Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXX, No.

4, Summer 2007

Use of Religion in Violent

Conflicts by Authoritarian
Regimes:
Pakistan and Malaysia in
Comparative Perspective
Arshi Saleem Hashmi*

Three decades ago, most social scientists saw religion as a remnant of a

long-gone age. Around 1979, surprisingly enough for many, religion began
to take on a new political importance as phrases like “liberation theology,”
“fundamentalism,” “revivalism” became common. R. Scott Appleby
argued that much of this religious violence is attributable to religious actors
who are actually quite ignorant of their own traditions, much like the foot
soldiers of the Balkan atrocities who knew nothing about Christianity.1
Marc Gopin, however, predicted that as religion became more important
in the lives of hundreds of millions of people, the political power generat-
ed by this commitment would either lead to a more peaceful world or a
more violent world, depending on how that power was utilized.”2
Gopin asserts that the religions of the world have all contributed at one
time or another to the creation and perpetuation of ethical values and
behaviors that are indispensable to peace and civil society. It is equally
within the capacity of the world’s religions to generate, justify and even
exult in the most cruel and barbaric behavior that human beings are capa-
ble of perpetrating. Religions go through periods of history in which one
or the other of these two alternatives will dominate, and it is also invariably

* Ms. Arshi Saleem Hashmi is a Research Analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies,
Islamabad, Pakistan.
1
R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
2
Marc Gopin, “Judaism, the Limits of War, and Conflict Resolution,” Paper presented at
Princeton University, April 27, 2001.

22 22
the case that there are always individual members, at any time of history,
who devoutly embrace one or the other of these alternatives.3

Problem Definition
The question arises, does religion accelerate violence? Under what con-
ditions are we likely to see the eruption of religious violence? Why leaders
both dictators and popularly elected, find it very easy to play with the
masses emotionally, and what are the factors that mobilize the masses on
the basis of religion? Is there something about the nature of religion that
creates conflict and leads inexorably to violence? It has been observed that
religious violence is more frequent in authoritative regimes, but do
Democracies use religion as a tool in conflicts too? Is it the lack of mandate
that allows authoritative regimes to indulge in sectarian violence, to pro-
mote vested interests, rather than resolving conflicts? Can religious con-
flicts be resolved peacefully?

Religion as a Source of Legitimacy

Politicians and dictators everywhere tend to invoke local religious
themes and symbols as sources of legitimacy when pursuing power—
termed by N.J. Demerath and Rhys Williams as “cultural power.”4
However, governmental regimes and their officials try to keep religion at
arm’s length once power is secured. Religion can become an unwelcome
constraint in the processes of state administration; it happens particularly
in the authoritarian regimes. Demerath developed this point in an earlier
article, arguing that, while few countries have the kind of formal, legal
“separation of church and state” (example-US), an informal de facto sepa-
ration is almost commonplace. Despite their reliance on religion for polit-
ical purposes, rulers do not reveal the fact that they need religious groups.
Most of the time, there is a covert understanding between the rulers and
the religious hierarchy based on mutual interest. Demerath says that the
most obvious exceptions here are not “religious states” but rather “state
religions” in which the government seeks to control religion.5 So for polit-
ical purpose, states tend to hide the fact that they use religion. In most
cases, there is no recognition in the form of “state religion.”

3
See for detailed argument, Marc Gopin, Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring
Peace to the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
4
N. J. Demerath and Rhys H. Williams, A Bridging of Faiths: Religion and Politics in a New
England City (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
5
Demerath, 1991.

23 23
 It is essential to know the two basic distinctions, one between the reli-
gious and the secular and the other between politics (democratic, authori-
tarian and military dictatorship) and the state. Thus, one can imagine reli-
gious politics in a religious state (Pakistan, Malaysia); secular politics in a
secular state; secular politics in a religious state (Indonesia), and finally reli-
gious politics in a secular state (the example of the US and India).
Pakistan’s case is special because of religious politics in a religious state,
which has been for the most part of its history, an authoritarian/military dic-
tatorship. The constitution demands that religion serve as the guiding prin-
ciple in religious politics. I have studied the nature of the relationship
between the two factors and its contribution to the violent politics in the soci-
ety. Religion in one sphere is matched symmetrically by religion in the other;
a religious state would seem to go hand in hand with religious politics.
In this study, Pakistan is compared with Malaysia, a religious state under
Mahathir bin Mohamed. Unlike Zia-ul-Haq’s politics in Pakistan; Mahathir
did not use religion to establish one particular type of Islamic state (i.e., a
Sunni State) and thus alienate the other sects. This comparison will show
that religious politics in a religious state can result in serious violent con-
flicts when there is a dictatorship. One may argue that Malaysia under
Mahathir was a kind of dictatorship, but here our focus is on religious vio-
lent conflicts in a military dictatorship versus a democratic regime.
Malaysia is a particularly good case to analyze as under Mahathir’s semi-
democratic regime the country did not experience violent religious politics
even though the state was declared an Islamic polity. In fact, the country
unexpectedly experienced very high economic growth and stability.6
The combination of a religious state and religious politics has induced
some of the most deeply rooted and tragic violence of the modern era. In
a religious state with religious politics, religion is an important source of
state legitimacy, and no alternative religious views are tolerated in a num-
ber of Islamic hegemonies in the Middle East, including Pakistan at vari-
ous points in its history. It also applies to several countries in South East
Asia such as Buddhist Thailand. Here the state controls the political world
very tightly and embraces religion more to control it than to submit to it.
Indonesia offers an interesting case; here the state has used an imposed
civil code seeking to bind the loyalties of different religions practiced in
Indonesia.

6
See Vali Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001).

24 24
 Strict electoral rules make it virtually impossible for any one religious
group to rise against the regime and the state’s administrative apparatus,
which functions as a controlling political structure. Thus; the combination
of a religious state with secular politics produces strange partnerships.7
Much of the literature on religious violence falls into three major groups.
First, there is school of thought that believes that religion is always violent
as seen in the writings of Hent de Vries (2002) and Mark Juergenmeyers
(2001). De Vries argues that there is no religion without violence of some
sort, and no violence without religion of some sort. However, De Vries’
theory cannot explain why religious conflict is sometimes violent and
sometimes does not lead to violence. “Does violence inevitably shadow
our ethico-political engagements and decisions, including our understand-
ings of identity, whether collective or individual?” he asks.8 Juergenmeyer
argues that religious violence is a result of people’s tendency to see their
life as a struggle between good and evil. He questions why religious peo-
ple commit violent acts in the name of their god, taking the lives of inno-
cent victims and terrorizing entire populations. He argues that the acts of
violence occur because people believe that they are part of a cosmic strug-
gle between the powers of good and evil and embroiled in a battle to bring
order and peace out of chaos and darkness. The clash between the forces
of darkness and light can be understood not as a sacred struggle but as a
real fight—often in the form of political maneuvering—taking place on the
earth. He claims that when there is an identity crisis, problem of legitima-
cy or a threat of defeat, a real-world struggle can be conceived as a sacred
war and enemies demonized.9 Another school of thought, that includes
Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis and Jessica Stern, sees
only Islam and not other religions as inevitably violent. Daniel Pipes, for
instance, claims that radical Islam is an ideology incompatible with secular
society. Muslims want to force the secular world to submit to their princi-
ples. They are thus, “a radical network of terrorists,” “terrorists in this
world who can’t stand the thought of peace,” “terrorism with a global

