[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with
Toby Miller, First Line Supervisor Area C, Traffic Management Supervisor on 9/11
Type of event: Interview
Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Miller explained the TMU outlook as a "system" view for balancing air traffic. He
explained that some of the positions at the TMU at ZBW are: a military coordinator, an
en route specialist, a severe weather specialist, and an arrival sequencing specialist for
Boston Logan Airport.

On 9/11, TMU staff was Dan Bueno as superviser, Joe Cooper, Dennis Wishheart and
Steve Wills. When Miller arrived at 5:30am everything was as usual. He worked the
departure coordinator position until his break. Around 9:15am Miller heard of the WTC
impacts, and went back to TMU. He was briefed by the supervisor of Area E. He
contacted ZNY and was told that New York would not take any aircraft through ZNY
airspace. He received word after this that there would be an impeding ATC Zero through
Herndon Command Center. At this point he informed all of the supervisors, then went
back to his desk. By the time he was back at his desk the ATC Zero had been called, and
he went back down the aisles and informed the supervisors. He personally verified with
the northeast area towers that no aircraft was to take off.

Through his proximity with the Operations Desk he heard of the reported bomb threat
and also of possible inbound planes towards ZBW. It was at this point that the ZBW
building evacuation order was issued. Miller and Bueno remained at the TMU to handle
air traffic for an additional ten to fifteen minutes, then the operations manager told them
to go. It was around one o'clock at this point, as far as Miller could remember.

Miller stated that it was Dan Bueno who contacted Otis for a fighter scramble. And that it
was his understanding from conversation in the TMU that Bueno's attempt was
unsuccessful.

Regarding the AA11 anomalies, Miller noted that the DynSim and CBI training prepared
ATCs for hijack scenarios in which the pilot was communicating with the ATC. He
acknowledged that the uncontrolled flight of AA11, which refers to the airplane's serious
course deviation, was a factor that calls for a higher level of concern, but stated that
without the "tip off from the pilot as per training, it would not be in an ATC's ability to
distinguish definitively that a plane had been hijacked.

Miller has daily contact with HUNTRESS regarding training in the military areas. Miller
informed Commission staff that "huntress" is NEADS call sign. Miller would get the
huntress training exercise in the evening and clear the appropriate space the next day.
Miller stated his belief that a military fighter could not have reached AA11 or UAL 175.

Miller does not believe the ROC has a role to play in 9/11 type events.

Miller noted that the slowing airspeed of AA11 indicates its descent. He had no
knowledge of reports of AA11 airborne after the first tower impact.

Miller distinguished an ATC handoff as a transfer of transponder frequency and a ATC

point out as showing another airspace sector that a plane is passing through that sector's
airspace, but that the original radar controller is maintaining the plane on the original
radar sector frequency. It is called "clipping" when a plane travels through an airspace
but does not switch it's communications over.

Miller stated that the DEN network now running is a useful tool, and that training since
9/11 has been adequate to address their work. He also stated that important training for
ATC personnel would be information on who to contact in different emergency
circumstance. Miller also noted that this type of training is more important on the
supervisor level than on the ATC level, since it is the supervisors who make decisions on
who to involve.

Miller stated that the military and FAA have an excellent relationship.
,sc-S.o
\