
f. ARC's June 2009 audit of the Philadelphia DCSC facility cited observations pertaining to
the DCSC failure to review donor management records in a timely manner. For example,
i. ARC's internal audit report includes the observation that post donation
information and donor ca11 back cases were not being process-verified in "a reasonable time
period." In response, the DCSC opened Exception E-0595192 (Issue 1-0020482-FC) (di:;covered
615109, still open as of 10/8/1 0) and determined the DCSC did not consider process verification a
priority because there is no deadline, there were competing priorities, and there was a lack of
staff proficiency. The DCSC audit response states that they were already aware of the process
verification backlog and had developed a plan to address it. The corrective action plan included
slowing down the consolidation and changing the work flow. The proposed effectiveness check
states that QA would do periodic case reviews to ensure that process verification is timely and
that cases are completed. QA approved the corrective action plan on 7/20/10. Only one part of
the corrective action plan is documented as having been completed on 8/30/10. The Exception
Report states that the corrective action plan was ineflective, but at the time of the FDA
inspection, there was no documentation of any fo llow-up corrective action investigation to
address this problem.
ii. ARC's internal auclit report includes the observation that the DCSC failed to
ensure timely and accurate management ofDRIRs. The DCSC opened Exception E-0595184
(Issue I-0011152-NF and Issue I-0020136-FC) (discovered 6/5/09, closed 8/3/1 0). (The problem
was later linked to Exception E-0794874, Issue I-0010881-FC, which addresses the FDA 483
observation issued at the Badger Hawkeye Region on 4/2311 0.) The DCSC determined the root
cause included Lack ofstaff proficiency and lack of a well defmed process. The DCSC response
stated that it was aware of the problem and had held workshops and proposed to establish a
DRIR group by 8/1/09, and to conduct another workshop. Additionally, the corrective action
plan included time studies by a ' lean engineer, ' development of a backlog plan, clarifying DRIR
time frames, and the hiring of. staffmembers to handle donor eligibility calls. QA approved
the corrective action plan on 6/2/10. Issue I-0020136-FC indicates the corrective action plan was
Page 8 - Mr. J . Chris Hrouda
not fully implemented until 7/21110. There was no due date documented for one ofthe
effectiveness checks, which was not completed as of 912110, 15 months after the problem was
identified.
Decree Vwlations: Failure to Comply with Reporting Requirements
3. Paragraph XJX requires ARC to report in writing to FDA any partial or complete suspensions of
operations ofone or more regions and/or laboratories. On 5/10/10, ARC notified FDA ofa complete
suspension of operations at a mobile blood drive held in the Connecticut Region on 5/8/10 (Exception E
0802346). The report stated that the collections operations were suspended at 1 :30 p.m. due to extreme
temperature conditions, two donor reactions, and staff feeling ill. However, during an inspection ofthe
Connecticut Region in May-June 2010, FDA discovered that the 5/10110 report was inaccurate because
the operations had not been suspended and ARC collected 16 blood donations at that drive between 1:30
and 2:59p.m.
Decree Violations: Inadequate National Donor Deferral Register
8
4. Decree paragraph IV.B.lO requires ARC to maintain a National Donor Deferral Register
(NDDR) that contains an accurate and complete list of all ARC nationally deferred donors from each
region. The safety of the blood supply depends on effective screening ofdonors to identify risk factors
for diseases transmissible by blood and blood components, and the deferral of high-risk potential donors.
Because of the mobility of the population of potential donors, the effective implementation ofa national
register of deferred donors is necessary to help ensure that accurate and current deferral information is
available to ARC facilities nationwide. During an inspection ofthe Southern California Region in
August-September 2010, FDA's review of records pertaining to permanently deferred donors revealed
that ARC has not established an accurate and complete list ofall permanently deferred donors, as
required at 21 CFR 606.160( e). Information pertaining to permanently deferred donors from each ARC
region is sent- to the DCSC to be incorporated into the ARC's NDDR. The NDDR was created
because the ARC's National Blood Computer System, which services its 36 regional facilities, does not
share donor deferral information among regions. The- ufdates to the NDDR are shared with all
regions in a table format referred to as an NDDR "pushed table" so that any region can identify
pem1anently deferred donors during the donor registration process, regardless of which region deferred
the donor.
ARC NDDR is not adequate because, for example: ( 1) permanently deferred donors may not be
identified during donor registration at the regions because the NDDR "pushed tables" only contain the
donor's current infonnation and not the "before images"
10
for donors who previously donated under
different names; and (2) permanently deferred donors usjng hyphenated names may not be identified if
attempting to donate using just one part ofthe hyphenated last name. FDA's record review identified
nine permanently deferred donors listed on pushed tables that did not include their previously used last
names. The absence of such information prevents ARC from performing an adequate evaluation ofits
NDDR records in order to prevent the distribution of subsequently donated blood products from donors
whose blood should not be accepted for donation. For example,
8
21 CfR 606.1 60(c) requires lhlll a record be available from which oosuitable donors may be identitied so that products made from the blood ofsuch
individuals will not be distributed. ACR refers to this record as the Donor Deferral Register.
9
"Pushed tables" are the mecllanism used to share information on permanently deferred donors among regions. If that information is not shared, regions are
unaware when another region has pennanenlly deferred donors.
10
A "before image" is a historical record ofchallges made to the donor record in National Biomedical Computer System.
Page 9 - Mr. J. Chris Hr ouda
a. A donor with a merged record had a newer identity under the initials- and an original
identity under the initials. However, the NDDR contains the donor's current name only (initials
-
b. Donors with hyphenated names are assigned multiple soundex codes.
11
For example, the
soundex code for has a hyphenated name, is different for the first part, second part and
entire hyphenated three parts ofDonor. s name were given different soundex codes.
Therefore, the NDDR only contains the donor's current information.
Decree Violations: Inadequate Problem Management
5. Paragraph IV .B.l. requires ARC to establish and submit to FDA a PM SOP to detect, investigate,
evaluate, correct, and monitor all problems, trends, and systemic problems.
12
The Decree directs that the
PM SOP include specific instructions to implement and document problem management requirements at
ARC's BHQ as well as at the regional and laboratory facilities.
Decree Violations: Problem Management [Management of Suspect Blood Products]
Failure to promptly implement adequate corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the failure to control
suspect
13
blood or blood components. FDA has repeatedly cited ARC for this deviation, in letters issued
pursuant to paragraph VI.A. ofthe original Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction entered on May 12,
1993, and in ADLs issued pursuant to the Decree entered on April15, 2003. ARC has repeatedly
promised to implement and monitor corrective actions, but the corrective actions have not prevented
recurrence ofthe problem.
14
The failures described below are particularly serious because the failure to
control suspect products and to correct the causes oferrors increases the likelihood that unsuitable blood
products will be transfused. For example,
a. The DCSC identified trends related to the improper management of suspect blood
products and inventory management, but failed to promptly and thoroughJy correct the problems. For
example,
i. A trend was identified for Biological Product Deviation (BPD) code QC-96-01-25
(product in wrong physical location, wrong electronic location) in October 2009. The trend was
discovered on 11/30/09, and Exception E-0707671 (Issue 1-00 18721-FC) was created. The
problem was closed on 2/1 8/ 10. The docwnented root cause was "Current process flows and
functional roles do not meet System 11 requirements as they include hand-offs with steps that
should be performed consecutively and immediately." The Issue report states that no formal
A soundex code is a. igit code. The soundcx algorithm calculates .. ..........
12
Paragraph 01.8 .52 defines "problem" as "any deviation from the law, ARC SOPs, or this Order, however discovered, recorded, or reported, including, but
not limited to deviations rep011cd in ARC Clarify repons (andlor in any other successor or similar deviation-reporting systems andlor reports), biological
product deviation reports, internal deviation reporu, trends, adverse reaction reports, lookhack cases, cases ofsuspectedtran.sfusion fran.smifted disease,
potential system (systemic) problems, system (systemic) problems, SUpply and equipment problem reports, FDA-483s, compliancerclatcd FDA
correspondence, internal and extcmol audit reports, and retrievals." Paragraph lll.S.63 defines "system (systemic) problem" as "a problem that results from
a defect in ARC policies, procedures, or supplies and affects either more than oneARC region and/or laboratory, or warrants corrective action
which, when implemented, could affect more than oneARCregion andlor /aborOU>ry." Paragraph 111.8.64 defi nes ''trend" as "the recurrence or multiple
contemporaneous occurrences ofthe same or similarproblems in one or more than one ARC region and! or laboratory."
ll ARC defines "suspect" blood products as those which "may or may not meet safety, quality, identity, purity, and potency (SQUJPP) requirements and are
potentially non-confonning." Directive: Mismanagement ofSuspect Products, 11.2.002, version 1.6.