7
N.J. Demerath, “Religion, Politics, and the State: Cross-Cultural Observations,” Paper
presented at the Institute of Oriental Philosophy in Tokyo, May 20, 1996.
8
Vries, Hent De, Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida (The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
9
Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

25 25
reach,” “evildoers,” “a dangerous group of people,” “a bunch of cold-
blooded killers,” and even “people without a country.”10
Samuel Huntington (1993, 1998) uses a similar approach. Like Pipes, he
insists that Islamic civilization has been in conflict with the west long
before 9/11. As Mahmood Mamdani observes, Huntington’s argument is
built around two ideas: the first that since the end of the cold war “the iron
curtain of ideology” had been replaced by “velvet curtain of culture,” and
the second that the velvet curtain had been drawn across “the bloody bor-
ders of Islam.” For Huntington Islam is an enemy civilization based on reli-
gious faith and dogma.11 Muslim countries are involved in far more inter-
group violence than others; he argues that the West should worry not about
Islamic fundamentalism but about Islam itself.
Jessica Stern identifies increasingly broad threats posed by Islam stating
that violence and terrorism once confined to the political realm have now
shifted to the religious realm.12 Bernard Lewis argues that it is not just the
issue of materialism and sexual freedom that bothers Muslims and forces
them to adopt a different path than the west, but it also is their opposition
to basic Western democracy. Islamic extremists worry that within their
own community more and more Muslims are coming to value the freedom
that political democracy allows.13 Long before Huntington’s work “Clash of
Civilization” (1993), Lewis wrote of the culture of Islam as something vio-
lent that led Muslims in the moment of upheaval and disruption to resort
to violence.
People who try to explain Osama bin Laden and militancy in Islam as
something “Islamic” apply Lewis’s explanation of the “violent nature of
Islam.” But this emphasis on Osama’s religious motivations underestimates
Bin Laden’s political agenda, and his emphasis on the political implemen-
tation of Islamic law. Bin Laden is a practicing Muslim but he is not a schol-
ar or Ulema who can pass verdicts on the right and wrongs in the society.
When Bin Laden or his followers talk about Islam, they are actually talk-
ing about political Islam—the way they believe the rulers should run the

10
Daniel Pipes, “The War Against Islamic Militants,” Human Events Vol. 58, Iss. 37
(Washington, October 7, 2002), p. 10.
11
See the article published in Foreign Affairs in 1993, and the book by Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order (Simon and Schuster,
1998).
12
See Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (Harper Perennial
2004).
13
See Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and UnHoly Terror (Random House,
2004).

26 26
state, policies, foreign affairs, finances, law, trade etc.
If one uses this approach to explain Islamic violence it becomes very
hard to explain the cases like Malaysia. Why has Malaysia with more than
40 percent ethnic and religious minorities remained calm and avoided seri-
ous religious violent conflicts? Nor can this approach explain why Islam
remains a main source of spirituality and culture in both Malaysia and
India, or why Muslims in India (India has more Muslims than Pakistan!)
did not fall prey to extremist ideology or Bin Laden’s mission against
Hindu extremism?14 Questions like these not only create doubts about the
cultural/civilization explanation of violent Islam, but also provide us an
opportunity to think that it is indeed the regime type that creates, sustains
and encourages extremism in the form of religious violent conflicts.
The third approach comes from the scholars who think that Political
Islam or politicization of Islam is the problem and not the religion itself.
Mamdani (2004) argues against the prevailing notion that
Judeo/Christian/Muslim civilizations have always been in conflict. He
points out that violent clashes within Christianity or between Christians
and Jews were more common than between either group and Muslims. It
is the political interpretation and implementation of Islam over the years
by different so-called “leaders” of the Muslim community (Umah) and their
political objectives that led them to collaborate with their western counter-
part. It is this, which has resulted in present day crisis Muslim states all
over the world are facing. Mamdani considers religious violence in
Pakistani society a direct result of “righteousness in politics” which had
nihilistic consequences. He further says that righteousness—or fundamen-
talism in religion does not automatically translate into political terrorism.
Rather, only when a righteous perspective religious or secular- is integrat-
ed into a ruthless and ideologically intolerant political project does it pro-
vide the language that fuels terrorism (or religious violence).15

14
The reason for using Indian Muslim’s example here is due to the fact that India faced a
great challenged in the form of Hindu extremism advocated by the BJP and its allies in
1990s, but people refused to accept the “Hinduvta” ideology mainly because of the demo-
cratic character of the society at grass root level. There have been instances such as “Gujarat
massacre” but political process continued to challenge extremism and democratic structure
provided a mechanism to handle the situation. Interestingly, even after such open threat
from extremists, Indian Muslim did not follow Osama Bin Laden against the infidels (in this
case Hindus). This proves that Islam does not endorse violence in any form; it is the politi-
cization of Islam that creates problems.
15
Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of
Terror (Pantheon Books, 2004), p. 249.

27 27
 Vali Nasr (2000, 2001) expressed a similar view. He notes that Pakistan’s
politics have been shaped by the dynamics of civilian-military relations
and Islam’s relation to the state. This has created an ongoing negotiation
for power in which the military, political leaders and Islamic forces have
individually and in alliance with one another vied for control of Pakistan.
The military overshadowed the influence of the bureaucracy when it took
control of the state apparatus after the 1958 military coup of General
Mohammad Ayub Khan. Since then, the effective power within the state
apparatus lay in the hands of the military.16
Ayesha Jalal (1995, 1997, and 1998) also considers politics to be more
important than religion in explaining violence in the Muslim world. She
completely negates the notion that Pakistan was created for Islam and
hence, anybody who tries to mix religion and the state invites trouble.
While focusing on Pakistan, she claims that the colonial state used “reli-
gion” as a marker not in any ordinary sense but to define majorities and
minorities—the Hindu and Muslim categories were used in India as the
Catholic and Protestant categories were used in Ireland. It is this, which
gave “religion” the role it came to play in identity politics of the late colo-
nial period. Without this form of colonial political engineering, the politics
of identity may well have taken a different turn. For example, the connec-
tion between language and nationalism was very strong in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.17
Charles Tilly (2003) explains the relationship between the type of gov-
ernment and violence. He argues that all collective violence involves con-
tention of one kind or another.18 He discusses the role of authority and
claims that governments, individuals or organizations that control concen-
trated means of coercion become parties to discontinuous, public, collec-
tive claims. Where and when governments are very weak, interpersonal
violence commonly proliferates in the populations under the nominal juris-
dictions of those governments. Where and when governments grow very
strong, violence among civilians usually declines.
Although, Tilly does not discuss violent religious conflict in his work, his
theory helps clarify why the situation is different in democratic regimes

16
Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan,” The Middle East Journal
Volume 58, No. 2, (Washington, D.C., Spring 2004), pp. 195-209.
17
Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
18
Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003) p. 26.

