TRANSPO Session 1 Article 1732.

Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. Article 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws.

petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMCs warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were wet/stained/torn and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn. The damages cost P93,112.00. SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent on the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC, brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On December 20, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier? Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a common carrier but a private carrier, has no merit. Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinction. (De Guzman v. CA, 68 SCRA 612) Te concept of common carrier under Article 1732 coincide with the notion of public service, under the Public Service Act which partially supplements the law on common carrier. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, it includes: x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services. x x x

FABRE VS CA Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion. Because of the mishap, several passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio. Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly liable. Spouses Fabre on the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not a common carrier. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers? Held: Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers. The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art. 1732, Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.

DE GUZMAN VS CA Facts: Cendena was a junk dealer and was engaged in buying used bottles and scrap materials in Pangasinan and brought these to Manila for resale. He used two 6-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan, he would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to Pangasinan. For that service, he charged freight lower than regular rates. General Milk Co. contacted with him for the hauling of 750 cartons of milk. On the way to Pangasinan, one of the trucks was hijacked by armed men who took with them the truck and its cargo and kidnapped the driver and his helper. Only 150 cartons of milk were delivered. The Milk Co. sued to claim the value of the lost merchandise based on an alleged contract of carriage. Cendena denied that he was a common carrier and contended that he could not be liable for the loss it was due to force majeure. The trial court ruled that he was a common carrier. The CA reversed. Issue: Whether or not Cendena is a common carrier?

CALVO V. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), and a custom broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area to the Tabacalera Compound, Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board M/V Hayakawa Maru. After 24 hours, they were unloaded from vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port Services, Inc. From July 23 to 25, 1990,

Held: Yes, Cendena is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely backhauled goods for other merchants, and even if it was done on a periodic basis rather than on a regular basis, and even if his principal occupation was not the carriage of goods. Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. It also avoids making a distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation services on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does it make a distinction between a carrier offering its services to the general

public and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of population.

BASCOS vs.CA FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE for short) entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp whereby the former bound itself to haul the latters 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal to the warehouse in Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE, through Cipriano, subcontracted with Bascos to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo. As a consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in accordance with their contract. Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with writ of preliminary attachment for breach of a contract of carriage. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment. In her answer, petitioner interposed the defense that there was no contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck to load the cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna and that the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked and being a force majeure, exculpated petitioner from any liability After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano and against Bascos ordering the latter to pay the former for actual damages for attorneys fees and cost of suit. The Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary Attachment Bascos is DENIED for being moot and academic. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but respondent Court affirmed the trial courts judgment. Hence this petition for review on certiorari ISSUE: (1) WON petitioner a common carrier (2) WON the hijacking referred to a force majeure HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. 1. YES In disputing the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner was a common carrier, she alleged in this petition that the contract between her and Cipriano was lease of the truck. She also stated that: she was not catering to the general public. Thus, in her answer to the amended complaint, she said that she does business under the same style of A.M. Bascos Trucking, offering her trucks for lease to those who have cargo to move, not to the general public but to a few customers only in view of the fact that it is only a small business. We agree with the respondent Court in its finding that petitioner is a common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as (a) person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. The test to determine a common carrier is whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted. 12 In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same. 13 But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease because they offer their services only to a select group of people. Regarding the first contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 14 is instructive. In referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus: The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a sideline). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions. 2. NO Likewise, We affirm the holding of the respondent court that the loss of the goods was not due to force majeure.

Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. 19 In those cases where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption. In this case, petitioner alleged that hijacking constituted force majeure which exculpated her from liability for the loss of the cargo. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being included in the provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy; xx (6) That the common carriers liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violences or force, is dispensed with or diminished; xx NOTES: 1. She cited as evidence certain affidavits which referred to the contract as lease. These affidavits were made by Jesus Bascos and by petitioner herself and Cipriano and CIPTRADE did not object to the presentation of affidavits by petitioner where the transaction was referred to as a lease contract. Both the trial and appellate courts have dismissed them as self-serving and petitioner contests the conclusion. We are bound by the appellate courts factual conclusions. Yet, granting that the said evidence were not self-serving, the same were not sufficient to prove that the contract was one of lease. It must be understood that a contract is what the law defines it to be and not what it is called by the contracting parties. Furthermore, petitioner presented no other proof of the existence of the contract of lease. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. 2. Having affirmed the findings of the respondent Court on the substantial issues involved, We find no reason to disturb the conclusion that the motion to lift/dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment has been rendered moot and academic by the decision on the merits.

