The Impact of 1

Title: The Impact of Social Identity on Willingness for Contact in Northern Ireland

Submitting to: Department of Psychology

Date of Submission: January 15, 2007

 The Impact of 2

The Impact of Social Identity on Willingness for Contact in Northern Ireland

The conflict in Northern Ireland, often referred to as “the troubles,” has resulted
in the deaths of 3,585 people and some 40,000 injuries since the late 1960s (Campbell,
Cairns, and Mallet 2004). Given that the population of Northern Ireland is only 1.6
million, these figures are considerable. Additionally, due to the nature of the “close-knit
fabric” of relationships within Northern Irish communities, the psychological effects of
incidents extend beyond the individuals involved and their immediate family members
into the community as a whole (Cairns, et al., 133). At the core of the conflict is a
disagreement between the people of Northern Ireland who aim to unite with the Republic
of Ireland (Nationalists who are generally Catholic) and those who desire to remain part
of the United Kingdom (Unionists who are generally Protestant) (Cairns and Darby
1998).
In the recent past, much progress has been made to remedy the more concrete
problems of the conflict between Protestants and Catholics such as inequality in voting,
employment, housing and related matters (Cairns and Darby 1998). However, social
divisions in Northern Ireland remain strong, which Muldoon (2004) suggests explains the
intractability of the conflict. While improvements have been made, problems that are the
result of social divisions rather than clear economic, political, or social inequality have a
psychological or symbolic meaning and are more difficult to remedy (Cairns and Darby
1998). Much additional attention must be paid to these issues.

Social Segregation and Conflict

The pervasiveness of social division in Northern Ireland is readily apparent in
many aspects of the society. While segregation is not identified as the principal source of
the conflict, it may have a role in maintaining the conflict (Campbell, et al. 2004).
Brewer (2001) suggests that intergroup conflict is more serious in highly segmented
societies. Even now in Northern Ireland only about 50% of the population lives in mixed
neighborhoods, just 11% of marriages are cross-community, and only 5% of students
attend integrated schools with equal numbers of Catholic and Protestant children
(Campbell, et al. 2004). Schools are thus a very pronounced example of segregation.
Integrating or desegregating the society specifically the educational system, which is
more easily addressable than marriage or living situation, has been proposed as a
promising option to foster lasting peace.
Integrated schools arose in the 1980s at the hands of parent facilitators who were
dedicated to the advancement of intergroup education. The schools attempt to maintain
an equal balance of Protestant and Catholic students, faculty, and staff in order to
promote education of children from all backgrounds together (McClenahan, et al. 2003).
While still limited in number, there has been an increase from a single integrated school,
first established in 1981, to nearly 45 integrated schools in 2000 (McClenahan, et al.
2003). Extensive research on the impact of integrated schooling has not yet been
accomplished, partly because it is such a recent phenomenon; however, several studies
have been conducted. Results have shown that children who attended integrated schools
had a more positive self image and greater self-esteem (McClenahan, et al. 2003).
However, researchers indicated that these effects could stem from the fact that children in
these schools have parents who are more likely to develop high self-competence and self-
esteem in their children. Integrated schools have also been found to encourage tolerance
 The Impact of 3

of diversity, which is thought to be a key aspect of peace-building (McGlynn 2004), but

again parents may be responsible for these outcomes by teaching their children to be
tolerant. Simply sending a child to such a school can be seen as a political act on the part
of the parent (McClenahan, et al. 2003) and thus the decision for integrated schooling is
very complex and not one that is taken lightly. Integrated schooling is an aspect of the
culture in Northern Ireland requiring much additional research. The present study will
examine attitudes about integrated schooling as well as attitudes regarding other areas of
integration and contact in the society of Northern Ireland. One important question for
research is the relation between individuals’ identity with the group to which they belong
and willingness for contact with the opposing group.

Theoretical Perspectives

Contact hypothesis. One relevant theoretical framework for supporting efforts at

integration in schools is the Contact Hypothesis (Allport 1954), which provides evidence
for the benefits that may be gained by intergroup contact. The general assertion of this
hypothesis is that communication between individuals of conflicting groups, resulting
from their being in contact with one another, will foster mutual understanding of their
common values and belief systems. Ideally contact will thus lead to greater acceptance
of a person from an opposing group (Allport 1954; Kilpatrick and Leitch 2004).
Attempts to promote contact between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland have
been initiated. However, as Cairns and Darby (1998) noted, many contacts have
emphasized involvement on an individual level (such as integrated holiday activities for
children) neglecting to address that the conflict is based on intergroup dynamics.
Furthermore, although some areas of Northern Ireland are not residentially segregated
and therefore members of the conflicting groups do come into contact with each other
regularly, this contact alone has not solved the intergroup problems (Cairns and Darby
1998).
Building upon the Contact Hypothesis, Kilpatrick and Leitch (2004) identified
four conditions that must be met in order for contact to be beneficial: 1) equal status
between the groups; 2) common goals; 3) no competition between the groups; and 4)
authority sanction for the contact. These criteria have proven difficult to fulfill in many
circumstances. However, in the school setting, all students are considered equal, the
school promotes both common goals and cooperation (lack of competition), and the
structure of the administration is such that there is authority sanction for the contact.
Thus the integrated school setting in Northern Ireland, in theory, may accomplish a
beneficial application of the Contact Hypothesis since it potentially meets the four critical
conditions for successful contact.

