Vent v. Brown Final Amended Writ

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Kelly Vent State Bar Number: 257418 3380 Hartselle Way Sacramento, CA 95827 Telephone: 916.949.9137 E-mail: k_vent@yahoo.com In pro per
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
KELLY VENT, Petitioner, vs. GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., in his official capacity; JULIE CHAPMAN, in her official capacity as Director of Department of California Human Resources; JOHN CHIANG, in his official capacity as State Controller; TIMOTHY GORSUCH, in his official capacity as acting Director of Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control; and STATE PERSONNEL BOARD Respondents
Case No.: 34-2013-80001576CU-WM-GDS
***AMENDED*** VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE/PROHIBITION AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF (pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. 1085-86; 1060)
Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES INTRODUCTION I. II. III. IV. V. PARTIES WHY THIS WRIT SHOULD ISSUE ALLEGATIONS COMPLAINT PRAYER 3-4 5 6-7 8-10 10-33 33-47 48-49 49 50
CONCLUSION VI. VERIFICATION .

2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Fifth Amendment ... passim Fourteenth Amendment ......passim Article I, 10 ..passim CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION Article I ... ..passim Article VIIpassim Article V, 1 8, 23, 38 Article XX, 21 . passim STATUTES, RULES, & REGULATIONS Business and Professions Code 23001...14 23053..8, 9 2576114 California Code of Civil Procedure 1085....passim 1086passim Government Code 3512, et seq. 7, 22 12010..8 12440..8 1631014 18524..8, 9 18525...35-36 19515..7, 8 19516.7, 8, 17
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
19816.2..8 1983718 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Bd. of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564...36 SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA Bd. of Social Welfare v. County of L.A. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98......9 (People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 150, 154.) ....23 Prof. Engineers in Cal. Govt. v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 989..passim ..passim White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 52839 CALIFORNIA Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 120324-25 Cal. Attorneys v. Schwarzenegger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 424......24 Green v. Mt. Diablo Hospital Dist. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 63.42 Marshall v. Williams (1927) 85 Cal.App 507 ....9 Ross v. Bd. of Education (1912) 18 Cal.App 222...10 Wirth v. State of Cal. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 131....43 California Attorneys, etc. v. Arnold Schwarzenegger et al. (Feb. 26, 2010) A127777....12, 25

4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
INTRODUCTION Primarily, this petition seeks a writ to order Respondents to return all civil-service salaries unlawfully withheld by governor furloughs from February 1, 2009 up through March 30, 2011. Petitioner seeks a writ to declare that unilateral furloughs, as applied to attorneys, doctors, dentists, and podiatrists in Work-Week Group Salaried Exempt (WWG-SE) are unlawful and unconstitutional. This petition also seeks a writ to order respondents to pay all similarly classified attorneys in BU2 the same salaries from April 1, 2011 to June 30, 2013. Further, Petitioner requests that this court issue a writ to Respondents to return the salary taken from all civil-service employees of the ABC without lawful authority. Most important, this petition seeks the return of all aspects of the civil service system to the direct authority of the non-partisan SPB as required by Article VII. In an effort to stop the corruption of the spoils system brought on by the political pressures and influences of governors over the predecessors to the SPB, the People of California overwhelmingly approved a constitutional amendment to remove all partisan authority, control, and jurisdiction over civilservice employment. Neither the legislature nor the governor can divest the SPB of its constitutional mandate.

5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1
Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. I, KELLY VENT, hereby petition this Court for a writ of mandate/prohibition and/or declaratory relief directed to respondents. Through this Petition, I allege the following: I. PARTIES PETITIONER 1. I, KELLY VENT, PETITIONER, am a taxpayer, resident and citizen of California. I am a resident of Sacramento, California where venue is proper. I am a permanent, full-time, civil service attorney employed by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC). RESPONDENTS 2. GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., is an elected official named in his official capacity to execute the law, supervise executive and ministerial officers, and negotiate civil service salaries. Article V, section 1, of the California Constitution provides that the supreme executive power of this State is vested in the governor and that the governor shall see that the law is faithfully executed. Pursuant to Section 12010, the governor is employer and supervisor to the official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers. The governor can order the return of salaries taken by furloughs. The Ralph C. Dills Act (Gov. Code1, 3512, subd. c, et seq.) authorizes the governor or governors designated representative to negotiate civil service salaries with employee unions under a system of collective bargaining. 3. JULIE CHAPMAN, a political appointee of the governor, is the acting Director of the California Department of Human Resources (CalHR [formally Department of Personnel Administration (DPA)]) is named in her official capacity. The directors duties, pursuant to Section 19815.4, subdivision (b), include the administration and enforcement of personnel laws. Section 19816 divests the SPB of its duties,
All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
purposes, responsibilities, and jurisdiction over the administration of salaries, hours, and other personnel-related matters, training, performance evaluations, and layoffs and grievances and grants such authority to CalHR. Section 19815, subdivision (g), provides that CalHR is the governors designee for the purposes of collective bargaining over wages, hours, and other conditions relating to civil service employment. The director of CalHR serves at the pleasure of the governor and can be removed at will. 4. JOHN CHIANG, State Controller, is an elected official named in his official capacity. The controller has a legal duty to issue warrants from authorized appropriations to pay lawful salary obligations. Art. XVI, section 7 of the Constitution of California and Section 12440 authorize the controller to draw warrants authorized by law upon unexhausted specific appropriations. 5. TIMOTHY GORSUCH, unofficial acting Director of the ABC, is named in his official capacity to make appointments to positions within the ABC. ( 18524; Bus. & Prof. Code, 23053.) The Director of ABC serves at the pleasure of the governor and can be removed at will. 6. The SPB is a five-member, non-partisan board vested with exclusive authority to enforce the merit principle of civil service employment as mandated by Article VII of Californias Constitution. The SPB has a constitutional duty to ensure that civil service employment laws are free from political influences and pressures of the governor, legislature, and other elected officials. Section 19816.2 requires that the SPB review all CalHR regulations, rules, or provisions pertaining to layoff or demotion in lieu of layoff of civil service employees whether established or agreed to by CalHR for consistency to Article VII. The board shall create and adjust classes of positions in the state civil service in accordance with Article VII of the Constitution and this part. The following members are named in their official capacity: Patricia Clarey, Kimiko Burton, Richard Costigan, Maeley Tom, and Lauri Shanahan. 7. All respondents have physical offices located in Sacramento where venue is proper.

7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
II.
WHY THIS WRIT SHOULD ISSUE Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as if
fully set forth herein.

8.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision a, provides: A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office . . . I performed all services as required by the ABC pursuant to my appointment to a full-time, civil service attorney in exchange for a fixed salary from February 1, 2009 through March 31, 2011. (Marshall v. Williams (1927) 85 Cal.App 507 [writ to city auditor to pay approved salary to duly appointed employee].) Acting Director TIMOTHY GORSUCH, as the appointing authority2, has a legal duty to pay me a full salary for services rendered. The partial salary paid by ABC resulted in ABC keeping 70 days of my unpaid salary in its fund.
9. The Supreme Court of California holds that a writ is proper [w]here the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. (Bd. of Social Welfare v. County of L.A. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 162.) As a resident, citizen, and taxpayer of California, I have a shared interest with the public that state officials not violate state and federal constitutions. I have a shared interest that California honors it contractual obligations. I have a shared interest to return to efficient government operations where employees can perform services free from the partisan influences and pressures of politicians. 10. Code of Civil Procedure section 1086, states: The writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must be issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested. There is no adequate remedy because the state never rendered a decision to appeal. Respondents denied employees due process and constructively denied all doors to
2
( 18524; Bus. & Prof. Code, 23053.) Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
administrative relief. Salary deprivations, caused by furloughs, began with little to no notice. Furloughs were unlimited in scope and duration. Employees received no written justification by CalHR. As a result, employees had nothing to appeal but an executive order. Closing all doors to relief, Governor Schwarzenegger, as executive or agent to the legislature, declared the unilateral salary reductions were beyond any due process protections. Each executive furlough order stated: This Order is not intended to create, and does not create, any rights or benefits, whether substantive or procedural, or enforceable at law or in equity, against the State of California or its agencies, departments, entities, officers, employees, or any other person. 11. Admittedly, an employee could litigate the breach of the employment contract in court. However, a writ shall issue to remedy the unlawful taking of salary as the result of an official duty because a mere win on a contract claim cannot compel performance to actually pay. (Ross v. Bd. of Education (1912) 18 Cal.App 222, 225.) 12. While technically employees had access to the courts, the denial of administrative remedies and years of increasing pay cuts created genuine barriers to court relief. Administrative relief would have allowed reasonable use of state time and resources to challenge the furloughs in a pre or post-deprivation, evidentiary hearing. During furloughs, administrative relief was futile. No employee received administrative relief from furloughs. The state and employee unions spent millions of dollars litigating the illegal furloughs of the governor. (Prof. Engineers in Cal. Govt. v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 989, 1033 [governor cannot unilaterally order unpaid furloughs] (PECG).) The state allows no use of state time or resources to litigate salary deprivations in the courts. 13. The legislature essentially denied responsibility for furloughs and hid behind Governor Schwarzenegger until the Supreme Court of California in PECG revealed the legislatures true role on November 4, 2010. (PECG at pp. 1047-48.) As a result