14
See Attacb01tnt B for details ofcompliance history related to failure to control suspect blood or blood
11
corrective action will be taken due to the corrective actions implemented under another problem
on 11/ 18/09 (Exception 0599613/lssue 1-0015339-FC) which QA approved on 2/ 16/ 10.
ii. A trend was identified for the same BPD code in February 2010. The trend was
discovered on 3/24/ 10, and Exception E-0774042 (Issue 1-0019647-FC) was created. As of
10/1110, the problem was still open. The documented root cause was, "Due to the original
design ofthe Donor and Client Support Center (DCSC) workflow, there is a waiting period from
the point when unsuitable components are identified to the time when they are managed or
retrieved." The Issue report indicates that QA approved the corrective action plan on 5/27/ 10,
and it was implemented the same day; however, the approved corrective action plan is only a
reference to corrective actions related to another problem. The interim effectiveness checks were
deemed effective on 7/27/ 1 0; however, as of 10/111 0, there was no record that the sustained
effectiveness check, which was due 8/26/10, was completed. Additionally, the records related to
the other referenced problem indicate that implementation ofthe corrective action plan was not
fully completed until10/5/10.
m. A trend was identified for BPD code QC-90-0 1-05 (failure to adequately manage
potentially non-conforming products, product not released) in May 2010. The trend was
discovered on 6/30/10, and Exception E-08311 04 (Issue I -00 11219-NF) was created. The
problem was closed on 8/2/ 10. The root cause was identified as, "The original process flows
associated with these gain control and retrieval processes did not provide staff with the
experience and responsibility to perform their required functions as a suspect product identifier."
The problem was closed without developing a corrective action plan, but instead referenced
corrective actions and effectiveness checks addressed under four other Issue reports (Issue 1
0020891-FC, Issue 1-0016426-FC, Issue 1-0019143-FC, and Issue 1-0019389-FC). A review of
Exception E-0625538 (discovered 7 /31109) and Exception E-0780785 (discovered 3/31/1 0),
which are both associated with Issue 1-0019389-FC, found that a corrective action plan extension
was approved for both problems on 4/30/ 10 and an additional corrective action plan extension
was reque&ted for Exception E-0625538 on 8/ 17/09. QA approved the corrective action plan
under Issue 1-0019389-FC on 5/ 19/10. One part ofthe corrective action plan was implemented
by 5/31110, but the other three parts were not implemented until 10/5/1 0. Both problems
remained open as of 10/ 14/10--one for more than 15 months and one for more than six months.
b. ARC discovered approximately 18 major risk problems coded as QC-90-01-05 (failure to
manage potentially non-conforming products, product not released) that occurred at the Philadelphia
DCSC facility during calendar year 2010. A review ofthose problem records found problem
management deficiencies. For example,
i. ARC did not conduct an adequate root cause analysis, develop an appropriate
corrective action plan, or conduct an effectiveness check for Exception E-0790730 (Issue 1
0020041-FC), which was discovered on 4/ 16110 and remained open as of 10/7/10. The problem
description states that a hold was not applied to an in-date product for a donor with an XW3
assertion.
15
The root cause is described as "Due to the peculiarity ofthis case, [a supervisor] was
puzzled which resuited in unclear guidance to a new staff." The corrective action plan stated that
the supervisor "recognizes how to appropriately handle these types of cases so that he can better
15
An XW3 assertion is ARC' s donor indefinite deferral code for donors with a history of hepatitis, bleeding conditions, blood diseases and/or who tested
positive for the HIV/AIDS virus by a non-ARC facility.
communicate to staff the appropriate actions that are required." QA approved the corrective
action plan on 5/21/ 10 and Issue I-0020041-FC states the corrective action plan was
implemented on 5/21/10; however, a corrective action plan was not listed in the report. The
effectiveness check was due on 8/27/ 10, but as of 10/7/ 10 had not been completed.
ii. ARC failed to implement a corrective action plan in a timely manner for
Exception E-0751845 (Issue 1-0019143-FC), which was discovered 2/17/10 and remained open
as of 10/7/ 10. The problem description states that no immediate effort was made to regain
physical control ofthe blood products for a possible DRJR-related infection. The documented
root cause was that the staff is feeling overwhelmed and frustrated. The corrective action plan
was to develop a process to ensure a more structured management of DRJR cases and to develop
a phone schedule. QA approved the corrective action plan on 3/17/ 10, but it was not
implemented until9/27110.
111. ARC failed to implement a corrective action plan and complete an effectiveness
check in a timely manner for Exception E-0746476 (Issue I-0018941-FC), which was discovered
on 2/5/10 and remained open as of 10/8/10. The problem description states that no hold was
applied and the receiving region was not notified to gain physical control ofa component
imported from another ARC region. The documented root cause was the staff failed to identify
the importance of gaining physical and electronic control ofthe component, "due to her lack of
knowledge with the American Red Cross and DCSC." The corrective action plan was that staff
will be counseled and will continue to gain experience; and the training department will develop
a communication to all staff and will conduct a training refresher. QA approved the corrective
action plan on 3110/ 10. Implementation of all corrective actions was not completed until
7/27/10, more than five months after discovery. Effectiveness checks due dates were 9/7/ 10 and
919110, but were not completed as of 10/8/10, more than eight months after discovery of the
problem.
6. Failure to promptly, thoroughly, and adequately investigate and correct problems in accordance
with the Decree and with ARC' s PM SOP. For example,
Decree Violations: Problem Management [Donor Reaction/Injury Records (DRIRs)]
a. During the inspection ofthe DCSC, FDA observed that ARC identified trends
16
related to
DRIRs beginning in June 2009, but failed to promptly and thoroughly correct and prevent recurrence of
DRIR documentation problems. For example:
i. On 9/30/09, ARC identified a trend, which occurred in June 2009, related to BPD
code BC-40-01-02 (adverse reaction donor: incorrect/missing documentation on Donor
Reaction/Injury Reports). Exception E-0664347 was created on 9/30/09. The root cause
investigation and corrective action plan development (Issue I-0018632-FC) did not begin until
2/5/10, four months after discovery ofthe trend problem. An extension ofthe 30-day corrective
action plan development time frame was granted by QA on 2/6/10. The documented justification
for the extension was that the original corrective action plan was due on 10/30/09, but the
problem was not assigned to a Problem Investigator untill/12/10. The root cause is documented
16
"Trend" is defmed in note II above. The DCSC began trending in accordance with the Decree and with WI 1 0.3. 13, Trend Identification by Facilities, in
September 2009.
as "staffare hurried and rushing to complete the form and overlook errors and omissions. The
DRJR is filled out electronically and it is easy to overlook omissions on the form." The Issue
further states that "no additional corrective actions are necessary at this time" and refers to
corrective actions implemented on 11/24/09 and 1/31/10 under BHQ system trend Exception E
0603 257. The DCSC Q A staff approved the proposed corrective action plan on 2/1811 0 and
closed the trend on 2/24110, five months after the trend was discovered.
ii. ARC BHQ system trend (referenced in 6.a.i above) was discovered on 6/23/09.
Exception report E-0603257 (Issue I-0000334-EFC) was created on 6/23/09 and was closed on
6/29/10. The described problem is incomplete or incorrect documentation ofDRIRs. The root
causes cited in Issue I-0000334-EFC include: "donor adverse reactions are rare stressful events
and staff busy attending to the donor fail to document all required information... ;" "staff
inattention to detail and lack offocus .. . ; misinterpretation of the Work Instructions; failure to
refer to the form instructions; gaps in DRJR instructions; and the format ofthe DRIR form." The
corrective action plan was approved by QA on 12/2/09, approximately five months after
discovery of the trend. The corrective action plan included the release of a communication in
November 2009 to remind staff ofrequirements and clarify instructions. The effectiveness check
success criterion was - mprovement. On 6/15110, ARC used data from 2/1110 through
4/30/10 to perform the effectiveness check. They deemed the corrective action effective with
only a 41% improvement. However, 41% is not sufficient and. is clearly inadequate as a
goal.
111. On 5/25/10, a trend was discovered again at the DCSC for BPD code BC-40-0 1
02 (adverse reaction donor: incorrect/missing documentation on Donor Reaction/Injury Record).
The trend occurred in April2010. Exception E-0811555 (Issue I-0020944-FC) was created and
was still open as of I 0/1/10. The root causes cited include staffnot reviewing their work and
"shortage ofdedicated DRIR staff." An extension for the corrective action plan development
was requested on 6/17110 and was granted by the DCSC QA the same day. A second extension
was requested on 7113110 and was granted on 7/14/10. The corrective action plan, which was
approved by QA on 9/8110, included a reminder to affected staff of the DRJR requirements,
hiring additional DRIR staff, and providing refresher training to other staff members that
perform DRJR tasks. The staff reminder is documented as completed on 9/27/ 10, four months
after discovery ofthe trend.
