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96 Secularism & Secularity
on behalf of all individuals at the address, and to the extent that such people tend
to be older and more religious than average, the numbers may be higher than
they would be on confidential individual questionnaires. The religion question
used on the census form in Scotland preceded (rather than followed) those on
ethnicity, and also offered answer categories for specific Christian denominations;
perhaps as a result, people were nearly twice as likely as in England to give their
affiliation as “none.”
In contrast to the census, the question posed in the British Social Attitudes
(BSA) survey occurs in the context of a wide-ranging inquiry into opinion and
practice, and is worded in a way that might seem more likely to discourage
than to encourage a positive response: “Do you regard yourself as belonging
to any particular religion?” The respondent must interpret for him or herself
what “belonging” might mean, but for most it probably implies some current as
opposed to past affiliation. Indeed, the BSA questionnaire goes on to ask what
religion (if any) one was brought up in, and the answers are strikingly different.
While some 43 percent of people in 2004 said that they belonged to no religion,
only 16 percent declared that they had been raised without one—though this
figure has been increasing. A bare majority still present themselves as belonging
to a Christian denomination.
The importance of wording is strikingly apparent when the BSA results and
those from Gallup Polls are compared. In the latter the question has a strong
positive presumption, similar to that found in the recent census: “What is your
religious denomination?” In consequence, the proportion of “nones” is less than
half that found in BSA: 18 percent in Gallup vs. 39 percent in BSA. Fully a
fifth of people apparently do not regard themselves as belonging to a particular
religion, but if pushed to claim one will do so. Even nominal affiliation has
different levels: in conjunction with the phenomenon of “believing without
believing,” there are multiple ways of “belonging without belonging.” Relatively
few people actually practice their supposed religion; there is much more notional
than actual belonging.
Belief
Opinion polls in Britain show high levels of belief, but in all sorts of things,
including reincarnation (a quarter of respondents), horoscopes (also a quarter),
clairvoyance (almost half ), ghosts (nearly a third), and so on.7 It is far from
clear that these beliefs make any difference to the people claiming them.
Research suggests that casual believers, even in astrology, for example, which is
distinguished by its practical orientation, rarely do or avoid doing things because
of published advice.8 Studies on polling show that people are prepared to express
100 Secularism & Secularity
opinions about almost anything, whether or not they have any knowledge of or
interest in the topic. Such “beliefs” may be uninformed, not deeply held, seldom
acted upon, and relatively volatile. Feeling required to hold and even to express
opinions is one thing; finding those issues important is another.
While 25 percent of respondents may say that they believe in reincarnation,
one is not inclined to feel that they thereby express any basic truths about their
own identities. The corollary, though, is that it is difficult to be too impressed
by the apparent number of conventional believers. The argument here is not
that the large subpopulation that acknowledges the God of our fathers—the
memorably styled “ordinary God”9—is shallow or insincere. The point is simply
that it cannot be concluded from the fact that people tell pollsters they believe in
God that they give the matter any thought, find it significant, will feel the same
next year, or plan to do anything about it.
In any event one can no longer infer from the widespread inclination to
believe in a broadly defined God that people are basically Christian. Opinion
polls over recent decades suggest (even given the previous caveats about
interpreting survey evidence) that the characteristically Christian beliefs—
particularly in Jesus as the Son of God—have been in decline, and are now
held by a minority.10 Many Britons would like to be known as “spiritual” (the
alternatives seem unattractive; who wants to be labelled a “materialist?”) and will
therefore acknowledge a belief in something, but that something is less and less
likely to be recognizable as religious doctrine.
A useful supplementary approach (employed for example by Opinion
Research Business in its Soul of Britain survey, or in the Scottish Social Attitudes
survey module on religion in 2002) is to ask respondents to rate the personal
importance of various activities they might have tried, from prayer to divination.
Similar questions can be found on some national surveys; the British Household
Panel Survey, for example, periodically asks ‘How much difference would you say
religious beliefs make to your life?’ The responses are helpful in distinguishing
between real commitment and mild interest or nominal allegiance.
Behavior (Practice)
Comprehensive surveys of church attendance in England and Scotland have
been conducted by Christian Research, an organization that produces statistics
on organized religion. Although the most recent results11 are still confidential
pending publication, it is safe to say that at best 10 percent of the population
goes to church with any regularity (e.g. monthly or more often). Even if we
assume that half of all Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews and other non-Christians
(who collectively make up 5.4 percent of the population) are observant, only one
8. Secularity in Great Britain 101
religious, the privately religious, and the unreligious. For example, someone
may be categorized as actively religious if he/she claims to attend services at
least monthly and rates him/herself as 6 or higher on a scale from 0 (not at all
religious) to 10 (very religious). The “privately religious” attend services rarely or
never, but they both rate themselves as more religious than not (6+ on the scale)
and also describe religion as more important than unimportant in their lives (6+
on the scale).
A rather strict definition of being unreligious would require the respondent
to satisfy all of the following:
• attends only at major holidays, less often, or never
• prays only at major holidays, less often, or never
• rates self as 0, 1 or 2 on a scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very
religious)
• describes the importance of religion in his/her life as 0, 1 or 2 on a scale
from 0 (extremely unimportant) to 10 (extremely important)
These three categories still only account for half the population, as seen in
Figure 8-1). A key question, therefore, is what characterises the other half of the
population. What do they believe, when do they go to church, and how do they
describe themselves? Are they somewhat religious or basically secular?
In 1998, about a quarter of British respondents answered a question on
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) religion module with either
“I don’t believe in God” or “I don’t know whether there is a God and I don’t
believe there is any way to find out.” Not quite a quarter said ‘I know God really
exists and I have no doubts about it’. As the sample was only 800 the results
should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, these figures do correspond to the
distribution suggested here (a quarter religious, a quarter unreligious).
It seems reasonable to suppose that most of the “middle 50 percent”
identified here will fall into one or another of the remaining ISSP categories for
belief:
• I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of
some kind
• I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others
• While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God
As for religious practice, few of these people attend church services except
for weddings, funerals, and possibly on special occasions such as Christmas.
Many (40 percent) never pray, but a quarter do so weekly or even daily.
8. Secularity in Great Britain 103
Figure 8-1
Religious Composition of Great Britain
(Categories based on ESS data)
Actively religious
15%
Privately religious
?? 10%
50%
Unreligious
25%
Finally, about half identify with a religious group and half do not. Of those
who do not, two thirds have a religious background, generally in a mainline
Anglican/Protestant church.
In terms of general orientation, these respondents are by definition neither
particularly religious nor unreligious. Nearly three-quarters place themselves at
points 3, 4 or 5 on the 0-10 scale from “not at all religious” to “very religious.”
What is more striking, however, is how little religion seems to matter in their
lives. Nearly a third rate religion as unimportant (placing it at 0, 1 or 2 on the 0-
10 scale from extremely unimportant to extremely important), with another 30
percent rating it at 3 or 4 and 27 percent giving it a 5 (moderately unimportant).
Only 10 percent, in other words, think that religion is personally even somewhat
important rather than unimportant.
The dominant British attitude towards religion, then, is not one of rejection
or hostility. Many of those in the large middle group who are neither religious
nor unreligious are willing to identify with a religion, are open to the existence of
God or a higher power, may use the church for rites of passage, and might pray
at least occasionally. What seems apparent, though, is that religion plays a very
minor role (if any) in their lives.
Those who fall in the “middle 50 percent” may simply be at intermediate
(and possibly confused) stages between religion and irreligion. Perhaps, though,
characteristics on separate dimensions distinguish them from the others. A
104 Secularism & Secularity
Figure 8-2
Religious Typology for Great Britain
Figure 8-3 shows the percentage of adult men and women classified as
having no religion on the 2001 census of England and Wales. Although these
figures may underestimate the actual size of the secular population, they do give a
good indication of the generational trend. As is evident, gender is also associated
with secularity. Exactly half of white men say that they have no religion (in the
BSA 2004), versus 41 percent of white women. To put it another way, men make
up 58 percent of the secular category as defined using European Social Survey
data, but only 36 percent of the religious groups.
Only 17 percent of religious people are not married, widowed, separated or
divorced; by contrast, nearly 40 percent of the secular are never-married. Most
but not all of this effect is explained by age; among those born before 1970,
17 percent of the secular and only 8 percent of the religious are never-married.
Likewise, only 15 percent of the religious born before 1970 say that they have
ever lived with a partner without being married, while 38 percent of the secular
have done so.
Both the religious and the secular are better educated, on average, than
those who are neither. (About 30 percent have been in higher education, as against
less than 20 percent for the others.) High levels of education often produce skepti
cism about religion and the self-confidence to be overtly Agnostic or Atheist, but
higher education is also associated with middle-class values, civic participation,
suburban living and other characteristics conducive to churchgoing. The
census shows a clear distinction between the “Nones” and “Christians” (among
people aged 25-49, for example, 32 percent and 23 percent respectively have
high qualifications), but the latter group includes nominal as well as religious
Christians. Conversely, 23 percent of religiously active BSA respondents have
degrees, as against only 18 percent for religiously unaffiliated non-attenders, but
this “secular” group (which includes 41 percent of the population) is much more
loosely defined than with the ESS or census criteria.
Actively religious respondents to the BSA are more likely to be in inter
mediate, managerial or professional occupations than unaffiliated non-attenders
(55 vs. 42 percent). Using 2001 census data for England and Wales, however,
there is a tendency for those responding “none” to the question “what is your
religion?” to be in the higher occupational categories. Among men (omitting
those not classified) 51 percent of the Nones were in intermediate, managerial or
professional occupations, as compared with 44 percent of (nominal) Christians.
These findings are consistent with the suggestion that many of those describing
themselves as Christian on the census were working class whites who viewed the
term as an ethno-national rather than a religious label.19 As with education, it
30
8. Secularity in Great Britain 107
25 Figure 8-3
No Religion by Age and Sex (England and Wales, 2001 Census)
20
30
15 25 Men
Men
Women
Women
20
No Religion (%)
10
15
5
10
0
25 30 35 40 5 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Age
0
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Age
is apparent that the better-off are over-represented among both the genuinely
religious and the overtly secular.
Unsurprisingly nearly two thirds of religious people describe the view that
“it is important to follow traditions and customs” as “like me” or even “very
much like me;” not even a quarter of the secular do the same. More unexpectedly,
hedonistic values are not claimed solely by the secular: 46 percent identify with
the statement that “it is important to seek fun and the things that give pleasure,”
but 36 percent of the religious do so as well. The gap is modest, but perhaps
the secular have some catching up to do; in answer to the question “how happy
are you?,” 39 percent of religious people but only 29 percent of the secular
placed themselves at 9 or 10 on a scale from 0 to 10. (A similar finding has
been reported from the U.S. General Social Survey.)20 The association is partly
explained by a remarkably strong age effect, however: 45 percent of people born
before the end of the Second World War say that they are extremely happy (9 or
10 on the scale), against only 28 percent of those born since 1945.
Conclusion
So, are secular and religious people in Great Britain different? Yes and no.
The age contrasts are significant, with younger, more secular generations
gradually replacing the older and more religious. At the same time, people
who are consciously and consistently religious or unreligious tend to be better
educated and in higher occupational categories than those in the muddled
middle. Sociologists of religion have tended to concentrate on the core religious
constituency, and this volume is a welcome opportunity to examine the opposite
pole.
Ultimately, the challenge lies in understanding the group in between.
When it comes to religion, the British have been “puzzled people” for decades.21
Their secularity, like their religiosity, is casual and unconcerned. Britain may
illustrate how the secular triumphs: by default.
Endnotes
1. Buchanan, Colin, Cut the Connection: Disestablishment and the Church of England
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1994).
2. See http://www.secularism.org.uk/generalprinciples.html.
3. Davie, Grace, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1994) 83.
4. Bailey, Edward, ‘Implicit religion: A bibliographical introduction’, Social Compass,
37(4): 499-509; Davie, Grace, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Be-
longing (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Luckmann, Thomas, The Invisible Religion (Lon-
don: Collier-Macmillan, 1967).
8. Secularity in Great Britain 109