9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
3
of an omission of a material fact, all legal challenges were incorrectly premised on the actions of the Executive, not the appropriation power3 of the legislature. 14. I did not sit on my hands. I filed amici curiae briefs with the Supreme Court of California and for the special fund suit in the First District Court of Appeal (California Attorneys, etc. v. Arnold Schwarzenegger et al. (Feb. 26, 2010, A127777) (revd & remand Sept. 29, 2011) [nonpub. Opn.]) 15. Due to the risk of inconsistent judgments, judicial economy, and since I assert only one cause of action, the doctrine to exhaust administrative remedies should not apply to relief requested for April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2013. 16. If relief is not granted, I will continue to suffer irreparable harm as I relied on my promised salary in order to meet my own contractual obligations. Such reliance resulted in my detriment because I defaulted on certain loans and lost low-interest credit payments on others. My credit rating went from very good to merely good. A writ should issue because I no adequate remedy at law since there was never a decision to appeal and respondents denied all constructive access to administrative relief. 17. Similarly, other civil-service employees will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted because they too have constitutionally, protected rights in employment contracts. They too have a shared interest that the state officials they provide services for will not violate the state and federal constitutions. Irreparable harm to the peoples trust in government and to civil-service employees will occur if relief is not granted.
III. ALLEGATIONS 18. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
The Court in PECG consolidated several of the general fund furlough suits. The Court raised the issue of appropriations for the first time when it essentially asked parties to brief, what effect, if any, did appropriations have on the executive order issued by the governor? Before briefing the Court in PECG, no one had mentioned appropriations in any furlough litigation. Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
4
19. I began my civil-service career with the State of California on or about September 1993, as a tax program assistant for the Franchise Tax Board. I earned $1388 per month. I eventually promoted to a tax compliance representative at the Employment Development Department (EDD) where I earned $4670 per month. Thanks to the supportive management team at EDD, I took approved educational leaves of absences to attend law school in order to become a state attorney. 20. On October 31, 2008, I accepted a full-time, civil service appointment to Staff Counsel I, Range A (renamed as attorney) to work for the ABC in exchange for a fixed salary of $4674 per month4. I performed all services as required by the ABC from October 31, 2008 through present day. 21. As an attorney, the state retains my services and availability on a monthly basis for a fixed salary. I prosecute administrative hearings throughout northern California. During furloughs, I spent an average of one month, each year, living in hotels away from home while conducting state business. I rely on a fixed income because the changing demands and irregular hours of attorney work make outside employment difficult since I have a legal and ethical obligation to put the needs of the state first. 22. I am a voting member of the employee union, California Attorneys, Administrative Law Judges and Hearing Officers in State Employment (CASE), Bargaining Unit 2 (BU2). I can only vote on my own employment contract if I agree to kickback part of my salary to the direct or indirect benefit of politically elected employers of other civil-service attorneys, members of the legislature, and the governor. I am required to pay another part of my salary for the benefits of collective bargaining. The majority of this money goes to political causes that directly or indirectly benefit the above politicians. 23. From February 1, 2009 through March 31, 2011, I performed the same attorney services as other similarly classified attorneys who worked for the Board of Equalization, Department of Education, Department of Justice (DOJ), Legislative
Before and after appointment, I had informed the ABC that I should have been appointed to Range B, not Range A. The ABC eventually corrected the error after 29 months. Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS
11
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Counsel Bureau (LCB), Secretary of State, State Controllers Office, State Treasurers Office, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, Bureau of State Audits, Public Utilities Commission, California Earthquake Authority, Employment Development Department, Franchise Tax Board, California Highway Patrol, State Compensation Fund, Prison Industries Authority, California State Lottery Commission, First 5 Association of California, and California Housing Finance Agency. Without regard to the constitutional merit principle enshrined in Article VII, the governors paid higher salaries to similarly classified attorneys in the above departments.
The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 24. The ABC is a constitutional department (Art. XX 22) funded entirely by license fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 25761.) The ABC takes nothing from the general fund and the general fund is prohibited from incurring a debt-obligation to the ABC in the Budget Act. The general fund may temporarily borrow monies from the ABC fund for short-term use when such borrowing will not impair the operations of the ABC. (Gov. Code, 16310.) Borrowing usually occurs during the annual budget impasse so the general fund can save money on outside borrowing costs from private lenders. 25. The ABC exercises the police powers of the State for the protection of the safety, welfare, health, peace, and morals of the people of the State. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 23001.) The subject matter involves in the highest degree the economic, social, and moral well-being and the safety of the State and of all its people. (Id.) 26. The ABC fund is a continuous appropriation available for use for the enforcement and administration of the ABC Act, without regard to fiscal year. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 25761, subd. (d); 16304, subd. (f).) The legislature appropriates the entirety of ABCs special fund money to the ABC each year for the enforcement and administration of the ABC Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 25761.) Any funds not used in any given fiscal year remain available for use in subsequent years.

