T3 B22 Workplan FDR - 4 Draft Workplans W Notes - Withdrawal Notice 068

Draft — Unclassified
Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy Team
Alexis Albion
Scott Allan
Warren Bass
Daniel Byman
Bonnie Jenkins
Charles Hill
Draft: April 25,2003
Draft - Unclassified
Contents
Project Overview
Key Questions
Proposed Division of Labor
Initial Document Review List
Appendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on Policy
Appendix Two: Suggested Readings
Appendix Three: Notional Interview List
Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners
Project Overview: Counterterrorism Policy
The policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. counterterrorism
policy before the September 11 attacks, the changes in the immediate aftermath, and the
nature of the policy today. These tasks will require reviewing overall priorities,
identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism (prosecutions,
military strikes, extraditions/renditions, and so on), and determining how well senior
policy makers understood the threat from al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policy
team's effort is examining U.S. relationships with key foreign partners and adversaries
with regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the team will distinguish between
U.S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.
The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy when
al-Qa'ida began to emerge. These earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian
Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of
people dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The
most lethal terrorists during this era were those backed by states, not those operating
independently. In general, terrorism during this period was viewed as an important but
not overriding policy concern.
As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1990s, the focus
slowly shifted. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center marked a turning point. For
the first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In contrast to the
terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the new
radicals wanted a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.
Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, but
U.S. policy changed unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general and al-Qa'ida in
particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the
September 11 attacks to dramatically change U.S. counterterrorism policy. Even today,
counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policy decisions being made almost
daily.
The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests
and review, briefings by key individuals both inside and outside government, and
extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulation and
implementation of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena. In addition, the
team will draw on the work of the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry as
appropriate.
Key Questions
At the Commission hearings held on March 31 in New York, witnesses described their
views of the September 11 attackers, the intelligence capabilities of the government, and
the quality of the USG's counterterrorism policy before September 11. They also
suggested improvements in these areas in order to prevent another tragedy. Based upon
their statements and our research so far, we have compiled a list of key questions and
issues that we think need to be addressed by the Commission.
The list is divided into three parts, corresponding to the overall statutory structure of the
Commission's inquiry. Most of the questions focus on Part I (the pre-September 11 era),
as this is essential for understanding Parts n and ffl, which cover the period after the
attacks.
Part One: Counterterrorism Policy before September 11,2001
Background
1. What shaped counterterrorism policy before the 1993 World Trade Center attack?
• What was the "old paradigm" regarding the threat posed by terrorist groups?
• What instruments (law enforcement, diplomacy, military strikes, financial
controls, and so on) were used for lighting terrorism?
• How important was terrorism considered, in general?
Strategy and Priorities <
2. Did the USG possess a unified counterterrorism policy prior to September 11, or did
policy vary between agencies?
• Did our strategy employ all instruments of U.S. national power?
• What were the gaps in the strategy? Were they obvious at the time?
• Was there leadership and coordination?
• Did any political concerns affect counterterrorism policy?
3. Was counterterrorism factored into the design of key foreign policy measures,
including policy toward Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Middle East peace process, Pakistan, and
Egypt?
4. Where was counterterrorism on the overall USG priority list?

• What were the other priorities?
• Did money follow the priority list? Did high-level time and attention follow
the list? If not, why not?
• Was there a system for managing priorities?
• Was there an integration of domestic policy and foreign policy on
counter-terrorism?
• With the knowledge available at the time, should counterterrorism have been a
higher priority?
• Was the particular threat of al-Qa'ida recognized?
5. Were any "balls dropped" during the transition from the Clinton administration to the
Bush administration? Were transition mechanisms effective?
Understanding the Threat
6. Did policy makers feel well-informed by the intelligence community on the nature
the threat, both at home and abroad? At what stage was al-Qa'ida considered a thread?
At what point was al-Qa'ida considered a grave threat?
^_ 7. Did the White House and Congress exercise effective oversight of the intelligence
f community and other bureaucracies fighting terrorism?
\ • Was U.S. policy realistic given the limitations of the key agencies?
\-CAAAN * ^° formulatmg counterterrorism policy, was sufficient attention given to the
organization of the intelligence community and its ability to combat
terrorism?
• In formulating counterterrorism policy, did the USG focus sufficient attention
on the FBI's organizational ability to counter foreign terrorists in the United
States?
Terrorism and Foreign Relations
8. To what extent did the United States emphasize and integrate counterterrorism into its
foreign relations? What were the tradeoffs?
9. Did the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan and Afghanistan?
10. Did the United States properly address the issue of state sponsors of terrorism? Was
too much attention given to state-sponsored terrorist groups?
11. How supportive were key countries in fighting al-Qa'ida?

• How supportive were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries where popular
support for Islamists was high and where the governments reportedly had links to
al-Qa'ida?
• How supportive were key European countries, such as Germany?
• Who were our vital friends in the effort against al-Qa'ida?
Counterterrorism Instruments
12. What were the primary instruments used in fighting terrorism?