Decree Violations: Problem Management [DRIRs Failing to Reach the DCSC from the Regions]
b. On 7/911 0, ARC discovered a problem related to missing DRIRs that were sent by the
regions to the DCSC. Exception E-0836426 was created on 7/12/10. As of 10/8/10, ARC had not
completed an investigation into the root cause of missing DR1Rs and had granted two extensions for the
development ofa corrective action plan untilll/12/1 0, four months after initially discovering the
problem. A record review was completed in July 2010 for the period 12/ 1109 through 6/30/10. and
identified 292 donor adverse reaction or injury cases with missing DRIR.s. The safety of donors depends
on the prompt investigation into the causes of donor injuries and reactions, to correct causes ofsuch
injuries where possible, and to implement training for appropriate staffintervention. The
mismanagement of records interferes with that process.
Decree Violations: Problem Management [Confirmatory Test Results and the Donor Deferral
Register]
c. During the inspection of the DCSC, FDA observed that ARC identified trends related to
management ofconfirmatory infectious disease test results and Donor Deferral Registry (DDR) entry,
but failed to promptly and thoroughly investigate, correct, and prevent the problems. For example,
i. On 10/29/09, ARC identified a trend for BPD code DD-30-01-10 (confirmatory
results/DDR entry not performed/not timely) that began in September 2009. Exception E
0683307 (Issue I-00 17599-FC) was created and was closed on 2/23110. The root causes were
cited as inattention to detail due to staff being new, not understanding, or rushing. The proposed
corrective action plan refers to corrective action taken under another problem (Issue I-00 16921
FC). QA approved the corrective action plan on 12118/09 and the Issue report shows the
corrective action plan was implemented on 12/18/09. It is described as "Reiterate the need for
staff to slow down and pay closer attention to information being entered and to make sure that
they go back and review entries prior to moving to the next step." The corrective action plan
also required supervisors to observe the involved staff while performing test result entry. The
effectiveness check was performed and the corrective action was deemed effective by ARC on
2/19/10. However, the records for Issue I-0016921-FC, which was referenced as the corrective
action plan for the trend problem, indicate that it was not fully implemented until4/27110 and the
effectiveness check was not completed until 6/23/ 10.
ii. On 10/29/09, ARC identified a trend for BPD code DD-30-01-12 (incorrect/no
computer property/assertion applied, no product released) for September 2009. Exception E
0683302 (Issue I-00 17306-FC) was created 10/29/09. The root causes included misinterpretation
ofinstructions, staff new to task, staff not aware they could remove assertions, and limited
experience with holds. The investigation did not address why staff had been released to perform
tasks they did not understand, yet QA approved the corrective action plan on 11118/09. The
Issue report shows that the corrective action plan included the development ofa communication
document for staff as well as the development and implementation of a new operational team.
The problem was closed on 5/ 11110. However, because ofthe inadequacy ofthe corrective
action plan, the DCSC subsequently had a trend recurrence for BPD code DD-30-01-12 in
August 201 0.
Decree Violations: Problem Management [Consignee Notification
17
]
d. During the inspection ofthe DCSC, FDA observed that ARC identified trends related to
consignee notification, but failed to promptly and thoroughly correct and prevent the problems. Prompt
notification to consignees regarding the distribution ofunsuitable blood products is essential to
preventing such products from being transfused. For example,
i. On 9/30/09, ARC identified a trend for BPD code MI-00-01-19 (48 hour
notification to consignee not performed/complete/timely for distributed expired products) in June
17
Paragraph X.E ofthe Decree requires ARC to notify consignees and FDA's Baltimore District Office within 48 hours after initially learning that a unit of
unsuitable blood or blood component has been distributed. Paragraph X.F. ofthe Decree requires ARC, within 10 days of initially discovering a problem
that may have resulted in the release for distribution of units of unsuitable blood or blood components, to review and document the review ofall records
necessary to determine whether distribution of units of unsuitable blood or blood components in fact occurred and to identify all related units of unsuitable
blood or blood components that were, may have been, or may be distributed.
2009. Exception E-0664458 (Issue I-0020096-FC) was created on 9/30/09 for missed 48 hour
consignee notification and missed follow up timelines. Corrective action plan development
extensions were approved by QA on 10/20/09, 12/1/09, and 4/28/10. The justification for the
4/28/10 extension was "staff issues and lack of good tracking mechanisms ...." No investigation
of the trend problem was documented until 5/ 18/10. QA approved the corrective action plan on
7/611 0, ten months after discovery of the trend. The root causes are cited as "poor work
practices/work flow including poor follow-up, insufficient reviews, and oversight." The
described corrective action plan included restructuring the DCSC into functional teams and
revising work flows to standardize gain control activities. Approximately one year after
discovery ofthe trend, the corrective action plan has not been fully implemented. Functional
teams were not implemented at the Philadelphia DCSC as late as June 2010 and at the Charlotte
DCSC as late as September 2010, as described in the Issue report. The status ofthe work flow
revisions is not documented. The trend problem remained open as of 10/ 1/ 10, twelve months
after identifying the trend.
ii. On 9/24/ 10, ARC identified a trend for MI-00-01-23 (recall/market withdrawal
records incorrect/incomplete/not timely, including late follow up letters to consignees) in August
2010. Exception E-0878847 was created on 9/27/10. The problem description refers to the June
2009 MI-00-01-19 trend being managed under Exception E-0664458, as described in the item
above. The trend problem remained open as of 10/1/ 10, twelve months after identifying the
trend, with no documentation ofan investigation or corrective action.
Decree Violations: Problem Management [Lookback Investigations]
e. During the inspection ofthe DCSC, FDA observed that ARC had discovered problems
related to the management oflookback cases dating back to 3/ 15/10, but failed to promptly correct those
problems. When a person donates blood early in an infection, screening and testing may not detect the
presence of an infectious agent (the "window period"). After the infection is discovered, it is important
to identify and "lookback" at prior donations that might have been collected during the "window period"
in order to identify, notify and test any recipient of a transfusion ofblood or blood components collected
during the "window period." Such process is necessary for the protection of blood product recipients.
For example,
i. Issue I-0019746-FC was created 4/26/10 to implement a formal corrective action
for 17 different problems involving management of lookback investigations. The oldest ofthose
problems was discovered on 3/15/10, yet a corrective action plan was not approved by QA until
6/25/10, more than three months after the initial date ofdiscovery. The root causes of these
problems are identified as "supervisors are not consistently reviewing with their staff the open
cases report generated from the Access Lookback Log" and "Operations Staff ofthe involved
Supervisors may not have been trained to generate and use reports in the Lookback log
database." The effectiveness checks were not due until 12/ 10/10, nine months after the oldest
problem was discovered.
ii. A trend related to the management oflook back investigations was discovered on
6/30/10. Exception E-0831094 (Issue I-0011220-NF) was created on 6/30/10 and was closed on
8/2/10. No formal corrective action plan was required by ARC and the Issue report references
the formal corrective action implemented in Issue I-0019746-FC discussed in the item above.
However, Issue I -00197 46-FC remained open at the time ofthe September-October 2010
inspection because the effectiveness checks were not due until 12/10/10, nine months after the
oldest problem involving the management oflookback investigations was discovered.
111. On 8/31/10, ARC discovered another trend related to the management of
lookback investigations. Exception E-0864242 (Issue I-0011479-NF) was created on 8/31/ 10.
The Issue report also referenced the formal corrective action implemented in Issue I-0019746
FC, discussed in the item above, which remained open at the time ofthe September-October
2010 inspection, because the effectiveness checks were not due unti112/ 10/ 10, nine months after
the oldest problem involving the management oflookback investigations was discovered.
Decree Violations: Problem Management [Failure to Meet Established Timeframes]
f. During the DCSC inspection, FDA investigators requested a search ofARC's automated
problem management system for the period 111110 through 9/22/ 10. A review ofthe results revealed
that the DCSC does not always meet the established time frames required in ARC' s PM SOP and in the
Decree. For example, FDA observed that the query showed 90 problems in which the DCSC failed to
comply with the paragraph X.E requirement to notify consignees within 48 hours "after initially learning
that a unit of unsuitable blood or blood component has been distributed."
g. During an inspection ofthe Indiana-Ohio Region in July 2010, FDA discovered that ARC
failed to promptly correct a problem related to the late entry of a donor into the NDDR. For example, a
donor was confirmed positive for anti-HTL V on 116/ 10, but the result was not promptly entered into
ARC' s National Biomedical Computer System until4/4/10 and was not promptly submitted for entry
into the NDDR by the DCSC until4/5/ 10. Exception E-0781884 was opened on 4/6/10. It was merged
with 27 other problems (in Issue I-0019116-FC, created 3/ 11/ 10) involving similar occurrences in other
regions. The investigation determined the root causes were a lack of defined processes and
misinterpretation oftimeframes for reconciliation oftest results. QA approved the corrective action plan
on 5/11110, yet there was no documentation that the corrective action plan was implemented as of
7/16/ 10, four months after Issue I-0019116-FC was created. The corrective action plans that were
approved by QA did not adequately address the identified root causes and the effectiveness checks were
not adequate to assess effectiveness ofthe corrective action plan.
Decree Violations: Problem Management {Overweight Units]
h. During an inspection ofthe Heart ofAmerica Region in June-August 2010, FDA's
review of monthly trend records for BPD code BC-43-03 ( overbleed; not discovered prior to component
preparation) in December 2009 revealed that ARC did not follow Work Instruction 10.3.013, Trend
Identification by Facilities, Version 2.1, when analyzing data for the effectiveness checks for the
corrective action plans implemented for Exception E-0717565 (discovered in December 2009) (Issue I
0018377-FC). For example, the effectiveness check query found 13 additional overweight units during
the queried period. ARC eliminated six ofthose occurrences from its effectiveness check calculation
because their failure modes were "unknown." ARC deemed the corrective action plan effective and
closed the trend problem. FDA requested a query for March through June 2010 and found there were
five additional occurrences of overweight units.
Decree Violations: Failure to Follow Standard Operating Procedure
7. Failure to comply with paragraph IV.A.l., which requires "continuous compliance with this
Order, the law, and ARC SOPs." For example, during an inspection of the Southwest Region in July
August 2010, FDA observed that ARC did not follow its written procedures pertaining to consignee
notification in order to determine the fmal disposition of a blood product. The region held 25 imported
components out ofcontrolled storage in excess of 30 minutes. The region opened Exception E-07 48767
(Issue I-0004237) and Biological Product Deviation Report E-0748767 was opened on 2/12/10 and the
region notified the DCSC to manage the components. The DCSC placed holds on the components and
notified consignees. FDA's review from the DCSC found that the DCSC had no
final disposition for five components and two components had a final disposition of"Q" (quarantine).
According to Work Instruction 11.3.011, Sending Retrieval Letters and Notifications, Version 1.5, ifthe
consignee does not respond to the first notification, a second notice must be sent in order to obtain the
final disposition ofthe recalled component. The DCSC failed to send the second letters. Additionally,
FDA noted during a subsequent review ofthe records that the Component Status Change Record for the
recall found that it had not been process-verified five months after being created.
GMP VIOLATIONS:
GMP Violations: Inadequate System for the Distribution or Receipt of Blood Products
8. Failure to establish and maintain a distribution and receipt procedure that includes a system by
which the distribution or receipt of each unit of blood can be readily determined to facilitate its recall, if
necessary [21 CFR 606.165(a)]. This procedure is necessary to ensure that unsuitable products are
promptly recalled and not transfused. For example,
a. During an inspection of the Heart of America Region in June-August 2010, FDA
discovered that on 12/15/08, ARC changed the manner in which it assigns a unique number to the label
ofeach unit of pooled cryoprecipitate. Prior to that date, each unit was assigned a four digit number,
and after that date a nine digit number was assigned. The nine digit unique number is applied to the
label on each unit of pooled however, the computer record for each such unit continued
to use the four digit format. ARC's relevant written procedures still do not provide adequate
instructions to ensure that staff responsible for blood product retrieval and consignee notification
consider whether the unit was distributed prior to or after the change to the numbering format.
Beginning February 2009, the Heart ofAmerica Region's donor management functions, including blood
component retrieval and consignee notification, were consolidated with the DCSC. FDA's review of
records pertaining to consignee notification for units ofpooled cryoprecipitate found that the DCSC
notified consignees using the incorrect unit number format for four units. For example, pooled
cryoprecipitate unit 2399 was distributed on 5/30/08. It was subsequently determined to require
retrieval by ARC due to high risk behavior by one of the donors. On 12/2/2009, the DCSC notified the
consignee ofthat unit by letter, using the erroneous nine-digit number 040C02399. The DCSC
documented the unit's final disposition on a Component Status Change Record (CSCR) as discarded;
however, the FDA investigator was informed during the inspection that the documentation to support
that final disposition was misplaced. During the inspection, ARC again notified the consignee with the
correct four digit unit number and the consignee responded that the unit had been transfused into a
patient on 6/26/08.
During the inspection, ARC reported to FDA that as a result ofthis observat ion, it had opened an
investigation and identified an additional 62 cases that were managed by the DCSC using the wrong unit
number format. Those cases involved regions other than the Heart ofAmerica. In its 9/8/10 response to
the FDA 483, ARC stated that the problem was caused by a procedural gap and that it was a system
wide problem.
b. During an inspection ofthe Northern California Region in September 2010, FDA
discovered that the DCSC was unable to locate documentation for the final dispositions of 31 Red Blood
Cell units that were subject to retrieval. A Material Review Board decided to retrieve the products after
it was discovered that the storage temperature of the units, documented at the time ofreceipt, was
unacceptable. ARC contacted the consignee ofthe units to request a copy ofthe missing notification
documentation. The CSCR form documented that all 31 units were destroyed. However, the consignee
reported that eight units had been transfused into patients. The CSCR, with the incorrect dispositions,
had been process-verified by the DCSC on 3/4/10, but the discrepancies were not detected.
GMP Violations: Failure to Follow Manufacturer's Instructions
9. Failure to ensure that supplies are used in a manner consistent with the manufacturer' s
instructions, as required at 21 CFR 606.65(e); and failure to prepare the phlebotomy site using a
method that gives maximum assurance of a sterile container ofblood [21 CFR 640.4(f)]. For example,
During an inspect ion ofthe Southern California Region in August-September 2010, FDA observed
collection staff placing hand warmers directly on Whole Blood donors' arms over prepared phlebotomy
sites. Only a piece of gauze separated the hand warmer from the area where the venipuncture was
performed. This action may have compromised sterility during the collection procedure. FDA' s review
of the manufacturer's instructions for the hand warmer found that they specifically stated, "***Do not
use***on parts ofthe body other than the hand***." ARC's 11/4/ 10 response to the FDA 483
acknowledged that this use ofhand warmers was inappropriate and could bum donors' skin.
GMP Violations: Failure to Maintain and/or Follow Written Procedures
10. Failure to establish, maintain and follow written procedures that include all steps to be followed
in the collection, processing, compatibility testing, storage, and distribution ofblood and blood
components for transfusion and further manufacturing purposes [21 CFR 606.1 OO(b)]. For example,
a. During the inspection ofthe DCSC, FDA reviewed ARC's management of recipient
complication cases, in which a patient had difficulty with a blood transfusion. ARC' s Job Aid
11.4.ja056, Timing Guidelines for Recipient Complication Investigations, Version 1.0, requires that the
DCSC complete a recipient complication case investigation within three months ofit being opened or
document why the case remains open. In addition, the Job Aid requires that a monthly review of each
opened case file be performed, to ensure that actions are being appropriately managed. However, FDA
reviewed nine recipient complication investigations during the inspection ofthe Philadelphia DCSC
facility and discovered the following:
i. Case ID DCSC-P-053-TR-TRL00375 was opened on 11/04/09 and was closed
5/25/10, 202 days later. The case file did not have a justification for exceeding the 90 day time
frame documented in the case notes until2/ 16/ 10, the date ARC documented why the case was
open for more than three months. The file also contained no documentation that the case was
reviewed on a monthly basis to "ensure that actions are being appropriately managed."
ii. Case ID DCSC-P-053-TII-HBV00429 was opened on 12/28/09 and was closed
5/25/ 10, 158 days later. The case file did not have ajustification for exceeding the 90 day time
frame documented in the case notes until 5/25/ 10, the date ARC documented why the case was
open for more than three months. The file also contained no documentation that the case was
reviewed on a monthly basis to "ensure that actions are being appropriately managed."
m. Case ID DCSC-P-053-TTI-HBV00651 was opened on 4/28/10 and was closed
during the inspection on 10/611 0, 157 days later. The case file contained no j ustification for
exceeding the 90 day time frame documented inthe case notes Wltil 8/1 2/10, the date ARC
documented why the case was open for more than three months.
b. During an inspection of the Southeastern Michigan Region in August - September 2010,
FDA reviewed 26 transfusion reaction/recipient complication cases and discovered 11 that were not
managed according to ARC's written procedures. For example,
i. The DCSC opened a transfusion reaction/recipient complication case on 7/9/09
and closed it on 5/22/10, without justification for why the case was open for more than three
months.
ii The DCSC documented inaccurate final component dispositions on CSCRs.