12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
5
27. The ABC fund became encumbered as soon as I performed as required in exchange for a promise of a fixed salary. Section 16304 states: An appropriation shall be deemed to be encumbered at the time and to the extent that a valid obligation against the appropriation is created. 28. When furloughs began on February 1, 2009, the ABC had a fund balance of $13.8 million5 of monies already appropriated in prior budget acts. A fund balance is a surplus. This surplus was 28 percent over and above the $49.3 million in operating costs for 2008-20096. According to the Director of ABC in 2011, the ABC typically operates with a 10% fund balance above and beyond its operating costs of roughly $50 million dollars per year. 29. As of August 1, 2010, the fund balance for ABC was $21.1 million dollars; this surplus was 47% over and above its operating costs of 44.8 million dollars. In 2012, the fund balance ballooned to $32 million dollars. Currently, the fund balance is $31 million dollars. This surplus is 59% over and above the costs necessary for the administration and enforcement of the ABC Act. 30. The ABC employs approximately 400 people. The repayment of salaries taken by the executive and legislature from February 1, 2009 to March 30, 2011, would reduce the fund balance to about $27 million dollars. 31. The ABC has unexhausted specific appropriations available for encumbrance. The ABC fund continues in existence. As a continuous appropriation fund, monies already appropriated by the legislature for the enforcement and administration of the ABC Act remain available for such use without regard to fiscal year. ( 16304, subdivision (f); Bus. & Prof. Code, 25761, subd. (d).) 32. I have asked the ABC for the legal authority that justified the ABC keeping my salary and I was told the ABC has to do what the governor and Department of Finance says to do. During a meeting early in 2011, I asked the Director of ABC why the legislature would want to take my salary if the ABC takes no general fund money and
ABC Budget Fund Statement 2007-2008 from the Governors Budget 2009-2010. ABC Budget Fund Statement 2008-2009 from the Governors Budget 2010-2011. Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS
13
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
the general fund cannot borrow from the ABC. The Director confirmed I was correct, but he said that the public does not know the difference between the general and special funds. Furloughs via Executive Orders (exhibit A) 33. On December 19, 2008, the Friday before Christmas, Governor Schwarzenegger publicly advised me that he intended to take nearly 10% of my fixed salary for 17 months due to another projected fiscal crisis of the general fund. The governor created a furlough law and ordered me to stay home on two normal workdays each month for 17 months to start February 1, 2009. (Governors Executive Order Number S-16-08 [issued December 19, 2008, effective February 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010].) 34. Each executive order stated: This Order is not intended to create, and does not create, any rights or benefits, whether substantive or procedural, or enforceable at law or in equity, against the State of California or its agencies, departments, entities, officers, employees, or any other person. 35. Politically elected state employers do not serve at the pleasure of the governor and lawfully receive money from civil service employees. These employers did not furlough their people. 36. Most political appointee employers serve at the pleasure of the governor and none can accept money from their employees. These employers furloughed their employees. 37. While working on July 1, 2009, I learned through published media reports that the governor ordered another day of furloughs to begin on the same day of his order. I had already lost 10 days of salary and budgeted for another year of losing 10% each month. The new order required ABC to keep 15 instead of 10% of my salary each month through June 30, 2010. (Governors Executive Order Number S-13-09 [issued July 1, 2009, effective July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010].) 38. When furloughs ended on June 30, 2010, the ABC had retained 46 days of my salary. On July 28, 2010, I learned through published media reports that the governor needed 15% more of my salary to start the following week on August 1, 2010. (Governors
14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Executive Order Number S-12-10 (issued July 28, 2010, effective August 1, 2010 with no end date) The governor said that involuntary pay cuts would continue indefinitely or until BU2 agreed to voluntary pay cuts. By this time, the majority of BU2 lacked incentive to vote for voluntary pay cuts because the majority received full salary. 39. Other than the legislature, no one knew the legislature tacitly approved of the new furlough law created by the governor until the Supreme Court told everyone on November 10, 2010. (PECG, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989). As interpreted by both governors S and Brown, as long as the legislature later agrees to reduce individual salaries in an appropriation bill, governors now have unfettered discretion to reduce any civil service employee salary outside of collective bargaining through furloughs. 40. When furloughs, via executive order, ended on March 31, 2011, Governors S and Brown had collectively ordered the ABC to keep 70 days of my salary for no legitimate government purpose. I performed as required by my appointment and the respondents broke its promise to pay my salary.
California Human Resources (formally the Department of Administration) 41. Under the direction of the governor, CalHR implemented and administered the new furlough law. CalHR never developed safeguards to protect against erroneous deprivations. It implemented furloughs by department without regard to each departments fiscal soundness or workload by classification. CalHR never implemented furloughs according to merit principle factors like seniority. 42. Prior to the start of furloughs, CalHR did not provide written notice to employees advising of the reason for the salary deprivations. CalHR did not give any employees written information regarding any individual rights to a pre or post-evidentiary hearing to dispute the furloughs. CalHR gave no written information to employees regarding procedures for administrative relief or appeal rights. CalHR did not offer an individual exemption process.
15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
43. It appears CalHR did not have the SPB review its furlough plan for conflict to the merit principle within Article VII as required by Section 19816.2. Section 19816.2 mandates SPB review for all CalHR regulations, rules, or provisions pertaining to layoff or demotion in lieu of layoff of civil service employees whether established or agreed to by CalHR for consistency to Article VII. 44. Of the approximately 800 attorneys similarly classified to Attorney I in 2009, 55% were never furloughed and lost no salary. Under the merit principle, where seniority is a major component, I would have replaced any of those fully-paid attorneys who had less than 12 years of service credits with the state. After February 2009, the state hired 23 new Attorney Is at full salary. Pursuant to the competitive exam process, I was more qualified than these attorneys, yet I received substantially less salary. Under the merit principle, only furloughed Attorney Is with more than 12 years of service credit would have taken hiring preference over me for those 23 appointments. 45. Of the approximately 830 attorneys similarly classified to Attorney I in 2010, 53% were never furloughed and lost no salary, 4% lost 18 days of salary, and the remaining lost 33 days or 1.5 months of salary. During 2010, the state hired another 63 new Attorney Is at full salary. Pursuant to the competitive exam process, I was more qualified than these attorneys, yet I received substantially less salary. Under the merit principle, only furloughed Attorney Is with more than 13 years of service credit would have taken hiring preference over me for those 63 appointments. 46. If offered demotion in lieu of furlough, then I would have been eligible to take an appointment to a lower classification without losing salary due to my ten years of state service. ( 19050, subd. (a).) 47. The furloughs, as administered by CalHR, effectively caused a substantial demotion of two classifications in violation of Section 19837. Section 19837, subdivision (a), demands that employees in a class shall receive a salary within the limits established for that class. The attorney series is a deep classification that has four distinct ranges from A through D. Movement between and appointment to each range is no different from movement between two classifications.
16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
7
48. From February 1, 2009 through October 31, 2009, my fixed salary for appointment to Attorney in Range A, fell below the minimum salary due that classification. (Unrelated to furloughs, the ABC later corrected my original appointment on October 31, 2008 from Range A to Range B on April 14, 2011. The subsequent result was that the corrected salary to reflect Range B still fell below the minimums for both Range A and B within the attorney classification.)
49.
From November 1, 2009 through October 31, 20107, my fixed salary for appointment to Attorney in Range B, fell below the minimum salary for both Range A and B in the Attorney classification. (The subsequent correction on April 14, 2011, to my original appointment, resulted in my placement to Range C. As a classified attorney in Range C, I received less salary than the minimums for both Range B and C within the attorney classification.)
50. From November 1, 2010 through March 31, 2011, my fixed salary for appointment to Attorney in Range C, fell below the minimum salary for both Range B and C in the Attorney classification. (The subsequent correction on April 14, 2011, to my original appointment, resulted in my placement to Range C, second year. As a classified attorney in Range C, I still received less salary than the minimums for both Range B and C within the attorney classification.) 51. During furloughs, less qualified attorneys received higher salaries than attorneys with more experience. Furloughs via Executive Order as applied to attorneys in BU2 2009 52. In 2009, there were approximately 3,205 attorneys and 1,907 (60%) lost no salary. With the exception of 69 attorneys in the Public Utilities Commission and 3 in Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, only attorneys who worked for politically elected bosses were never furloughed in 2009.
The governor allowed furloughed employees their full salary for July 1, 2010 through July 31, 2010. Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS
17
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
53. 1722 attorneys worked for elected officials in the following departments and were never furloughed: Board of Equalization Bureau of State Audits California Earthquake Authority California Institute for Regenerative Medicine Department of Education Department of Justice Legislative Counsel Bureau Secretary of State State Controllers Office State Treasurers Office Department of Insurance
Of those 1722 attorneys employed by elected officials, who were never furloughed, 1634 (95%) worked for departments that received more than 25% of their revenue from the general fund.
480 attorneys in SCIF were furloughed for 10 days, but received back salary with interest in 2009.
As a result of a civil agreement between Governor Brown and CASE on February 1, 2012, approximately 16 attorneys in the following departments lost 28 days of pay, but later received back pay: California Housing Finance Agency California State Lottery Commission Prison Industries Authority
54. Unrelated to merit, workload, or funding source, 1,298 (40%) of the remaining attorneys lost 28 days of pay. Of these attorneys who lost 28 days of pay: 337 (26%) worked for departments that received no general fund monies.

18
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
248 (19%) worked for departments that received up to 11% of general fund monies.
173 (13%) worked for departments that received between 12 and 22% of general fund monies. 2010
55. In 2010, the numbers of attorneys grew to approximately 3,378. 2,028 (60%) lost no pay and worked for the following departments: Board of Equalization Bureau of State Audits California Earthquake Authority California Institute for Regenerative Medicine Department of Education Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Department of Justice Legislative Counsel Bureau Public Utilities Commission Secretary of State State Compensation Insurance Fund State Controllers Office State Treasurers Office Department of Insurance
56. As a result of a civil agreement between Governor Brown and CASE on February 1, 2012, the 10 attorneys who were furloughed 33 days in the following departments later received back salary: California State Lottery Commission Prison Industries Authority
Approximately ten attorneys who were furloughed 18 days in the following department later received back pay without interest: California Housing Finance Agency
19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
57. As of July 1, 2010, no attorney who worked for a politically-elected official lost pay to furloughs. 123 (4%) attorneys in the following departments lost 18 days of pay: California Highway Patrol Employment Development Department Franchise Tax Board
1,227 (36%) of the remaining attorneys lost 33 days of pay unrelated to merit or funding source. 2011
58. In 2011, the total number of attorneys was approximately 3,353. 37% of attorneys lost nine days of salary under Governor Brown.
Furloughs via MOU (effective April 1, 2011 to June 30, 2013) for BU2 59. Effective April Fools Day, 2011, Governor Brown lifted the involuntary furloughs for the remaining 37 percent of state attorneys furloughed since February 1, 2009. CASE presented members with a 27-month MOU to run April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2013. CASE urged members to vote for 15 months of voluntary furloughs for most of CASE attorneys to begin April 1, 2011 with an end date of June 30, 2012. This new MOU would allow BU2 members to receive full-time salary from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013. 60. On March 22, 2011, CASE reminded members in an email not to exploit the end of involuntary furloughs because [f]or the first time in years, CASE is dealing with an administration that is bargaining in good faith. Governor Brown told employees we had to volunteer for 5% pay cuts or the legislature was going to take that and possibly more, whether employees agreed or not. 61. CASE members voted the voluntary pay cuts for most attorneys on April 17, 2011. The MOU excluded SCIF attorneys, for reasons unrelated to merit, from the pay cuts negotiated for all other members to from April 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012. The

