BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION vs.NOEL G.R. No. 76565 November 9, 1988 FELICIANO, J.

: FACTS: On 3 July 1986 the twenty-one (21) private respondents (plaintiffs below), claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late Amir Mindalano, suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the entire Mindalano clan of Mindanao, filed a Complaint 1 for damages charging petitioners with libel. Private respondents' action was anchored on a feature article written by Jamil Maidan Flores entitled "A Changing of the Guard," which appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue of Philippine Panorama, a publication of petitioner Bulletin Publishing Corporation. Private respondents alleged in their complaint that, contrary to the above portion of the article, the Mindalanos "belong to no less than four (4) of the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao del Sur." Private respondents likewise objected to the statement that the late Amir Mindalano, grand patriarch of the Mindalano clan, had lived with an American family, a statement which, they alleged, apart from being absolutely false, "has a distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society." Contending finally that petitioners had with malice inflicted "so much damage upon the social standing of the plaintiffs" as to "irreparably injure" the Mindalano name and reputation, private respondents interposed a claim for the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, all in the aggregate amount of P2,350,000.00. Reacting to the complaint, petitioners filed on 6 August 1986 a Motion to Dismiss 3 urging that (a) venue had been improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and (c) the complainants lacked the capacity to bring the suit. In an Order 4 dated 30 October 1986, however, respondent Judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed petitioners (defendants below) to file their answer to the complaint. Issue: Whether libel has been committed? Held: No. The subject matter of the article "A Changing of the Guard" is clearly one of legitimate public interest. Petitioners in the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press have kept well within the generally accepted moral and civil standards of the community as to what may be characterized as defamatory. It is axiomatic in actions for damages for libel that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. 6 We have accordingly examined in its entirety the subject article "A Changing of the Guard" which is in essence a popular essay on the general nature and character of Mindanao politics and the recent emergence of a new political leader in the province of Lanao del Sur. We note firstly that the essay is not focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his family. Save in the excerpts complained about and quoted above, the name of the Mindalano family or clan is not mentioned or alluded to in the essay. The Identification of Amir Mindalano is thus merely illustrative or incidental in the course of the development of the theme of the article. The language utilized by the article in general and the above excerpts in particular appears simply declaratory or expository in character, matter-offact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or derisive implications or nuances appear detectable at all, however closely one may scrutinize the above excerpts. We find in the quoted excerpts no evidence of malevolent intent either on the part of the author or the publisher of the article here involved.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that titles of royalty or nobility have been maintained and appear to be accorded some value among some members of certain cultural groups in our society. At the same time, such titles of royalty or nobility are not generally recognized or acknowledged socially in the national community. No legal rights or privileges are contingent upon grant or possession of a title of nobility or royalty and the Constitution expressly forbids the enactment of any law conferring such a title. 9 Thus, the status of a commoner carries with it no legal disability. Assuming for present purposes only the falsity (in the sense of being inaccurate or non-factual) of the description in the Panorama article of Amir Mindalano as not belonging to a royal house, we believe that such a description cannot in this day and age be regarded as defamatory, as an imputation of "a vice or defect," or as tending to cause "dishonor, discredit or contempt," or to "blacken the memory of one who is dead" 10 in the eyes of an average person in our community. The above excerpts complained of do not disparage or deprecate Maranao titles of royalty or nobility, neither do they hold up to scorn and disrespect those who, Maranao or not, are commoners. There is here no visible effort on the part of petitioners to cast contempt and ridicule upon an institution or tradition of members of a cultural or ethnic minority group, an "indigenous cultural community" in the language of the Constitution, whose traditions and institutions the State is required to respect and protect. 11 What private respondents assert is defamatory is the simple failure to ascribe to the late Amir membership in a Maranao royal house, the ascription, in other words, to him of a factual condition shared by the overwhelming majority of the population of this country, both Maranao and non-Maranao, Muslim and non-Muslim. In a community like ours which is by constitutional principle both republican in character 12 and egalitarian in inspiration, 13 such an ascription, whether correct or not, cannot be defamatory. The Court is similarly unable to see anything defamatory in a statement (even if inaccurate) that private respondents' patriarch once lived with an American family. Since the early decades of this century a great many young Filipinos (including Muslim Filipinos) have been going abroad for study and many of them share the experience of staying with a foreign family, improving their language skills and learning something about the culture and mores of the people. Once more, from the viewpoint of the average person in our present day community, the statement complained of is not defamatory. Private respondents' feelings and sensibilities have obviously been hurt and offended by the reference to Amir Mindalano as a commoner and as having lived for a time with an American family. Personal hurt or embarassment or offense, even if real, is not, however, automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as good as one's character and conduct warrant," 14 in the community and it is to community standards-not personal or family standardsthat a court must refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be defamatory. G.R. No. 135306January 28, 2003 MVRS PUBLICATIONS, vs. ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,