Form 11.4.frm9, Component Status Change Records, Version 1.1, provides a component fmal
disposition section and states that if it mu::;L with "a valid disposition to the
fmal disposition." DCSC-C-013-TR-ORX00246 indicates that one component was marked
destroyed, but had in fact been shipped to a consignee. Another component was marked as
expired in-house, but in fact had been destroyed by the consignee.
c. During the inspection ofthe DCSC, FDA discovered that the DCSC has not established
adequate procedures to ensure that donor health history deferred reports are generated daily and that
failure to generate such reports will be detected promptly. According to the DCSC management, it has
been operating with only draft work flows for the health history deferred report review process. During
the inspection ofthe Philadelphia DCSC facility, FDA requested health history deferral records for July
2010 for three regions. The DCSC informed FDA that it had failed to generate five requested reports;
therefore, it failed to conduct a review ofeach listed donor with prior donations for potentially
unsuitable blood components requiring quarantine, retrieval, and consignee notification, when
necessary. Upon discovery during the inspection, the DCSC opened Exception report E-0869169 to
address the problem and review the omitted reports. Their review found that, due to the omission, prior
donations from five donors had not been managed appropriately. In addition, ARC discovered an
additional 18 omitted donor health history reports.
d. During an inspection ofthe Greater Alleghenies Region in September 2010, FDA
observed that during the blood donation process, the region provided donors with hand warmers prior to
collecting a blood sample using the finger stick method. The blood samples were collected for
hemoglobin determination as part ofthe donor health assessment to determine
management said the hand warmers are used in the winter with the ----
- ARC bas not established a written standard operating procedure for use of hand warmers to
increase blood flow when a donor's hands are cold. In addition, ARC has not provided training to the
collections staff regarding their use.
e. During an inspection of the Heart ofAmerica Region in June-August 2010, FDA
observed that ARC does not consistently follow Work Instruction 10.3.011, External Customer
Complaint Management, Version 1.1 and Directive 10.2.9, Managing Customer Concerns, Version 1.0.
For example, ARC's recruitment staff distributes "Blood Drive Sponsor Satisfaction Survey" forms to
mobile blood drive coordinators and/or chairpersons. A portion ofthe survey requests feedback
regarding the ARC blood drive staffing level. It also includes a space for comments. FDA's review of
survey forms found that complaints related to FDA-regulated functions were not investigated as
concerns or complaints, in accordance with established written procedures as required by 21 CFR
211.100(b) and 21 CFR 606.100(b). For example,
Survey cards for two mobile blood drives conducted on 11/4/09 and 12111/09 reported complaints
pertaining to a donor sprayed with blood and pertaining to donor injuries during phlebotomy.
During the inspection, ARC informed the FDA investigator that it believes complaints on the survey
cards are not complaints because they are solicited information and that Directive 1 0.2.9 only applies
when the donor takes the initiative to inform the staff ofthe complaint. Yet, Work Instruction 10.3.011
states that a complaint is "any written, electronic, or oral communication that alleges deficiencies related
to the identity, durability, reliability, safety, effectiveness, or performance of any device, blood
component, blood product, process, procedure, or employee performance that impacts donor or product
safety." ARC also solicits donor feedback through the internet and does not evaluate those to determine
whether there is an issue that should be managed as a concern or complaint, in accordance with its
written procedures and regulations. In its 9/8110 response to the FDA 483, ARC maintains that the
surveys are "proactive methods to improve business," that they are not "designed to assess regulatory
compliance," and that they are "outside the scope ofthe Problem Management SOPs." The response
further states that subsequent to the Heart of America inspection, it modified the survey to remove the
comment section and to add a statement directing the user to report donor issues to the collections lead
and to provide a contact number. ARC's response does not state how it modified the survey with
respect to complaints about staffing or how it will address staffing complaints that may appear on future
surveys.
f. During the inspection ofthe Penn Jersey Region in May-June 2010, FDA observed a
failure ofthe DCSC to follow written procedures to obtain final dispositions (January 2009 and March
201 0) for four components that were subject to retrieval because they were collected from a male donor
who was registered as a female. The DCSC also had no documentation to support the final dispositions
for the components. One CSCR had been process-verified, but the errors were not detected by the staff
performing the verification.
g. During inspections ofnine ARC regions and the Philadelphia DCSC, FDA discovered
multiple failures by ARC to follow written procedures pertaining to managing adverse donor reactions,
as required by 21 CFR 606.170(a). For example,
i. During an inspection ofthe Heart ofAmerica Region in June-August 2010, FDA
discovered that the region failed to conduct a thorough investigation of each reported adverse
reaction, as required by 21 CFR 606.170(a). For example, on 5/20/10, ARC received a report
of an adverse donor reaction from a high school blood drive coordinator regarding a blood drive
on 5/19/10. During the blood drive, a 16-year-old donor's hemoglobin test result was
unacceptable and a second blood sample was collected to re-test the donor' s hemoglobin level.
The donor was accepted for donation based on the results ofthe second test. The donor lost
consciousness and hit his/her head after a unit ofblood was collected. The report included
injuries sustained by the donor subsequent to falling in the canteen area. In an ARC document, a
collection staff member stated he/she had concerns about the donor's weight and was aware of
the loss of consciousness, but did not believe a DRIR was necessary. Even after the region
received the report from the high school coordinator on 5/20/10, it failed to document the event
on a DRIR and investigate the adverse reaction. It was not until 6/29/10, after FDA reviewed the
complaint from the high school, that the region addressed the adverse reaction and the failure to
document and investigate it. At that time, the region opened a problem report to investigate the
failure to initiate a DRIR upon receipt ofthe 5/20/10 report, but the problem report did not
address the failure ofthe collection staff to initiate a DRIR on 5/19/1 0, when the event occurred
at the collection site. ARC's 8/9/10 response to the FDA 483 states the root cause of the failure
to initiate a DRIR at the collection site is that the staff was focused on providing care to the
donor, which caused the failure to document the reaction. The root cause of the failure ofstaff at
the region to initiate a D RIR on 5/20/ 1 0 is that they "may not be familiar with recognizing all
aspects ofa donor reaction. These staff members focus primarily on the customer service
aspects ofthe concern and do not consistently identifY a potential donor reaction."
ii. During the inspection of the Heart of America Region, FDA also reviewed
Concern/Complaint forms for 2009 and 2010 and observed that eight ofthe forms included
complaints related to adverse donor reactions. There were no DRIRs initiated in response to
those complaints and there were no investigations of the reported adverse reactions. The reports
pertained to bruising and swelling at the venipuncture site, painful needle sticks, and injury to
arms and back subsequent to a donor fainting. In its 9/8/10 response, ARC stated that staff
responsible for investigating the donor reaction "may not be familiar with recognizing all aspects
of a donor reaction. These staff members focus primarily on the customer service aspects of the
concern and do not consistently identifY a potential donor reaction."
111. During the inspection of the Heart ofAmerica Region, FDA also reviewed DRIRs
completed during the period 3/1/10 through 5/2/10, and found three that had an untimely
Medical Director's review and/or final quality review. For example, a donor experienced a large
hematoma after donating on 3/ 15/10. The final quality review was not performed unti16/25/ 10.
The donor donated three more times before that final quality review was performed and
experienced another hematoma following one ofthose donations.
iv. During an inspection ofthe Badger Hawkeye Region in April2010, FDA
reviewed DRIRs initiated in 2009, and found 13 without the final quality review and five missing
the Medical Director review and the fmal quality review. On 5/3/2010, ARC reported a
Significant Corrective Action (Issue 1-0010881-NF) following its investigation of this FDA 483
observation issued to the Badger-Hawkeye Region in April2010. ARC reported to FDA in this
Significant Corrective Action that the DCSC facility in Charlotte had a backlog of approximately
2,000 DRIRs open for more than 60 days, demonstrating that the violations observed in the
Badger Hawkeye Region were only a small part ofa larger issue. ARC's corrective action was
to assign and train more staff, to approve overtime, to do a time study, and to change the filing
system.
v. During an inspection of the Great Lakes Region in April2010, FDA reviewed 47
DRIRs initiated during November 2009, and discovered that three had no final quality review
and two had untimely reviews.
vi. During an inspection ofthe Indiana-Ohio Region in July 2010, FDA reviewed 24
DRIRs and discovered that three had no Medical Director review and eleven with no final
quality review.
vii. During an inspection ofthe Appalachian Region in August 2010, FDA's review
ofDRIRs found five initiated in 2010 with no Medical Director's review or final quality review.
An additional 12 DRIRs (two initiated in 2009 and ten initiated in 201 0) had no final quality
review.
vm. During an inspection ofthe Northern Ohio Region in August-September 201 0,
FDA reviewed DRIRs initiated in 2010 and discovered that six had no final quality review.