• What were their limitations?
• Were these instruments effective? Were they used well?
• Were certain options off the table? Should they have been?
Part Two: The Immediate Aftermath of September 11 (through September 20)
13. What changes were made in the aftermath of September 11, and why?
/
\7 J 14. Could these changes have been made before September 11? Why or why not?
.15. What was the doctrine laid out by the President's September 20 speech and other key
pronouncements made during this pivotal period? How did these emerge?
Part Three: Counterterrorism Policy Today
16. Could the United States be better positioned to fight al-Qa'ida and other terrorists
today?
V Gc \. Are the problems that hindered effective efforts against al-Qa'ida and terrorism
J before September 11 fixed?
18. What policy steps should be taken today? What bureaucratic and coordination
changes are necessary?
19. Is Counterterrorism properly integrated into U.S. foreign policy today? Does our
current handling of such issues as "winning hearts and minds" abroad, using preemptive
sor retaliatory force, handling failed states, and formulating Middle East policy make
sense from the perspective of the war against al-Qa'ida?
Proposed Division of Labor (this will change as our team decides who has the
best skills for which issue)
Person Agency Issues

Alexis Albion CIA, DoD Background (lead),
oversight, transition,
understanding the threat
(lead)
Scott Allan State, DoJ, CIA Post-9/1 1 changes,
counterterrorism
instruments (lead), foreign
governments and
sanctuaries
Warren Bass White House/NSC, State Strategies/priorities (lead),
foreign governments,
transitions (lead),
understanding the threat,
post-9/1 1 changes
Daniel Byman White House/NSC Foreign governments (lead),
strategies/priorities
Bonnie Jenkins DoD, State Post-9/1 1 changes (lead),
oversight (lead),
counterterrorism
instruments (but not law
enforcement)
Charles Hill* State Background, foreign
governments
Dana Leseman or other DOJ Counterterrorism
person who could do DOJ instruments (particularly
issues law enforcement)
Kevin Scheid or other OMB Counterterrorism budgets
person with budget
experience
* Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it
progresses rather than assign a particular task. Byman may be used in a similar
manner.
All team members will work Part HI - or at least we will split it up later.
Proposed Briefings for the Commission
We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S.
counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy toward al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the
status of U.S. policy today. ^
• Richard Clarke, the former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would be

the ideal briefer, given his pivotal role in counterterrorism in/both administrations.
• General John Gordon, who now holds Clarke's old job, should brief on the
current counterterrorism policy.
Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for

Counterterrorism, would also be well-suited for helping Commissioners
understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11.
• Dr. Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation, jêrhaps the leading non-
government authority on terrorism, could provide an excellent analysis of how the
threat of terrorism has changed over the years', "â** \ Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Inte
South Asia, is perhaps the government's leading analyst of terrorism and could
provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of different counterterrorism
instruments.
If necessary, staff member Daniel Byman could brief on the nature of al-Qa'ida and
several aspects of the Joint Inquiry investigation (e.g. covert action, foreign liaison, the
use of military force, and the overall counterterrorism strategy as it related to
intelligence). However, in his view, these briefers would be preferred given their stature
and experience.
Mr. Clarke, Ambassador Sheehan, Dr. Pillar, and Dan Byman would probably prefer to
brief in a classified or, at least, private venue in order to provide the maximum detail.
Dr. Hoffman could brief in public.
Generalized Document Review List
It will be difficult to accurately predict what documents the team will want to review,
although there are some obvious ones. Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking
for will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents, the focus will be the
Executive/NSC/OMB and probably the Departments of State and Justice as well. This
list will grow and become more specific as the investigation proceeds.
The documents we will be requesting include:
• Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy;
• NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy;
• State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to
counterterrorism policy;
• Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy;
• Deliberative information and factors considered before issuing policy;
• Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism;
• Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism; and
• Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.
Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will be
predecisional. Such documents will provide insights into which options were chosen,
which were rejected, and which were off the table. Because of the sensitivity of these
documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may necessitate high-level
interventions.
Appendix One: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area
The Inquiry did some work on policy issues, but most of that focused on the intelligence-
policy nexus rather than on the soundness of the overall policy. The Inquiry discussed
intelligence priorities, the dissemination of information, and the quality of analysis with
policy makers in some depth, but it did not venture far beyond this. The focus of its work
was on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with the Inquiry having more success
learning about the Clinton period.
Policies toward foreign partners received at best incomplete attention. For example, the
Inquiry looked at how the policy makers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship with
Country X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or on neighboring countries.
However, this was only done with a few countries, and even there it was not done
systematically. Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge whether other
equities in a bilateral relationship were more or less important than counterterrorism.
The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of military force and on covert action.
On the former, however, it was hampered by a lack of interviews and access to many key
individuals and documents outside the strict purview of intelligence.
The Inquiry did not try to judge overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensive
way. Parts of the Inquiry's work looked at issues such as warning the public, working
with state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over disruption of
terrorist groups. Many of these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence
Community agencies (e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS), which received less
attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysis
such as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and
political support in Congress.
Suggested Readings for the Commissioners on Terrorism and U.S. Policy
Readings on U.S. Policy
1. Jonathan Fredman, "Covert Action, Loss of Life, and the Prohibition on

Assassination," Studies in Intelligence (1997), pp. 15-25.
2. Adam Roberts, "Counter-terrorism, Armed Force, and the Laws of War," Survival,
Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 7-32.
3. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-129.
4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,
2002), pp. 219-392.
General Readings on Terrorism
1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,

eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 55-66.
2. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44.
Readings on al-Oa'ida and Jihadist Groups
1. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes (Brassey's, 2002), entire.
2. Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," Studies in

Conflict and Terrorism, no. 25 (2002), pp. 303-316.
3. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University

Press, 2002), pp. 101-114.
4. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" New
Republic, June 24,2002.
2002), pp. 3-37.
Notional List of People to Interview
As a first cut, the team would divide people to be interviewed into several categories:
those with responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy who can place counterterrorism in
context; those with counterterrorism responsibilities; those with valuable related
responsibilities; foreign officials; and outside experts. The first list in particular includes
the most prominent names in U.S. government. That may seem ambitious, but priorities
and focus do begin at the top — and often end there. Once you go one or two levels down
the food chain, the individuals have "accounts" and thus do not have a sense of where
their responsibilities fit into the overall picture. So if we are to be comprehensive, we
need to talk to these people. In several cases (e.g., at OMB), it may be more appropriate
to talk to a deputy or someone who focused more on counterterrorism.
Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing the
working-level individuals, particularly those involved in counterterrorism, and outside
experts first whenever possible. Only when we know as much of the story as possible
will we interview the most senior individuals. .
People Responsible for Overall Policy |
• President George W. Bush

• President William J. Clinton
• Vice President Richard Cheney
• Vice President Al Gore
• Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor
• Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor
• Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor
• Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor
• Colin Powell, Secretary of State
• Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State
• Attorney General John Ashcroft
• Former Attorney General Janet Reno
• Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
• Secretary of Defense William Cohen
• Former Office of Management and Budget Director Jacob Lew
• Office of Management and Budget Director Mitch Daniels
• Former FBI Director Louis Freeh
• Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
• Former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch
• Former U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson
• Any other participants in the "Small Group"
• Deputies of various departments as appropriate
10
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107
WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/18/2008
BOX: 00008 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 4 DOC ID: 31209622
COPIES: 1 PAGES: 6
RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
FOLDER TITLE: Workplan
DOCUMENT DATE: 09/09/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: List
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Notional List of People to Interview
This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Closed by Statute
9/11 Personal Privacy
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Team: On this first page are notes to myself. I will insert these once I have the new
interview list and document request list from you. In the section on questions, you'll see
that I opted for brevity and tried to simplify as much as possible. See what you think - I
don't want to lose specific issues, but my strong impression was that Philip thought we
were way too much in the weeds. Make sure that eveiy important issue is covered under
one of the broader questions laid out.
To be inserted under documents:
To gain a deeper understanding of counterterrorism, we also intend to focus on the

activities of several U.S. missions, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany, to
determine how they handled counterterrorism in practice. In addition to examining
directives from Washington, we also plan to look at cables and instructions to and from
key counterterrorism officials at these posts. We will also interview key country team
members as appropriate.
Additional people to interview:
Mary Jo White
Barbara Bodine
Bill Frenzel
James Steinberg
Alexis Albion
Scott Allan
Warren Bass
Daniel Byman
Bonnie Jenkins
Charles Hill
Draft: May 6, 2003
r
Draft -- Unclassified
Contents
Project Overview
Key Questions
identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism, and
determining how well senior policy makers understood the threat from al-Qa'ida.
Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S. relationships with key
foreign partners and adversaries with regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the
team will distinguish between U.S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to
fight al-Qa'ida in particular.
al-Qa'ida began to emerge. These earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian
Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of
people dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The
most lethal terrorists during this era were those backed by states, not those operating
independently. In general, terrorism during this period was viewed as an important but
not overriding policy concern.
slowly shifted. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center marked a turning point. For
the first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In contrast to the
terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the new
radicals wanted a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.
Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, but
U.S. policy changed unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general and al-Qa'ida in
particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the
daily.
extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulation and
implementation of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena, hi addition, the
team will draw on the work of the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry as
appropriate.
Key Questions
The policy team will determine why the United States did not successfully stop al-Qa'ida
before September 1 1 and assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism policy today. In the
process, the team will tell the story of how counterterrorism policy evolved as the al-
Qa'ida threat grew during both the Clinton and Bush administrations, examining such
key events as the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the
2000 attack on USS Cole.
In particular, the team plans to answer the following questions:
U /vsx • What was U.S. counterterrorism policy? What were the gaps in the strategy and
iw* « h°w did policy makers address them? What other concerns hindered an effective
*•* • How effective were counterterrorism instruments such as diplomacy, criminal

prosecutions, renditions, disruptions, military operations, covert action, and public
diplomacy? What were the limits of various instruments? Were some off the
table? How supportive were key countries, such as Saudi Arabia^ ~" ^| ja./,
• Did the United States confront terrorist sanctuaries, such as Sudan and
Afghanistan, properly? Were "permissive environments" in Europe and
elsewhere addressed?
• How did counterterrorism policy change in the aftermath of the September 11

attacks? Why were several aggressive steps only taken after the attacks occurred?
5• Is the United States properly positioned to fight al-Qa'ida and other terrorist
groups today?
1AA, '
Person Agency Issues (to be changed to