DA'WAH

FACTS: 1.ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and some individual

Muslims field in the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRSPUBLICATIONS, INC and some its staff arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar , a daily tabloid. 2.The complaint: a)The statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; b) that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations;c)that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. 3.MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. and BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims. 4.The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that Islamic Dawah et al.failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. The alleged libelous article refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of the libel could not readily identify the personalities of the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslim member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. 5. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. It opined that it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAHCOUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.6.MVRS brought the issue to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not there was an existence of the elements of libel in the Bulgar article. RULING OF THE CASE: HELD The article was not libelous. Petition GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the RTC was reinstated. 1. There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious view. There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. 2.Defamation, which includes libel (in general, written) and slander (in general, oral), means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to

injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. 3. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious,ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. 4. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, aswell as of the press, under the Bill of Rights. 5. The SC used the reasoning in Newsweek v IAC: where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately. 6.The SC cited some US cases wherein the rule on libel has been restrictive. It was held that there could be no libel against an extensive community in common law. With regard to the largest sectors in society, including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of the individual, will lie. 7."Emotional distress" tort action has no application in this case because no particular individual was identified in the Bulgar article. "Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. This kind of tort action is personal in nature,i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. Under the Second Restatement of the Law , to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:(a)The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b)The conduct was extreme and outrageous;(c)There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress;(d)The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. 8."Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. The actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff. 9. Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. Intentional tort causing emotional distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to frees speech. 10.Respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit. An element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider:(a)whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class;(b)the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and,(c)any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the

rest of the class. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity NANERICO D. SANTOS, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-45031 October 21, 1991 Facts: Petitioner as a columnist of the then Manila Daily Bulletin wrote and published in his weekly column an article entitled "Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc." which article was quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 13,1970 by Rosario Sison Sandejas and her daughters charging CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its board chairman and controlling stockholder Carlos Moran Sison and its president-general manager Luis F. Sison, of engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market. On the very day that the news item appeared, Carlos Moran Sison sought a meeting with petitioner Santos so that he could submit to the columnist his reply which he wanted published "the very next day" and in the same column. They met at about 6:15 in the evening at the Andres-Soriano Executive Center in Makati, Rizal where petitioner promised Sison that he would have the reply published, not on the next day, but in the February 25, 1970 issue of the Manila Daily Bulletin because " it was already past the deadline for the next day's issue." The reply was not published on February 25, 1970 as petitioner had promised and so Carlos Moran Sison called petitioner by phone to tell him not to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle the talks. Sison also informed petitioner that he would be sued for libel, to which statement petitioner retorted: "Well, sue me for libel." Subsequently, the corresponding information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) on November 16, 1970. 3 It is interesting to note that a few weeks following the publication of the complaint, Santos' weekly column was stopped, ostensibly to cut down on overhead expenses brought about by the adoption of the floating rate in foreign exchange . Consequently, trial court and ca convicted petitioner. Also, it ruled that the article in question is not a privileged communication. Petitioner now insists that the published article is privileged, being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding, without comments or remarks, and therefore not punishable. He maintains that the alleged libelous news report which came out in the Manila Daily Bulletin was merely lifted from a complaint word for word, except for the last innocuous paragraph which he added to the effect that "(i)nvestors and Sison's fellow brokers are eagerly awaiting developments on these charges". Issue: whether or not accused is liable? Held: No. It is plainly evident from a reading of the published article itself that it is but a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations, distortions or defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them to public contempt. What petitioner has done was to simply