28 28
where religious differences do exist but do not become violent conflicts.
Tilly divides regimes along two lines—democratic versus authoritarian and
weak versus strong (he calls it capacity). The least violent are strong
democracies the most violent are weak dictatorships. According to Tilly, it
is not always the case that collective violence completely disappears in
democratic regimes. Democratic regimes, undoubtedly harbor less collec-
tive violence than undemocratic regimes, reasons being, broadening of
political participation, extension and equalization of political rights, regu-
larization of nonviolent means for making claims and increasing readiness
of third parties to intervene against violent resolution of disputes.19
In most of these studies, scholars have looked at the way religion is used
for political purposes. However, there is not much focus on the relationship
between the different types of regimes and the way they use religious con-
flicts to achieve their political motives.
Politicization of Islam is certainly a problem, but it doesn’t become a seri-
ous threat to the society unless the state is under authoritarian regime, for
instance, Pakistan under military dictatorship or the Middle Eastern author-
itative regimes. We have often seen in other countries (with the exception
of Ireland) the rise of religious violent conflict, but it rarely becomes an issue
of extremism. How do democracies deal with the religious violence without
falling into its trap? What kept Indian Muslims away from extremism?
Authoritarian regimes not only sustain extremism in the form of violent reli-
gious conflict but also strengthen and encourage it. The question emerges,
why authoritative regimes tend to be so impatient and intolerant of religious
ideologies different from what they proclaim?
The theoretical arguments in this study are drawn from Tilly’s theory on
regime type and his relational approach to examine the link between dic-
tatorship and religious violence.
Clearly additional research is needed to explore the relationship between
the type of regime and violent religious conflicts, not only to examine if
there is any link between authoritarianism and religious extremism, but
also to examine how conflicts, particularly religious ones, escalate in mili-
tary dictatorships in countries like Pakistan. This study would be helpful in
identifying the potential threat of religious violence in countries where the
military is politically active or has the potential to disrupt the political
process.

19
Ibid., p. 44.

29 29
 The study is an attempt to argue that violent religious conflicts have less
to do with religion and more to do with politics. That is,
(a) Religion does not inevitably lead to violence, even in religious
states.
(b) Islam is not in itself a religion that leads to violence.
(c) Religion and violence are most likely to coincide in authoritarian
regimes where the government lacks support.
(d) Governments that must run in elections and win wide spread sup-
port, even governments that use religion to win elective office, are
unlikely to engage in sectarian violence; this holds true even among
Islamic states.
Religious violence in Pakistan was a consequence of the dictator’s need
to maintain power in the face of wide spread opposition. In Malaysia,
where the government had won elections, religious rules were intentional-
ly inclusive and non-sectarian.

Genesis of the Problem: The Case of Pakistan

Religion itself is not responsible for violent conflicts. It has often been
observed that religious violence or conflict with religious dimensions
occurs very frequently under a dictatorship. Authoritarian regimes have
been far more successful in using religion in the implementation of their
agenda. The question is whether it is something in the religion that makes
it helpful for the regimes to play with emotions of the masses, consequent-
ly, giving them no room to question the real issues.
For instance, the crucial and perplexing question of the role Islam should
play in Pakistan existed before the creation of the nation and remains unre-
solved today. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, himself, sup-
plied a historical reference to the dilemma. Stating in his inaugural address,
“You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and
Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because
that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as cit-
izens of the state.”20
Hamza Alavi has articulated how military regimes’ have utilized Islam
differently than democratic regimes. For example, in Malaysia the process
of Islamization was started from the top for the purpose of establishing
Islamic principle for guidance not legitimacy. Regarding military regimes

20
Ishtiaq Ahmed, <http://www.statsvet.su.se/stv_hemsida/statsvetenskap_04/publika-
tioner/ahmed/artiklar_2004/47_jinnahs_speech.htm>.

30 30
he writes: “Lacking a popular mandate, the military regime had sought its
claim to legitimacy, if not its purpose, in divine ordinance.”21 He further
writes, “The irony of the argument that Pakistan was founded on religious
ideology lies in the fact that practically every Muslim group and organiza-
tion in the Indian subcontinent that was specifically religious-Islamic was
hostile to Jinnah and the Muslim League, and strongly opposed the
Pakistan Movement. The fact remains that Islam was not at the centre of
Muslim nationalism in India, but was brought into the political debate in
Pakistan after the nation was created. The Pakistan Movement was not a
movement of Islam, but of Muslims.”22
It is very important to understand for research analysis that the idea of
Pakistan for the homeland of “Muslim Community” is completely different
from establishing an Islamic state for all the Muslims of the Sub-Continent.
Several scholars like Alavi, Jalal and Bose have discussed this point in their
work in detail. Alavi, for instance states: “The Bengal case is particularly
relevant for illustrating not only the contingent nature of (Muslim) ethnic-
ity but also the fact that neither Jinnah nor the Muslim League intended to
create a state exclusively of Muslims or an Islamic state.”
The Islamist vision became ensconced in the state during the Zia ul-Haq
era (1977-88).23 Although each of Pakistan’s indigenous constitutions has
defined Pakistan as an Islamic state, determining what this means in prac-
tice has usually been left open to individual preference. General Zia-ul-
Haq elevated the tempo of the debate over the role of Islam in Pakistani
society by directly involving the authoritarian state with religion. The Zia
period witnessed the Islamization of laws, public policy, and popular cul-
ture, producing a unique case of systematic propagation of Islamism from
above.24
The Zia regime embraced the Islamist vision of state and society and
used it not only to shore up state power by ending its war of attrition with
Islamism, but also to expand its own powers domestically as well as region-

21
Hamza Alavi, “Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology,” in State and Ideology in the
Middle East and Pakistan, ed. Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (Monthly Review Press, 1988),
p. 21. See also, <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/sangat/Pakislam.htm>
22
Ibid.
23
Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven years of Zia- ul-
Haq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).
24
Lawrence Ziring, “From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan,” Asian Survey:
Vol. 24, No. 9 (September 1984), pp. 931-46 and Charles Kennedy, “Islamization and Legal
Reform in Pakistan, 1979-89,” Pacific Affairs: Vol. 63, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 62-77.

31 31
ally.25 The alliance provided legitimacy to military rule—which justified its
suppression of democratic forces by claiming to be building an Islamic
order. The alliance between Islamism and military rule produced stability,
but was ultimately fraught with too many inconsistencies and divergent
interests of its key actors to survive.

Mullah-Military Alliance26
Religious parties and military getting together to “purify” the society from
Bhutto’s “un-Islamic” social democracy

General Zia-ul-Haq benefited greatly due to the very obvious opposition

towards Bhutto by the Islamic parties. It was not merely an “Islamic” gov-
ernment that the religious parties were after. From the very beginning of
the Bhutto era in 1971, the landlords, military bureaucracy as well as the
religious parties realized that they would not “benefit” under the Bhutto
regime. It was the rhetoric of the Bhutto government that it emphasized on
the economic issues, though unfulfilled, it had acted as a catalyst for change
in Pakistan’s political culture by pushing obscurantist religious issues to the
background and by highlighting problems of economic redistribution and
social justice. It not only alarmed the capitalists but also hurt the interests
of strong sections of Pakistani political leadership ranging from the Muslim
league to the Jamat-i-Islami that had thrived upon obscurantist Islamic slo-
gans that had been used largely to obscure the real social and economic
problems.27
It is a fact that through out the checkered history of Pakistani politics,
Islamic parties have never received enough votes to claim a majority in the
parliament, not even enough to form a government by alliances. (The
recent success of the MMA in Sindh and Baluchistan in 2002 elections was
mainly a reaction after the US attacked Afghanistan and the preparation
for war with Iraq). The religious parties were well aware of their weak point
and saw in the military the only opportunity to achieve their goal. These
parties, particularly the Jamat-i-Islami welcomed the military take over
whole heartedly and it was this mobilization by the Jamat-i-Islami that cre-
ated the momentum in General Zia’s Islamization process. None of the two

25
Nasr, Islamic Leviathan, 2001.
26
A term used in Urdu language for religious leader/person who teaches how to recite
holy Quran but less respectful as compare to “Maulana” which means Islamic scholar.
27
Mohammed Ayoob, “Two faces of political Islam: Iran and Pakistan Compared”, Asian
Survey, Vol, 19, No. 6 ( June 1979), p. 538.