reflect the new
organization)
(lead)
Scott Allan State, DoJ, CIA Post-9/1 1 changes,
counterterrorism
instruments (lead), foreign
governments and
sanctuaries
Warren Bass White House/NSC, State Strategies/priorities (lead),
transitions (lead),
understanding the threat,
post-9/11 changes
Daniel Byman White House/NSC Foreign governments (lead),
Bonnie Jenkins DoD, State Post-9/1 1 changes (lead),
oversight (lead),
counterterrorism
enforcement)
Charles Hill* State Background, foreign
governments
Dana Leseman or other DOJ Volunteer for DOJ issues?
person who could do DOJ
issues
Kevin Scheid or other OMB Counterterrorism budgets
person with budget
experience
* Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it
progresses rather than assign a particular task. Byman may be used in a similar
manner.
All team members will w -or at least we will split it up later.
-i 1
We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S.
counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy toward al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the
status of U.S. policy today.
• Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for

understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11.
• General John Gordon, who now holds Clarke's old job, should brief on the
current counterterrorism policy.
• Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Office for the Near East and
provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of different counterterrorism
instruments.
• Dr. Daniel Byman, who headed the "lookback" team on the 9-11 Inquiry, could
offer a staff briefing on several aspects of the Congressional Joint Inquiry
investigation, particularly covert action, foreign liaison, the use of military force,
and the overall counterterrorism strategy as it related to intelligence. These
briefings would follow the Joint Inquiry's more narrow focus and would not
reflect many of the broader issues the Commission will examine.
All four suggested briefers would probably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least,
private venue in order to provide the maximum detail.
Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking for will be classified. Since we will be
requesting policy documents, the focus will be the Executive/NSC/OMB and probably
the Departments of State and Justice as well. This list will grow and become more
specific as the investigation proceeds.
The documents we will be requesting include:
• Presidential Decision Directives related to counter-terrorism policy;
• NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy;
• State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to
counterterrorism policy;
• Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism;
• Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism; and
documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may necessitate high-level
interventions.
""U
\\AMJIAAAA-C
The Inquiry did some work on policy issues, but most of that focused on the intelligence-
policy nexus rather than on the soundness of the overall policy. The Inquiry discussed
policy makers in some depth, but it did not venture far beyond this. The focus of its work
was on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with the Inquiry having more success
learning about the Clinton period.
equities in a bilateral relationship were more or less important than counterterrorism.
with state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over disruption of
terrorist groups. Many of these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence
Community agencies (e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS), which received less
attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysis
such as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and
political support in Congress.
1. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-129. These
pages in Dr. Pillar's book provide an excellent overview of the instruments used to
fight terrorism.
2002), pp. 219-349. These pages review (and defend) the Clinton administration's
counterterrorism policy and examine (and attack) the Bush administration's policy
before September 11.
3. Note to team: there is a Time article that I have asked Lisa to find that covers the
Benjamin/Simon issues. It was a long article by Time's standards, but it is a pale
shadow of the Benjamin/Simon discussion. However, I worry that the pages above
are far too long (particularly as I want to include the Pillar readings). I can't think of
anything else that quickly covers the same material as Benjamin and Simon - let me
know if you can..
4. Daniel Byman, "A Scorecard for the War on Terrorism," The National Interest,
Summer 2003. This piece examines how well the war on terrorism has gone since
September 11. Note to team: I'm not trying to play up my own work, but I don't
know a piece that examines current counterterrorism policy in any depth (the depth
on this is scant ...). We may wish to kill this, but I'd like some piece that evaluates
policy after September 11.
Alexis Albion
Scott Allan
Warren Bass
Daniel Byrnan
Bonnie Jenkins
Charles Hill
Draft: April 25, 2003
' Draft — Unclassified
Contents
Project Overview
Key Questions
identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism (e.g.
frenditions,lprosecutions, military strikesland so on), and determining how well senior
policy makers understood the threat from al-Qa'idaÂnother integral part of the policy
team's effort is examining U.S. relationships with key foreign partners and adversaries
with regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the team will distinguish between
U.S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.
al-Qa'ida began to emerge. In general, terrorism was viewed as an important but not
overriding policy concern. The most lethal terrorists were those backed by states, not
operating independently.
slowly shifted.y^several government counterterrorism experts recognized the danger al-
Qa'ida posed, but policy changed unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S.
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general and al-
Qa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the
daily.
extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulation and promulgation '
of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw
on the work of the Congressional 9-11 Joint Inquiry as appropriate.
SL<Z<dL -W. b*U/
1 <P -L
-
Key Questions
At the Commission hearings held on March 3 1 in New York, witnesses described

their views of the 9-11 attackers, the intelligence capabilities of the government, and the
quality of the USG's counter-terrorism policy before 9-11. They also suggested
improvements in these areas in order to prevent another tragedy. Based upon their
statements and our research so far, we have compiled a list of key questions and issues
that we think need to be addressed by the Commission inquiry.
The list is divided into three parts, corresponding to the overall structure of the
Commission Inquiry. The vast majority of the questions focus on Part I (the pre-9-1 1
era), as this is essential for understanding Parts II and III.
Part One: Counterterrorism Policy Before September 11, 2001
Background
1. What shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy before 1993?

• What was the "old paradigm" regarding the threat posed by terrorist groups?
• What instruments were used for fighting terrorism as a result?
• How important was terrorism considered in general?
Strategy and Priorities

4 4-
i
2. Did the USG possess a comprehensive counter/terrorism policy bet« before prior to
11 or did policy ivary between agencies?
i £KA
• WasTthe strategy employtsg^r*all instruments of U.S. national power?
• What were the gaps in the strategy? Were they obvious at the time?
• Was thej;e an overall lack ofleadership and coordination in connection with
counterterrorism policy?
3. Where was counterterrorism on the overall priority list?

What were th^ other priorities^.
^.j AVM-, - T., . _
• Did moneyjoIlowjjTe
^\ Was 6ffty1
priorrty
therelist? If not,for
a system why not? priorities?
managing
• Was there an integration of domestic policy and foreign policy on
4. Was tho focus on te-iroi'iam maintained during the transition from the Clinton to the
Bush administration?
Understanding the Threat
3- 5
5. Did the USG.havo a ouffioicnFunderstand*ftg-eythe threat posed by international
terrorismJo^cirmhlate
A *•* a comprehensive
r rpolicy?
j
• Did policy makers feel well-informed by the Intelligence Community on the
nature of the threat at home and abroad? -j
• At what stage was al-Qa'ida considered a threat? At what stage was, a—^
considered a grave threat?
6. Oversight^)
• In formulating counterterrorism policy/was sufficient attention given to the
organization of the intelligence community and its ability to combat terrorism.
• In formulating counterterrorism polic^did the USG.focus sufficient attention
on the FBI's organizational ability to counter duiiOiiyjterroris»C? "^V*^ vu
Terrorism and Foreign Relations *

u
7. Did the United States properly empfrdGiae.counterterrorisrn in its foreiglTi'clatioiis?
What were the tradeoffs required to do so?
8. Did the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan and Afghanistan?
9. How supportive were key countries in fighting al-Qa'ida?ft

• How supportive were the governments^PakistairattcKSaudi Arabia and other
locations where popular support for Islamists was high? '
• How supportive were key European countries, such as Germany?
• Who were vital friends in the effort to fight al-Qa'ida?
Counterterrorism Instruments
10. What were limits on various instruments of national power?

• What were the primary instruments?
• Were these instruments/eTfective? Were they used well?
• Were certain options off the table?
Part Two: The Immediate Aftermath of September 11
1 1 . What changes were made in the aftermath of September 1 1 , and why?
12. Could these changes have been made before September 11? Why or why not?
Part Three: Counterterrorism Policy Today
13. Is the United States well-postured to fight terrorism today?

$*•«-&»*/<
14. Is the United States aosnion to" fight all terrorism, or just al-Qa'ida?
A
15. Are the mistakes or problems that allowed the September 11 attacks fixed?
16. What policy steps should be taken today?
C-T
Person Agency Issues

(lead)
Scott Allan State, DoJ Post-9/11 changes,
counterterrorism
instruments (lead)
Warren Bass NSC, State Strategies/Priorities (lead),
transitions (lead),
Daniel Byman NSC Foreign governments (lead),
Bonnie Jenkins DoD, State Post-9/1 1 Changes (lead),
counterterrorism
enforcement)
Charles Hill CIA? Oversight (lead),
background
Dana Leseman or other DOJ Counterterrorism
person who could do DOJ instruments (particularly
issues law enforcement)
All team members will work on 13, 14, 15, 16 - or at least we will split it up later.
We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about U.S. policy toward
terrorism in general, about U.S. policy toward al-Qa'ida before September 11, and about
the status of U.S. policy today.
• Richard Clarke, the former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would be

the ideal briefer given his pivotal role in counter-terrorism in both administrations.
• Generafipordon, who now holds Clarke's old job, should brief on the current
Counterterrorism policy.
• Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for

understand Counterterrorism policy in context before September 1 1 .
• Dr. Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation, perhaps the leading non-
government authority on terrorism, could provide an excellent analysis of how the
threat of terrorism has changed over the years.
• Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Office for the Near East and
provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of different Counterterrorism
instruments.
If necessary, staff member Daniel Byman could substitute for several of the above
briefers based on his own work for RAND, the CIA, and the 9-11 Inquiry. However, in
his view these briefers would be preferred given their stature and experience.
Mr-Clarke, Ambassador Sheehan, Dr. Pillar, and Dr. Byman would probably prefer to
brief in a classified or, at least, private venue in order to provide the maximum detail.
Mr. Hoffman could brief in public.
It will be difficult to accurately predict what documents the team will want to review,
although there are some obvious ones. Much, if not all, of what we will be asking for
will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents/the focus will be the
Executive/NSC/OMB and probably State and Justice as well. This list will grow and
become more specific asfcbeinvestigation proceeds. Jru.
The documents we will be requesting include;
• Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy; dPueiiU*~(|) 1 'Nil
• NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy; I <rI) «
• Tasking directed to the Intelligence Community related to counterterrorism;
• Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism;
documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them.
The Inquiry did some work on policy issues, but most of it focused on the intelligence-
policy nexus rather than on the soundness of the overall policy. It discussed intelligence
priorities, the dissemination of information, and the quality of analysis with policy
makers in some depth, but it did not try to go far beyond this. The focus of our work was
on the late Clinton-early Bush administration, having more success learning about the
Clinton period.
equities in the bilateral relationship were more or less important than counterterrorism.
with state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over disruption. Many of
these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence Community agencies (e.g.
the Department of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. In
addition, the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysis such as trying to evaluate the
available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and political support in Congress.

Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 7-32.
2002), pp. 219-392.
1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,

Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 55-66.
Readings on al-Qa'ida and Jihadist Groups
1. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes, entire.

S—
3. Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (Free Press,
2002), pp. 27-42- [Note to team: I've kept this on for now, as no one has suggested a
book that discusses radical Islamist activities in the United States. Find me a replacement
on this subject, and I'll do it.]
4. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" New
Republic, June 24, 2002.
A First Cut at People to Interview
As a first cut the team would divide people to be interviewed into several categories:
those with responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy who can place counter-terrorism in
context; those with counterterrorism responsibilities; those with valuable related
responsibilities; foreign officials; and outside experts. The first list in particular includes
the most prominent names in U.S. government. That may seem like a stretch, but
priorities and focus do begin at the top — and often end there. Once you go one or two
levels down the food chain, the individuals have "accounts" and thus do not have a sense
of where their responsibilities fit into the overall picture. So if we are to be
comprehensive, we need to talk to these people. In several cases (e.g. at OMB), it may be
more appropriate to talk to a deputy or someone who focused more on counterterrorism.
Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing the
working level individuals, particularly those involved in counterterrorism, and outside
experts first whenever possible. Only when we know as much of the story as possible
will we interview the most senior individuals.
People Responsible for Overall Policy

• Madeline Albright, former Secretary of State
• Former Attorney General Janet Reno -^ II
• Secretary of Defenseûmsfeld l->DV*Al <^
• Former Office of Management and Budget Director Jacob ("Jack") Lew
• Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
• Former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch
• Any other participants in the "Small Group"
• Deputies of various departments as appropriate
Counterterrorism Specialists
• Richard Clarke
• Participants in the
• Ambassador Michael Sheehan (former S/CT at State)
10
• Sheehan's predecessors at S/CT
• General (ret.) Wayne Downing, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism
• General/Gordon, Coordinator for Counterterrorism

• Asst. Secretary, SOLIC, OSD, the Clinton Administration
• SOLIC and CENTCOM officials with CT responsibilities
• Other NSC staff working with Clarke (Roger Cressey, Dan Benjamin,
Steve Simon, and so on)
• NSC staff working on intelligence>x^
• Cofer Black, both in his CTC and in his S/CT responsibilities ^%^
Those with related responsibilities
• Ambassador Karl Inderfurth (former Asst. Secretary, South Asia)

• Ambassador Mark Parris (former Asst. Secretary, Near East)
• Ambassador William Burns (Asst. Secretary, Near East)
• Ambassador Martin Indyk
• Bruce Reidel, former Senior NSC Director for the Middle East
• Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Germany, Britain, Israel, Qatar,
Egypt, and Jordan before September 1 1
Foreign government officials
• HRH Prince Bandar bin Sultan

• Jean-Paul Brugiere, investigating magistrate, France
Outside experts
• Bruce Hoffman, the RAND Corporation

• Brian Jenkins, the RAND Corporation
• Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University
• Jessica Stem, Harvard University
• Juliette Kayyem, Harvard University
• Richard Betts, Columbia University
11
Initial Work Plan of the Counterterrorism Policy Team
Introduction
The following investigative plan being presented by the 9-11 Commission Team
looking at USG Counterterrorism Policy should be viewed very much as a work in
progress. It certainly is not intended to be rigid. As the investigation proceeds the team
expects that the work plan will change and move in different directions as information is
developed and investigative leads are followed. Therefore we view this plan as a starting
point, but only that at this juncture. Also, a cautionary note. This is an unclassified work
plan. As the team moves forward and begins delving into classified documents,
briefings, interviews, and other information it is more likely that the plan could change.
The Counterterrorism policy of the United States has evolved over time and more
then one administration. It can be a broad subject with many facets. Given the time this
inquiry has to complete its work the team in its internal discussions and discussion with
staff management has decided to break the Counterterrorism policy subject into two
phases in order to facilitate a timely and thorough investigation.
Research done thus far seems to show a change, albeit not drastic thus far, in the
government's approach to Counterterrorism policy before and after the East African
embassy bombings in 1998. The team plan is to initially approach its investigation in
two parts - CT policy pre-1998 and CT policy post 1998. There are some indications
that policy began to be reevaluated after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and that
will clearly play a role in our deliberations and could change our premise depending on
what we find. What seems to be clear thus far is a change in the volume and stridency of
USG pronouncements on CT policy after the embassy bombings We will pay particular
attention to USG policy as it related to countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi
Arabia with an emphasis on policy towards sanctuaries. As the investigation becomes
more specific the document research and cast of people to interview will no doubt change
from that listed below. The same will hold true as we begin to move deeper into
classified information.
The team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests

extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulation and promulgation
of USG policy in the Counterterrorism arena. In addition the team will draw on the work
of the Congressional 9-11 Joint Inquiry in as much detail as ongoing commission
negotiations for access to Inquiry records and reports permit. One area of particular
interest will be the documents collected or requested by the Joint Inquiry and the policy
level individuals interviewed. Two members of the team come to the Commission Staff
from the Joint Inquiry. One of them has provided a summary of Joint Inquiry activity as
it touched on the Counterterrorism policy question.
—»
Summary of Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area
The Inquiry did some work on policy issues, but most of it focused on the intelligence-
policy nexus rather than on the soundness of the overall policy. We discussed
policy makers in some depth, but we did not try to go far beyond this. The focus of our
work was on the late Clinton-early Bush administration, having more success learning
about the Clinton period.
equities in the bilateral relationship were more or less important than counterterrorism.
with state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over disruption. Many of
these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence Community agencies (e.g.
the Department of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. In
addition, the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysis such as trying to evaluate the
available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and political support in Congress.
Key Questions
At the Commission hearings held March 31 in New York witnesses described, in

