Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

168546 July 23, 2008

MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 20043 and July 28, 20044 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation. The facts, culled from the records, are as follows: On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,5 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous drugs.7 The Information reads: The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows: On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseurbuyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. Contrary to law.8 When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.9 During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Paduas counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 7010 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection.11 Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order12 stating that the former plea of

Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision13 dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged: In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. SO ORDERED.14 Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation15 dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 96816 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said laws. The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the order. On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.18 However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 2419 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus: Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana. In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence. On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned. More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is

of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted: "Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended." (underlining supplied) WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.20 Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.21 Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW. II. WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.22 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment23 as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that I. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in applying Section 24, Article II of R.A. 9165 instead of Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.

II. Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has no application to the instant case.24 Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344,25 the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3) Does Section 3226 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" have application in this case? As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari. For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27 "Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28 A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas petition for probation. Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit: SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.(Emphasis supplied.) The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.30 Furthermore, there is the maximverba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.31

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 1132 and 1533 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.35 The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165. As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application in this case. Section 6836 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation. Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 3837 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child39 for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 18-24. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa concurring.
2

Id. at 26. Id. at 37-38. CA rollo, p. 34.

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case. For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case. If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
6

An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Repealing Republic Act No. 6425, Otherwise Known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, approved on June 7, 2002.
7

Rollo, p. 19. Id. at 27. Id. at 29.

10

SEC. 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the sentence provided under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on probation, or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation, the Board shall submit a written report to the court recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the court shall issue such an order. The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may be determined by the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act. The completion of the community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall render a report on the manner of compliance of said community service. The court in

its discretion may require extension of the community service or order a final discharge. In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64 of this Act. If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the Center by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the sentence to be served.
11

Rollo, pp. 19-20. Id. at 30. Id. at 31-32. Penned by Judge Leticia Querubin Ulibarri. Id. at 32. Id. at 33.

12

13

14

15

16

Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes, done on July 24, 1976.
17

Rollo, p. 34. CA rollo, pp. 22-26.

18

SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
19 20

Rollo, pp. 37-38. Id. at 23-24. Id. at 97. Id. at 48-71. Id. at 55, 64.

21

22

23

24

25

An Act Establishing A Comprehensive Juvenile Justice And Welfare System, Creating The Juvenile Justice And Welfare Council Under The Department Of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes, approved on April 28, 2006. Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and
26

his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile: 1. Care, guidance, and supervision orders; 2. Community service orders; 3. Drug and alcohol treatment; 4. Participation in group counseling and similar activities; 5. Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juveniles in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the DSWD. The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary. The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
27

Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 133.
28

Id. Baranda v. Gustilo, No. L-81163, September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA 757, 770. R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 124 (5th ed., 2003). Id.

29

30

31

SEC. 11 Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the decree or purity thereof:
32

(1) 10 grams or more of opium; (2) 10 grams or more of morphine; (3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; (5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu"; (6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil; (7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and (8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act. Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows: (1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams; (2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana. SEC. 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for
33

use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
34

Rollo, pp. 22-23. Id. at 23.

35

36

SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
37

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
38

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
39

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used in this Act shall be defined as follows: xxxx

(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979 KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee. Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant. Gregorio Baroque for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.: In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the cooperative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative." 1 To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the following: "Then petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not appear. In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not

convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. 2 Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P" respondent, in effect, implemented the said provision of law. 3 This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm. 1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: 4 "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently born to that effect. 5. 2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa, 6 this Court held. "Man-damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. 7 The opinion continued in this wise:"According to former Chief Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated: "This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: "It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed." 8 So it has been since then. 9 The latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, 10 this court speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. 11 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., took no part.

#Footnotes

1 Section 62 of Republic Act No. 2023 (1957). 2 Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, 7-8. 3 Brief for the Respondent-Appellee, 4-5. 4 L-27455, June 28,1973, 61 SCRA 381. 5 Ibid, 385. The following cases were cited: People v. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, L-2l88l, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 917; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla v. City of Pasay L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349, Garcia v. Vasquez, L-26808, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 505; La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Capapas, L-27948 & 28001-11, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1085; Mobil Oil Phil. Inc. v. Diocares, L-26371, July 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon Surety Co, Inc. v. De Garcia, L-25669, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111; Vda. de Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., L-27489, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 563; Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs L-28463, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 269, Maritime Co. of the Phil. v. Reparations L-29203, July 26, 1971, 40 SCRA 70, Allied Brokerage Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-27641, Aug. 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 555. 6 L-23783, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 190. 7 Ibid, 197. 8 Ibid, 197-198. The citation from former Chief Justice Moran is found in Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., at 172; the Crispulo Zamora decision is reported in 53 Phil 613, 621 (1929). the citation from Justice Recto is found in Sanson v. Barrios, reported in 63 Phil. 198, 202 (1936); and that from Justice Barrera, from Alzate V. Aldana in 118 Phil. 221, 225 (1963). 9 Cf. Valdez v. Gutierrez, L-25819, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 661; Lemi v. Valencia, L-20768, Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 203; Commissioner of Immigration v. Go Tieng, L22581, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 237; Vda. de Serra v. Salas, L-27150, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 541; Del Rosario v. Subido, L-30091, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 382; Yuvienco v. Canonoy, L-23352, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 597; Enriquez Jr. v. Bidin, L-29620, Oct. 12, 1972, 47 SCRA 183, Orencia v. Enrile, L-28997, Feb. 22, 1974, 55 SCRA 580; Isada v. Bocar, L-33535, Jan. 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 37; Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, L-40779, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277; Ocampo v. Subido, L28344, Aug. 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443. 10 L-27448, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 376.

11 Ibid, 380. Gonzales v. Board of Pharmacy, 20 Phil. 367, was cited.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 166199 April 24, 2009

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners, vs. CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, Respondent. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1dated September 14, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated November 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578. The assailed Decision set aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), and dismissed the deportation case filed against Christopher Koruga (respondent), an American national, for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; while the assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The factual background of the case is as follows: Sometime in August 2001, then BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous letter3 requesting the deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien for having been found guilty of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, United States of America (USA) for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in 1983. On the basis of a Summary of Information,4 the Commissioner issued Mission Order No. ADD-011625 on September 13, 2001 directing Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Lino G. Caligasan, Chief of the Intelligence Mission and any available BI Special Operations Team Member to conduct verification/ validation of the admission status and activities of respondent and effect his immediate arrest if he is found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. On September 17, 2001, respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The case was docketed as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-126. The Charge Sheet reads: On September 17, 2001, at about 10:00 A.M., respondent was arrested by Intelligence operatives at his residence, located at 1001 MARBELLA CONDOMINIUM II, Roxas Boulevard, Malate, Manila, pursuant to Mission Order No. ADD-01-162;