20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
legislature ratified a 27-month MOU for BU2 on May 16, 2011, effective April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2013. (Stats. 2011, ch. 25 2 (SB 151).) 62. Despite the existence of an employment contract without pay cuts for the final year of the MOU from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013, CASE negotiated a side-letter agreement with Governor Brown on July 17, 2012 for another year of salary reductions retroactive to July 1, 2012. 63. Before member ratification, CASE told members the legislature would impose a year of involuntary salary reductions for all civil-service attorneys in the budget act if employees did not agree to voluntary salary reductions. SCIF attorneys were to have their salaries cut as well. 64. In July of 2012, Governor Brown issued a furlough memo to force involuntary furloughs on employees from two other unions that would not bargain for voluntary furloughs. 65. Undisclosed to CASE members and unrelated to merit, the legislature and Governor Brown excluded LCB attorneys from the pay cuts imposed on all other attorneys from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013. (Stats. 2012, Sess. 20112012, ch. 21 3.90, subd. (a).) 66. LCB attorneys draft legislation render legal opinions for members and committees of the legislature.
Governor Brown 67. In 1977, Governor Brown signed the State Employer-Employee Relations Act (SEERA) ( 3512- 3524.), which named the governor as the designated representative of the legislature to negotiate employee salaries with employee unions. 68. SEERA removed many of the non-partisan functions of the SPB. The attorney general sued Governor Brown on behalf of the SPB claiming that SEERA was unconstitutional. (People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 150, 154.) The Court held it was incongruous for an attorney general to sue the governor. (Id. at p. 158.) The Court quoted Article V, section 13, "Subject to the powers and duties of
21
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
8
the Governor, the Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the State. (Id.) The constitutional pattern is crystal clear: if a conflict between the Governor and the Attorney General develops over the faithful execution of the laws of this state, the Governor retains the supreme executive power to determine the public interest; the Attorney General may act only subject to the powers of the Governor. (Id.) The SPB eventually obtained independent counsel, 69. Governor Brown served as State Attorney General for the Department of Justice (DOJ) from 2007 to 2011. As State Attorney General, he employed approximately 34% of the States attorneys in both 2009 and 2010. Taxpayer monies from the General Fund finance nearly half of the operating costs for the DOJ. 70. During furloughs in 2009-2010, Governor Brown, as attorney general and employer to 34% of the states attorneys, received more CASE money than any other individual. 71. As Attorney General, he utilized resources of the Attorney Generals office to file an amicus brief in support of a constitutional challenge brought by CASE on behalf of his DOJ attorneys against Governor Schwarzenegger. He argued that DOJ attorneys were grossly underpaid in violation of the merit principle within Article VII; he blamed collective bargaining. (CA Attorneys v. Schwarzenegger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) 72. As candidate for governor in 2010, Governor Brown said [unilateral] furloughs [via executive order] were a bad idea.8 73. As attorney general, Governor Brown refused to implement any of the furlough orders of Governor S against his DOJ attorneys. Governor Brown then represented his Department of Justice, Board of Equalization, Board of Education, Secretary of State, State Controllers Office, State Treasurers Office, and Department of Insurance in defense of litigation brought by Governor S. This litigation has been
Sacramento Bee, Jerry Brown Proposes 4-day work week (Jan. 4, 2013) at <http://blogs.sacbee.com/the_state_worker/2013/01/top-10-posts-of-2012-jerry-brown-proposes-4-day-workweek.html> [as of July 20, 2013]. Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS
22
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
9
referred to as the legal challenge by the Constitutionals. (Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 1203.) 74. The trial court upheld the governors furlough orders as to employees of the Constitutionals on April 9, 2009. As attorney general, Governor Brown appealed and Governor Schwarzenegger did not challenge the automatic stay. The Director of CalHR said "Courts apply a very high legal standard when considering whether to grant relief from an automatic stay. Our lawyers decided that given the enormity of the State's ever-growing deficit, the impact of not furloughing those 15,000 employees didn't appear to meet the court's 'irreparable harm' criteria." 9 75. When the Constitutionals lost at trial court, furloughs had only been in place for about two months. 90% of their employees worked for departments that rely upon general fund appropriations for more than 25 percent of each departments total operating costs, 76. CASE prevailed at trial court on behalf of special fund departments on December 31, 2009. Governor Schwarzenegger appealed the decision and successfully argued against lifting the furloughs for these employees. (California Attorneys, etc. v. Arnold Schwarzenegger et al. (Feb. 26, 2010, A127777) (revd & remand Sept. 29, 2011) [nonpub. Opn.]) 77. Governor Brown, as attorney general, utilized the resources and political clout of the Attorney Generals office to avoid a ruling on his appeal for the employees of the Constitutionals. By the time Governor Brown was sworn in as governor on January 3, 2011, the appellate court still had not ruled and Governor Brown asked for another delay. Jerry Brown lost the suit as attorney general, but he won the suit as governor. (Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 1203.) 78. When Governor Brown assumed office on January 3, 2011, Governors Executive Order Number S-12-10 was still in effect. That executive order required 15 percent salary reductions for most attorneys in BU2. Governor Brown exercised discretion and chose not to apply the executive order to his attorneys and other employees in the
Sacramento Bee, Furlough update: What's up with the constitutionals? (June 4, 2009) at <http://blogs.sacbee.com/the_state_worker/2009/06/> [as of September 30, 2013].. Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS
23
28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Department of Justice. Governor Brown continued to apply the executive order to employees in special fund departments. 79. On February 1, 2012, Governor Brown and CASE entered into a civil agreement to settle the special fund litigation. (exhibit D) As a result of the settlement, less than a few dozen attorneys who were furloughed for 70 days received back salary unrelated to merit. 80. CASE never notified its members it intended to settle the special fund litigation three years to the day furloughs began. 81. As a result of the settlement, the department heads of California Housing Finance Agency, California State Lottery Commission, and Prison Industries Authority decided to pay all of its employees back salary out of fairness. Regardless of whether such employees were beneficiaries to the settlement, all ultimately received higher salaries, unrelated to merit, than other similarly classified employees. 82. As of 2011, the state employed about 3,353 attorneys. Of all attorneys, about 26 percent (869) were classified as Attorney IVs. In 2011, the DOJ employed about 34 percent (1143) of all state attorneys yet it held 67 percent (586) of all Attorney IV positions. In both 2009 and 2010, the level of Attorney IVs at DOJ remained at 477. By 2011, the number grew to 586. 83. Part of the consideration given to BU2 during collective bargaining in 2011 was a promise by Governor Brown to have a conversation about adding an Attorney V series. 84. Governor Brown, as governor or candidate for public office, can take from money and services from civil-service employees to directly or indirectly help his career. Members of the SPB cannot take money or services from such employees in the furtherance of their careers.

24
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
History of the State Personnel Board and Article VII 85. Article VII, section 1, (b): In the civil service permanent appointment and promotion shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination. Article VII , section 2: (a): There is a Personnel Board of 5 members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership concurring, for 10-year terms and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Appointment to fill a vacancy is for the unexpired portion of the term. A member may be removed by concurrent resolution adopted by each house, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring. (b) The board annually shall elect one of its members as presiding officer. (c) The board shall appoint and prescribe compensation for an executive officer who shall be a member of the civil service but not a member of the board. Article VII , section 3, (a): The board shall enforce the civil service statutes and, by majority vote of all its members, shall prescribe probationary periods and classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute, and review disciplinary actions. 86. 100 years ago, the legislature enacted a statute creating California's first civil service system in order to help combat evils of the spoils system stemming from political patronage in state employment. (Stats. 1913, ch. 590, p. 1035.) Section 2 authorized the creation of a three-person Civil Service Commission (Commission) where the governor appointed each member to serve a four-year term. This Commission was the predecessor to the current SPB. A member could only be removed by a concurrent resolution of both houses of the legislature. For the first year, the staggering of term end dates allowed Governor Hiram Johnson to appoint the first three members and one replacement in his first term as governor. 87. The responsibility of the Commission was to establish, maintain, and enforce an employment system premised on the merit principle free from political influence. The act made any willful violation a misdemeanor. The relevant provisions to this Petition are as follows:

