Analysis

October 3, 2013

Summary: Recep Tayyip Erdoan is likely to be defined as a political figure that has left his mark on one of the most important periods of progress of the country. The local elections in 2014, the presidential elections in 2014, and the general elections in 2015 will be consecutive tests of Erdoans campaign managerial skills. The two greatest challenges in these elections will be the economy and his ability to form a winning coalition.

Erdoans Longest Year

by Emre Erdoan

For those who will study Turkish political history in the future, Recep Tayyip Erdoan is likely to be defined as a political figure that has left his mark on one of the most important periods of progress of the country. He is a political strategist as qualified as Karl Rove or David Axelrod in the United States, and has won all elections as well as referenda that he has managed as the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002. Although their results are not spectacular, even the past elections that Erdoan has lost also show how qualified he is as a campaign manager. Examples include his race for the mayor of Beyolu in 1989 when he lost by 5 percent and a chair he won in the parliament from Istanbul in 1991 when he handed his mandate to another candidate in his party because of the preferential voting system. Although his mastership term is said to have started with the elections in 2011, it is obvious that as a campaign manager, he reached that level long ago. The coming two years are likely to be the longest for the most qualified political strategist in Turkey and possibly in Europe. The local elections in 2014, the presidential elections in 2014, and the general elections in 2015 will be consecutive tests of Erdoans campaign managerial skills, with

objectives that would be unimaginably difficult for an ordinary politician. The first objective is to maintain his partys achievements in the local elections of 2009 at a minimum and, even better, to win in a number of provinces that are considered Republican Peoples Partys (CHP) strongholds such as Izmir and/ or Antalya. The second objective is to become the first president of Turkey elected by popular vote if he chooses to run or at least to select that candidate. The third objective is to pass the psychological 50 percent threshold in the general elections or at least to keep his majority in the parliament. He has to achieve all of this against an opposition block that is ready to do anything to make him lose. Erdoan and his supporters are confident that he will pass all these tests successfully, but he now faces a reality that all leaders have faced. History is written not only by the desires of leaders; there are usually other factors at play. The first challenging factor is the economy. Economic growth in Turkey is one of the most important issues affecting the decisions of the voters. Each one point increase in the per capita real income increases the votes of the governing party by 0.7 percent points when all other factors are

OFFICES

Washington, DC Berlin Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw Tunis

Analysis
static.1 Although the growth expectation of World Bank for Turkey of 4 percent is high compared to other countries, it is doubtful whether this will be enough for the Turkish voters, who enjoyed an average growth of 7 percent between 2002 and 2007. For the analysts who explained the decline in the AKPs votes in local elections in 2009 with the economic slowdown in the previous year, it was not a surprise that 7 percent growth in 2011 turned into an election victory. If the voters decide their vote solely based on the economic factors, then Erdoan must ensure economic growth is above average in order to reach his targets. Although, the impact of the Erdoan-led governments on the almost-miraculous economic performance of Turkey after 2002 cannot be denied, sticking with the economic policy that was imposed by Kemal Dervi on the extravagant coalition government in 2000 has also played a significant role. Moreover, as the economist Dani Rodrik pointed out, the global growth trend in the first period of the AKP governments had a positive impact on this performance. According to Rodrik, Turkey doubled the average global growth rate between 2002 and 2007, while its performance between 2008 and 2011 was not better than other countries.2 It appears that the economic growth coincided with the Erdoan governments ability to use the global opportunities very well rather than reflecting proficiency in their management of the economy. Therefore, in order to achieve the needed economic growth mentioned above, the government should continue to look for opportunities in the global economy. It is more difficult to define the second factor that may affect Erdoans performance. One of his most significant achievements in the last decade was his ability to form a winning coalition in each election. Although the general tendency is to see AKP as the continuation of a traditional religious political movement, under Erdoans leadership, the party has reached a level of public support that is beyond the imagination of the movements founding fathers. The parties that AKP has inherited reached their highest votes in the elections of 1999 when almost every party got an equal share of not more than 21 percent each. Therefore, it would not be wrong to explain the upward trend in the
1 Ali Akarca, A Prediction for AKPs Nationwide Vote Share in the 12 June 2011 Turkish Parliamentary Election,ktisat letme ve Finans,May 2011 2 Dani Rodrik, http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2013/06/how-well-didthe-turkish-economy-do-over-the-last-decade.html

It appears that the economic growth coincided with the Erdoan governments ability to use the global opportunities very well rather than reflecting proficiency in their management of the economy.
votes of AKP in the last three elections through Erdoans ability to attract voters who did not vote for AKP in the past and to establish a winning coalition in each election. Although he owes his first election victory to the failures of the previous governing parties as well as to the election systems 10 percent threshold, which left at least three potential opposition parties out of the parliament, convincing one-third of the voters to support to support a newly established party among 18 competitors is a great success. Analysis of the 2002 elections suggests that only one-third of AKPs votes came from the traditional religious political parties. The AKP voter base in 2007 elections, 45 percent of all voters, consisted of those who benefited from the economic growth as well as former supporters of center-right parties. In this regard, we can describe the election victory in 2007 as the success of the voter coalition from various and of course right-wing political backgrounds. The young voters who were socialized during the AKP era and former supporters of two far-right parties that lost their charismatic leaders made important contributions to the 50 percent in 2011. If AKP manages to keep its 50 percent voters base from 2011, that will be enough for Erdoan to survive the 2014 and 2015 elections unscratched. It will also allow Erdoan to amend the Constitution and to open the gates of the Presidential Palace as a more powerful president. The problem is how the qualified political strategist will achieve this.

Analysis
Lets put aside the challenges that may occur in the global economy. It is certain that an economic crisis similar to the one in 2001 will cost the AKP a significant percent of votes, even if it doesnt lose the government. In such a situation, Erdoans room to maneuver will be limited to the second factor, which is to establish a winning coalition or to keep his former coalition. A winning coalition may be formed by gathering partners with common interests, either in favor of an issue or group or against an issue or group. The broad-based coalition formed in Turkey between 2002 and 2004 that supported full membership in the EU became possible after various groups who had an interest in a possible EU membership got together. We can use this coalition as an example of the first type of coalitions. The most widely known example of the second type of coalition is the National Front governments that were formed by ultra-right political parties against the political left and had two chances to govern the country in 1970s. The developments seen in the last year indicate that Erdoan would prefer to form one of the second type of coalitions. Those who dont want the welfare of the country form the political others of Erdoans broadbased coalition. Foreign powers, the interest rate lobby, oligarchs in Istanbul, and any other social/political group fall under this wide definition. The leadership of the governing party, and particularly of Erdoan, succeeds in defining, framing, and selling any political development by using the political others. The promotion of the supporters of the Gezi Protests, which were the top item on the agenda during May and July, from pure environmentalists to looters is a good example of this process. If we leave the methodological limitations aside, an initial survey conducted in June 2013 showed one-third of the voters said the Gezi protests were the exercise of a democratic right. This ratio is 79 percent among the CHP voters, 43 percent among the Ultra-Nationalist National Movement Party (MHP) voters, and only 9 percent among AKP voters. According to the same survey, 82 percent of AKP voters considered these protests a coup attempt against the government, while this view was supported by 14 percent of CHP voters. Such separation of the views of the voters in line with their political party choices on such a multi-dimensional issue like the Gezi Park Protests indicates a wide political polarization. It also shows that Erdoans efforts to frame the Gezi Protests as a rebellion movement succeeded at least in the eyes of AKP voters. If we put it assertively, every voter who has tendency to vote for the AKP will interpret the Gezi Protests and any related action as a game of dissident powers, and this perception cannot be easily changed. In the meantime, it is important to note that MHP voters are divided into two camps on this issue. This sort of partisan split is hardly unique. A survey conducted prior to the 2012 U.S. presidential elections showed Democratic and Republican voters had completely different perceptions in regards to economic gauges such as inflation and growth. Two surveys published in the past showed that there is meaningful difference between AKP and CHP voters in the perception of foreign policy issues such as the Davos Crisis and economic matters. AKP voters supported Erdoans Davos outburst more than CHP voters, while CHP voters estimates of inflation rates are double that of AKP voters.3 The political polarization makes the formation of voters views on difficult to understand multi-dimensional issues easier. Of course, voters are not the only ones that profit from this process. The leaders who succeed in drawing a framework on an issue for their voters also consolidate their voter bases. When we look from this perspective, we understand why the Gezi Protests did not lose the AKP any votes and, on the contrary, helped it to strengthen its voter base. This also explains why the prime minister was very outspoken during this process and organized two rallies called Respect of National Will.

Those who dont want the welfare of the country form the political others of Erdoans broad-based coalition.
3

3 E. Erdoan, Revising the Equation: Partisan Bias and Economic Voting Hypothesis in the Turkish Context, letme ktisat ve Finans, February 2013; E. Erdoan, Politicization in Foreign Policy Attitudes: Attitudes of Turkish Public Opinion about the Davos Crisis and its Aftermath, Uluslararas likiler Dergisi, Spring 2013

Analysis
Erdoan will focus more on polarization and framing issues to ensure political power for himself and his party until 2023.While the AKP owes its previous success mainly to the relative achievements in economic performance, there are indications that the global environment will not allow continued high economic growth in Turkey. Therefore, the AKP is likely to spend its energy forming a winning coalition. In order to consolidate a coalition formed against political others, every political development will be carefully framed, turned into an instrument for political polarization, and simplified for easy absorption by the AKP voter base. It is not a stretch to predict that Erdoans long year, which will run through 2015, will bring a moderate growth rate, vulnerability to economic crisis, and a lot of political oratory for ordinary Turkish voters. On the other hand, it is still puzzling to say with whom Erdoan will form this coalition, whom he will define as political others, and which developments he will use as opportunities. Anyone from right to left, from Kurdish nationalists to Turkish nationalists, and from liberals to devout Muslims in the society may become his friend as well as his enemy.

About the Author

Emre Erdoan, Ph.D., is an expert in public opinion and foreign policy. He is one of the founders of Infakto RW, an Istanbul-based independent research institute, and a professor of political methodology in Istanbul Bilgi University and Boazii University. Erdoan is author of several articles about public opinion, foreign policy, political participation, and social capital. They Know Us Wrongly, about perceptions of Europeans about Turks and Turkey, was published in 2012.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and U.S. writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www. gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database. gmfus.org/reaction.