That respondent was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled Substance Act in connection with his being Drug Trafficker and/or Courier of prohibited drugs in the State of Washington, United States of America, thus, making him an undesirable alien and/or a public burden in violation of Sec. 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. CONTRARY TO LAW.6 On September 28, 2001, after filing a Petition for Bail7 and Supplemental Petition for Bail,8 respondent was granted bail and provisionally released from the custody of the BI.9 Following the submission of respondent's Memorandum10 and the BI Special Prosecutor's Memorandum,11 the BOC rendered a Judgment12 dated February 11, 2002 ordering the deportation of respondent under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. On February 26, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 but it was denied by the BOC in a Resolution dated March 19, 2002. Unaware that the BOC already rendered its Resolution dated March 19, 2002, respondent filed on April 2, 2002, a Manifestation and Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Cautelam14 with the Office of the President, which referred15 the appeal to the DOJ. On April 1, 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong rendered a Resolution16 dismissing the appeal. On April 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 which he subsequently withdrew18 on April 23, 2003. On April 24, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition19 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76578, seeking to set aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC. On September 14, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision20 setting aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC and dismissing the deportation case filed against respondent. The CA held that there was no valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent since there was no violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed the case for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA filed against respondent; that petitioners further failed to present or attach to their pleadings any document which would support their allegations that respondent entered into a plea bargain with the U.S. Prosecutor for deferred sentence nor did they attach to the record the alleged order or judgment of the U.S. Court which would show the conviction of respondent for violation of the prohibited drugs law in the USA; that even if respondent was convicted and sentenced for the alleged offense, his deportation under Section 37(a)(4) is improper, since the prohibited drugs law referred to therein refers not to a foreign drugs law but to the Philippine drugs law, then Republic Act No. 6425 or the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972"; that although the BOC is clothed with exclusive authority to decide as to the right of a foreigner to enter the country, still, such executive officers must act within the scope of their authority or their decision is a nullity. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration21 was denied by the CA in its presently assailed Resolution22 dated November 24, 2004.

Hence, the present petition on the following grounds: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE SUBJECT CASE WHICH FALLS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT. II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT COULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OVER THE CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF HEREIN PETITIONERS. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST THE HEREIN RESPONDENT WERE DROPPED. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIOR CONVICTION IS REQUIRED BEFORE RESPONDENT COULD BE DEPORTED.23 Petitioners contend that the BI has exclusive authority in deportation proceedings and no other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence presented therein; that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioners when they sought the deportation of respondent since he was convicted by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington for attempted Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and underwent probation in lieu of the imposition of sentence; that the dismissal of the charge against respondent was only with respect to penalties and liabilities, obtained after fulfilling the conditions for his probation, and was not an acquittal from the criminal case charged against him; that there is a valid basis to declare respondent's undesirability and effect his deportation since respondent has admitted guilt of his involvement in a drug-related case. On the other hand, respondent submits that the proceedings against him reek of persecution; that the CA did not commit any error of law; that all the arguments raised in the present petition are mere rehashes of arguments raised before and ruled upon by the CA; and that, even assuming that Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 does not apply, there is no reason, whether compelling or slight, to deport respondent. There are two issues for resolution: (1) whether the exclusive authority of the BOC over deportation proceedings bars judicial review, and (2) whether there is a valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent. The Court resolves the first issue in the negative. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings.24 Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 125 of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President,26 the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.27 In Domingo v. Scheer,28 the Court set aside the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC over an alien for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in violation of the alien's constitutional

and statutory rights to due process, since the BOC ordered the deportation of the alien without conducting summary deportation proceedings and without affording the alien the right to be heard on his motion for reconsideration and adduce evidence thereon. In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,29 the Court held that while, as a general rule, the factual findings of administrative agencies are not subject to review, it is equally established that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are contrary to evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the CA as provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.30 Clearly, the filing by respondent of a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to assail the order of deportation on the ground of grave abuse of discretion is permitted. This brings us to the second issue. The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.31 Respondent was charged with violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which provides: Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. xxxx (4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Respondent contends that the use of the definite article "the" immediately preceding the phrase "law on prohibited drugs" emphasizes not just any prohibited drugs law but the law applicable in this jurisdiction, at that time, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.32 The Court disagrees. The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.33 However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole.34 After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.35 Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.36

Were the Court to follow the letter of Section 37(a)(4) and make it applicable only to convictions under the Philippine prohibited drugs law, the Court will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws may be allowed to enter the country to the detriment of the public health and safety of its citizens. It suggests a double standard of treatment where only aliens convicted of Philippine prohibited drugs law would be deported, while aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws would be allowed entry in the country. The Court must emphatically reject such interpretation of the law. Certainly, such a situation was not envisioned by the framers of the law, for to do so would be contrary to reason and therefore, absurd. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for which the law was passed. This Court has, in many cases involving the construction of statutes, always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity, and that therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.37 Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes no distinction between a foreign prohibited drugs law and the Philippine prohibited drugs law, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.38 Thus, Section 37(a)(4) should apply to those convicted of all prohibited drugs laws, whether local or foreign.
lavvphi 1.zw+

There is no dispute that respondent was convicted of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA for attempted possession of cocaine, as shown by the Order Deferring Imposition of Sentence (Probation).39 While he may have pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, and was not imprisoned but applied for and underwent a one-year probation, still, there is no escaping the fact that he was convicted under a prohibited drugs law, even though it may simply be called a "misdemeanor drug offense."40 The BOC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the deportation of respondent. The Court quotes with approval the following acute pronouncements of the BOC: x x x We note that the respondent admitted in his Memorandum dated 8 October 2001 that he pleaded guilty to the amended information where he allegedly attempted to have in his possession a certain controlled substance, and a narcotic drug. Further, he filed a "Petition for Leave to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and Enter Plea of Not Guilty" to obtain a favorable release from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the filing of the said charge. Evidently, the U.S. Court issued the Order of Dismissal in exchange for the respondent's plea of guilty to the lesser offense. Though legally allowed in the U.S. Law, We perceive that this strategy afforded the respondent with a convenient vehicle to avoid conviction and sentencing. Moreover, the plea of guilty is by itself crystal clear acknowledgment of his involvement in a drug-related offense. Hence, respondent's discharge from conviction and sentencing cannot hide the fact that he has a prior history of drug-related charge. This country cannot countenance another alien with a history of a drug-related offense. The crime may have been committed two decades ago but it cannot erase the fact that the incident actually happened. This is the very core of his inadmissibility into the Philippines. Apparently, respondent would like Us to believe that his involvement in this drug case is a petty offense or a mere misdemeanor. However, the Philippine Government views all drugrelated cases with grave concern; hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known