Additionally, one DRIR was not reviewed by a supervisor and a Medical Director and had no
final quality review until eight months after the donor reaction. Only one attempt was made by
the DCSC to re-contact the donor, eight months after the reaction.
ix. During an inspection of the Arizona Region in September 2010, FDA reviewed
records related to a potential donor complication that involved a phlebotomist who stuck herself
with a needle, then stuck a donor with the same needle and collected a unit ofblood. For more
than a month, the DCSC did not notify a Medical Director and the donor was not deferred. In its
10/29/ 10 response to the FDA 483, ARC stated the DCSC staff member who managed the DRIR
associated with this incident was not aware ofthe need to immediately notify a Medical Director.
x. During the inspection of the Arizona Region in September 2010, FDA also
reviewed 13 DRIRs and discovered that 11 had no final quality review or an untimely final
quality review. Four DRIRs also had an untimely or late Medical Director' s review
xi. During an inspection ofthe Greater Alleghenies Region in September 2010, FDA
discovered five DRIRs that were initiated in 2010 and had no final quality review. Another
DRIR had the final quality review six months after the donor reaction.
xii. During an inspection ofthe Southeastern Michigan Region in August-September
2010, FDA reviewed DRIRs for the period 11/18/09 through 2/13/10, and discovered that 22 had
no final quality review.
xm. During the DCSC inspection, FDA reviewed 13 DRIR case files that were opened
in the DCSC in January, February, and March 2010, but had not been process-verified as of
September 2010, as required by ARC' s written procedures. FDA also found that six ofthe
DRIRs had no final quality review and six had no Medical Director review.
GMP Vwlations: Inadequate Training and Staffing Levels
11. Failure to ensure that the personnel responsible for the collection, processing, compatibility
testing, storage, or distribution ofblood or blood components are adequate in number, educational
background, training, and experience to assure competent performance oftheir assigned functions and to
ensure that the final product has the safety, purity, potency, identity, and effectiveness it purports or is
represented to possess [21 CFR 606.20(b)]. For example,
a. During an inspection ofthe Heart of America Region in June-August 2010, FDA's
review of adverse donor reaction procedures and cases revealed that ARC permitted Medical
Director designees located in the DCSC, who had no apparent medical training, to perform the
required Medical Director's review for major donor complications. The Medical Director' s
review includes a determination regarding donor suitability and a decision as to whether product
quarantine or retrieval is necessary as required in Form 15.4,frm015 , Donor Reaction and Injury
Record, Version 1.2. Job Aid 14.4.ja164, Final Case and Donor Suitability Assessment Code
and Case Types, Version 1.0, permits designees to perform the Medical Director's review. For
example, ARC permitted DCSC staff with no medical degree, certificate or medical training to
perform the Medical Director's reviews for the following adverse donor reactions:
i. An adverse donor reaction that was reported on 9/ 17/09, and included
seizures/convulsions.
ii. An adverse donor reaction that occurred on 12/3/09, and included a long
loss ofconsciousness and loss control.
111. An adverse donor reaction that occurred on 1/28110, and was reported to
ARC as a large hematoma (6"x3").
In its 9/8/ 10 response, ARC states that when it began consolidating donor management functions in the
DCSC, it decided to eliminate the requirement to have a Medical Director review all DRIRs because
minor reactions account for most ofthe post-donation reports. ARC further states that it trained DCSC
case investigators to serve as Medical Director designees for adverse reactions, including minor
complications, arterial punctures, large hematomas, and long loss ofconsciousness. However, ARC
states that, at the recommendation ofthe BHQ Medical Office, it decided to require a Medical Director' s
review of all major complications, except large hematomas. The implementation ofthat requirement
was scheduled for 9/15/ 10.
FDA also notes that despite permitting designees with no medical training, certification, or experience to
perform the reviews, ARC's 9/8/10 response states, "The practice ofmedicine requires physicians to use
available resources as necessary to make their medical assessment that may or may not include an
assessment of prior reactions or other medical history. Medical evaluation of donor reactions requires a
case-by-case approach and medical judgment; consequently, medical practice is not defined in ARC
procedures."
b. During an inspection ofthe Detroit National Testing Laboratory (NTL) in May-June
2010, FDA discovered that ARC did not thoroughly investigate a problem that it had detected. For
example, proficiency test records for January- December 2009 were found by ARC to lack the signature
oftwo employees on attestations that they had received the training. The NTL opened a minor risk
problem (Exception E-0744002). FDA review ofthe records for that period found an additionall3
employees had not signed attestations. FDA also found an additional seven employees had not signed
their attestations for the period 11/1/08-12/31108.
c. During an inspection of the Detroit NTL in May-June 2010, FDA discovered that annual
competency reviews
18
and/or QA reviews did not detect that employees were not correctly performing
all steps of testing blood samples. One test was repeatedly performed incorrectly by many employees
beginning 2007, and another test was repeatedly performed incorrectly by many employees since April
2008. FDA's review ofthe competency assessments for those employees performing those tests found
that none failed the assessment. FDA's review ofthe quality process review for one ofthe tests found
that the errors were not detected.
d. In addition to understaffing issues noted during review ofrecords at the Philadelphia
DCSC during the September-October 2010 inspection discussed in paragraphs 2(d) and (e) above, FDA
observed collection staffing issues during inspections at the Heart of America Region in June-August
2010. For example, FDA observed donor survey cards for three mobile blood drives conducted on
11/6/09, 1/12/10 and 1113/10, each of which reported dissatisfaction with ARC's staffing levels. FDA's
review of the operation reports and staffing matrices for those three drives found that staffing for both
was below the staffing matrices.
GMP Violations: Inadequate Recordkeeping
12. Records are not maintained and/or not as detailed as necessary to contain a complete history of
work performed as required by 21 CFR 606.160. For example,
During the August-September 2010 inspection of the Southern California Region, FDA reviewed reports
of potential duplicate donors and determined that investigations of potential duplicate donors are
incomplete and/or not fully documented and lack documentation necessary to assess whether corrections
were made. Duplicate donors are of concern because multiple donor records for the same donor may
result in the release for distribution ofunsuitable blood products. Therefore, it is very important to
correct duplicate records as soon as possible because each day the incorrect information remains in the
system increases the likelihood that an unsuitable blood product will be released. For example, Soundex
Reports for 2/1110-2/8/10, 2/9/10-2/16/10, 2/2/10-2/9/10, 3/22/10-3/29/10,2/8/10-2/15/10, 3/8110
3/15110, 1/31/10-2/6/10,2/10/10-2/17/10, and 2/4/10-2/11/10 state multiple donor pairs were determined
to be false duplicates based on review ofBDRs. The specific information noted during ARCs review of
the related BDRs and used as the basis for the false duplicate determination is not documented.
This is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations in ARC facilities.
* * *
ORDERS
Paragraph VIII ofthe Decree provides that "[i]n the event that FDA determines, based upon
inspection... review ofARC records, or other information that comes to FDA's attention ... that ARC is
not following any SOP that may affect donor safety or the purity or labeling of blood or any blood
component ... ; has violated the law; has failed to fully comply with any time frame, term, or provision
of this Order ... ; then FDA may order ARC to come into compliance with the law, ARC SOPs, or this
18
Paragraph IV.C.5 requires competency reviews to "be conducted and documented, at least annually, to evaluate each
employee'sjob performance including, when appropriate, actual performance oftesting and data entry in controlled
situations."
Order, assess penalties, and/or take any step that FDA deems necessary to bring ARC into compliance
with the law, ARC SOPs, or this Order." FDA directs ARC to do the following:
1. Within 60 days of receipt ofthis letter, provide a status report of each issue noted during internal
audits of the DCSC since the beginning of consolidation in May 2008 and whether each issue has been
effectively corrected. Please provide a justification for any open problems created as a result of an
internal audit. Explain why they were not addressed promptly when the auditors found each issue.
2. Within 30 days of receipt ofthis letter, provide a list and a complete description ofeach
functional team in the DCSC, including a complete list of all supplemental sites assisting with
Philadelphia and Charlotte DCSC activities. Provide a status report ofthe staffhiring plan described in
your 12/15/10 response to the Philadelphia DCSC FDA 483 issued on 10/29110.
3. Within 90 days ofreceipt ofthis letter, re-examine the DCSC response to the ARC BHQ audit
observations related to training. Report to FDA what ARC is doing to strengthen its DCSC training
program given the audit observation and the lack ofa corrective action plan to address training at that
point in time. Explain why obvious training deficiencies were not addressed promptly and adequately at
the time oftheir discovery by the auditors. Also, explain ARC' s methodology for evaluating the
adequacy ofits DCSC training program.
4. Within 45 days of receipt ofthis letter, provide a thorough description ofARC's system for
determining the staffing levels for the mobile collection drives and submit the written procedure that
describes this system.
5. Within 60 days of receipt of this letter, provide a thorough description ofthe DCSC's operation
for answering donor eligibility calls from collection sites, including the number of staff assigned to this
function. Explain the use of inexperienced DCSC personnel answering donor eligibility calls from
collections sites. Describe what controls ARC has implemented to ensure DCSC personnel provide
accurate answers to donor eligibility calls.