FGU INSURANCE CORP. VS. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP. (GPS) Facts: GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc. One day, it was to deliver certaingoods of Concepcion Industries, Inc. aboard one of its trucks. On its way, the truck collided with an unidentifiedtruck, resulting in damage to the cargoes.FGU, insurer of the shipment paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc. the amount of the damage and filed a suit againstGPS. GPS filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prove that it was a common carrier. Issue: Whether or not GPS falls under the category of a common carrier Held: Note that GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc. offering its service to noother individual or entity. A common carrier is one which offers its services whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular but never on an exclusive basis. Therefore, GPS does not fit the category of a common carrier although it is not freedfrom its liability based on culpa contractual.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS VS. CA Facts: Planters Product Inc. purchased from Mitsubishi international corporation metric tons of Urea fertilizer, which the latter shipped aboard the cargo vessel M/V Sun Plum owned by private respondent Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha. Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel respondent entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as ship owner, in Tokyo, Japan. Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, (4) of her holds were presumably inspected by the charterers representative and found fit to take a load of urea in bulk. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids. Upon arrival of vessel at port, the petitioner unloaded the cargo pursuant to the terms and conditions of the charter-party. The hatches remained open throughout the duration of the discharge. Upon arrival at petitioners warehouse a survey conducted over the cargo revealed a shortage and the most of the fertilizer was contaminated with dirt. As

such, Planters filed an action for damages. The defendant argued that the public policy governing common carriers do not apply to them because they have become private carriers by reason of the provisions of the charter-party. Issue: Whether or not the charter-party contract between the ship owner and the charterer transforms a common carrier into a private carrier? Held: A charter party may either her be time charter wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer, wherein the ship is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter party provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate time or for a single or consecutive voyage. It is therefor imperative that such common carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or part of the vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a timecharter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both ship and its crew as in bareboat or demise that it becomes a private carrier. Undoubtedly, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains in possession and control of the ship, although her holds may be the property of the charterer.

respondent Black Sea) 545 hot rolled steel sheets. The vessel arrived at the port of Manila and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned it a place of berth at the outside breakwater at the Manila South Harbor. Petitioner Schmitz Transport, engaged to secure the requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes from the shipside, and to deliver them to Little Giant Steelpipe Corporations warehouse at Cainta, Rizal. It likewise engaged the services of respondent Transport Venture Inc. (TVI) to send a barge and tugboat at shipside. The tugboat, after positioning the barge alongside the vessel, left and returned to the port terminal. Later on, arrastre operator commenced to unload 37 of the 545 coils from the vessel unto the barge. By noon the next day, during which the weather condition had become inclement due to an approaching storm, the unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. However, there was no tugboat that pulled the barge back to the pier. Eventually, because of the strong waves, the crew of the barge abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. The barge capsized, washing the 37 coils into the sea. Earnest efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant and Industrial Insurance to recover the lost cargoes proved futile. Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants) before the RTC of Manila, for the recovery of the amount it paid to Little Giant plus adjustment fees, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. Industrial Insurance won and the Schmitz et al.s motion for reconsideration is denied. In effect, Schmitz now filed charges against TVI et al. It asserts that in chartering the barge and tugboat of TVI, it was acting for its principal, consignee Little Giant, hence, the transportation contract was by and between Little Giant and TVI. The Court rendered a decision holding Schmitz and TVI liable. ISSUES: Whether or not the liability for the loss may attach to Black Sea, Schmitz and TVI HELD: TVIs failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation, but was the proximate cause of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a considerable number of hours, at such a precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing that the barge does not have any power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea. That it was nighttime and, therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be charging overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat. As for Schmitz, for it to be relieved of liability, it should, following Article 1739 of the Civil Code, prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before, during and after the occurrence of the storm in order that it may be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods. While Schmitz sent checkers and a supervisor on board the vessel to countercheck the operations of TVI, it failed to take all available and reasonable precautions to avoid the loss. After noting that TVI failed to arrange for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea conditions, it should have summoned the same or another tugboat to extend help, but it did not. The Court holds then that Schmitz and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the cargoes. As for Black Sea, its duty as a common carrier extended only from the time the goods were surrendered or unconditionally placed in its possession and received for transportation until they were delivered actually or constructively to consignee Little Giant Parties to a contract of carriage may, however, agree upon a definition of delivery that extends the services rendered by the carrier. In the case at bar, Bill of Lading No. 2 covering the shipment provides that delivery be made to the port of discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get, always afloat. The delivery of the goods to the consignee was not from pier to pier but from the shipside of M/V Alexander Saveliev and into barges, for which reason the consignee contracted the services of petitioner. Since Black Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little Giant, through Schmitz, it had discharged its duty. In fine, no liability may thus attach to Black Sea.

FIRST PHILIPPINES INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. C.A. FACTS: [D]uring the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals, Henry Co and several other stockholders of the Bank (petitioner), through counsel Angara Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz, filed an action (Second Case) purportedly a derivative suit with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 against Encarnacion, Demetria and Janolo to declare any perfected sale of the property as unenforceable and to stop Ejercito from enforcing or implementing the sale. In his answer, Janolo argued that the Second Case was barred by litis pendentia by virtue of the case then pending in the Court of Appeals. During the pre-trial conference in the Second Case, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Dismiss the Case Without Prejudice. Private respondent opposed this motion on the ground, among others, that plaintiffs act of forum shopping justifies the dismissal of both cases, with prejudice. Private respondent, in his memorandum, averred that this motion is still pending in the Makati RTC. [P]etitioners explain that there is no forum-shopping because: 1) In the earlier or First Case from which this proceeding arose, the Bank was impleaded as a defendant, whereas in the Second Case (assuming the Bank is the real party in interest in a derivative suit), it was the plaintiff; xxx ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum-shopping on the part of petitioner Bank. HELD: YES. Petition was denied. Assailed decision was affirmed. Petitioner was reprimanded. Costs against the petitioner. RATIO: [W]here a litigant (or one representing the same interest or person) sues the same party against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendencia in one case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest. In either case, forum shopping could be cited by the other party as a ground to ask for summary dismissal of the two (or more) complaints or petitions, and for the imposition of the other sanctions, which are direct contempt of court, criminal prosecution, and disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. [W]hat is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue. In this case, this is exactly the problem: a decision recognizing the perfection and directing the enforcement of the contract of sale will directly conflict with a possible decision in the Second Case barring the parties from enforcing or implementing the said sale. Indeed, a final decision in one would constitute res judicata in the other.

SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE vs TRANSPORT VENTURE A common carrier shall exercise extraordinary diligence to prevent and/or minize the loss or destruction of goods. FACTS: SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V Alexander Saveliev (a vessel of Russian registry and owned by

A.F. SANCHEZ BROKERAGE VS CA A common carrier is liable to the resulting damage to the goods if the improper packaging is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception. FACTS: Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU) brought an action for reimbursement against petitioner A.F. Sanchez Brokerage Inc. (Sanchez Brokerage) to collect the amount paid by the former to Wyeth-Suaco Laboratories Inc. (Wyeth-Suaco) as insurance payment for the goods delivered in bad condition. A.F. Brokerage refused to admit liability for the damaged goods which it delivered from Philippines Skylanders, Inc. (PSI) to Wyeth-Suaco as it maintained that the damage was due to improper and insufficient export packaging, discovered when the sealed containers were opened outside the PSI warehouse. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the said complaint; however, the decision was subsequently reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals, finding that Sanchez Brokerage is liable for the carriage of cargo as a common carrier by definition of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the FGU Insurance is liable for the delivery of the damaged goods HELD: As defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. It does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. The contention therefore of Sanchez Brokerage that it is not a common carrier but a customs broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration. In this light, Sanchez Brokerage as a common carrier is mandated to observe, under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it transports according to all the circumstances of each case. In the event that the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. The concept of extra-ordinary diligence was explained in Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals. The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of goods tendered for shipment and to exercise due care in the handling and storage including such methods as their nature requires. It was established that Sanchez Brokerage received the cargoes from the PSI warehouse in good order and condition and that upon delivery by petitioner some of the cargoes were found to be in bad order as noted in the Delivery Receipt and as indicated in the Survey and Destruction Report. While paragraph no. 4 of Article 1734 of the Civil Code exempts a common carrier from liability if the loss or damage is due to the character of the goods or defects in the packaging or in the containers, the rule is that if the improper packaging is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for the resulting damage. If the claim of Sanchez Brokerage that some of the cartons were already damaged upon delivery to it were true, then it should naturally have received the cargo under protest or with reservation duly noted on the receipt issued by PSI but it made no such protest or reservation.

attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same. The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court. ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. HELD: A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to P660,000.00.

BA FINANCE CORP VS CA FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of

BENEDICTO VS IAC FACTS: Greenhills Wood Industries - bound itself to sell and deliver to Blue Star Mahogany, Inc.100,000 board feet of sawn lumber with the understanding that an initial delivery would bemade. Greenhills resident manager in Maddela, Dominador Cruz, contracted Virgilio Licuden, thedriver of a cargo truck, to transport its sawn lumber to the consignee Blue Star inValenzuela, Bulacan; this cargo truck was registered in the name of Ma. Luisa Benedicto,the proprietor of Macoven Trucking, a business enterprise engaged in hauling freight the Manager of Blue Star called up Greenhills president informing him that the sawnlumber on board the subject cargo truck had not yet arrived in Valenzuela, Bulacan;because of the delay in delivery Blue Star was constrained to look for other suppliers Greenhills filed criminal case against driver Licuden for estafa; and a civil case forrecovery of the value of the lost sawn lumber plus damages against Benedicto Benedicto denied liability as she was a complete stranger to the contract of carriage, thesubject truck having been earlier sold by her to Benjamin Tee; but the truck had remainedregistered in her name because Tee have not yet fully paid the amount of the truck; bethat as it may, Tee had been operating the said truck in Central Luzon from that andLicuden was Tees employee and not hers ISSUE: WON Benedicto, being the registered owner of the carrier, should be held liable forthe value of the undelivered or lost sawn lumber HELD: Yes. The registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of thecarrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been transferred toanother person. This doctrine rests upon the principle that in dealing with vehiclesregistered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume that theregistered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof It would be very difficult and oftenimpossible as a practical matter, for members of the general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. Greenhills is not required to gobeyond the vehicles certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier.