ART.

VI Sec 17
ROBLES VS. HRET 1990 Robles and Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman (Caloocan). Robles was proclaimed the winner. Santos filed an election protest with the HRET, alleging frauds and irregularities in the counting of votes and canvassing of election returns. The HRET issued an order commencing the revision of contested. Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest. the revision of ballots was stopped. Beyond that, no action on the two motions was taken by the HRET. Until the time Santos, who had backed out from the revision of the ballots, pushed again for its revision. HRET granted Santos Motion and the revision of ballots was resumed. ISSUES: 1.Whether or not HRET lost jurisdiction over the case upon Santoss filing of a Motion to Withdraw Protest HELD: NO. HRET retains jurisdiction over the case. The mere filing of the Motion to Withdraw Protest, without any action on the part of the Tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It has been intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature. this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" The Electoral Tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office maybe fully resolved vis--vis the popular will intended to resolve beyond doubt who the people have right fully chosen as their representatives.

Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission is very indicative. But it is a body separate from and independent of the Legislature. The transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. Confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests..." to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. Independency of EC would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse.

In moving to dismiss private respondents protest on the ground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec.250 of the Omnibus Election Code: A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa...shall befiled...within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election. Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until February 6 to file a protest.Since the protest was filed on February 8, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it. However, the HRET argued that petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET rules: Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed...within fifteen (15)days from the effectivity of these rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15)days from the date of proclamation Using the above rule, the HRET argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was filed on February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and thus, had jurisdiction over thematter. ISSUE:Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest YES.The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar: Under the 1973Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or cityofficial. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective Electoral Tribunals. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Its rulemaking power necessarily flows from the generalpower granted it by the Constitution. Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral protests. A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislativebranch has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935 Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impa rtial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and speciallycreated for that singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of election for all elective national andlocal officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the respective Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives. Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET: Its corrective power extends only to decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals.

ANGARA v ELECTORAL COMMISSION 1936 In elections 1935, Angara and Ynsua, Castillo, and Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a Protest against Angara. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

LAZATIN VS. HRET 1988 Lazatin and respondent Timbol were candidates for Representative (Pampanga) in 1987 elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC. COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed the winner. Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b) prevent petitioner from taking office. the COMELEC did not act on the petitions. petitioner assumed office. But later the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the revocation. On January 28, Respondent received a copy of the Courts decision and consequently filed an election protest with the HRET on February 8. ARGUMENTS:

ABBAS v SET 1988 Petitioners filed before the SEY an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senatorselect in the 1987 elections. The respondent tribunals was at the time composed of 3 Justices of the SC and 6 senators. petitioner filed with SET a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution HELD:NO. Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both judicial andlegislative components commonly share the duty and authority of all contests relating to the election,returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the SET is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the legislative componentcannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of senators. The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations. Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may recuse himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its entire membershipof Senators or Justices.

BONDOC v. PINEDA 1991 Pineda of LDP and Bondoc of Nacionalista were rivals in the 1987 congressional elections. Pineda was proclaimed winner, but Bondoc filed a protest before HRET. HRETs decision that Bondoc won over by Pineda; LDP members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation of votes and recount of ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four months. The reexamination resulted in increase of Bondocs lead over Pineda from 23 to 107 votes. It shall be noted that Cong. Camasura, a member LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No. 25 declaring Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Cong. Cojuanco informed Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party on the ground of betrayal to the cause and objectives and loyalty to LDP. LDP withdrew the nomination and rescinded the election of Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a Resolution canceling the previous decision on the ground that without the vote of Cong. Camasura, who was relieved from the Tribunal, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Sec. 24 of the Rules of Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. ISSUE: Whether of not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant party, change the partys representation in the House Representatives Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the said tribunal in an election contest pending therein. NO.SC ruled in favor of Bondoc. The tribunal was created to function as a non partisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. The Tribunal is a body separate from and independent from the legislature. The Resolution of House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to LDP, because he cast a vote in favor of Nacionalista party, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independenceeven independence from political party to which they belong. Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as judges, are entitled to security of tenure, just as members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec 2. Art VIII, 1987 Constitution). Membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for just cause, such as, expiration of the members congressional term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from political party which he represents, formal affiliation with anither political party, removal for other valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group.

CHAVEZ v COMELEC 1992 In 1992 SC issued a resolution in GR no. 104704 entitled Francisco Chavez v. Comelec,et al. Disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for the office of senator. Francisco Chavez filed a motion with comelec to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates and count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor Chavez in favour of Francisco Chavez. comelec issued a resolution to remove the name of Melchor Chavez in the list of qualified candidates, but failed to cancel the name of Melchor Chavez in the list of qualified candidates. Comelec also failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes to Francisco Chavez. Confusion arose as the Chavez votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEI). comelec issued a resolution to credit all the Chavez votes in favour of Francisco Chavez. Francisco Chavez was not satisfied of the resolution because he maintains that it did not reach all the precincts. June 4, 1992; court issued a TRO enjoining comelec from proclaiming the 24th winning senatorial candidate. TRO was subsequently lifted. ISSUE: Did COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion due to its inaction in deleting Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates? Was there cause of action on the part of the petitioner? Does the courthave jurisdiction over the subject matter? DECISION:Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The court can review the decisions or orders of the comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion commited by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of itsadministrative functions. The failure of comelec to implement its own resolution is administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate. Petitioner has no cause of action. The controversy presented being one in the nature of pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives according to sec. 15 of republic act 7166. What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as any question pertaining to or affecting theproceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political pary or coalition of political paries before the board or directly with the commission in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of theelection returns. (sec. 241, omnibus election code)

PIMENTEL, JR. v HRET 2002 1998 elections: 14 representatives from 13 party-lists are entitled to occupy seats in the House of Representatives. Subsequently, the House nominated contingents for HRET and Commission on Appointments (CA) however, no party-list representative is nominated for the said constitutional bodies. Sen. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to the Senate requesting the restructure of HRET and CA.No response from the Senate. Pimentel contends that under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party list representatives are entitled at least 1 seat in HRET and 2 seats in the CA. House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list representatives, constituting 6.3636% of the House. Of the remaining 206 district representatives affiliated with different political parties, 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%), 36 belonged to LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%) each to KBL, PDRLM, Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1 representative was an independent.

PALPARAN vs. HRET 2010 In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the sufficient voting percentage in which Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the said party-list group. petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, Palaparan. They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of Representative because he did not belong to a marginalized and underreprsented sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels. Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee and that HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list that was elected to assume membership in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such question should be raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET. ISSUE: Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress. YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of the Housse of Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be elected from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Thus, it is the part-list representatives who are elected into office, not their parties or organizations. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes member of the House of Representatives. Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives and districts representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, but only initially.

ART. VI Sec 18
DAZA v. SINGSON 1989 1987 elections: Cong. Raul Daza was chosen as one of the members of the Commission on Appointments (CA) as a representative of (LP). In September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives (HR). 24 members of the LP shifted to LDP resulting to the swelling of the latter with 159 members and leaving only 17 members with the former. HR revised its representation in the CA withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly formed LDP in the person of Luis Singson.The petitioner challenges this reappointment and the court issued a TRO for Daza and Singson fromserving in the CA. The petitioner argues that LDP is not a stable and permanent party so it is not entitled for seats in the CA. ISSUE: WON the reappointment of members of the CA is constitutional HELD:Yes. Petition Dismissed the issue is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Cunanan v. Tan: a shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress. However, this case is different from Cunanan case. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. The Constitution does not require that the party must be a registered party. But the COMELEC already granted the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. SUMMARY: the House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

ISSUE:WON the exclusion of party-list representatives in the HRET and CA is unconstitutional HELD:No. Petition dismissed RATIO:Sec 17 & 18 Art VI of the Constitution provides that in the composition of HRET (6 members of the House) and CA (12 members of the House) there must be a proportional representation from the political parties and the party-list. Since according to the Party-List System Act, the party-list representatives must constitute 20% of the seats in the House, party-list representatives must have 1 and 2 seats for HRET and CA respectively. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court rules that it cannot interfere with the exercise by the house of this constitutionally mandated duty unless there is an abuse in discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Party-lists are not unlawfully deprived of the opportunity to be nominated in the HRET or CA. Party-list has no locus standi. Furthermore, HRET and CA have no constitutional powers to reconstitute themselves. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution24 explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review.

COSETENG v. MITRA 1990 1987 election in the House of diverse political parties. Petitioner Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. House elected from the Coalesced Majority, 11 out of 12 congressmen to represent the House CA. the House elected Ablan, th Jr., KBL, as the 12 CA member, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House. A year later, the LDP was organized as a political party. CA had to be reorganized to conform with the new political alignments. Petitioner Coseteng requested that she be appointed as a member of the CA and HRET. Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen. After the reorganization, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. Hence the petition by Coseteng alleging that a. the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House; b. the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their respective political parties or coalitions; c. the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the minority was clearly invalid; and d. that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House. Respondents contend that the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition "as a form of a political party". ISSUE: W/N the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties HELD:YES. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.

should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen. The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap. there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the CA should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties, as they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) in accordance with the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is unassailable.

reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKASNUCD or the NPC. The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the composition of the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of Section 18 which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail. REMEDY: Those entitled to fractional memberships may join their half-memberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition to the Commission on Appointments.

GUINGONA JR. V. GONZALES 1992 1992 elections, senate composed of the following members with their respective political affiliations and their respective number of proportional representatives in the Commission on Appointments (CA).

Sen. Tolentino proposed that for the 12 available seats in the CA, 8 seats be given to LDP, 2 for NPC, 1for LAKAS-NUCD and 1 for LP. It was approved. Sen. Guingona, Jr. files a petition to prohibit the Senate President Gonzales to recognize Sen. Romulo(LDP) and Sen. Tanada (LP) as members of the CA. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. ISSUE:WON appointment of Romulo and Tanada were constitutional HELD:No. Appointments of Romulo and Tanada are null and void. RATIO:Sec 18 Art VI of the Constitution provides that 12 senators are to be appointed in the CA by proportional representation however, it was not expressly stated that the 12 seats must be filled in order for CA to function. CA can function even if only 10 senators are elected as long as the quorum exists. The election of Romulo and Tanada violates the proportional representation clause of Sec 18 Art VI since 0.5 of a representative do not count as 1. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it

ART. VI Sec 21

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committee acted without jurisdiction and/or acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, purportedly in aid of legislation HELD:NO.Petition for prohibition DENIED. Respondent has jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry although the subject matter involved is the very same subject matter pending in court. Bengzon does not apply squarely to petitioners case. The inquiry here is in aid of legislation so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasijudicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. RIGHT TO PRIVACY. there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. SELF INCRIMINATION. petitioners, officers of SCB-Philippines, are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. the authority of that body, directly or through its Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits.

imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention. HELD [The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.] 1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00? YES, Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. the subject question is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." 2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session? YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. 3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against selfincrimination? NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against selfincrimination. Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of

BENGZON v SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE 1991 It was alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter.The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted. HELD: No.The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation, It is a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO 1950 The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt. Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS 2007 Standard Chartered Bank, of England violated RA 8799 for selling unregistered foreign securities. Senator Enrile in his privilege speech introduced a Resolution to attend to the matter. Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing and submit their written position paper. Petitioners, in response, submitted to respondent a letter stressing their position that there were cases already pending in court which involved the same issues that the respondent is subjecting to legislative inquiry. Respondent still commenced the investigation. issuance of a subpoena to those who did not attend the hearing.

Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. 3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. Note: EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. SEC. 21 vs. SEC. 22 A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it. The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to

SENATE vs. ERMITA 2006 The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The President then issued EO 464 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. Issues: 1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; YES. Section 21 of Article VI power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour. HENCE Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Schwartz and Rozell defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.

such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar concerns would be accorded due judicial evaluation. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class. any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of public accountability),Article II, Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public information). In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, the Court characterized contempt power as a matter of self-preservation. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis . One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action." First is the right to privacy. Second is the right against self-incrimination, A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an executive session. No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his duty to give testimony.

GUDANI v. SENGA 2006 On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the Hello Garci tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before said Committee, prompting Gen. Senga to order them subjected to General Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer. In the meantime, President Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative inquiry YES. The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of SABIO v. GORDON 2006 1986 E.O. No. 1, creating PCGG. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance." 2006 inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by some government corporations due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors." Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG was invited but he declined and invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted. ISSUE: whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. YES. Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees. we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers NERI vs SENATE COMMITTEE 2008 FACTS: 2007 - DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter

to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. What reasons were given for the claim of executive privilege? Executive Secretary Ermita said that the context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Neri further added that his conversations with the President dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? HELD: the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege, which is one type of executive privilege. Hence, the Senate cannot compel Neri to answer the three questions. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. What are the elements of the presidential communications privilege? 1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. 2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Are the elements of the presidential communications privilege present in this case? YES. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Does the grant of the claim of executive privilege violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern? NO. a. Neri appeared before the Senate on Sept. 26, 2007 and wasquestioned for 11 hours. He also expressed his willingness to

answer more questions from the Senators, except the three questions. b. The right to information is subject to limitation, such asexecutive privilege. c. The right of Congress to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right toinformation. Congress cannot claim that every legislative inquiry isan exercise of the peoples right to information. What is executive privilege? It is the right of the President and high-level executive branchofficials to withhold information from Congress, the courts and the public. It is a privilege of confidentiality which applies tocertain types of information of a sensitive character that would beagainst the public interest to disclose. Executive privilege is based on the constitution because it relates to the Presidentseffective discharge of executive powers. Its ultimate end is to promote public interest and no other. Is executive privilege absolute? No. Any claim of executive privilege must be weighed against other interests recognized by the constitution, like the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest,the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,the accountability of public officers, the power of legislativeinquiry, and the judicial power to secure evidence in deciding cases. Did the revocation by the President of E.O. 464 on March 6, 2008 diminish the concept of executive privilege? No. Executive privilege may still be invoked despite the Presidentsrevocation of E.O. 464 because it is based on the constitution Did the Senate Committees commit grave abuse of discretion inciting Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest? YES. Hence, the Senate order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest was not valid. What are the types of executive privilege? a. state secrets (regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters) b. identity of government informers c. information related to pending investigations d. presidential communications e. deliberative proces How are the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege distinguished? The presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. The deliberative process privilege applies to decision-making of executive officials. It includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. Moreover, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

Is there a presumption in favor of presidential communications? Yes. Presidential communications are presumptively privileged. The presumption is based on the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. Who are covered by the presidential communications privilege? Aside from the President, the presidential communications privilege covers senior presidential advisors or Malacanang staff who have operational proximity to direct presidential decision-making. What are examples of quintessential and non-delegable presidential powers which are covered by the presidential communications privilege? The privilege covers only those functions which form the core of presidential authority such as the powers of the president as commander-in-chief (i.e., to callout the armed forces to suppress violence, to declare martial law, or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), the power to appoint officials and remove them, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the power to receive ambassadors, and the power to negotiate treaties and to enter into execute agreements. Was the claim of executive privilege properly invoked by the President in this case? Yes. For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formalclaim by the President stating the precise and certain reason for preserving confidentiality. The grounds relied upon by ExecutiveSecretary Ermita are specific enough, since what is required is onlythat an allegation be made whether the information demanded involvesmilitary or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.

What reasons were given by the Supreme Court in holding that it waswrong for the Senate to cite Neri in contempt and order his arrest? a. There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege. b. The Senates invitations to Neri did not include the possibleneeded statute which prompted the inquiry, the subject of inquiry,and the questions to be asked. c. The contempt order lacked the required number of votes. d. The Senates rules of procedure on inquiries in aid of legislation were not duly published. e. The contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate because theSenate did not first rule on the claim of executive privilege andinstead dismissed Neris explanation as unsatisfactory. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION: Who has the burden of showing whether or not a claim of executive privilege is valid? the decision recognized Presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Hence, the party seeking disclosure of the information has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the confidentiality of Presidential communications. This presumption is inconsistent with the Courts earlier statement in Senate vs. Ermita (April 20, 2006) that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. It is also inconsistent with constitutional provisions on transparency in governance and accountability of public officers, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

Does the decision expand the coverage of executive privilege? Yes, the decision expands the coverage of executive privilege in atleast two ways: a. The decision explained that the presidential communications privilege covers communications authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. This means that the privilege applies not only to communications that directly involve the President, but also to communications involving the Presidents close advisors, i.e., those in operational proximity with the President. There is no definition of operational proximity, so it is not clear how far down the chain of command the privilege extends. b. The decision also stated that the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. This means that the privilege protects not only the deliberative or advice portions of documents, i.e., communications made in the process of arriving at presidential decisions, but also factual material or information concerning decisions already reached by the President. How will the decision affect other investigations? The decision makes it easy for the President to invoke executive privilege, since what is required is only that an allegation be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. This in effect will enable the use of executive privilege to hide misconductor crime. According to Fr. Bernas, S.J., the implication of the ruling is that once the presidential communications privilege is invoked, no evidence is needed to support it even if there are valid reasons for disclosing the information sought. This would revolutionize the doctrine in a manner that can affect all other investigations. This can, for instance, hamper effective use of the writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. It can also cripple efforts to battle official corruption . In particular, what is the effect of the decision on the Senates power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation? The decision severely limits the Senates power of legislative inquiry and its ability to investigate government anomalies in aid of legislation. The decision encroaches upon matters internal to the Senate as an institution separate from and co-equal to other branchesof government.The decision, for instance, requires the Senate to give its questions in advance of its hearings. But this is a requirement applicable only to the question hour and not to inquiries in aid of legislation. Moreover, it is impractical, since follow-up questions of Senators will be difficult to anticipate.The decision also requires the Senate to publish its rules of procedure on legislative inquiries every three years. But the Senate traditionally considered as a continuing body. Senate committees continue to work even during senatorial elections. By tradition and practice, the Senate does not republish its rules. To require publication of its rules every three years is unnecessary and inconsistent with its tradition and practice. Did the Supreme Court ruling establish a doctrine on executive privilege? No. Although the vote is 9 6 in favor of upholding the claim of executive privilege, two of the nine Justices concurred merely in theresult, while one Justice argued not on the basis of executive privilege. Hence, only six out of the nine Justices explained their votes in favor of the claim of executive privilege. Six out of atotal of 15 Justices do not establish a doctrine.

GARCILLANO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2008 infamous Garci Tapes which allegedly contained the conversation of PGMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano where the former instructed the latter to manipulate the election results in favor of PGMA. The speech of Cong. Escudero in the House of Reps jumpstarted the congressional investigation over these tapes. During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, NBI Director Wycoco, Atty. Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. In the Senate, Senator Lacson also delivered a speech regarding the Garci Tapes. On motion of Sen. Pangilinan, these tapes should be the subject of a legislative investigation by the Senate. However, Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. Sen. Defensor-Santiago also delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. petitions before the Supreme Court. Garcillano prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. On the other hand, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili prayed that the Senate be barred from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the House Committee hearings and the Senate legislative should be prohibited for violation of RA No. 4200 (Anti-wiretapping Law) and sec. 3, Art. III of the Constitution (privacy of communications) Held: The petition of Garcillano praying that the House Committee hearings on the Garci tapes be stopped must be dismissed for being moot and academic. The Court noted that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. (However, the ponente did not touch upon the issue of the admissibility of the Garci Tapes.) As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation to be conducted by the Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status. All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate. The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.