COOMBS V. SANTOS G.R. No. L-7644 March 24, 1913 SYDNEY COOMBS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOPE K. SANTOS, defendant-appellant.

Facts: The property in question was seized on March 31, 1911, by the defendant Lope K. Santos as sheriff of the Province of Rizal, acting by virtue of an execution issued at the instance of Kuenzle & Streiff in a case where in the latter was the plaintiff and George Cruickshank was the defendant. The plaintiff, who was in possession of the property at the time of the seizure, demanded its return from the sheriff. Upon the sheriff's refusal to comply with this demand the plaintiff instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover possession of the property seized and for damages caused by reason of the seizure. The first complaint was against Lope K. Santos alone and a summons was served upon him on the 10th day of April. The amended complaint added the firm of Kuenzle & Streiff as defendant. Not having answered within the time provided, Lope K. Santos was, by a judgment of the court, declared to be in default on the 23rd of May, and the case was heard on the 25th of May, at which time the defendant Kuenzle & Streiff was declared to be in default. Lope K. Santos appealed. Issue: Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment? Ruling: A default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified on the ground that it is the one final expedient to induce the defendant to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay. A judgment of default may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. But it is urged that the granting of the motion to set aside a default rests in the discretion of the court; that such discretion cannot be controlled in the absence of a showing of an abuse thereof; and that this showing has not been made in the case at bar. The Court held that the only discretion conferred upon officers is a legal discretion, and when anything is left to any officer to be done according to his discretion the law intends it to be done with a sound discretion and according to law; and if a given case falls within both the letter and spirit of section 113, Code of Civil Procedure, a denial of the relief sought will amount to an abuse of such discretion. There is, however, a serious drawback to granting the relief asked. The motion asking that the default judgment be set aside is accompanied by no affidavit of merits. If the defendant has no real defense to the action or intends to enter only a technical plea, there would be no justice in permitting the case to be reopened and subject plaintiff to further delay and expense for the mere purpose of rendering a judgment in the regular manner.

CHIONG V. BALOLOY A.M. No. P-01-1523 October 27, 2006 CARMELITA CHIONG, Complainant, vs. SHERWIN BALOLOY, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, Caloocan City, Respondent. Facts: Complainant Carmelita Chiong alleged that on October 12, 2000 at about 4:30 p.m., she was at the Aurelio Building at 9th Avenue, Caloocan City to collect payments from her customers for various merchandise she sells on installment. She proceeded to the IBP Office to collect from Ana Baloloy, wife of respondent, who is the office secretary. However, when she opened the door, the same was partially blocked by respondent, thus, she was not able to enter and was forced to remain standing outside the premises. She communicated by hand signals to Ana the purpose of her visit, who in turn, gestured that complainant return the next day for the payment. Complainant, however, remained outside the door pleading with Ana to pay her whatever amount she could spare. At that point, respondent irritably said: "Bakit ba ang kulit mo? Sinabi ng wala ah. Pasensiya ka nagpapahulog ka eh. Kasama iyan." Instead of reacting in kind because respondent was a long-time acquaintance, complainant calmly replied that she was not there to collect from him. At that juncture, the now infuriated respondent suddenly faced her saying: "Talagang ang kulit mo ah, lumayas ka nga rito!" then shoved her outside with his hands. Ana attempted to pacify respondent but the latter became more incensed and choked the complainant, then punched her left jaw. Owing to the force of the blow, complainant fell down and passed out. When she regained consciousness at about the same time respondent returned to the place of the altercation and who, upon seeing her thus revived, scornfully said to her: "O ano, nakita mo na ang hinahanap mo." Still not content with uttering such contemptuous remarks, respondent punched her again hitting her at her left jaw and before going out the door turned and threatened her. The incident prompted complainant to file criminal charges for Slight Physical Injuries and Light Threats with Branch 49 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City. Respondent likewise filed criminal complaints against complainant for Slander by Deed. These cases were consolidated with the criminal complaints for Slight Physical Injuries and Light Threats filed by complainant against respondent. the case was docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City for investigation, report and recommendation. Issue: Whether or not the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions? Ruling:

Yes. Government service is people-oriented. Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where employees are bound by the rules of proper and ethical behavior and are expected to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. Public officers and employees should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of their official duties, but also in their personal and private dealings with other people. Moreover, this is not the first time that the respondent has been administratively charged. In Baloloy v. Flores, respondent was fined for fighting with a co-worker employed in another branch of the trial court. In addition to the instant case, respondent is also involved in two other pending administrative cases of grave misconduct. Respondent obviously has not learned how to curb his bellicose predisposition. A more severe penalty is thus in order. BELICENA V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE G.R. No. 143190 October 17, 2001 ANTONIO P. BELICENA, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondent. Facts: Antonio P. Belicena was appointed Acting Undersecretary, in the Department of Finance, on February 12, 1997 and forthwith assumed office. While still acting as Acting Undersecretary of Finance, the president designated him, on May 20, 1997, as Acting Secretary of Finance, effective May 22, 1997 until May 27, 1997, while the Secretary of Finance, Roberto de Ocampo, was in Hongkong, on official business for the government . The Petitioner took his oath of office, on May 22, 1997, as Acting Secretary of Finance. In a letter-Memorandum, Acting Secretary Executive Luis C. Liwanag III confirmed the designation of the Petitioner as Acting Secretary of Finance. On October 8, 1997, the Petitioner reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years old, by which time, he had rendered forty-four (44) years of continuous service with the Department of Finance. However, the President extended his services, as Acting Undersecretary of Finance, until April 8, 1998 and extended the same anew until June 30, 1998. In anticipation of his impending compulsory retirement, the Petitioner submitted, on May 18, 1998, his application for terminal leave to the then Secretary of Finance Salvador Enriquez but the latter did not act on said application. When Secretary of Finance Edgardo Espiritu assumed office, he approved the application of Petitioner. Accordingly, a Disbursement Voucher inclusive of the terminal leave pay of the Petitioner, in the amount of P2,521,568.21, were processed and submitted, on July 21, 1998, to Assistant Secretary Ma. Eleanor F. dela Cruz for her signature. However, the latter refused to sign the voucher, claiming that, in the computation of Petitioners terminal leave pay, his one-day salary as Acting Secretary of Finance should not be considered as his last monthly salary. The same should be based on his salary as Acting Undersecretary of Finance. Despite petitioners request for the reconsideration of the decision of Assistant Secretary dela Cruz, the latter refused to budge. In the meantime, conformably with the opinion of Assistant Secretary Ma. Eleanor dela Cruz, a Disbursement Voucher were prepared and signed by Assistant Secretary Ma. Eleanor F. dela Cruz. There was thus a difference of P418,243.50 between the amount claimed by the Petitioner and the amount approved under the latter

