The Strange and Unexpected Collapse of the Soviet Union The most dangerous time for a bad government

is when it starts to reform itself. Alexis de Tocqueville Introduction This paper aims to examine some of the structural and catalytic factors behind the collapse of the Soviet Union. The historic event of the political and economic empire of Soviet Union and its collapse was in many ways an unexpected, swift, economically and socially painful, and surprisingly peaceful event of the 1990s. The Soviet Union emerged out of a Great War as a revolutionary state. It evolved into a military superpower over the following years. The result was an empire with an ideological model which was emulated by a third of the wo rlds population. The perception for the SU by the rest of the world was that it was a secure and stable society. Nonetheless, the Russian Bolshevik Revolution is among the greatest of surprises of political and social history of the world. Its collapse was another surprise that no Western or Russian expert, official, politician, or scholar foresaw. Neither Soviet dissidents nor future revolutionaries themselves in the Soviet Union did anticipate a revolutionary crisis. Despite the fact that there were wide disagreements on the practice and organization of the Soviet system, along with its setbacks and problems, no one in the leadership or academic world thought them to be a threat for the Soviet regime's stability and legitimacy, at least not anytime soon. Even Mikhail Gorbachev and his contemporaries in 1985 expected such an outcome. The reason why its demise was not anticipated was because of the fact that the Soviet Union was at the height of its global influence and power. it is a fact that the Soviet Union in 1985 had almost the same human and natural resources that it possessed in 1975. Clearly, the standard of living in the Soviet Union was much lower than in most of Eastern Europe and incomparably lower than the Western Europe. Shortages of any kind, food rationing, long lines of people in stores, and endemic poverty were serious and severe. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had known far greater calamities and coped without sacrificing an iota of the state's grip on society and economy, much less surrendering it (Aron, 2011). In addition to this, there was no any key parameter of financial performance prior to 1985 point to a rapidly progressing crisis. From 1981 to 1985 the growth of the country's GDP, though slowing down compared with the 1960s and 1970s, averaged 1.9 percent a year (Aron, 2011). The size of budget deficits was quite manageable even in 1989. There was almost no hardly catastrophic pattern continued through 1989 that could be evaluated as a sign of a coming revolutionary crisis. Apart from the fact that there was certain stagnation, the situation was manageable. Yes, the stagnation was obvious and worrisome. But as Wesleyan University Professor Peter Rutland has pointed out, "Chronic ailments, after all, are not necessarily fatal." Even the leading student of the revolution's

economic causes, Anders slund, notes that from 1985 to 1987, the situation "was not at all dramatic." From the Soviet leadership's point of view, the political environment and circumstances were even less worrisome. There was almost no political threat due to the fact that all the prominent dissidents had been either imprisoned or exiled as the result of 20 years of relentless suppression of political opposition. Most of the opposition leaders were virtually forced to emigrate, or had died in jails and camps. Looking at the circumstances, there did not seem to be very serious signs of a pre-revolutionary crisis including a situation of a state failure or external pressure. On the contrary, the previous decade was correctly judged to amount "to the realization of all major Soviet military and diplomatic desiderata," as American historian and diplomat Stephen Sestanovich has written. Then, one needs to ask what were the actual possible reasons behind the collapse of the Soviet Union?. On one hand, American-centric dominant perception that Ronald Reagan bankrupted the Soviet Union ideologically and economically through his moral clarity and massive defense spending that the Soviet regime could not compete with. On the other hand, a second view which claims that the Soviet Union was inevitably going to collapse because of the weak foundations of the unbalanced Soviet economy and Gorbachevs Perestroika. Gorbachevs Perestroika and its impacts To understand the collapse of the SU, the nature of the political system of its regime needs to be understood. According to the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Communist Party was the vanguard of the proletariat class. The party exercised a totalitarian power monopoly over the political system and society on behalf of the working class. The legitimacy of the system depended upon the ideological faith among the social layers of society of the sureness of the Marxist-Leninist canon but was crucially underpinned by the coercive state powers of the secret police and the Red Army (McCauley, 2001). The factors that prepared the collapse would be incomplete without noting that the system produced a leadership appropriate to operate it. Through the Great Terror, engineered by Stalin, people were horribly oppressed by widespread intimidation and fear. Previous Soviet leaders ruling resulted in a stalled economy. The late 1980s were a period of political, economic and social reforms and changes that was eventually resulted in demise of the Soviet Union. The mastermind behind these political, economic and social reforms was Mikhail Gorbachev, who became General Secretary in 1985. At the same time, states communist ideology drifted away from its Marxist roots. The g ravest consequence was that the government went on to wield an oppressive hand over the Soviet people. In an attempt to introduce the philosophy of perestroika, Gorbachev restructured economy and reorganized party doctrine. More freedoms in the market and social life were allowed by Perestroika. Gorbachev used his position to promote a series of democratic,