as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972" and the creation of various drug-enforcement agencies. While We empathize with the innocent portrayal of the respondent as a man of irreproachable conduct, not to mention the numerous written testimonies of good character submitted in his behalf, this incomplete and sanitized representation cannot, however, outweigh our commitment and sworn duty to safeguard public health and public safety. Moreover, while the U.S. Government may not have any law enforcement interest on respondent, Philippine immigration authorities certainly do in the able and competent exercise of its police powers. Thus, this case of the respondent is no different from a convicted felon abroad, who argues that he cannot be removed from the Philippines on the ground that the crime was committed abroad. Otherwise, it would open the floodgates to other similarly situated aliens demanding their admission into the country. Indeed, respondent may not be a menace to the U.S. as a result of his being discharged from criminal liability, but that does not ipso facto mean that the immigration authorities should unquestionably admit him into the country. x x x x41 (Emphasis supplied) It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.42 Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest.43 The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power.44 It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.45 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration ordering the deportation of respondent Christopher Koruga under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., CA rollo, p. 610.
2

Id. at 677. CA rollo, p.140. Id. at 139. Id. at 138. CA rollo, p. 141. Id. at 144. Id. at 154. Id. at 157. Id. at 159. Id. at 187. Id. at 243. Id. at 72. Id. at 103.

10

11

12

13

14

15

Id. at 124. Id. at 74. Id. at 126. Id. at 133. CA rollo, p. 9. Supra note 1. CA rollo, p. 630. Supra note 2. Rollo, pp. 36-37.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 853, 874;Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81798, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 756, 761; Miranda v. Deportation Board, 94 Phil 531, 533 (1954).
25

Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, states: SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

26

See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 347; Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 681; Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 4849.
27

Republic v. Garcia, G.R No. 167741, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 495, 502; Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 148.
28

466 Phil. 235 (2004). G.R. No. 149013, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 419. Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 4. Supra note 28, at 269-270; 487.

29

30

31

32

Repealed by Republic Act No. 9165 or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002" approved on June 7, 2002, or about four (4) months after the BOC rendered its Judgment on February 11, 2002.
33

Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990), p. 131, citing Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 598 (1954); Espino v. Cleofe, G.R. No. 33410, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 92; Philippine Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, 120 Phil. 829 (1964).
34

Solid Homes, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 145156-57, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 137, 149; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 148191, November 25, 2003, 416 SCRA 436, 460; In Re Allen, 2 Phil. 630, 643 (1903).
35

Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Buag, G.R. No. 143784, February 5, 2003, 397 SCRA 27, 37;Cosico, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118432, May 23, 1997, 272 SCRA 583, 591;Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., G.R. No. 28502-03, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 364, 370.
36

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, supra, note 35; People v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236, 242 (1933).
37

Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation, G.R. No. 78309, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 513, 519; Bello v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38161, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 509, 518; Vda. de Macabanta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company, G.R. No. L 27489, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 553, 558;Automotive Parts & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248, 256.
38

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 484; Pilar v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA 759, 763; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 101976, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 203, 214-215.
39

CA rollo, p. 650.

40

Letters dated September 19, 2001 and September 20, 2001 of Michael A. Newbill, Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, CA rollo, pp. 148 and 149.
41

CA rollo, p. 245. Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, supra note 24, at 896. Lao Tan Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 (1948). In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918). Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910).

42

43

44

45

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996 DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.: Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. 1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. 2 In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3 Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local

election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree. The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. [Emphasis added] It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6 It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ." Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . . 8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the

next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9 ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia. However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118). Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local). Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an exofficio member of the sangguniang barangay an elective body that fact does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regularsangguniang barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code.

Separate Opinions DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia. However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118). Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local). Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an exofficio member of the sangguniang barangay an elective body that fact does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regularsangguniang barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 COMELEC Resolution No. 95-3345, September 5, 1995. 2 RTC, Cabanatuan City, Order dated December 20, 1995; Rollo, p. 28. 3 Rollo, pp. 64-66. 4 Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464, 467. 5 Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617, 627. 6 Id. at p. 628. 7 PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674. 8 People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 167.

9 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 5; See: Evardorne v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 183517 June 22, 2010

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent. DECISION PEREZ, J.: The inclusion of allowances in the computation of the retirement/separation benefits of the employees of petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) is at issue in this petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rules 64 and 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the nullification and setting aside of the adverse rulings dated July 4, 2003 and February 15, 2008 issued by respondent Commission on Audit (COA). The Facts Created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 252 dated July 21, 1973, petitioner is a governmentowned and controlled corporation tasked with promoting and developing Philippine trade in pursuance of national economic development. Subsequent to the repeal of said law with the May 9, 1977 issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine International Trading Corporation, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 756 on December 28, 1981, authorizing the reorganization of petitioner pursuant to his legislative powers to amend charters of government corporations through executive orders in turn issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772. On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 877, authorizing further the reorganization of petitioner for the purpose of accelerating and expanding the countrys export concerns.1 On December 31, 1983, Eligia Romero, an officer of petitioner, opted to retire under Republic Act No. 1616 and received a total of P286,780.00 as gratuity benefits for services rendered from 1955 to 1983. Immediately re-hired on contractual basis, it appears that said employee remained in the service of petitioner until her compulsory retirement on April 27, 2000. In receipt of retirement benefits in the total sum of P1,013,952.00 for the period July 1, 1955 to April 27, 2000, net of the P286,70.00 gratuity benefits she received in 1983, Ms. Romero filed a July 16, 2001 request, seeking from petitioner payment of retirement differentials on the strength of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. Said provision states that "any officer or employee who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled to one month pay for every year of service computed at highest salary received including allowances, in addition to the other benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or regulations to the contrary."2

Confronted with the question of whether the computation of Ms. Romeros retirement benefits should include the allowances she had received while under its employ, petitioner sent queries to respondent and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel regarding the application of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. On August 20, 2002, then Government Corporate Counsel Amado D. Valdez issued Opinion No. 197, Series of 2002, espousing a literal interpretation and application of the aforesaid provision. Invoking the principle that retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby, said opinion declared that, pursuant to the subject provision, the basis for the computation of the retirement benefits of petitioners employees should be the highest basic salary received by them, including allowances not integrated into the basic pay.3 On the other hand, on July 4, 2003, COA Assistant Commissioner and General Counsel Raquel R. Habitan issued the first assailed ruling, the 6th Indorsement dated July 4, 2003, finding the denial of Ms. Romeros claim for retirement differentials in order. Taking appropriate note of the fact that the Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits of petitioners employees did not include allowances outside of the basic salary, said officer ruled that Executive Order No. 756 was a special law issued only for the specific purpose of reorganizing petitioner corporation. Although it was subsequently adverted to in Executive Order No. 877, Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was determined to be intended for employees retired, separated or resigned in connection with petitioners reorganization and was not meant to be a permanent retirement scheme for its employees.4
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Elevated by petitioner on appeal before the respondent,5 the foregoing ruling was affirmed in the second assailed ruling, the Decision No. 2008-023 dated February 15, 2008,6 which likewise discounted the legal basis for Ms. Romeros claim for retirement differentials. Finding that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was simply an incentive to encourage employees to resign or retire at the height of petitioners reorganization, said decision went on to make the following pronouncements, to wit: "Moreover, RA No. 4968 prohibits the creation of any insurance retirement plan by any government agency and government-owned or controlled corporation other than the GSIS, viz.: Section 10. Subsection (b) of Section twenty-eight of the same Act, as amended is hereby amended to read as follows: (b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be created by the employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore in force in any government office, agency, or instrumentality or corporation owned or controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the rights of those who are already eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected. The Supreme Court explained the rationale of the above provisions in Avelina B. Conte et al. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 116422, November 4, 1996, thusly: Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and iniquitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such financial assistance. (Emphasis ours)

To hold that Section 6 of E.O. 756 is a retirement law for PTIC employees other than the GSIS law would run counter to the policy of the state to prevent the undue and iniquitous proliferation of retirement plans that would unduly promote the inequality of treatment in the retirement benefits of government employees."7 Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner seeks the nullification and setting aside of the assailed rulings on the following grounds, to wit: A. RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE FIRST ASSAILED RULING, OPINING THAT SECTION 6 OF EO 756 WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A PERMANENT RETIREMENT SCHEME OF THE PITC. B. RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE SECOND ASSAILED RULING DENYING PITCS REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE OPINION OF COA GENERAL COUNSEL RAQUEL HABITAN, LIKEWISE HOLDING THAT SECTION 6 of EO 756 WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A PERMANENT SCHEME OF THE PITC. C. RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RULINGS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THAT RETIREMENT LAWS ARE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED AND ADMINISTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONS INTENDED TO BE BENEFITTED AND THAT ALL DOUBTS AS TO THE INTENT OF THE LAW SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE RETIREE TO ACHIEVE ITS HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES. D. RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RELYING ON SECTION 10 of RA 4968 AS TO THE ALLEGED PROHIBITION AGAINST ANY INSURANCE OR RETIREMENT PLAN OR RETIREMENT PLAN OTHER THAN THE GSIS, SAID LAW HAVING BEEN PASSED PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF EO 756. OTHERWISE STATED, SECTION 10 OF RA 4968 IS DEEMED REVISED, AMENDED, SUPERSEDED OR REPEALED BY EO 756 PURSUANT TO THE REPEALING CLAUSE OF SAID EO 756.8 The Courts Ruling We find the petition bereft of merit.

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.9 Because the law must not be read in truncated parts, its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. The statute's clauses and phrases must not, consequently, be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.10 Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory construction, all the words in the statute must be taken into consideration in order to ascertain its meaning.11 Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find it well worth emphasizing at the outset that Executive Order No. 75612 was meant to reorganize petitioners corporate set-up. While incorporating amendments of petitioners Revised Charter under Presidential Decree No. 1071 with provisions relating to the subscription of its capital,13 the establishment of subsidiaries, including joint ventures,14 the composition15 and grant of additional powers to its Board of Directors,16 the appointment of its President,17 the grant of incentive scheme to its officers and employees18 as well as its authority to deputize commercial attaches19 and to grant franchises to operate Philippine trade houses abroad,20 Section 4 (1) of Executive Order No. 756 specifically authorized petitioners Board of Directors to " reorganize the structure of the Corporation, in accordance with its expanded role in the development of Philippine trade, with such officers and employees as may be needed and determine their competitive salaries and reasonable allowances and other benefits to effectively carry out its powers and functions." For this purpose, Section 6 of the same law provides as follows: SECTION 6. Exemption from OCPC. In recognition of the special nature of its operations, the Corporation shall continue to be exempt from the application of the rules and regulations of the Office of the Compensation and Position Classification or any other similar agencies that may be established hereafter as provided under Presidential Decree No. 1071. Likewise, any officer or employee who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled to one month pay for every year of service computed at highest salary received including all allowances, in addition to the other benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or regulations to the contrary; Provided, That the employee shall have served in the Corporation continuously for at least two years: Provided, further, That in case of separated employees, the separation or dismissal is not due to conviction for any offense the penalty for which includes forfeiture of benefits: and Provided, finally, That in the commutation of leave credits earned, the employees who resigned, retired or is separated shall be entitled to the full payment therefor computed with all the allowances then being enjoyed at the time of resignation, retirement of separation regardless of any restriction or limitation provided for in other laws, rules or regulations. (Italics supplied) As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order No. 756, we find that the foregoing provision cannot be interpreted independent of the purpose or intent of the law. Rather than the permanent retirement law for its employees that petitioner now characterizes it to be, we find that the provision of gratuities equivalent to "one month pay for every year of service computed at highest salary received including all allowances" was clearly meant as an incentive for employees who retire, resign or are separated from service during or as a consequence of the reorganization petitioners Board of Directors was tasked to implement. As a temporary measure, it cannot be interpreted as an exception to the general prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance and/or retirement or pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,21 amended. Pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 496822 which was approved on June 17, 1967, said latter provision was amended to read as follows: Section 10. Subsection (b) of Section twenty-eight of the same Act, as amended is hereby further amended to read as follows:

(b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be created by any employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore in force in any government office, agency, or instrumentality or corporation owned or controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the rights of those who are already eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected." In reconciling Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 with Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,23 as amended, uppermost in the mind of the Court is the fact that the best method of interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws which are to be harmonized rather than having one considered repealed in favor of the other.24 Time and again, it has been held that every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence interpretere et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi.25 Thus, if diverse statutes relate to the same thing, they ought to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them, as it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law.26 We find that a temporary and limited application of the more beneficent gratuities provided under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 is in accord with the pre-existing and general prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement and/or pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186. In the absence of a manifest and specific intent from which the same may be gleaned, moreover, Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 cannot be construed as an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an exception to the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as aforesaid. Aside from the fact that a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein by construction,27 petitioner would likewise do well to remember that repeal of laws should be made clear and express. Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject,28 the congruent application of which the courts must generally presume.29 For this reason, it has been held that the failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.30 The dearth of merit in petitioners position is rendered even more evident when it is borne in mind that Executive Order No. 756 was subsequently repealed by Executive Order No. 877 which was issued on February 18, 1983 to hasten the reorganization of petitioner, in light of changing circumstances and developments in the world market. For purposes of clarity, the full text of Executive Order No 877 is reproduced hereunder, viz.: "EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 877 AUTHORIZING THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION CREATED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1071, AS AMENDED WHEREAS, it is the declared policy of the New Republic to pursue national development with renewed dedication and determination; WHEREAS, there is a need to position and gear up the country's export marketing resources in anticipation of a recovery in the world economy; WHEREAS, the Philippine International Trading Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Corporation, is in the vanguard of marketing Philippine exports worldwide;

WHEREAS, in order to accelerate and expand its exports, there is a need to upgrade the management and marketing expertise of the Corporation consistent with the requirements of international marketing; WHEREAS, in the light of the foregoing, the reorganization of the Corporation becomes imperative; WHEREAS, under Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended, the President is empowered to undertake such organizational changes as may be necessary in the light of changing circumstances and development; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, and the authority vested on me by Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended, do hereby order and direct: 1. Reorganization. The Minister of Trade and Industry is hereby designated Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation with full powers to restructure and reorganize the Corporation and to determine or fix its staffing pattern, compensation structure and related organizational requirements. The Chairman shall complete such restructuring and reorganization within six (6) months from the date of this Executive Order. All personnel of the Corporation who are not reappointed by the Chairman under the new reorganized structure of the Corporation shall be deemed laid off; provided, that personnel so laid off shall be entitled to the benefits accruing to separated employees under Executive Order No. 756 amending the Revised Chapter of the Corporation. 2. Functions of Chairman. The Chairman of the Corporation shall have the following functions and powers: a. Exercise all the powers incident to the functions of a Chief Executive Officer, including supervision and control over all personnel of the Corporation; b. Review, develop, supervise and direct the export marketing thrusts and strategy of the Corporation; c. Upon recommendation of the President of the Corporation, appoint personnel of the Corporation in executive and senior management positions; d. Call meetings of the Board of Directors and of the Executive Committee of the Corporation. 3. Personnel Recruitment and Other Services. In recognition of the special nature of its operation, the Corporation shall, in recruiting personnel and in availing of outside technical services, continue to be exempt from OCPC rules and regulations pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 and Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1071. In addition, the provision of Section 7 of Executive Order No. 756 is hereby reaffirmed. 4. Repealing Clause. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1071 and Executive Order No. 756, as well as of other laws, decrees, executive orders or

issuances, or parts thereof, that are in conflict with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. 5. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of February, in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Three." (Italics supplied) Specifically mandated to be accomplished within the limited timeframe of six months from the issuance of the law, the reorganization under Executive Order No. 877 clearly supplanted that which was provided under Executive Order No. 756. Nowhere is this more evident than Section 4 of said latter law which provides that, "All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1071 and Executive Order No. 756, as well as of other laws, decrees, executive orders or issuances, or parts thereof that are in conflict with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." In utilizing the computation of the benefits provided under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 for employees considered laid off for not being reappointed under petitioners new reorganized structure, Executive Order No. 877 was correctly interpreted by respondent to evince an intent not to extend said gratuity beyond the six-month period within which the reorganization is to be accomplished. In the case of Conte v. Commission on Audit,31 this Court ruled that the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance and/or retirement plan under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 was meant to prevent the undue and iniquitous proliferation of such plans in different government offices. Both before the issuance and after the effectivity of Executive Order Nos. 756 and 877, petitioners employees were governed by and availed of the same retirement laws applicable to other government employees in view of the absence of a specific provision thereon under Presidential Decree No. 252,32 its organic law, and Presidential Decree No. 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the PITC. As appropriately pointed out by respondent, petitioners observance of said general retirement laws may be gleaned from the fact that the Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits for its employees were based only on their basic salary and did not include allowances they received. No less than Eligia Romero, petitioners employee whose claim for retirement differentials triggered the instant inquiry, was granted benefits under Republic Act No. 1616 upon her retirement on December 31, 1983. It doesnt help petitioners cause any that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756, in relation to Section 3 of Executive Order No. 877, was further amended by Republic Act No. 6758,33 otherwise known as the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989. Mandated under Article IX B, Section 534 of the Constitution,35Section 436 of Republic Act No. 6758 specifically extends its coverage to government owned and controlled corporations like petitioner. With this Courts ruling in Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit37 to the effect that petitioner is included in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6758, it is evidently no longer exempted from OCPC rules and regulations, in keeping with said laws intent to do away with multiple allowances and other incentive packages as well as the resultant differences in compensation among government personnel. In the context of petitions for certiorari like the one at bench, grave abuse of discretion is understood to be such capricious and whimsical exercise of jurisdiction as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.38 It is tantamount to an evasion of a positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.39 As the Constitutional office tasked with the duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue, and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to the government or any of its subdivisions,40 respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in disapproving petitioners

utilization of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 in the computation of its employees retirement benefits. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DECASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice (On leave) JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes

On leave. Rollo, pp. 6-7. Id. at 24-25. Id. at 29-36. Id. at 22-23. Id. at 37-43. Id. at 24-28. Id. at 27-28. Id. at 7-8.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation, G.R. No. 174971. October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 154, 183.
10

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, G.R. No. 162288. April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 515, 535.
11

Smart Communications, Inc. vs. The City of Davao, G.R. No. 155491, September 16, 2008, 565 SCRA 237, 247-248.
12

Authorizing the Reorganization of the Philippine International Trading Corporation

SECTION 1. Subscription to Capital. The provisions of Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1071 otherwise known as "The Revised Charter of the Philippine International Trading Corporation" notwithstanding the forty percent (40%) share in the authorized capital stock of the Corporation allocated for the private sector which is equivalent to 800,00 shares with the total par value of P80,000,000 is hereby transferred to and assumed by the National Development Company;
13

Likewise, the shares allocated to the Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines as specified in the same Section, which have not been subscribed and paid for amounting to P39,000,000 representing 390,000 shares are transferred to and assumed by the National Development Company which shall be fully subscribed and paid-up after the issuance of this Order. The Budget Ministry is directed to release to the Corporation to carry out its functions the unpaid balance of the share of the National Government amounting to P74,000,000.00. SECTION 2. Subsidiaries. The Corporation may establish subsidiary companies, including joint ventures, as may be decided by the Board with such participation as it may deem proper and necessary in the performance of its powers and functions, any provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such subsidiaries created and registered with the
14