voucher. The Petitioner accepted the amount without prejudice to his right to assail the position of the Assistant Secretary. To settle the matter, Solomon S. Cua, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Secretary of Finance, sought on August 22, 1998, the resolution of the Civil Service Commission on the salary of the Petitioner to be used as correct basis for the computation of the monetary value of his terminal leave. He averred that, since the Secretary of Finance Roberto de Ocampo was in Hongkong, on official business, for the government, the Petitioner, when designated as Acting Secretary of Finance, was merely given additional duties and responsibilities. Hence, the Petitioner was not entitled to the salary of a Secretary of Finance. Only one person was entitled to receive the salary for said position since there was only one salary appropriated by Congress for the position of Secretary of Finance. On January 28, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition, in effect upholding the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission. Issue: Whether in the commutation of petitioners terminal leave credits, his highest monthly salary shall be that corresponding to the position of Secretary of Finance.

Ruling: When the President designated the petitioner as Acting Secretary on May 22, 1997, he did so under a well considered opinion that the absence of Secretary de Ocampo was of such an extent that the latter would be unable to perform his duties and, by reason of such opinion, the President extended a temporary designation to petitioner under Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The well-settled rule is that the money value of the terminal leave of a retiring government official shall be computed at the retirees highest monthly salary. In computing the petitioners terminal leave credits, it was held that his highest monthly salary is that corresponding to position of Secretary of Finance which petitioner received while he was Acting Secretary from May 22 to 25, 1997, during the travel abroad of the Secretary. Petitioner was due to retire as Undersecretary of Finance upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on October 8, 1997, at which time he would have served the government for forty-four (44) years. However, President Ramos saw the need to extend petitioners services with the Department of Finance and, hence, extended his term twice until June 30, 1998. Thus, the Court affirms the ruling of the Civil Service Commission that the highest monthly salary of petitioner, which shall be the basis for the commutation of his terminal leave credits, is that corresponding to the position of Secretary of Finance, excluding COLA and RATA.

PCA V. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-21786 February 28, 1974 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARRA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, GUMERSINDO GARCIA, SR., JOSE M. ARUEGO, E. VOLTAIRE GARCIA AND ROMAN OZAETA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA, AND JOSE AVILES, respondents. Facts: A petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction of the Philippine Constitution Association and some of its individual members, 1 with the then Auditor General Pedro M. Gimenez as principal respondent to declare unconstitutional and void certain items of the General Appropriations Act for the fiscal year 1963-1964, more specifically its Special Provisions 1, 2, 4 and 6 for the Senate, and its Special Provisions 1, 3, 4 and 5 for the House of Representatives insofar as they would authorize the payment to any member of Congress of any emolument, per diem or allowance for expenses other than that expressly set forth in the provision of the 1935 Constitution dealing with compensation of legislators was filed. A writ of preliminary injunction was also sought to restrain respondent Auditor from passing in audit and countersigning checks or treasury warrants for the payment to senators and representatives of expenses for entertainment, representation, personal and clerical services, and for any other purpose except for the payment of their salaries and traveling expenses to and from their respective places of residence while attending the sessions of Congress as authorized by the then Constitution, and likewise restraining respondent Disbursing Officer from taking any action

whatsoever on, or with regard to, any of such vouchers, checks or treasury warrants, issued for the payment of such kind of expenses.No writ of preliminary injunction was issued but the late Justice Alejo Labrador, then a member of this Court, was designated as Commissioner to receive evidence in support of the petition for preliminary injunction. While the late Justice Labrador did his best to hasten proceedings, with the various incidents that took place, respondents being adamant in their stand that no intrusion was allowable coupled with delays that usually attend hard-fought legal suits, it was not until June 29, 1964 that the late jurist was able to submit a report with the recommendation that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. Issue: Whether or not the items in the General Appropriations Act for such fiscal year would automatically lapse by operation of law? Ruling: The constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued. It is to be admitted that there was no question as to the issue of validity being vigorously pleaded as well as insisted upon, but there was lack of adequacy as to the facts and consequently a failure to meet the necessary standard requisite for the nullification of a legislative act. Parenthetically, it is to be observed that such difficulty need not attend a petition of this character if filed now in view of the specific provision in the present Constitution: "The records and books, of accounts of the National Assembly shall be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually the itemized expenditures for each Member." At any rate, what further militates against any further action on the part of this Tribunal with respect to this petition is that with the 1935 Constitution having replaced by the present Charter, the determination of any alleged violation of a section thereof binding on a Congress which had likewise passed out of existence, assumes a rather academic aspect. The petition was dismissed for being moot and academic. .