Social identity theory. Given that the conflict in Northern Ireland is predominately
a social level phenomenon, it is crucial to understand the framework for group beliefs and
behavior in order to examine how these elements can affect outcomes. One theory of
intergroup behavior appropriate for the examination of attitudes in Northern Ireland is
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986). This theory asserts that
individual members of a group take part in comparisons between in-groups and out-
groups in order to formulate their own positive social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
 The Impact of 4

Tajfel and Turner (1979) propose that a positive perception of one’s own group in the
context of in-group/out-group comparisons is gained through differentiating one’s own
group from a relevant out-group. Due to this comparison, a bias for one’s own group is
established. Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) identify three variables necessary for this to
occur: 1) one must identify oneself with the pertinent in-group (internalized group
membership); 2) the social situation must permit assessment of appropriate characteristics
(evaluation of relevant attributes); and 3) only the most relevant out-groups are to be
compared as the number of out-groups for any one group is endless (relevant comparison
group). All of these criteria are evident in Northern Ireland given that one predominant
aspect of the majority of Northern Irish citizens’ identities is religious group membership,
that Northern Irish society emphasizes assessment and comparison of groups, and that the
two religious groups, Catholic and Protestant, are rooted against one another and serve as
the relevant out-groups.
Additionally, according to Social Identity Theory there are differences in attitudes
and goals of groups of different statuses: ‘superior’ versus ‘inferior’ groups. ‘Superior’
groups view the social situation as legitimate, desiring to maintain the status quo since
the present situation supports their social identity positively. For example, the ‘superior’
group could have control over aspects of society such as the politics or the economy and
may be viewed as generally better; thus they would like to retain their position.
Contrastingly, ‘inferior’ groups view the social situation as illegitimate, adopting instead
a social change mentality because the present situation does not support their social
identity positively and perhaps even discriminates against them.
An example that supports this status discrepancy in the context of Northern
Ireland is a study by Irwing and Stringer (2002), which found that Protestants’ beliefs
corresponded with protection of the status quo whereas Catholics’ beliefs corresponded
with a social change ideology. Since historically Catholics have been identified as the
‘inferior’ group and Protestants as the ‘superior’, this discrepancy is explained by the
difference in status element of Social Identity Theory. Cairns and Darby (1998) suggest
that Social Identity Theory is fitting for the Northern Irish context since its group-level
description allows better explanation of exhibited behaviors than explanations which
solely examine individual variables. For example, the individual price of rioting in terms
of injury, arrest, or other costs may seem exceptionally high relative to the individual
benefit. But when examined at a group level, the benefit potentially could be much
greater, for instance by bringing great attention to a certain cause.
Various studies examining social identities in Northern Ireland have been
conducted via this theoretical framework. Irwing and Stringer (2002) found that the two
groups maximally differentiated on key issues of the British state, an expected
discrepancy given that Northern Ireland’s status as part of the British state is a critical
aspect of the conflict and an element upon which each group defines itself. Neins and
Cairns (2002) examined identity management strategies in Northern Ireland through the
framework of Social Identity Theory. Their findings suggested that Catholics perceive
the government as illegitimate whereas Protestants perceive it as legitimate. Once again,
this finding conforms to Social Identity Theory in that the ‘inferior’ group will adopt a
social change policy whereas the ‘superior’ group will work to maintain the status quo. It
is clear that Social Identity Theory should be applied to gain a better understanding of
attitudes in any context of intergroup conflict.
 The Impact of 5

The Current Study

The present work is based on an integration of Social Identity Theory and the
Contact Hypothesis. Taken together, these two frameworks suggest that the need for
contact is greatest between those possessing the strongest in-group biases. That is, in
order to promote further mutual understanding, successful contact experiences are most
needed for those with the strongest sense of identity with their own group (Catholic or
Protestant). Integrating these two theoretical frameworks suggests that social identity
could affect willingness for, and effect of, contact. Since researchers have proposed that
negative biases against an out-group could limit the effectiveness of contact, and could
even be counter-productive (Amir, 1969, 1979 as cited in Maoz, 2003), strong
expressions of social identity in Northern Ireland in the form of in-group bias could make
individuals less willing to engage in contact with the other group.
Of particular relevance is a study involving varying degrees of out-group attitudes
in relation to contact in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which it was
found that contact can be more effective for those with strong in-group bias (Maoz 2003).
While the more in-group-biased participants showed little motivation to engage in contact
and even reported post-contact satisfaction as very low, their post-contact responses to
questions of social-distance attitudes were more favorable than their pre-contact
responses. The more moderately oriented participants contrastingly showed greater post-
conflict satisfaction, but no great change in social-distance attitudes, probably due to their
already high positive attitudes toward the out-group before contact. The integration of
Social Identity Theory and The Contact Hypothesis in the context of Northern Ireland
needs much further exploration as it may shed light on the influence of one’s social
identity on attitudes toward integration, particularly since integration has been proposed
as an option to foster peace between the two conflicting groups.

Hypotheses
The current study will consider the following elements of Social Identity: strength
of identification with the relevant in-group, level of in-group bias, and social change
ideology versus maintenance of the status quo. These elements will be examined in
relation to attitudes about integration with particular emphasis on schooling, but also in
the contexts of the community and the workplace. Based on previous research, the first
hypothesis predicts that the stronger one’s in-group identification, the more biased the
individual will be to favor the in-group and the less willing the individual will be for
contact with the out-group. The second hypothesis predicts that since Catholics have
been identified historically as the inferior group, they will conform to social change
ideology, and therefore be more willing for contact, as contact is seen as a means of
social change whereas Protestants, identified historically as the superior group, will
desire to maintain the status quo, and therefore be less willing for contact.