humanitarian reforms with a purpose of advancing the communist system from within. In addition to dealing with the economy; perestroika dealt with political life and organization as well. The new political organization allowed opposition groups to speak out against regime and communism. However, to some degree, Gorbachevs attempts and reforms in trying to save the system have actually contributed to the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union its end. Strangely but not entirely surprisingly the dissolution of the Soviet Union rocked the world. Gorbachevs reform policies that allowed for greater diversity and freedoms in the social, political and economic fields have been a final fatal blow to the crumbling Soviet regime. Although Gorbachevs humanitarian sentiments were at the centre of the Perestroikas philosophy it did not completely solidify the communist regimes hold over the people. Along with many other factors in the fall of the Soviet, this was one of the key players. Economic decline One of the most striking factors of the collapse was the dramatic economic decline recorded in official statistics and the pervasively negative economic impact on most peoples lives in the Soviet Union. There was a steady decline in conditions in the Soviet Union prior to 1985 particularly in terms of the economy. Under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, the economy stalled and eventually fell into decline. His economic policies were based upon the fundamental Stalinist principles of state ownership of land and non-agricultural capital, collectivized farming, centralized planning of most production and inter-mediate consumption, and state provision of housing and basic amenities (Harrison, 2002). As economist Mark Harrison (2002) pointed out, the fundamental problem was that the financial planners of the SU overloaded goods producers with products; supply simply did not meet the demands of the population. The efficiency of government-owned factories was also constrain for financial development and not considered when funds were distributed. Brezhnev attempted to reform the economy and promote efficiency but his policies did not work well due to the fact that it was widely ineffective and weak (Zemtsov, 1989). Eventually, because of the problem of the government controlling the prices of consumer goods and its attempts to fix them above or below market value, it has unbalanced the economy. Although the economy began to stagnate during Khrushchevs term as General Secretary, Brezhnev did not enact policies that ended the stagnation and in fact his policies only pushed the economy further into decline (Farrar and Zemtsov, 1989). This economic decline only worsened during the gerontocracy period, which culminated in the regimes of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko in the early 1980s (Farrar and Zemtsov, 1989). The two leaders were both old in age and were generally out of touch with the Soviet citizens. In fact, Chernenko was seventy two when he became General Secretary and was