32 32
sides had a purely religious goal, it was more of gaining legitimacy among
the public than anything else.
It was extremely difficult for the past rulers to initiate any discourse on the
role of religion in the politics due to the differences among different sects
within Islam. General Zia, interestingly, decided to exploit the moderate
Muslims of Pakistan, who had voted for a Muslim state, a home for the
“Muslim community” of India but had no interest in an Islamic state based
on Sharia.28 As much as they love being Muslim, having an Islamic state
under strict Islamic set of rules, was never acceptable to them. Foreign inter-
vention in the form of Saudi money and American support for Afghan Jihad
turned the direction of Islamization towards “Deobandi/Wahabi” Islam
rather than the local “Barelvi” Islam based on local rituals and traditions.
General Zia needed a reason to justify why his predecessor Bhutto’s gov-
ernment deserved to be removed; Islam was the answer, and Deobandi
Islam became the guiding line for it was acceptable to the Saudis. As his-
tory tells us dictators need “ideologies” to discipline people and make them
obedient. In case of Pakistan, the ideology came in the form of Islam. But
given Pakistan’s society, it was very difficult to define which sect of Islam
would become the state religion. Again without any far-sightedness,
Pakistan agreed to host the most fundamentalist form of religious practices
which does not tolerate anything different from its own tradition. Wahabism
or Deobandi Islam, in theory may not be violent but due to its lack of toler-
ance towards other sects and minorities, it paved the way for sectarian vio-
lence between Sunni and Shi’ites.
The escalation of the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict helped General Zia keep the
population busy in discourse on the “right” and “wrong” interpretation of
Islam. It resulted in the absence of any organized mobilization of the peo-
ple against the military regime, except a few protests by the political par-
ties soon after the military coup of 1977. Religion came out of people’s
home on to the street and became the source of violent conflict. It helped
Zia, but created a permanent dent in the inner fabric of the society. The
case of Pakistan under Zia is a perfect example of politicization of religion
and its violent expression.
Mohammed Ayoob in his paper written in 1979 analyzed that a throw-
back to Islamic slogans appeared very attractive to General Zia also, both
because they appealed to the homespun officer who had suffered the
humiliation of 1971 (surrendering before the Indian army in East Pakistan)

28
See Alavi, Hamza, “The Social origins of Pakistan and Islamic Ideology,” in South Asia
in Transition, ed. Kalim Bahadur (Patriot Publishers New Delhi, 1986).

33 33
and now found solace in religion, and because they also provided the gen-
eral’s main basis of legitimacy for the re-imposition of military rule.
The second consideration was as, if not more, important than the first,
particularly since a military take over in 1977 was bound to remind a sig-
nificant number of Pakistanis of the catastrophe that overtook the country
in 1971 after more than thirteen years of overt military rule. To the tradi-
tional twin justifications of military rule in Pakistan, “political instability”
and “threat to the country’s survival,” General Zia-ul-Haq had to add the
slogan of “enforcement of Islamic Sharia law” in a mammoth effort to sell
extended military rule to an increasingly skeptical public.29
It is interesting to note that use of Islam not only suited the military but
the secular landlords and capitalists also because such deliberations trans-
formed the political debate in Pakistan. The issue of land reforms remained
incomplete and feudal aristocracy secured their future in the military
regime. One can say that it was double jeopardy, because it was not only
the military dictatorship under Zia but also the authoritative rule of landed
aristocracy in small villages and towns that created a land with very little
outlet to the free world.
Zia’s “new” political system under Islamization was not taken favorably
by all of the people of Pakistan. In the last half of 1983, acts of civil dis-
obedience, verging on insurrection, spread through the interior of Sind
province. Allegedly precipitated by General-President Mohammad Zia-ul-
Haq’s August 12th announcement of a “new” political system, demonstra-
tors attacked government installations and personnel leaving a substantial
loss of life and property in their wake. In the view of General Zia, the
“new” political system was more true to Islamic precept and practice than
anything Pakistan had experienced since its independence.
Despite such assurances, however, there was apparently little popular
inclination to adopt the administration’s reform program. The population
harbored grievances that the military establishment could not address.
These grievances involved the desire for self-government, which military
rule appeared to make impossible. The opposition was unimpressed with
government attempts at redesigning Pakistani political and legal institu-
tions along religious lines. Indeed, the politically attentive public was more
inclined to interpret the military government’s actions as power reinforc-

29
Ibid., pp. 538-539.

34 34
ing, rather than as a genuine and sincere effort at the construction of an
Islamic State.30

Politicization of Religion: Policy Implications in the Form of

Violence
Pakistan had experienced religious violence before the rise of
Sunni–Shi’ite sectarian violence in the form of “Ahmadiya” (A group
declared non-Muslim because of its following of the Mirza Ahmed who
claimed prophet hood).31 Perpetrators of violence against Ahmadis were
never prosecuted, and theoretically Ahmadis could be jailed or executed
for carrying a Quran or uttering the Islamic confession of faith. In this
sense, a political climate against a religious minority forced the state to craft
laws, which sanctioned violence against the targeted group.32
In the 1980s, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq promoted the madrasahs
as a way to garner the religious parties’ support for his rule and to recruit
troops for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. At the time, many madrasahs
were financed by the zakat (the Islamic way tax on savings/wealth collect-
ed by the state), which gave the government at least a little control.
Without any check, these madrasahs were free to preach a narrow and vio-
lent version of Islam. Most madrasahs offered only religious instruction. As
Maududi warned in his 1960 book, First Principles of the Islamic State, “those
who choose the theological branch of learning generally keep themselves
utterly ignorant of [secular subjects, thereby remaining] incapable of giving
any lead to the people regarding modern political problems.”33
The Islamic state of Pakistan, in the words of Ziring, “not only seeks to
reinforce Pakistani unity, it seeks to do so by demonstrating the effective-
ness of the ruling authority’s coercive power. The Islamic state thus
becomes the dramatic portrayal of authoritarian government. It also high-
lights repressive policies and actions.34
30
Lawrence Ziring, Asian Survey (1984), pp. 942-943.
31
Details about Ahmadi group and how they are different form the main stream original
Islam, see <http://www.understanding-islam.com/related/text.asp?type=discussion&did=
71&sscatid=374? ?>
32
Sumit Ganguly and Alyssa Ayres, “ Explaining Ungodly Behavior: The Roots of
Religious Violence in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh,” Paper presented and distributed at
the Conference “ Religion and Conflict in Asia: Disrupting Violence” organized by The
Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict, Arizona State University, October 14-15
2004.
33
Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2000).
34
Lawrence Ziring, “From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan,” Asian Survey Vol.
24, No. 9 (September, 1984), p. 932.

35 35
Sunni–Shi’ite violence: Direct Result of State Patronage to
Sunni Deobandi Islam
It is important to note that sectarianism extended beyond sporadic clash-
es over doctrinal issues between Sunnis who constitute 75-80 percent of
Pakistani Muslims and nearly 90 percent of the world’s Muslims and
Shi’ites who constitute 15-25 percent of Pakistani Muslims. These clashes
grew into political conflict mobilized by group identity. Sectarianism devel-
oped political utility and militant organizations that championed its cause
for the most part in the political rather than religious arena.35
Amir Mir points out:
It is also significant that, for decades, the country’s Shi’ite and Sunni sects lived side by
side without any major problems. The roots of sectarian killing lie not in religious dif-
ferences, but in political and social developments within Pakistan and the region. They
are intimately tied up with the country’s wider problem of militant and extremist Islam.
With the passage of time, the largely theological differences between Shi’ite and Sunni
Muslims of Pakistan have been transformed into a full-fledged political conflict, with
broad ramifications for law and order, social cohesion and governmental authority.36

The level of intensity and organization of the militant groups leads one
to think that the two sects never maintained cordial relations at any point
in time. It is surprising and difficult to believe that historically sectarian vio-
lence between the two sects of Islam was rare if not unknown. “The Sunni-
Shi’ite conflicts were mostly unknown before partition in the areas which
now form Pakistan because of the influence of Pirs and Sufis, relations
between Shi’ites and Sunnis remained normal except for occasional riots
or minor clashes during Muharram ceremonies. The state was neutral and
had no sectarian agenda.”37
It was later on that these militant-sectarian organizations were created
and nursed by different regimes for their own political purposes. The
strength of religious extremism has till now been derived from state patron-
age rather than popular support. The west needed Zia to fight its Afghan
war against the former Soviet Union, and Zia needed the Mullahs’ politi-
cal support for his illegal regime and also to utilize “Mullah Power” to com-
bat Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) and groups further to the left.38

35
Vali Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization:
Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979-1998,” Comparative Politics (2000), p. 171.
36
Amir Mir, “Pakistan’s Sectarian Monster,” South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly
Assessments & Briefings, Vol. 3, No 47, ( June 2005), < http://satp.org/satporgtp/sair/
Archives/3_47.htm#assessment1>.
37
Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, (London: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 195.
38
Ibid., p. 139.

36 36
 Since the overall direction of Pakistan’s military establishment had been
committed to an “Islamic ideological” state, some of the militant groups
that were supported by the regime were often found involved in bloody
acts of sectarian violence. Sunni political parties have been around since
the days of British colonialism, but Sipah-i-Sahaba, the first openly anti-
Shi’ite sectarian group, emerged in Pakistan only in the mid-1980s.

The Outsiders
Role of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the U.S in Sustaining Religious Conflict through
Political and Financial Support

With the intensification of regional politics after the Iranian revolution of

1979 and the beginning of the Afghan war in 1980, the state of Pakistani
failed to prevent the influences of these forces on its domestic politics. It is
a well documented fact that the CIA, in order to provide cover of plausi-
ble deniability to its activities, arranged for the arms supplied via Pakistan
to be those of Soviet make, delivered through unofficial networks and
coordinated by Pakistan as the front actor.39
Sectarian clashes have killed or injured thousands of Pakistanis. The
impotent Pakistani government has essentially allowed Sunni Saudi Arabia
and Shi’ite Iran to fight a proxy war on Pakistani soil, with devastating con-
sequences for the Pakistani people.40
General Zia’s initiative of religious education helped the U.S. find dedi-
cated soldiers willing to die in the name of Islam and also created a wide
gap between the Sunnis and Shi’ite groups in Pakistan. Madrassas under
government patronage were all Sunni religious seminaries that indoctri-
nated their students with a brand of extremist Islam and thus laid the foun-
dation for sectarian violence in the country. Zia needed the support for his
decision to involve Pakistan in the war against the Soviet Union; he man-
aged to do it with an army of young Pakistani students of religious semi-
naries.

Saudi Arabia, Money and Islam

While the Americans were concerned only with winning the war in
Afghanistan and defeating the Soviet Union, the Saudis had ideological
and sectarian aims. To the extent that jihad in Pakistan responded to the

39
For a detailed analysis see, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Steve Coll, Ghost Wars and Milton
Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires,” Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2001), pp. 17-30.
40
Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2000).

37 37
financial stimulus of Saudi Arabia it became mercenary and cannot be dis-
cussed as a manifestation of Islam. It is quite certain that at the level of the
jihadi leadership, the jihad was motivated by financial gains. Almost all the
jihadi leaders came into possession of considerable wealth, which they
shared with the state apparatus in Pakistan and not in sufficient measure
with the young recruits who fought the war. It is possible that among the
rank and file of the jihadi youth there was belief in the spilling of blood in
the name of Islam and belief in martyrdom. The same is true of sectarian-
ism. The leader who plans the killings is working for money but the man
who actually kills may be moved by religious passion. There is evidence
that youth from the crime underworld also joined the jihad. One has to
concede that in such cases the rank and file too were motivated by finan-
cial considerations. Jihad and the consequent “weaponization” of Islam
have inflicted permanent damage on civil society and state institutions in
Pakistan.41
Pakistan and the United States embraced the term “jihad” and built up
the Mujahideen to mobilize and unite the Afghan anti-occupation forces.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 meanwhile profoundly influenced the
Muslim world, and Sunni states like Saudi Arabia were particularly keen
to give material support to these groups. Madrassahs started to grow rap-
idly, vying with one another to attract valuable Saudi money.42

Iran’s Role in Politicizing Shi’ite Community in Pakistan

Zia’s Islamization project and Pakistan’s failure to contain the impact of
regional conflicts—the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the start of the
Afghan War in 1980s—on its domestic politics intensified the rise in mili-
tancy and sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. According to some scholars, the
Iranian Revolution changed the character of sectarian politics in Pakistan.
Its impact on Shi’ite was, however, more direct and that in turn influenced
the politics of Sunni activism as well.43

41
Khalid Ahmed, “Islamic Extremism in Pakistan,” South Asian Journal, Lahore, Pakistan,
(October/December 2003).
42
Mandavi Mehta and Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer, Islam in Pakistan: Unity and
Contradictions, A Report from the CSIS Project (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, October 7, 2002), <http://www.csis.org/images/stories/saprog/
021007schaffer.pdf>; Teresita C. Schaffer, Pakistan’s Future and U.S. Policy Options
(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1, 2004),
<http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,23/type,1/>.
43
Ahmad Rashid, 1996, p. 160.

38 38
 The ideological force of the Revolution combined with the fact that the
first Islamic revolution had been carried out by Shi’ites, emboldened the
Shi’ite community and politicized its identity. Soon after the success of the
revolution in Tehran, zealous emissaries of the revolutionary regime active-
ly organized Pakistan’s Shi’ite community.44 There are however, some who
have argued that it was actually Zia’s reliance on Saudi Arabia and his
attachment to Deobandi Islam that led to the organized political activism
on part of Shi’ites in Pakistan. While Iran was uneasy with the proximity
of the Americans to its borders, it was just as unhappy with the irreligious
Soviets’ occupation of Afghanistan.45 For centuries the Shi’ites had main-
tained that zakat should be donated on a voluntary basis and that no gov-
ernment had the right to collect it. Faced with strong Shi’ite opposition and
significant pressure created by the Iranian revolution, Zia declared Shi’ites
exempt from all those aspects of the Islamization package that contravened
Shi’ite law.46 The Shi’ite victory was considered a defeat for the ruling
regime and for the Sunni Islamists. In the minds of Sunnis, Shiaism grad-
ually was becoming a problem for their desired Islamic State. This led Zia
and his Islamist allies to develop a concerted strategy for containing Shi’ite
mobilization and limiting both Pakistani Shi’ites and Iran’s influence in
Pakistan.47
Due to successful social resistance to the state’s policy initiative, combined
with the intrusion of outside forces into the body politics, state leaders
looked to mobilizing sectarian identities as a means of contending with the
challenges before them.48 The SSP (Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Sunni militant
organization) was founded to counter the rise of Shi’ism in September 1985
at Jhang with the apparent financial support of Saudi Arabia and Iraq; both
countries were concerned about Shi’ite influence in the region. The Saudi
and Iraqi involvement in effect imported the Iran-Iraq war into Pakistan as
the SSP and its allies on one hand and the TJP (Tehrik-e-Jaferia Pakistan,
Shi’ite extremist group) and its allies on the other fought with each other.

44
See Mushahid Hussain, “Pakistan-Iran Relations in Changing World Scenario:
Challenges and Response,” in Pakistan Foreign Policy Debate: The Years Ahead, ed. Tariq Jan
(Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1993).
45
Sudha Ramachandran, “Pakistan and Iran—‘Brothers’ in Arms,” Asia Time Online, March
18, 2005, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia>.
46
S.V.R. Nasr 2002, p. 87.
47
Ibid., p. 88.
48
N.V.R. Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization:
Sectarianism in Pakistan 1979-1998,” Comparative Politics ( January 2000), p. 176.

39 39
 These sectarian killings were not only confined to leaders and activists,
symbols of state authority, main government functionaries, police officers,
judges, doctors, lawyers and traders, from both sides, were also targeted. A
change was seen in 1997 with indiscriminate gunfire on ordinary citizens
who were not involved in sectarian activities and whose only fault was to
be either Sunni or Shi’ite.49

Lack of Democracy: Religious Violence Flourishing in

Dictatorship
A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan and Malaysia

In order to understand the very complicated issue of religious violence

and its political manifestation, one needs to analyze the relationship
between the type of regime and religious violence in the light of historical
evidences and events that have taken place over the years. Also it is impor-
tant to examine whether it is a frequent phenomenon that in the absence
of a democratic form of government, authoritative regimes use religions for
political purposes.
In Pakistan, it has always been the collaboration between the military
dictatorship and the religious parties, Jamat-e-Islami’s alliance with Zia,
MMA with Musharraf in the initial phase of Musharraf regime. In
Pakistan’s brief democratic history, democratic political parties and reli-
gious political parties have always antagonized each other. Whether it is
the religious politics that bar them from supporting democratic forces or
that religion itself needs an authoritative regime for its complete imple-
mentation, both socially and politically is the center of the argument on
Islam and politics. A recent report published by The International Crisis
Group in April 2005, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, maintains that
power politics are the name of the game in Pakistan and religion appears
to be a very “productive” instrument, the report says:
Sectarian terrorists in Pakistan are thriving in an atmosphere of religious intolerance
for which its military government is largely to blame. General Musharraf has repeat-
edly pledged that he would eradicate religious extremism and sectarianism and trans-
form Pakistan into a moderate Muslim state. In the interests of retaining power, he has
done the opposite.50

49
Ibid.
50
International Crisis Group Report, April 2005.

40 40
 A comparison between Malaysia and Pakistan is odd in many ways, but
at the same time one finds certain similarities. Both are weak states, as Nasr
puts it, wherein the ruling regimes have made prolific use of Islamic sym-
bols and policies to shore up state authority at a critical junctures viewing
Islamic politics more as an opportunity than a challenge. Also the countries
are unique in the degree to which they moved away from the dominant
nationalist paradigm to invest in a state ideology of Islam.51
Pakistan and Malaysia provide us an insight to understand that the use of
religion can produce different results in different types of regimes. While
in Pakistan, military dictatorship used religion to gain legitimacy as well as
to divert the attention of the people from real economic issues by engag-
ing them in issues like Muslim solidarity, in Malaysia, religion was not used
but Islamic principles were used to reform the Malaysian society with
equal importance given to modernization. This policy adopted by
Mahathir, on the one hand took Malaysia down the path of development,
on the other hand it created opponents among the liberal as well as the
Muslim parties; both parties complained about not having enough of any
system.

Democratic Malaysia and Islamization Process

By no standards was Malaysia an “ideal” democracy under Mahathir. In
fact, according to the western standards, Malaysia did not even qualify as
a democracy. Mahathir did not use religion (Islam is the majority religion
in Malaysia) to rouse conflict in order to strengthen his rule. Instead his
vision promoted Islamization with modernization. He took an entirely dif-
ferent path than General Zia who used Islam to invest in religious/sectari-
an violence in order to gain legitimacy. Zia depended largely on one sect
of Islam for political reasons. The Afghan jihad that Pakistan was support-
ing was carried out with the help of Sunni Mujahideen; therefore, it was
very important for General Zia to promote Sunni sect of Islam (Wahabism,
more precisely) in Pakistan. This decision then led to the emergence of a
violent Shi’ite movement supported by Iran.
As noted earlier, it is very important to note that Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian
violence in Pakistan does not have historical roots. From the time of inde-
pendence in 1947 up until 1979 there is no evidence of organized violence
between the two sects. It can be proved that the need of the state to gain
legitimacy for its decision to back the Afghan jihad helped create sectarian
violence in the society.
51
Vali Nasr, Islamic Leviathan, p. 4, 11.

41 41
 The Malaysian situation leads us to understand that state patronage of a
religion is entirely different from state patronage of religious sectarianism
as a tool to strengthen the regime. While in Pakistan sectarian differences
were exploited to mobilize the majority of the masses in the favor of the
regime, the Malaysian government’s implementation of Islamic principles
included minorities in order to avoid violent conflict between different
sects. A democratic process through a policy of accommodation paved the
way for a secular constitution in Malaysia. Since the constitution did not
make the state a strictly Sunni or Shi’ite, Wahabi or Salafi52 “Islamic state,”
minorities did not feel threatened the way they did in Pakistan. Unlike a
dictatorship, democratic governments must gain approval from the major-
ity of the voters in the population; therefore, it is pivotal for a democratic
system not to rely on just one particular group. Mahathir accommodated
opposing parties to ensure his success in the election. Although it was his
own interest to win elections, he did not use the tools often used by dicta-
tors, for instance banning the opponent political parties. Mahathir knew
that he required the votes of contending parties to win an election and
show the world that he had the support of the people of Malaysia.
Following the chronology suggested by Jomo and Ahmed, who detect
three phases in the resurgence, the beginning of the Islamic revival began
in the early 1970s among Muslim Malays educated in western secular tra-
dition.53 While overseas, a number of students came under the influence of
Islamic teachings. In the late 1970s, an alliance between the Malaysian
Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) and the main Islamic opposition party,
the Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) gave the resurgence a political momen-
tum. In the third phase, Islamic resurgence was tolerated by the Malaysian
government through its own Islamization program. David Camroux iden-
tified another phase in which the state has attempted to channel the Islamic
resurgence along a modernization path linked to the secular objective of
Malaysia becoming a fully industrialized country by the year 2020.54

52
For an explanation of the different sects, see Satu Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan
Malik, eds., Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies, Spring 2004), <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20
Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/ReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsia.pdf >.
53
Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Ahmed Shabery Cheek, “The Politics of Malaysia’s
Islamic Resurgence,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1988), p. 843.
54
David Camroux, “State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia: Accommodation,
Co-Option, and Confrontation,” Asian Survey Vol. 36, No. 9 (Sept 1996), p. 855.

42 42
Islamic Democratic Malaysia with a Secular Constitution
According to the International Religious Freedom Report of 2003,
released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
Department of State:
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, Islam is the official reli-
gion, and the practice of Islamic beliefs other than Sunni Islam is restricted signifi-
cantly. In September 2001, the Prime Minister declared that the country was an Islamic
state (Negara Islam). Government funds support an Islamic religious establishment (the
Government also grants limited funds to non-Islamic religious communities), and it is
official policy to ‘infuse Islamic values’ into the administration of the country. The
Government imposes Islamic religious law on Muslims only in some matters and does
not impose Islamic law beyond the Muslim community. Adherence to Islam is con-
sidered intrinsic to Malay ethnic identity, and therefore Islamic religious laws bind eth-
nic Malays.55

In June 2002, the Government implemented a rule requiring all Muslim

civil servants to attend religious classes taught by government-approved
teachers. But interestingly, several religious holidays are recognized as offi-
cial holidays, including Hari Raya Puasa (Muslim), Hari Raya Qurban
(Muslim), the Prophet’s birthday (Muslim), Wesak Day (Buddhist),
Deepavali (Hindu), Christmas (Christian), and, in Sabah and Sarawak,
Good Friday (Christian).56
In an effort to avoid religious conflict the government took measures to
ensure that the Islamization process not be a source of insecurity among the
non-Muslims. The government generally restricts remarks or publications
that might incite racial or religious disharmony. This includes some state-
ments and publications critical of particular religions, especially Islam. The
government also restricts the content of sermons at mosques. Some state
governments ban certain Muslim clergymen from delivering sermons.57
Religious tolerance despite distinctly enforced Islamic principles is evi-
dent everywhere in Malaysia. Even the critics of Mahathir accept the fact
that the religio-ethnic situation remained in control under Mahathir. For
instance, Francis Loh, writing in Aliran Monthly, acknowledged: “For it is in
spite of money, politics and nepotism, the resort to communalism and the
manipulation of ethno-religious sentiments by political leaders, indeed, in
spite of BN rule or Dr. Mahathir’s leadership, that economic development
has occurred, political stability been maintained, and inter-ethnic harmony

55
U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2003: Malaysia
(Washington, D.C., 2003), <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/23838.htm>.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.

43 43
sustained. We must therefore understand the secret of Malaysia’s success
lest we shortchange ourselves.”58
The process of modernization with Islam as the guiding principle that
started in 1980s is criticized for two reasons, in the words of Roger Hardy,
BBC Islamic affairs analyst: “In the 1980s and 1990s, Malaysia’s course
was charted by its ambitious Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. He and
his ruling UMNO party pursued a modernization programme based on
two guiding principles. First, they gave Islam a new pre-eminence in pub-
lic life. This meant stressing Muslim values and identity, building up
Islamic institutions and forging new links with the wider Muslim world.
Second, they continued the “affirmative action” policies, begun in the
1970s, which gave the ethnic Malays—who form some 60 percent of the
population—a privileged position in government, education and the
bureaucracy. But where do these twin goals leave the Chinese, Indians and
others who form the non-Muslim minority? Can a society based on these
two principles also be genuinely democratic?59
Interestingly, both the liberals and Islamic groups were not satisfied with
Mahathir’s policies of modernization. Liberals criticized Mahathir’s regime
for too much Islamization; Islamic parties, like PAS, criticized the regime
for not having enough Islamization of the society. The biggest challenge for
the UMNO government under Mahathir was how to prevent religious
revivalism from turning into extremism. Given Malaysia’s multi-ethnic
society, it required great skills to deal with Islamic parties and non-Muslim
ethnic Malays and other ethnic groups. Keeping in view the extreme sen-
sitivity of Islamic issues in terms of their communal, political and even
international ramifications, the regime for the most part chose to respond
to with co-operative measures.
Overall, the UMNO government has succeeded in meeting the immedi-
ate challenges of Islamic resurgence. In order to avoid any confrontation
between the radicals and the moderates, it has taken firm action to curb the
violent excesses of religious zeal and absorb the momentum of revival
within its own officially sanctioned organizations and activities. It has
sought to reassure non-Muslims that their religious freedom and constitu-

58
Francis Loh, “Dr. Mahathir and the BN’s Hegemony: Demolishing the Myths that
Sustain their Rule” Aliran Monthly (August 2003), <http://www.aliran.com/monthly/2003a/
8f.html>.
59
Roger Hardy, “Malaysia, Islam and Multiculturalism,” BBC News, February 7, 2005,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4232451.stm>.

44 44
tional rights will not be eroded, while reaffirming its commitment to an
expanded role for Islam.60

How Democracy Worked with Islamization?

William Case draws the attention of those involved in scholarly debate
over Malaysia’s democracy in his paper, “Semi Democracy in Malaysia:
Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change.”61 He says that while
Malaysia’s pluralist tensions are intrinsically interesting, it is the overall
avoidance of conflict despite these deep cleavages that raises the country’s
analytical importance. This record is further distinguished by Malaysia’s
overall practice of at least semi-democratic politics. It can thus be argued that
British Colonialism served less to divide local elites over ethnic differences
and functional roles than to link them in a ‘tradition of accommodation’ and
to ground them in principles of consultation and representativeness.”62

Patronization or Strategy to Counter Radical Islamic Politics

Islamic resurgence was potentially destabilizing for Mahathir’s govern-
ment as it had very tangible political consequences. Mahathir’s political
ally, the UMNO, did not want to be seen as a competitor of PAS; there-
fore, it was decided at the state level to initiate the Islamization process,
mainly to lead Malay Muslims away from the radical Islamic ideas of
PAS.63 The Malaysian case provides an interesting insight; the approach
towards Islamization was both reactive and proactive. Mosque building
and the promotion of Islamic courts were used as indicators of the
Malaysian government’s Islamic credentials. Also, the development of the
Malaysian model of modernization was designed to shift the agenda of the
ideological debate onto grounds where “fundamentalist” doctrine would
have no resonance. This modernization model was incorporated to some
extent into secular models. For example, Mahathir’s Look East Policy
urged Malaysians to follow the examples of the work ethic and business

60
Simon Barraclough, “Managing the Challenges of Islamic Revival in Malaysia: A
Regime Perspective,” Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 8 (August 1983), pp. 972-73.
61
William Case, “Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime
Change,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 66, No. 2 (Summer 1993).
62
Ibid., p. 184, see also Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative
Explanation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 99-103.
63
It is very important to note that Islamization under Mahatir was not just to counter PAS
and actually motivated by religious beliefs, but the political motivation to do it before PAS
creates a political problem for Mahatir was certainly there.

45 45
practices of Japan and Northeast Asia, and the goal of his Vision 2020 plan
is to make Malaysia a fully industrialized country.64
The problem for the government before Mahathir was that it firmly
desired to avoid direct confrontations with any Islamic groups and consid-
ered itself restricted in the use of most of the coercive powers of the state
in dealing with activities involving Islam. It attempted to keep Islam out of
the mainstream of politics; however, via its concessions, the extensive
media coverage given to dakwah activities, and the expansion of the size
and activities of the federal religious bureaucracy, the government
response drew more attention to Islam and thus partly exacerbated its own
problems by trying to control the scope of Islamic political demands.65
After Mahathir took office as Prime Minister in 1981, it became very
clear to him as well as his party, the UMNO, that the only way to meet the
Islamic challenge was with more Islam; they could not afford to leave
Islam to the opposition. That was the only way to break any future radical
alliance between ABIM and PAS, the two Muslim fundamentalist organi-
zations, and avoid a demand from them for Islamic revivalism and the
enforcement of Sharia (Islam Law).

Policy of Accommodation
The authorities used Islam as a necessity to save Malaysia from sectarian
conflicts between the Muslims and non-Muslims. Had PAS and ABIM
joined hands to make Malaysian a “real” Islamic state, Malaysia would
have experienced a long period of religious violence in the country. On the
contrary, because of UMNO’s strategy to “deal” with the issue of
Islamization rather than hiding it under the carpet worked well, and it
saved the government as well as the economy from being effected by the
radicalization of the society. The absence of really strong opposition also
helped the administration to concentrate on the economic development of
the state. Instead of encouraging controversial issues and pitting one group
against other, the policy of the Malaysian government was one of accom-
modation. Malaysia has had a significant Islamist political opposition since
the 1950s, most clearly embodied in PAS and especially since the 1970s, in
a range of non-governmental mass organizations. Such activism has gener-
ally been contained within legal bounds: contesting elections, organizing in
registered societies for community service and advocacy work, etc. There

64
David Camroux, Asian Survey (1996), pp. 857-858.
65
Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne, “The Mahatir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline
through Islam,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Winter, 1983-84), p. 635.

46 46
have been sporadic violent incidents on occasion, but since open political
participation is allowed, only a small minority turns to extremism.66

Conclusion
Zia’s Islamization, the Iranian Revolution, the Afghan War and Kashmir
were the enabling factors that gave scale and sustenance to sectarianism
and militancy in Pakistan. But above all, it was the military regime that
patronized the extremist element against other religious communities, par-
ticularly Shi’ites, to get maximum support from the majority of Sunnis by
showing them how protective the regime was of their religion.
The military dictatorship under General Zia used Shi’ite-Sunni sectarian
violent conflict in late 1970s and during 1980s to prevent the population
from questioning the legitimacy of military dictatorship and its decision to
involve Pakistan in the Afghan war. In an effort to establish one particular
brand of Islam in the state, other minority sects, especially Shi’ites, felt
threatened and this gave Iran opportunities to influence the local politics
in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. While Pakistan was helping the USA to
contain the Soviet Union, Iran was confronting the U.S. via financial and
moral support for the Shi’ites in Pakistan with the hope of instigating a
Shi’ite revolution in Pakistan and the Uzbek/Hazara ethnic areas of
Afghanistan.
It was clearly a domestic decision by General Zia-ul-Haq to sustain his
regime with the help of U.S. administration and Saudi money. Above all
else, it was General Zia’s foremost priority to secure his regime. In order to
silence the opposition at home, he had to present something that was “in
danger” and needed to be “protected”. Islam became the main issue; it was
“Sunni Deobandi” Islam that was in “danger” and the threats were coming
from Shi’ite Iran and Afghanistan occupied by “non-believers.” Sunni mil-
itant groups were given a free hand to “correct” the ignorant among the
Muslims. Zia’s policy rendered the Shi’ites the “Infidel” ignorant; the only
choice given to them was to accept the Sunni way or risk losing every-
thing—including life. This decision led to the beginning of violent sectarian
conflict between Sunnis and Shi’ites in Pakistan. Zia’s policy not only ful-
filled the purpose of justifying a longer stay in power and control of the law
and order situation but also extended involvement in Afghanistan’s war
without any accountability.

66
Meredith L. Weiss, DePaul University, ( July 14, 2004) Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific House International Relations Committee, http://wwwc.house.gov/
international_relations/108/wei071404.htm

47 47
 Zia benefited from the Sunni/Shi’ite violent conflict. The majority of
Pakistani Muslims are Sunnis, and during Zia’s rule they looked upon him
as the leader who would safeguard their religion from the impurities. Zia
received legitimacy for eleven years until his death in an airplane crash in
1988. However, the society had to pay the price in the form of drugs,
weapons, refugees and violent conflicts that still haunt the society today.
It was the vulnerability of the military dictatorship due to the lack of a
popular mandate that encouraged outsiders to intervene in the sectarian
conflicts and domestic politics of Pakistan. It was the vested interest of the
military dictatorship to control the state by any means. Zia’s regime down-
played the level of interference from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. In fact, the
regime tried to convince the people that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia estab-
lished strong relations with the country because of the military govern-
ment’s successful diplomacy.
The International Crisis Group analyzed the complicated relationship
between the clergy and the military in Pakistan. It concluded that the
choice Pakistan faces is not between the military and the mullahs, as is gen-
erally believed in the West; it is the constant battle for either genuine
democracy or a military-mullah alliance that is responsible for producing
and sustaining religious extremism of different hues. The report recom-
mends to the Pakistan Government that it recognize the diversity of Islam
in Pakistan, reaffirm the constitutional principle of equality for all citizens
regardless of religion or sect, and give meaning to this by repealing all
laws, penal codes and official procedures that reinforce sectarian identities
and cause discrimination on the basis of faith.67
If the alliance between mullah and the military has brought anything to
Pakistan, it is the status of a “not free” country. A Freedom House survey
classified Pakistan as a country that is not free. On the other hand,
Malaysia was classified as a partly free country.68 Though the Freedom
House survey is not the absolute criteria to measure a country’s political
system, it does show that Malaysia with its system of democracy managed
to keep a multi-ethnic country free from religious violence, even with
neighboring Thailand already marred with Muslim militancy and state
sponsored violence by the Thai army in Muslim majority areas.
67
ICG Report on Pakistan April 2005.
68
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2005, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.
cfm? page=363&year=2005>. In the report Malaysia ranked a 4 (partly free) in political
rights and civil rights while Pakistan ranked a 6 (severely restricted rights) in political rights
and a 5 (very little compliance in civil liberties). Overall, as stated above, Malaysia ranked
as a partially free country and Pakistan ranked as a country that is not free.

48 48
 It also shows that Mahathir’s policy of Islamization with modernization
did quite well to continue the political process with religious practices. The
Malaysian example is a true case of Islamization with modernization with-
out relying on extremism, manipulation or patronization of a particular
sect in Islam. It is very important to note that unlike Pakistan, in Malaysia,
the regime initiated the Islamization process to counter radical Islam and
to provide a spiritual and social aspiration to Malay Muslims. This obser-
vation gets support from the fact that in Malaysia ethnicity was the most
salient feature in regard to political rights, followed by contestation and
political participation rather than Islamic process and fear among the
minorities vis-à-vis the government’s Islamization process.69
It seems that the majority of the Malaysians were not really bothered
about the Islamization process perhaps due to the nature of the initiatives.
The majority of Malaysians did not support Mahathir because he took
responsibility for Islamic revivalism; they supported him for his policy of
accommodation and his economic program that led to the modernization
process and industrialization in Malaysia. It worked completely the other
way round in Pakistan, where the Islamization process was initiated by
patronizing one sect of Islam which created religious resentment among
other sects in an already ethnically divided society.
It also shows that state patronization encouraged the violent, radical pol-
itics of the sectarian groups to thrive in Pakistan that gave legitimacy to
General Zia’s military rule and created the public opinion, which exists
even today that only the institution of the military can provide security in
a society where sectarian violence can erupt at any time killing innocent
people.
Mahathir’s Malaysia saved the country going into the trap of extremism
by accommodating Islamic ideas in the governance while the process of
industrialization and modernization continued. The policy of accommoda-
tion worked well in Malaysia compared to the politics of confrontation
which resulted in violent sectarian conflict and a deteriorating social and
economic situation in Pakistan.

69
Bridget Welsh, “Attitudes towards Democracy in Malaysia: Challenges to the Regime?”
Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No 9 (September, 1996), p. 902.

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