25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5 defined the primary duties, responsibilities, and obligations of the Commission. The Commissions first duty was to ensure that like salary shall be paid for like work through its establishment of job classifications and salary ranges. Its second duty was to develop an examination process to ensure that candidates were properly rated as to merit, efficiency, and fitness. Its third duty was to ensure compliance to the merit principle through its power to adopt and enforce suitable rules and regulations.
Pursuant to Section 7, the Commission could exempt any position from the civil service requirements with the agreement of two members.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Section 8 vested the Commission with the authority to make all rules for classifications including rules for appointments, transfers, reinforcements, promotions, reductions and removals, and examinations.
Section 16 required all appointing authorities to report to the Commission the name, title, salary, and start date for each appointee.
Section 17 prohibited the Controller from issuing a salary warrant without approval and verification by the Commission.
Section 19 stated: any officer, agent, clerk, or employee under the government of the state shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or receive, any assessment, subscription, contribution or political service, whether voluntary or involuntary, for any political purpose whatever, from any one on the eligible lists or holding any position under the provisions of the act.
Section 20 stated, No one, while holding any public office, or in nomination for, or while seeking a nomination or appointment for, any public office, shall use or promise to use, whether directly or indirectly, any official authority or influence (whether then possessed or merely anticipated) in the way of conferring upon any person, or in order to secure or aid any person in securing any position under the provisions of this act, either in nomination, confirmation, promotion, or increase in salary, or as to any change in position, upon a consideration or condition that the vote or political influence or action of the last named person or any other,
26
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
shall be given or used in behalf of any candidate, officer or party, or upon any other corrupt condition or consideration. And no one, being a public officer, or in nomination for, or while seeking nomination or appointment for, any public office or having or claiming to have any authority or influence (whether then possessed or merely anticipated) for the securing or holding of or as to affecting any position under the provisions of this act, shall use, or promise to threaten to use, any such authority or influence, directly or indirectly, in order to coerce or persuade the vote or political action of any person on the eligible lists or holding any position under the provisions of this act. 88. In 1915, the Commission successfully argued to Governor Johnson to veto a bill that would have stripped the Commission of all of its investigatory powers. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune. June 20, 1915, p. 29.) Commission secretary F.E. Doty of Los Angeles said the separation of civil service functions and investigations is not consistent with the practices of the federal government and other states. He reasoned, If the power to investigate resides in the commission, the commission will be enabled to prevent scandals. To advertise the fact that the commission is powerless to enforce its own rules is to encourage secret violations of the law. The bill further sought to remove the requirement that state officers report to the Commission the removal of employees and the requirement that such employees be given a reason for discharge and an opportunity to respond. 89. On June 15, 1919, the Efficiency and Economy Commission on the Civil Service Commission gave recommendations to Governor Stephens that would require a governor to appoint two of the three Civil Service Commission members from a certified list developed by a non-partisan panel comprised of a civil service expert, Supreme Court justice, and faculty of University of California. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune. June 15, 1919, p. 10.) The chairman said the purpose of the Efficiency and Economy Commission was to achieve accrued efficiency, divorced of political influence, and raised civil service standards. Governor Stephens did not adopt the recommendations.
27
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
90. On March 20, 1919 Governor Stephens walked back his earlier endorsement of a bill to reorganize the administrative structure of government into departments where each Department head was appointed by the governor to serve at his pleasure. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, March 20, 1919, p. 1.) Critics opined this centralized power was a return to the spoils system. In response, Governor Stephens said he was unwilling to advocate greater power to the governor without hearing from the people. He also acknowledged this would place tremendous power in the hands of the executive. 91. On January 14, 1921, the legislature unanimously passed an urgency resolution for the Civil Service Commission to compile list of employees and salaries paid to them. (exhibit E: Modesto Evening News, January 14, 1921, p. 1.)
92.
On May 16, 1921, the Civil Service Commission reported that temporary appointments comprised 45% of the states total workforce. (exhibit E: Modesto Evening News, May 16, 1921, p. 1.)
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
93. On June 4, 1921, Governor Stephens reduced appropriations to Civil Service Commission by $8000. Effective July 1, 1921, the Civil Service Commission was reduced to one full-time executive member and two paid only per diem. (Stats. 1921, ch. 601, p. 1021.) The Department heads, who now served at the pleasure of the governor, seemingly absorbed some of the primary duties and responsibilities of the Civil Service Commission. (Stats. 1921, ch. 602, p. 1022-1027.) 94. On February 1, 1923, the Civil Service Commission released a Cost of living Survey and concluded salaries do not provide a comfortable living for the average family. (exhibit E: Modesto Evening News, February 1, 1923, p. 18.) 95. On March 3, 1923, the lower house began a second investigation of the Civil Service Commission. (exhibit E: Modesto Evening News, March 3, 1923, p. 3.) 96. On May 27, 1925, Governor Richardson signed bill to eliminate two of the three Civil Service Commission members despite the fact the Legislature did not pass the bill. (Stats. 1925, ch. 236, pp. 391-392.) (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune. May 27, 1925, p. 1.) The original bill called for the elimination of two members. Seen as a spoils measure, the legislature debated the reduction to the Civil Service Commission for
28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
hours. The legislature ultimately amended the bill to restore the two members. Without explanation, the original bill landed on the governors desk. Attorney General A.G. Webb upheld the bill as signed by the governor. (Id.) 97. In 1927, Governor Young restored the Civil Service Commission to three members. (Stats. 1927, ch. 719, pp. 1313-1317.) 98. Effective August 14, 1929, all of the duties, powers, responsibilities, and jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission transferred to the Department of Finance under the authority of the Director, a political appointee who served at the pleasure of the governor. (Stats. 1929, ch. 293, p.597.) Within the Department of Finance, a newly created Personnel Division was created to administer all existing and future civil service laws under the direction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission was to select a Chief of Personnel with the approval of the Director of Finance. This Chief would be part of civil service with the salary fixed by the Director of Finance, subject to the approval of the governor. This Chief assumed all responsibilities of the executive member of the Civil Service Commission. 99. On May 15, 1931, Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 4 called for the appointment of a special committee to investigate the Civil Service Commission. (Stats. 1931, ch. 83, pp. 3144.) The legislature made the following findings: Whereas, The state civil service commission is charged with the duty to classify positions to be held under state authority; and Whereas, It is the function of the state civil service commission to establish grades within the different state departments to the end that proper and equitable salaries shall be paid for similar work in all departments and to designate maximum and minimum salaries for each grade; and Whereas, The said commission is authorized to hold examinations for the purpose of determining efficiency and capability and thereby prepare lists of eligible applicants from which appointments to state service, with certain exceptions may be made; and Whereas, Complaints have been made by certain citizens of the State of California to the effect that serious misconduct is chargeable against the present civil service commission with respect to the holding of such said examinations; Effective August 14, 1931, the governor selected the executive member of the
100.
Civil Service Commission. (Stats. 1931, ch. 1009, pp. 2021.)

29
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
101.
On January 6, 1933, two senate committees formed to look into the irregularities
of Governors Rolphs administration and the costs of government. (Oakland Tribune, January 6, 1933, p. 10.) While these hearings did not lead to an impeachment or other criminal charges of politicians, they exposed the rampant corruption of the government hiding in plain site. Primarily, the executive control over the Civil Service Commission allowed for the continuation of Tammany Hallstyle politics in California. The governors essentially controlled appointments and exemptions to the civil service act through partisan influence and pressure. Department heads served at the pleasure of the governor; those who did not do the bidding of the governor were merely replaced. The exemptions to civil service gave free reign to the legislature and the governor to cherry-pick friends and political patrons for appointments and salaries unrelated to merit. 102. On January 10, 1933, Col. Garrison, former director of Public Works; charged
that Earl Lee Kelly, former chairman of the Highway Commission (who later became director of Public Works), told him that he should solicit funds from subcontractors to prevent the reelection of a political opponent of the governor. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, January 10, 1933, pp. 1-2.) Garrison testified the brother-in-law tried to exert pressure on him at a bbq to run a highway through property belonging to Governor Rolph. Governor Rolph got seven miles of state highway to his road at a cost of $50,000 per mile. 103. On January 10, 1933, Vandegrift, Director of Finance, was implicated in land
purchase deal where failed to reveal he had bought adjoining property to future state hospital site. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, January 10, 1933, p. 2.) Vandegrift also entered into 25-year lease at 450 McAllister Street in San Francisco at a cost of $60,000 per year. (Oakland Tribune, January 11, 1933, p. 1.) He overpaid by a million. Governor Rolphs son-in-law received $10,000 each year for life of lease and another player was to receive $6,000 each year of the lease. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, March 22, 1933, p. 9.)

30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
104.
As reported on January 13, 1933, the government inquiry into state supplies led to
investigations of the State Civil Service Commission and Department of Agriculture. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, January 13, 1933, p. 1.) Governor Rolphs son to testify regarding alleged insurance kickbacks; ordered to bring records on all state employee salary and bonuses. (Id.) 105. January 20, 1933: The legislature announced bills coming out to limit powers of
the director of finance and stop state officers and legislators form taking commissions on state insurance transactions (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, January 20, 1933, p. 16.) 106. February 1, 1933: California State Grange launched a recall effort against
Governor Rolph alleging tax discrimination for public utilities and gross abuse of civil service. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, February 1, 1933, p. 1.) Governor Rolph turned $31 million surplus in 1931 into a $9 million deficit in 1933. 107. February 20, 1933: Dr Toner, Director of Institutions, testified that Scudder, head
of Whittier Boys School, passed on hiring 700 employees recommended by the governor because Scudder would only hire employees he needed. As a result, Scudder was replaced as disloyal. A citizen supporter of Scudder testified that spoils system ruined the school. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, February 20, 1933, pp. 1-2.) 108. January 12, 1933: Vandergrift, Director of Finance, accused of selling bonds
below par. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, January 12, 1933, pp. 1-2.) 109. January 18, 1933: former Governor Friend W Richardson looked into for
insurance juggling- securing kickbacks for law firm headed by Rolph's son in exchange for state contracts. (exhibit E: Oakland Tribune, January 18, 1933, p. 4.) 110. August 12, 1934: Governor Merriam appointed former Governor Richardsons
son to State Bank Superintendent. Then Governor Richardsons son gave over a dozen family appointments and would not reveal the amount of salaries. Governor Richardsons son-in-law went from collector a few months ago to manager of Commissions. (exhibit E) 111. In 1934, the people voted to amend the constitution in order to remove the
government corruption brought by partisan influence over the civil service

31
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
commission. The people overwhelmingly approved Article XXIV (present-day Article VII). Article XXIV created a five-person, non-partisan SPB to administer and enforce all civil-service rules in existence or that would ever be created by the legislature. Members are appointed by the governor for staggered, fixed terms and do not serve at the pleasure of the governor. The legislature could pass only those laws to help facilitate the operation of the SPB. 112. Section 3 (a) of Article XXIV clearly vested the SPB with ultimate authority over
the civil-service system of employment: Said Board shall administer and enforce, and is vested with all of the powers, duties, purposes, functions, and jurisdiction which are now or hereafter may be vested in any other State officer or agency under, Chapter 590 of the California Statutes of 1913 as amended or any and all other laws relating to the State civil service as said law may now exist or may hereafter be enacted, amended or repealed by the Legislature. Chapter 590 of the California Statutes of 1913 and later amendment vested the authority to classify and create salary ranges to the civil service commission. 113. From 1913 to the enactment of collective bargaining in 1977, the SPB had
retained its constitutional mandate to establish employee classifications and related salary ranges without interference from political pressure. 114. Employment, premised on merit, existed since 1913. It was the political influence
and pressure exerted by governors over the civil service commission which allowed the opening for political patronage and the other evils associated with the spoils system. A lawmaker from another state facing the same problems as California said, The administration of the civil service, not the theory, is the biggest fraud in government. February 23, 1933 (Oakland Tribune). 115. Article XXIV removed all partisan influences and pressures by the governor over
the SPB (formally civil service commission). Pursuant to the constitutional amendment, the governor and legislature could no longer do any of the following: Appoint the executive member and set the executives members salary; Appoint of all or a majority of SPB members during one term; Appoint a civil-service employee to the SPB;
32
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Divest the SPB of it functions and place those duties under another department that answers to the governor;
Divest the SPB of its salary-setting functions to another department that answers to the governor; and
117.
Authorize the payment of secret salaries.
The relevant provisions of present-day Article VII (formally Article XXIV, as
adopted 1934, 1, renumbered 1976 [without substantial change]) are as follows: Section 1: (b): In the civil service permanent appointment and promotion shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination. Section 2: (a) There is a Personnel Board of 5 members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership concurring, for 10-year terms and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Appointment to fill a vacancy is for the unexpired portion of the term. A member may be removed by concurrent resolution adopted by each house, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring. (b) The board annually shall elect one of its members as presiding officer. (c) The board shall appoint and prescribe compensation for an executive officer who shall be a member of the civil service but not a member of the board. Section 3: (a) The board shall enforce the civil service statutes and, by majority vote of all its members, shall prescribe probationary periods and classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute, and review disciplinary actions. (b) The executive officer shall administer the civil service statutes under rules of the board.

33
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Writ of Mandate (Code of Civil Procedure 1085- 1086) (Breach of Contract and Violation of art. V, 1) 118. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 119. Respondents have a contractual duty to pay me a fixed, monthly salary in
exchange for employee services rendered from February 1, 2009 through March 31, 2011. I performed as required and Respondents repudiated the promise to pay me the entirety of my fixed salary of appointment. Respondents breach gives rise to a right to receive damages for 70 days of salary not paid. 120. After appointment to a full-time attorney in exchange for a fixed-monthly salary,
the State issued a Notice of Personnel Action (NOPA), which memorized the terms of my appointment. A formal notice of appointment is the equivalent of an employment contract. (Bd. of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 566, fn. 1.) 121. An appointment is the offer to and acceptance by a person of a position in the
State civil service. ( 18525.) A full-time position or appointment is a position or appointment in which the employee is to work the amount of time required for the employee to be compensated at a full-time rate. ( 18550.) Section 18000 requires the payment of a fixed salary for all services rendered: The salary fixed by law for each state officer, elective or appointive, is compensation in full for that office and for all services rendered in any official capacity or employment whatsoever, during his or her term of office, and he or she shall not receive for his or her own use any fee or perquisite for the performance of any official duty. 122. The legislature had approved all terms and provisions of my employment contract
with BU2 before furloughs began. As required by Section 3517.5, all negotiated terms and provisions were memorialized in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (effective July 1, 2005- June 30, 2007) (Stats. 2006, ch. 28, 1-4, p. 231.) All terms and provisions remained in effect through March 31, 2011, due to the

34
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
operation of the evergreen clause within Section 3517.8. (Prof. Engineers in Cal. Government v. Schwarzenegger (2000) 50 Cal.4th 989, 1039-40 (PECG).) 123. The terms and provisions of MOU for BU2 do not require legislative approval in
the Budget Act in order to take effect each pay period. Stats. 2006, ch. 28, section 4 provides: Notwithstanding Section 3517.6 of the Government Code, the provisions of any memorandum of understanding that require the expenditure of funds shall become effective even if the provisions of the memorandum of understanding are approved by the Legislature in legislation other than the annual Budget Act. 124. The monthly, fixed salary of civil-service attorneys, teachers, doctors, dentists,
and podiatrists, in Work Week Group- Salary Exempt (WWG-SE) (exhibit B), cannot be reduced when not required to work a normal workday. These employees are salaried, not hourly workers. The salary rules established by CalHR for WWG-SE provide: If an employee in this subgroup is not required by the appointing power to work a normal workday or part thereof, the employee nevertheless shall receive the regular rate of pay without deduction for the entire pay period. 125. WWG-SE states that: The regular rate of pay is full compensation for all time
that is required for the employee to perform the duties of the position. SEERA is unconstitutional as applied to the authority it grants the governor and legislature and should be declared invalid. Employees in WWG-SE are exempt from all FLSA protections. The state cannot reduce the salaries of employees in WWG-SE for partial days worked. These employees are ineligible for overtime compensation and are not required to record hours worked for the purposes of payroll. (exhibit B) 126. As professional employees, attorneys do not have fixed hours due to the
predominately intellectual nature of required work that is not easily measured by the hour. ( 3521.5.) 127. During furloughs, CalHR never converted employees in WWG-SE to hourly
wage earners and made clear that such employees were still ineligible to earn overtime compensation. CalHR issued a policy memorandum on February 11, 2009 which stated: WWG SE employees are statutorily exempt from overtime under
35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
FLSA. The FLSA by statute exempts teachers, doctors, and attorneys; therefore they earn no overtime and would not convert to hourly employees. (exhibit C) 128. For each day Respondents ordered me not to perform legal services for the state, I
was ready, willing, and able to perform.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Writ of Mandate (Code of Civil Procedure 1085- 1086) (Breach of Contract and Violation of art. V, 1) 129. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 130. Respondents have a contractual duty to pay civil-service attorneys, teachers,
doctors, dentists, and podiatrists in WWG-SE, a fixed, monthly salary even when not required to work a normal work day. Governor Brown has a constitutional duty pursuant to Article V, section 1 to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. 131. As a taxpayer, citizen, and resident of California, I have shared interest to ensure
that the State of California keeps its promises and contractual obligations. I have a shared interest, pursuant to Article V, section 1, to ensure that Governor Brown faithfully executes the collective bargaining laws he signed into law. I have a shared interest to maintain public trust in the government. 132. Employees in WWG-SE, who were unilaterally furloughed without pay and who
otherwise rendered services from February 1, 2009 through March 31, 2011, have a contractual right to receive their full, fixed salaries of appointment. 133. Respondents breach gives rise to a duty to remedy the unlawful act. Employees
in WWG-SE have no adequate remedy at law. Irreparable harm to the peoples trust in government and to those employees will occur if relief is not granted.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Declaratory Relief (Code of Civil Procedure 1060) (Breach of Contract and Violation of art. V, 1)
36
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
134.
PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 135. Unilateral, unpaid furloughs to salaried professionals in WWG-SE are illegal and
should be declared invalid. 136. Respondents have a lawful duty to pay civil-service attorneys, teachers, doctors,
dentists, and podiatrists in WWG-SE, a fixed, monthly salary even when not required to work a normal work day. 137. 138. Salaried professionals in WWG-SE rely on a fixed income. A real controversy exists because Governor Brown can furlough members of
WWG-SE at any time, for any reason, for any duration, and for any amount of days by the issuance of an executive order or memorandum to CalHR. The Director of CalHR serves at the pleasure of the governor will administer any request made by Governor Brown.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Writ of Mandate (Code of Civil Procedure 1085- 1086) (Violation of U.S. Const., art. I, 10 and Cal. Const., art. I, 9) 139. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 140. Public employment gives rise to certain obligations which are protected by the
contract clause of the Constitution; promised compensation is one such protected right. Once vested, the right to compensation cannot be eliminated without constitutionally impairing the contract obligation. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 565.) 141. Respondents have a constitutional duty not to impair its own contractual
obligations to pay their civil-service employees pursuant to the salary provisions in the various MOUs. Employees have a constitutionally protected interest in the terms and provisions of their MOUs from February 1, 2009 to March 30, 2011. Respondents failed to show a legitimate government purpose to justify a lawful
37
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
impairment of contracts and such impairment caused substantial harm to employees and the public. 142. Furloughs to the majority special fund employees, like those at the ABC, did
nothing to alleviate the fiscal crisis of the general fund. 143. The Court in PECG made clear it did not decide the issue of the contract clause.
(PECG, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1009, fn. 11.) Before furloughs, governors never had authority to make unilateral changes to the material terms and provisions of the MOUs outside of collective bargaining. Layoffs allow governors to control employee costs in the aggregate. The legislature too can control employee costs in the aggregate through the reduction of appropriations. Not since the decision in PECG has the legislature been able to make substantial changes to individual salaries outside of collective bargaining through a mere appropriation. 144. The ABC reimburses the Controller for the costs to issue salary warrants. The
ABC pays for its own building costs and electricity. Furloughs did not save the ABC any facility costs because one employee was exempt from furloughs. 145. The ABC always had plenty of work and an unprecedented surplus. Like most
special fund departments, the ABC paid overtime compensation and never stopped hiring during furloughs. 146. When furloughs began, Governor Schwarzenegger announced he would not
accept any recommendation for alternative savings. In 2009, he infamously said employees needed to share the pain regardless of funding source. Next he said that all civil-service employees, except those he exempted, had to lose salary out of fairness. 147. 148. Governors have the legal authority to implement layoffs and hiring freezes. Governor S said furloughs to special fund employees were necessary to preserve
cash. Governor S wanted the special funds to grow so that the state could save borrowing costs during budget impasses. Such general fund savings on borrowing costs was negligible compared to the impairment to salary. In 2010, the general fund borrowed money in August from outside lenders for about six weeks during the
38
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
impasse. By August 2010, the ABC fund had about $12,000 of my salary. After the general fund borrows from special funds for temporary use, those special funds get repaid immediately upon return of money to the general fund. The use of that money by the general fund amounted to less than $25 in interest savings. 149. On January 30, 2009, the day before furloughs started, the LAO reported that the
salaries of special fund employees needed to be reduced by 10% for the next 17 months to prevent employee migration from one state department to another. The LAO acknowledged such salary reductions were unrelated to the projected fiscal crisis of the general fund. (Legislative Analysts Office: 2009-10 Budget Analysis (Jan. 30, 2009) at <http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2009/general_govt/gengov_anl09.pdf> p. GG-7.) 150. As a one-time exception to the Ralph C. Dills Act, the LAO recommended that
the Legislature should adopt the governors plan to disregard thirty years of collective bargaining and just take the salaries. The LAO acknowledged that layoffs were lawful for lack of work or lack of funds. However, the LAO preferred the ease of furloughs over the lengthy statutory process that is required for layoffs to ensure that more junior workers are the ones most likely to be affected by the layoffs. (Legislative Analysts Office: 2009-10 Budget Analysis (Jan. 30, 2009) at <http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2009/general_govt/gengov_anl09.pdf> pp. GG-89.) 151. The $42 billion deficit cited in EO S-16-08, issued December 19, 2008, did not
actually reflect a true deficit, overstated the problem, and lacked perspective to the budget as a whole. The emergency was not an existing emergency since it covered a projected deficit through June 30, 2010. According to EO S-16-08, issued December 19, 2008: . . . there is an approximately $15 billion General Fund deficit for the 2008-2009 fiscal year, which without effective action, is estimated to grow to a $42 billion General Fund budget shortfall over the next 18 months; (exhibit A.)

39
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
10
152.
A fiscal emergency is primarily created by the legislature as it has the ability to
tax and spend. A fiscal crisis cannot justify impairments of its own contractual obligations. (U. of Haw. Prof'l Assem. v. Cayetano, supra, 183 F.3d 1096, 1105.)
153. The
LAO put the legislature on notice back in 2005 that California faced major
operating deficits in the next several years. In 2006, the LAO predicted large operating shortfalls through fiscal year 2009-2010.10 In 2007, the LAO warned: Addressing the states current budget problem is even more urgent because we forecast a continuing gap between revenues and expenditures. A plan to permanently address the states fiscal troubles must involve a substantial portion of ongoing solutions. This is not only because of the persistent operating deficits projected throughout the forecast, but also because of the downside risks inherent with the economy, General Fund revenue volatility, and a wide range of budgetary uncertainties.11 154. The fiscal crisis of the general fund to justify furloughs was not the worse since
the Great Depression. California faced an unprecedented budgetary crisis at the beginning of fiscal year 19911992 that was more dire than any funding gap faced by Governor Schwarzenegger. (Dept. of Personnel Admin. v. Greene (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155, 163 (Greene).) Projected revenue for fiscal year 19911992 was $46.1 billion.12 Thus, the percent of the deficit to revenues was at 30 percent. Adjusted by the CPI, $14.1 billion in 1991 equaled 22.5 billion in 2009 dollars. 155. On November 18, 2009, the projected deficit for fiscal year 2009-2010 was $6.3 billion with general fund revenue projections of $89.5 billion.13 The projected deficit for fiscal year 2009-2010 represented 7 percent of projected revenues. The projected deficit for fiscal year 2010-2011 was $14.4 billion and revenue was $87.8 billion.
LAO: California's Fiscal Outlook: LAO Projections, 2006-07 Through 2011-12: Large Operating Shortfalls Projected Through 2009-10, p. 8 (Nov 15, 2006) at <http://www.lao.ca.gov/2006/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_06.pdf> [as of July 20, 2013].
11
LAO: California's Fiscal Outlook: LAO Projections, 2007-08 Through 2012-13 (Nov. 14, 2007) at <http://www.lao.ca.gov/2007/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_07.pdf> [as of July 20, 2013]. 12 LAO: The State's Fiscal Problem (Dec 1, 1991) at <http://www.lao.ca.gov/1991/reports/1291_states_fiscal_problem.pdf> [as of July 20, 2013].
13
LAO: California's Fiscal Outlook: The 2010-11 Budget (Nov 18, 2009) at <http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_111809.pdf> [as of July 20, 2013]. Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
(Id.) Thus, its projected deficit represented 16 percent of projected revenue. Contrasted to fiscal year 1991-1992, the fiscal crisis used to justify furloughs was likely overstated. The same can be said when the furlough deficits get compared to the deficits of fiscal years 1991-1994 (See Wirth v. State of Cal. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 131, 136 [monumental budgetary crisis at $38.2 billion for fiscal year 2003-2004].)
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Declaratory Relief (Code of Civil Procedure 1060) (Violation of U.S. Const., art. I, 10 and Cal. Const., art. I, 9) 156. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 157. Unilateral furloughs outside of collective bargaining agreements are
unconstitutional and should be declared invalid. 158. A real controversy exists because governors now use the threat of involuntary
furloughs via executive order or policy memo to extract voluntary furloughs in collective bargaining. 159. A real controversy exists because the governor can use an executive order or
memo to change the terms of existing MOUs. 160. A real controversy exists because unions must now negotiate for furlough
protection since the governors power to furlough operates outside of collective bargaining. Unions must now bargain for the amount of salary and then bargain that the salary bargained for will be the salary actually paid.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION Writ of Mandate (Code of Civil Procedure 1085- 1086) (Arbitrary and Capricious as applied to the ABC) 161. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein.

41
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
162.
Respondents have an obligation to pay the civil-service employees in the ABC the
fixed salaries of their appointment. These employees have a contractual expectation that the terms and provisions of their employment agreements will be honored by the appointing authority of ABC. 163. The Court in PECG ruled the governor never had the authority to unilaterally
reduce employee salary. 164. 165. 166. 167. The Court did not decide the issue of special funds. The legislature never reduced any appropriations to the ABC in any budget act. The ABC did not have a lack of work or funds. The only authority given to furlough ABC employees was the self-serving
interpretation of a Supreme Court decision by both governors.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Writ of Mandate or Prohibition (Code of Civil Procedure 1085- 1086) (Violation of U.S. Const., 5th and 14th Amends. and Cal. Const., art. I, 7, 15. ) 168. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 169. Respondents BROWN, CHAPMAN, and the SPB have a duty to develop pre
and/or post deprivation safeguards to minimize erroneous deprivations of constitutionally protected property interests such as promised compensation. I have a right not to be deprived of a protected property interest without due process of law. Respondents can only take salary for cause and employees have the right to know the reasons. Failure by Respondents to afford due process resulted in years of unlawful salary deprivation from February 1, 2009 through March 30, 2011. 170. I have a constitutionally protected interest in continued employment and promised
salary. (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194, 207-208 [due process protects employee salary from deprivation without cause].) While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in civil service employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the

42
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. (Id. at 212.) 171. The continuation of civil-service employment is subject to good behavior and an
employee can only be demoted, suspended, or terminated for cause. 172. Respondents exempted employees by department without regard to lack of work
or fund. Earthquake Authority was exempted as vital to public health and safety. The Earthquake Authority is an insurance company. The ABC protects health and safety.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION Writ of Mandate or Prohibition (Code of Civil Procedure 1085- 1086) (Violation of U.S. Const., 5th and 14th Amends. and Cal. Const., art. I, 7, 15. ) 173. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 174. Respondents BROWN, CHAPMAN, and the SPB have a duty to develop pre
and/or post deprivation safeguards to minimize erroneous deprivations of constitutionally protected property interests such as promised compensation. Respondents can only take salary for cause and employees have the right to know the reasons. 175. Respondents never gave proper, written notice to any civil-service employee who
suffered a deprivation due to furloughs. Failure by Respondents to afford due process resulted in years of unlawful salary deprivation from February 1, 2009 up through March 30, 2011. All civil-service employees have a right not to be deprived of contracted salary without due process of law.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION Declaratory Relief (Code of Civ. Proc. 1060.) (Violation of U.S. Const., 5th and 14th Amends. and Cal. Const., art. I, 7, 15. )

43
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
176.
PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 177. Furloughs, without due process, are unconstitutional and should be declared
invalid. 178. A real controversy exists. With or without a contract, Governor Brown can issue
a furlough memo to CalHR for any amount and duration to effect a constructive termination. Without due process safeguards to protect against an erroneous deprivation, I may needlessly lose more years of salary. The same is true for all other employees.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Writ of Mandate or Prohibition (Code of Civil Procedure 1085- 1086) (Violation of Cal. Const., arts. VII and I , 7, 15. ) 179. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 180. Respondents BROWN, CHAPMAN, and the SPB have a duty to ensure equal
protection of the law pursuant to Article I. Respondents have a constitutional duty, pursuant to the merit principle in Article VII, to pay similarly classified attorneys in BU2 the same salaries. Respondents BROWN and CHAPMAN have a constitutional duty to conduct staffing reductions in strict adherence to the merit principle. The SPB has a constitutional duty to review staffing reductions plans by CalHR to ensure compliance. 181. Article VII prohibits BROWN from authorizing higher salaries, unrelated to
merit, for similarly classified employees through civil agreement, executive memo, or MOU. 182. The failure of Respondents to pay similarly classified attorneys the same pay and
conduct staffing reductions with adherence to the merit principle caused a substantial loss of promised and earned salary for all furloughed attorneys in BU2 from February 1, 2009 to March 30, 2011.
44
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
183. 184.
Not all CASE attorneys are paid through appropriations in the budget act. From April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012, SCIF attorneys received 5 percent
higher salaries than all other similarly classified attorneys. The remaining attorneys lost 15 days of salary unrelated to merit. 185. From July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013, LCB attorneys received 5 percent
higher salaries than all other similarly classified attorneys. The remaining attorneys lost 12 days of salary unrelated to merit. 186. The failure of Respondents to pay similarly classified attorneys in BU2 the same
pay from April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2013 violated the merit principle of Article VII and caused harm to those attorneys.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Declaratory Relief (Code of Civ. Proc. 1060.) (Violation of Cal. Const., arts. VII and I , 7, 15. ) 187. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 188. Attorneys in BU2 cannot be unilaterally furloughed through appropriation
language in the budget act because not all attorneys are paid from annual appropriations in the budget act. 189. Unilateral furloughs imposed on attorneys in BU2 are unconstitutional and
should be declared invalid. 190. A real controversy exists because Respondents can implement furloughs at any
time, without notice, or stated reason.
TWELTH CAUSE OF ACTION Writ of Mandate or Prohibition (Code of Civil Procedure 1085- 1086) (Violation of Cal. Const., arts. VII and I , 7, 15. ) 191. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein.

45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
192.
Respondents BROWN, CHAPMAN, and the SPB have a duty to ensure equal
protection of the law pursuant to Article I. Respondents have a constitutional duty, pursuant to the merit principle in Article VII, to pay similarly classified employees the same salaries. Respondents BROWN and CHAPMAN have a constitutional duty to conduct staffing reductions in strict adherence to the merit principle. The SPB has a constitutional duty to review staffing reductions plans by CalHR to ensure compliance. 193. Article VII prohibits BROWN from authorizing higher salaries, unrelated to
merit, for similarly classified employees through civil agreement, executive memo, or MOU. 194. The failure of Respondents to pay similarly classified employees the same pay
and to conduct staffing reductions, without regard to merit, caused a substantial loss of promised and earned salary for all civil-service employees from February 1, 2009 up through March 30, 2011.
THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Declaratory Relief (Code of Civ. Proc. 1060.) (Violation of Cal. Const., art. VII ) 195. PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as
if fully set forth herein. 196. The authority of CalHR to establish salary ranges or administer any other civil-
service rule without direct control of the non-partisan SPB is unconstitutional due to the governors partisan influence over the Director of CalHR. Such unlawful delegations of constitutional authority should be declared invalid. 197. SEERA is unconstitutional as applied to the authority it grants the governor and
legislature and should be declared invalid. 198. Article VII prohibits the legislature from making any law divesting the non-
partisan SPB of its ultimate jurisdiction over the civil service system of employment.

46
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
199.
SPB has a constitutional duty to administer all civil service rules free from
partisan influences and pressures of the governor, legislature, and employee unions. 200. When the people approved Article XXIV (present-day Article VII) in 1935, it was
unlawful for any employee or potential employee on an employment list to give any money or services to any elected official, candidate for office, or member of the predecessor to the SPB in exchange for the direct or indirect promise of appointment, promotion, or other employment benefit. 201. I have a shared interest in returning to an efficient government where employees
can focus on their work instead of politics. I have a right to work where I do not have to give money to the benefit of elected officials as a condition of employment. 202. A real controversy exists because the Director of CalHR must administer any
civil-service rule ordered by the governor or face getting replaced for a director who will serve at the pleasure of the governor. 203. The SPB cannot succumb to political pressure and is not likely to administer
made-up laws of the governor. 204. Irreparable harm, like the furloughs, will occur again unless this court grants
relief.

47
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10.
IV.
PRAYER Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as if
fully set forth herein. Wherefore, and for the reasons stated more fully below, petitioner prays that this Court issue a writ of mandate/prohibition and/or grant declaratory relief: 1. Grant this petition and issue a writ of mandate/prohibition directing respondents to return all earned salary of Petitioner retained by the ABC from February 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011 and from April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2013. 2. Direct respondents to return all earned salary from February 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011 and from April 1, 2011 through June 30, 2013 to attorneys in BU2. 3. Declare that unilateral furloughs are unlawful and invalid as to employees in BU2. 4. Direct respondents to return salary taken from all ABC civil-service employees during furloughs from February 1, 2009 up through March 31, 2011. 5. Direct respondents to return all earned salary from February 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011 to salaried professionals in WWG-SE. 6. Declare that unilateral furloughs are unlawful and invalid as to salaried professionals in WWG-SE. 7. Direct respondents to return all earned salary from February 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011 to all furloughed employees. 8. Declare that unilateral furloughs without due process and adherence to the merit principle are unconstitutional and invalid. 9. Declare that the governor and executive cannot reduce individual employee salary outside of collective bargaining. Declare that Article VII prohibits the legislature from making any law divesting the nonpartisan SPB of its ultimate jurisdiction over the civil service system of employment. 11. Declare that SEERA is unconstitutional as applied to the authority it grants the governor and legislature and should be declared invalid. 12. Declare that the authority of CalHR to establish salaries and salary ranges unlawfully divests the SPB of its Constitutional mandate.
48
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
13. Direct respondents to pay statutory interest. 14. Direct respondents to pay attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code of Procedure section 1021.5 or where authorized. 15. Grant such further relief as may be just and proper.
CONCLUSION This Court should grant relief because Article VII says that the governor cannot cherry-pick winners and losers for higher salaries, unrelated to merit. Further, I should not have to give money to fund political careers just to vote on my own employment contract. I should not have to give money or even think about elections. Governor Schwarzenegger made up a furlough law that hurt real people for no reason. Governor Brown embraced this new power to set employee salaries outside of collective bargaining. The only way to prevent such abuses going forward is to return the civil service employment system back to the non-partisan SPB. Without the political influence and pressures exerted by both governors over CalHR, furloughs would have never happened.

49
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
V.
VERIFICATION I, KELLY VENT, declare as follows:
Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. I am petitioner in this action and I researched and wrote the foregoing AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE/PROHIBITION AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF and know its contents. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this ______ day of ________, 2013, in Sacramento, California.
_____________________ Kelly Vent

50

Vent v. Brown Final Amended Writ

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Vent v. Brown Final Amended Writ

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

Case No.: 34-2013-80001576CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

CONCLUSION VI. VERIFICATION .

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

fully set forth herein.

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Civil Service Commission. (Stats. 1931, ch. 1009, pp. 2021.)

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

government corruption brought by partisan influence over the civil service

Authorize the payment of secret salaries.

The relevant provisions of present-day Article VII (formally Article XXIV, as

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

was ready, willing, and able to perform.

PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

A fiscal emergency is primarily created by the legislature as it has the ability to

if fully set forth herein.

interpretation of a Supreme Court decision by both governors.

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

PETITIONER hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as

time, without notice, or stated reason.

if fully set forth herein.

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

PRAYER Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference all of the foregoing paragraphs as if

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

VERIFICATION I, KELLY VENT, declare as follows:

Executed this ______ day of ________, 2013, in Sacramento, California.

_____________________ Kelly Vent

Vent v. Brown; Case No.: 34-2013-80001576-CU-WM-GDS

Вам также может понравиться

Executed this day of __, 2013, in Sacramento, California.