Securities and Exchange Commission shall be entitled to all the incentives and privileges granted by law to private enterprise engaged in business activities. SECTION 3. The Board of Directors. The Corporation shall be governed by a Board of Directors which shall be composed of the Minister of Trade and Industry as Chairman, the President of the Corporation as Vice-Chairman, and the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Natural Resources, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Investments, the General Manager of the National Development Company, a representatives from the Office of the President, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Development Bank of the Philippines, the President of the Philippine National Bank, and a representative from the private sector to be appointed by the President, as members.
15

The members of the Board may, whenever unable to attend its meetings, be represented by their duly designated representatives who shall have the same powers, duties and privileges in those meetings as the members they represent. SECTION 4. Powers of the Board. In addition to the powers granted under Presidential Decree No. 1071, any provision of law, rule or regulation to contrary notwithstanding, the Board shall have the following powers:
16

1) To reorganize the structure of the Corporation, in accordance with its expanded role in the development of Philippine trade, with such officers and employees as may be needed and determine their competitive salaries and reasonable allowances and other benefits to effectively carry out its powers and functions. 2) To organize an Executive Committee within their ranks, to decide on urgent matters subject to the confirmation of the Board in its proper meetings or, pending such board meetings, to make corporate decisions as needed by referendum or referral to individual members of the Board to be implemented if concurred in by the majority of the required quorum. 3) To determine reasonable rates of per diems and allowances for its members, for their travel and those of its officers and employees, local or foreign, as well as the reasonable remuneration for overtime services and other official business as may be required by the exigencies of this service. SECTION 5. The President of the Corporation. The President of the Corporation shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
17

SECTION 7. Incentive Scheme. The Corporation is hereby authorized to grant incentives to its officers and employees and other persons deputized, detailed or assigned to serve it which shall be drawn from gross income and commissions from marketing operations and other income but excluding income from money market placements; Provided, however, That the total amount of the incentives granted in any one year shall not exceed five percent (5%) of said income from marketing operations and other income, excluding those from money market placements, during the particular year; and Provided, finally, That the distribution thereof shall be in such manner and/or amounts as may be approved by the Board.
18

SECTION 8. Deputization of Commercial Attaches. The Corporation, in coordination with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, is hereby authorized to deputize the Commercial
19

Attaches to act as its representatives in their respective areas of assignments to, among others, initials and/or pursue trade opportunities, follow-up on pending business activities including transactional activities and keep the Corporation informed of all opportunities and developments that will enhance the establishment of Philippine presence in that market and any other activity as may be authorized by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. For this purpose, said attaches shall be directed by the Corporation and be provided with appropriate support to carry out the assignment. Such deputization shall be implemented in accordance with the proper guidelines jointly adopted by the Corporation and the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the different areas of assignment. SECTION 9. Franchise for Philippine Trade House. The authority to grant franchises to operate and maintain Philippine Trade Houses abroad is hereby vested in the Corporation. For this purpose, the Corporation shall determine the guidelines for the establishment and operation of said trade houses.
20 21

The Government Service Insurance Act.

22

An Act Amending Further Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Eight-Six, As Amended
23

The Government Service Insurance Act. Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, 407 Phil. 618, 639 (2001). City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Estrella, 416 Phil. 634, 656 (2001).

24

25

26

Vda. de Urbano vs. Government Service Insurance System, 419 Phil. 948, 969-970 (2001).
27

Government Service and Insurance System v. Commission on Audit, 484 Phil. 507, 517 (2004).
28

Recana, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 26, 35 (2001). Republic v. Marcopper Mining Corporation, 390 Phil. 708, 730 (2000).

29

30

Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, 422 Phil. 519, 529 (2001).
31

332 Phil. 20 (1996).

32

Authorizing the Creation of a Philippine International Trading Corporation Appropriating Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes
33

An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Classification System In The Government And For Other Purposes
34

Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with

original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.
35

Valdez vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 146175, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA, 580, 593. SEC. 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions.
36

The term "government" refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term "governmentowned or controlled corporations and financial institutions" shall include all corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform governmental or proprietary functions.
37

Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, 368 Phil. 478 (1999). Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 304, 308 (1999). J.L. Bernardo Construction vs. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 25, 36 (2000). Belicena v. Secretary of Finance, 419 Phil. 792, 799, ( 2001).

38

39

40

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993 JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent. Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner. Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.: The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. 1 The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that: In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows: Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus: Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied) In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims." Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:

Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal. Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied) The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC? It was. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC. It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur. As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims. As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur. Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent. It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered. Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

Footnotes 1 Order issued by NLRC Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta, Second Division, dated October 30, 1992. 2 "That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed." Simonds v. Walker, 100 Mass. 113; National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass. 373, 11 Am. Rep. 367. Charitable bequests are also governed by this maxim. Kieg v. Richardson, C.C.A. N.C., B6 F. 2d 849, 858.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970 AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf. Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.: The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision. In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on

November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent. This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine ofejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory." 4 1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. 9 2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent

Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10 3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the President to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'"11 It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing. WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur. Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations: This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that there are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers." Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice. Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary. Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right. The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's

limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and consent.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations: This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that there are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers." Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice. Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary. Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is

through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right. The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and consent.
#

Footnotes 1 Petition, paragraphs 1 to 5. 2 Republic Act No. 6132 (1970). 3 Section 12 (E), Ibid. 4 Resolution of Nov. 3, 1970. 5 Section 12(E), Constitutional Convention Act. 6 Cf. United States v. Santo Nino, 13 Phil. 141 (1909); Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v. Union Insurance Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 40 (1919); People vs. Kottinger 45 Phil. 352 (1923); Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930); Ollada v. Court of Tax Appeals, 99 Phil. 605 (1956); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission, L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10. 7 Cf. Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); Manila Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Employees Association, 79 Phil. 409 (1947); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 84 Phil. 847 (1949); City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil. 663 (1950); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950); Sanchez v. Harry Lyons Construction, Inc., 87 Phil. 532 (1950); American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957); Gonzales v. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Automotive Parts and Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248; J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413. 8 Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950). 9 Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Ross, 289 US 373 (1933). 10 Cf. Saia v. People of the State of New York, 334 US 558 (1948). 11 Abcede v. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958). The portion of the opinion from which the above excerpt is taken reads in full: 'Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the President to which the Constitution