Method
Participants
Participants were 1,800 residents of Northern Ireland. Each participant completed
the 2004 Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) survey. To meet eligibility criteria,
individuals had to reside in Northern Ireland at the time of the survey and be at least 18
 The Impact of 6

years of age. In order to ensure that less densely populated areas would be represented, a
stratified random sample was conducted in which three geographic regions were
identified including Belfast, East of the Bann, and West of the Bann. Within these strata,
simple random samples were conducted using Postal Address Files (PAFs) as the
sampling frame. A total 3,056 addresses were initially selected using the PAFs. One
hundred eighty-one addresses were cut due to their status as vacant, derelict, or
commercial. Of the remaining 2,875, six hundred twenty-seven refused participation,
417 were unable to be contacted, and 31 did not participate for other reasons. The
remaining 1,800 served as the sample. At each selected address, if more than one
resident was age 18 or over, the participant was determined by selecting the person
whose date of birth was the closest to the date of the visit.
Participants’ ages are presented followed by the population percentages from the
2001 census data to show the comparison: 23% of participants were age 65 and over
(13.26% of population), 17% were ages 55-64 years (9.64% of population), 15.5% were
ages 45-54 years (11.92% of population), 20.1% were ages 35-44 years (14.65% of
population), 13% were ages 25-34 years (14.38% of population), and 11.5% were ages
18-24 years (9.36% of population) (Conflict Archive on the Internet, 2005). Although it
appears that some of the age ranges were over-represented, it must be kept in mind that
the population percentages are based on all persons in Northern Ireland, including those
under age 18, who were not a part of the study. There were 746 male participants
(41.4%) and 1,054 female participants (58.6 %) compared to males making up 48.74% of
the population and females making up 51.26% of the population, indicating that females
are slightly over-represented in the sample (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research
Agency, 2005). In terms of marital status, 26.4% of respondents were single/never
married, 47.4%were married, 4.4% were living as married, 5.3% separated, 4.5% were
divorced, and 11.9% were widowed. Regarding household income, it should first be
noted that a total of 549 participants chose not to respond to the question about their
household income. For the remaining 1,168 respondents, annual household income
ranged from less than £3,000 to more than £50,000. The range for approximately the
middle 50% of respondents was roughly between £7,000 and £25,999. T-tests were
conducted to examine differences in household income between Catholics and
Protestants. The mean income range for Catholics (M = 5.52, SD = 2.37) indicating a
range of £10,000 - 19,000 was not significantly different from the mean income range for
Protestants (M = 5.68, SD = 2.44) which indicated a range from £10,000 – 19,000, t = -
1.061, p= .289.
Participants’ highest levels of educational attainment are presented below as
percentages of the sample: 14.2% of respondents completed degrees or certifications
from universities, colleges of technology, and/or professional institutions; 4.4%
completed non graduate teaching qualifications from universities, colleges of technology,
and/or professional institutions; 10.9% completed General Certificate of Education A
level; 3.3% completed non-graduate teaching qualifications at the national/general
certificate or diploma level; 17.6% completed General Certificate of Secondary
Education O level, with clerical and commercial training; 3.1% completed Certificate of
Secondary Education other than grade 1; 43.4% had no formal qualification; and 3.2%
had other levels of qualification (National Statistics, 2001). T-tests were conducted to
examine differences in highest educational qualifications between Catholics and
 The Impact of 7

Protestants. The mean qualification for Catholics (M = 5.03, SD = 2.34) indicating a

qualification of GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education), GCE O level, with
clerical and commercial qualifications or apprenticeships, Senior Certificate, BTEC, or
BEC, was not significantly different from the mean qualification for Protestants (M =
5.23, SD = 2.18) which indicated the same level of qualification.
Regarding religion, 11.6% of respondents reported no religious affiliation, 34.5%
identified themselves as Catholic, and 53.8% identified themselves as Protestant. In the
general population, 3% of all residents in Northern Ireland report belonging to no religion
or to a religion other than Catholic or Protestant, 44% identified themselves as Catholic,
and 53% identified themselves as Protestant, (National Statistics, 2004). Thus in the
2004 NILT survey, Protestants’ representation directly reflects their proportion of the
population, Catholics are slightly underrepresented, and those belonging to other
religions or no religion are slightly over-represented. Overall, these percentages show a
fairly representative sample.

Materials
Data for the current study was taken from the 2004 Northern Ireland Life and
Times (NILT) Survey. Conducted annually, the NILT survey examines attitudes and
behavior of residents of Northern Ireland. Four main purposes for the NILT survey were
identified: 1) to monitor public attitudes towards social policy and political issues in
Northern Ireland; 2) to provide a time-series on attitudes to key social policy areas; 3) to
facilitate academic social policy analysis; and 4) to provide a freely available resource on
public attitudes for the wider community of users in Northern Ireland (UK Data Archive
2005). The survey has a repeated cross-sectional design as it has been conducted with
new participants each year since 1998 with slight variations. There were a total of 7
sections in the 2004 survey including Background, Men’s Life and Times,
Grandparenting and Family Life, Community Relations, Countryside and Farming,
Political Attitudes, and Religious Observance. The principal investigators of the 2004
NILT survey were P. Devine of Queen’s University Belfast and L. Dowds of University
of Ulster. All data acquired through the NILT surveys are open for public use free of
charge and can be accessed via the Internet at http://www.ark.ad.uk/nilt/.
The 2004 NILT survey has a total of 188 items, 166 of which were administered
via a face-to-face interview and 22 of which were administered via a self-completion
questionnaire. The current study used a small subset of 7 items from the face-to-face
interview portion.
Social Identity. Four questions that were particularly relevant for measuring
Social Identity were extracted from the section of the survey entitled Political Attitudes.
As the survey was not designed to measure Social Identity as a construct, relevance of
each item was determined on the basis of agreement of a panel of researchers for the
current study. The Social Identity questions and answer choices are as follows: 1) Would
you call yourself a very strong (unionist/nationalist), fairly strong, or not very strong?
with answer choices of: very strong, fairly strong, not very strong, and don’t know; 2) Do
you think the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be for it to with answer
choices of: remain part of the United Kingdom, reunify with the rest of Ireland, become
an independent state, other, and don’t know; 3) If the majority of people in Northern
Ireland ever voted to become part of a United Ireland do you think you with answer
 The Impact of 8

choices of: would find this almost impossible to accept, would not like it, but could live
with it if you had to, would happily accept the wishes of the majority, and don’t know;
and finally 4) If the majority of people in Northern Ireland never voted to become part of
a United Ireland do you think you with answer choices of: would find this almost
impossible to accept, would not like it, but could live with it if you had to, would happily
accept the wishes of the majority, and don’t know. These questions assess the strength of
each participant’s social identity as well as their inclination toward either maintaining the
status quo or adopting a social change mentality.
Attitudes about Contact. Three questions for measurement of attitudes about
contact were extracted from the survey, and relevance again was determined on the basis
of agreement of a panel of researchers. Questions and answer choices are as follows: 1)
If you were deciding where to send your children to school would you prefer a school
with children of only your own religion or a mixed-religion school? with answer choices
of: own religion only, mixed religion school, other, don’t know; 2) If you had a choice,
would you prefer to live in a neighborhood with people of only your own religion, or in a
mixed-religion neighborhood? with answer choices of: own religion only, mixed religion
neighborhood, other, don’t know; and 3) If you were working and had to change your
job, would you prefer a workplace with people of only your own religion, or a mixed
religion workplace? with answer choices of: own religion only, mixed religion
workplace, other, don’t know. These questions came from the section entitled
Community Relations and examine respondents’ willingness for contact with their
relevant out-group.

Procedure
All interviews were conducted between October of 2004 and February of 2005.
Interviewers were employees of Research and Evaluation Services (RES) who attended
informational sessions conducted by RES and the NILT researchers for training on how
to conduct the survey interviews. Interviewers were instructed to attempt calling in
person at each residence 5 times before discontinuing an address. If interviewers were
unable to make contact after 5 attempts or received notification of refusal to participate, a
replacement address was issued.
The households identified for the study were sent a mailing explaining the
purpose and method of the survey before participation. The letter also provided contact
information for RES and requested consent for participation. Participants completed the
interviews in their own homes, participating in face-to-face interviews with an
interviewer using computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). Participants also
completed a self-report questionnaire, which they filled out and gave back to the
interviewer either immediately following the interview or at a later date. Information
about the average amount of time taken to complete the 2004 survey is not available;
however, the 1998 NILT survey of similar length and structure took an average of 40
minutes to complete. All participants who completed the survey were entered into a
drawing for three prizes of £500, £300, or £200.

Results
Summary Statistics
 The Impact of 9

Chi-square analyses were used to explore the hypothesized pattern of observations

for the categorical variables measuring religion and different elements of social identity
and willingness for contact. The contingencies are shown in Tables 1-7.

Strength of Identity
The pattern of observations for the strength of social identity and willingness for
contact was first examined. Results are displayed in Table 1. A significant chi-square
was found for the analysis of strength of social identity and willingness for contact in all
three contexts examined: mixed-religion education, 2 (2, N= 1035) = 27.12, p<.01,
phi=.16; mixed-religion neighborhood, 2 (2, N=1079) =32.02, p <.01, phi=.17; and
mixed-religion workplace, 2 (2, N=1078) =42.81, p <.01 , phi=.2. Thus for respondents
who reported having a very strong or fairly strong identification with their in-group,
preferences for non-integrated (own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods, and
workplaces were greater than expected by chance whereas preferences for integrated
(mixed religion) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were less than expected by
chance. Conversely, for respondents who reported having a weak identification with
their in-group, preferences for integrated (mixed-religion) schools, neighborhoods, and
workplaces were greater than expected by chance while preferences for non-integrated
(own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were less than expected by
chance. As the phi values indicate however, the correlations between willingness for
contact in these three areas and strength of identity are relatively weak, given that they
did not reach the .3 level, which would indicate a moderate correlation.

