STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Legislation is an active instrument of government, which for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to be achieved and statutes should be construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. Legislative intent - it is the spirit which gives rise to the legislative enactment which must be enforced when ascertained although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. It is found in the four corners of the law itself Legislative purpose it is the reason why a particular statute was enacted by the legislature. Legislative meaning it is what the law means and if there is ambiguity in the language used in a statute, its purpose may indicate the meaning of the language and leads to what the legislative intent is.

CONSTRUCTION vs. INTERPRETATION While there appears to be a technical distinction between the two terms, they are so alike in practical results so they are usex interchangeably as to have become almost synonymous. The office of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent and the true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the lawmaking body, to the end that it may be enforced. Interpretation the art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of words. Construction - the process of drawing unwarranted conclusions not always included in direct expressions or determining the application of words to facts in litigation. The duty and power to interpret and construe a statute or the constitution belong to the judiciary. While the legislative and the executive departments, enact and enforce the law, it is the court that has the final word as to what the law means.

AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION: 1. Title In case of doubt in the language of the statute, this indispensable part of a statute serves as an aid to its construction and in ascertaining legislative will as it may tend to extend and restrict the scope of the law.

Where the meaning of a statute is obscure, courts may resort to its title to clear the obscurity because of the constitutional injunction that every bill must embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. 2. Preamble While it is not an essential part of a statute, it serves as the key of the statute to open the minds of the lawmakers as to the purpose to be achieved, the mischief to be remedied and the object to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute. Whenever there is ambiguity in a statute or whenever the words used therein have more than one meaning, the preamble may decide the proper construction to be given to the statute as it may express the legislative intent to make the law apply retroactively or it may restrict the scope of the statute. 3. Context of whole text Legislative intent should accordingly be ascertained from a consideration of the whole context of the statute and not from an isolated part or particular provision. The context may circumscribe the meaning of a statute; it may give to a word or a phrase a meaning different from its usual or ordinary signification and in such a case, the meaning dictated by the context prevails. The best source from which to ascertain the legislative intent is the statute itself - words, phrases, sentences, sections, clauses, provisions taken as a whole in relation to one another. 4. Punctuation marks Punctuations, such as a comma, semi-colon and a period are grammatical marks. It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against intelligible meaning of written words. If the punctuation gives the statute a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words as thus punctuated but an argument based upon punctuation alone is not persuasive. 5. Capitalization of letters Another aid of low degree in the construction of a statute. The court had always held that there is no difference between the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in a statute. 6. Headnotes and epigraphs Headnotes, headings or epigraphs of sections of a statute are convenient index to the contents of its provision, and are prefixed to sections or chapters of a statute for ready reference or classification. In case of doubt or ambiguity in the meaning of the law or the intention of the legislature, they may be consulted to but headnotes or epigraphs are not entitled to much weight and inferences drawn therefrom offer little value and can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not part of the law.

7. Lingual text Philippine laws are officially promulgated either in English, Spanish or Filipino. The rule is that, unless otherwise provided, where a statute is officially promulgated in English and Spanish, the English text shall govern, but in case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the Spanish may be consulted to explain the English text. 8. Intent or spirit of the law The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself, as it is the spirit, rather than the letter of a statute that determines its construction, hence, legislative intent is the controlling factor, the leading star and the guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute. 9. Policy of the law The policy of the law, once ascertained should be given effect by the judiciary. One way of accomplishing this mandate is to give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public policy and one which would carry into effect the evident policy of the law should be adopted in favor of that interpretation which would defeat it. 10. Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed The purpose of a statute is more important than the rules of grammar and logic in ascertaining its meaning. In construing a statute, the purpose or object of the law or the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment of the law are important factors to be considered in its construction. The court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evil to be remedied, or the purpose to be achieved and should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will effectuate its purpose. 11. Dictionaries Where a statute does not define the words or phrases used therein, nor does its purpose or the context in which the words or phrases are employed indicate their meaning, the courts may consult dictionaries, legal, scientific or general, as aid in determining the meaning to be assigned to such words and phrases. While definitions given by lexicographers are not binding, courts have adopted in certain cases, such definitions to support their conclusion as to the meaning of a particular words or texts used in a statute. 12. Consequences of various constructions In construing a statute, the consequences of the various constructions offered will be inquired into as additional aid to interpretation. As a general rule, a construction of a statute should be rejected that will cause injustice or hardship, result in absurdity, defeat legislative intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of legislative purpose or object, render certain words or phrases a surplussage, nullify the statute or make any of its provisions nugatory. 13. Presumptions

Presumptions are based on logic, experience and common sense, and in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, doubts as to the proper and correct construction of a statute will be resolved in favor of that construction which is in accord with the presumption on the matter. 14. Legislative history The history of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its inception until its enactment into law and it covers the period and the steps done from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed by the legislature. Where a statute is susceptible of several interpretations and there is no ambiguity in its language, there is no better means of ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of the statute. 15. Legislative debates, views and deliberations Where there is doubt as to what a provision of the statute means, that meaning which was put to such provision during legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted. Construction may resort to ascertaining the legislative intent based on floor deliberations by the lawmakers on a bill which eventually as enacted into law but this is not usually controlling in the interpretation of the law and are not given decisive weight especially where there are circumstances indicating a meaning of a statute other than that expressed by the legislators, where the views expressed were conflicting, where the intent deducible from such views is not clear, or where the statute involved is free from ambiguity. DOCTRINES OF ASSOCIATED WORDS 1. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. In accordance with this principle, where most of the words in an enumeration of words in a statute are used in their generic or ordinary sense, the rest of the words should be similarly construed. Stated differently, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. 2. EJUSDEM GENERIS Means of the same kind or specie. The general rule is that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or the restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to, or resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. While general words or expressions in a statute are, as arule,

accorded their full, natural and generic sense, they will not be given such meaning if they are used in association with specific words or phrases. Requisites for the application of the rule: (1) a statute contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word or phrase; (2) the particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind; (3) the enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examples, and (4) there is no indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases a broader meaning. The purpose of the rule of ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular word. This principle is based on the proposition that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated the specific words. 3. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its controlling canons are of restrictive interpretation and are used generally in the construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes that are strictly construed. Where a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded but it is considered as an auxillary rule that can be ignored where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. 4. CASSUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It operates clearly when the omission had been clearly established and in such case what is omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein. The court cannot supply the omission even though it may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated. 5. DOCTRINE OF LAST ANTECEDENT A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated. They do not qualify words or phrases which are distantly or remotely located. In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and qualifying words or phrases must be applied only to their immediate or last antecedent and not to the other remote or preceding words or association of words.

6. REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS It means referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately related and to which it is most applicable.