has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.' (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines) It has no authority to decide matters 'involving the right to vote.' It may not even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 47 Off. Gaz., [6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could assert the greater and more far-reaching authority to determine who among those possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the procedural requirements, relative to the filing of certificate of candidacy should be allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law therefore. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits a candidate must be capable of 'understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election,' and must have over a month prior to the elections (when the resolution complained of was issued) 'the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate, is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such general, broad power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious whether, if so granted in the vague, abstract, indeterminate and undefined manner necessary in order that it could pass upon the factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant must not be deemed made, in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at bar) the legislative enactment would not amount to undue delegation of legislative power. (Schechter vs. U.S., 295 US 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)" pp. 141-142. 12 Cf. Cortez v. Commission on Elections, 79 Phil. 352 (1947); Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 (1949); Guevara v. Commission on Elections, 104 Phil. 268 (1958); Masangcay v. Commission on Elections, L-13827, Sept. 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 27; Lawsin v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 643; Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465; Janairo v. Commission on Elections, L-28315, Dec. 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 1173; Abes v. Commission on Elections, L-28348, Dec. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 1252; Ibuna v. Commission on Elections, L-28328, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1457; Binging Ho v. Mun. Board of Canvassers, L-29051, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 829. 13 Cf. Cauton v. Commission on Elections, L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911. The other cases are Espino v. Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1204; Ong v. Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan. 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 241; Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, L-28517, Feb. 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662; Pedido v. Commission on Elections, L-28539, March 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 1403; Aguam v. Commission on Elections, L-28955, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 883; Pelayo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, L-28869, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1374; Pacis v. Commission on Elections, L-29026, Sept. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377; Ligot v. Commission on Elections, L-31380, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 45; Abrigo v. Commission on Elections, L-31374, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 27; Moore v. Commission on Elections, L-31394, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 60; Ilarde v. Commission on Elections, L-31446, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 72; Sinsuat v. Pendatun, L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

1 L-32546 & 32551, Oct. 17, 1970, re: sections 8(A) and 12(F) and other related provisions. 2 Petition, page 9.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 169637 June 8, 2007

BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITY represented by its President ROGELIO D. COLTING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Benguet State University (BSU) seeking to nullify Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2003-1121 and Decision No. 2005-0192 dated March 17, 2005. COA Decision No. 2003-112 affirmed COA-CAR Decision No. 2000-3, disallowing the rice subsidy and health care allowance to the employees of BSU, while COA Decision 2005-019 denied BSU's motion for reconsideration. On July 6, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8292 entitled An Act Providing for the Uniform Composition and Powers of the Governing Boards, the Manner of Appointment and Term of Office of the President of Chartered State Universities and Colleges, and for Other Purposes, commonly known as the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997. Pursuant to Section 4 (d) of the said law, the Board of Regents of BSU passed and approved Board Resolution No. 794 on October 31, 1997, granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to BSUs employees. The sums were taken from the income derived from the operations of BSU and were given to the employees at different periods in 1998. On October 20, 1999, the grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance in the total amount ofP4,350,000.00 was disallowed in audit under Notice of Disallowance No. 99-001-STF (98), stating that R.A. No. 8292 does not provide for the grant of said allowance to employees and officials of the university.3 BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the COA Regional Office but it was denied in COA-CAR Decision No. 2000-3 dated January 26, 2000.4 Citing Section 55 (2) of R.A. No. 8522 or the General Appropriation Act of 1998, it held that a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose, or object of expenditure cannot be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations. It further held that the grant of said allowances lacked statutory basis, transgressed the constitutional proscription on additional, double, or indirect compensation and ran counter to the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law.

BSU thereafter filed a petition for review of Decision No. 2000-3 with the COA, which petition was denied in Decision No. 2003-1125 dated July 17, 2003. The Commission ratiocinated: Concededly, the provision in Section 8, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution that, "No elective or appointive public officers or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law" allows the payment of additional compensation when specifically authorized by law. In the instant case, BSU alleges that the grant of Rice Subsidy and Health Care allowance to its employees in 1998 is authorized by law, specifically Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, otherwise known as the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997. However, a closer perusal of the specific legal provision which reads thus: "Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards xxx "d) x x x Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, any income generated by the university or college, from tuition fee and other charges, as well as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the university or college, and may be disbursed by the Board of Regents/Trustees for instruction, research, extension or other programs/projects of the university or college x x x" clearly negate such claim of authority. It is noted that the term "other programs/projects" refers to such programs which the university may specifically undertake in pursuance of its primary objective which is to attain quality higher education. The law could not have intended that the term "program/projects" embrace all programs of BSU, for these benefits, though part of the overall operations, are not directly related to BSU's academic program. Under the maxim of ejusdem generis, the mention of a general term after the enumeration of specific matters should be held to mean that the general term should be of the same genus as the specific matters enumerated and, therefore, the "other programs and projects" should be held to be of the same nature as instruction, research and extension. The inclusion of an incentive such as Rice Subsidy and Health Care Allowance to its teachers and non-teaching personnel is a patent or blatant disregard of the statutory limitation on the powers of the governing Board of SUCs, as these benefits are indubitably not one of instruction, research or extension. Furthermore, employment in government service guarantees salaries and other compensation packages and benefits pursuant to pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law. Allowing other benefits to be granted in excess of those authorized by law is illegal. As such, BSU's attempt to grant benefits over and above those granted by the Civil Service Law cannot be countenanced.6 A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in the assailed Decision No. 2005-019 dated March 17, 2005.7 Hence, this petition with BSU positing these issues: A. Whether or not Petitioner is authorized to grant Health Care Allowance and Rice Subsidy to its employees; and

B. Whether or not the recipients should reimburse the amounts received by them.8 Before addressing the issues raised in the present petition, it bears noting that what was filed before this Court is a petition captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari. We point out that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper mode by which the COAs decisions are reviewed by this Court. Under Rule 64, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or final order of the COA may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65.9 Thus, it is only through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that the COA's decisions may be reviewed and nullified by us on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack or excess of jurisdiction.10 However, though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we treat this petition as a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 for it alleges "grave abuse of discretion" and "reversible legal error." The averments in the complaint, not the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the action.11 Likewise, in previous rulings, We have treated differently labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play.12 BSU ascribes legal error and grave abuse of discretion to the COA in affirming the disallowance of the rice subsidy and health care benefits. Relying on R.A. No. 8292, BSU maintains that it can grant said benefits to its employees. It argues that the said law vests state universities and colleges with fiscal autonomy, and grants them ample leeway in the appropriation and disbursement of their funds. BSU adds that the grant did not contravene the constitutional prohibition on additional compensation because the allowances are granted as an incentive in appreciation of services rendered and in recognition of the economic plight of the employees. Also, the amounts used were taken from income generated by its operation and retained by the university which, under R.A. No. 8292, may be disbursed by its Governing Board in a manner it may determine to carry out its programs. Finally, it argues that the Salary Standardization Law does not expressly prohibit the benefits, because the said allowances are in the nature of a financial assistance and not an additional income. We affirm the assailed Decisions. BSUs contention that it is authorized to grant allowances to its employees is based on Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292. The provision reads: SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines: xxx xxx xxx

d) to fix the tuition fees and other necessary school charges, such as but not limited to matriculation fees, graduation fees and laboratory fees, as their respective boards may deem proper to impose after due consultations with the involved sectors. Such fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by the university or college, shall constitute special trust funds and shall be deposited in any authorized government depository bank, and all interests shall accrue therefrom shall part of the same fund for the use of the university or college: Provided, That income derived from university hospitals shall be exclusively earmarked for the operating expenses of the hospitals.

Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, any income generated by the university or college from tuition fees and other charges, as well as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the university or college, and may be disbursed by the Board of Regents/Trustees for instruction, research, extension, or other programs/projects of the university or college: Provided, That all fiduciary fees shall be disbursed for the specific purposes for which they are collected. If, for reasons beyond its control, the university or college, shall not be able to pursue any project for which funds have been appropriated and, allocated under its approved program of expenditures, the Board of Regents/Trustees may authorize the use of said funds for any reasonable purpose which, in its discretion, may be necessary and urgent for the attainment of the objectives and goals of the universities or college; xxx xxx xxx

Similarly, Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum No. 03-01, the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for R.A. No. 8292, provides: RULE V Powers and Duties of the Governing Boards SECTION 18. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards (GBs). The GBs of chartered SUCs shall have the following powers and duties, in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to a Board of Directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the "Corporation Code of the Philippines," thus: xxx xxx xxx

(d) to fix the tuition fees and other necessary charges, such as, but not limited, to matriculation fees, graduation fees and laboratory fees, as they may deem proper to impose, after due consultations with the involved sectors. Such fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by the university or college, shall constitute special trust funds and shall be deposited in any authorized government depository bank, and all interest that shall accrue therefrom shall be part of the same fund for the use of the university or college: Provided, that income derived from university or college hospitals shall be exclusively earmarked for the operations of the hospitals. Any income generated by the university or college from tuition fees and other charges, as well as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the university or college, and may be disbursed by its GB for instruction, research, extension, or other programs/projects of the university or college: Provided, That all fiduciary fees shall be disbursed for the specific purposes for which they are collected. If, for reasons beyond its control, the university or college shall not be able to pursue any project for which funds have been appropriated and allocated under its approved program of expenditures, its GB may authorize the use of said funds for any reasonable purpose which,

in its discretion, may be necessary and urgent for the attainment of the objectives and goals of the university or college; xxx xxx xxx

What is clear from Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292 cited by BSU as legal basis of its claim as well as from its implementing rules is that income generated by the university may be disbursed by its Governing Board for "instruction, research, extension, or other programs/projects of the university or colleges." BSU theorizes that the phrase "other programs/projects of the university or college" in Section 4 (d) covers all projects and programs of the university, including those designed to uplift the economic plight of the employees. It is not limited to those programs which the university may specifically undertake in pursuance of its primary objective to achieve quality education, contrary to the interpretation of the COA. We disagree. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute which would repel such inference.13 The COA correctly ruled that the "other programs/projects" under R.A. No. 8292 and its Implementing Rules should be of the same nature as instruction, research, and extension. In BSU's case, the disbursements were for rice subsidy and health care allowances which are, in no way, intended for academic programs similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section 4 (d) cannot, therefore, be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the allowances. Furthermore, a reading of the entire provision supports the COAs interpretation that the authority given to the Governing Board of state universities and colleges is not plenary and absolute. It is clear in Section 4 that the powers of the Governing Board are subject to limitations. This belies BSU's claim of plenary and absolute authority. Neither can BSU find solace in the academic freedom clause of the Constitution. Academic freedom as adverted to in the Constitution and in R.A. No. 8292 only encompasses the freedom of the institution of higher learning to determine for itself, on academic grounds, who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.14 The guaranteed academic freedom does not grant an institution of higher learning unbridled authority to disburse its funds and grant additional benefits sans statutory basis. Unfortunately for BSU, it failed to present any sound legal basis that would justify the grant of these additional benefits to its employees. Section 8, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, is clear that: No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of Congress, any present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.

Besides, Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law already provides for consolidation of allowances in the standardized salary rates, thus: SEC. 12. Consolidation of All Allowances and Compensation. All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. The benefits excluded from the standardized salary rates are the "allowances" which are usually granted to officials and employees of the government to defray or reimburse the expenses incurred in the performance of their official functions.15 Clearly, the rice subsidy and health care allowance granted by BSU were not among the allowances listed in Section 12 which State workers can continue to receive under R.A. No. 6758 over and above their standardized salary rates. Hence, no abuse of discretion was committed by the COA in disallowing the disbursement of funds. As regards the refund of the disallowed benefits, this Court holds that the employees need not refund the benefits they received based on our ruling in Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit.16 In that case, the COA disallowed the payment of hazard duty pay and birthday cash gifts to its employees. This Court sustained the disallowance because the grant was without legal basis. However, this Court ruled against the refund holding that: x x x Petitioners received the hazard duty pay and birthday cash gift in good faith since the benefits were authorized by PPA Special Order No. 407-97 issued pursuant to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 34-95 implementing DBM National Compensation Circular No. 76, series of 1995, and PPA Memorandum Circular No. 22-97, respectively. Petitioners at the time had no knowledge that the payment of said benefits lacked legal basis. Being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the benefits they received.17 The ruling in Philippine Ports Authority applies to this case. The BSU employees received the rice subsidy and health care allowances in good faith since the benefits were authorized by Board Resolution No. 794, series of 1997. They had no knowledge that the grant of said benefits lacked statutory basis. Therefore, a refund is unnecessary. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Commission on Audit Decisions No. 2003-112 and No. 2005-019 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION that BSU employees need not refund the rice subsidy and health care allowance received per Board Resolution No. 794, series of 1997. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Quisumbing* , Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur. Puno, C.J., on official leave. Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

Footnotes
*

Acting Chief Justice. Annex "B," rollo, pp. 21-25. Annex "A," id. at 17-20. Annexes "C" to "C-1," id. at 26-28. Annex "D," id. at 29-30. Supra note 1. Id. at 23-24. Supra note 1. BSU's Memorandum, p. 5.

SEC. 2. Mode of review. - A judgment or final resolution of the Commission of Election and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on Certiorari under Rule 65, except as herein provided.
10

Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 512, 517.

11

Partido ng Manggawa v. Commission of Elections, G.R. No. 164702, March 15, 2006, 484 SCRA 671, 684-685.
12

Id. Ching v. Salinas, G.R. No. 161295, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 241, 261. Vide: Camacho v. Coresis, G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 628, 637.

13

14

15

Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 152688, November 19, 2003, 416 SCRA 245, 249.
16

G.R. No. 159200, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 490, 498. Id. at 500.

17