Type of Ideology
General Future Policy. The next step was to examine the pattern of observations
for ideology and willingness for contact by examining whether preferences regarding the
future policy for Northern Ireland, which taps into maintenance of the status quo versus
social change ideology, was related to willingness for contact in the three contexts of
education, neighborhood, and workplace. The data set was split according to religious
affiliation in order to gain a more fitting and explanatory analysis, since Catholics’ and
Protestants’ responses to future policy questions are qualitatively different. For example,
a Catholic who responded with a preference for Northern Ireland to remain part of the
United Kingdom differs qualitatively from a Protestant who responded with a preference
for Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. Even though the responses
themselves are the same, this response for Catholics, who were historically the persecuted
minority and considered the ‘inferior’ group, would have a different meaning than it
would for Protestants, who were historically the ‘superior’ group making up a majority of
the population. Initial analyses were conducted to explore the pattern of observations for
religion and future policy preferences, and the results indicated that the religious
categories had different implications for future policy preferences, 2 (2, N= 1632) =
581.78, p<.01, phi=.60. Results are shown in Table 2. Thus Protestants responded with a
preference to remain part of the United Kingdom more than expected by chance and
responded with preferences for uniting with Ireland or creating an independent state less
than expected by chance. Conversely Catholics responded with preferences for uniting
with Ireland or creating an independent state more than expected by chance and
responded with a preference to remain part of the United Kingdom less than expected by
 The Impact of 10

chance. Those reporting no religious affiliation responded with a preference for creating
an independent state more than expected by chance and responded with preferences to
remain part of the United Kingdom or unite with Ireland less than expected by chance.
The phi value indicated a fairly strong correlation between these two variables.
For Catholics, there was a significant chi-square for future policy preference and
willingness for contact in all three contexts examined: mixed-religion education, 2 (2,
N= 502) = 28.49, p<.01, phi=.24; mixed-religion neighborhood, 2 (2, N=523) =14.39, p
<.01, phi=.17; and mixed-religion workplace, 2 (2, N=524) =12.78, p <.01 , phi=.16.
Results are shown in Table 3. For Catholics who desired to unite with Ireland, reported
preferences for non-integrated (own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods, and
workplaces were greater than expected by chance and reported preferences for integrated
(mixed-religion) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were less than expected by
chance. For Catholics who desired Northern Ireland to remain part of the United
Kingdom or create an independent state, reported preferences for integrated (mixed-
religion) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were greater than expected by chance
while reported preferences for non-integrated (own-religion only) schools,
neighborhoods, and workplaces were less than expected by chance.
For Protestants, willingness for contact in all three contexts examined varied as a
function of future policy preference: mixed-religion education, 2 (2, N= 882) = 27.28,
p<.01, phi=.18; mixed-religion neighborhood, 2 (2, N=905) =10.57, p <.01, phi=.11; and
mixed-religion workplace, 2 (2, N=903) =6.99, p <.01 , phi=.10. Results are shown in
Table 4. For Protestants who reported a desire to remain part of the United Kingdom,
preferences for non-integrated (own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods, and
workplaces were greater than expected by chance whereas preferences for integrated
(mixed-religion) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were less than expected by
chance. For Protestants who reported a desire to unite with Ireland or create an
independent state, preferences for integrated (mixed religion) schools, neighborhoods,
and workplaces were greater than expected by chance whereas preferences for non-
integrated (own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were less than
expected by chance. For respondents reporting no religious affiliation, chi-squares were
non-significant for future policy preference and willingness for contact in each of the
contexts examined: mixed-religion education, 2 (2, N= 169) = 3.12, p=.21, phi=.14;
mixed-religion neighborhood, 2 (2, N=171) =.93, p =.63, phi=.07; and mixed-religion
workplace, 2 (2, N=168) =.84, p=.66 , phi=.07. Results are shown in Table 5
Maintenance of Status Quo. The pattern of observations for ideology and
willingness for contact was further explored within respondents who reported a desire to
maintain the status quo, i.e., those who preferred for Northern Ireland to remain part of
the United Kingdom as opposed to Northern Ireland becoming part of a united Ireland. A
significant chi-square was found for the desire to remain part of the United Kingdom and
willingness for contact in all three contexts examined: mixed-religion education, 2 (2,
N= 1319) = 97.52, p<.01, phi=.27; mixed-religion neighborhood, 2 (2, N=1362)
=103.55, p <.01, phi=.28; and mixed-religion workplace, 2 (2, N=1360) =97.28, p <.01 ,
phi=.27. Results are shown in Table 6. Hence for respondents who reported that a united
Ireland would be impossible to accept or that they would not like it but could live with it,
preferences for non-integrated (own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods, and
workplaces were greater than expected by chance whereas preferences for integrated
 The Impact of 11

(mixed-religion) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were less than expected by

chance. Conversely, for respondents who reported that they desired to remain part of the
United Kingdom but would happily accept a united Ireland if it was the majority
decision, preferences for integrated (mixed-religion) schools, workplaces, and
neighborhoods were greater than expected by chance whereas preferences for non-
integrated (own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were less than
expected by chance. The phi values for these analyses show moderate correlations
between these variables.
Social Change. The pattern of observations for social change ideology and
willingness for contact was also explored within respondents who reported a desire to
unify with the rest of Ireland. The desire to unify with Ireland appeared to be an
important factor for willingness for contact in all three contexts examined: mixed-religion
education, 2 (2, N= 646) = 39.25, p<.01, phi=.25; mixed-religion neighborhood, 2 (2,
N=672) =32.65, p <.01, phi=.22; and mixed-religion workplace, 2 (2, N=670) =70.92, p
<.01 , phi=.33. Results are shown in Table 7. Therefore for respondents who reported
that the possibility of Northern Ireland never uniting with Ireland would be impossible to
accept or that they would not like it but could live with it, preference for non-integrated
(own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were greater than expected
by chance and preferences for integrated (mixed-religion) schools, neighborhoods, and
workplaces were less than expected by chance. Alternatively, for respondents who
reported that they desired to unify with Ireland but would happily accept it if the majority
decision was for Northern Ireland never to unite with Ireland, preferences for integrated
(mixed-religion) schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces were greater than expected by
chance and preferences for non-integrated (own-religion only) schools, neighborhoods,
and workplaces were less than expected by chance. The phi values for these analyses
show moderate correlations between these variables.

