To: Team Three

From: Scott Allan

Date: 4/9/03

RE: Suggestions for Team Three Working Paper

PROPOSED QUESTIONS:

—During the years preceding 9-11, was our policy making establishment stuck in a "cold
war mindset" that prevented it from formulating an effective counterterrorism policy?

• Did the USG have a clear and comprehensive counterterrorism policy with ample
leadership? How was it articulated to other nations (and to terrorist groups)?

• Were our policy makers focusing too heavily on institutionalized cold war threats
as opposed to asymmetrical threats? Was the USG focusing on state sponsors of
terrorism (i.e. Iran) when more attentions should have been given to cross-border
groups such as Al-Qaeda?

• Did policy makers place too much faith in coercion and containment (carried over
from cold war thinking) when formulating a counterterrorism strategy? Did they
consider preemption as a viable alternative? Did policy makers rely too heavily
on a "law enforcement" approach (i.e. arrests and trials) in the mid-to-late 1990's?

• Prior to 9-11, was enough priority given to fighting terrorism or was

counterterrorism eclipsed by other issues such as relations with China,
peacekeeping in the Balkans, etc.? Were enough financial resources directed to
the counterterrorism groups in the USG?

-Did the USG understand Al-Qaeda well enough?

• What were the USG's efforts to understand and eliminate the "root causes" of the
Al-Qaeda movement?

• What agencies were responsible for understanding Al-Qaeda's aims, philosophy,

targeting methods and recruitment techniques?

• Were there any efforts by the USG to delegitimize the Wahhabism sect of Islam
and acts such as "suicide bombings" in Islamic countries?

• Did the USG study the prior Al-Qaeda attacks closely enough? Did the USG fail
to learn lessons from prior attacks?

• Did we consult with other nations that had experience with Al-Qaeda?
 • How did the USG attempt to remedy its negative "image" in the Islamic world
prior to 9-11?

--How did the USG address the Al-Qaeda problem with countries such as Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan?

• What leverage did we use to elicit their cooperation against radical movements
and what was their response? Did we condition aid, loans, arms sales, etc. based
upon their cooperation?

• When dealing with these countries, did we subordinate our eounterterrorism

agenda in favor of other issues (i.e. Egypt's role in the Palestinian peace process,
Saudi Arabia's cooperation for a US military campaign against Iraq or securing
stability between Pakistan and India)?

—How did the USG address the terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan and Afghanistan?

• What agencies were responsible for monitoring Al-Qaeda actions in those

countries?

• What actions were taken against those countries and were they successful in
combating terrorism or removing terrorist from the regions?

• To what extent did we seek Pakistani help in pressuring the Taliban? Could we
have stopped Islamabad's support for the Taliban without causing significant
internal political problems?

—How did our support of radical Islamic groups during the Afghan war fit into our
eounterterrorism policy? (W.Bass)

• Was there significant Congressional criticism of the CIA's support of the Afghan
Arabs?

-Why did the USG not seek custody of bin Laden when the Sudan was preparing to
expel him in 1996?

-How did the Clinton administration change its eounterterrorism policy after the 1998
embassy bombings?

• Was this policy effectively implemented?

• How did covert action fit into this policy?

• How did the Bush administration react to the policy it inherited? Did it appreciate
the urgency of the Al-Qaeda threats?
BACKGROUND READING:

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (2002).

• Lists established tenets of USG counterterrorism policy and how they changed in
the late 1990's (p, 119-223).

• Describes the Clinton administration's decision not to seek custody of bin Laden
from the Sudan (p. 247).

• Explains the Clinton administration's diplomatic efforts and covert action

program aimed at weakening Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (p. 256-325).

• Describes the evolution of the Bush administration's counterterrorism policy (p.

326-349),

Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism. Security, and Power (2002).

• Describes cold war tool of diplomatic coercion as ineffective against non-state

actors (p. 4-9).

• Lists four key components of the Clinton administration's counterterrorism policy

(P- 10)-

• Describes the change in the Clinton administration's approach to counterterrorism

after the 1998 embassy bombings (p. 18).

Michael Elliot, The Secret History, Time Magazine (August 12, 2002).

• Describes transfer of the Clinton counterterrorism policy to the Bush

administration.

Barton Gellman, A Strategy's Cautious Evolution: Before Sept. 11, the Bush Anti-Terror
Effort was Mostly Ambition. The Washington Post (January 20,2002).

• Description of the Bush policy towards the Taliban (p. 9).

Bruce Hoffman, Prepared Testimony Before the House Committee on Government
Reform, (September 20,2001),

• 9-11 attacks underscore the need for a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy

(P- 2).

• USG's national security architecture is based on cold war threats (p. 3).

Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy, (2001).

• Describes tenets of pre 9-11 counterterrorism policy (p, 8),

• Discusses pro's and con's of:

1) criminal law enforcement as a counterterrorism tool (p. 79-92);

2) military force as a counterterrorism tool (p. 97-110); and
3) assassination of terrorist leaders (p. 120-123).

Farced Zakaria, The Politics of Rage: Why do They Hate us?, Newsweek (October 15,
2001).

• Discusses underlying causes of Arab/Islamic hate towards the US.

POSSIBLE BRIEFERS (Team should discuss before contacting them):

Daniel Benjamin (CSIS)

Daniel Byman (Georgetown University)
Martha Crenshaw (Wesleyan University)
Rohan Gunaratna (University of St. Andrews)
Bruce Hoffman (RAND Corp.)
Brian Jenkins (RAND Corp.)
Paul Pillar (CIA)

INDIVIDUALS TO INTERVIEW:

Sandy Berger
Richard Clarke (Chairman of the Counterterrorism and Security Group; Clinton and
G.W. Bush Administrations).
Brent Scowcroft
Michael Sheehan (State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism; Clinton Administration).
Francis Taylor (State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism; G,W, Bush Administration)
Phillip Wilcox (State's Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism; Clinton
Administration).