Vatican II and Culture

How Culture Mattered at Vatican II: Collegiality Trumps Authority in the Council's Social Movement Organizations Author(s): Melissa
J. Wilde Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 576-602 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593066 . Accessed: 27/09/2013 03:11
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atVatican HowCulture Mattered II:

in the Council's TrumpsAuthority Collegiality SocialMovement Organizations
Melissa J. Wilde
Indiana University The overwhelminglyprogressive outcome of the Second VaticanCouncil in the Roman Catholic Church (1962 to 1965) changed Church doctrine on everythingfrom the Latin mass to nuns' habits to openness to otherfaith traditions. This article examines a cause of this outcome by analyzing the informal organizations activist bishops built during the Council. Progressives' and conservatives 'cultural understandings of authority determined what type of organization they built as well as how effectively that organization helped them to address their concerns. Progressives believed in the doctrine of "collegiality," that bishops convening together are as infallible as the Popea doctrine conservatives saw as threatening the primacy and authority of the Pope. Consequently, while progressives built a highly effective, consensus-based organization as soon as the Council began, conservatives were much slower to mobilize and, when they did so, formed a hierarchical organization that proved to be much less effective. Most studies of social movements do not havefaith in the effectiveness of the progressives 'consensus-based organization, which have typicallyfound such organizations to be inefficient and subject to breakdowns. This study suggests that organizational effectiveness depends in part on how well activists 'cultural understandings mesh with the environmentin which they are enacted.
The was a watershed event in the history of
Second Vatican of 1962to 1965 Council
RomanCatholicism of because of the multitude changes it broughtabout.VaticanII ended the Latin mass; sent nuns from their cloisters and into the world;relaxeddietaryrestrictions, confessional obligations,and service attirefor the laity; relinquishedthe Church'sclaim of being
the one truechurch;andofficially renounced its claims to power in relation to nation-states. Though sociologists have examinedthe extensive effects of Council reforms (e.g., Dillon 1999; Greeley 1998; Casanova1994; Finkeand Stark1992; Smith 1991), few studieshavetried to understand how they came about.1This article demonstrates thatmuch of VaticanII'spro-
Direct all correspondence to Melissa Wilde, Ballantine Hall 744, 1020EastKirkwood Avenue, Bloomington, IN, 47405-7103 (mwilde@ The author thanksthe threeanonyindiana.edu). mousASRreviewers, Elizabeth Gene Armstrong, Burns,Rocco Caporale, AnthonyS. Chen,Tom Gieryn,AndrewGreeley,Mike Hout,the Junior atIndiana Faculty University, Working Group Joseph IsaacMartin, Komonchak, MaryEllenKonieczny, David JimNelson, Francesca Nelson, Meyer, Shelley Ann Polletta,Rob Robinson,Brian Steensland, Pam KimVoss, Walters and Swidler, Viscelli, Stephen
wassupported Jane Zavisca. Thisresearch byIndiana Research NSF an SSSR Award, University, Grant(SES-0002409), Dissertation Improvement anda Charlotte Dissertation Writing W.Newcombe YearFellowship. The opinions, findings,andconclusions inthisarticle aretheauthor's and expressed do notnecessarily reflecttheviews of theNational ScienceFoundation. book(1964) is RoccoCaporale's 1An exception basedon interviews with80 of the mostimportant Whilehistranscripts werean leaders of theCouncil. datasourceforthisarticle,he couldnot important
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gressive outcome can be explainedby a simple sociological fact: progressives built a more extensive, flexible, and creative organization thantheirconservativecounterparts, becauseof which they were better able to mobilize the majorityof voting bishops to supportprogressive causes.2 Theseorganizational derivedfrom differences of the locus of differentculturalunderstandings authority in the Roman Catholic Church. Progressiveshad a deep belief in collegiality,a doctrinethatposits thatthe bishops, when convened as a council, are as infallibleas the Pope. Because of this, progressivesbuilt a consensusbasedorganization thatwas well-suitedto developing compromisesthat could be championed by their heterogeneouspopulationof potential In contrast,conservatives'rejection supporters. of collegiality preventedthem from communicating with the majorityof the bishops, much less from developing compromises. These findingsarecontrary to whatwouldbe predictedby an examinationof the two groups' resourcesat the beginningof the Council,or by many studies of consensus-based organizing (e.g., Freeman 1970; Epstein 1991; Stevens 2001). This suggests that consensus-based organizationsare not necessarilyineffective or thateffectivenessdepends inefficient,butrather on the fit between activists' cultural understandings and the environment in which the organizationis enacted.
development of LiberationTheology in Latin America (Smith 1991); as an importanttheological resource for progressive Catholics in the United States (Dillon 1999; Burns 1992); and a reason why the Churchbegan to more actively engage in public debatesover war and peace, capitalism,and economic redistribution (Casanova 1994; Burns 1990). Practically,the Council liberalizeda wide varietyof religious practices, such as dietaryrestrictionsand marriage annulment procedures (Wilde 2001), changes that some theoristsarguehave created a less involved laity (Finke and Stark 1992; Sengers 2003). To appreciate VaticanII just how remarkable was, one must understandthat no one expector even hopedfor what ed, could havepredicted, came fromthe Council.Councilsarerareevents, called only by the Pope, occurring less than once every century.The Church'slast council beforeVatican II was Vatican I, whichendedprein 1869 as a result of the Francomaturely Prussianwar.VaticanI did little of note besides declaringpapal infallibility.Priorto VaticanI, the Church had not held a council since the CouncilofTrentclosed in 1563 (Bellitto2002). Councils such as Vatican II are officially called "ecumenical councils" because they involve the entireepiscopate:all of the bishops, cardinals, heads of religious orders, and thereferredto as ologians of the Church(hereafter bishops). Duringcouncils, the episcopategathers together,discusses issues of concern,drafts ABOUTVATICAN II statements,and eventuallyvotes on whetherto In the case of VaticanII, ratifythose statements. By December8, 1965, afterthreeyearsof delibit took four years of preparationsafter John erations, Vatican II turned the Church on its XXIII announcedthere would be a council for head. A wide variety of sociological studies the 3000 membersof the hierarchy to gatherin demonstratedthat VaticanII had far-reaching Rome. Approximately2,200 bishops voted on effects on the doctrine,practices, identity,and one vote, but over the four years of the any strengthof RomanCatholicism.Politically,the Council almost 3,000 bishops participated Council was cited as a central factor in the because of illness, death and replacement. During the first stage of those preparations, Pope JohnXXIII asked all of the Churchleadtheoutcome of theCouncil because it was examine ers to write downtheirconcernsand send them stillunfolding whenhe conducted his interviews. to theVatican. Theirletterswerethencondensed, 2NotallCouncil decisions wereprogressive (birth and categorized, givento committeesthatdevelordination andwomen's control, priest celibacy, poliabbreviated statements of the Church's oped I cies wereallunchanged Vatican by II).Elsewhere, stance on the issues raisedin the letters.On the some others examine reforms and failed. why passed Inbrief, a result surface, the plan seemed fair and efficient. werelargely priorities progressives' and Powell of isomorphic pressures 1983) Ratherthanarrivingin Rome in a stateof mass (DiMaggio to bringing the Roman Catholic connected Church confusion, the bishops would come having intotheEcumenical movement (Wilde, forthcoming). alreadyread documentsthatprovidedthe plat-
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form for the Council debates; and they could amend or approve the documents and return home within a few months. committees' docHowever,the preparatory uments derailed Council preparations, and resulted in a Council that lasted three years, thana few months.The committeeswere rather comprised "entirely of acknowledged curialists" (Alberigo and Komonchak 1995:95), meaning members of the Roman Curia-the Vatican offices that govern the worldwide Church (Huebsch 1996:75)-and their allies. These individualswere, by virtue of theirposiinvestedin keeptionsas Church administrators, as possible.Rather as unchanged ing the Church thanassessing the possibilities for the Council, documents reassertedChurch the preparatory those who hadpublicly doctrineandcondemned it (Alberigo and Komonchak questioned 1995:166).3 thoughconservativesseemedconIronically, fident because of this advantageat the startof the Council, it proved to be their downfall. Whenprogressive bishopsreceivedthe preparatory documents, they were dismayed, finding that many of their ideas had been condemned or simply ignored,andthey moved quicklyduring the very first day of the Council to counteract this conservative direction. In a tumultuousfirst few weeks, these progressives succeededin changingthe courseof the Council and building an organizationalstructurethat would serve them well throughout the three years and four sessions of the Council. When it was over, the Council resulted in a wider variety of reforms than had ever been envisionedat its start.By comparingthe informal organizationsprogressives and conservatives built at the Council, this article provides one important piece of the puzzleaboutwhy and how thathappened.Of course,when examining an institutionlike the Roman Catholic Church anda politicalprocessas complex as VaticanII, it wouldbe simplisticto arguethatthe outcome of the Council can be attributed solely to organizational differences between two informal
groups of activist-orientedbishops. I examine otherimportant factorselsewhere(WildeforthWilde et al. 2003). Nonetheless,I argue coming; that despite these other factors, the organizational differencesexaminedin this articleprovided progressive bishops with resources far andwithoutthesedifto conservatives', superior have had a less revwould Vatican II ferences, outcome. olutionary Before proceeding with this argument,two common alternativeexplanationsfor the progressive outcome of the Council need to be addressed.The first has to do with the role of the Pope in promotingthese changes. There is no questionthat,because it takes a Pope to call a council, Pope John XXIII is an essential part of why VaticanII happenedat all. The progressive natureand agendaof the Council was, to a large extent, due to his openness. In the terms of studentsof social movements,Johnprovided the "politicalopportunity" necessaryfor any reformsto occur. Nonetheless, while necessary, John's openness cannotexplainthe outcomeof the Council. John died just weeks before the second of the fourCouncilsessionswas to start,afteronly one of the hundredsof reformsthat came fromthe Council had passed. The vast majorityof progressive reformsthatresultedfromthe Council were finalized under John's much more conservative successor, Pope Paul VI.4 But, like John, Paul's decision to continue the Council to was essentialto its occurrenceand,therefore, its ultimatelyprogressiveoutcome. In additionto calling a Council and keeping it going, the Popehadthreeways he could direct the Council,the the Council.At anypointduring Pope could mandatethat an issue be discussed or removed from discussion. Paul used this option twice, by removing birth control and priestly celibacy from the Council's agenda, bishops'stateddesires despitemanyprogressive to reform the Church'slaws on these matters. Second, once a documentwas approvedby the Council, the Pope had "veto" authority. He could mandate that the drafting committee
3Another wasthatthebishop's responsproblem andconsisted es (calledvota)werefarfromcandid to takepartin the Council mostlyof declarations Komonchak and Komonchak 1995:108, (Alberigo 1994).
4 Accusedof havinga "Hamlet-like complex" the"Pope of December 6, 1963)andnamed (Time, "more timVIwasgenerally buts" bythepress,Paul XIII(Rynne andcautious" than John orous 1968:430, 287).
HOWCULTURE ATVATICAN MATTERED II
579
amendany document,as Paul did most notably by qualifyingthe Council'sstatementon collegiality during the Third Session (Rynne1968: 406).5 Finally,the Pope could simply drafthis own statements or encyclicals on any matter with which he disagreedwith the Council.Paul did so in relationto the highly contentiousissue of the VirginMary (discussed below) by referring to her in a speechclosing the ThirdSession in terms progressivebishops had successfully kept out of Council documents (Rynne 1968: 2000: 332). 425, 444; AlberigoandKomonchak Thus,therewere a numberof ways the Popes played a causal role in the Council: by calling and continuing it; allowing or preventingdiscussion of certain issues; mandating amendments to Council documents;and writingtheir own documentsor speeches on occasion. But, the Popes'role shouldalso not be overstated, at the riskthatthis analysisbe turnedinto a "great man" theory of history. There were few momentswherePaul actively intervenedin the more Council,thoughhe mighthave intervened often if he had not felt thatthis wouldjeopardize the Council and his authority(each of his interventions met with strong reactions from progressives). If Paul had intervened more actively undoubtedlythe Council would have been less progressive,not more. Therefore,the Popes are a necessary, but insufficient explanation for the overwhelmingly progressiveoutcome of the Council. Their actions (or lack thereof)duringthe Council cannotexplainwhy the majorityof bishops decidedto vote forprogressive reform. Alternatively, perhapsthe majorityof bishops were discontentedprogressiveswho seized the political opportunity posed by the Council to addressissues of concern, and thus, no further examinationof organizationaldifferences is necessary? The terms progressive and conservativeareused in this articleas shorthand for to with general openness change, progressives
being much more so than conservatives.The majorityof Council statementswere ultimateby landslidevotes, a fact which, on ly approved the surface,suggests overwhelmingsupportfor progressive causes. However, to use the progressive resultof the Councilvotes as evidence of a cause of their outcome is misleadingfor a numberof reasons. First, Rocco Caporale's (1964) interviews with bishops reveal thatwhen the Council was called, even the most powerful bishops who would rise to prominence once the Council beganexpectedlittle-often statingthatthey had expectedthe Councilto simply "rubber-stamp" the Curia'sviews. It took action on the part of progressiveleaders for any bishops to be convinced that real changes could result from the Council (Wilde forthcoming). Second, though most Council issues passed with overwhelming support, several votes demonstratethat the bishops did not all arrive readyfor change. Forexample,on the first vote on the Blessed Virgin Mary,the bishops were almostevenly divided;the progressiveswon by only 40 votes of approximately2200. By the time of the final vote on Mary, two-thirdsof those who voted conservativelythe first time switched to the progressiveside. Third,even amongbishops with a decidedly outlook, there was greathetero"progressive" geneity at the startof the Council.As the most important"masterframe"(Snow and Benford 1992) among progressivesbecame improving relations with Protestants,it became evident that many progressive bishops (particularly LatinAmericans)had difficulty embracing this framebecause they were experiencingincreasmissionariesin ing competitionfromProtestant theircountries(Wildeforthcoming). Without the open debate and compromise that occurred withinthe progressives'organization examined the Council's outcome could have been here, different much and more conservative than very it was. DATA AND METHODS The story presentedhere is aboutthe informal groupsboth sides builtto bolster theirinterests once the Council began.The progressiveswere a group of 20 or so bishops who met weekly at the hotel called the Domus Mariae (House of Mary,DM hereafter).The conservativeswere
did so withenough (muchof whichwas ambiguity a resultof thesequalifications) to appease conserThisoccurred after vatives. both of the long organiherewerecreated, zationsexamined andthus,long aftertheirdisparate viewsof collegiality are (which in detail haddetermined their examined below) orgaandtactics. nizational forms,strategies,
5 In the end,the Councilvalidatedcollegiality,but
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the far less successful group of approximately 10 to 16 conservative"Councilfathersandtheologians" (Perrin 1997:179-80; Alberigo and Komonchak 1997:198) known as the Coetus InternationalisPatrum(International Groupof Fathers,CIP hereafter). Because they werenot official organizations, but were formedsolely at the behest of activistorientedbishops,theymost resembletraditional "social movement organizations." Both are widely cited as the most importantof all such groups, mainly because they did not have a regionalor otherwiselimitedfocus (see Alberigo and Komonchak 1997:194-221 about other informalgroups at the Council).6 The data for this study came from a variety of primaryand secondarysources.The firstprifrom interviews mary datasourceis transcripts with 80 of the most importantleaders at the Council. The interviews were conducted by Rocco Caporale (1964) for his dissertation researchin sociology at ColumbiaUniversityin 1962. Beginningwith obviousleaders,Caporale asked his respondentsto identify five of the most important people at the Council. He stoppedsnowballsamplingafter80 interviews, whenno new nameswerebeing volunteered. By the leadersof the Council,Caporale interviewing interviewed overhalf of the membersof the DM leadersof the CIP.7 and two important thatCaporale's The descriptions respondents and its connections to other DM of the gave organizationsat the Councilwere invaluablein piecing this story together,as was the second source of primarymaterials:archivalmaterials which include formal fromboth organizations, minutesfrommeetings,variouscorrespondence, When gatherpetitions, and otherdocuments.8
ing these materials,I also focused on leaders, because doing so allowed me to obtain all of their availablepersonalcorrespondence. This focus on leaders admittedlyoverlooks thebeliefs, activities,andopinionsof the roughly 3,000 "rankand file" bishops who ultimately decidedthe outcomeof Councilreformswith theirvotes. I remedythisproblemthrough analyses of Council votes that I obtained from the VaticanSecretArchiveandenteredintoan electronic database.The voting data identify individualbishops, theirdioceses, andtheirvote on 10 of the most contentiousCouncil reforms(3 of which are examinedhere). With these dataI assess national trends that were previously obscuredbecause the Vaticanonly made summaries of the votes availableto the public.
EFFECTIVENESS ORGANIZATIONAL ATVATICAN II AND CULTURE