furnish the readers with the information that a complaint has been filed against a brokerage firm. Then he proceeded to reproduce that pleading verbatim in his column. Now this is decidely part and parcel of petitioner's job as a columnist whose "beat" happens to be the stock market. He is obligated to keep the public abreast of the current news in that particular field. On this crucial point, the Court is inclined to resolve all doubts in favor of petitioner and declare that there is no libel. It may be well for us to keep in mind that the rule on privileged communications in defamation cases developed because "public policy, the welfare of society and the orderly administration of justice" have demanded protection for public opinion. Therefore, they should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice and falsehood. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. 6 The controversial publication being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and made without malice, we find the author entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 (2). It follows that he cannot be held criminally liable for libel. FERNANDO SAZON y RAMOS vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 120715 March 29, 1996 FACTS: Private complainant and the petitioner ran in the election held by PML-Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of PML Homes. The petitioner was elected as a director and president of the homeowners' association. Unable to accept defeat, the private complainant contested the said election. Private complainant also wrote his co-homeowners explaining to them his election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the other members who won in the election. A phrase "Sazon (petitioner), nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan?" was seen boldly written on the walls near the entrance gate of the subdivision. Thinking that only private complainant was responsible, petitioner Sazon wrote in an issue of PML-Homemakers, in which he is the editor, an article against the complainant using words such as "mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong niloloko," "may kasamang pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit," "patuloy na kabulastugan," "mastermind sa paninirang puri," etc. to describe him. ISSUE: Whether the questioned article written by the petitioner is libelous. HELD: Petitioner concedes the existence of the third (it must be given publicity)and fourth (the victim must be identifiable) requisites of Art. 353 in the case at bench. Accordingly, only the first and second elements need to be discussed herein. First requisite: It must be defamatory. Test to determine the defamatory character of words: A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule This test was satisfied in the case at bench. Branding private complainant Reyes "mandurugas," et al, most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of sophistical explanation on the part of petitioner can hide, much less erase, the negative

impression already created in the minds of the readers of the libelous material towards private complainant. Second requisite: It must be malicious. The general rule laid down in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: Art. 354 Requirement of publicity . Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. . . . Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is defamatory, as in this case, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the defendant's imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden in the case before us. Furthermore, the questioned article cannot come under the protective mantle of privileged communication because the rule on privilege impose that such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges. In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was vested with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. Another rule is that rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation. A perusal of the petitioner's article reveals that it has no reference whatsoever to the performance of private complainant's position as a public relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry.

and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the following exerpts of the news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished were supposed allegations by Vasquez that (1) nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa; (2) ang mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. x x x Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latters statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation. On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the atual malice standard in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in prosecutions for criminal libel. Held: The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in criminal prosecutions for libel. For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Libel was used as a form of harassment:

Rodolfo Vasquez v Court of Appeals The 1964 ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan handed down by the United States Supreme Court has been the barometer used in defamation cases involving public officials in both jurisdictions. The Philippine case that comes comparably close in circumnstances with that of the New York Times ruling is that of Rodolfo Vasquez versus Court of Appeals. It is similar to the New York Times v. Sullivan ruling in the sense that the plaintiff is also a public official (a barangay official). When the barangay official sued for criminal libel (note: New York Times case was a civil case), the Supreme Court ruled that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice, and failing such, no liability attached against the accused. In any event, the Supreme Court took ocassion to apply the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard in this case. Here is the digest of that of case: Appeals 118971 1999

Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the charges against complainant, it would appear that complainant filed this case to harass petitioner. It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his clients who have nothing to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper.

Rodolfo R. G.R. September

Vasquez v. Court No. 15,

Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner