The Bigger They Are: Monday, 30 September 2013

!
Issued by Wilson HTM Ltd ABN 68 010 529 665 - Australian Financial Services Licence No 238375, a participant of ASX Group and should be read in conjunction with the disclosures and disclaimer in this report.
Important disclosures regarding companies that are subject of this report and an explanation of recommendations can be found at the end of this document.
NOTE TO RETAIL INVESTORS: This is a document prepared for institutional investors by our quantitative research staff. The recommendations
are not targeted to a retail investor audience and may be inconsistent with fundamental research you receive from Wilson HTM.
A multi-faceted approach to identifying blow-ups
!
!
!
In the appendix (page 18) we detail our methodology. The five stocks that show up
currently at risk are:
! Incitec Pivot (IPL): Weak macro environment, overly optimistic earnings
forecasts, poor shareholder returns and negative signs from short sellers and
quant strategies leaves IPL on our list.
! Orica (ORI): Facing similar conditions to IPL, ORI looks cheap as long as you
have confidence in the earnings. we don't. Low P/Es can be "fixed by a rising
share price OR by falling earnings.
! Newcrest (NCM): NCM featured in our first edition of hunting for
underperformers and returns this week. NCM's fundamentals have weakened,
there have been big movements in the short selling market and the valuation
looks over-cooked.
! Coca-Cola Amatil (CCL): Recent option and short selling action raises
suspicions. Our concerns over earnings quality, poor quant signals and poor
earnings momentum were enough to put CCL on this list.
! Qantas (QAN): Very poor return on capital record, poor earnings quality and
poor interest cover: QAN is relying on a rebound in earnings to improve debt
metrics.

FIGURE 1: FACTOR SUMMARY

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Low
Below Avg
Average
Above Avg
High

Monday, 30 September 2013
THE BIGGER THEY ARE
Damien Klassen damien.klassen@wilsonhtm.com.au Tel. (61) 2 8247 3101
John Lockton john.lockton@wilsonhtm.com.au Tel. (61) 2 8247 3118
Our first three editions searching for underperformers in the ASX 50 all
saw average underperformance of close to 5% over the 2 weeks from
publication. In this edition we again examine information in options
markets, debt markets, short sellers, director transactions, analyst sell
recommendations and index reweighting for signs of potential under
performance before overlaying quantitative trading strategies and
fundamental views. The outcome is we add Incitec (IPL), Orica (ORI),
Newcrest (NCM), Coca-Cola Amatil (CCL) and Qantas (QAN) to our list. A
number of REITs rated poorly, however we believe this was largely due to
US Fed taper concerns and so we opted not to include them on this list.
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30 September 2013

INCITEC PIVOT (IPL):

!
Equities Research - The Bigger They Are 2
Report Card: Earnings sustainability the key issue

!
!
!
Source: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Wilson HTM
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FUNDAMENTAL SIDEBAR
! Recent profit downgrades
in the global fertiliser
names Agrium, Mosaic
on the back weak fertiliser
prices highlight the difficult
operating conditions for
IPL. Soft volumes and
higher costs in the Dyno
Nobel business also limit
earnings growth.
! IPL has also seen
production difficulties at key
manufacturing sites in
Moranbah and Phosphate
Hill during 2012/13.
! The market is looking for
almost 25% earnings
growth in FY14e on the
back of 11% sales growth
which may prove too
aggressive if we don't see
$US DAP and urea prices
improve.
! FY13 Results: 12
November, 2013
F,%>$7%;*/$,&02*/&7,&+@$/0,*.5$/4+2728+2;$,%*&2&:8$=/*,;%8+8@$4//*$
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8+*%+,:2,8$.,%0,8$#9)$/&$/1*$.28+$
30 September 2013


!
QUANTITATIVE COMMENTARY:

FIGURE 2: SHORT SALES:
! Key longer term issue seems to be mean reversion, will EBITDA margins
(currently around 19% and drifting lower) revert to the circa 10% levels of
2003-06 or will they reverse course and head back to the 20%+ levels of the
last few years? Without a catalyst its hard to see why margins will improve.
! IPL does not measure well on the earnings quality or debt fronts, leaving it
pre-disposed to come up on our screen.
! Short sellers have recently begun to build up positions in the stock. Overall
short position levels are only slightly higher than average.
! Valuation measures are mildly positive, but we note that the key issue is
whether current forecasts can be maintained.
! IPL does not rate well on our quant strategies with one of the lowest scores in
the ASX 50.

FIGURE 3: EARNINGS QUALITY - RETURNS:

FIGURE 4: EPS FORECASTS OVER TIME:

Source (All charts): Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Wilson HTM
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30 September 2013


!
FIGURE 5: P/E PERCENTILE BANDS VS ASX 100:

FIGURE 6: CONSENSUS FORECAST DIRECTION:

FIGURE 7: QUANT FY1 EPS MOMENTUM TRADING STRATEGY:

FIGURE 8: QUANT PRICE MOMENTUM TRADING STRATEGY:

K/+6$,%*&2&:8$%&'$4*2;,$7/7,&+17$
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1 October 2013

ORICA (ORI):

!
Report Card: Low P/E can be "fixed" by rising prices or falling earnings

!
!
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FUNDAMENTAL SIDEBAR
! Weak global explosive
volumes down 2% to end
of Aug. vs. flat till the end of
June 13.
! FY13 guidance (19 July) -
"NPAT pre-significant items
to be ~10% lower than the
A$650.2m reported in the
prior year. Guidance was
not reiterated or revised at
trading update on 24
September.
! 1H14 guidance may see
weaker volumes guided to
at Result and Minova
carrying value likely to
scrutinised. 1H14 comps
are tough.
! FY13 Result: 11 November
2013
!
1 October 2013

ORICA (ORI):

!

FIGURE 9: OPEN INTEREST - CALL OPTIONS VS PUT OPTIONS:
! Earnings forecasts look optimistic consensus forecasts have both sales and
margin expansion in 2014 and 2015 despite a history of volatile earnings and a
weak macro environment.
! Earnings quality is not particularly high, and consensus forecasts have been in
downgrade mode for the last five years.
! Both short selling and option markets are flashing warning signals.
! Valuation measures are positive, the key issue is whether current forecasts
can be maintained.
! Quant strategies are mixed, ORI looks good on valuation screens, average on
earnings momentum and poor on price momentum.

FIGURE 10: EARNINGS QUALITY

FIGURE 11: SHORT SELLING:

K2:$2&;*,%8,$2&$86/*+$8,..2&:$
/0,*$+6,$.%8+$=,-$7/&+68$
K1+$0,*5$.2++.,$/=$+6,$
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/4+2/&8$3,2&:$3/1:6+$
1 October 2013

ORICA (ORI):

!
FIGURE 12: EARNINGS DECOMPOSITION:

FIGURE 13: QUANT PRICE MOMENTUM:

FIGURE 14: QUANT VALUATION TRADING STRATEGY:

Source (All charts): Bloomberg, Capital IQ, Wilson HTM
K/+6$0%.1%+2/&$%&'$4*2;,$7/7,&+17$
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ABHT$31+$-,%>$7%;*/$;/&'2+2/&8
1 October 2013

NEWCREST (NCM):

!
Report Card: Back after a hiatus

!
!
!
Source: Bloomberg, Capital IQ, Wilson HTM
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FUNDAMENTAL SIDEBAR
! Poor recent operational
performances make it
difficult for the stock to
outperform the gold price.
! Management are focused
on delivering consistent
production, but CY15 re-
financing obligations are
dictating operations. Whilst
current gold prices allow
the debt to the serviced
meaningful reductions in
the NCM debt profile are
unlikely unless the gold
price is >$US1,400.
! Catalysts: AGM 24
October, 2013.
!
1 October 2013

NEWCREST (NCM):

!

FIGURE 15: CONSENSUS FORECAST DIRECTION:
! NCM featured in our first edition as a sell at much higher prices and after a
hiatus it's back on our list of stocks to sell.
! The key risk to our call is an improvement in its production issues.
! Over recent years weakness in the gold price has led to gold stocks
underperforming but increases do not appear to have had a commensurate
positive effect. This plus production issues means less faith in valuation
measures.
! The recent trends in both short selling and the options markets point to further
concerns.
! Return on equity has not been particularly good, and forecasts continue to
suggest poor returns for shareholders.

FIGURE 16: CONSENSUS PRICE / EARNINGS RELATIVE:

FIGURE 17: SHORT SELLING:

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1 October 2013

NEWCREST (NCM):

!
FIGURE 18: IMPLIED VOLATILITY:

FIGURE 19: ANALYST SELL RECOMMENDATIONS:

!
!
!
!

FIGURE 20: QUANT PRICE MOMENTUM:


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1 October 2013

COCA-COLA AMATIL (CCL):

!
Report Card: Ex-growth?

!
!
!
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[.7/8+$35$',=2&2+2/&$/1*$G1%&+$82:&%.8$%*,$:/2&:$+/$.%:$+6,$8+/;>$4*2;,$%;+2/&L$F62.,$8/7,$/=$
/1*$/+6,*$=%;+/*8$8/7,+27,8$42;>$+1*&2&:$4/2&+8@$-6,&$-,$*,.5$/&$+6,$G1%&+$82:&%.8$^%&'$
8/7,$=1&'%7,&+%.$/0,*.%5_$-,$%*,$7/*,$.2>,.5$+/$62:6.2:6+$8+/;>8$-6,*,$&,:%+20,$+*,&'8$
%*,$%.*,%'5$,8+%3.286,'$31+$,N4,;+,'$+/$;/&+2&1,L$R628$28$+6,$;%8,$=/*$(()$
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*,;,&+$5,%*8L$R6,$
G1,8+2/&$28$-6,+6,*$+6,$
71.+24.,$28$$+//$62:6L
FUNDAMENTAL SIDEBAR
! Trading conditions still
remain competitive with
elevated levels of
discounting the Australian
grocery channel. Failure to
turn this division around
would likely see another leg
of CCL's P/E de-rate post
the two profit warnings this
year.
! Catalysts:
Coles/Woolworths. CCL
trading update November,
2013.
.

1 October 2013


!

FIGURE 22: EARNINGS FORECASTS OVER TIME
! CCL has been sitting on the verge of being included for some time. Its appearance
this time is due to a range of factors from short sellers, options markers, insider
share sales and analyst sell recommendations.
! Earnings quality is also a little suspect, the last few years have seen a number of
"inventory writedowns given the benefit of the doubt by consensus analysts
! Reported earnings and dividends have been significantly above cashflows
! Quant signals are at odds with each other

FIGURE 23: INSIDER SHARE SALES OVER LAST 6 MONTHS

FIGURE 24: ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS

M0,&$'1*2&:$ABBJVABHB$%&%.58+8$-,*,$
;/&+2&1%..5$14:*%'2&:$,%*&2&:8@$31+$+628$6%8$&/-$
;6%&:,'$%&'$(()$28$&/-$2&$'/-&:*%',$7/',
[.7/8+$`T7$/=$86%*,8$8/.'$35$;/*4/*%+,$
2&82',*8$2&$+6,$.%8+$Z$7/&+68 )/+8$/=$%&%.58+8$%*,$
81::,8+2&:$+/$8,..
1 October 2013


!
FIGURE 25: P/E PERCENTILE BANDS VS ASX 100

FIGURE 26: EARNINGS QUALITY - CASH CONVERSION

FIGURE 27: EARNINGS QUALITY - CASH PAYOUT RATIO

Y202',&'8$6%0,$3,,&$%3/0,$;%86=./-8$
=/*$8/7,$+27,$^a$5*$%0,*%:,$
/4,*%+2&:$;%86=./-$.,88$;%4,N_LL$
(/&0,*82/&$/=$4*/=2+8$+/$;%86$6%8$3,,&$4//*L
R*%'2&:$/&$%$+/4$G1%*+2.,$9bM$7%',$8,&8,$
ABBZVABHB$-6,&$(()$-%8$2&$14:*%',$7/',@$
31+$7%>,8$.,88$8,&8,$&/-$
1 October 2013

QANTAS (QAN):

!
Report Card: Poor fundamentals, lots of put options being bought

!
!
!
Source: Bloomberg, Capital IQ, Wilson HTM
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274*/0,$',3+$7,+*2;8L$
!
FUNDAMENTAL SIDEBAR
! +6% outperformance vs.
the XJO in the last month
and almost +10 since the
beginning of August.
! International comps have
also risen strongly in the
last month, with the
S&P500 Airlines Index up
13.5%.
! Despite some improvement
in structural issues
international business,
lower capacity expansion
domestically (although off
the highest base in a
number of years), fuel costs
may represent headwind to
earnings. Higher fuel
prices and lower AUD likely
to be drag in FY14 may
make furl prices difficult
pass on in current
environment.
! AGM/Trading update 18
October, 2013.

1 October 2013

QANTAS (QAN):

!

FIGURE 28: RETURN ON INVESTMENT:
! QAN scores so badly on most of our other measures that even mildly negative
scores in our key categories are enough to bring it into the spotlight for all the
wrong reasons.
! Its hard to find a positive. QAN is consistently poor across almost all of our
measures .
! Balance sheet looks stretched and is relying on an earnings recovery to make
debt metrics palatable
! Returns on capital are below average (at best).

FIGURE 29: OPEN INTEREST - CALL OPTIONS VS PUT OPTIONS:

FIGURE 30: LONG TERM P/E RELATIVES:

E[U$28$/&$%$61:,$*,.%+20,$9bM$^:20,&$+6,$
*,+1*&8_@$%.+6/1:6$+6,*,$%*,$4*/3%3.5$0%.2'$
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"!#($-%8$2&$+6,$ZVJI$=/*$7/8+$/=$+6,$',;%',L
(/1&+,*%*:17,&+c$./+8$/=$
;%..$/4+2/&8$3,2&:$3/1:6+$
1 October 2013

QANTAS (QAN):

!
FIGURE 31: EARNINGS QUALITY:

FIGURE 32: EARNINGS QUALITY:

FIGURE 33: QUANT EPS MOMENTUM TRADING STRATEGY:


F,$.//>$%+$,%*&2&:8$G1%.2+5$2&$%$*%&:,$/=$-%58L$!&,$28$
+6,$'2==,*,&;,$3,+-,,&$-6%+$+6,$+%N$7%&$%&'$+6,$
7%*>,+$%*,$+/.'$2$E[U$*%+,8$-,..$/&$+6%+$7,%81*,
K1+$E[U$*%+,8$4//*.5$/&$/+6,*$
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4*/=2+8$2&+/$;%86$$
[&/+6,*$G1%.2+5$7,%81*,$28$+/$+*%;>$+6,$
0/.%+2.2+5$/=$M9<$=/*,;%8+8$%&'$+6,$
4*,'2;+%32.2+5$/=$,%*&2&:8$35$%&%.58+8L$E[U$
*%+,8$4//*.5$/&$3/+6$+6,8,$7,%81*,8L
A>O&$#$(7+;$&,)07<+&)D+;)--'&
3,,&$+6%+$4*/=2+%3.,$%8$%$8+*%+,:5$
E#*&NIHG&8+&0)'0&0(--&D;**(7+-'&
P)-;)+8#7&!0(--%&0897)-0&,)M(&"((7&
*(-)+8M(-'&*(-8)"-(&E#*&NIH&";+&!";'%&0897)-0&
6%0,$3,,&$%$*,0,*8,$2&'2;%+/*$2$W18+$-6,&$
E[U$.//>8$;6,%4@$,%*&2&90&9(+&D;+G&
1 October 2013

APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

!
1. SPECIAL FACTORS
We use the special factors category to represent other markets and data sources
that can give information about where the stock price may go.
a. Short selling: the theory behind watching this market is that the participants
are generally more sophisticated investors and so their actions contain more
information. Additionally, to hold a short position an investor needs to borrow
the stock which is an additional cost (sometimes quite a significant cost)
and so the short seller needs to be even more convinced than the investor
who holds a long position.
Weighting: This measure has a high weight in our overall measurement.
b. Index changes: in the ASX 50 we estimate that passive index positions
make up well over 10% (passive funds tracking ASX 50 = 5-6%, passive
funds tracking MSCI Australia = 5-6%). Potential changes in weights or index
positions will affect trading.
Weighting: This measure has a small weight in our overall measurement
c. Options: The theory behind watching this market is that at times investors in
options market will be more positioned to hedge against share price falls,
and at other times they will be more positioned to gaining upside to share
price rises. Looking for stocks where investors are increasingly looking to
hedge against share price falls may give a leading indicator. Additionally we
know when the price of buying the options (as measured by implied volatility)
increases, which gives more weight to the above factor i.e. when its
expensive to buy protection (and investors buy protection) then it sends a
stronger signal than when its cheap to buy protection. All of these measures
are examined both in an absolute sense and relative to other stocks in the
ASX 50.
Weighting: This measure has a medium high weight in our overall
measurement. The relative measurements have a much larger weights than
the absolute.
d. Debt Markets: We watch this market for changes in spreads that may signal
the need to raise additional capital, the increase in future interest costs or (at
the extreme) concerns about the solvency of companies. Currently we look
at the 5 year CDS market (only about half of the companies have CDS) and
will expand to cover other debt instruments over time.
Weighting: This measure has a medium weight in our overall measurement
as not all companies have CDS. We will increase the weight when we add
further debt analysis.
e. Corporate Actions: This is the only "user generated rating in this section.
In this we score companies on the likelihood of being acquired (assumed to
be share price positive) or making a large acquisition (assumed to be share
price negative). We also score companies for any stock overhang (negative)
and the likelihood of a capital raising (negative).
Weighting: While this measure has a medium weight in our overall
measurement, most of the time the scores are of quite a low weight due to
the uncertainty. For example, potential takeover targets will generally only
have a small positive weight until a takeover is announced / obviously
imminent.
f. Insider Transactions: We look at the number of shares bought by directors
/ management (treating it as a mild negative if zero) and the number of
shares sold (the higher the $ figure the more negative the score).
Weighting: This measure has a medium low weight in our overall
measurement.
g. Analyst Sell recommendations: While "buy recommendations predict little
about future stock price movements, there appears to be predictive power in
analyst sell recommendations. We look at the number of current sell
recommendations as a factor.
Weighting: This measure has a medium weight in our overall
measurement. The relative measurements have a much larger weights than
the absolute.

1 October 2013


!
2. FUNDAMENTALS
We use the fundamentals category to assess companies over a long period of time
(10 years+) in order to get a quality score for each company. The intent with this
category is not to automatically sell a company that has scored poorly, but rather to
"predispose our scoring system. i.e. a the hurdle for a company with a poor
fundamental record to end up on our sell list is lower than the hurdle for a company
with a good record.
a. Earnings Quality: We look at four measures within earnings quality:
! Companies effectively prepare two accounts one for the stock market
(with earnings pre-disposed to be higher) and one for the tax man (with
earnings predisposed to be lower). We look for systematic differences
between the two.
! We examine whether reported profits are being converted to cash
! We look at the volatility of analyst forecasts and the longer term spread of
analyst forecasts with the view that more predictable earnings are worth
more. There is, we admit, a counter argument that if earnings are too
predictable then it suggests management "smoothing of earnings.
! .We look at reported profits vs (consensus) normalised profits for
systemic issues for example restructuring charges that occur every
second year.
Weighting: We weight all factors equally in the fundamentals category.
b. Return on Investment: We use ROE and ROIC as our key measures and
examine both the current position and recent improvements or declines.
c. Return on Re-Investment: We look at incremental return on invested
capital over 3 year periods. This is also weighted by the amount that
companies are re-investing each year, i.e. if a company is earnings poor
returns on its re-invested capital, but it is returning most of its capital to
shareholders and not investing much then its score will be better than a
company with the same returns that does not pay dividends.
d. Consensus forecast direction: We look at the long term history of analyst
forecasts with a view to determining whether forecasts are systematically
overestimated (a positive to our score) or underestimated (a negative).
e. Earnings vs macro environment: We look at the nature of the company
and then score it relative to the macro environment. For example, resource
companies are leveraged to world growth. If world growth is running slightly
below trend then resource companies will generate a mildly negative score.

3. VALUATION
We use the valuation category in a similar way to the fundamentals category, not to
automatically sell a company that has scored poorly, but rather to "predispose our
scoring system. i.e. a the hurdle for a company with a poor valuation score to end
up on our sell list is lower than the hurdle for a company with a good score.
In a number of categories we use dividends per share for REITs and Utilities rather
than earnings per share due to measurement issues with earnings per share.
a. Cheap / Expensive vs market: we use a range of valuation measures
(Forward P/E, Trailing P/E, Cyclically Adjusted P/E, various dividend yields,
price to book, EV / EBIT and EV/EBITDA and others) and look at the current
position of the stock vs others.
Weighting: This measure has a high weight.
b. Sector vs market: We use the same valuation measures as above but this
time score the sector that each company is in rather than the company itself.
Weighting: This measure has a medium weight.
c. Valuation vs History: We use the same valuation measures as in section a)
but this time score each company according to its own history i.e. if stock A
and stock B are both trading at a market multiple but stock A has always
traded at a discount and stock B has always traded at a premium then stock
A will score poorly and stock B will score well.
1 October 2013


!

4. FINANCIAL STABILITY
We use the financial stability category in a similar way to the fundamentals
category, not to automatically sell a company that has scored poorly, but rather to
"predispose our scoring system. i.e. a the hurdle for a company with a poor
financial stability score to end up on our sell list is lower than the hurdle for a
company with a good score.
a. Gearing Levels: we use a range of measures (interest cover, Debt / Debt +
Equity, Debt / EV, Debt / Mkt Cap) and look at both the current position of
the stock vs others and also the position of the stock over time i.e. is it
more or less geared than it has been in the past.
b. Altman Z score: The Altman Z score is a quantitative formula that has a
reasonable record at predicting insolvency over the following two years. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altman_Z-score for more details. We look at both
the absolute score and how the score has changed over time.
c. Earnings volatility: We look at the volatility of earnings and then re-score
the company based on the gearing metrics above with the view that
companies that have greater earnings volatility should carry less debt. i.e. if
Company A and Company B have the same interest cover, Altman Z score
and gearing metrics but Company A has very stable earnings and Company
B has very volatile earnings then Company B should score lower than
Company A.

5. SECTOR COMPARISONS
We use this category to re-look at sections 2, 3 and 4 above and to apply an
offsetting score depending on how the stock rated relative to its peers rather than
all stocks. For example an infrastructure stock may score poorly on gearing
measures relative to other stocks in the ASX 50 but score well relative to other
infrastructure stocks.
6. QUANT STRATEGIES
We use the quant strategies category to score companies based on a number of
the most commonly used quantitative strategies.
a. Earnings Momentum: This measure suggests that when companies are
upgrading earnings that it is profitable to buy those companies, and when
companies are downgrading earnings it is profitable to sell those companies.
We score companies based on what this measure says over different time
periods, and weight the results according to how much success this strategy
has had in the past. For example, this method generally works well for more
cyclical companies but for defensive companies you often find that it is a
poor (or even reverse) indicator i.e. when earnings are being downgraded
for the defensive company earnings are also being downgraded for other
companies by more and so the defensive company will actually outperform
despite earnings downgrades.
b. Price Momentum: This is the simplest measure but one of the most
effective. It suggests that when company share prices have outperformed or
underperformed that they will continue to do so. We score companies based
on what this measure says over different time periods, and weight the results
according to how much success this strategy has had in the past.
c. Valuation Bands: This measure suggests that when companies are trading
on relative valuation metrics that are below average that it is profitable to buy
those companies, and when companies are trading on relative valuation
metrics that are above average that it is profitable to sell those companies.
We score companies based on what this measure says over different time
periods, and weight the results according to how much success this strategy
has had in the past.

1 October 2013

!

Return Reinvestment Matrix and Risk Measures
For definitions at http://www.wilsonhtm.com.au/Disclosures
Recommendation Structure and Other Definitions
For definitions at http://www.wilsonhtm.com.au/Disclosures
Disclaimer
Whilst Wilson HTM Ltd believes the information contained in this communication is based on reliable information, no warranty is given as to its accuracy and persons relying on this information
do so at their own risk. To the extent permitted by law Wilson HTM Ltd disclaims all liability to any person relying on the information contained in this communication in respect of any loss or
damage (including consequential loss or damage) however caused, which may be suffered or arise directly or indirectly in respect of such information. Any projections contained in this
communication are estimates only. Such projections are subject to market influences and contingent upon matters outside the control of Wilson HTM Ltd and therefore may not be realised in
the future.
The advice contained in this document is general advice. t has been prepared without taking account of any person's objectives, financial situation or needs and because of that, any person
should, before acting on the advice, consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to the client's objectives, financial situation and needs. Those acting upon such information
without first consulting one of Wilson HTM Ltd investment advisors do so entirely at their own risk. This report does not constitute an offer or invitation to purchase any securities and should not
be relied upon in connection with any contract or commitment whatsoever. If the advice relates to the acquisition, or possible acquisition, of a particular financial product the client should
obtain a Product Disclosure Statement relating to the product and consider the Statement before making any decision about whether to acquire the product. This communication is not to be
disclosed in whole or part or used by any other party without Wilson HTM Ltd's prior written consent.
Disclosure of Interest
The Directors of Wilson HTM advise that at the date of this report they and their associates have relevant interests in securities mentioned in this report. They also advise that Wilson HTM and
Wilson HTM Corporate Finance A.B.N. 65 057 547 323 and their associates have received and may receive commissions or fees from these companies in relation to advice or dealings in
securities. Some or all of Wilson HTM authorised representatives may be remunerated wholly or partly by way of commission.
In producing research reports, members of Wilson HTM Research may attend site visits and other meetings hosted by the issuers the subject of its research reports. In some instances the costs
of such site visits or meetings may be met in part or in whole by the issuers concerned if Wilson HTM considers it is appropriate and reasonable in the specific circumstances relating to the site
visit or meeting.
Please see disclosures at http://www.wilsonhtm.com.au/Disclosures. Disclosures applicable to companies included in this report can be found in the latest relevant published research.

! !
1 October 2013

!

Head of Research
Jacqueline Fernley (02) 8247 6661
Head of Institutional Sales
Duncan Gamble (02) 8247 6629
Industrials Sydney
James Ferrier (03) 9640 3827 Jonathan Scales (02) 8247 6613
Andrew Dalziel (07) 3212 1946 Richard Moulder (02) 8247 6603
Stewart Oldfield (03) 9640 3818 Michael Pegum (02) 8247 6602
Daniel Wan (02) 8247 6694 Anthony Wilson (02) 8247 3113
Simon Callaghan (07) 3212 1001 Melbourne
Healthcare and Biotechnology David Permezel (03) 9640 3885
Shane Storey (07) 3212 1351 Adam Dellaway (03) 9640 3824
Resources
Cameron Judd (03) 9640 3864 Wealth Management Research
Phillip Chippindale (02) 8247 3149 Peter McManus (02) 8247 3186
Liam Schofield (02) 8247 3173 John Lockton (02) 8247 3118
Nathan Szeitli (03) 9640 3806 Email: firstname.lastname@wilsonhtm.com.au
Quantitative Strategy/TAA
Damien Klassen (02) 8247 3101 National Offices
Brisbane Ph: (07) 3212 1333
Sydney Ph: (02) 8247 6600
Melbourne Ph: (03) 9640 3888
Gold Coast Ph: (07) 5509 5500
Dalby Ph: (07) 4660 8000
Hervey Bay Ph: (07) 4197 1600
Our web site: www.wilsonhtm.com.au

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