6. Within 45 day of receipt ofthis letter, establish and implement a time frame for the Medical
Director' s review ofDRIRs. A timely review is critical to donor safety due to the seriousness ofsome
donor reactions. In order to ensure that the safety ofthe donor is not compromised, the Medical
Director's review should be completed prior to allowing a donor who has experienced a donor reaction
to return for additional donations.
7. Within 45 days of receipt ofthis letter, communicate to all collection staff personnel and
management the regulatory and procedural requirements for managing and documenting donor adverse
reactions. Ensure that all collection staff is adequately trained to perform this task. Report to FDA your
plan to accomplish this order.
8. Within 60 days of receipt ofthis letter, develop a work around to assess whether a donor has
prior names in the NDDR to ensure that unsuitable blood products are not distributed from donors who
have prior names in the NDDR.
9. Within 60 days ofreceipt ofthis letter, perform a retrospective review ofsurvey cards, since the
time they were first issued to the date ofthis letter, to identify all complaints or concerns that are related
to FDA regulated functions and, as required by the Decree, manage any regulated complaints/concerns
as problems. Identify all regions that issue such survey cards. Additionally explain how ARC manages
such complaints and concerns that are received through the internet.
10. Within 30 days ofreceipt ofthis letter, provide copies ofall Quality Process Reviews conducted
at the DCSC since the DCSC began merging of the regional donor management operations. This
material was requested numerous times during the September-October 2010 Philadelphia DCSC
inspection. Provide a detailed explanation why the completed Quality Process Reviews were not
provided to the FDA investigators during the inspection.
11. Within 60 days of receipt ofthis letter, provide a status report on ARC' s 12/ 15/10 response to the
Philadelphia DCSC FDA 483 issued on 10/29/10.
12. Within 30 days ofreceipt ofthis letter, provide a copy and complete description of the Modified
Compliance Improvement Strategy (MCIS) that the DCSC was placed on in January 2011, as well as the
status of the MCIS.
13. Within 60 days ofreceipt ofthis letter, develop and implement an SOP to require complete
documentation ofall information evaluated during review ofany utility report including the soundex
reports. Provide a copy ofthis SOP to FDA and include the effective date ofits implementation.
14. Within 30 days ofreceipt of this letter, provide an explanation for the use of BPD Code QC-90
01-05 [failure to adequately manage potentially non-confirming product (product not released)] when
ARC's investigation into problems determined that blood products were actually distributed. FDA
noted this during the review ofException Reports E-0780785 and E-0790730.
15. Within 60 days ofreceipt of this letter, review the contents ofthe quarterly and annual QA
reports to ensure that such reports adequately convey to ARC' s Biomedical Services senior management
that serious problems or deficiencies are developing and/or have occurred. This would enable senior
management to be aware of the potential risk ofthe developing problems/deficiencies to public health
and the impact on ARC's compliance with the law and the Decree.
16. Within 45 days ofreceipt ofthis letter, provide a list ofall facilities using the hand warmers
during the blood collection process. Include details regarding: when the facilities began utilizing the
hand warmers, the purpose oftheir use is, and why they were in use without training and a written
procedure.
17. Within 45 days ofreceipt ofthis letter, evaluate the process for performing annual competency
assessments and determine the reason they consistently fail to identify employees who do not perform
tasks in accordance with written procedures or manufacturer' s instructions. Report to FDA what steps
you plan to take to ensure the assessments are adequate.
* * *
FDA has determined that ARC did not comply with the law, ARC SOPs, and the Decree, and, under
paragraph IX of the Decree, FDA is fining ARC a total of $9,592,200.
19
In previous Adverse
19
Paragraph IX.F.5. ofthe Decree states that "All penalties assessed under this Order shall be based on the year in which the
violative conduct occurred. The annual cap amounts described in paragraph IX.F. l ofthis Order shall also be attributed
solely to the year in which the violative conduct occurred." To document compliance with that provision, FDA provides the
Determination Letters (ADL), FDA fmed ARC $10,000 for each day on which one or more violations
occurred without regard to the number ofviolations that occurred on a particular day. This was the
method used to calculate the fine in the October 2009 Problem Management ADL. However, as FDA
noted in that letter, the Decree authorizes alternate methods of calculating fines. For example, paragraph
IX.A authorizes FDA to assess penalties for "each violation." Thus, FDA can charge a per diem fme for
each violation instead ofthe single per diem charge for all ofthe violations collectively. Because many
ofthe violations continued for an extended period oftime, there were many days on which several
violations occurred simultaneously, and thus an assessment for each violation will be considerably
higher that a single per diem rate.
For the reasons explained below, FDA is assessing per diem fines separately for each of the violations as
described by the following chart:
ADL
Item
Violation Violation Timeframe Amount
ner Dav
Total
$2,437,500 l .a-e Decree:
Inadequate
Managerial Control
375 days
[912110 (date FDA 482 issued to the Philadelphia DCSC)
back to 1216109 =270 days; 912110 to 12115110 (date of
ARC's FDA 483 response) =105 days; 270 days + 105
days =375 days]
$6,500
2.a-f Decree:
Inadequate Quality
Assurance
375 days
(912110 (date FDA 482 issued to the Philadelphia DCSC)
back to 1216109 = 270 days; 912110 to 12115110 (date of
ARC's FDA 483 response) = 105 days; 270 days + 105
days =375 days}
$6,500 $2,437,500
3 Decree: Failure to
Comply with
Reporting
Requirements
58 days
[5110110 (date of ARC 's Suspension Report) to 7/6110
(date of ARC 's FDA 483 response) = 58 days}
$1,000 $58,000
4.a-b Decree:
Inadequate
National Donor
Deferral Register
358 days
[8/9110 (date FDA 482 issued to the Southern California
Region) back to 11112109 = 270 days; 819110 to 1114110
(date ofARC 's FDA 483 response) =88 days; 270 days +
88 days = 358 days}
$2,000 $716,000
5.a-b
6.a-h
Decree:
Inadequate
Problem
Management
375 days
(912110 (date FDA 482 issued to the Philadelphia DCSC)
back to 1216109 = 270 days; 912110 to 12115110 (date of
ARC's FDA 483 response) = 105 days; 270 days + 105
days = 375 days}
$4,000 $1,500,000
7 Decree: Failure to
Follow SOP
146 days
(413110 (date final notification feller should have been
sent) to 8/26110 (date ofARC 's FDA 483 response) = 146
days/
$1 ,600 $233,600
8.a-b GMP: Inadequate
System for the
Distribution or
Receipt of Each
Unit of Blood
288 days
[1213109 (date the DCSC notified the consignee with the
incorrect unit number) to 918110 (date ofARC's FDA 483
response) = 288 days]
$1,600 $460,800
9 GMP: Failure to
Follow
Manufacturer's
Instructions
83 days
[8/1311 0 (date investigators observed use ofhand
warmers) to 1114110 (date ofARC 's FDA 483 response)=
83 days)
$1,600 $132,800
following information. The penalty period described in this letter includes violations that occurred in 2007, 2008, 2009 and
2010. The penalty amounts assessed as a result ofthe violations for each of those years is $81,600 in 2007, $964,382 in
2008, $2,839,578 in 2009, and $5,706,640 in 2010.
l O.a-g GMP: Failure to
Maintain and/or
Follow Written
Procedures
375 days
[912110 (date FDA 482 issued to the Philadelphia DCSC)
back to 12/6109 = 270 days; 912110 to 12115110 (date of
ARC 's FDA 483 response) = 105 days; 270days + 105
days = 375 days]
$1,600 $600,000
II.a-d GMP: Inadequate
Training
357 days
[911 7109 (earliest date investigator noted personnel
without medical training were permitted to review adverse
donor reactions) to 918110 {date ofARC's FDA 483
response) = 356 days]
$1,600 $571 ,200
12 GMP: Inadequate
Recordkeeping
278 days
[113111 0 date ofearliest report ofpotential duplicate
donors) to 918110 (date ofARC's FDA 483 response) =
356 days]
$1,600 $444,800
TOTAL $9,592,200
In arriving at this penalty amount, we have taken the following facts into account:
First, as noted above, proper QA programs by blood establishments are essential to ensure the safety of
donors and the nation's blood supply by properly and promptly investigating and addressing unsafe
practices and procedures; preventing the collection, manufacture, processing, packing, holding, and
distribution of unsuitable blood and blood components; and identifying and effectively fixing the causes
ofrecurrent problems. Many ofthe violations discussed in this letter, when not suitably addressed and
corrected, implicate these concerns.
Second, during the period 10/ 1109 to 12/1/10, FDA completed 42 inspections of ARC regions, National
Testing Laboratories, and the DCSC facility. Ofthose inspections, FDA has classified nine as Official
Action Indicated (OAI) and 19 as Voluntary Action Indicated; one has not yet been classified. This is
the highest proportion of OAI inspections of ARC facilities since ARC entered the Amended Consent
Decree of Permanent Injunction on April15, 2003.