Discussion
Although researchers have examined the effects of intergroup contact (Amir,
1969, 1979 as cited in Maoz, 2003) and aspects of social identity such as in-group bias
and group status differences in the context of Northern Ireland (Irwing and Stringer 2002;
Neins and Cairns 2002) social identity and contact are typically investigated
independently of one another. To gain a more integrated understanding, the present study
examined elements of participants’ social identities in conjunction with their desire for
contact. The first hypothesis, which proposed that the stronger one’s in-group
identification the less willing for contact the individual would be, was supported.
Strength of identity was significantly associated with willingness for contact. Hypothesis
2, which proposed that Catholics as the ‘inferior’ group would adopt a social change
ideology, whereas Protestants as the ‘superior’ group would desire maintenance of the
status quo, was partially supported in the analyses. An individual’s desire for the future
policy of Northern Ireland was associated with religion, but willingness for contact,
hypothesized as a means of social change, was not always divided along religious lines as
predicted.
The results relating to hypothesis 1 support previous research based on the
framework of Social Identity Theory. In the present study, those with strong social
identities conveyed strong in-group bias demonstrated by their unwillingness for contact
 The Impact of 12

with the out-group. This was true for all contexts examined including education,
workplaces, and neighborhoods. This finding supports the assertion that in-group/out-
group comparisons with a focus on differentiation between groups can lead to a bias
favoring one’s own group (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and possibly the formation of a
positive social identity, although positive/negative perceptions were not specifically
measured in this study.
Relating to Hypothesis 2, the current study also supports Social Identity Theory in
line with the findings from an investigation by Irwing and Stringer (2002), which
suggested that Protestants and Catholics have maximally differentiated on key issues of
the British state. Catholics have been identified historically as the ‘inferior’ group in
Northern Ireland and studies exploring group status differences within the framework of
Social Identity Theory have found that Catholics in Northern Ireland adopted a social
change ideology as ‘inferior’ groups tend to do (Niens and Cairns 2002). Contrastingly,
Protestants have been identified historically as the ‘superior’ group; thus Neins and
Cairns (2002) found that Protestants perceive political, social, and economic situations as
legitimate and therefore desire to maintain the status quo. Fittingly, analyses of the
pattern of observations for religion and future policy preference suggested that the
religious categories had different implications for future policy preferences; Protestants
responded with a preference to remain part of the United Kingdom more than expected
by chance, while by contrast Catholics responded with a preference to unite with Ireland
more than expected by chance. As the standing of Northern Ireland as part of the British
state has been identified as a root cause of the conflict, this finding is not surprising.
The difference in status element was further examined in terms of willingness for
contact. It was expected that willingness for contact would be seen as a means of social
change and thus Catholics would be more willing for contact and Protestants less willing.
This prediction was only partially supported in the analyses. Consistent with the
prediction, Catholics who desired Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom
or create an independent state reported preferences for integration greater than expected
by chance in all three contexts examined. Consistent with the prediction that Protestants
would be less willing for contact was the finding that Protestants who reported a desire to
remain part of the United Kingdom expressed less willingness for integration.
However, Catholics and Protestants did not adopt the predicted preferences for
contact uniformly. Future policy preferences were not consistent along religious lines.
Analyses of preferences for integration among Catholics who desired to unite with
Ireland were contrary to hypothesis 2 as they reported preferences for integration less
than expected by chance. There are several possible explanations for this finding. It
should first be noted that desiring to unite with Ireland is itself a social change ideology,
as it shows desire for change in the present status of Northern Ireland. Thus, these
individuals did show a social change ideology but not in terms of willingness for contact.
Catholics who desire to unite with Ireland may very likely have strong social identities
and stronger in-group bias and thus, based on findings in this and other studies, may be
less willing for contact. The implication would be that strength of social identity may
outweigh desire for change in the context of contact. Catholics who responded in this
way may find integration contrary to their desire to unite with Ireland, since presumably
Ireland offers a place in which Catholics would be able to express their unique traditions
and heritage as the majority group. Likewise, non-integration could be seen as a means
 The Impact of 13

to allow exclusive expression of this identity. Additionally, in terms of unwillingness for

integration in education, the loss of traditional religious education could be seen as a
threat to the Catholic faith. Furthermore, Niens and Cairns (2002) also found that while
Catholics tended to view social, economic, and political situations as illegitimate, they
also viewed these situations as stable, a belief that could impact future policy responses
and willingness for contact.
Analyses of the preferences for integration among Protestants who reported a
desire to unite with Ireland or create an independent state were also contrary to
hypothesis 2 as they reported preferences for integration greater than expected by chance.
However, the results indicate that future policy preferences were not consistent across
Protestants. As expressed, some Protestant respondents desired social change in their
future policy preferences (i.e., either the creation of an independent state or unification
with Ireland) and thus perhaps would view social change in other areas such as
integration as being acceptable as well. Specifically for Protestants who responded with
a desire to unite with Ireland, it is logical that contact with Catholics would be seen as
acceptable since uniting with Ireland would result in their being part of a country the
majority of which is Catholic.
Although willingness for contact did not align along religious lines as predicted,
explorations of the attitudes of those who felt very strongly about their future policy
preferences did show striking differences in regard to willingness for contact in line with
Social Identity Theory. Those who strongly desired Northern Ireland to remain part of
the United Kingdom (and thus would find it difficult or impossible to accept a united
Ireland) favored non-integration more than expected by chance. Similarly, those who
strongly desired to unite with Ireland (and thus would find it difficult or impossible to
accept remaining part of the United Kingdom) favored non-integration more than
expected by chance. This adds support to the idea that the stronger one’s in-group
identification, which in this case was expressed in the form of attitudes toward not
achieving the outcome favored by one’s group, the less willing for integration the
individual will be.
The findings from the current study have important implications. First, studies
have shown that contact can be more effective for those with strong in-group bias (Maoz
2003). Although the effects of contact suggested by the Contact Hypothesis were not
specifically assessed in the current work, this study lends support to the idea that in the
context of Northern Ireland, those respondents with strong in-group bias are more
opposed to contact, and these individuals could potentially gain the most from contact.
Consequently, further initiatives for integration could be a positive step in facilitating
peace. Individuals who express bias towards the out-group are not likely to initiate
contact themselves.