both verbal and written statements, their views of the 9-11 attackers, the intelligence
capability and the USG's counter-terrorism policy before 9-11, and suggested
improvements in these areas in order to prevent another tragedy. Additionally they
recommended, either explicitly or implicitly by way of suggested improvements, areas
that the Commission should focus its analysis on. Based upon their statements and our
research so far , we have compiled a list of key questions/issues we think need to be
answered by the Commission inquiry:
1. Did the USG possess a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy both before

and after the embassy bombings and particularly prior to 9-11 or did policy vary between
agencies?
• Was the strategy employing all instruments of U.S. national power?

4
What were the gaps in the strategy? Were they obvious at the time?
Was everyone "on board" with this strategy? If not, why not?
Did the President exercise direction?
Was there an overall lack of leadership and coordination in connection
;ith/p9unter-terrori«m policy?
i counterterrorism on the overall priority list?
• What were thr nthrrprinrition 0 ~~ • ~~T x

• Did mone\rfoliow the priority list? If not, why not?
• Was there a system for managing priorities?
3. Did USG policy on counterterrorism allow for sufficient resources and

attention to combat the threats?
• Was enough priority given to fighting terrorism or was it eclipsed by the

USG's attention towards China, peacekeeping in the Balkans, etc.?
• What percentage of the intelligence community's budget was directed
towards counter-terrorism and was this amount sufficient?
4. Did the USG have a sufficient understanding of the treat posed by

international terrorism to formulate a comprehensive policy prior to 1998?
• Was there an overall lack of leadership and coordination in connection

with counter-terrorism policy?
5. Did the USG sufficiently understand Al-Qaeda, at least post 1998, to formulate
a comprehensive policy?
• What were the USG's efforts to understand and eliminate the "root
causes" of the Al-Qaeda movement?
• What agencies were responsible for understanding Al-Qaeda's aims,
philosophy, targeting selection and recruitment methods?
• Did the USG study the prior Al-Qaeda attacks closely enough?
Did the USG fail to learn lessons from the prior attacks?
)id w/& conswdt with other nations that had experience with Al-Qaeda?
6. Did the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan and
Afghanistan?
• What agencies were responsible for monitoring the Al-Qaeda related

actions in those countries?
• What actions were taken against those countries and were they effective in
combating terrorism or removing terrorists from such regions?
7. Was there an integration of domestic policy and foreign policy on
counterterrorism?
• Did budgets and other manifestations of policy reflect this integration?

• Did the USG focus its intelligence efforts too heavily on Al-Qaeda's
foreign activities as opposed to monitoring Al-Qaeda's domestic
operations?
• If so, were there policy implications?
8. What were limits on various instruments of national power?
• Was law enforcement effective?

• How well did renditions and intelligence cooperation work?
• Why was military power used sparingly?
9. Did the USG approach terrorism as a criminal problem (i.e. employing FBI
investigations, arrests and trials) as opposed to a military one that required the use of
force?
10. Why was preemption not a major focus in the USG's pre 9-11 counter-
terrorism policy?
11. Did USG policy on counterterrorism allow for sufficient resources and
attention to combat the threats?
• Was enough priority given to fighting terrorism or was it eclipsed by the

USG's attention towards China, peacekeeping in the Balkans, etc.?
• What percentage of the intelligence community's budget was directed
towards counter-terrorism and was this amount sufficient?
12. In formulating counterterrorism policy did the USG focus sufficient attention
on the FBI's organizational ability to counter domestic terrorism?
• Did the FBI's role as a domestic law enforcement agency, which prepares
evidence for criminal cases, restrict it from sharing information with other
agencies?
• Was there any intelligence gathering by local law enforcement groups and
how was it shared with federal agencies such as the FBI?
13. hi formulating counterterrorism policy was sufficient attention given to the

organization of the intelligence community and ifsability to combat terrorism.
• Before 9-11, how was information shared between agencies?

• Was the intelligence community too "reactive" in connection with
counter-terrorism?
• Did it "fail to keep up" with the fluid structure of Al-Qaeda?
• How did the intelligence community change it operations after they
learned that Al-Qaeda had "declared war" on the United States and vowed
to attack it?
• Were too many agencies taking "parallel tracts" in monitoring Al-Qaeda
while failing to acknowledge gaps in intelligence coverage?
• To what extent did the culture of secrecy in the intelligence community
restrict it from sharing information?
• Before 9-11, how was threat information shared within the agencies of the
intelligence community and between the intelligence community as a
whole and the FBI and local law enforcement?
14. Did the United States properly emphasize counterterrorism in its foreign
relations? What were the tradeoffs required to do so?
15. Has the United States made the appropriate changes since September 11?
Suggested Readings

Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 7-32.
2002), pp. 219-392.
1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, eds

Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 55-66.
Readings on al-Qa'ida and Jihadist Groups
1. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes, entire.

~"7 3. Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (Free Press,
' 2002), pp. 27-42.
--i 4. Daniel Pipes, "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Military Islam?" The
• National Interest (Winter 2001/02), pp. 14-21.
Richard Clarke - Former NSC Director for Counterterrorism

Ambassador Michael Sheehan - Former Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism
Bruce Hoffman - For background on terrorism and 9-11 context
Daniel Byman - Present consultant to Team 3 and former Joint Inquiry Staff
Mr Clarke, Ambassador Sheehan, and Mr. Byman would probably prefer to brief
in a classified or, at least, private venue in order to provide the maximum detail. Mr.
Hoffman could brief in public.
A First Cut at People to Interview
As a first cut the team would divide people to be interviewed into three
categories: those with responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy who can place
Counterterrorism in context; those with Counterterrorism responsibilities; and those with
potential competing responsibilities (e.g. nuclear proliferation). The first list in particular
includes the most prominent names in U.S. government. That may seem like a stretch,
but priorities and focus do begin at the top — and often end there. Once you go one or
two levels down the food chain, the individuals have "accounts" and thus do not have a
sense of where their responsibilities fit into the overall picture. So if we are to be
comprehensive, we need to talk to these people. In a few cases (e.g. at OMB), it may be
more appropriate to talk to a deputy or someone who focused more on Counterterrorism.
People Responsible for Overall Policy -
• Madeline Albright, former Secretary of State

• Former Attorney General Janet Reno
• Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
• Former Office of Management and Budget Director Jacob ("Jack") Lew

. tXLl ^
Counterterrorism Specialists -
• Richard Clarke
• Ambassador Michael Sheehan (former S/CT)
• Sheehan's predecessor at S/CT
• General (ret.) Wayne Downing, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism
• General Gordon, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
• Asst. Secretary, SOLIC, OSD, the Clinton Administration
• SOLIC and GENICOM officials with CT responsibilities
• Other NSC staff working with Clarke (Roger Cressey, Dan Benjamin,
Steve Simon, and so on)
• NSC staff working on intelligence.
• Intelligence Community officials (Tenet, Deutch, and CTC leaders) who

can explain their understanding of priorities
Those with competing responsibilities -
•
UjL
Ambassador Karl Inderfurth (former Asst. Secretary, South Asia)
• Ambassador Mark Parris (former Asst. Secretary, Near East)
• Ambassador William Burns (Asst. Secretary, Near East)

• Bruce Reidel, former Senior NSC Director for the Middle East
• Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Germany, Britain, Israel, Qatar,

Egypt, and Jordan before September 11
It is a little difficult to accurately predict what documents the team will want to
review, although there are some obvious ones. Much, if not all, of what we will be
asking for will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents the focus will
be the Executive/NSC/OMB and probably State. There could be some requests of the
Justice Department as well. This list will grow and become more specific as the
investigation proceeds.
The documents we will be requesting include;
• Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy
• NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy
• Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy
• Deliberative information and factors considered before issuing policy
• Tasking directed to the Intelligence Community related to
counterterrorism
• Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism
• Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism

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Draft — Unclassified

Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy Team

Draft: April 25,2003

Proposed Division of Labor

Initial Document Review List

Appendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on Policy

Appendix Two: Suggested Readings

Appendix Three: Notional Interview List

Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners

Part One: Counterterrorism Policy before September 11,2001

Strategy and Priorities <

4. Where was counterterrorism on the overall USG priority list?

Understanding the Threat

Terrorism and Foreign Relations

11. How supportive were key countries in fighting al-Qa'ida?

12. What were the primary instruments used in fighting terrorism?

Part Two: The Immediate Aftermath of September 11 (through September 20)

Part Three: Counterterrorism Policy Today

Person Agency Issues

• Richard Clarke, the former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would be

Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for

The documents we will be requesting include:

• Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy;

• NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy;

• Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy;

• Deliberative information and factors considered before issuing policy;

• Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism;

• Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism; and

• Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.

Readings on U.S. Policy

1. Jonathan Fredman, "Covert Action, Loss of Life, and the Prohibition on

General Readings on Terrorism

1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,

Readings on al-Oa'ida and Jihadist Groups

1. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes (Brassey's, 2002), entire.

2. Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," Studies in

3. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University

People Responsible for Overall Policy |

• President George W. Bush

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/18/2008

BOX: 00008 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 4 DOC ID: 31209622

FOLDER TITLE: Workplan

DOCUMENT DATE: 09/09/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: List

SUBJECT: Notional List of People to Interview

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

To be inserted under documents:

To gain a deeper understanding of counterterrorism, we also intend to focus on the

Additional people to interview:

Draft: May 6, 2003

Proposed Division of Labor

Initial Document Review List

Appendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on Policy

Appendix Two: Suggested Readings

Appendix Three: Notional Interview List

Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners

In particular, the team plans to answer the following questions:

*•* • How effective were counterterrorism instruments such as diplomacy, criminal

• How did counterterrorism policy change in the aftermath of the September 11

Person Agency Issues (to be changed to

All team members will w -or at least we will split it up later.

• Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for

• • How effective were counterterrorism instruments such as diplomacy, criminal

• What were thr nthrrprinrition 0 • T x