ories of social movementsare most relevantto the specific groupsexaminedhere.Thisis mainly becausethe sociology of religion, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Chaves 1997; Finke 2004; Smith 1991;Wuthnow1994;Zaret1985), does not often explain religious change as a dependentvariable.Instead,it focuses on religion's effects on othervariables,or on religious growth, decline, or individualparticipationas a dependent variable. Such studies, though important,do little to help us understandthe resources,forces, andmobilizaorganizational tion effortsinvolvedin an eventlike theCouncil. ThoughVaticanII is obviouslydifferentfrom traditionalsocial movements,I am not the first to noticethe importance religiousorganizations have had for many social movements (e.g., Morris 1984; Zald and McCarthy1987; Smith 1996a and 1996b;Wood2002; Young2002); to use social movementtheoryin relationto pressuresfor change withinreligious organizations (e.g., Wood and Zald 1966) or the Roman CatholicChurchspecifically (e.g., Katzenstein Vatican 1998; Smith 1991); or to characterize
thethisis a caseof religiouschange, Though
6 Forassessments of the DM see
et al. Alberigo
2000:61-62; Caporale 1964:72-73; Grootaers 1981:133-65; Laurentin 1966:43-44; Noel 1997;
Forassessments of the CIPsee Wiltgen1967:129.
Alberigoet al. 2000:170-75; Laurentin1966:39-41; Perrin1997;Wiltgen1967:148-50,274-78, 235-52. 7 While Caporale'ssample seems to have been representativeof conservatives, he seems to have a summary of the way I haveabbreviated my citations over-sampledprogressiveleaders. For more details were The archivalmaterials of the archivalmaterials. see Table 1 in the ASR Web site supplement in Latin,French,Italian, Portuguese English,German, (http://www.asanet.org/journals/asr/2004/toc040.html) and Spanish. Whenever possible, I cite secondary to this article. sourcesthatcan be found in English, along with the 8 Descriptionsand addressesof the archivescited in the articlecanbe foundin theAppendix,alongwith primarysources I used.
ATVATICAN HOWCULTURE II MATTERED
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II as a social movement(e.g., SeidlerandMeyer 1989). The story presentedhere demonstrates thatthoughthe Councilwas not a case of grassroots mobilization,it was a case whereactivistoriented bishops attemptedto, and eventually did, radically change their institution.In fact, cite VaticanII as an important manyresearchers resourcefor,andevenpartialcause of, moretraditional social movements which took place afterthe Council(e.g., Tarrow1988: 286; Ganz 2000: 1036). In this sense, VaticanII is a clear case of the "contentiouspolitics" (McAdam, Tarrow,and Tilly 2001) that social movement theorists seek to explain, and I will show that social movement theories may benefit from a systematic study of the factorsthat explain the progressiveoutcome of the Council. Social movementtheoryhelps us understand many aspects of the Council. For example, the DM was far more successful than the CIP at populationof bishmobilizing a heterogeneous ops to supporta variety of causes, despite the factthatmanybishopsinitiallyspokewith reluctance or suspicion in regardsto the DM agenda. The DM was more successful at "framing" theirissues in termsthata wide varietyof bishops could support(Snow et al. 1986). In contrast, conservatives failed to ever develop an framethatthe majorityof bishops over-arching could support,and were left drawingon different populationsof bishops from issue to issue. Recent developments in social movement the theory also help sociologists to understand success of the DM andpointto reasonswhy they had a far greater"strategiccapacity"than the CIP (Ganz 2000). In his study of the Farm WorkersMovement,Ganz (2000:1005) argues the following: if a leadership team is greater Strategic capacity andweak insiders andoutsiders, includes strong network ties, andaccess to diverse,yet salient, of collectionaction,and also if an repertoires conducts regular, open,authoritative organization conresources frommultiple draws deliberation, in thoseconandrootsaccountability stituencies, stituencies. The analyses presentedin this article demonstratethatthe DM encompassedvirtuallyall of these factors, and the CIP,almost none. In her study of six social movementorganiPolletta(2002) finds definite zations,Francesca to or what she consensus-based, advantages calls "participatorydemocratic,"organizing.
She argues that a focus on the deliberative process allows groupsto build leaders,be more tactically innovative,own the decisions of the group, and create group solidarity.The analysis here highlightsthe fact thatone of the greatest strengths of the DM was their focus on consensus-buildingand communication. When the Council opened in 1962, few thatan informal observerswouldhavepredicted of organization progressive bishopswouldprove to be far more successful than an organization of conservative bishops with close alliances with the Curia.Indeed,in many ways this case thatresources arenot the sole explanaillustrates tory variable for social movement success. Activistsuse "modelsof action"(Polletta 2002), 2002a), "cultural "politicallogics"(Armstrong toolkits" (Swidler 1986; 1995), "repertoires" (Clemens 1993; Swidler 2001), or "schemas" (Sewell 1996) which are availableand familiar (c.f. Stevens 2001), and these ideas andbeliefs hold explanatorypower (Weber 1978 [1956]). that This studyof the DM andCIPdemonstrates more thanany othervariable(resources,status, prestige, etc.), whatexplains the type of organization each group built, and therefore ultimatelytheireffectiveness,was deeplycultural.9 These culturaldifferenceshinged aroundeach groups' view of the locus of authorityin the Church. COMPETINGVIEWS OF AUTHORITYIN THE ROMAN CATHOLICCHURCH Progressiveandconservativebishopswere able to hold very differentopinions on the natureof authoritybecause the Church'sstance on the TheFirstVatican issue was officiallyundecided. Council (1869-1870) closed prematurelyby the Franco-Prussian war (Huebsch 1997:215)
9 I use culture hereto referto boththereligious as wellas the beliefsheldby thesereligious leaders, worldviews andunderstandings of the quitedifferent Tosomeextent, Church theseimplied andsupported. thesemapalongnational lines,andso also encombelow Analysispresented pass nationalcultures. hada direct that national cultures infludemonstrates ence becausebishopsfromItalyand Spainwere intheiroutlooks whencomdecidedly anti-collegial paredto bishopsfromFranceand LatinAmerica to favor whotended associational orcollegial models of authority.
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with the declarationof Papal infallibility as its primary accomplishment. Papal infallibility refersspecifically to doctrinalstatementsmade by the Pope,which,morethanbeing considered exemptfromerror,aretechnicallyexempteven "from the possibility of error"(The Catholic Encyclopedia 1908 [2003]; McCarthy 1994:120-25). The doctrineof PapalInfallibilityis not withAt the time it was promulgatout controversy. ed, critics argued that "neither a fallible individualnor a collection of fallible individuals can constitute an infallible organ" (The CatholicEncyclopedia1908 [2003]). Most analysts agree that had Vatican I continued, the Churchwould have produceda corresponding doctrinal decree that would have augmented the doctrine of Papal infallibility by asserting that the college of bishops, when acting as a body, were just as infallible as the Pope. However, without any corresponding decree aboutthe importanceof the college of bishops, the Curia focused on the primacy of the Pope and his infallibility in the century between VaticanI and II (Pottmeyer1998). This accentuation of papalprimacyandinfallibility was of great concern to progressives. Augmentingthe doctrineof infallibilitywith a decree about the importanceof the college of bishops, or collegiality,thus became an important issue on the progressive agenda at the Council, and therefore an issue that came to deeply concern conservatives (Wenger 1996:118). The sides were dividedby one simple question:Was the doctrine of collegiality, which in essence statesthatwhen actingtogether,the bishops also have ultimateauthorityand are infallible, legitimate Roman Catholic doctrine?Did it, in some way,hinderor qualify the primacyandinfallibilityof the RomanPontiff? The DM and the CIP had sharply differing beliefs aboutthe answerto this question. IN COLEGIALITY DM's BELIEF THE Early in the Council, the DM wrote the following petition, demonstratingthat they saw collegialityas a centralpriorityfor the Council: Council Fathers of theecumenical Theundersigned thatthe of Vatican II, takinginto consideration ithaddefined the after of theVatican, firstCouncil andinfallibility of theRoman Pope, partprimacy beenableto dealwiththe oried without having of the of theBishops,successors gin andpowers
of theorigin findthatthedetermination Apostles, is of special for andpowers of bishops importance to be dealtwith of other thediscussion questions ... [We that the therefore] propose bytheCouncil. be studied anddecided schema[on collegiality] uponfirst.10 Thoughprogressiveswere successful in ensuring a vote on Collegiality during the Second Session, which did pass with majoritysupport, the DM was not happy with how the drafting the issue afterthe votes. committeesummarized They noted the following: whatthey theFathers keenlyexpressed Although to collegiality, these[progressive felt... inregards in the least views]havestill notbeenconfirmed
.... fortheyconsidto theend, thatwe mustproceed that hasbeen ercollegiality tobe,asitwere,a truth demonstrated andestablished.11 Already acting collegially, DM memberswere distressedwhen theirviews of collegialitywere not initially incorporatedinto Council documents. When it became clear that the Council would come out with an acceptablestatement, the DM noted,"Everyone rejoicesat the thought that this decree of greatest importancewill be promulgatedby the most Holy Father."12 ABOUT THECIP's SUSPICIONS COLLEGIALITY in the [official Council] text. Not a few deem
In contrast to progressives' strong prioritization of collegiality, conservatives (especially those involved in the CIP) adamantlyopposed the less-hierarchicalview of the Churchpromoted by the doctrine.Indeed, in the minutes from the first official CIP meeting, CIP theologian Berto stated that the group'sprimary to purposewas to formand support"opposition the idea of collegiality ... adoptingas a banner the defense of the rightsof the SupremePontiff and,secondarily,those of each individualbishop."(Perrin1997:177) "colCIPfounderBishopCarlitold Caporale,
legiality ... unless we define it properly it is
going to be a terribleheadachefor futurecouncils and theologians. ... They say they don't
want to define new dogmas and here they are defining a new dogma of the utmost conse-
10 ISREA 1.5.11. Undated. Petition onCollegiality.
8, 1963,PC. 5:2,November 11DM Minutes

12 DMMinutes
1, 1965,PC. 3:4,October
HOWCULTURE MATTERED ATVATICAN II
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quences. What is this?" (CTC). Another CIP founder, Brazilian Archbishop Geraldo de ProengaSigaud,gave a forceful speech against the doctrine of collegiality prior to the first votes on the issue duringthe Second Session. When his speech failed to convince the majority of bishops to vote against collegiality, CIP leaders were dismayed. Cardinal Siri, a conservative Italian and key ally of the CIP,had harsh words about those first votes on collegiality. He told Caporalethe following: Thefamous voteon collegiality is notvalidandI it to themandto the Pope.... I felt haveproved likewalking moderators [up]to thefour[Council] andtear[ing] theIBM[punch] cardrightin their faces.... Ofcourse, I votednoandmake nosecret aboutit. (CIC6)
and build and enact very different organizations--one of which was much bettersuited to a Council environment.
THE DoMus MARIAE

As the Council opened amid uncertaintyand with conservative preparatoryschemas as its only guide, two Latin American leadersl7and a few progressive French bishops decided to createan organization thatwould allow them to communicate with all the bishops present at the Council. French theologian Roger Etchegaray (1995), who would become the DM's secretary,told the story of this decision years later: CardinalLienart[a prominentand important French asked me attheopening of the progressive] to make"useful contacts" withbishops Council, of othercountries. Therehadbeen littlemutual andmeetings wereevenupto thatpoint contact, discouraged byRome. bythe .... Thus,stimulated twobishops I metthefirstevening Larrain (Manuel and Helder Camara,both vice-presidentsof CELAM [the Latin American Episcopal Conference])....I was so boldas to invitea few for an bishops,as I metthem,to meetregularly of the exchangeof views on the proceedings Council. (p. 293)
Letters from Berto to Carli referred to the votes as "disastrous," "peculiar,"13 "unhappy," and to the doctrine "hasty"and "secretive,"14 itself as a "false question" that rejects "the divine rights of the Roman Pope," as "that and unrealistic... pseudo-theology," detestable, as "bad faith" that is "refutedby the Sacred Scriptures,the Teacher,Tradition,'theological reason'-common sense itself."5 His primary concern was collegiality's threatto the primacy of the Pope. Less thana week afterthe votes, Berto wrote Carlithe following: Fromthe beginning,theirstrategywas to assess the concerns of bishops from diverse places The "so-calledcollege" (at least as it is now is "deadly" forthe... Pope,forit shatters and develop an organization with, and platargued) his Fatherhood. .... If the Popealoneis the head forms from, which to best addressthem. of the Churchbecause he is the head of the of Bishops," thenthetrueSovereign of "College THE DM'sSTRATEGY: BUILDING COLLEGIALITY theChurch is thatCollege.... I consider thisview CONSENSUS to be false... logically... theverynameof "Holy THROUGH whichwas granted to the Pope,is not Father," Early in the Council, Helder Camara told thetrue"Holy Father" is the"College of befitting; Caporale,"Mydreamis the formationof a colBishops!"'16 of bishopsatthenationaland legial organization These competingviews aboutthe natureofjust international level" (CTT).Theirbeliefs in colauthoritywithin the Churchled the two groups of bishops to develop very differentstrategies, 17 Latin American leaders werecentral to Though theDM'sformation, structure andsuccess andthereoutcome of theCouncil, byto theprogressive explanations forandassessments of theCouncil seemto havesuffered from a "First World" bias.Thebishops and theologians who are notedfor theircontributionsto theCouncil aremainly Northern Europeans. Thisanalysis thatthattheLatin American suggests leadersManuelLarrain and HelderCamara were to theprogressive outcome of the just as important Council.
13 Berto to Carli, 11, 1964, January 1 andJanuary
ISR (FCrl 15.32).
1963,ISR(FCrl15.31). 1, 1964(FCrl15.32), 15Bertoto Carli,January 9 andNovember December 13, 1963(FCrl15.31), March13,1964, ISR(FCrl17.1). 16 Bertoto Carli, November 6, 1963,ISR (FCrl
15.3).
14 Bertoto Carli, December 9 andNovember 13,
584
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
legiality had importantstrategicand organizational implicationsfor the DM. Takento a practical level, those who believedin the doctrineof collegiality saw consensus-building, creating knowledgeable bishopswho were in agreement, as a holy enterprise. The agendafor theirthirdmeeting statedthat the members would discuss "what is felt by anyone concerningthe meetings in the Domus Mariae and what results are expected from Rather than coming together with a them."'18 concrete agenda, the progressiveswho started the DM seemed open to figuring out the best course of action, form, and function of their group. In effect, they decided to create a "participatory democracy"(Polletta 2002) within structure the hierarchical andnon-democratic of the Churchthat seems to have lasted throughout the Council.At the beginningof the last sessent this flyerto the members: sion, Etchegaray It seems thatit wouldbe very useful for us to resumeour weeklymeetings withoutdelay.We meettogether shalltherefore as onein theDomus 17th1965,at5 p.m. Mariae, Saturday, September Thereis a sufficientvarietyof quesprecisely. at thebegintionsthatseemto require discussion Weintend to listthemandto ningof thissession. a better devise andhelpeachother.19 wayto inform The DM ensured that they would be able to "informand help each other"by attemptingto generateconsensuson the issues they were discussing, with the minutes often noting that a decision or opinionhad been expressed"unanimously."20This focus on consensus was vital to the DM because of the complex, but highly effective, organizationalform within which it arose. THE DM'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:USING EPISCOPAL CONFERENCES The linchpinof the DM's organizationwas the organizations of the bishops' episcopal, or national,conferences (AlberigoandKomonchak 1997:207-209). Episcopal Conferences(ECs)
generally consisted of all of the bishops and membersof the hierarchyin a given country,or even continent (whichat the timeof Councilwas the case with the CELAM), who met annually to discuss issues of common concern to the Churchandnationor region.Thoughthe extent to which each EC was organized,and the frequency with which they met varied,they provided a natural solution and pre-existing organizationalstructurefor the DM's conflicting desires to communicatewith the bishops at the Council openly,but subtly and within limited time.21 ECs were importantto the DM in a number of ways. When the Council began, ECs were inchoate; most were not recognized by the Vatican,and some countriesdid not even have one (Caporale1964:51;Komonchak1989;Noel 1997:95). This changed during the first few weeks of the Council,22when ECs were officially given the function of nominatingcandidates for the Council commissions (c.f. Grootaers 1981:134; Komonchak 1989) and in laterCouncilschemas was further crystallized and Komonchak 2000:466-71). The (Alberigo Council'sapprovalof ECs helped the DM gain validity, just as preexisting ECs, especially CELAM, provided organizationalmodels or repertoires(Clemens 1993 and 1997; Polletta 2002) for the group (c.f. Grootaers1981:136, n. 6; Falconi 1964:343). Furthermore,ECs were seen as a way of enactingcollegiality.So, while thebishopsfrom France and CELAM (who founded the DM) hadbeen meetingin theirconferencesfor years, the bishops fromItaly (who were infamous for their rejectionof collegiality) neverhad a conference meeting until after the Council began and it was mandatedby the Pope. Just as conservativessaw collegiality as threatening to the primacy of the Pope, they saw conferences of of the Pope as bishops acting "independently" heretical. ECs became an Thus, potentially
18DMMinutes 2:1,November 13, 1962,PC. 19Flyer of Delegates fromECs," titled,"Meeting Fourth Session,PC. 20Forexample, see DM Minutes 2:1, November 13, 1962,PC.
21 Themethod of appointing a DMrepresentative seemsto havevaried witheachEC,withsomesimorbeinginvited because of network plyvolunteering andothers elected connections, bytheirconference. 22Brouwers notesthatthenumber of ECswhich existedandbegan to meetregularly almost doubled, fromforty tomorethan of thecourse seventy, during theCouncil c.f. Noel 1997:96). (1993:360;
HOW CULTURE ATVATICAN MATIERED II 585

United Ireland
Ja~n Oceania Greatr

Bel ium
Phil p pines
Britain
3
Germanydci
59
ts Domus Mariae Core MembersiBurma
Canada
Inda
80
& Ceylon Vietnam

France
Si
Spain
J
CELAM
50
Eastern Orthodox
Poland
FACE 320
51
Brazil10
167
Argentina
50
Uruguay
7 89dne130
South Africa
1 28
Chile 25
1671
Peru 36
Congo Leon 40
Rhodesia 14
Columb2
54
Vene C
uela
me
Cameroon 8
Mada
24
gascar
53
80
Structure of the DomusMariae: Estimated Numberof BishopsReached Figure 1. The Organizational Weekly 1,800 Approximately
importantresource for the DM that helped to offset conservatives' greater institutional resourcesbecause the CIP avoidedthem. Most importantly, the ECs linkedthe 22 DM to the vastmajorityof bishopsat the members23 Council who would ultimatelydecide the outcome of the Councilwhen issues were voted on in the Council Hall. Figure 124shows an esti23 See the ASR Web site supplementand Table 2 for details on DM members. 24The numbersin Figure 1 representthe number of bishops in each countryat the startof the Council. For more details on the ECs and number and prosee Table3 portionof the episcopatetheyrepresented,
mate of how many and which bishops the ECs helped the DM to reach, including only those ECs that met at least once a week (the vast majoritydid so) or were closely connectedto a DM representative. The DM's wheel-like organizationalstructure allowed them to quickly build consensus about their agenda and strategies in a small group of 22. But the structurealso helped to
in the ASRWeb site supplement.Sources:regarding interviewdata;regardmeetingfrequency, Caporale's ing the numberof potentialvotes for each EC:Acta (Series I, Index, 1960-61:209-406).
586
REVIEW AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
feedback from their ECs, the DM members would be able to provide"suggestionsthat are more thought-through and clear."28 Withregularcontactwith at least 1,800 bishat the DM did nothops, if the ECs represented ing more than meet and inform theirmembers on Council issues, the DM would still have been successful in educatingenoughbishopsto I sendyouthelistof the22 regular ... participants better theirchances when issues came to a vote their ownepisall[ofwhom] more orlessrepresent hadto be approved documents (early by a majoranddegreeof to the structure copacyaccording of the and final doctheir While are conscience" of ity bishops [about1,200], EC. they "collegial at uments needed least two-thirds their in not able to approval naturally engage colleagues reflectthemoregener- [about 1,500]). Yet such a structurewould not debates, theynevertheless andinturn ... report have helped the DM to "develop suggestions al thought of their episcopacy of the Domus thataremore thought-through on all thatis saidin the meetings and clear." To do Mariae. 1981:141) (Quotein Grootaers this, they needed feedback.A centralresource thatensured thatthe DM did get useful feedback Communicationbetween the DM and the ECs was that many ECs tried to reach consensus lasted throughout the four Council sessions. At or at least polled their members themselves, the beginning of the Fourth Session, the DM about Council issues. Their EC's position was of this relatheirimpressions againsummarized then to the DM through their communicated in their minutes: tionship as Bishop DeProvencheres, a representative, Almostallthedelegates havebeenableto consult from France,told Caporale: theirownConferences on a weekly basis,to gath- progressive I wascharged withtheliaison taskwithother ersuggestions thetasksto be accomplished. about epis... First[we]consulted ourselves havesought whodidnotholda meeting, copates. ... Those among ... to decide to takeandwhat whatposition to say fromtheirconthe opinions of several members at theinternational ference.26 (CIC 2) meeting. convey that informationto, and get feedback from,more than 1,800 or two-thirdsof the voters-all within a week.25 Etchegaraydescribedhow he saw the relationshipbetweenthe DM andECs in a letterhe wrote to CardinalSuenens, a prominentprogressive theologian, duringthe First Session: Many of the leaders interviewedby Caporale or told him identified their DM representative thatthey knew someone from their conference was attendingthe DM meetings.The American hierarchyreceived weekly reports from their representative, Bishop Ernest Primeau, who summarized the DM's meetings and recommendationsfor votes or other action. The DM minutesoften closed by statingthatpoints coveredin the report"aresubmittedto the Bishops for study, discussion and decision at the next in the hopes that by getting [EC] meeting,"27 The ECs thatworkedto develop a consensus were also those that believed in collegiality. Bishop Elchinger, a French progressive, told Caporalethat the FrenchEC had "organizeda researchcommitteeof bishopsin orderto study the ways andmeansto realizeandput intopractice the idea of collegiality, and thus, reorganize the EC" (CIC 1). However,even those ECs thatdidnot workfor consensusprovidedimportantinformationfor the DM. DM minutesfrom the Second Session remindedthe participants that: is invited to present observations made Everyone at his own Episcopal Conference, by indicating whatmayor oughtto be emended, as experience 29 hasshown thisto be better. This feedbackfromthe ECs allowedthe DM to developcompromise positionsthattheycould be relatively sure would be supportedby the diverse episcopates they represented.As the DM decided on their agenda and strategies,
25Furthermore, the DM didnot relyunilaterally Session ontheECstructure. theSecond they During to "feel noted that because muchdesired" they"very withother whicharenotrepconnected conferences, strucorwhich "donothavea 'continental' resented," a subcommittee of DM members was going ture,'" to meet to consider the best way to communicate with unrepresented bishops (DM Minutes 2:2 October 11, 1963;PC). 26 DMMinutes 24, 1965, PC. 2:4, September 27 of the DM," to the U.S. Hierarchy "Report 18, 1964(DOH3(5)). September
28DMMinutes 17, 1965,PC. 1:4,September

29DM Minutes 5:2, November 8, 1963, PC.
HOW CULTUREMATTEREDAT VATICAN II
587
each episcopate'srepresentative could communicate these to all of the bishops from their country,gaugetheirreactionsandestimatesupport for progressivereformswhen they came to a vote. The DM benefited not only from its relationship to individual episcopal conferences, but also from strong links between episcopal conferences. Returningto Figure 1, note that Great Britain'srepresentativealso communicated the news to the Irish Episcopate, and communicated to the Germany's representative Austrians,the German-speaking Belgians, and the Swiss.30Two supra-episcopalconferences were crucial in providing both numbers and models for enacting collegial organizationfor the DM: the LatinAmericans,who were organized under CELAM prior to the Council (and whose leaders spearheadedfounding the DM along with the French),andtheAfricanbishops (Federationof AfricanEpiscopalConferences, or FACE)31 who beganmeeting duringthe First Session (Falconi1964:185).Throughthese two organizationsalone, the DM was able to reach approximately870 (or almost 40 percent) of the 2,200 bishopswho couldvote on anyreform. Bishop Blomjous, one of the two FACErepresentativesto the DM, describedto Caporale how FACEworked and its relationshipto the DM: theFederation Westarted of African ECsin order At themeetings to helpthe Council. of the indiwhich vidual conferences we discussed later topics turned is [FACE] upattheFederation [meetings]. a boardof twelvebishopsrepresenting different
Ecs..... Two [Zoaandmyself]actas secbishops retaries. ... Weparticipated atthemeetings of the intercontinental conference attheDomus Mariae, is mutual informaeveryFriday....Thepurpose thesamepeopleparticipate. tion;usually (CIC2) CELAM vice-president and DM founding memberBishopCamara, fromBrazil,was aware of the powerCELAMwieldedwithinthe assembly. He told Caporalethe following: There from arenearly 600bishops South America. ... Wethought, "how canwe carry outthesecontacts andimplement evenafter theCouncil?" them; CELAM. Westarted 2) (CIC Camara thatCELAMprovided other recognized with an of a groups example collegial organizationthatthey mightadoptthemselves,andhe seems to have encouragedbishops from other areas to mimic their organization. He told Caporale, "We hope to form a secretariatfor Asia, to organize the Churchon a continental scale"(CTT).Suchan organization wouldbe in addition to the "friendlyrepresentation of the of the world" whole whom he told bishops were "each week as Caporale alreadymeeting voluntary members" at the Domus Mariae (CTT). The following description of how Camara's EC evaluated support for issues among its membersprovidesa good exampleof how CELAM and FACEcombinedto provide educatedand mobilized bishops for the DM: TheBrazilian mettwicea week.Thefour bishops would andstudy andbrief selections periti analyze A trialvotewould themon whatposition to take.
be takentofeel theattitudeof thecrowdand a deci-
No doubt because of this deliberativeprocess, many council observers felt that CELAM and FACE were "absolutely monolithic" during Council votes, as Bishop Raymond,a progressive from India,told Caporale(CIC 2). Just as the missionary Germanbishops ... and some bishthe DM's focus on consensus-buildingwas a (CIC2). ops fromNordiccountries" resultof theirbelief in collegiality,the focus on 31 FACE used deliberation and wasnotshorthand UnlikeCELAM, democracy within CELAM at thetimeof the Council, butis my ownabbreviaand FACEwere a result of a deep belief in it as 1 showsonlythosecountries tion.Figure mentioned well. CardinalZoa, the other FACErepresenas in byCaporale's respondentsparticipatingCELAM or FACE. For details on CELAM and FACE tative to the DM, told Caporalethat,"Theconsee Table4 in theASRWebsite sup- cept of collegialitywas for me the consecration membership of my most cherished idea .... We felt very plement(http://www.asanet.org/journals/asr/2004/ toc040.html). seriously aboutit" (CIC 7).
30Irish toldCaporale, "We didnot Bishop Conway theinformal attend the bishopsof groupmeetings, England substitutedfor us, and we were kept informed by them (CIC 2). German Bishop toldCaporale, we hada "Each Hengsbach Monday of German and Austrian [and other] meeting Bishops from Switzerland, bishops: German-speaking bishops
sionwouldbemadeas to thetotalvoting trend of theBrazilian CHT, (Guglielmi Episcopate. emphasis added)
588
Their beliefs in collegiality led DM leaders to enacta consensus-based formof participatory where discussed theirconcerns, democracy they listenedto Church leadersfromareaswith problems quite differentfromtheirown, and developed compromise solutions to those concerns in a small groupof 22 bishops. This resultedin a learning experience that DM members felt intellectually and spiritually.The Philippines representativeto the DM, Bishop Olalia told Caporalethe following: I widened I came of ideas. Personally, myhorizons withmy ownlittleideas,thinking thattheywere I sawthatothers thebest.Instead, hadbetter ideas thanI had.(CIC7a) Reflectingon the Council,Bishop Primeau,the US representativeto the DM, wrote the following: Contact withthebishops of theworld haswidened mademe moreappreciative of the my horizons, ideasandproblems of others,moresensitiveto theirneeds,spiritual andmaterial. ... Beforecollegiality[wasformally approved by theCouncil].
... I had alreadyprofoundlyexperienced[it].32
introducedto the strategyand organizationof the CIP. THE COETUS INTERNATIONALIS PATRUM In contrastto the DM, conservativeswere slow to organizeoutsideof the official organizations of the ChurchandCouncil.This hesitationwas in large part due to their already substantial resourcesand access to the centersof power in the Church,the Roman Curiaand the Pope at the startof the Council;and to the overwhelmingly conservative tone of the preparatory schemas distributed at the startof the Council. However,as the Council progressed,and conservative schemas were defeated or watered down time and time again, they grew increasingly alarmed. Sometime early in the Second Session,33 three prominent conservatives, Brazilian ArchbishopGeraldode ProenqaSigaud,French Superior General34 Marcel Lefebvre, and Italian Bishop Luigi Carli, began corresponding with each other and with their personal theologianswith the intentionof slowingdown, if not stopping, the progressive momentumof the Council. This correspondenceprovides an interesting picture of their growing concern, and the strategies these conservative leaders devised and eventually implemented in their organization. CIP STRATEGY Justafterthe SecondSessionbegan,LordBerto, who would eventuallybecome one of the CIP's main theologians, wrote to Carli that he felt sorrow"at the First Session defeat of "dreadful
More than simply a voting machineor political mobilizing structure(though those functions should not be discounted), the DM was, in effect, a school where bishops went to learn about issues and returnedto their episcopates with greaterknowledgeandunderstanding than they had before,andthus, an even deeperbelief in collegiality. In fact, DM member Bishop wrotethatCELAMandthe DM were McGrath, "a formativeschool for our bishops"that provided "a practicallesson" in "episcopalcollegiality" (McGrath 1997:140). As the DM developed their positions, each representative was able to communicatethem to the bishops who were members of their EC sincerely,and help the DM develop and employ effective tactics. These tactics and their successes will be examined in detail below, after the reader is
32 Primeau to Tirot, 4, 1966, PC 21(7). February WhilePrimeau doesnotexplicitly referto the DM, it seemslikely that hewasthinking of it (nowhere else didhe comeintosuchregular anddirect with contact bishopsfromotherpartsof the world),especially sincehe waswriting theletterforpublication-and the DMwascareful to neverreferto themselves by name andKomonchak publicly (Alberigo 1997:208).
of theexact Estimates timeSigaud andLefebvre 33 from thefirst weekof theFirst began strategizing vary Session(Wiltgen 1985:89) to mid-way the through FirstSession(Alberigo andKomonchak 1997:197); butsourcesagreethatSigaud andLefebvre didnot forma group withCarli untilthebeginning officially of the SecondSession(Wiltgen1985:89; Alberigo andKomonchak Perrin 1997:197-98; 1997:175). 34Superior Generals are the headsof religious orders. alsoanarchbishop, wastheSuperior Lefebvre, General of the Holy GhostFathers and (Alberigo Komonchak 1997:197).
ATVATICAN HOWCULTURE MATTERED II
589
the conservative schemas,35complaining that progressives seemed to have a "monopoly"on Council "discourse."36 As the Second Session closed however,Berto began to feel more than He and otherconservasorrowand frustration. tives began to see that their numerous defeats were the result of some kind of progressive organization: "who I cannot a frightening stands avoid question: ... Whois the author behind of this the curtain? Thusit is thatall the textsof colossaldeception? thenew"schemata" havebeenwritten according to ... the "progressive" direction?Is there a donotask theChurch?" I certainly within "mafia" for a responsefromyourExcellence!But, the drive itaway.37 andI cannot is onmymind question
(Alberigo andKomonchak1997:198).Yeteven though they became a full-fledged organization, they never figured out a way to communicate with the majority of bishops at the A cenCouncilwithoutseemingtoo "collegial." tral reason for this failure had to do with the CIP'srelationshipto ECs.
THE CIP's ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: ANTI-COLLEGIAL, SusPICIous OFECS AND ISOLATED
In contrastto the DM, for whom the ECs were essential,the CIPwas not ableto utilize ECs for two reasons. First, the ECs that most closely aligned with the CIP agenda (Italy and Spain) were less effective conferences for such purA few monthslater, just beforetheThirdSession that wrote Carli the was to begin, Berto poses because they were not deliberative. proto "a substantial Second, the CIPhad little contactwith the ECs change gressives' plan impose thatwere deliberative becausethey viewed such of Catholicism"was making"itselfmore manThis created a sense of real ifest each day."38 organizations as a direct threat to the Pope's authority. urgency and alarm among conservatives. The only complete CIP petition left in the Lefebvrewrote Carlijust before the startof the FourthSession: archives, which sought a conciliar condemnation of communism,circulatedtwo weeks into of subversion of Wearefacedwithan enterprise theChurch the Fourth Session (Wiltgen 1967:274). The of a kind that thedoctrine of theChurch itshistory. hasnever seenthroughout Fortunately, petition gives a good indication of the nationalities of CIPsympathizers.40 brave of thefaith.39 Godinspires defenders Thoughthey drew from a wide variety of countries,more than a Conservatives began realizing that their thirdof the 435 signerswere servingin or origschemas were being defeated and their views inally from Italy or Spain. While such support had a plan and ignored,because "progressives" from SpanishandItalianbishops could be seen some kind of organization(whethermafia-like a CIP advantage,characteristics of the ECs as or not) throughwhich to implementthatit. This of countries these hindered communication, to develthemto attempt realization encouraged and thereforeCIP effectiveness. which own with their they op organization, Descriptionsof the Italianand SpanishECs hopedto preventthese changesfrombeing instisuggest that they were far less communicative underthe name tuted.Theyeventually organized or vital thanECsmoreclosely affiliatedwith the Coetus Internationalis Patrum (International DM. In fact, though it was the largestnational Groupof Fathers,or CIP) (c.f. Laurentin1996: conference at the Council, the ItalianEC had 39-40; Perrin 1997: 174-175), hired office never held a meeting with all of the members staff, bought a printing press (Wiltgen 1967: a which led Caporaleto consituation present, 149), and held weekly meetings that were "Prior to clude the Council, the Italian that, attended by a core group of sixteen bishops episcopate,nearly400 strong,hadneverknown what an EC was" (1964:56). Bishop Valerii,an Italian who participated in the DM, told 35 Bertoto Carli, November 13, 1963,ISR(FCrl Caporalethe following:
15.31).
36
Bertoto Carli,November 6, 1963,ISR (FCrl

40 ISR,FSig 3.7. Formoredetailssee Table5 in theASR Web sitesupplement (http://www.asanet.org/ journals/asr/2004/toc040.html).
15.?).
38
37 Berto March ISR(FCrl17.1). to Carli, 13,1964,
ISR(FCrl Berto to Carli, 5, 1964, 15.35). August 39Lefebvre to Carli, 15.2). May3, 1965,ISR(FCrl
59o
TheItalian ECis verydisorganized.... TheItalian I did, didnotmeetmanyforeign bishops. bishops

.... The otherItalians becauseI was hereat the DM.
stayathomeandmeetnobody... TheBrazilians, on the otherhand,are very well organized. ... (CIC1) CIP leader Bishop Carli told Caporale, "The ItalianEpiscopatedelegatedsome participants to otherconferences,but they neverreportedto confirmedCarli's us" (CIC2). Bishop Calabria, impressions: ECswere]a greatdeficienlinksto other [Italian commissions of representatives cy.Weappointed to us buttheynever to other reported episcopates, session ... [and] wenever inourgeneral exchanged ... [or]reported orheard anyreport, impressions alltheECswerecovered by theoretically although ourdelegations (CIC1). Though the SpanishEC, which met at least twice a week, was one of the most active, frequentmeetingswerenot enoughto ensuregood or to generateconsensus.Like communication, the Italiansandunlikebishopsfromothercouninterviewedby tries,none of the four Spaniards Caporalementionedthe DM or their DM repand resentative.When explainingthe structure functionof his EC to Caporale, BishopMorcillo, a progressive Spaniard,told Caporalethe following: Neverdid one bishopspeakfor all the Spanish represenbishops.I did it once,butexaggerated tation,[and]I spokeonlyin thenameof "many" (CIC2) bishops. Spanish The fact thatSpainandItalydidnot achievethis level of consensus (when most other ECs had at least on occasion (Caporale 1964:75-77)) by the Second Session is indicativeof a central weakness of their ECs for the CIP'spurposes. Therewas simply less "exchangingof impressions" (as Bishop Calabriaput it) when they met. were rootedin a central These characteristics ideological characteristic of the Italian and wrote SpanishECs.RecallthatwhenEtchegaray Suenensto attenda DM meetto inviteCardinal ing, he noted that the participants'ability to representtheir episcopacy depended upon the anddegreeof 'collegial conscience'" "structure of their EC (Quote in Grootaers 1981:141). There is no doubtthatthe ItalianEC was foremind when he made that most on Etchegaray's qualification,and that Spainwas close behind.
Simply put, they were suspicious of collegiality. Some indicationsof this arepresentedin the voting data. Of the 408 bishops who voted no on the most progressive statement on collegiality, more than half were from Italy.Italians were infamous for their anti-collegial stances. a progressive fromIndia,told Bishop Raymond, that "with to regard collegiality, we Caporale have mostly Italians against us" (CIC 1). bishops fromItalyand Spainmadeup Together, more than 60 percent the bishops who voted against collegiality (see Table 6 on the ASR Web site supplement, http://www.asanet.org/ though again, journals/asr/2004/toc040.html), bishops from those two countries constituted less than a quarterof the voting bishops. In otherwords,bishops fromItalyand Spainwere two and a half times as likely as their proportion in the episcopate would indicate to vote against collegiality. No other countries came close to such a disproportionate showing. However, and more importantly,conservatives were hurt not only by the fact that the bishops in their sentiment pool (Snow et al. 1986:467) were from less collegial ECs, but CIP members were reluctantto use the structure of the ECs at all because collegiality within ECs was particularlytroublingto them. All three of the CIP leaders made disparaging comments about ECs in and outside of the Council Hall. Lefebvretold an interviewerthat he regardedECs "as a threat to the teaching authority and pastoral responsibility of individual bishops," and referredto the tendency of some ECs to issue joint statementsas "anew kind of collectivism invading the Church" (Wiltgen 1967: 89-90). And duringthe Second Session, the two othermajorCIP leaders,Carli and Sigaud, made formal interventionsin the institutionalization CouncilHall againstfurther of ECs. Carli's primary concern about ECs was their institutionalization of collegiality. Speaking for a number of CIP leaders and sympathizers,41he argued that ECs "should not be based on the supposed principle" of
41 Carlireported thathe spokein the nameof and butAlberigo from various fathers nations," "thirty was that when thelistof signatures Komonchak report andLefebvre it contained checked onlynine:Sigaud n.109). andsevenof theirclosestallies(2000:149
HOWCULTURE ATVATICAN MATTERED II Table 1. Voteson CIPCommunism for Collegiality Petition,by Support
591
Voteon the Fourth Pointon Collegialityb CIPPetition Communisma AskingCouncilto Condemn Conservative Did Not Sign,n 296 Row (%) (17) Column(%) (73) 112 Signed,n Row (%) (33) Column(%) (27) 408 Totals,n Row (%) (19) Column(%) (100) Patrum Note: CIP= CoetusInternationalis a FSig. 3.7, ISR. b SecondSession,October VolumeXX: No. 104. 30, 1963,Suffragationes, Progressive 1492 (83) (87) 225 (67) (13) 1717 (81) (100) Totals 1788 (100) (84) 337 (100) (16) 2125 (100) (100)
collegiality, "even if the 'alleged' collegiality" was approved by the Pope and Council (Alberigo and Komonchak 200: 149-50). Sigaud stated that ECs could limit "the powers of individual bishops" or "even destroy them" (Noel 1997: 113). Despite their negative feelings towardECs, CIP leaders did recognize their utility for any group wishing to communicatewith the "rank and file." Sigaudreportedly wantedto establish a "Conferenceof Presidentsof ECs,"because the CIPwould"gainin vigor andsize he thought if it were based on pre-existing structures" (Perrin 1997:177; Alberigo and Komonchak 1997:197). However, there is no record of Sigaud or any other CIP leader attemptingto with the bishopsthroughthe ECs. communicate It seems they were simplytoo disturbing a form of organizationfor these conservativeleaders. Insteadof using the ECs, CIP leaders communicatedwith what seems to have been only a select few allies. For example, writing to Sigaudjust before the ThirdSession, Lefebvre stated, "I am sending these documents to you with the hope thatwhen possible you will give them to the Councilfatherswho will look upon themfavorably."42 And,just before the startof the FourthSession, Lefebvrewrote Carli: I thinkin addition to ourthreenamesyou could addthatof [three others].... Regarding sending it to the200Fathers whoarenotItalian, I hopethat
you will be able to obtainthe list through [the Cardinal's have secretary] ....They must,I think, kept the namesof those who signedthe documentsat theendof the last[session].43 The CIP'scommentaryon collegiality was disseminatedonly to those they knew to be sympatheticto theircause. Lefebvreclosed the form letter seeming to recognize that such communication was less than ideal, stating: Fathers youmaybe ableto findevenother Perhaps whoagreewiththeseprinciples, andwhowill be ableto undersign themandwhothusmayconfer thegreatest on thispetition. Onthiswe authority congratulate you.44 was Communicating only with sympathizers a flawed strategybecause the CIP often failed to bring their various sympathizerstogether. Table 1 presents a cross-tabulationof bishops who signed the CIPpetition asking the Pope to condemn communismwith the bishops' votes on collegiality. Nearly three-fourths(73%, see column percents) of the bishops who voted conservatively on collegiality did not sign the communism petition, and two-thirds of those who signed the petition voted progressively!In contrastto the DM, who broughtdiversegroupsof bishops theircauses,the CIPwas left togetherto support
42
Lefebvreto Sigaud,August 5, 1964, ISR (FSig
1.9).
43 Lefebvre to Carli, December 27, 1964, ISR (FCrl 15.13). 44 Lefebvreto Carli and other CIP sympathizers, February14, 1964, ISR (FCrl 15.27).
592
fromissue to populations appealingto fractured issue. As a consequence,the CIP'sregular meetings were usually attended by only "five or six Council fathers"and "fourto six theologians." Thoughthey occasionallyopenedtheirmeetings to the generalpublic,the highestturnout reported at any of those meetingswas "eightyCouncil fathers"(Perrin 1997: 179-180). CIP leaders seemed to recognize that their organizational choices had left them isolated. Caporalewrote notes after his interviews summarizing his impressionsof his respondents.Whathe wrote about Carli is fascinating: mewashisgoodsenseof humor, What impressed to talkandhe didso veryextensivehis readiness reacthathe was considered ly, his realization andyethis feelingof doinghis dutyeven tionary, He wasveryopenand at the cost of martyrdom. thathe hadhadveryfew butit wasevident frank, of lifeattheCouncil andwasatthemargin contacts (CTT). Even after the CIP had formed,Sigaud,in a of regstatementthathighlightsthe importance ular feedback to an organization's strategic capacity (Ganz 2000), complainedto Lefebvre that, "Herein Brazil we have little news on the process of [Council] work and for that reason we cannotplan anythingfor the ThirdSession" (quotedin Perrin1997:182). It is hardto imagine a DM membermaking a similar statement at any point during the Council. Indeed, as Sigaud was complainingabouta lack of infordraftmation,the DM was busilycorresponding, Third the for and schemas making plans ing Session. INCOMMON: TACIICS
voted on in intermediatestages, and eventually ratified or not by the more than 2200 bishto both groupsattempted ops. Correspondingly, influence the Council agenda,the membership the tone of docuof the draftingcommittees,45 ments to be voted upon, and the voters. There were two primarytactics used by each groupto achieve these: they wrote and submittedpetitions to the Council moderatorsand the Pope, and authoredamendments(modi) for Council documents which they attemptedto get their supportersto submitalong with their votes. PETITIONS Both the DM and the CIP used petitions, or formal requests to the Pope or Council Moderators,to indicatetheir displeasurewhen an issue had been kept off or removedfromthe Council'sagenda.The DM submitteda number of petitionsoverthe courseof the Council.Their use of petitions illustratesthe advantagesthe ECs gave them, as well as how their views of ECs and collegiality freedthem to employ similar tactics more efficiently than the CIP.For example, during the Third Session, the DM grew concerned that importantschemas were anddebatethey not going to receivethe attention deserved due to time constraints. However, thancirculatea petitionto all of the bishrather ops at the Council, the DM was comfortable of the group,to allowingVeuillot,as moderator write "in the name of the Bishops representing or groupsofECsfrom conferences twenty-seven thefive continents."46 They saw themselves as of almostall the bishlegitimaterepresentatives the Council. at ops In contrast,andbecausethey couldnot stomach such reliance on ECs and were not a collegial organizationthemselves, when the CIP wanted the weight of the entire episcopate behind them, they disseminated petitions to all of the bishops at the Council throughthe
ANDTHEMODI PETTIONs,VOTES
In manyways, especially in theirstrategies,the DM and the CIP could not have been more different.Yetthese differencesshouldnot obscure both held weekly meettheirmany similarities: ings, correspondedbetween Council sessions, consulted theologians and had substantial help, with staff, printingpressadministrative es or organizations willing to print their materials. In additionto these similarities,certainlongCouncilrules dictatedthe tacinstitutionalized to bothgroups.Councildocuments tics available would be drafted by Council commissions,
45In fact,theDM spenta greatdealof timedurconfering the SecondSessionusingthe episcopal to be to compilelists of candidates ence structure their electedto the commissions. categorizes Noel success mostsignificant as "the in thisregard efforts thatwasreported" by theDM (1997:112). 46 Veuillot 14th October to Council Moderators, 1964,ISR(EA5.4).
ATVATICAN HOWCULTURE MATTERED II
593
mail.47Justbeforethe FourthSession, Lefebvre wrote the following to Carli, which illustrates how andwhy they eschewedthe more collegial, and efficient, petitioningused by the DM (c.f. Alberigo and Komonchak1997: 198): thinks[weare]an It is clearthattheHolyFather association or a highly organized organization a thatareenrolled withmembers ..., a Council, this We far from etc. are, however, organpresident, ... now andit seemsto me of littleimport ization whether we havea title thatwe knoweachother, of saying"international or not.Instead meeting" in various Fathers we cansay"some nations." ... What Wehaveno officialorpublicorganization. thesignahas valueonlythrough we do together themto us, whenwe askthem;moreofteneven, theyaskus.48 Theirtwo petitionswerethe only two occasions to communicate duringwhichthe CIPattempted with the entire episcopate (c.f. Perrin 1997: 179). THE MODI Another important tactic employed by both groupswere the modi. When a bishop was voting on Council documents,especially those in theirfinal stages,he hadthreeoptions.He could vote to reject the documentoutright,accept it, or acceptit with certainconditions.These "conditions"were called the "modi,"as the proper term for themwasjuxta modum(or "withmodifications").If more thanone-thirdof the episcopate rejected or submitted modi on a document,the draftingcommittee had to take the bishops' suggestions into account during revision. The DM andthe CIPboth recognized the value of the modi and tried to use them to their advantage. Mobilizing enough bishops to submit modi was an effective tactic for the DM when they risked losing because they could not muster enough votes, when a document was not bad enoughto rejectentirelybutneededrevision,or when they were simply running out of time. DM minutesfromthe FourthSession note modi
tures of the Fathers who are very willing to grant
being preparedon nine separateschemas. The followingpressreleaseis an exampleof how this tactic was effective for the DM: Nov.16--Thiscorrespondent haslearned ROME, thatas manyas 400-if not more--of the 712 affirmative votes with modifications submitted five days ago on the vital Fifth paperof the an identical amendMissionsschemacontained The was recommended amendment ment. by .... North cardinals from South five leading America, andby sixhighrankAfrica andEurope, America, fourof whomare ing bishopsandarch-bishops, of extensiveECs.As a resultof this presidents the received lessthan amendment, [thedocument] two-thirds ballots "yes" necessary straight required, must means thattheMissions Commission which revisethe paperin view of the variousamendmentssubmitted.49 This is only one of many instances where the DM was successful (the schema on missions hadbeen a very contentiousone) butkept their role in the victory obscured, so that not even the conservative authorof the pressrelease seemed awareof the carefulplanningandmobilization behind it. Instead of attributingthe modi to the DM, who were surelybehindthem, he attributed them to the individualefforts of some prominentleaders(all of whom wereDM members)and while an alliance between them on this one issue was obvious, their over-archremained ing agendaand efficient organization behind the scenes. Likethe DM, the CIPgave its membersmodi to submitwhen they were voting on schemas.50 However,becausethey failedto contactbishops beyond those whom they knew to be conservative sympathizers,they alwaysfailed to get the necessary one-third of the bishops to submit modi (c.f. Laurentin1966: 123). The CIP's continued failures on the modi were not, however,due to a lack of conservative sympathizers. Though the Mary petition is estimatethat510 signed incomplete(researchers it [Wiltgen 1967:241], but I found a list with
47 Sigaud to Council anddeCastro Fathers, Mayer 15, 1964.ISR(FSig2.19). September 48 Lefebvre to Carli, 20, 1965,ISR(FCrl August
15.11) French,emphasisadded.
49 Divine Word News Service, Wiltgen, of Propaganda Made Congregation "Composition Precise November More 16,1965 Clauses," By Three (DOH4(13)). see the CIPModion Religious 50 Forexample November 18, 1965(ISRFCrl1.84)orthe Liberty, Toward NonCIPModion "TheChurch's Attitude Christians" (ISRFCrl15.28).
594
450 signers in the archive) only approximately and thereforeprovidesa conservativeestimate of sympathizers,682 bishops signed eitherone or both of the CIPpetitions [for details, see the ASR Web site supplement,http://www.asanet. 40 org/journals/asr/2004/tocO40.html])-about bishops shy of the one-thirdneeded to sink a this is by no meansa complete reform.However, Twohundredfifty pictureof CIP sympathizers. bishops who voted conservativelyon collegiality in the SecondSessiondidnotsign eitherpetition (resultsnot shown). At least 38 percent of the episcopate (841 bishops) was in some way a part of the CIP's sentimentpool. This figure is a conservativeestimate. It does not include the 60 missing signaturesfrom the Mary petition, because they may have voted conservatively on collegiality and thereforeshould not It also does it includethe 31 be double-counted. bishops who voted conservativelyon collegiality duringthe Second Session but who did not vote on the final vote on collegiality (which was takenduringthe same session as the communism petition, results not shown), because they were likely deceased or no longer participating. The CIP's sentiment pool was large enough to sink almost any reformthroughthe modi-if they had been able to mobilize it. THE FIGHT OVERTHE BLESSED
MARY VIRGIN
The DM andCIPemployedthese strategiesand tactics throughoutthe course of the Council, with consistent results. The full story of their effortsis beyondthe scope of thispaper,but one issue servesas representative example:the question of how the Councilwouldtreatthe Blessed Virgin Mary. Devotion to Mary "has been a hallmarkof the Catholictradition" (McCarthy 1994:343), which has often served to differentiate Catholics and Protestants.At the time of the Council, conservatives wanted to further elevateMary'sstatusin the Church. Progressives resisted their efforts because one of their central goals for the Council was rapprochement with Protestants; and many Protestants saw Catholic devotion to Mary as inappropriate, and even verging on the heretical,because her status was often exalted to one which seemed to equal, or even surpassJesus'. Conservatives attempted to end the First Sessionby discussing(andhopefullyapproving) the Schemaon Marythathadbeen prepared by
the conservative preparatory commission. Progressivesresistedthis move, andarguedthat Mary should not have her own schema, but into a schemaon shouldinsteadbe incorporated the Church,because (using savvy political language) "it was not possible to speak of the Church without speaking of Mary" (Rynne 1968: 159). A vote was not taken on the conservative preparatory schema, and the First Session closed without any decision. DM correspondence between the First and Second Session noted that revising the schema on the Churchto include "the schema of the Blessed Virgin"was a first orderof business.51 As the SecondSession opened,Councilmoderatorscalledfora vote on whether Maryshould have her own schema or be includedwithin the schema on the Church.The vote was the closest of the Council (1114 to 1074), with progressives winning by only 40 votes (Alberigo and Komonchak2000:98; Fesquet 1967: 199; Rynne 1968:214). Ironically,this conservative near victory was not a result of their organization. As the Council was voting on Mary,CIP leaders were just beginning to correspond.In fact, this defeat,combinedwith the "disastrous" votes on collegiality the following day,is what probably spurredconservatives to form their organization. In contrast, the DM, and progressive bishops in general, had campaigned mightilyin favorof puttingMaryin the schema on the Church(Wilde, forthcoming). thinkAfter theirdefeat on Mary,apparently elevate not the Council would that if Mary's ing status perhaps the Pope would, the CIP petitioned the Pope to consecrate the world to This petition provides more evidence Mary.52 thatthe CIP failed to mobilize all of their symThe highestestimatesreportthatonly pathizers. 510 bishops signed the petition (Alberigo and Komonchak2000:175 n. 188). Thatthey were
51 Source: Primeau fromEtchegaray, 4, January
1963,PC. makes in general, is anactwhich 52Consecration, or or"bywhicha person sacred; profane something of God the and to service is dedicated worship thing A consecration is rites,andceremonies." byprayers, thana similar to, butis moresolemnandelaborate would have theworld to Mary Consecrating blessing. of the care" shewascapable of "taking that indicated andof makingsurethatthe evils and entireworld, of theworldwouldbe addressed by God problems 1908[2003]). andJesus(TheCatholic Encyclopedia
ATVATICAN HOWCULTURE MATTERED II in Stanceson the BlessedVirginMary Table2. Consistency FinalVoteon Marya
595
Conservative Progressive Modi Totals FirstVoteon Maryb n 565 293 8 866 Conservative, (65) (34) (%) (1) (100) n 2 741 147 891 Progressive, (83) (%) (0) (17) (100) 1307 10 440 1757 Totals,n (74) (%) (1) (25) (100) CIPPetition World to Maryc AskingPopeto Consecrate 1 208 109 318 Signed,n (65) (%) (34) (0) (100) 1351 412 Did Not Sign, n 9 1772 (76) (%) (1) (23) (100) 10 521 2090 1557 Totals,n (75) (25) (%) (0) (100) Patrum Note. CIP= CoetusInternationalis a Third VolumeXLII:No. 215. Dataarerestricted to only thosewho Session,October 29, 1964, Suffragationes, votedon bothvotes on the BlessedVirginMary. b SecondSession,October VolumeXIX:No. 97. 29, 1963,Suffragationes, c ISR. 2.8, FSig
able to garnerless thanhalf of the numberwho voted conservativelyon the first vote on Mary illustratestheirinabilityto mobilize all of their and perhapsmost sympathizers.Furthermore, that had the the petition suggests importantly, CIPbeen in tunewith the assembly,the way the DM was through the ECs, they could have gaineda victory on a very contentiousissue. At least 101 bishops who signed the Mary petion the firstvote,more votedprogressively tion53 than enough sympathizersto have given them an importantearly victory. In responseto the petition,the Pope wroteto Sigaud (through his Secretary of State Cicognani) that though he would not consecrate the world to Mary, "nothing forbids the Diocese or religious institutionsfrom carrying reaction outtheirown consecrations."54 Sigaud's As the Fourth to the Pope'srefusalis instructive. Session was beginning, Sigaudwrote: the Councilwill end without the Unfortunately, to the Immaculate Heart of world's consecration andhaving ourrequest, Mary... After presenting doneeverything possiblein thissense,I feel that of us at this the homagethatOurLadyrequires
is to faithfully thedecision moment of the accept HolyFather.55 The tone of resignation within Sigaud'sstatement is due, no doubt,to the fact thathe wrote it after conservatives suffered a second, and final, defeat on Mary in the Council hall. After the first vote indicated that Mary would not have her own schema, a final vote was called duringthe Third Session on the precise wording to be used to describe Mary in the schema on the Church. In the end, though the docu-
ment wascertainly acompromise, progressives

succeeded in keeping the majorityof the problematic terms used to describeMary out of the schema. The final schema was approvedmidway through the Third Session by more than two-thirdsof the voters. Analysis of the vote indicatesthatconservatives, even once theyhad in afull-fledged organization the CIP that was actively working on elevating Mary's status, faredworseon the secondvote thantheyhadon the first. Table2 shows that of the 866 bishops who originally supportedthe conservativeposition on Mary (and who voted on the second vote), only 301 voted conservativelyor submitteda
(FSig3.29)Latin.
53 ISRFSig2.8. 54 Cicognani to Sigaud, 16, 1965,ISR January
30, 1965, ISR (FSig 55Sigaudto Frota,September
3.36)Portuguese.
596
(most likely conservative) modi on the final vote. In otherwords,conservativeswere able to hold onto only 35 percentof their originalsentimentpool. Fully65 percentof those who voted conservativelythe first time had swung overto the progressiveside by the time the secondvote on Marywas taken.56 In contrast,progressives lost only two out of the 858 bishops who voted Table2 also progressivelythe first time around. thatthis happenednotjust for the demonstrates bishopswho voted conservativelythe first time around,but also for those who were motivated enough to sign the CIP's petition on Mary, almosttwo-thirdsof whom simply acceptedthe progressivefinal document.Because they were not in touch the entireepiscopate,the CIP was most likely unableto identify those with similar views about Mary,and thus lost their closest chance for a conservative victory in the Council hall, not once, but twice.
INSTITUTIONAL RULES Onereasonwhy conservatives' resources greater did not lead to victory at the Council was because Vatican II was an "unsettled time" (Swidler 1986) for the RomanCatholicChurch, and the first few weeks of the Council demonstratedthat all else was not equal;real changes in both the institutionalrules andthe legitimate of the Church powerstructure beganthemoment the Councilopened.As researchers havenoted, "changingenvironmentsgeneratenew opportunities-and constraints" (Ganz 2000: 1041). New opportunitiescan lead to "collective creativity" and new organizational forms (Armstrong 2002b), though these are always generatedwithin the confines of pre-existing culturalschemas and symbols (Sewell 1996). The Council created new organizational opportunities within the Church because it changed the institutional rules of the game (albeitfor a shortand specified periodof time), and provided a moment of democraticgovernancewithina non-democratic andhierarchical structure. The progressiveswho had been outof the Church side of thepowerstructure administrationwere quick to recognize this shift in institutionalrules and to adapttheir organization to suit it. In contrast,instead of adaptingto the new rules presentedby the Council, conservatives, in no doubt partly because they realized the change in rules threatenedtheir accumulated power, simply resisted them. Conservatives, particularlythose within the Curia, began the Council insisting that votes were not binding, but were "recommendations" that the conservative drafting committees could take into account.There was no historicalprecedentfor such an argument, council votes had always been binding (but this was easy to ignore because councils were such rare events), and conservativesquicklylost thatbattle.But, their refusal to recognize that the institutionalrules had changed once the Council was underway provided progressives with their first advantage. By immediatelyrecognizingthat they needed an organizationif theirconcernswere going to be heard, and organizing around the new institutionalrules surrounding votes, progressives were able to somewhat compensate for their initial lack of resources. This provides thatorganizationsupportfor Ganz'sargument
INSTITUTIONAL CONCLUSION: RULES, MODELS OFAUTHORITY, SEMIAND MARGINALITY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

When the Second Vatican Council opened in 1962, few observerswould have predictedthat of progressivebishops an informalorganization would prove to be far more successful than an of conservative bishopswith close organization This case illustrates allianceswith the Curia. that resources alone do not explain social movement success. In combinationwith the conservative tone of the preparatory schemas andthe power and resources of the Curia, conservatives should not have even needed an extraconciliar organization,all else being equal.
56Thoughthese two votes werenot identically thecore worded andhadslightly different nuances, issueremained howmuchimportance the Council wouldgive Mary. Whilein the firstvote,the question was whethershe shouldhaveher own docufocusedaround ment,on the finalvote,contention threehotlydebated titles:whether Marywouldbe "Mother of theChurch;" which called "coredemtrix," thatMaryis one of thereasons meansliterally why humansare saved(the otherbeing JesusChrist); and/or"mediatrix," which meansthat Marycan obtain 1994:351). graceforsinners (McCarthy
HOW CULTUREMATTERED AT VATICAN II
597
In fact, their culturalmodel of authority hurt conservativesbeyond theirlimited strategiesin the CIP.This becomes obvious when the folthathadlittleto do with ... selectedforreasons lowingquestionis posed:if the DM wereso sucthe needsof the environment withinwhichthey withthe ECs,why did wereto work,developed within an strategy orga- cessfulin communicating in generaloften seem nizational to reproduce the CIPandconservatives settingbetterequipped than to innovate newones.Ironically, less thanawareof the extentof the DM's organpastroutines theabundance of internal to which resources wellization and agenda?There are three important haveaccessmaymakeit hard- points to the answerto this question. established groups erto innovate it easier forthemto keep bymaking First, conservatives from deliberative ECs the same on the New doing thingwrong. groups, had a different experience of their ECs than other oftenlackconventional but hand, resources, their progressive counterparts.For example, of their therichness of strategic capacity-aspects though Bishop Chaves, a prominentBrazilian theirleadership andorganization ... -can offset andprogressive Braziliansagreed conservative, this. about the frequency of their EC meetings, Because they formed at the time of a Council, Chaves told Caporale that the Brazilian EC the DM was well-adaptedto a Council envi"hadno relationswith otherEpiscopates" (CIC ronmentwhere votes were binding, andwhere, 2). When the connections between Brazil, in contrastto the normal machinationsof the CELAMandthe DM areconsidered, it is almost thanthe RomanCuria's hard to believe Chaves was a member of the Church,more mattered same EC as Helder Camara. and the Pope's opinions. This suggests that even if the CIP had used the ECs, they may havebeen less useful for conservatives, because CULTURALMODELSOF AUTHORITY their sympathizerswere less engaged in them, However,while it was new, the DM was not the or simply did not go to any "extra-conciliar" newest organizationexamined here. The CIP meetings. Chaves implied that such organizaactuallyformedlaterthanthe DM, andnot until tions,eventhose he felt alliedwith theologically, Council rules and debates were much more were simplynot a priority. He told Caporale,"I was invitedto join a groupof those who are ... crystallized.If strategic capacitysolely depended upon temporality, then the CIP shouldhave more conservative(with a little smile) fromall been betteradaptedto the Councilenvironment countries, but I never went because I am too than the DM. This study suggests that despite busy" (CIC 2). Forconservatives,organization the time at which it forms, an organization's outside of the formal groups of the Council was not viewed as necessary,or even as entireculturecanharmits strategic capacityif thatculin whichthe tureconflictswith the environment ly legitimate, so it seems plausible that CIP is acting,as studiesof movements sympathizers were simply more "out of the organization as diverseas Women'sLiberation(Mansbridge loop" thanmore progressivemembersof their episcopates. 1986; Polletta 2002) and new-left homeSecond, as Berto's letters to Carli demonschoolers (Stevens 2001) have illustrated. strated, The CIP's paralysis in the face of progresthoughthey didnot knowpreciselyhow, conservativesdid recognize that a progressive sives' continuing success provides a powerful organizationexisted and that they were dancan constrain the actions exampleof how culture gerous. However, while they recognized the of individuals and groups. Even though they threat the DM posed,conservatives simplycould knew they were losing, and were aware of an not conceive of or DM was so how the why effective structure alternative, organizational because that not consuccess was successful, they simply could not stomach using the ECs. tingentupon hierarchical authority.57 Collegial The ECs' collegial organizationdirectly conorganizations were both mysterious and tradicted theirdeeplyheldbeliefs in the holiness In other absolutelyillegitimateto conservatives. of the hierarchical structure of the Roman were a "mafia." the DM was words, Thus, they Catholic Churchand the primacy of the Pope; and thus theirbeliefs aboutthe way things are, andthe way thingsshouldbe, withinthe Church, and by extension within the world as well. 57Bertoto Carli,March13, 1964, ISR (FCrl17.1).
al "newness can be an asset" (2000:1043). He found that traditionalunion organizers
598
able to stay out of the limelight partlybecause conservativeswere not sure exactly how they were doingwhatthey seemedto be doing,if they were not using coercion. DM memberswere awareof such criticisms, but as individualswho were "living collegialicomingto (whattheyunderstood ty"andthereby of the Church,they to be) a truerunderstanding almost completely disregardedthem. Almost. They deflected the criticism by simply never claiminganyvictories,a decisionthatalso gave them an advantage by protecting their semimarginalstatus. SEMI-MARGINALITY
tive than other,particularlymore hierarchical, Forexample,Mitchell Stevens organizations.58 found that the conservative,hierarchical,notconsensus-oriented conservative Protestant homeschoolers were more successful then the consensus-based because, hippiehomeschoolers indecision andunpredictable making Sluggishness of orgaarethedownside resource commitments to the forms thatlenda lotof discretion nizational cancomeatthecost ... Pure individual. democracy divisurvival. of organizational .... Hierarchical makethecompletion andauthority sionsof labor tasksmoreefficient; of complex (2002:193).
BarbaraEpstein (1991) found that the direct action movement'sreliance on consensus, lack In her studyof the growthof interest-based of hierarchical polleadershipand distrustof power lead to unresolvedconflicts, short-livedorganitics, Clemens (1997: 63) arguesthat successful groups have memberswho are marginalto izations and a lack of strategy,even while it the institution they are trying to change, but produced strong feelings of solidarity among Withuniquepositionsas wellnot too marginal. members. known and powerful bishops outside of the The DM's ability to avoid these problems Roman Curia, the DM benefited from their was rooted in a few qualities of their organizain a numberof ways. semi-marginality tion. First,as FrancescaPollettanotes, the most As the rules by which the Council would successful forms of participatorydemocratic and the structure proceedwerebeingestablished, seem to be those which combine organizations embodiment of authorityin the Church were forms with aspects of collectivist of "aspects being questioned.By the time they were interbureaucratic ones" more conventionally viewed by Caporale(at the end of the Second As an of leaders of organization (2002:219). Session), most of his respondentsopenly diswith conferences desig(and clearly episcopal and refusal paragedthe Roman Curia'spower nated leaders within the group), the DM careto embracechange, and called for radicalrevifully wedded hierarchy (a familiar sion to the structureof the Curia or its elimination all together (Wilde, forthcoming). "organizationalrepertoire"(Clemens 1997)) This allowed andparticipation. Because they were entirelyoutsideof the Curia, with cooperation the DM was unharmed by this shiftin legitimate them to benefit from "thesolidary, innovatory and developmental benefits of participatory authority,but were instead well-placed to be seen as legitimateleaders as "representatives" democracy"(Polletta2000: 2), but to avoid the of the newly legitimatedepiscopal conference problemsassociatedwith not havingcleartasks of the DM's 22 structure.Over three-quarters and leaders. memberswere eventuallyrecognized as being people at the Council amongthe most important by Caporale'srespondents. 58 I should note here that the CIP was not comFurthermore,it is no coincidence that the pletely ineffective. At a very basic level, the CIP foundingmembersof the DM were Frenchand demonstrates that any organization is better than Latin American-and not Italian, individuals none. Thoughthey were ineffective at communicatand who were geographically, administratively the ing with voters,theywere successfulin pressuring Church. the to theologically marginal those Council decisions, especially Popeto qualify ORGANIZATIONALEFFECrTIVENESS On the surface this account contradictsmost studies of consensus-based organizing which have foundthatthey areless efficient and effecwhich most conflicted with their theological views. The Pope accededto theirdemandson bothMaryand collegiality. Indeed,the CIP's clearest victories are connectedto these two issues (c.f. Rynne 1968:407), though both issues, especially Mary,were ultimateas progressivevictories. ly interpreted
HOWCULTURE MATTERED ATVATICAN II
599
This carefulmeldingof organizational forms was made more successful by the DM's focus on ensuring good communication.They made sure thatthe core group did not grow too large and that no ECs were over-represented at the DM-which could have hampereddiscussion and createdpowerdifferentials.59 They stressed the importanceof regularattendance,mandating that anyone who could not personally be meetingmust havea subpresentat a particular stitute.60 Finally,they attemptedto ensure not
only frequent, but accurate, concise and con-
APPENDIX
ABBREVIATIONS ANDDESCRIPTIONS OF ARCHIVAL MATERIALS Archivio Segreto Vaticano (Vatican Secret
Archive),Cortiledel Belvedere, 00120 Vatican City.The Council votes cited in this articleare as follows: * FirstVoteon the BlessedVirginMary, Second Session,October 29, 1963. 1114 placets,1074
non-placets. (Suffragationes,Volume XIX: No.
sistent communication, by providing bullet points for the representativesto read or disseminateto their ECs.61 The DM was not able to generateconsensus on all issues (Grootaers 1981:161). Yet even when they failed to achieve consensus, they actively worked towardcompromisepositions everyone in the group could supportand were careful to recorddivergentviews in theirminutes. In contrast, no divergent views were recorded in CIP minutes or correspondence. Compromisewas not an option, and consensus not the goal for the CIP--assertingthe Church's hierarchicalteaching authorityand the primacy of the Pope were. Forthe DM, give-and-take was key to their participatory democratic approach,while for the CIP and conservatives in general, to compromisetheir views of the Churchwas to compromisethe Churchitself. These contrasting cultures led one group to organizationalsuccess and the otherto failure; and ultimately profoundly altered Roman Catholicism.
Melissa J. Wildeis AssistantProfessor of Sociology Her researchinterestsinclude at Indiana University. the sociology ofreligion, social movementsand culture, with a particular focus on religious change. She is currently finishing CatholicismContested:A
* TheVoteon the Fourth point on Collegiality: Second Session,October 30, 1963.1717placets, 408 non-placets. Volume XX: (Suffragationes, * FinalVote on the BlessedVirginMary: Third Session,October29, 1964. 1559 placets,521
Juxta modum, 10 non-placets. (Suffragationes, No. 104).63
97).62
Volume XLII:No. 215).
Caporale's Materials
CIC = Caporale Interview Notecard: thenumber notecards areorganized. CHT = Caporale Handwritten Transcript CT = denotes thatwasnotcatetypedtranscript gorizedin thenotecards.
Other Materials gives the category number by which the
DOH = Daniel O'HanlonCollection from the Graduate Flora Lamson Union, Theological
62TheVatican's officialtotalsforthisvoteappear to be slightlyinaccurate. Twobishops' whosevotes wereisolated on the lastpageof the votewerenot inthetotals included andoneplacet). (onenon-placet I included them,andthushave 1,115placetsand 63 Point on Thelastpageof thevoteontheFourth Collegialityseems to havebeen lost, because15 bishopswhoselastnamesstartwithZ aremissing. I extrapolated theirvotes usingtheirvotes on the Pointon Collegiality Third on the (whichoccurred sameday,atthesametime,andwashighly correlated withthe Fourth nowmatch Point). My numbers theofficialtotals,so I usethisapproximation rather than themissing these excluding bishops. Regardless, onepercent lessthan of thevoters, bishops represent andinclusion or exclusion does not affectanysubstantive conclusions.
1,075 non-placets in all analysis of the first vote on the Blessed Virgin Mary.
with II,forthcoming Sociological Studyof Vatican

Princeton UniversityPress.
59Only one delegateper EC was allowed,and to "invite nooneto future meetmembers wereasked of the members." DM without "the consent all ings"
Minutes 2:1, November 13, 1963, PC.
60 DM Minutes
representatives"from Etchegaray, October 12, 1963, PC.
61 "Letter to
1:2,October 4, 1963,PC.
6oo
REVIEW AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL Hewlett library,Berkeley, CA. 3(10), for example,denotesBox 3 (file folder10).The materials in this archive are in English, French and Latin as well as German and Dutch. Instituto Per Le Scienze Religiose Giovanni XXIII, Via San Vitale 114, Bologna, Italy. Documents from ISR are cited by the following: F(Fondo(Archive))Sig (Sigaud), 1.84 (box and document). The majority of Sigaud's documents are in Latin, and correspondence in Portuguese or French (with Lefebvre). EA = Etchegary Archive,5.4 (box anddocThe ument). majority of materials in this archive are in French or Latin and have been translatedinto Italian. F (Fondo (Archive)) Crl (Carli), 1.2 (box anddocument). The majorityof Carli'scorrespondenceis in Italianand French. PrimeauCollection,CatholicUniversityof American,VaticanIIArchive,Washington, D.C. Primeau'smaterials are in English, The majority of Latin,French,andGerman. DM minutes cited in this article are available in this collection, in Latin or French. "Minutes of the x meeting at the Domus Mariaeduringthe y Session" are abbreviated "DM Minutes x:y," followed by the date. "Reportto the U.S. Hierarchyof the Meeting of the InternationalCommittee, September 18, 1964--Domus Mariae" is abbreviated as "Report to the U.S. of the DM" September18, 1964. Hierarchy 1950-1994. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. . 2002b. "Crisis,Collective Creativity,and the Generation of New Organizational Forms: The Transformation of Lesbian/GayOrganizations in San Francisco."Pp. 361-95 in Research in the Sociology of Organizations, edited by Michael andMarcVentresca. Oxford:JAIPress. Lounsbury M. 2002. TheGeneralCouncils: Bellitto,Christopher A History of the Twenty-OneChurch Councils from Nicaea to VaticanII. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press. Brouwers, Jan A. 1993. "Vatican II: Derniers Priparatifs et Premiere Session Activities Conciliairesen Coulisses."Pp. 353-68 in Vatican II Commence... :Approaches editFrancophones, ed by E'.Fouilloux.Leuven,Belgium: Bibliotheek Van De FaculteitDer Godgeleerdheid. Burns, Gene. 1990. "The Politics of Ideology: The American Journal PapalStrugglewith Liberalism." ofSociology 95:1123-52. . 1992. "Commitments and NonCommitments: The Social Radicalism of U.S. and Society21:703-33. CatholicBishops."Theory Caporale,Rocco. 1964. VaticanII: The Last of the Councils. Baltimore,MD: Helicon Press. The Catholic Encyclopedia. 1908 [2003]. Online Edition (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/) by Kevin Knight. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Culture and Chaves,Mark.1997. OrdainingWomen: in Conflict Religious Organizations.Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress. Clemens, Elisabeth S. 1993. "Organizational Repertoires and InstitutionalChange: Women's of U.S. Politics, Groups and the Transformation 1890-1920." American Journal of Sociology 98:755-98. . 1997. ThePeople' Lobby:Organizational Innovationand the Rise oflnterest GroupPolitics in the United States, 1890-1925. Chicago, IL: Universityof Chicago Press. Dillon, Michele. 1999. CatholicIdentity:Balancing Reason. Faith and Power.New York:Cambridge UniversityPress. DiMaggio, Paul J. andWalter W.Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: InstitutionalIsomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." AmericanSociologicalReview48:147-60. 1991.PoliticalProtestand Cultural Epstein,Barbara. Revolution. Berkeley,CA: Universityof California Press. Etchegaray, Roger. 1995. "Interventi Scritti." Pp 293-95 in Paolo VIe La CollegialitdEpiscopale. Rome, Italy:Edizioni Studium. Falconi,Carlo. 1964. PopeJohn and theEcumenical Council:A Diary of the Second VaticanCouncil, from the September-December1962. Translated
ISR
PC
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How Culture Mattered at Vatican II: Collegiality Trumps Authority in the Council's Social Movement Organizations Author(s): Melissa

atVatican HowCulture Mattered II:

The was a watershed event in the history of

Second Vatican of 1962to 1965 Council

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2004, VOL.

HOWCULTURE ATVATICAN II MATIERED

REVIEW AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL

HOWCULTURE ATVATICAN MATTERED II

5 In the end,the Councilvalidatedcollegiality,but

REVIEW SOCIOLOGICAL AMERICAN

EFFECTIVENESS ORGANIZATIONAL ATVATICAN II AND CULTURE

thethisis a caseof religiouschange, Though

6 Forassessments of the DM see

2000:61-62; Caporale 1964:72-73; Grootaers 1981:133-65; Laurentin 1966:43-44; Noel 1997;

Forassessments of the CIPsee Wiltgen1967:129.

ATVATICAN HOWCULTURE II MATTERED

10 ISREA 1.5.11. Undated. Petition onCollegiality.

8, 1963,PC. 5:2,November 11DM Minutes

HOWCULTURE MATTERED ATVATICAN II

THE DoMus MARIAE

13 Berto to Carli, 11, 1964, January 1 andJanuary

ISR (FCrl 15.32).

14 Bertoto Carli, December 9 andNovember 13,

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

HOW CULTURE ATVATICAN MATIERED II 585

Ja~n Oceania Greatr

ts Domus Mariae Core MembersiBurma

& Ceylon Vietnam

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28DMMinutes 17, 1965,PC. 1:4,September

HOW CULTUREMATTEREDAT VATICAN II

sionwouldbemadeas to thetotalvoting trend of theBrazilian CHT, (Guglielmi Episcopate. emphasis added)

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

ATVATICAN HOWCULTURE MATTERED II

Bertoto Carli,November 6, 1963,ISR (FCrl

37 Berto March ISR(FCrl17.1). to Carli, 13,1964,

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TheItalian ECis verydisorganized.... TheItalian I did, didnotmeetmanyforeign bishops. bishops

Lefebvreto Sigaud,August 5, 1964, ISR (FSig

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ATVATICAN HOWCULTURE MATTERED II

REVIEW SOCIOLOGICAL AMERICAN

51 Source: Primeau fromEtchegaray, 4, January

ment wascertainly acompromise, progressives

53 ISRFSig2.8. 54 Cicognani to Sigaud, 16, 1965,ISR January

30, 1965, ISR (FSig 55Sigaudto Frota,September

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

INSTITUTIONAL CONCLUSION: RULES, MODELS OFAUTHORITY, SEMIAND MARGINALITY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

HOW CULTUREMATTERED AT VATICAN II

al "newness can be an asset" (2000:1043). He found that traditionalunion organizers

REVIEW SOCIOLOGICAL AMERICAN

HOWCULTURE MATTERED ATVATICAN II

Volume XLII:No. 215).

with II,forthcoming Sociological Studyof Vatican

representatives"from Etchegaray, October 12, 1963, PC.

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