Implications for Policy

A large-scale attempt to promote possibilities for contact between the two social
groups through the government or other social service organizations seems necessary.
Cross-community dialogues supported by governmental agencies offering some
incentives could be very effective as a first step toward promoting contact. Discussion
groups could help break down barriers and help individuals view the opposing group in a
 The Impact of 14

less negative way. Additionally, public messages from powerful partisan political leaders
emphasizing the importance of contact initiatives could encourage citizen participation.
More specifically, education is perhaps the most promising route through which
to initiate contact, especially given the finding that integrated schools have been effective
in the promotion of peace through encouraging tolerance of diversity (McGlynn 2004).
Education is an element of society over which the government has influence, unlike other
aspects of life such as choice of neighborhood, employment, and marriage, among others.
As other researchers have suggested, perhaps parental preferences should not be
considered over what is best for the peace process (McGlynn 2004). Incentives to send
children to integrated schools could help to promote educational possibilities aimed at
fostering mutual understanding and appreciation among Catholics and Protestants.
Perhaps government funding should be increased for the development of such
educational opportunities.

Strengths and Limitations

The current study offers an integrative examination of social identity and attitudes
toward contact. The sample size in this study was very large, allowing for a wide cross-
section of respondents including those of many different ages, income levels, educational
backgrounds, those from both genders, and those from both major religious groups.
Despite these strengths, there were also a number of limitations in this study. The
interview from which the questions were drawn was taken from a public data set and thus
was not designed specifically for the purpose of this study. Consequently, elements such
as effectiveness of contact or other reasons for not desiring contact (e.g., quality of
education, workplace, or neighborhood environment or convenience of location, among
other factors) were not assessed. Additionally, as the study was cross-sectional, changes
in attitudes across time could not be assessed. While the large number of participants
allowed for collection of responses from a diverse pool, the large sample size may have
artificially inflated the results.
Future research should use a longitudinal design, allowing for investigation of
attitudes before, during, and after contact. Research with such a method could provide
comprehensive information about attitudes toward, and effects of, contact. Although
randomization of groups, which would be essential in testing the effectiveness of contact
programs, would be difficult to achieve, matching subjects may allow for exploration of
the effects of integration. An investigation of the differences between those of the same
religion with opposing future policy preferences would also provide valuable
information. A weakness in the current study was the absence of the measurement of
both strength of social identity and future policy preferences in relation to willingness for
contact. As seen from the findings inconsistent with hypothesis 2, religion alone is not a
good predictor of willingness for contact, especially given the varying degrees of strength
in the participants’ social identities. Future studies should be more thorough in
examining differences in strength of identity between and within the religious groups and
how this may affect willingness for contact. Exploration of other factors such as
differences in socio-economic status or education levels may also provide information
about elements relating to social identity and attitudes in general. Further studies should
also include interviews with students actually in attendance at integrated schools to
 The Impact of 15

examine their attitudes and changes in these attitudes over time and not simply the
attitudes of their parents.
This examination of contemporary attitudes in Northern Ireland has shown that
group differences continue to impact society greatly. Many people strongly identify with
their in-group, an unfortunate consequence of which is less willingness for contact with
the out-group. It is unlikely that those with strong identities will voluntarily initiate
contact with the out-group, and forced contact most likely would be met with much
opposition. The society of Northern Ireland is still greatly polarized, and tensions
between the two communities remain high. Although theoretical implications indicate
that those with the strongest in-group bias could benefit most from contact, it is possible
that resistance to contact efforts would be great and even counterproductive. Given the
potential benefits however, contact attempts should not be rejected altogether. Forceful
integration may not be the best application currently, but more moderate means may be
beneficial. Integration in education should be pursued as one possible option for the
promotion of contact since it is an element of society that is readily addressable.
Incentives to send children to integrated schools could increase willingness for contact in
education, which could in turn produce positive outcomes and reduce bias toward the out-
group.
 The Impact of 16

Table 1
Strength of Identity
Strength of identity
Very strong Fairly strong Not very strong
Education
Own religion only
Actual 67 (>) 196 (>) 217 (<)
Expected 48.7 176.7 254.6
Mixed religion
Actual 38 (<) 185 (<) 332 (>)
Expected 56.3 204.3 294.4
Neighborhood
Own religion only
Actual 47 (>) 113 (>) 114 (<)
Expected 26.4 102.3 145.3
Mixed religion
Actual 57 (<) 290 (<) 458 (>)
Expected 77.6 300.7 426.7

Workplace
Own religion only
Actual 30 (>) 53 (>) 40 (<)
Expected 12 45.9 65.2
Mixed religion
Actual 75 (<) 349 (<) 531 (>)
Expected 93 356.1 505.8
Note. Values with a (>) sign indicate actual counts greater than the expected value. Values with a (<) sign
indicate actual counts less than expected value.

Table 2
Future Policy and Religion
Future policy for Northern Ireland
Remain Unite with Independent
part of UK Ireland state
Religion
Catholic
Actual 155 (<) 289 (>) 87 (>)
Expected 353.3 121.7 56
Protestant
Actual 822 (>) 45 (<) 57 (<)
Expected 614.9 211.8 97.4
No religion
Actual 109 (<) 40 (<) 28(>)
Expected 117.8 40.6 18.7

Note. Values with a (>) sign indicate actual counts greater than the expected value. Values with a (<) sign
indicate actual counts less than expected value.
 The Impact of 17

Table 3
Future Policy: Catholics
Future policy for Northern Ireland
Remain Unite with Independent
part of UK Ireland state
Education
Own religion only
Actual 38 (<) 140 (>) 27 (<)
Expected 60.8 111.5 32.7
Mixed religion
Actual 111 (>) 133 (<) 53 (>)
Expected 88.2 161.5 47.3
Neighborhood
Own religion only
Actual 14 (<) 67 (>) 15 (<)
Expected 28.3 51.8 16
Mixed religion
Actual 140 (>) 215 (<) 72 (>)
Expected 125.7 230.2 71
Workplace
Own religion only
Actual 5 (<) 31 (>) 2 (<)
Expected 11.2 20.5 6.3
Mixed religion
Actual 150 (>) 251 (<) 85 (>)
Expected 143.8 261.5 80.7
Note. Values with a (>) sign indicate actual counts greater than the expected value. Values with a (<) sign
indicate actual counts less than expected value.
 The Impact of 18

Table 4
Future Policy: Protestants
Future Policy for Northern Ireland
Remain part of Unite with Independent
UK Ireland state
Education
Own religion only
Actual 332 (>) 5 (<) 11 (<)
Expected 308.1 17.4 22.5
Mixed religion
Actual 449 (<) 39 (>) 46 (>)
Expected 472.9 26.6 34.5
Neighborhood
Own religion only
Actual 204 (>) 4 (<) 7 (<)
Expected 191 10.7 13.3
Mixed religion
Actual 600 (<) 41 (>) 49 (>)
Expected 613 34.3 42.7
Workplace
Own religion only
Actual 104 (>) 1 (<) 3 (<)
Expected 96 5.3 6.7
Mixed religion
Actual 699 (<) 43 (>) 53 (>)
Expected 707 38.7 49.3
Note. Values with a (>) sign indicate actual counts greater than the expected value. Values with a (<) sign
indicate actual counts less than expected value.
 The Impact of 19

Table 5
Future Policy: No Religion
Future Policy for Northern Ireland
Remain Unite with Independent
part of UK Ireland state
Education
Own religion only
Actual 21 5 2
Expected 17.1 6.5 4.5
Mixed religion
Actual 82 34 25
Expected 85.9 32.5 22.5
Neighborhood
Own religion only
Actual 17 4 4
Expected 15.2 5.8 3.9
Mixed religion
Actual 87 36 23
Expected 88.8 34.2 23.1
Workplace
Own religion only
Actual 5 1 2
Expected 4.9 1.9 1.3
Mixed religion 97 38 25
Actual
Expected 97.1 37.1 25.7
Note. Non-significant chi-squares for all three contexts

Table 6
Future Policy: Remain Part of the UK
Possibility of a United Ireland
Impossible to Could Happily
accept accept accept
Education
Own religion only
Actual 95 (>) 245 (>) 115 (<)
Expected 51.1 223.2 180.8
Mixed religion
Actual 53 (<) 402 (<) 409 (>)
Expected 96.9 423.8 343.2
Neighborhood
Own religion only
Actual 70 (>) 142 (>) 55 (<)
Expected 29.4 129.6 108
Mixed religion
Actual 80 (<) 519 (<) 496 (>)
Expected 120.6 531.4 443
Workplace
Own religion only
Actual 44 (>) 60 (>) 18 (<)
Expected 13.5 58.9 49.5
Mixed religion
Actual 107 (<) 597 (<) 534 (>)
Expected 137.5 598.1 502.5
Note. Values with a (>) sign indicate actual counts greater than the expected value.
Values with a (<) sign indicate actual counts less than expected value.
 The Impact of 20

Table 7
Future Policy: Unite with the Republic of Ireland
Possibility of a United Ireland
Impossible to Could Happily
accept accept accept
Education
Own Religion only
Actual 17 (>) 69 (>) 129 (<)
Expected 5.7 61.2 148.1
Mixed religion
Actual 0 (<) 115 (<) 316 (>)
Expected 11.3 122.8 296.9
Neighborhood
Own religion only
Actual 11 (>) 35 (>) 63 (<)
Expected 2.8 30.7 75.6
Mixed religion
Actual 6 (<) 154 (<) 403 (>)
Expected 14.2 158.3 390.4
Workplace
Own religion only
Actual 9 (>) 15 (>) 17 (<)
Expected 1 11.5 28.5
Mixed religion
Actual 8 (<) 173 (<) 448 (>)
Expected 16 176.5 436.5
Note. Values with a (>) sign indicate actual counts greater than the expected value. Values with a (<) sign
indicate actual counts less than expected value.
 The Impact of 21

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