Third, many of the violations recounted in this letter are virtually identical to violations charged in
previous ADLs. ARC has known ofthese continuing problems and has failed to take adequate steps to
correct them.
Fourth, ARC's Biomedical Services senior management knew or should have had full knowledge of the
extent ofthe continuous and serious violations regarding the DCSC consolidation and the lapses in QA
throughout the ARC facilities no later than October 2008 when the first internal audit ofthe Philadelphia
DCSC occurred. (See paragraph IV.B.3 which requires internal audits to be performed and results to be
reported to ARC Biomedical Services senior management.) In addition, ARC held periodic senior
management meetings, QCOC meetings, and Board of Governor meetings in which the DCSC
consolidation project was discussed. Quarterly and annual QA and training reports were also submitted
to ARC' s Biomedical Services senior management. (See paragraph IV.A.2.b. and e.) As ARC
acknowledged, it "did not effectively manage consolidation ofthe donor management functions into the
DCSC" and the methods it used to oversee the consolidation and operations ofthe DCSC "proved to be
inadequate." (12/ 15/ 10 response to the Philadelphia DCSC FDA 483.)
You should note that we have charged a higher per diem rate for the violations related to management
oversight and QA to highlight the need for ARC Biomedical Services senior management to accept
greater accountability and responsibility with respect to the correction and prevention of QA problems,
as well as a higher per diem rate for the substantial and recurring problem management violations.
Under the Decree, FDA could have assessed penalties under alternative schedules that would have
resulted in greater fmes. For example, under paragraph IX.A., FDA could have penalized ARC "up to
$10,000 for each violation andfor each day described in FDA's [ADL]." (Emphasis added.) Second,
under paragraph IX.F.4 ofthe Decree, FDA could have penalized ARC not only for the initial violations
of each line employee but also for each subsequent ARC failure to detect and correct the violations (e.g.,
by downstream supervisors and BHQ). Finally, the Decree authorizes a per diem maximum fine of
$10,000, and, as shown in the chart above, FDA has chosen smaller per diem amounts. Please note that,
in future ADLs, we may choose one ofthese alternate methods of calculating the fine, or we may assess
a different per diem amount, including the maximum allowed under the Decree, for violations similar to
the ones listed in this ADL.
As provided in the Decree, ifARC agrees with this adverse determination, it shall within 20 days of
receipt ofthis letter, notify FDA ofits intent to come into compliance with the Decree and submit a plan
to do so. If ARC disagrees with FDA's adverse determination, it shall respond in writing within 20 days
of receipt ofthis letter, explaining its reason for disagreeing with FDA' s determination. Your response
must be submitted to me at the Food and Drug Administration, Baltimore District Office, 6000 Metro
Drive, Suite 101, Baltimore, Maryland 21215, with a copy to Karen Midthun, M.D., Director, Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research, 1401 Rockville Pike, Suite 200 N, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
Sincerely yours,
Evelyn Bonnin
Director, Baltimore District
Enclosures
cc: Gail J. McGovern
President and CEO
Kathryn Waidman
Senior Vice President for Quality
and Regulatory Affairs
2025 E Street, N.W.
MaryElcano
General Counsel
2025 E Street, N.W.
Page 29 - Mr. 1. Chris Hrouda
Bonnie McElveen-Hunter
Chairman, Board of Governors
ATTACHMENT B
Suspect Product History
1. Observation 3.c of the FDA 483 Inspectional Observations (FDA 483) issued to
ARC's Biomedical Headquarters (BHQ) on April 26,2000, cited the firm for distribution
oftwo unsuitable blood products. The components were not stored correctly and were
quarantined. The components were inappropriately released from quarantine, and ARC
had to recall them. The Establishment Inspection Report states that for the period,
January 1, 1999, through February 2, 2000, the FDA investigators observed 86 reports
related to distribution or potential distribution ofunsuitable products. In a July 21, 2000
letter, ARC stated, "Deviation reports are reviewed to determine the frequency of release
of unsuitable product. In addition, QA regional staff is required to report any unsuitable
releases to BHQ within 24 hours. Each incident must be immediately and thoroughly
investigated, and results reported to BHQ. All information is being closely monitored to
determine the existence of any weaknesses not previously identified and verify the
effectiveness ofcorrective actions ..." In a September 29, 2000 letter, ARC stated that it
released a written procedure that included " ... a requirement for 24-hour coverage to gain
control of non-conforming materials immediately upon discovery ... "
2. On October 19, 2001, FDA issued a VI.A. letter to ARC following FDA's
inspection ofthe Lewis and Clark Salt Lake City facility. The letter cited numerous
violations, including the failure to "correct known critical deviations, such as failure
to... ensure that unsuitable units of blood are physically and electronically quarantined to
prevent distribution of such units." ARC stated the problem was mismanaged by the
Region and that "long term corrective action to prevent recurrence ofthis type of problem
has been undertaken by Biomedical Services Headquarters." (Bates pages 025356
025357)
3. Observations 21-24 of the FDA 483 issued to BHQ on December 20,2002, cited
the firm for distribution of unsuitable blood products. The observation describes ARC's
System Problem 618 opened in January 2002 after discovering that regions were
distributing unsuitable blood products. ARC stated that it implemented corrective action
and that it would consider implementation effective if the number ofoccurrences was
reduced by only- FDA issued a VI.A. letter to ARC that stated, "ARC failed to
correct and prevent deviations that resulted in release and/or distribution of unsuitable
blood products." ARC's April 14,2003 response to the VI.A.letter stated, "Red Cross
recognizes and understands the importance of preventing the release of unsuitable
products ....Over the last several years, BHQ has spent considerable time and effort to
identify the factors that contribute to the release of unsuitable products and to institute
corrective actions related to these sources of information." ARC committed to further
investigate, develop additional corrective actions, and increase BHQ oversight." (Bates
pages 028681-028683)
1
4. In a December 2003 submission, ARC reported to FDA that it opened System
Problem 702 because "data continues to demonstrate an adverse trend in the release of
suspect products. ARC described a corrective action plan that included establishing a
task force, identifying the nature ofthe occurrences in facilities, and assessing data to
develop appropriate corrective actions. (Bates pages 030099-030101) ARC also
reported that it implemented corrective actions for earlier system problems related to
mismanagement of suspect products and that the effectiveness checks found that the
corrective actions were ineffective. (Bates pages 030733, 031383-031389)
5. On March 28, 2005, FDA issued an Adverse Determination Letter (ADL) based
on violations observed during a July-August 2004 inspection of ARC's Southern
California Region. The inspection revealed that the Region had distributed 20 blood
products manufactured after the Region had made the decision that they were to be
discarded. Until the inspection, the Region was unaware that the blood products had
been distributed. In multiple response letters, ARC described corrective actions,
including implementation of new procedures. In a November 30,2005 letter, ARC stated
" Although there is some improvement in performance in this area, the initial
effectiveness check did not indicate a satisfactory decline in the number of problems after
implementation ofthe System 11 documents ....ARC will continue to monitor this area
and develop further system-wide corrective action based on the analysis of recent
problems that have occurred in this area" (Bates pages 038567-038568) In a February
7, 2006 letter, ARC discussed the results ofits monitoring. The corrective actions were
evaluated to determine effectiveness. Success criteria were defined by ARC as follows:
"The corrective action will be deemed efiective ifthere are ~ o b l e m s associated with
the release of suspect products and ifthere are no more than- roblems associated with
mismanagement ofsuspect products during a given month for the EC evaluation period."
(Bate page 039139). ARC also included in the February 7, 2006 Jetter a bar chart
showing that it reported to FDA 92 occurrences of having distributed suspect blood
products during the nine month period following receipt ofthe ADL, April through
December 2005. ARC stated that it developed and implemented additional procedural
changes and promised to "continue to evaluate the data to ensure that all root causes for
mismanagement ofsuspect products have been identified and appropriate corrective
action taken. ARC is working at the system and individual facility level toward a goal of
'first-time right' and a continual reduction in the number of suspect products that require
management." (Bates pages 039145 and 039149-039150)
6. On November 21, 2006, FDA issued an ADL to ARC following the 2005
inspection ofthe New York Penn Region. The ADL cited ARC for failure to control
suspect blood products and for fai lure to comply with the Decree problem management
requirements during their handling of numerous related problems. ARC promised
corrective action.
7. On October 30, 2009, FDA issued an ADL to ARC following multiple inspections
of ARC facilities beginning February through November 2008. The ADL cited ARC
again for failure to control suspect blood products and for failure to comply with the
2
Decree problem management requirements during the handling ofnumerous related
problems. ARC promised corrective action.
3

FDA Fines American Red Cross

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

FDA Fines American Red Cross

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

( " ~ DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

Вам также может понравиться