more concerned with maintaining the status quo of the Marxist-Leninist government than with doing anything to reform or improve the conditions within the empire (Zemtsov, 1989). In addition to all these factors that had a negative impact on the Soviet economy, the sharp drop in oil prices, from $66 a barrel in 1980 to $20 a barrel in 1986 (in 2000 prices) certainly was a heavy blow to Soviet finances (Aron, 2011). It is interesting to note that, on the contrary of expectations, the contribution of the disintegration of finance and dramatic economic decline did take place faster in the so-called transition periods. Nationalism and the Soviet Empire Empires are defined by Michael Doyle as: Empires are relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies (Doyle, 1986). In the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia there have always been core Russian institutions, identity and population. They were molded in Russian traditions, language and culture along with some participation of other traditions and cultures which helped to sustain the existence of Russian-centric institutions. This helped the establishment of an imperial relationship with non-Russian populations as it has been described by Doyle. This relationship provided enormous economic, social and political benefits for both the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia. However, these non-Russian populations never enjoyed certain sovereignty or social, economic, religious and political independence. Nevertheless, in the case of the Soviet Union, some peripheral autonomy in addition to some freedom to express their nationalities can be seen. A display of a striking flexibility in defining the function, identity and place of Russianness was also existed in the Soviet Unions institutions. Following the 1917 Revolution, a new nationalities policy and a campaign of de-Russification were launched (Martin, 2001). Because the Russian empire was exhausted by the WW1 and it was on the verge of disintegration in relation to non-Russian nationalities. The Communists had to develop an effective nationalist policy to keep non-Russians under control and get rid of the risks of fragmentation of Empires territory. The main remnant of the old rgime, the nationalist White Army was absolutely uncompromising on the idea of a single and undivided Russia ruled by Russians (Simon, 1991).Lenin started the first shift away from these policies. At the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, he argued that the nascent socialist fatherland must radically distance itself from the imperialism of Tsarist Russia (GrigorSuny, 1993). he promoted the idea of recognition of other peoples of the Tsarist empire as separate nationalities and argued that they should be granted significant concessions. He believed nationalism is

obsolete due to the fact that the supremacy of the proletariat would ultimately render nation-states (Suny, 1993). Stalin slowed and finally reversed what Lenin initiated because he believed that a strong sense of national consciousness posed a challenge to the existence of Russian-centric life and institutions in the Union. Rising economic and financial centralization required Russian to be imposed as the predominant language of economics, development and education, and this logically favored an active incorporation of large numbers of educated Russians into the national enterprise (Lieven, 2000). A more balanced situation was seen in nationalities policy after Stalins death. The Soviet leadership believed that in order to gain support, they had to grant concessions to the non-Russian periphery and many non-Russians gained offices in the central and local governments (Simon, 1991). However, nationalism plays a significant role in revealing the situation during 1980s for both Russian and non-Russian. It increasingly became a catalyst of dispute and discontent under Brezhnevs era and following years. Nationalism was also used to express dissent in Gorbachevs time, (Suny, 1993) especially when economic reform failed and after glasnosts revelations about Soviet repression wiped out the states legitimacy almost overnight (Lieven, 2000) According to Dominic Lieven (2000), in the emerging re-construction of their own history, the nationalists identified the Soviet experiment as the enemy of essential, authentic, natural national aspirations, despite the fact that the Soviet policies had nurtured and even shaped some of these nations. Gorbachev failed to use the proper tools of power that had been used very often to hold the Soviet Union socially and politically stable. He committed to democratic reforms that could not meet non-Russians demands for independence and sovereignty. Then, one can ask; to what extent did the fluctuations in nationalities policy play a role in the collapse of the Soviet Union? The basic problem that nationalism produced in the SU was the fact that it led the SU towards extremism and radicalism which was a consequence of forced Russification. Along with many other reasons behind the collapse of the Soviet Union, nationalism was one among the most important drive. Already weak central authority had been weakened further as the result of Gorbachevs decentralization. The consequence was that the republics began to ask for declarations of independence. Two other crucial elements in relation to this process were Russian resentment and nationalism. Most Russians had the impression of not belonging to decision-making which was centered in Moscow. Because even the places were Russians were living controlled as tightly as non-Russian republics. Some smaller republics had superior autonomy, lobbying power and representation more than more-developed and larger Russian-living regions which resulted in a strong resentment. Actual social and political power along with financial decision-making was

still centered in Moscow despite the fact that non-Russian nationalities had an official recognition in the Soviet Union. The fact why nationalism was among the reasons behind the collapse of the SU is because when Russianness was restored as the dominant identity of the Soviet Union. Consequently, these national consciousnesses of non-Russian subjects were ruthlessly repressed. Russianness produced a deep resentment among non-Russian nationalists as the retribution. Russianness was imposed by the central government along with inequitable relationship on the non-Russian subjects. In addition to assimilation of the Soviet system, this approach left a consistent negative and reactionary perception among non-Russian subjects which led the non-Russian nationalists to indentify and define themselves against the Soviet system. On the contrary of proclamations of initial honorable objective of unifying the Soviet people under communism, later Russian identity hindered this idea and one day rendered it obsolete. Conclusion It can be clearly argued that a combination of factors contributed to the nature of the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. There are many factors which are believed to the contrubution of the fall of the Soviet Union that are not mentioned in this article. They include the Afghan intervention, the role of Solidarity in Poland, Reagans input, the decline in world oil prices and many others that are contributed to the implosion of the Soviet Union. During Stalins era, Soviet people were fully cut off from the outside world. However, with the crucial role of the policy of dtente, it changed, as academics, politicans, economists, officials and many other representatives of the Soviet inteligensia and top elite began to travel and work with the elites of outside world. In the light of this, one other factor that can be adressed is what Alexander Dullin argues; the increasing acquaintance and fascination with foreign norms, styles and practices and goods would in their own way, further contributed to the erosion of commitments to official Soviet Orthodoxy13 This helped the disintegration of the Soviet Union due to the fact that the exposure to the superior political, economic and social freedoms as well as standard of living resulted in a profound impact on the Soviet inteligensia after having the chance to travel in outside world. As the historian Ben Fowkes (1997) claims, the disintegration of the USSR was preconditioned by the progressive lessoning of its isolation from the rest of the world14. The direct consequence of this development was the introduction of glasnost (Malia, 1994) into the public sphere by Gorbachev. The total demise of the ideological framework was never wanted even by reformist Soviet leaders such as Gorbachev. In practice, the process of glasnost in unveiling the hidden crimes of Stalin opened the risk of bringing the question of legitimacy of the regime itself (Malia, 1994). Gorbachev and his fellows in the communist party believed that the socialist system could be reformed and humanized. In reality, as Malia (1994) argues, this loss of legitimacy would prove

fatal to the system; for its surreal structures were such that they could not survive exposure to the truth. Conclusively, the factors that have been outlined in this article do not fully paint the complex reality behind the Soviet Unions fall. AsMalia (1994) argues, none of the Soviet Unions external problems from Solidarity to Afghanistan would be capable of shaking the system unless there was a crisis at home. The perfect storm of deepening economic crisis forced the Soviet leadership to face the deepening systemic crisis enveloping the system and attempt to reform throughthe unleashing of societal forces. The result of glasnost was to unleash social and political forces which destroyed the Soviet Union and with the long-term structural collapse of faith in Marxism-Leninism among the Soviet nomeclatura, the middle to lower strata failed to support the attempted counterrevolutionary August coup, thus delivering the final blow to a morally, financially and politically bankrupt system. Resources 1- Aron, Leon. 2011, Everything you think you know about the collapse of the Soviet Union is wrong, Foreign Policy Journal, June, 2011 2- Cummings, Laura. 2012. Gorbachevs Perestroika and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Journal of Undergraduate Research, Lagrange Collage. 3- GrigorSuny, Ronald The Revenge of the Past; Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 87. 4- Simon, Gerhard Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union. From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society, Westview, 1991, p.21. 5- Martin, Terry The Affirmative Action Empire, Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. 11 12. 6- Harrison, Mark. Economic Growth and Slowdown. Brezhnev Reconsidered, p. 52, Eds Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 7- McCauley, Martin. Bandits, Gangsters and Mafia, p.86, Pearson Education, 2001. 8- Zemtsov, Ilya. Chernenko: The Last Bolshevik. New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher, 1989. 9- Zemtsov, Ilya and John Farrar. Gorbachev: The Man and the System. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989. 10- Doyle, Michael W. Empire, Cornell University Press, 1986, p.19. 11- Lieven, Dominic Empire, the Russian Empire and its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the Present, John Murray, London, 2000, p. 292. 12- Fowkes, Ben The Disintegration of the USSR: A Study in the Riseand Triumph of Nationalism, 1997, p.194

13- Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991, 1994, p.422